05000272/LER-1980-016, Forwards LER 80-016/03L-0

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Forwards LER 80-016/03L-0
ML19305D276
Person / Time
Site: Salem PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 04/09/1980
From: Librizzi F
Public Service Enterprise Group
To: Grier B
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML19305D277 List:
References
NUDOCS 8004140320
Download: ML19305D276 (3)


LER-1980-016, Forwards LER 80-016/03L-0
Event date:
Report date:
2721980016R00 - NRC Website

text

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) PSIEG Public Service Electoc and Gas Company 80 Park Place Newark. N J 07101 Phone 201430-7000 April 9, 1980 Mr. Boyce H. Grier Director of USNRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Grier:

LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 80-16/03L Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 1 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 80-16/03L.

This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours, l/)L&J q

F.

P. Librizzi General Manager -

Electric Production CC:

Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement (30 copies)

Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control (3 copies) g y',

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Report Number:

80-16/03L Report Date:

4/9/80 Occurrence Date:

3/19/80 Facility:

Salem Generating Station Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Loss of Air Particulate Detector Unit CONDITIONE PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Unit 1 operating at 100% reactor power with a grcsr electrical output of 1140 MWe DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 2004 hours0.0232 days <br />0.557 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.62522e-4 months <br /> while taking voltage readings in Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) Rack 109, the rack power supply was inadvertently grounded by an instrument probe.

This caused the 115 VAC breaker supplying the rack to trip and caused a voltage transient on the 1B ll5VAC vital instrument bus.

The results were that the Air Particu-late Detector (APD) unit tripped and a spurious RMS output caused a containment ventilation system isolation.

At 2004 hours0.0232 days <br />0.557 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.62522e-4 months <br />, Action Statements 3.3.3.1 and 3.4.6.1 were entered.

Action Statement 3.3.3.1 states with one or more radiation monitoring channels inoperable, close each of the purge and pressure-vacuum relief penetrations pro-viding direct access from the containment atmosphere to the cuLside a tmosphere.

Action Statement 3.4.6.1 says with only two of the three required reactor coolant leakage detection systems operable, operation may continue for up to 30 days provided grab samples of the containment atmosphere are obtained and analyzed at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> when i

the required gaseous and/or particulate radioactivity monitoring system is inoperable; otherwise, be in at least hot standby within the ncyt 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

rersonnel Error ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

1 The grounding of the radiation monitoring system power supply caused a voltage transient which resulted in the tripping of the Air Particulate Detector breaker,

W i

LER 80-16/03L CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The APD Unit was returned to service, containment ventilation isola-tion was reset and all computer alarms received were verified cleared.

The Action Statements were terminated at 2010 hours0.0233 days <br />0.558 hours <br />0.00332 weeks <br />7.64805e-4 months <br />.

The proper use of the test instruments was reviewed with all instru-ment technicians and supervisors.

FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable

[!-

Prepared By E.

P.

Czuchnicki M

SORC Meeting No.

21-80 t

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