ML19304C669

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LLC Submittal of Changes to Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 20.1, Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis External Events
ML19304C669
Person / Time
Site: NuScale
Issue date: 10/31/2019
From: Rad Z
NuScale
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LO-1019-67790
Download: ML19304C669 (3)


Text

LO-1019-67790 October 31, 2019 Docket No.52-048 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738

SUBJECT:

NuScale Power, LLC Submittal of Changes to Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 20.1, Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis External Events

REFERENCES:

1. Letter from NuScale Power, LLC to Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NuScale Power, LLC Submittal of the NuScale Standard Plant Design Certification Application, Revision 3, dated August 22, 2019 (ML19241A315)
2. Letter from NuScale Power, LLC to Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NuScale Power LLC, Submittal of Changes to Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 1.1, Introduction, Section 1.6, Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis External Events, and NuScale Technical Report Mitigation Strategies for Loss of All AC Power Event, TR-0816-50797, Revision 3, dated October 29, 2019 (ML19302G579)

During a teleconference with the NRC Project Manager and NuScale Power, LLC (NuScale) discussed potential updates to Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Section 20.1, Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis External Events. As a result of this discussion, NuScale changed Section 20.1. The Enclosure to this letter provides a mark-up of the FSAR pages incorporating revisions in redline/strikeout format.

NuScale will include this change as part of a future revision to the NuScale Design Certification Application.

This letter makes no regulatory commitments or revisions to any existing regulatory commitments.

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact Nadja Joergensen 541-452-7338 or at njoergensen@nuscalepower.com.

Sincerely, Zackary W. Rad Director, Regulatory Affairs NuScale Power, LLC Distribution: Samuel Lee, NRC, OWFN-8H12 Gregory Cranston, NRC, OWFN-8H12 Michael Dudek, NRC, OWFN-8H12 Omid Tabatabai, NRC, OEFN-8H12

Enclosure:

Changes to NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Section 20.1, Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis External Events NuScale Power, LLC 1100 NE Circle Blvd., Suite 200 Corvallis, Oregon 97330 Office 541.360-0500 Fax 541.207.3928 www.nuscalepower.com

LO-1019-67790

Enclosure:

Changes to NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Section 20.1, Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis External Events NuScale Power, LLC 1100 NE Circle Blvd., Suite 200 Corvallis, Oregon 97330 Office 541.360-0500 Fax 541.207.3928 www.nuscalepower.com

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis External Events 20.1.1 Not Used COL Item 20.1-1: Not used.

COL Item 20.1-2: Not used.

COL Item 20.1-3: Not used.

COL Item 20.1-4: Not used.

COL Item 20.1-5: Not used.

20.1.2 Not Used 20.1.3 Mitigationg Strategies for an Extended Loss of All AC Power Event Following a loss of all AC power eventn ELAP concurrent with a LUHS, automatic responses of safety-related equipment establish and maintain the key safety functions of core cooling, containment, and SFP cooling by placing the reactor modules into a safe, stable, shutdown state with passive core and containment cooling. Following the initial, automatic response of safety-related equipmentwhich requires no operator action and no electrical power (AC or DC)the reactor modules and the spent fuel pool rely only on the large inventory of the reactor, refueling, and spent fuel pools, which comprise the UHS, to maintain uninterrupted and long-term heat removal. The first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of a loss of all AC power eventn ELAP are identical to a station blackout, which is described in Section 8.4 of the FSAR.

Core Cooling The core cooling function is automatically established and passively maintained by safety-related equipment, as follows:

  • During a loss of all AC power eventn ELAP, reactor coolant system inventory is preserved by containment isolation that occurs within the first minute of the event.
  • If DC power is available, tThe decay heat removal system (DHRS) passively removes decay heat for the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> followingof a loss of all AC power eventn ELAP. If DC power is not available or is lost earlier than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, emergency core cooling system (ECCS) valves automatically open to remove decay heat.
  • The ECCS cools the core for the remainder of a loss of all AC power eventn ELAP.

Reactor coolant water accumulates in the containment vessel (CNV) and passively returns to the reactor vessel by natural circulation after ECCS valves open.

  • The reactor modules are partially immersedsubmerged in the reactor pool, which is part of the UHS. Passive heat removal to the UHS using DHRS and ECCS maintains core cooling for more than 50 days without pool inventory makeup or operator action during that period.

Maintain Containment Tier 2 20.1-2 Draft Revision 4