ML19208A980

LER 79-046/03T-0:on 790830,cables 1HP1ARC103 & 1LKDAR020 Found Routed in Some Areas within Same Cable Tray Sections as Cables Which Provide Power to Safety Relief Valves.Caused by Design Deficiency

ML19208A980
Person / Time
Site:	FitzPatrick
Issue date:	09/12/1979
From:	W. Verne Childs POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML19208A956	List: ML19208A955 ML19208A980
References
LER-79-046-03T, LER-79-46-3T, NUDOCS 7909180379
Download: ML19208A980 (2)

Text

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTROL BLOCK: l i

l l l l l lh e

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) la l t8l 9lN lYLICENSEE 7

lJ lACOOE lF l1 l@l0 14 15 l0 l - j 0 l 0 LICENSE l 0 l 0NUvdER

] - l 0 l 0 l 0 l@l 4 l 1 l 1 l 1 l 1 l@l l l@

25 26 LICENSE TYPE JO $7 CAT 58 CON'T o

7 i

8 3c gy60l X l@l0 61 l 5 l0 l0 l0 l 3 l 3 l 3 @l0 l 8 l 3 l 0 l 7 l 9 j@l 0 l 9 l 1 l 2 7l9 @

OOCKET NUVSER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80 EVENT DESCRIPTION PleaseAND SeePROBABLE AttaC mentCONSE ENCESh g , g O 3 l l

0 4 l 0 5 l 0 6 l 0 7 l 0 8 l 7 8 9 SYSTEV 80 CA USE CAUSE CODE CODE COVP. VALVE SUSCODE COMPONENT CODE SUSCODE SUBCODE o 9 7 8 lS l11 l@ l Bl@ l C l@ l Z l Z l Z l Z l Z l Z @ 19[Z l@

9 10 11 12 13 18 20 Zl@

_ SEQUE NTI AL OCCU R R E NCE REPORT REVislON LER RO EVENT YE AR REPOR T NO. CODE TYPE NO.

@ ,RE, ppt 7 9l [---J l0[4l6l l/ l0 l3 l

_ 21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 lTl 30 l-l 31 l0 l 32 TAKE A T OP O PLANT 1T HOURS 22 S B IT O FORid B. SUPPLI E R MA FA TURER F j@l34Z j@ lZl@ lN lg 3J l35Z l@ 36 l0l0l0 0l 37 40 lY l@

41 42 43 Zl@ lZ[9[9l9l(

44 47 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS h i O ] Please See Attachment I i 1 a hk I i 2 1 M

i 3 l M

11 14] I 7 8 9 l ST S  % POWE R OTHER STA TUS b!SCO /ER DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION i s G l@ l0 l0 l0 l@ NA l lD[@l Notified by A/E l

ACTIVITY CONTENT RELE ASEO OF RELE ASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 1 6 LOCATION OF RELE ASE NA 7 8 9 Z l @ lZ l@l 10 11 l l NA l 44 45 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES 80 NUMB E R TYPE DESCRIPTION 1 7 l0 0 l 0 l@l Z l@l NA

' "

• l PERSONNELINJU IES NUVBER DESCRIPTION t a 7 8 9 l 0 l 0 l 0 l@l12 11 NA l

80 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION ~ 001g ~ ~

l i I 98I 9l Z_l@[ NA 7 10 80 ISSUE DESCRIPTION 7

2 O 8 9 hl 10 NA llllllllllll ly *

. 68 69 80 ;

NAME OF PREPARER PHONE: ,

. _ . . . - ~ - , , -_. ...

POWER AlRHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-333 ATTACHMENT TO LER 79-046/03T-0 Page 1 of 1 Nhile in a cold shutdown condition and during a study being performed by the Architect Engineer, the Architect Engineer identified deficiencies in the design of the cable separation between the ADS System and the HPCI System. Specifically, the study determined that cable No. 1HP1 ARC 103 which is the control cabic for the HPCI System Steam Supply inside isolation valve (23-MOV-15) and cable Nos. ILKDAR020 and 021 which are thermocouple extension cables for the HPCI System Steam Line Leak Detection System were physically routed in some areas within the same cabic tray sections as those cables which provide power to those safety relief valves utilized as ADS valves.

Since the ADS and HPCI Systems are considered diverse counterparts and as such are considered as Division I and Division II, respectively, the isolation system for the HPCI Steam Line should be physically separated from the ADS System. The Architect Engineer and FitzPatrick taff have been in contact with the Nuclear Steam Supply System Vendor and it appears that while the cabic routing currently used does not appear to disagree with the Nuclear Steam Supply Vendors design specification for Electrical Equipment and Separation of Safe-Guard Systems, the conflict should be eliminated by rerouting the cables in certain areas.

In order for this event to cause a decrease in safe-guard equipment capabilities, the subject cables would be required to undergo a phenomenon known as a " double hot short" or be simultaneously destroyed by a significant fire. In view of this, the event did not represent any significant hazard to the public health and safety.

A plant modification was implemented to reroute portions of the control cable for 23-MOV-15 and the thermocouple extension cables for the HPCI Steam Leak Detection System. This was completed prior to plant startup. The new cable routing was verified to meet the separaton requirements for Division I and Division II cables and following installation logic functional tests were conducted with satisfactory results to verify proper installation of the cables.

360077

_ , , . [, .. . . . . - = * - - w*

r-h " W I' M s'h=@ mp hh e. 'm & he-  % +-M EM 4 .d* -

• ^

,%