ML19249E923
| ML19249E923 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 09/06/1979 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19249E920 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-13056, NUDOCS 7910020706 | |
| Download: ML19249E923 (6) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES y
g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 h
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGL'.ATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 24 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. OPR-72 FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION, ET AL CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT NO. 3 NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-302 Introduction By letters dateu November 21 and 23,1977, and March 17 and September 22, 1978, Florida Power Corporation (FPC) proposed changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) for Crystal River Unit No. 3 Nuclear Generating Plant (CR-3) dealing with containment tendon and dome surveillance,,c.ontainment isolation valves and administrative requirements. We have evaluated these changes.
21, 1977, FPC submitted an amendment application which requested changes On July to Appendix B Environmental TS 3.1.4 General Ecolacical Survey and 3.1.1 Benthos in Discharge Area.
The proposed change to Specification 3.1.4 would change the location of the " Outer Bay" zooplankton sampling station. The proposed change to Specificatior 3.1.1 would modify the wording of how the final sampling program was established. We have also reviewed these changes.
Containment Tendon Surveillance FPC's November 21, 1977 letter proposed changes to the pr mary containment surveillance requirements for CR-3.
The proposed changes would correct typo-graphical errors, update the requirements to be consistent with the NRC Standard TS, and incorpocate limits on tendon wire liftoff force which vary with tne age of the tendons.
1.
Tyoonraphical Errors FPC states that the guaranteed ultimate tensile strength of the tendon a.
wire is 240,000 psi not 14,109 psi as the TS now indicate. This agrees with the minimum ultimate tensile strength as stated in Section 5.2.2.3.2 of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and, therefore, correction of this value is acceptable.
Currently FPC is recuired to remove for inspection one wire from each of 5.
the dome, vertical and neop tendons tested.
The current Standard TS and Regulatory Guide 1.35 only require wire removal from each of a_ dome, vertical and hoop tendon. This is considered to be an acceptable repre-7 910 0 20 7g f
Therefore, the proposed change (from the, to g),
sentative ample.
to correctly indicate the number of wires to be inspected, is acceptable.
2.
Standard TS Four changes to make this surveillance requirement more consistent with the current Standard TS have been reviewed. These changes will:
Include inspection for cracks and damage during tendon wire check; a.
Expand the visual inspection conducted during Type A containment b.
leakage rate test periods to include exposed accessible interior and exterior surfaces in addition to the liner plate; Limit the required inspection of end anchorages and adjacent concrete surfaces to those associated with tendons which have been inspected for c.
lift off force in accordance with Section 4.6. s.6.1 of this TS; and Add a footnote which states that tendons should be selected on a random d.
but representa ive basis; however, one tendon from each group may be kept unchanged.
The changes above and requirements or clarify requirements currently stated in the Standard TS. These requirements add areas to be inspected for further assurance of containment integrity; correctly indicate the anchorage inspections to be parformed; and assure that the tendon sample group will change All changes comply with our current requirements somewhat for each 11spection.
as stated in the Standard TS and are acceptable.
3.
Tendon Wire Liftoff Force Portions of the proposed amendment dealing with liftoff force per wire and retensioning are not addressed in this evaluation. As discussed in our meeting with FPC on January 29,1978, (meeting sunmary dated March 13,1978),
additional information and revised TS must be submitted. These have not yet been provided.
C1ncainment Dome I:s accordance with license condition 2.C.(8), FPC by letter dated May 10, 1977, proposed a surveillance program for monitoring the CR-3 containment dome to detect We reviewed the proposed program and by letter dated any future delamination.
we informed FPC that the program was acceptable and requested they May 31, 1977, In response, FPC proposed the TS changes concerning submit appropriate TS changes.
the containment surveillance requirements on November 23, 1977.
We reviewed the proposed changes and found that they are in accordance with the previously approved program and that they are adequate to provide the required Therefore, the public safety protection for the postulated critical events.
proposed change to incorporate the approved containment dome surveillance program in the TS is acceptable.
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Containment Isolation Valves Specification 3/4 6.3.1 lists the containment isolation valves and specifies FPC has proposed operability and surveillance requirements for these valves.
to modify this specification such that 1) it applies only to automatic contain-ment isolation valves; 2) operability checks can be perfonned during ope-ational modes other than COLD SHUTDOWN and REFUELING MODE; and 3) automatic valves which do not receive or open on a containment isolation signal are exempt from the current surveillance requirements.
For the following reasons we have concluded that the proposed change is unacceptable and is therefore denied:
Table 3.6-1 lists all valves necessary to isolate containment. The oper-1.
ability requirements of Specification 3.6.3.1 are meant to apply to all valves, not just automatic valves.
The 18-month frequency for surveillance should allow performance of these 2.
checks during a scheduled shutdown of the facility.
In addition, the isolation position of the valves listed may not, under all plant conditions and operating situations, put the plant in a safer condition.
The valves which do not receive a containment isolation signal or which 3.
on such a signal are stH1 part of the containment boundary and open therefore are subject to the operability and surveillance requirements of this specification.
Specification 4.6.1.1 does not contain the operability requirements for the 4.
valves which do not receive a signal. These valves are required to be OPERABLE by Specification 3.6.3.l' and demonstration of operability is per 4.6.3.1.1 and 4.0.5.b.
For the valves which open on a containment isolation signal, Specification 5.
4.5.2.f.1 requires testing for low and high pressure safety injection test signals.
If these different type actuation signals involve any differcnt circuitry, then all tests required are appropriate.
If there is no difference, then performance of one check satis fies the other requirement and no unnecessary burden is placed on 7C.
Administrative Changes By letter dated September 22, 1978, FPC requested administrative type Appendix A TS changes.
Proposed change "m" relates to changes previously proposed in Change Request No. 24 and is denied for reasons discussed in the Containment Isriation section of this SE.
Proposed changes "p" and "q" are denied so as to retain these TS in the standard fonnat.
Typographical Errors and Editorial Changes l.
Proposed change "a", Index page I - CR-3 design does not include a Shiald a.
Building. A Shield Building Integrity definition is included in the Babcock and Wilcox Standard TS (B&W-STS) because some B&W units have a dual containment design.
The Shield Building Integrity definition was not included in the CR-3 TS derived from the B&W-STS, but the definition was erra ecusly not removed from the Index. The Shield Building Integrity definition will be removed from the Index.
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4 b.
Proposed change "b", Index page XIII, and proposed change "n", Bases page B 3/4 9-2, Specification 3/4.9.7 - the title for Specification 3/4.9.7 in the Index and Bases will be changed to be identical with the Specification title, Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Storage Pool Building.
Proposed change "g", page 3/4 4-31, Specification 3/4.4.10 Structural c.
Integrity, ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 Components - the Specification title number, Limiting Condition for Operation number, and Surveillance Requirments numoer were improperly assigned and will be corrected.
Proposed change "h", page 3/4 4-32, Surveillance Requirement 4.4.10, d.
Structural Integrity, ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 Components - the footnote was applicable 'nly to the first periodic :urveillance, which has been completed. The footnote will be deleted.
Proposed change "j", page 3/4 7-23, Surveillance Requirement 4.7.8.1, e.
Auxiliary Building Ventilation Exhaust System - the spelling of " ventilation" will be corrected.
Proposed change "i", page 3/4 6-19, Specification 3.6.1, Containment Iso-f.
lation Valves Table 3.6 the function of MUV-27 was erroneously shown to close during High Pressure Injection. The table will be corrected to show that MUV-27 closes during Reactor Building Isolation.
We conclude that the above group of changes will correct typographical or editorial errors and are therefore acceptable.
2.
Clarification and Consistency Proposed changes "c" and "l", pages 1-7, Definitions, and 3/4 9-1 a.
Specification 3.9.1, Boron Concentration - by definition in Table 1.1 on page 1-7, whenever the reactor vessel head is unbolted or removed and fuel is in the vessel the unit is in the Refueling mode, Mode 6.
A Specification 3.9.1 footnote also specifies that the reactor shall be maintained in Mode 6 when the reactor vessel head is unbolted or removed.
To make this footnote fully consistent with the definition in Table 1.1, FPC the footnote will be changed by adding "and fuel is in the vessel".
had proposed deletion of "and fuel in the vessel" in the definition in Table 1.1, page 1-7, and deletion of the footnote in Specification 3.9.1.
This change would have introduced confusion as to the intent of the Comission.
FPC accepts this clarification.
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b.
Proposed change "d", page B 2-2, Safety Limit Bases - Amendment No. 17 deleted references to operat'on with less than three reactor coolant pumps operating. This reference was overlooked and will be deleted.
c.
Proposed change "e", page 3/4 2-13, Specification 3.2.5, DNB Parameters; Table 3.2-1 (1) The reactor c'oolant flow instrumentation is ci.librated in Ibs/hr.
For operator convenience the limitations was converted trcin' "gpm" to "lbs/hr ~1n Amendment 19.
(2) Amendment No.17 deleted references to operation with less than three reactor coola.: pumps operating. This reference was overlooked and has been deleted 1n Amendment 19.
d.
Proposed change "f", page 3/4 4-11, Specification 3.4.5, Steam Generators, Table 4.4-1
- the' table presently in the CR-3 TL is a generic table with provisions for units with 2, 3 or 4 steam ge,ter". ors whose tubes did or did not receive a preservice inspection. The t'.le will be modified to apply specifically to CR-3 which has two steam generators whose tubes received a preservice inspection.
e.
Proposed change."k", page 3/ \\ 8-5, Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2, A. C. Sources 0perating:~
(1) Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.c - the footnote.was applicable only to the first periodic surveillance which has been completed.
The footnote will be deleted.
(2) Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.c.6 - the automatic sequential loading of an emergency diesel generator with its emergency loads is based on providing sufficlent~tiihETntervals between loads for
~
the diesel generator to regain normal output voltage, frequency and power before assuming another load. The sequencing times are based on time intervals between loads, not absolute times.
It is there-fore necessary to specify the time limitations in terms of intervals of time. This is densistent with the B&W-STS which are applica le to CR-3.
Interval" is hereby added to this requirement for clarification.
We conclude that the above group of changes made to clarify and improve the consistency of the TS are acceptable.
Environmental Changes Specification 3.1.4 requires that a general ecological survay be conducted to detect changes which might occur from plant operation. As part of the overall study, zooplankton samples are to be taken in the outer bay region.
This region is defined as the basin in which the planktonic ecosystem be-comes as important as the bottom ecosystems.
The basis is shown in Figure 1.1-2 of the ETS.
In reviewing the preoperational data, FPC has detennined that the plankton ecosystem becomes important in the basin that is at the end of the south discharge dike.
FPC proposes to move the zooplankton station in closer to the discharge where it will be under the influence of the thermal plume and to change ETS Figure 1-1-2 accordingly.
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?00R OREM
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Some slight loss af information will-occur since the original statiol,ould be eliminated.
However we find that the information gained in deter ir.ing the effect stat 7 operation is having on the environment outweighs oat lost from not samplic
'he original station. We conclude that there is no environmental impau. associated with this change.
Specification 3.1.1 Benthos in Discharge Area states that "the number, fre-quency and location of samples 4 o be taken shall be determined from a sta-tistical analysis of the research presently being conducted in this area."
FPC has found that the preoperationf. data are not suitable for a statistical analysis and proposes that the wc. ding be changed to "... number, frequency and locution of samples to be taken shall be determined from a critical review of j;_he results of the preoperational research. We find that the change is warranted in that the use of statistical tests on unsuitable data would be of little use and a critical review of the preoperational studies shnia yield an adequate sampling program.
In this regard, the FPC submitted, on March 23, 1973, its proposed final sampling program as required by Specification 3.1.1.
This p. oposed program, which has been coordinated with EPA for the requirements of the "PDES Permit, has been reviewed by the NRC staff and found acceptable in meeting the objective of Specification 3.1.1.
Environmental Considerations We have determined that the amendmen't does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact.
Having mace this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR 651.5(d)(a), that an environmental impact statement,,or repetive declaration and environ-mental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
- nclusiers We have concluded, based on the considerations dis-
- a. abcve, that:
(1) because the amendment dces not involve a signifi t increase in ve or:bability or consequences Of accidents previous.
consi.:e ed and d:es not i.'/ulve a significant decrease in a saf at r margin, tne amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the oublic will not be endangered by operation in the proocsed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's i7imical regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be,fety of
- the co-On defense and security or to the health and sa Pe oublic.
- ate:: September 6, 1979 10/3 294
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