ML19208B811

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RO 77-47:on 770924,during Electrical Storm,Bus R Was de-energized Causing Complete Loss of Offsite Power & Resulting in Loss of Main Condenser Cooling Water & Plant Trip.Cause Unknown.Tech Spec Change Will Be Made
ML19208B811
Person / Time
Site: Palisades Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 10/18/1977
From:
CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
To:
Shared Package
ML19208B784 List:
References
RTR-REGGD-01.016, RTR-REGGD-1.016 NUDOCS 7909210444
Download: ML19208B811 (2)


Text

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UCENSEE EVENT REPORT Palisades CONTROL BLOCK:l l

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[PLEAsE PRINT ALL REGUIRED INFORMATION]

1 6

UCENSEE UCENSE EVENT NAME UCENSE NUMBEA TYPE TYPE j lM lI l? l A l L l-1 l 0l0l-l0l0l0 0l0l-l0l0l l h l1 ~ l1 l1 1l l0l1l

/ 89 14 15 25 26 30 31 32 So7Es CCcxET NUMBER EVENT CATE REPCRT CATE 0 1 CCNT l

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  • l lL l l0l5l01-1012l515l l Ol 912l hl 7l 7l l1 l 0 (1l 8 l 7 l7 l 7 8 57 53 60 51 68 69 74 75 60 EVENT DESCR:PTION 02 l During an electrical stor=, the

'R' Eus was de-energized causing a ec=plete loss l

7 89 so

[Oii] [ of off _ite power, res'ulting in a loss of =ain condenser cooling water and ultimately l

d 7 89 80 04 l a plant trip. Pri=ary plant was stabilized in the hot condition and was borated.

7 89 60 05 l Event conrepetitive.

Tech Specs 3.1.1 and 3.7.1 vere violated.

Electrical power l

7 89 60

[5Til I was restored after L.75 hours8.680556e-4 days <br />0.0208 hours <br />1.240079e-4 weeks <br />2.85375e-5 months <br /> and the plant returned to Tech Spec limits.

(ER-77 h7) l 7 89 80 anME C-E CCMDONENT CCCE ACTUAER O

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7 89 10 11 12 17 43 44 47 CAUSE DESCR;PTION Oe l Exact cause of loss of electrical power is not kncvn. A change to the Tech Specs l

7 89 80 h l Vill be made to make this type of event a nonviolation.

l 7 89 80

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FACUTY METHCC CF STATUS

% PCWER OTHER STATUS C:SCCVERY CSCCVERY CESCAIPTCN LIJ lliolol I"/^

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10 12 13 44 45 46 80 YC N CCsTENT AELEASED Cs AELEASE AMOUNT CF ACTMTY LCCATCN CF AELEASE EE IJ L J lN/A l

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7 6 9

10 11 44 45 60 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUM8EA TYPE CESCRiPTCN 13 l 0l 0l 0l g N/A l

7 89 11 12 13 80

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PERSONNEL INJURIES r [./. l. ! I I 'J I fl; l

NUMBER CESCA:ATCN l 010l 0l l N/A W!

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7 89

/ 11 12 r

qy qp EO PRCHA3LE C^3SMUINCES b

ll f i! ; / l /

lII5) l ;/4 L h Ll d b N U b J. a l

7 C9 SO LOSS CR CAMADE TO FAC:UTY 7 0 09210Mi -i tvrE CEsCm0TCN Q lJ N/A l

7 89 10 60 -

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PUBUC!TY

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l-17 7 51 9 60 WOOM LOGITIONAL FACTCAS l..~, l !i/A I

7 8 '*9 50 119 l l

7 89 60

ATTACF2CT TO LER 77-Oh7 The cause of the 'R' Bus loss is not known.

Loss of off-site power causes a loss of =ain condenser cooling water.

Thus, the main turbine tripped on high back pressure and tripping of the main generator and reactor occurred.

Both e=ergency diesel generators started 4 ediately, loaded properly and performed satisfactorily throughout the incident.

The secondary syste= vas isolated, pri=ary system stabilized and the plant functioned as designed during the incident.

Atmospheric du=ps were operated as necessary to =aintain PCS te=perature.

During the incident, power was lost to the Security System and extra Security personnel vere called into the plant.

Technical Specifications 3.1.1 and 3.71 were violated.

3.1.1 At least one primary coolant pu=p or shutdown cooling pu=p shall be in operation whenever a change is being =ade in the boren concentration of the primary coolant.

It is conservative and prudent to borate the plant to shutdown condition after a reactor trip.

Boron sa=ples during the incident and after restoring pri=ary coolant flow vere as anticipated and verified that no stratification occurred.

3.~.1 The primary coolant system shall not be heated above 3250F or =aintained above 325 F if the following electrical systems are not operable.

a.

Station power transfor=er 1-2.

b.

Start-up transfomer 1-2.

1.

2h00

'V' Eus 1-E.

Throughout the incident the plant was maintained in hot shutdown.

Power was restored after h hours and h5 =inutes.

It was prudent to =aintain the FCS hot rather than add to the Operators workload as power was restored shortly, and plant conditions were stabilized.

This is per=itted by C.E. Standard Technical Specifications.

Changes to 3.1.1 and 3.7.1 vill be submitted for approval.

The plant operated as analyzed and no failures of safety-related syste=s occurred as a result of this incident.

300065 O

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