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STATE O I' MICIIIGAN OrriCE cr THE *aOJERNOE LANSING WILLI AM G MILLIKEN OOVERNOR May 9,1979 Honorable Joseph Hnndrie, Chairman Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20545
Dear Chairman Hendrie:
Recent news accounts have characterized the safety or operation of nuclear power plants within the State of Michigan as being "below average."
These accounts make reference to Nuclear Regulatory Commission studies conducted over the past three years which apparently justify the "below average" safe ty characterization.
It is not clear to me what staadards or criteria were used to make this determination, and I share a concern felt by many persons in Michigan over what, in fact, these reports may signify.
In an attempt to better understand this situation, I would appreciate being pro-vided the following information:
1.
What standards or criteria are used to rate the safety of plants in these comparative evaluations?
2.
Are Michigan nuclear plant operators rated below average in their t aining and capability?
If so, what am I to conclude from this evaluation?
3.
Is it logical to assume that continued licensed operation is an indication of NRC satisfaction with the safety of these plantt ?
Does the "below average" rating contribute to any increased risk to the citizens of IVIlch!gan?
4.
Has your agency chosen to upgrade performance of the plant operators and if so, when?
5.
Are the utilities involved cooperating with the NRC in any needed upgrading of their performance ?
Is there an opportunity for the state to work with these utilities toward a better operational result?
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4 Honorable Joseph Hendr!e, Chairman May 9,1979 Paga 2 6.
Will you please provide a copy of the document referenced in the attached news article?
How does the NRC determine safety related occurrences ?
How many such events have occurred in Michigan, and which ones are significant from a safety viewpoint?
I realize that these questions are broad in s ope and may require some effort on your part.
However, I will appreciate any attention you can give, even at this very difficult time in your agency's history, since the matter of main-taining safe operations at ICichigan nuclear plants is of great importance to me.
Only if a determination of acceptable safety of operation is first received from NRC, can agencies in this state pursue the subsequent goals of cost ef-fectiveness and reliability cf elect-ical supply that are of importance to our citizens.
Sincerely,
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i:l UNITED STATES U
NUCLEAR. REGULATORY COMMISSION
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OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT t=
WASHINGTON, D.C.
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April 1,1979 b
b T'i Bulletin No. 79-05 NUCLEAR INCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND N
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Description of Circumstances:
I On March 28, 1979 the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2 experienced core damage which resulted from a series of events which I
were initiated by a loss of feedwater traasient.
Seversi aspects of the incident may have general applicability in addition to apparent generic applicability at operating Babcock and Wilcox reactors.
This bulletin is provided to inform you of the nuclear incident and to request certain su actions.
Actions To Be Taken By Licensees (Although the specific causes have not been determined for individual I"
sequences in the Three Mile Island event, some of the f.ollowing may have
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contributed.)
For all Babcock and Wilcox pressurized water reactor facilities with an e
operating license:
1.
Review the description (Nlosure 1) of the initiating events and subsequent course of the incident.
Also review the evaluation by the NRC staff of a~ postulated severe.feedwater transient related to Babcock and Wilcox PWRs as described in Enclosure 2.
These reviews should be directed at assessing the adequacy of your reactor systems to safely sustain cooldown transients such as these.
2.
Review any transients of a similar nature which have occurred at your facility and determine whether any significant deviations from expected performance occurred.
If any significant deviations are found, ~ provide the details and an analysis of the significance and any corrective actions taken.
This material may be identified by reference if previously submitted to the NRC.
3.
Review the actions required by yout/
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PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION March 28,1979 PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE--PNO-79-67 This oreli*ninary notification constitutes EARLY notice of event of fi POSSIBLE safety or oublic interest sionificance.
The information sa presented is as initially received without verification or evaluation Mr and is basically all tnat is known by IE staff en tnis date.
G Facili'":
Three Mile Island Unit 2 Middletown, Pennsylvania (Docket No. 50-320)
Subject:
REACTOR SCRAM FOLLOWED BY A SAFETY INJECTION AT THREE MILE ISLAND - UNIT 2 The licensee notified Region I at approximately 7:45 AM of an incident at Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) which occurred at approximately 4:00 AM at 98% power when the secondary feed pumps tripped due to a feedwater polishing system problem.
This resulted in a turbine trip and subse-quent reactor trip on High Reactor Coolant Pressure.
A combination of Feed Pump Operation and Pressurizer Relief - Steam Generator relief valve coeration caused a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) cooldown.
At 1600 psig, Emergency Safeguards Actuation occurred.
All ECCS components started and operated properly. Water level increased in the Pressurizer and Safety Injection was secured manually approximately 5 minutes after actuation.
It was subsequently resumed.
The Reactor Coolant Pumps were secured when low net positive suction head limits were approached.
Abcut 7:00 AM, high activity was noted in the RCS Coolant Sample Lines (aporoximately 600 mr/hr contact readings).
A Site Emergency was then declared.
At approximately 7:30 AM, a General Emergency was declared based on High Radiation levels in the Reactor Building.
At 8:30 AM site boundary radiation levels were reported to not be significant (less than 1 mr/hr).
The source of sctivity was stated to be failed fuel as a result of the transient, and due to a known previous primary to secondary leak in Steam Generator B.
The Region I Incident Response Center was activated at 8:10 AM and -
direct communications with the licensee and IE: Headquarters was estab-lished.
The Response Team was dispatched at 8:45 AM and arrived at the site at 10:05 AM.
At 10:45 AM the Reactor Coolant System Pressure was being held at 1950 psig with temperature at 2200F in the cold leg.
By 10:45 AM, radiation n +-
levels of 3 mr/hr had been detected 500 yards offsite.
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Page 2 fiarch 28, 1979 Continued PNG-79-67 em There is significant -
'a interest at the present time because of i
concern about potential offsite radiation / contamination. The Contr.anwealth
.s of Pennsylvania and EPA have been informed.
Press contacts are being K
made by the licensee and NRC.
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Contact:
GKlingler, IE x28019 FNolan,,IE x28019 SEBryan, IE x28019 En Distribution:
Transmitted H St 572 ^
Chairman Hendrie Commissioner Bradic i S. J. Chilk, SECY Commissioner Kennedy Commissioner Ahearne C. C. Kammerer, CA Commissioner Gilinsky (For Distribution)
Transmitted: MNBB 1 '.i P. Bl dg 3'. 4 0 J. G. Davis, IE _
L. V. Gossick, E00 H. R. Denton, NRR Recion 4
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~s H. L. Ornstein, EDO R. C. DeYoung, NRR J. J. Fouchard, PA R. J. Mattson, NRR N. M. Haller, MPA V. Stello, NRR (MAII.)
R. G. Ryan, OSP R. S._Boyd, NRR J. J. Cummings, OIA H. K. Shapar, ELD SS Bldg 3 I';
R. Minogue, 3D W. J. Dircks, NMSS PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION e.e y -e
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PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION March 29,1979 PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE--PNO-79-67A This oreliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of event of POSSISLE safety or oublic interest sicnificance.
The information_
vresented is as initially received without verification or evaluation fgp and is basically all that is known by IE staff on tnis date.
Facility:
Three Mile Island Unit 2 D@QB Middletown, Pennsylvania (DN 50-320)
Subject:
NUCLEAR Ih:IDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND - UNIT 2 o FD)
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This supplements PNO-79-67 dated March 28, 1979.
O 1 1J db b As of 3:30 p.m., on March 28, 1979, the olant was being slowly cooled
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down with Reactor Coolant System (R';S) pressure at 450 psi, using normal letdown and makeup flow paths.
The buoble has been collapsed in the A Reactor Coolant Loop hot leg, and some natural circulation cooling has been e_stablished.
Pressurizer level has been decreased to the high range of visible indication, and some heaters are in operation.
The secondary plant was being aligned to draw a vacuum in the main condenser and use the A Steam Generator for heat removal.
The facility. clans to continue a slow (3cF/hr) cooldown, until the Decay Heat Removal System can be placed in operation at 350 psi RCS pres.sure, 3500F RCS temperature in 15-18 hours.
As of 3:30 p.m., a plume" approximately h mile wide and reading generally 1 mr/hr was moving to the north of the plant.
The ARM's helicopter is being used to define the length of the plume.
Airborne iodine levels of up to 1 x 10-8 uti/mi hase been detected in Middletown, Pennsylvania, "hich is located north of the site.
Media interest is continuing.
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is being kept informed by plant personnel.
Contact:
GKlingler, IE x28019 FNolan, IE.x28019 SEBryan, IE :x28019 Distribution:
Transmitted H St N P
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Cnairman Hendrie Commissioner Bradford S. J. Chilk, SECY Ccmmissioner Kennedy Commissioner Ahearne C. C. Kammerer, CA Commissioner Gilinsky
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MNBBk.-.,f P. Bldg hD'Ib bD J. G. Davis, IE T rans.,.i tte d :
L. V. bossick, ED0 H. R. Denton, NRR Region _l-I t' 1, 0 Jn H. L. Ornstein, EDO R. C. DeYoung, NRR J. J. Fouchard, PA R. J. Mattson, NRR s
J. J. Cummings, CI A g' ,.
R. Minogue, SD t/
M. K. Shapar, ELD SS Bldg
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PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION 7-March 30,1979 PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE--PNO-79-673
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inis oreliminary notifica; ion con titutes EARLY notice of event of h
PUS 51SLE safety or oun11-,1 nte res t _ 31 ani fi cance.
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MTormation oresented is as initial'.
receivec without verification or evaluation y
and 1: basically all tnat is known ov IE staff on this date.
E=E Facility:
Three Mile Island Unit 2 5
Middletown, Pennsylvania (ON 50-320) 7
Subject:
Nuclear Incident at Three Mile Island
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Plant Status Tnree Mile Island Unit 2 is continuing to remova decay heat through A-loop steam generator using one reactor coolant pump in that loop for coolant circulation.
The reactor coolant pressure and ter:perature were stable and under control throughout the night of March 29.
There has been some difficulty in maintaining coolant letdown flow due to resistance in the. purification. filters.
The licensee notified IE at about 11:00 p.m. on March 29 that they expected to remain in this cooling mode for at least 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
The licensee's engineering staff was requested by NRR to cbtain a better estimate of the volume of the noncondensible "cubbles" in the reactor coolant system.
There are apparently two such bubbles one in the pressurizer that has been intentionally established for control of
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pressure and level, and one in the reactor vessel head caused by the
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accumulation of noncondensible gases from failed fuel and radiolytic decomposition of water.
The estimate is to be obtainec by correlating pressurizer pressure and level indications over the past hours of stable operation.
The volume of the bubble in the reactor vessel is of interes" in assuring that sufficient volume remains in the upper head for collection of more noncondensible gases arising from continued operation in the present cooling mode as well as to assess the potential for movement of the bubble during a switchover to decay heat removal operation.
The licensee believas it is prudent to remain in the present cooling mode due to the potential for leakage of highly radioactive coolant from the decay heat removal system into the auxiliary building, movement of noncondensible gases into the reactor coolant lor, and boiling in the core when the reactor coolant pump is shut down.
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PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION g//77U K_2n
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March 30, 1979 lin.T r
PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE--PND-79-67C j
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.This oreliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of e. vent of Od POSSIBLE safety or oublic interest sianificance.
The information W "?
oresented is as initially received without verification or evaluation 55 #
and 1s basically all tnat is known by IE staff on this date.
_J. L is
=w-;b; Facility:
Three Mile Island Unit 2 D P 9 D)
=E Middletown, Pennsylvania (DN 50-520) g
Subject:
NUCLEAR INCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND O T;~@~ ] q l+ "
W Plant Status There have been intermittent uncontrolled releases of radicactivity into the atmosphere from the primary coolant system of Unit 2 of the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant
.ar Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.
The licensee is attempting to stop the intermittent gaseous releases by transferring the radioactive coolant water into the primary containment building.
The levels of radioactivity being measured have been as high as 20 to 25 millirem per hour in the immediate vicinity of the site 'at cround_ level.
Off ' site levels were a few milliroentgen.
j At about 11:30 a.m. EST, the Chairman of the NRC has suggested to Governor Thornburg of the Comonwealth of Pennsylvania that pregnant women and pre-school children in an area within five miles of the plant site be evacuated.
Members of the NRC technical staff are at the site and efforts to reduce the temperatures of the reactor fuel are continuing.
These temperatures have been coming down slowly and the firr.a'l depres-surization c,f the reactor vessel has been delayed.
There iis evidance of severe damage to the nuclear fuel._ Samples of primary coolant containing high-levels of radiciodine and instruments in the core indicate high fuel temperetures in some of the fuel bundles, and the presence of a large bubble of non-condensible gases in the top of the rezctor vessel.
Eecause of these non-condensible gases, the possiblity exists of interrupting coolant flow within the reactor when its pressure is further decreased and the contained gases expand.
Several options to reach a final safe state for the fuel are under consideration.
In the meantime, the reactor is being maintained in a stable condition.
Contact:
Transmitted H St /J, D Cnairman Hendrie Commissioner Bradford S. J. Chil k, SECY Commissioner Kennedy Commissioner Ahearne C'. C. Kammerer, CA Commissioner Gilinsky (For Di'.ribution)
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Transmitted: MNBB 4.23 P.BldgLI,f3 J. G. Davis, IE t2 l U. T G L. V. Gossick, ED0 H. R. Denton', WRR Re gion_~~C d ic
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H. L. Ornstein, EDO R. C. DeYoung, NRR
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J. J. Fouchard, PA R. J. Mattson, NRR M8, '
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r R. G. Ryan, OSP R. S. Bovd. 'T J. J. Cinnings, OI A ni k ',
H. K. Shapar, ELD SSBldgtJj;;
R. N.inogue, SD
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W. J. Di rcks, 2'.55 M'
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PRELIMINA'RY NOTIFICATIOH
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March 30, 1979
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Os PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE--PNO-79-67D fE EE:
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This oreliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of an event of
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The information
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Facility:
Three Mile Island Unit 2 Middletown, Pennsylvania (DN 50-320)
Subject:
NUCLEAR INCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND Plant Status
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Gaseous r,adioactivity from the primary coolant system letdown has been contained in waste gas decay tanks since the last gaseous release at approximately 2:50 p.m. March 30, 1979.
At the present reactor. coolant letdown rate of approximately 20 gpm it may be necessary to make a planned release of radioactive gas tomorrow to prevent gas decay tank relief valve operation at its setpoint of 100 psi.
The. licensee has installed a temporary line from the gas decay system back to reactor containment which is under. evaluation before being placed in operation.
Containment pressure is being maintained slightly negative (-l psi) as e result of fan cooler operation.
Reactor coolant temperature measured at fifty-two locations at the outlet of the core have continued to come down slowly. Three outlet temperature instruments continue to indicate above taturation temperature, r
The NRC staff was informed by the licensee on Friday morning that examination h
of containment pressure data for March 28 indicates a pressure spike up h
to approximately 30 psi occurred at approximately 1:50 p.m.
NRC personnel are evaluating the possibility that' a hydrogen explosion was the cause M()
of the contain' ment internal pressure spike.
The reactor coolant path is through one reactor coolant pump and one L,
The steam generator is being fed by an auxiliary feed-J
' L@f pumo.
Several options for depressurizing the reactor and continuing C/
cocidown via ie residual heat removal syst c l
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IMMEDIATE PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION E-g t rch 31,1979 g
=.E PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE--PNO-79-67E E"
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This immediate oreliminary notification censtitutes an uodate of event Hi.'
of safety and oublic interest sienificancts.
The information Dresented i{
is as initially received without verification or evaluation and is
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basically all tnat is known by NRC staff at this time.
54 Facility:
Three Mile Island Unit 2
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Middletown, Pennsylvania (DN 50-320) y~
Subject:
NUCLEAR INCIDENT /J THREE MILE ISLAND Plant Status
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~ actor cooling continues using the 1 A main reactor coolant pump with
- eam generator A steaming to the main condenser.
Changes to this cooling. method are not planned for the near term.
An operabi'ity stat:us of equipment is being compiled for use as backup in the event of failure of existing operating equipment.
The hydrogen recombiner is in an operable status; however, shielding of
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its piping and components is not fully installed and. is presently con--
sidered inadequate.
Lead for shielding has been located and will be moved to the site on an expedited basis.
Calculations of hydrogen in containment show that the present concentration is less than 45, the staff's limit on allowed concentration to ensure an explosive mixture is not obtained.
Attempts are being made to obtain a containment atraosphere sample.
The waste gas decay tank pressures were 80 psi at 10:15 p.m. on March 30 and had been relatively constant for about five hours.
The tank is set 3
to relieve pressure at 100 - 110 psi.
The radiction field (60 R/hr at h
contact) prevents resetting relief points, g (i.:-
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Reactor coolant temperatures measured by incore thermocouples at 52 f
(V locations presently show only one location above saturation temperature. U/
Temperatures in the core as measured from outlet thermocouples are aJ gf gradually decreasing.
Other system parameters are remaining stable. t gy gj Environmental Status
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x Three ARMS flights of one-hour length wg 9:30 p.m. on March 30, and at midnight DUPLICATE DOCUMENT M00W Entire document previously entered CONTINUq into system under:
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IMMEDIATE 5:-
NELIMINARY NOTIFICATION
{Q 7-March 31, 1979 K
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PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE--PNO-79-67F J((
This oreliminary notification constitutes summarv information of an event
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of safety or ouolic interest sionificance.
The information oresented is a summary _of j.nformation as of 5:30 pm date 3/31/79.
Facility:
Three Mile Island Unit 2 Middletown, Pennsylvania (DN 50-320)
Subject:
NUCLEAR INCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND Plant Status There _has been no change in the method of cooling the reactor since the previous report (PNO-79-67E).
Reactor coolant temperatures measured by incore thermocouples at $2 locations have cor.tinued to decrease.
At present none of the temperature readings is above saturation temperature for this pressure (554*F).
System parameters remain stable.
There has been a slight crop in pressurizer level from 215 to 191 inches.
Efforts continue to complete installation of components and piping on the hydrogen recombiner.
Approximately 220 tons of lead shielding in various shapes and forms has arrived, or is on the way, to the site.
Lead shielding is being installed around the recombiner.
A decision to use the recombiner has not yet been made.
Two samples of containment atmosphere have been analyzed which show hydrogen concentrations of 1.7 and 1.0%.
Efforts continue to estimate the volume of the noncondensible gas bubble above the core.
Licensee calculations of the size of the bubb'le at 2: 40 pm was 880 cubic feet at 875 psig.
At about 4:20 pm this was recalculatec by the licensee to be 621 cubic feet at 875 psig.7is is being further evaluated.
Environmental Status Three ARMS flights were conducted at about 6:00'a.m., 9:00 a.m., and 12:00
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noon on March 31.
All flights reflected a rather stable situation.
Maximum
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readings in th 71ume were,from 1.5 to 2.5 milliroentgens per hour (mr/hr) at a distance of one mile from the plant, from 0.5 to 1.0 mr/hr out to 7 miles, and 0.1 to 0.2 mr/hr beyond 10 miles.
The plume wiidth is about 1-1/2 f- --
to 2 miles.
No radiciodines have been detected in the plume.
Offsite ground level gamma surveys performed in the predominant wind direction h
indicated maximum levels of about 2 mr/hr at about 1/2 mile from the site iT in the direction of the plume.
The wind was from the SSW at the time of the f.
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Continued Page 2 March 31,1979 PNO-79-67F ARMS flights.
At abouti 1 PM the winds shifted and' are now blowing in a south easterly direction.
International Contacts NRC's Office of Inters.ational Pregrams (OIP) has prepared daily status a n.e reports, transmitted by Immediate Department of State telegrams to official NRC contacts in the 25 foreign countries with whicil NRC has regular official relations.
OIP is also receiving many foreign telephone calls.
Two senior safety experts from the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) arrived late March 30 and were briefed by NRC experts at the Operations Center, late March 30 and during March 31.
Washington Representatives or senior visitors of Japan, FRG, and SwedenTw also have been briefed in the Operations Center. OIP also has been briefing the President of the AECB of Canada, wno offered to send any AECL or AECB experts who could be of assistance.
Contact with Licensee NRC Regional Offices are transmitting to the utilities with operating licenses summary information (in the form of Preliminary Not.ifications) as they are prepared.
Qntact:
DThompson, IE x28111 EMHoward, IE x28111 Distribution:
Transmicted H St 7.'ofr.
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Chairman Hendrie Ccmmissioner Bradford S. J. Chilk, SECY Commissioner Kennedy Commissioner Ahearne C. C. Kammerer, CA Commissioner Gilinsky (For Distribution)
Transmitted:
MNSB7,'/dp P. Bldg 71&p J. G. Davis. IE L. V. Gossick, EDO H. R. Denton', NRR Region I - 7: 48 H.
L. Ornstein, EDO R. C. DeYoung, NRR Region 11-7: 5 S' J. J. Fouchard, PA R. J. Mattson, NRR Region III-f//4" N. M. Haller, MPA V. Stello, NRR Region IV ff y F
G. Ryan, OSP R. S. Bovd NRR H. K. Shapar, ELD SS Bldg 7/2,,Op Region V-7,'@s (MAIL)
W. J. Dircks, NMSS J. J. Cummings, OIA R. Minogue, 50 White Hcuse Situation Roca 7/2b EPA ~
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" arch 31,1979 AERIAL SURVEY plume direction and radiation readings shown above conducted at 6:00 & S:00 f#,
and 12:00. noon.
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IMMEDIATE PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION
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April 1,1979 PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE--PNO-79-67G g.
This oreliminary notification constitutes summary information of an event of safety or oublic interest sicnificance.
The information presented is a summary of information as of 7:00 am on 4/1/79.
Facility:
Three Mile Island Unit 2 Middletown, Pennsylvania (DN 50-32^)
Subject:
NUCLEAR INCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND Plant Status "There has been no substantial change in the primary system t.emperatu're and pressure.
Incore thermocouples continue to show a downward trend.
Actions are underway to vent radioactive gases from the sas e gas decay tank to the containment building.
This will be performed th: rough a temporary pipeline.
The licensee plans to hook up and shield two recombiners prior to initiating recombining operations to reduce the concentrations of hydrogen in the containment.
The licensee estimates that it will require about 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> before the recombiners will be operational.
Calculated values by the licensee of the volume of noncondansible gases above the core continue to vary.
The NRC staff has been unable to draw meaningful conclusions from this data.
Environmental Status ARMS' flights at approximately 3-hour intervals were continued on March 31 and the early hours of April 1.
Survey results reflected stab'.3 condi-tions.
Maximum readings were 2 mR/hr in the plume at a distance of 1 mile from the plant.
The plume width has been about 1.5 miles cut to a distance of 10 miles.
At a distance of 10 miles, plume readings were 0.15 mR/hr.
Milk was collected at nine stations on March 31; no radio-active iodine was detected.. Offsite ground level gamma surveys performed in the predominant wind direction showed a maximum of 0.6 mR/hr at 500 yards from the plant to a low of 0.06 mR/hr at distances of 2 to 3 miles.
An exception was noted during the collection of a sample from the waste gas decay tank when gamma levels of 3 mR/hr were observed at a
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distance of 500 yards east of the plant.
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Continued Page 2 PND-79-67G Other Information
[
24 Analysis of a sample of primary coolant indicated that the principal a
isotopes released from the fuel were iodine, cesium and noble gases.
A MJ preliminary evaluation of the analytical results related to these more ig..
volatile isotopes indicates high fuel temperatures existed, perhaps for
?ff extended periods.
However, ratios among isotopes indicate that the less volatile isotopes, such as strontium, were released to the coolant in
-G quantities characteristic of releases from the gaps of the fuel and,
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therefore, based on this preliminary evaluation, melting of the fuel is not considered likely to have occurred.
[
Analysis of a containment building gas sample showed the fol sowing results:
)
Isotooe Concentration (microcuries/ milliliter)
Xe-133 676 Xe-133m 16 Xe-135 8.1
-2 I-131 6.3 x 10 I-133
< 0.03 NRC.epresentatives at the facility were informed at 10:45 p.m. on March 31 that there would be an attempt to sabotage the facility during the night.
The FBI, Pennsylvania State Police and the licensee were notified.
Contact:
DThompson, IE x28111 NCMoseley, IE x28111 Distribution:
Transmitted H St D O f Chairman Hendrie Commissioner Bradferd S. J. Chilk, SECY Commissioner Kennedy Commissioner Ahearne C. C. Kammerer, CA Commissioner Gilinsky (For Distribution)
Transmitted:
MNBB d F 3 3 P. Bldg 6 M J. G. Davis, IE L. V. Gossick, EDO H. R. Denton, NRR Region I GITS II: D Region II-f;%g,Dp*6 R >W H. L. Ornstein, EDO R. C. DeYoung, NRR Region IIIg.u J. J. Fouchard, PA R. J. Mattson, NRR N. M. Haller, MPA V. Stello, NRR Region IV-5't34 0 R. S. Boyd f
Region V-6:20p, kg SS Bldg /)M, NRR R.'G.
Ryan, OSP C
(MAIL)
H. K. Shapar, ELD W. J. Dircks, NMSS J. J. Cummings, OI A
.C R. Minogue, SD White House Situation Room M
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EPA U!
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Attachment (1)
Radiation Survey Map 9
IMMEDIATE PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION 390022
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IMMEDIATE PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION
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April 2,1979 6f e.-
U E
PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE--PNO-79-67H l{
This oreliminary notification constitutes summarv information of an event of safety or public interest sicnificance.
The information oresented is a summary of information as of 12 noon on 4/2/79.
Facility:
Three Mile Island Unit 2 Middletown, Pennsylvania (DN 50-320)
Subject:
NUCLEAR INCIDENT AT THREE MILE IS AND Plant Status
. Reactor pressure is being held at about 1000 psi.
Incore thermocouples continue to show a decrease in fuel channel temperatures, with all measurements below about 475 degrees F.
Bulk core inlet and outlet temperatures are 280 degrees F.
At 11 p.m., April 1, a containment air sample indicated 2.3% hydrogen.
Further analyses and consultations with experts has led to the develop-ment of a strong concensus that the net oxygen generation rate inside the noncondensible bubble in the reactor is much le 5 than originally conservatively estimated.
Also, measurements at the plant appear to indicate that the volume of gases within the bubble is being signifi-cantly reduced.
Further developments are being closely followed to confirm these favorable indications.
Action on Other Facilities The T cee Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) pressurized water reactor was supplied by Babcock & Wilcox. (B&W).
All utilities with an operating B&W reactor were sent an NRC Bulletin yesterday to provide then with informa-tion about the TMI-2 incident; require a prompt review of their plant conditions, and to effect action to prevent such an incident.
NRC inspectors are being sent to each licensed B&W reacte: to provide increased inspection coverage.
Additional reactor shutdowns or power reductions are not being required by the NRC at this time.
Environmental Status n
Thirty-seven thermoluminescent. dosimetry (
DUPLICATE DOCUMENT by the NRC at distances from about one mil 390()M piant.
Multiple dosimeters are placed at Entire document previously entered i nto system under:
CONTINUED ANO
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0fttISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, DC 23555 g
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APRIL 5, 1979 IE Bulletin 79-05A W
NUCLEAR INCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND - SUPPLEMENT
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Description of Cireumstances!
E Preliminary infomation received by the NRC since issuance of IE Bulletin 79-05 on April 1,1979 has identified six potential human.
design and mechanical failures which resulted in the core damage and If.
radiation releases at the Three Mile Island Unit 2 riuclear plant. The information c.nd actions in this supplement clarify and extend the original Bulletin and transmit a preliminary chronology of t:he TMI accident yg through the first 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> (Enclosure 1).
rm-7 1.
At the time of the initiating event, loss of feedwater, both of the auxiliary feedwater trains were valved out of service.
w.
,b 2.
The pressurizer electranatic relief valve, which opened during the initial pressure sui ge, failed to close winan the pressure
[
decreased below the actuation level, wj p..
3.
Fo11cwing rapid depressurization of the pressurrizer, the pressurizer R..
level indication may have lead to erroneous in:ferences of high 7
lavel in the reactor coolant system.
The pressurizer level indice+ ion i.
apparently led the operators to prematurely teminate high pressure C.
injection flow, even though substantial voids existed in the reactor h'
coolant system.
b 4.
Because the containment does not isolate on high pressure injection (HPI) initiation, the highly radioactive water from the relief valve discharge was pumped out of the containment by the automatic initiation of a transfer pump.
This water entered the radioactive
~i.
waste treatment system in the auxiliary building where some of it overflowed to the floor.
Outgassing from this water and discharge through the auxiliary building ventilation system and filters was Q..'
the principal source of the offsite release of radioactive noble E-/
gases.
- m 5.
Subsequently, the high pressure injection system was intemittently
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operated attempting to control primary coolant inventory losses E
through the electromatic relief valve, apparesitly based on pressurizer level indicatio
~
noncondensible voids elsewh DUPLICATE DOCUMENT
% 0a2D" this led to a further reduc-t'N.,
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT EE WASHINGTON, DC 20555
- Es APRIL 21, 1979 FT
==
iE NUCLEAR INCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND - SUPPLEMENT g
=-
Description of Circumstances:
[
- E Continued NRC evaluation of the nuclear incident at Three Mile Island is Unit 2 has identified measures in addition to those discussed in IE ii Bulletin 79-05 and 79-05A which should be acted upon by licensees with M
reactors designed by B&k' As discussed in Item 4.c. of Actions to be E=
taken by Licensees in IEB 79-05A, the preferred mode of ccre cooling P
following a transient or accident is to provide forced ficw using b
reactor coolant pumps.
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It appears that natural circulation was not successfully achieved upon F
securing the reactor coolant pumps during the first two hears of the i
Three Mile Island (TMI) No. 2 incident of March 28, 1979.
Initiation
!.=
of natural circulation was inhibited by significant coolant voids,
=.
possibly aggravated by release of noncondensible gases, in the primary coolant system.
To avoid this potential for interference with natural circulation, the operator should ensure that the primary system is P
subcooled, and remains ~ subcooled, before any attempt is made to establish 7
natural circulation.
g Natural circulation in Babcock and Wilcox reactor systems is enhanced by 3
maintaining a relatively high water level on the secondary side of the E
once through steam generators (OTSG).
It is also promoted by injection
=
of auxiliary feedwater at the uoper nozzles in the OTSGs.
The integrated 1-Control System autcmatically sets the OTSG 1evel setpoint to 50% on the operating range when all reactor coolant pumps (RCP) are secured.
- However, Z
in unusual or abnormal situations, manual actions by the operator to
~~
increase steam generator level will enhance natural circulation capability 4
in anticipation of a possible loss of operation of the reactor coolant rumps.
As stated previously, forced flow of primary coolant through the cru i,
(_
preferred to natural circulation.
E Other means of reducing the possibility of void formation in the reactor coolant system are:
1 OOb A.
Minimize the operation of the Powe DUPLICATE DOCUMENT the pressurizer and thereby reduce
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reduction by a blowdown through a -
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 April 11, 1979 IE Bulletin No. 79-06 f
REVIEW OF OPERAT'IONAL ERRORS AND SYSTEM MISALIGNMENTS IDENTIFIED DURING THE THREE MILE ISLAND INCIDENT
=-4 As previously discussed in IE Bulletin 79-05 and 79-05A, the Three Mile a
Island Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2 experienced significant core damage
~
which resulted from a series of events initiated by a loss of feedwater transient and apparently compounded by operational errors.
Several C
aspects of the incident have generic applicability to all fight water power reactor facilities, in addition to those previously identified as applicable to Babcock and Wilcox reactors.
This bulletin is to identify certain actions to be taken by all other light water power reactor facilities with an operating license.
Actions previously have been required of licensees with B&W reactors.
Action to be taken by licensees:
For all pressurized water power reactor facilities with an operating license except Babcock and Wilcox reactors:
1.
Review the description of circumstances described in Enclosure 1 of IE Bulletin 79-05 and the preliminary chronology of the TMI-2 3/28/79 accident included in Enclosure 1 to IE Bulletin 79-05A.
This review should be directed toward understanding: (1) the a.
extreme seriousness and consequences of the simultaneous L
blocking of both auxiliary feedwater trains at the Three Mile Island Unit 2 plant and other actions taken during the early phases of the accident; (2) the apparent operational errors which led to the eventual core d? mage; and (3) the necessity to systematically analyze plant conditions and parameters and take appropriate corrective action.
T.
b.
Operations personnel should be instructed to:
(1) not override automatic action of engineered safety features without careful review of plant conditions; and (2) not make operational F
decisions based on a single plant parameter indicatio'1 when a confirmatory indication is available.
j Vi?
A'l licen;2d operator? and pl c.
with operational responsibili DUPLICATE DOCUMENT (JS0027 review and such participatio records.
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OF..CE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 Anril 18, 1979 IE BuIletin No.79-06A (Revision No. 1)
REVIEW OF OPERATIONAL ERRORS AND SYSTEM MISALIGNMENTS IDEETIFIED DURING THE THREE MILE ISLAND INCIDENT IE Bulletin 79-06A identified actions to be taken by the liicensees of all pressurized water reactors designed by Westinghouse.
Item No. 3 of the actions to be taken, as stated in the oriisinal
. bulletin, was:
"3.
For your facilities that use pres urizer water Tevei g
coincident with pressurizer. pressure for automat 5:e initia-
~~
tion of safety injection into the reactor coolarrt system, trip the low pressurizer level setpoint bistables such that, when the pressurizer pressure reaches the low serpoint, safety injection would be ini'.iated regardless oif the pres-surizer level.
In addition, instruct operators to manually initiate safety injection when the pressurizer pr essure indication reaches the actuation setpoint whether or not the level indication has dropped to the actuatico setpoint."
Information from licensees and Westinghouse has identified -that implementation of this action would preclude the performance of surveil-lance testing of the pressurizer pressure bistables without initiating a safety injec'. ion.
In. order to permit surveillance testing of the pressurizer pressure bistableg, the low pressurizer level bistables that must operate in coincidence with the low pressurizer pressure bistables may be restored to normal operation for the duration cf the surveillance test of that coincident pressurizer pressure channel.
At the conclusian of the surveillance test of each pressurizer pressure channel, the coincident f
prassurizer level channel must be returned to the tripped rnode defined in Action Item 3 of IE Bulletin 79-06A.
As a result, Item 3 should be revised as DUPLICATE DOCUMENT WOOT@
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f4 No. of pages:
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.I 44 i-U::ITED STATES
!;UCLEAR REGULATORY CO'":ISSION C.:FICE 0. INSPECTION A G EM:CRCEMENT
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23:::-
April la,1979 i~
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...IE': CF 3:E:.ATIONAL ER:.0:.5 A:;0 SYSTEM MISALIGN:*.E::TS IDENTIFIED DURI!C-
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' esc '
i:n o' i cu stances:
II Ealle-'n 79-:5 ider.:i'ied a:-icr.s te be taken by the licensees of all
- ress.-i:ed wster :..er rea: ors (except Sabcock & Wilcox reactors) as a result c' -he Three Mile Island Unit 2 incident.
This Sulletin clarifies the ac-ic"s o' Eu'letin 79-05 for reactors des';ned by Ccrbustion Engineeri ;, an: -he res:Onse :: this bulletin will eliminate the need
+.
- o res::n: :o Eul e:in 79-05.
c-i:rs :: 'e taker, by Licensees:
c
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a cr a.1
- -tustie-Er;ir.eering pressuri:ec water react:r facilities
..ith a
- era-in; license (the acticns specified below replace those iden-f #ied in IE Euiletin 79-05 on an item Oy item basis)
.=
~ evie.v tre cascrip icn of circumstances described in Enclosure 1 c' IE Sullet'n 79-05 and the preliminary enrenology of the TMI-2 2'23/75 acciderIt included in inclesure 1 :o IE Builetin ~ 79-05A.
a.
This retiew should be directed towarc understanding: (1) the r
extre. e seriousness and consecuen:es of the simultaneous
~
blockin; of both auxiliary feedwater trains at the Three Mile Island Unit 2 plant and Other actions taken during the early phases Of the accident; (2) the a: parent c;erati:nal errors
.!hich lec :: the eventual core danace; (3) tha: the potential exists, under certain accident or transient conditions, to have a water level in the pressurizer simultaneously with the reactor vessel not full of water; anc (4) the necessity to systematically analyze plant conditiens and parameters and take appropriate corrective action.
z L
b.
Operaticnal cersonnel should be instructed ::: (I) not override au cmati: a::icn of engineered safety features unless continued Operati:r. of engineered safetv features will result in m
e 7,l a r.: c:ndi:icr.s (see Se::i
- ior.al Oe isiCns based sole DUPLICATE DOCUMENT
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'r.dicati:r wher One er more 3,, a i l a b ' s.
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0f' MISSION 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 April 14, 1979 7
~
EVENTS RELE'.' ANT TO SOILING L'ATER POWER REACTORS IDENTIFIED DURING TEREE MILE ISLAND IEIDENT
[.)
Description of Circumstances:
On march 28, 1979 the' Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2 experienced core damage which resulted from a series of events which were initiated by a loss of feedwater transient.
Several aspects of the incident may have general applicability to operating boiling water reactors.
This bulletin requests certain actions of licensees of cperating. boiling water reactors.
2:
Actions to be taken by Licensees:
For all Boiling water reactor facilities with an operating license complete the actions specified below.
-=
1.
Review the description of circumstances described in Enclosure 1
~
of IE Bullefin 79-05 and the preliminary chronology of the TMI-2 3/25/79 accident included in Enclosure 1 to IE Bulletin 79-05A.
L' a.
This review should be directed toward understanding:
(1) the
~
extreme seriousness and consequences of the sirr.ultaneous blocking of both trains of a safety system at the Three Mile Island Unit 2 plant and other actions taken durine the early phases of the accicent; (2) the apparent operation'ai errors which led to the eventual core damage.; and (3) the necessity to systematically analyze plant conditions and parameters and take appropriate corrective action.
b.
Operational personnel should be instructed to (1) not override automatic action of engineered safety features unless continued operation of engineered safety features will result in unsafe plant conditions (see Section 5a of this bulletin); and (2) not make operational decisions based solely on a single '
one or more confirmatory DU_PLICATE DOCUMENT S$QQ]Q
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