ML19308E093

SER Input from Auxiliary & Power Conversion Sys Branch

ML19308E093
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	05/03/1974
From:	US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
To:
Shared Package
ML19308E090	List: ML19308E089 ML19308E093
References
NUDOCS 8003200818
Download: ML19308E093 (32)

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.v AUXILIARY A':D F0"ER CO:.".*IRSIO:: SYSTb:S EPX:CH SAETY E7ALUATION CRYSTAL RIVER NUCLEAR POWER STATI0'*, UNIT 3 Docket No. 50-302 3.4 Water Lrtel (Flood) Desien Critaria The design flood Icvel resulting fron that condition or ceabination of conditions, such as the prehabic naximun hurricane with coinci-dental 1:ind wave action and/or other natural phenor.cna, that produce the maximun vind wave and runup level for all plant structures vould be 121.4 and 129.0 feet 1:SL respectively.

All essential Cc:cger;-

I systens end equipnent n ::ssary to cafntain the reactor in a safe shutdo.:n condition are either located en floors above the flood clevation or protected fron flooding by providing:, (a) adequate 1:211 thickness; (b) vater-tight seals at censtruction joints; (c).:ter-tight pancis; and (d) concrete wate'. barriers. All essential Category I structures enterior openings and penetrations located belott the 13 f t wave runup level have Leca provided with teater-tight type doors or seals.

In addition, the applicant has provided internal sunp pt=ps so thac they can control any local seepage into the building to precluda adverse affects to safety related equipment.

In response to our request, the applicant has also stated that the diesel generator fuhl storage tanks thdt are located underground are protected frem tha flooding effects and that hold doun straps and concrete anchor restraints praclude danage resultiq fren their own n

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or protected by =issile shiciding so that noida= age :111 result t > this iequipacnt frc: tornado generated missiles..

The seismic Category'I spent fuel building is constructed of-reinforced concrete _(capchle to withstand the effect of tornado generated missiles)-

up to the cperating ficer elevation of the spent fuel. pool.(162 fect).

Above this clevatien, nen-tornado ciss11e resistant conventionalLectal siding has been provided. Houever,.the applicent has proviced the spent

~ fuel pool with a stainless steel missile shield cover. This missile shielding has been' designed to preclude penetration of high energy tornado generated tissilas and is anchored to the spent fuel pool concrete struc-i t

ture at each end to provent the missile shic1d itself frc= bccening a j

i missile. The applicant, in respense to our request,'has.alsc stated that the inadverecnt dropping of-a nissile shield into the pcol during handling would not ha.c an cdverne effect en the stored fuel because tha i.

shicids have been previded with suf ficient air space so that its density

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is less than that of the' borated water, consequently the missile shielding uill' float.

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h Based on our review, uc cenclude that the missilo protection provided for the facility is acceptabic..

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bouyancy action during flooded conditions.

The tank' vents extend above the postulated wave action icvel to prevint sea water entering

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the tanks.via the vent lines.

Based on our review, we conclude that the protection provided the facilitics safety related sturetures, syste=s'and co:ponents against.

flooding is acceptabic.

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3.5 !!issile Protection The design of essential structures and vital equip =ent includes'the effects of a spectrun of tornado-borne missiles and internally generated nissiles associated with ec=ponent ove speed failures and missiles that could originate frem high-pressure systen ruptures.

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design will assure that there vill be no loss of function of a scismic Category I structure or of essential system or ccaponent functions as a result of cissile.

Initially, all scis=ic Category I structures ucre designed to withstand the effcets of the folicwing spectrun of tornado-borne missiles:

a utility pole 14.0 inches in diameter by 35 fact-long, rith a density 3

of 50 lbs per ft and traveling end-on at 150 mph, and an aute:obile weighing one ton or equiva. lent ninsile traveling at 150 mph.

In response to our request, the applicant has increased its missile spectrun to include the following itets th

'ould be present at the site or dislodged from structures by ton.ad_c winds to becena missiles:

l a 4" x 12" by 12 foot long wooden plank, weighing 105 lbs and traveling l

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end-on at 300 rph; and a -3 inch diancter schedule 40 pipe,10 fcet i

j long and traveling cnd-on at 100 =ph, striking the structure anywhere l

over its full height..Conpenents contained in seismic Category I 0

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n 9.0 i.exiliare k stcrs The evaluatien of safety related auxiliary systers, as set forth-in the folleving-subsections,'is based on reactor safety require ents radiological safety requirement, and power generation requirenents.-

These s; stens l: c grouped in the folic cing paragraphs to indicata-the requircnents that are cpplicable.

The auxilicry systens necessary to assure safe reactor operation or' shutdeun are:

(1) decay heat sea water cooling ' ysten,- (2) decay s

heat clcsed cycle cooling watcr systc=,- (3) ~ nuclear service sca. vater

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systca, (4) nuclear service elesed cycle cooling unter systc=, (5) ultinate heat sink (in conjunction with the nuclear service cater systers, intake canal and intche structure), (6) nakeup and chenical addition systen, (7) c:argen:y fecductor systen and condensate storage facility, (5) control reca and engineered' safety roens ventila-tion and air conditioning systens, and (9) diesel auxiliary systers.

These systers' have been designed to seistic Category I requircrentc.

Other auxiliary systers chece failure vould not prevent safe reactor shutdown, but cay interrupt pouer generation or be a potential for a radiological release to the environ =cn't are:

(1) fire protection systc=,

(2) spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup' system, (3) nor:al heating and ventilation systc=, (4) new and spent fuel storage and Zucl handling facilitics. These systets or essential portions of the systen have also been designed to seismic Category. I requirencnts.

-The Crystal River Nuclear Power Station, Unit #3 utilizes a pressuri:cd vator reactor for its nuclear steam supply systen while Unit #1 and ?2' utili:c's conventional fossil fired plant for its stesa supply systc=.

Based on cur *revicu of the reactor auxiliary sys ters and -the ince patibil-ity of the stcan supply systems, we have determined that there vill bc d

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-t no sharitig of'scfoty-rcicted systets between these units.- it' nit _

shcrin,; hac been Llinited to non-safety. related fccilities; cnd systc=s such!as the intche end discharge canals vc11' water and' ester treat =ent.

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systc=s, the fire protectica sys c= _ storege tank makeup and: auxiliary-s tes= sys tc=. -

The chilled' water cccling systen, secondcry rcrvices cooling ucter system, the denincraliced water system, dencstic and sanitary _ water system,.

de=incrclined wcter -storcge. tanks, precess sampling syste=, co: pressed air systc=, equipment and floor drainage' systc=, purificatien sys tem, co=nunication systen, _ and the lighting system are additional reactor auxiliary systems that are non-safety relcted and non-seismic Category.

'I designed systers that have been.revicwed. l'e: have determined that (a) the systc=s arc not requirci to' achieve a' safe reactor 'shutdcun during normal or accident cenditions and are not necessary to prevent or citigate the consequences of an accidt nt, (b) the systers uhere interfaced cr connected to scicnic Category I systens or cceponents vill be prcvided with seis=ic Category I isolation vrives to physicc11y separate the non-essential perticas frem the es ;catici systen or ce=pon-ent, and (c) the fcilure cf these'non-seismic systems or pr-t' ins of the systems vill not have an cdverse effect on safety reisted systens or components'1'ocated in cicsc proximity so that their safety function vil 1 not be precluded.

Based en ourfrevicu, we conclud that these systensdesigns are acceptable.

9'.1 Fuel Storare and Hcndling 9.1.1 New Fuel Storace The new' fuel storage vault is a separcte and protected area for the dry storage of fuel cssemblies in the fuel storcge and handling portion

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of the cuxildary building. The storage facility is designed to

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- accc =ddate c6' ncu fuel' assc:blics'in storage racks that have.bcen designed'vith. sufficient spacing between the ncu fuel assc blics to.

assure: that, whenL fully loaded, the ef fective multiplication f actor.

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- of the array (k,,)' to less than 0.90 even in 'the flooded condition.

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The.fuci storage rachs and vault have also been designed to Category I scismic' require = cats.

1 We conclude that the design of the new fuel storage facility is

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i acceptable.

9.1. 2 Spent Fuel Storace i

The spent fuel storage racks provide specially designed underwater storage space for spent fuel assemblics. requiring shiciding and cooling priot to shipm:nt.

Pool ctora;c space to accer nodate more than one and one-thirds of the full core fu:1 load (240 clements) has been

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l provided.

The spent fuel storage racks design assures that the sub-l critical multiplication factor (kcf,) of the array will be less thnn

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I O.90 for both normal (berated water) and abnor:ci (unborated water) l storage conditiens. The spent fuci storage racks have been designed to scismic Category I requirements.

In response to our request, the applicant by Amend ent !!o. 32 has stated that the spent f uel storage racks have also been designed to withstand the icpact loads resultin; from.a dropped fuel assembly and that they are capabic to withstand uplif t forces in excess as that capable of being applied by the lif ting-device (fuel handling hoist).

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j The spent fuel stcrage facility censists of two separated and distinat epent fuel.pcols 15cated adjacent:to one ancther and is hydraulically separated frca the adjacent poc1 by a water tight gate.

Each of the spant fuel' storage pools have been linodjvith:

stainless-stcol to limit tha pessibility of pool leakage through-scans and penetrations.- No inlets, outlets, or drains have been providcd that night allt r. the pool to be drained below the normal pool level (23 feet above the top of. the stored fuel assemblies).

External lines entending below this level have been equipped with anti-syphen devices to prevent inadvertent pool drainage.

The pool, has bcon provided uith interconnected channel drainage paths behind.

the liner ucided coats.

In response to our request, the applicant.

has stated that these channels interconnact to forn' a series cf Icak chase trenches behind the pool and have been designed to (a) provide i

detection, reasurcnent, and location of liner leaks, and- (b) prevents e

uncontroll;d less of contaminated pool water.

7 A hydraulically separate spent fuel: shipping cask loading arca has l

been provided adjacent to ene of the spent fuci pools.

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ing canal b2 tween these are:r will pernit underrator fuel transfer :o l

l the shipping cash.

A watertight gate, located above the tcp of the

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-f c1 assc=blies, assures that the watertight integrity of the pools is l

maintained. The cask storage area, constructed of reinforced concrete and lined with st ainless steel, has been designed so that if the cask

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drop accident s'hould breach this area the resultant drainage would not have an adverse effect on the storage of the spent fuel or on any l

l safety related equipment located in cloce proxicity below the pool area.

The spent fuel pools and the spent fuel shipping cask loading area have been designed as Category I scis=ic structurcs.

l l-Our independent evaluation of the spent fuel cask handling indicates.

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.that transfc*rral of the cranc and the shipping cash over the spent l

fuci pool vill be prchibited during cask transferral 'cy the use of l

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appropriate.interlochs and/dr nechenical stops. However, during-handling over~theistora;e'arca,J he potentisi exists that the ecsk t

could strika the fedge of' the' pit and roll or tumble in the adjacent spent fuel pool. To avoid danage: to the stored fuel, they have agreed to administratively locate the fuel assc=bliesiin the spent fuel pool:

that Lis' not located adjacent to the cask loading arca uhenever the fuel handling cranc'is operated in' the cask handlin; mode.- For this condition the unter tight gate between the fuel pools is in place and scaled so that an inadvertent cask drop accident could effect the adjacent fuel pool but would not have 1ut adverse effect on the fuel pool uith the stored fuel assenblics. We find this acceptable.

Essed on our revicu, we have concluded that the design of the spent fuel storage facility nects the intent of the positions set forth in-Regulatory Guido No. 1.13. " Fuel Storage Facility Design Sasis," and, therefore, is acceptabic.

9.1.3 spent Fuel Prol Ccoline and Cicenup Systers The spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup syste=s have been designed to maintain the water quality and clarity of the pool water and to rc=cvc the decay heat generated by the stored spent fuel assenblies.

The cooling system has been designed to scisnic Category I requirc=ents and consists of two apent fuel pccl cooling pumps, heat enchangers,

and associated piping, valves and instrumentation. The spent. f uel pool cooling systen piping is also used to supply the scismic Category I mahoup source frca the borated water storage tank to the spent fuel through-tho' direct valve cross-connection via the decay heat roroval-systc=.

In Acendment No. 36, in response to our request, the applicant has stated 'that the lines froa the spent fuel pool to the suction cf the fuel poo,1 pumps, frca the fuel pool heat exchangers to the spent fuel' peal and all piping and valves to and frca the decay heac rcneval sycten vill be designad -to ecct' scis=ic Catego:7. I requirc cnts.

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J The Nuclear Service' Cloccd Cycic Cooling t: ster Systen (USCCCS.*S) removes the decay heat during nor=al operations) and has-been backed by direct-valve cross-connec: ions. to :he decay heat renoval sys c= for use during emergency conditions.

The heat. load from the nor=al 1/3 of a core stored in the fuel' pool is rc oved by ro purps and tuo coolers uhich vill naintain the' pool-temperature at 120*F or less, while one pump and' one cooler.will esin-

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tain the pool temperature at 130'F.

The hes: load ' from the' abnormal storage conditien (1-1/3 of a core) is capable of being rc=oved by the systa=s two pumps and two coolers, or supplemented by the decay heat rc:aval system or the latter systen itself and raintain the pool vacer tc=perature belev boiling.

The cleanup system is a non-safety reisted systcn and has been designed to non-seismic Category I requirements.

Isolation capabilitics fre-the Category I portion of the fuci poci cecling systc= has b ten provided by seismic Category I isolation valves. The cleanup system i ns been designed to precess water through the purification icep frc= the fuel transfer canal, the spant fuel pool, and tha borated unter stcrase tank.

Based on our review, we conclude that the design of the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup systes =cets the intent of the pcsitions set forth in Regulatcry Guide No. 1.13, " Fuel Storage Facility Design Basis", and, therefore, is acceptable.

9.1.4 Fuel llandline Svsten The -fuel handling system provides the means of transporting and

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handling fuel from the time it reachos the plant in an unfrradiated

- conditon until it leaves af ter post-irradiation ecoling. The systen consists of.,the fuel transfer canal, the fuel transfer systen, and-apptcpriate crancs and ~ handling fi::tures. The integrated fuel handling cperations are basically perferred in two separate buildings, par:2;-

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Linside: theireactor: building and partly in the spent fuel' storage area

_ in the auxiliary. building..

e Our revieu of. =ajor Lee:penents necessary - for safe fuel handling operations indicates that the folleving co=ponents.have been designed to seismic Category I' require =ents:. refueling' building crane

(spent" fuel cask cranc); reacter: (con'ta.innen:)- building; polar-cranc;-

spent. fuel pool handling bridge; and ' fuel transfer tube-and isolstica

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valves. The reactor polar crane'and the sp'ent' fuel'caskLeranc includib.g th-the crane hoists brahing.have been designed'in accordance with Electric Overhead Crane Institute. Specification No. 61. -The cranes:and =cjer-conponents provid:d are of:cssentially. s: ndard design and si ilar to those we have previously found acccptable.

The applicant has stated -that the refueling equipment has been designed to withs tand the associated deaducight, live lead and design scistic

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loads acting without exceeding the allouable stress of the cquipscnt.

Also the crane systems used for fuel ha'ndling have been provided uith interlocks or limit switches or load sensing devices to preclude unstfc fuel' handling operations in the ~ auxiliary building.

In addition, heis t upper. limits.swithces. limit over-travel of the main and aut:lliary hoeks in the~hois direction 'to preclude any possible inadverten: drcpping cf the spent fuel cask or fuel elements during all codes of. handling.

On -the basis of our review, we have concluded that the fuel handling system is-~ acceptable.

9.2 Water Systers l

i 9.2.1' Muc ear Serv ces Cooline Water Systc=

The nuclear. service'ecoling unter syste: (SSCWS) uti.' ires _two

-independent subsyste: functicas 1:o previde essantial heat removal frca 5

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the f acility..The NSC'..*5 consists of the nuclear ~ service scava:cr tsysten (NS$3) and the nuclear scrvice~ closed, cycle cooling va:ce L sys ten- (MSCCC 3).

These-sys:cas have boca _dasigned to seis=ic Category I requirements. The systens provide cooling vater _ to systems corponents essential for the plant's safe shutdeun during nor=al and 'e=ergency operatin; cenditiens, such as the reactor building fan assenhly, makcup

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pumps - (HPSI), energency feed pump lube oil coolers. control roca air.

conditioning units, and others.

Accordingly, the NSCWS acts as the heat sink for sciety related ce=ponents and roccivesLits water supply from the scoun:cr-intake canal during normal operation and during accident condi: ions.

The NSSS systan consists of four 50 percent capacity _ heat. c:.: changers to ensure cen:inuous heat renoval-f rc= the NSCCCNS during all operating conditions.

One normal and tuo cacrgency 1C0 percent capacity, notor driren purps are located in the intake structurc (the intake structure and associa cd operations are discussed separatly under Section 9.2.5.

i Ultimate Heat Sir %) and apprcpriata valving has been provided :o enabic any p_unp to supply servf:c ec:cr to the header 2d syster.

Meter operated i

valves provide the isolation capcbilitics so that the pumps and'the L

heat exchangers connected to the systc= are capable of being isolc:cd t

j-on an individual basis. Our independent evaluation of the applicant's failure code and offcets analysis indicates that the system is capable of providing continuous coolin;.durinF all operating conditions in the event of a single active failure in the system.

During r.n accident condition and/or when offsite pouer is lost,' the service scavater pu'mps are pcuered by the crorgency diesel generaters.

One emergency water pump is capable of supplying the mininun essential I

. cooling requirements during_and~following an accident for unir safe-

. shutdown.

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' k'e conclude that the nuclcar service seavater system is' acceptabic.

s The ' nuclear scrvice clesed cycle coolin, waterisysten (NSCCCUS) cooling dater pumps, heat cxchangers and associated equip =cnt'have

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been designed to scistic Category I requirc ents and' provide-cooling-water to-dissipate unste host frc= co ponents or systces essential

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for the plant's. safe shutdcun during normal and e crgency operating conditions and from non-essential' water systc=s during normal cpera-tions.. The NSCCC" systen acts as an intermediate heat sink for all-vital ec penents and receives its cooling uater supply frca the nuclear service seawater systen during all operation conditiens.

Non-essential cc ponen:s er systems ccolod by the NSCCCW'systan during nor=al opera =

tiers are isolated frem the system by valving actuated by the. safety injection actuation signals during an accident condition.

The nuclect service c1cscd loep sys te._ provides an addition:l'bcrrier betvcan the sys:cm that may contain radioactivity and the nuclear service seawater systen.

This provides additional assurance that an accidental rcicase cf rcdicactivity uill net cecur.

In addit'icn, a l

radiation monitor has been installed in the USCCCUS' to continuously conitor for possible in-leakage of radicactive' fluids.

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l-redundant (=otor driven purps an'd heat exchangers) have been located in the tornado protected auxiliary building and apprcpriate valving enables any pump ~ to provide cooling water to the heat exchangers connected

~7 the headered sys:ca. 'In addition, the system has bcen designed so that the ec=penents connected to it are capabic of being isolated on'an individual basis.

Our independent evaluation indicates

. that. systen redundancy has been providdd se that it has the capability of providing centinuous cooling during all cperating conditions in the event of any single-active failure in the system.

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'During an accident cenditien and/or whenL off-site ;ur.icrcis lost. : the

-syste=_purps vill b'e pcucred by the energenef diesel generators. Any

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- _two-pump hes; the capability of supplying the ninimu= orsential cccling <

require = cat's.during and.folicwing cn accident.conditica so that the safety; fundtion of the USCCCW'systc= has not' bcen precluded.

Based en our rcOiew of the nuclear service cooling water syste=, we have concluded that the nuclear service cicscd cycle cooling water sys ten and the nucicar service se: vater system cre.acceptcbic.

9.2.2 Decav Haat Services Coolf er systc The deccy heat service cooling systen (DHSCS) clso utill:cs two indapendent subsystc= functions to previde ecoling for essential' safety related cc:pencats and for decay hoac recovel frem the reactor fcc111ty.

The DiiSCS concists of the decay heat service secratcr cooling systc (DHCCWS) and th; dccay heat cle:cd cycle ecoling vater sys tcn l

(DHCCCUS). These systems have been dcsigned to nect scismic Category I i

requirc ents and provides cooling vater to systen cceponents essenticl-for the plant's safe shutdown during nor=al and c=crgency cporating conditiens. These conponcnts include the decay heat renoval heat exchangers, decay heat service seawater pump noter, DHCCCUS pump ~cotor iair handling units, doccy heat pumps and. motors, reactor building spray L

pu p and motors, and the makeup purps (H?SI). Accordingly, the'DHSCS

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acts as' a heat sink for safety related compenents and also receives l-its veter supply frc= the secwater intake canal during normal operations t

a d during accident conditions.

n The DHSSC Systen consists of two -independent (split header) full capacity,-100-percent redundant headers to ensure ccatinuous heat.

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-renova 1_frem the DECCCWS during all operating conditiens. ' Each header of the syste'n:centains-a full capacity motor driven pump-and heat i cxchanger 'and appropriate valving has bcon provided to enabic -the pump 4

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p and host enchengers cennected to the system to-be isolated on an individual bcsis. Our independent evaluatica of"the' applicant's

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failurc code and.cifcets' analysis indicates"that the. sys ten 'is ' capable of providing centinuous cooling during all operating. conditions in

. the event - of a single failure in any, part of the syntc=...

The decay heat closed cycle cooling water sys:cm-.-(D"CCCilS) cocling-water pumps, heat enchangers and associated equip =ent have been designed to scismic Category I cquircacn:s.

The sys:c= acts as an intermedia:a heat sinh'for the decay heat renoval eys c= and/or cc ponen:s essential for the plant's scfe sutdcra durin; normal and c=ergency operating conditions.

Our independen: evalu:: ion indicates that syston redundency has bcon provided so that it has tha ecp:bility cf previding;cen:inucus-cooling during all operating conditiens in the event of an'/ singic f ailure in any part of the sysren.

During an accident condition and/or when off-site power is lost, the decay heat service scavater coolin; and the closed cycle cooling ucter systes pumps are pce: red by the c=crgency cicsc1 generators.

Any cingic header in each systen has the capability of supplying-the mininun essential cooling requirements during and folicwing an accident condi:ica so that the safety function af the decay heat service cooling systc= has

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not-been precluded.

Based ca cur review of the doccy heat service cooling system, we have concluded thet the decay heat service seawater ecoling system and the decay heat closed c'ycic cooling water syste are accep:able.

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9.2.3-Ultiuste' Heat sink The ulticate heat sink-concists of the scavater -intake and discharge-canals connected to the Gulf of; Mexico, the intake structure and openings, the intake-and discharge conduits and the seawater pt=ps su=p pit. The nuclear service 'scavater system and the decay heat scrivce seawater cooling syste= p cvidcs a means of supplyin;

- cooling water for reactor equip =cnt.

The entire ultimate heat sink has been designed as a.scis=ic Category I cooling source and vill be used for safe reactor shutdown during -both normal' and e=crgency opera-tions.

Cooling unter has been supplicd by natural flow dhrough the scavater Ein intake canal fren the Gulf of Mexico to the intake structure lccated directly on the canal water source.

The seawater is conveyed frc the intake structure to t' scawater punps sung pit by two redundant

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underground scis=ic Category I intake conduits.

Each. intake conduit connects individually to separate cenpart: cats (containing the seawater purp) that cc prise the surp pit.

A normally open manually operated.-

sluice gate hydraulically connects the two compar:nonts.

The seswater punp sump pit is located in the scistic Category I portion of the auxiliary building that has been designed to withstand the ef f ects resulting frca the probabic taximun hurricane, the safe shutdown seismic event and tornadic vind forces and missiles.

The ecoling uater is-returned to the ulticate heat sinh via the scavater discharge canal after being circulated through the water systems - to remove the required shut-down or. accident heat loads from the reactor facility.

Additional detailed infor=atien pertaining to its capability to withstand the offects of severe natural phenomena and the staff analyses perfor:cd to determine-its adequacy for coolin; capabilitics is contained in Sectica 2. ' of this report.

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Based on our evaluation of. th'c ultimate heat sink, we conclude that the i

design =cces. the pos?.icas ' set forth in.CC R.egulatorf Guide

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" Ultimate Heat Sink"

..id, therefore,nis' acceptable.

9.2.4 Cendensate storane iccility L

' The' condensate stora;;e tank in conjunction with the. auxiliary feedwater systc= has been designed to provide a seisnic Category I auxiliary feedwater.scurce to the steam generators for heat rc= oval from the primary systen during normal power conversion system inoperability and due to - the l

loss of all off-site power, so that a safe shutdown of the reacter-3-

facility can be achieved. The storage tank has been located external f

to the reacter facility and has been designed to seiscic Category I i

requirc ents so that it.is capable to withstand the safe shtudoun carth-quahc.

In addition, the applicant has stated that the enternal Category I storage tcnk is designed to withstand the effc:ts of tornadit uind fcrecs and the condencate capacit/ of 2C2,000 callens. cf water'has been protceted from tornado missiles sotthat a minimum of 112,000 gallons of condensarv vill be availabic fer that rc cval'from the 'prin:ry systen l

to achiev2 a safe shutdeun condition.

1 Initially, the piping frca the condensate storage tank to piping -

I-connections to the suction side of the turbine and motor driven

(

at:<iliarj feeduater pu.ps were designed to non-seismic Categer/ I f

requirements.

In response to our request, the applicant has agreed to modify the design of the condensate storage systen so that all piping utilized in conjunction with the e=ergency feedwater sys ten will be designed in accordance with scis ic Category I requirements.

Based en our review and the applicant's cennittent to nodify their systen design, we conclude that the design of the condensate storage 1

facility is, acceptable.

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9.3.4 Precess A :NiliaricC 9.3.1'.~ Chemical Addition and' 3bkeus Systens

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!The chedical addition system has -been designed c:

(1) adjust t e concentra: ion cf boric acid for reactivity control; ;(2) provide the: reactor-ccciant systen with' fill and operational;c keup vater; (3) maintain 'the proper concentration of hydrogen, oxygen end corrosion

' inhibiting clics.icals in 'the coolant sys:c=;.(4) provide seal'injcetion-water for :he reac:or coclant pumps; [(5) provida borated =akeup vater to.the-core ficoding : anks and (c) ~ provide energency -high pressure L

injection coolant to the -reactor cooling systen follcwing a less-of=

coolan:~ accident (LOCA)~. ~Accordingly, a pertion of the chc=ical additica and n.shaup syste vill. be used cs part of the 'e:cr;cacy core cooling system in -the event of a LOCA and these portions have been designei to seismic Category I requite =ents.

During n'ernal operations, one of three nahcup pumps takes suction' frem i

the makeup :anh to re: urn the' letdown coolant flou :o the reactor coolan:

systen and to provide ecolant uater to the seals of the reactor coolant pumps.

During energency operations tiro of the three pumps vill be used to inject bora:ed uater into the reactor coolant systen from the borated water storage tank.

A low reactor coolant system pressure signal or a-high contcin= cat pressure safety injec:fon actuction signal (EIAS) vill g

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. automatically start the nakeup pumps not operating (only'one pump is normally running).

The SIA signal vill-also function to transfer the makeup pump suction frc= the nakeup tank to the discharge of the borated water stor ge tank. The caergency. function of the system, heup, pumps, l

makeup and barated va:cr storage tanks, and associated valving and pipin;,

?are classified as safety related equipment.

Our independent analysis t

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.provided.uithisufficicnt.cenponent r dundancy so t at it isIcapable'

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to withstand the effects ef'a singleLactive failure.

The effects'of failurcs and =alfunctiens in the chemical addition and naheup sys te= (including the. purification syste=) during-other functicnal cpar tiens listed chcvc have been evaluated. The'results of our analys_s ' indicate that the nornni epcrating. design requiraments

~

vill.not be precluded by a single active f ailure.. Seismic Category I

~

.isolatien valves provide' assurance that f ailure of non-seismic Category I equipment vill.not effect the integrity of-the seis=ic Category I por-tion of the system, and that the f ailure of any portion of the system

-vill not rpreclude the systen fr = perfor=ing its safety related function durin; all operating conditions.

Based on cur revicu of the systers design, we' conclude that the systen is acceptable.

9.3.2 Storage of Comoressed Gases The storage of containers containing gases under pressura, such as nitre-gen, hydrogen, oxy;cn, conpressed air, and CO, tanks, is necessitated by 4

l-the functional use of the gases in the operation of the facility.

Accordingly, the applicant has evaluated and considered the-potential hazard that could result from the failure of cetponents pressuriced by gases.

In response to our request, they state that protection for the facility frc= nissiles is based on the following:

(a) the containers will be designed, constructed and tested to rigid specificatiens; (b).

relief valves will be provided en tanks and the set points are belcu the design pressures of the ' tanks, (c) tanks vill be located in linited access areas; (d) tanks and cylinders vill be anchored so that they will l

not' beco=2 nissiles themselves followin; the failure of attcched piping,-

t and (c) the remote le:ation of gas' storage facilities and/or the lecatic 4

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.3 of= missile proof teells'in~ relation to equip ent cssential for initiating and maintaining' a safe recetor_ shutidown precludes.the possibility of-interdction in the event of an incident. 'Infaddi-

.. tion, -the cpp11 cant has' also stated that no exceptions are taken

- to nect the requirc ents of the Hacardcus' Material Section ef' Occupational Saicty and Health: Adninistratica OSHA 29 CFR 1910 Subi s

-part H.

Eased 'on' ~otsr revicu. chd the chove considerations,.' we conclude that the protection lprovided is*acceptcbic.

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. 9.4-Air-Cenditichine. Heatine. Ccoline and 'lentilation Systens

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. 9'. 4.1 -control' con 91cx Building-The centrol complex air-conditioning and ventilation systens have been. designed to provide a continuous supply cf ceoled ' air to the.

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control roo=, and'other areas centaining safety.related ccuipment during various operating conditiens -such as during nor al,lshutdcun and accidant conditions.

The-control complex' air-conditioning systc=

t-consists of two full capacity,'100 percent redundant seis=ic Category I' designed' air' handling and chilled water cooling units.

Each air conditienin; systen train has been provided with noccssary danpers and controls for autonatically bypassing the system through the

- ccorgency recirculation nede (EF:) cceponents.

The ETC system con icts of tuo 100 percent redundant, seismic Category 1-designed particulate, HEPA, and charcoal filters, control da pers and recirculation fan units.

The tuo full capacity trains. for the air-conditioning and ET0! systen h '

has been provided with two 100 percent capacity raturn air systen fan

~

units and all eceponents of the independant trains are poucred by the standby A-C power systen in the event of an accident and/or icss of

-offsite power.

Based on our evaluation, vc have determined that the design of the air conditioning and ventilation.systen including the l

EPJi and return systems contains sufficient ec=ponent redundancy.'and-physical separation to acet the single failure criterion so that i-air-conditioning and ventilation will be assured during all operating-conditions.-

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During anfaccident' condition and/or upon feceipt'of a'high, radiation.or an cngineered safeguards signal,.the ventilatica

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system controlidampers are automatically placed into the complete recirculation mode of operation so that all air is filtered thrcu;h the ena:gency ' filter. bank.

During this recir-culation codelif operation,-all outside air da:pers'are' closed to preclude-inducing potentially con'taninated air _in'o the sentrol t

roca.

However,-capabilities have been.provided to medulate danpers so that portions of the systen air or outside air car be manually bypassed through the control room filtratien syrien's charcoal filters for cleanup prior to supplying the air to the control roon.

Based on our evaluation of the system. design, ve conclude that the control complex normal and energency air-conditioning and ventilation systems are acceptable.

9.4.2 Fuel Handline irea The fuel handling area (FH/d ventilation systen has been designed to. function in conjunction with the auxiliary building supply air system and the exhaust air systen during normal operatien and accident conditions.

The fuel building systan has been designed as a once-through ventilation systen and will provide ventilation to-the fuel handling; area and pump ~ roca area to maintain the fuel handling.

- area at a negative pressure uith respect to the surrounding areas so that all leakage 'will be to the fuel handling ventilation systen.

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During' normal plant = operations, theisupplys fans te and exhaust fans

fron'the auxiliary; building'and fuel handling area operate continuous'y..

' The :FIM air - supply ventilatien s;.s:ca censists of -a particulate 1 filter, inlet ventilatien fan'and heating unit.

The. exhaust fro:~the fuel handling arca during ncrtal and_ accident.operatica is.dischar cd thorugh the station vent-by the auxiliary buildings =ain exhaust systen. The ' exhaust systen censists -of feur 50fpercent ' capacity fans,

- and four twenty-five percant -capacity particulate, HEPA,. and charceal

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filter plenums.

The fuel. building -energency ventilation systen is -

necessary to citigate the consequances of the fuel handling accident, therefore,'in response :o our request,-the applicant has s:sted-that the f:Iters of the exhaust systen have been designed co seismic Catc; cry I requirements.

During an energency, high radiatien detcetien-signais-in the auxiliary building -exhaust vents in the event of a fuel b;ndling accident will autceatically s:op the auxiliary building and FiiA supply fans to maintain' a negative pressure trithin the fuel handling area to assure that all potentially contaminated exhaus: is filtered'threngh the exhaust system.

Sased on our indepandent failure analysis, vc hav:

determined that the energency fuel handling ventilation sys:cr has been designed to neet our single failure criteria so-that it is capable of performing ~its intended function.

Based on our evaluation we have determined that the ventilation spsten -

for the fuel handling area meets the position-set forth in F.cgulatcry Guide 1.13, and, therefore, is' acceptable.

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9.4.3. iEncincered Enfor ; Feature and Other ' Essential' Ecuirrent

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The-engineered safety feature and other essential:cquipment reens,

-ventilation cnd air-conditioning systens.havAlbeen designed to provide p

an.adeqdate supply ef'ecolad airito equipment'in arcas that =ust renain

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. operable during c design bases accident -and be capable.of functionine

during post-accident. conditions.

The1 emergency core' cooling sys. ten

-pu=p roo=s.(the FPSI,-the.LPSI, and the containment spray pumps),-deeny heat renoval pump rooms,' spent fuel pool cooling"punp.arca, energency feedwater.pu=p area, vital electrical and switchgear roces, and the diesel

generator rects, have been. designed to be service'd by such systens.

T These-crecs have been provided with redundant 100' percent capacity, seismic Category 1 designed. air-conditioning cnd ventilation systens that have the capability of bein; povered fren the crergency buses.

Based on our cvaluation of the failure.=cde'and effcces analysis

-we have d.zerained that. the design of -these: safety roots ventilation :

and air coalitioning systens teet. our-cingle failure criterien sec that

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adequate ventilation will be provided during all'operatin; cenditicns.

We' conclude that the design.of the engineered safety feature and other.cssential equipment roons, air-conditioning and ventilation systens are acceptable.

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-9.5.1 Fire Protection Svsten

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' The Firo Protectica-Systc= (FPS) has been designed to teet the requireronts 'of-thelational Fire Protection Associatien (::7PA),

Factory;!!utualResearchCorporation,jandthe:uclearEnergy Property' Insurance Association ~(::E?IA). - This includescinspection

- End approval of the fire protection systen and its equip =cn by appropriaccLinspectors.

The FPS ~will~ be basically designed to non-seismic Catcgory I:

requirements. -However, in reponse to our request, the applicant has r.tated that the FPS has been designed so that isolation valves provided for each fire hydrant, sprinkler, or deluge systen, and at various~other locations throughout the system can be-isolated i

to protect areas housing safety related equip =ent and that'azpreaction sprinkler systen vill utilize 2-dry pipe system to preclude ficoding

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the Cate;;ory I equipment due to inadvertent operations.

I External fire protection is provided arcund the periphery of the j

station complex by a-full-capacity motor-driven pump and two diesel-

- engine driven pumps that discharga to a 12-inch yard loop.

A jechey

-makeup' pump has been provided to naintain the fire protection piping l

full and pressurized.

The internal fira protection for.-general plant areas is provided by water hose stations and-strategically

- locates portable dry chemical, pressurized 3.ater and CO., fire

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. extinguishers. -The fire protection for specific plant areas utiliac i

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carbon 'dicxide.and ~special extinp,uishing agents

in' the following i

areas: :(1)' deluge' water spray systens will protect the main' power transformers; startup and auxiliary transfer =crs, the charcoal filters in the auxiliary building and centrol cenplen, the hydrogen seal oil cnit arca.and the turbine lube oil reservoir and, purifier.

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The systen consists of dry pipe, open head sprinkler arrangenent activated autenatically;or rc=ote nanually controlled, (2) an L

.autenatic wet pipe sprinkler systen has been~ designed to provide protection for'the turbine' generator buildin; area, fire pump. house, and the control conplex= floors, (3) the total floodin; carben dioxide will. protect the oil lubricated bearings of the turbinc ~ generator ar.d the tain feedwater purps, (4) a special frcen 2-1301 systen is l-designed to protect-the cable spreading roon areas located in the control conplon, and (5) the energency diesel generater rocas have been protected by an autonatic preaction sprinkler extinguishing systen.

l The fire detection systen will utilize product of ccchustien (ionizatien)?

and heat actuated detection devices installed in arcas such as cabic spreading rocas, electrical chases and tunnels, switchgear room, diesel generator roons, feedwater punp arcas-and other areas chere fixed. firc protection is required.

The detection systen will initiate an alarn in the ncin equipacnt control roon panel.

Actuation of all sprinkler and deluge systens in the systen activates a local alarm and an audible-visual alarn in the control room.

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. We conclude that the design of the station fire protection systen is acceptable.

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- 9.5.2 Diesel Generator Fuct Oil Storane. Transfer and Auxiliarv Svstcrs The standby A-C powar syste=:censists of two separate diesel generator

-sets and. associated auxiliary iquipment.

Tha diesel generators (*-5)

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E are housed in separate diesel generator rooms located in seismic

- Category I, tornado protected portions of the auxiliary building.

The diesel generators.are also located above the probable maxinua flood level established for this facility.

Each diesel generator roo is self-sufficient and protected frc= cae another fer fira, flooding and internally generated nissiles.

A se' mic Category I diesel generator fuel' oil storage and transfer-systen has been provided for each of the two diesels and consits of an underground c=crgency stora;e tank, an AC and DC cngina driven fuel oil' translor pu=p, and associated pipin; and valves.

Each energency storaga tank hai been designed to'scisnic Category I requirements and has been tornado missile and ficod protected.

Appropriate piping, cress connections and valving in the fuel oil i

transfer systen has been provided to enable either or both storage i

tanks to supply fuel oil transfer pumps.

The cross connecting l

1 piping has been provided with two seismic Category I valves in series to assure systen isolation.

Based on our evaluation we have dccr=ined that the design of this syste=. satisfactorily =cets our single failure requirenents thus assuring that a mininun of at least seven days of

~

diesel oil inventory will be available for operations of one diesel generator loaded to full capacity during all energency conditions.

The diesel generators have been provided with independent auxiliary syste=s, such as cooling water system, starting-systcm,~ lubricatica

.systen and air intake systen.

The design and location of these subsystens are such'that a single failure in any one systen will not disable both dicsc1 generator units.

Based on our~ review, we conclude that the 30 fuel oil storagc,.

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transfer and auxiliary systc=s are acceptable.

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. 10.0: Stean and Po cr ronversion~s. sten.

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The steam and power. conversion systen is of,a conventional design similar'to those'of previously approved plants. - The system is designed to recove heat. energy frca-~the reactor coolant in two-

. once thru'stcan generators and conver't-it to electrical energy by the turbine driven genera:or.

The condensers transfer unusabic-' heat-4

- in the. cycle to the' condenser.ccoling water.

The entire systen has-beendesignedfor:the.=aninunenpectedenergyfrogthenucl2arstean

~

supply system.

Upon loss of full load, the sysrea dirsipates the 1

energy in the reacter coolant through turbine bypass valvcs co the condcascr or through atmospheric steam dunp valves _ and/cr main staan safety valves to the a:r: sphere.

Based en cur review of the s: cam and povar conversion systems,-we I

have determined that other than the circulating water systen intahe I

and discharge can Q there vill be no significaut sharing of systens between units 1 and 2, and unit 3.

10.2 Turbine Generator The turbine generator is a candem ccepound, three elenent turbines

~

consisting of a double flow high pressure turbine and two double-flow low pressure turbines, with a design speed of 1800 rpn.

Stea ex-hausted from the high pressure turbine passes through four parallel moisture separators and tuo stage reheators prior to entering the

- low pressure turbines.

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The turbine' generator is~provided with.overspeed protection by i

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providing two;conpletely independent systc=s. T;uring nornal' operation overspeed is precluded by the-speed governor action-of

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the~ electro-hydraulic control systen that is designed.to fully' cut.

off secam admission to the turbine nt approximately'103 percent of rated < turbine ~ shaft! speed by closing-the turbine stop,,contrel and intercept valves.

Speed sensingLfor;this' control is provided by tuo:

magnetic pickups in conjunction with's.' toothedt ' teel on the main -

. turbine-shaft.

A mechanieni overspeed' trip device that consists.cf a spring-loaded concentric ring is counted on the ccd of the turbine shaft.

At 111'

. percent of rated speed, the centrifugal force of the ring overcones the force of the sprin; and the ring snaps to an eccentric pcsitien which ncchanically actuates.the overspeed. trip devicas.

When the trip is initinted, the system's hydraulic pressure is rc=cved to cause closure of the turbine stop centrol and intercept valves.

We conclude that the design for the turbina generator and its overspeed protection systen are acceptabic.

10.3 Main steam suoply Sisten The main stean supply lines have been designed to conduct steam generated in the tuo once-thru stcan generators and route it to the high pressure turbine.

The tuo =:in stcan lines fron ecch stcan ;cncrctor hcvc been '.ccdcred betueen the turbine stop valves and the.contrcl valve in the turbine I

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Ench staan line has been prc,vided with a main s tcat-line~ isolation valve.

These. valves-serve as-isolation

. valves to prevent blowdcwn of the. steam generators in the~

event:cf:a stca: line. break between the= isolation valves and the-turbino step valves and are essentially-the sa:e as those used on previcusly. approved-facilitics.

l Eased on cur review of the main stean supply system design, we conclude.that it is acceptable 10.4 Stone and Pcwcr Conversion Sch m tens 10.4.1 General The folleving sections discuss subsyst r.s of the steam and pcwcr conversion systen char are used during the precess of converting thercal energy to cicetrical energy.

Other non-mafety related sub-systens of the stean and power conversion systen have been reviewed I

but not discussed in detail.

On the basis that the failure of these systems vill not have an adverse effect on cafety related systens or components and are similar to those provided on previously approved facilities, we conclude they are acceptable.

10.4.2 -Turbine Bypass Svstem The-turbine bypass systen has been provided to-discharge steam-directly to the condenser.during load transient.and turbine trip.

The. turbine bypass systen has been designed for a total stcas flow 1

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capacity equiialenti to' 30 percentfof,the turbine design stean cflow. -:Thebypass!syste.v.censists'of;fourau6:atically actsated regulating valves 1=aunted on a manifold. vThe manifold-is connected-

'to the main stean.linas between the secan.line isolation-valves and the turbine stop valve.- Zach of the bypass valves. individually

^

' discharge to the cain condenser: and^.re provided with manual:

. isolation valves upstrean of the bypiss controlivalves for isolation'

.in.the event of =alfunction o'f the bypass control systen.

The. turbine' bypass systen 'allous a large, sudden 1 cad decrease (turbine trip) from full power without adverse affect to tha reactor.

systen.

The. bypass valves are fully opened within three scaends after a turbine-trip to-avoid lifting of the safety valves.

If tho condenser is unavailabic, the bypass valves 'close succ=atically and the safety and ateospheric dunp valves cr.haust tha ' accca ge:1erated to the at=csphere.

The denp capacity (7.5 - percent of reactor pcuer) ~ is sufficient - to ecol the. reactor coolant systen to safe shutdoun.

We conclude that the design of the turbine bypass system in conjunction with the main staan supply systen is acceptable.

10.4.3. Circulation Water systen The circulating unter systen has been designed to provide cooling unter to the main condenscrs and-the secondary service coolin; water systes.. The_systen has been designed to serve as a-heat sink to dissipate rejected-heat fro the power conversion systen.

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, ;_31 The circulating rater systen> does not perf' ora a safety related

-functica'and:has-been' designed to.non-seisnic Category.1 re--

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quirencnts.- Therefore, the applicant in response-to our request, has.perforned a failure node'and effcces, analysis to demonstrate that-a failure of any cc penent in the circulating water systen such as pipe breaks, pump failure, op expansion' joint ruptures -

-will'not. result _in the loss of any s5fety related conponents or systers necessary for safe shutdown due'to resultant ficoding.

~

In addition, the applicant also stated that cableways, pipe chases.

or passageways interconnecting.other spaces that are in the

~

vicinity of the circulating.ater syste: will not be ficoded.

On the basis of our revieu, we have concluded that the design of the circulating unter system is acceptabic.

10.4.4 Auxiliary Peedwater System The auxiliary feedwater systen has been designed to provide feeduater to the stean generators for the re= oval of decay heat fren~the reacter's primary system during nornal and energency operations.

In repense to-our request, the applicane has stated that the system util be redesigned so that the entire auxiliary systc= vill =cet our seismic Category I requirenents.

The s' sten is safety related in-so-far as it is required j

to maintain sufficient water in the'stean generators for decay heat renoval following the loss of off-site power, or nalfunction of-the main:feedwater syisten.

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The auxiliary feeduater system.censists of.100" capacity steca-turbino driven pd p.and 's full capacity electric-tetor driven auxiliary fecdrater pump. Leach of;the'syston's pumps has been

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located in an individual missile protected, seisnic Category I designedjstructura,(intermediate building). ' Interconnected piping-

-and valving to eachEstens generator' arc such that.any pump is capable-

~

of delivering.the required feeduster flow to either or both stean-generaters for renoval.of decay heat.

.The results of our independent-failure codes and offects analysis indicates that the auxiliary feeduater systen h s been designed to nithstand the effects of a singla active failure.

1:c-ever, the

- results of an analysis based o:t a postulatcd high energy piping break outside the pri:.ary containment (i.e.,.c piping break en ene feccuator icop and a concurrcat singic active failure in the other, c'.g., an isolation' valve) indicate that a conplete-loss cf all auxiliary feedwater to both steam generators has -not becaprocluded.

This natter is under review with the applicant.

- The applicant, in response'to our concern, has stated that an amendment codifying their auxiliary feedwater systen to incorporate the high energy piping break criteria eculd be previded.

We vill complete this area upon the cenpletion of our review of the forthcc ing amendment..

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