ML19116A196

License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications 3.8.1, Required Action A.3, for Temporary One-Time Extension of Completion Time

ML19116A196
Person / Time
Site:	Peach Bottom
Issue date:	04/26/2019
From:	Jim Barstow Exelon Generation Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML19116A196 (83)

Text

Exelon Generation 200 i::xelon Way Kennett Square. PA 19348 www.exeloncorp.com 10 CFR 50.90 April 26, 2019 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56 NRG Docket Nos. 50-277 and 50-278

Subject:

License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications 3.8.1, Required Action A.3, for Temporary One-Time Extension of Completion Time In accordance with 10 CFR 50.90, "Application for amendment of license, construction permit, or early site permit," Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon) requests an amendment to Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56 for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS), Units 2 and 3.

Exelon is submitting this proposed License Amendment Request (LAR) for PBAPS, Units 2 and 3, to provide a temporary one-time extension of the completion time for Technical Specifications (TS) Section 3.8.1, "AC Power - Operating," Required Action A.3, from seven (7) days to 21 days. This temporary one-time TS change is needed to allow sufficient time to perform physical modification work to replace 27 electrical cables from the 3EA Emergency Auxiliary Transformer to the J-58 junction box serving the 3SU-E 4.16 kV feed switchgear. These cables are located in an underground duct back and are reaching the end of their dependable service life and are in need of replacement. This work is expected to take no more than 21 days.

Entry into TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.8.1. Required Action A.3, affects both PBAPS units and failure to satisfy the specified 7-day completion time would require a dual-unit shutdown. The current 7-day completion time for TS LCO 3.8.1, Required Action A.3, does not provide sufficient time to complete the necessary physical modification work and, therefore, additional time is needed to complete the work.

Extending the completion time on a temporary one-time basis as requested will help to avoid the unnecessary shutdown of both PBAPS units. PBAPS will also follow the actions associated with LCO 3.8.1, Required Actions A.1 and A.2, during physical modification work as applicable. PBAPS is not requesting relief for these completion times and Operations will perform the required actions for A.1 and A.2 within the currently designated completion times.

Exelon has concluded that the proposed changes present no significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10CFR 50.92, "Issuance of amendment."

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission License Amendment Request Technical Specification Section 3.8.1 Completion Time Extension DPR-44 and DPR-56 April 26, 2019 Page2 The proposed changes have been reviewed by the PBAPS Plant Operations Review Committee in accordance with the requirements of the Exelon Quality Assurance Program. provides the evaluation of the proposed changes in support of the one-time extension in the completion time for TS LCO 3.8.1, Required Action A.3. Attachment 2 provides a copy of the marked-up TS pages for PBAPS, Units 2 and 3, that reflect the proposed changes.

This amendment request contains regulatory commitments in support of implementing the compensatory measures discussed in Section 4 of Attachment 1 which describes the compensatory and risk management actions that will be instituted during the extended TS completion time. The commitments are described in Attachment 3. provides 4.16 kV emergency power line-up diagrams to facilitate the technical discussions contained in Attachment 1. Attachment 5 provides the 3EA Transformer cable replacement schedule during the 21-day extended one-time Completion Time period. Attachment 6 provides supporting load tables.

Exelon requests approval of the proposed changes by November 1, 2019. Once approved, the temporary changes to TS Sections 3.8.1 will be implemented as required to facilitate the necessary cable replacement modification work, which is expected to be completed by December 31, 2019. Should grid conditions or emergent work become a priority, then this cable replacement will be scheduled and completed no later than June 30, 2020.

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, "Notice for public comment; State consultation,"

paragraph (b), Exelon is notifying the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania of this request by transmitting a copy of this letter along with the Attachments to the designated State Official.

Should you have any questions concerning this submittal, please contact Richard Gropp at 61 0-765-5557.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on the 26th day of April 2019.

Respectfully, A V

~~,~ 1 James\.Ja.rstow Director, Licensing and Regulatory Affairs Exelon Generation Company, LLC Attachments: 1. Evaluation of Proposed Changes - License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications 3.8.1, Required Action A.3, for Temporary Extension of Completion Time

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission License Amendment Request Technical Specification Section 3.8.1 Completion Time Extension DPR-44 and DPR-56 April 26, 2019 Page 3 Attachments: 1. Evaluation of Proposed Changes - License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications 3.8.1, Required Action A.3, for Temporary Extension of Completion Time

2. Mark-up of Technical Specifications Pages

3. Summary of Regulatory Commitments

4. 4.16 kV Emergency Power Line-up Diagrams 5 3EA Transformer Cable Replacement Project Schedule

6. Load Tables - PBAPS 1E Switchgear Schedule cc: w/ Attachments Regional Administrator - NRC Region I U.S. NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station U.S. NRC Project Manager, NRR - Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station R. R. Janati, Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation Protection D. A. Tancabel, State of Maryland

ATTACHMENT 1 Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56 EVALUATION OF PROPOSED CHANGES

Subject:

Evaluation of Proposed Changes - License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications 3.8.1, Condition A.3, for Temporary Extension of Completion Time 1.0

SUMMARY

DESCRIPTION 2.0 DETAILED DESCRIPTION

5.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

5.1 Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria 5.2 Precedent 5.3 No Significant Hazards Consideration 5.4 Conclusions

7.0 REFERENCES

License Amendment Request Technical Specification Section 3.8.1 Completion Time Extension DPR-44 and DPR-56 Page 1 of 32 1.0

SUMMARY

DESCRIPTION In accordance with 10 CFR 50.90, "Application for amendment of license, construction permit, or early site permit," Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon) requests an amendment to Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56 for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS), Units 2 and 3.

Exelon is submitting this proposed License Amendment Request (LAR) for PBAPS, Units 2 and 3, to provide for a temporary one-time extension of the completion time for Technical Specifications (TS) Section 3.8.1, "AC Power - Operating," Required Action A.3, from seven (7) days to 21 days. This temporary one-time TS change is needed to allow sufficient time to perform physical modification work to replace 27 electrical cables from the 3EA Emergency Auxiliary Transformer to the J-58 junction box serving the 3SU-E 4.16 kV feed switchgear. Each cable is approximately 320 feet in length and is located in an underground duct bank. These cables have been in service since 1991 and are reaching the end of their dependable service life and are in need of replacement. This work is expected to take 21 days to complete.

Entry into TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.8.1, Required Action A.3, affects both PBAPS units and failure to satisfy the specified 7-day completion time would require a dual-unit shutdown. The current 7-day completion time specified in TS LCO 3.8.1, Required Action A.3, does not provide sufficient time to complete the necessary physical modification work related to replacing and testing the cables and, therefore, additional time is needed to complete the work. Extending the completion time on a temporary one-time basis to facilitate the work as requested will avoid the unnecessary shutdown of both PBAPS units. PBAPS will also follow the actions associated with entering LCO 3.8.1, Required Actions A.1 and A.2, during physical modification work as applicable. PBAPS is not requesting relief for these completion times and Operations will perform the required actions for A.1 and A.2 within the currently designated completion times.

A description and evaluation of the proposed changes are provided in this attachment.

Attachment 2 provides a copy of the marked-up TS pages that reflect the proposed changes. Attachment 3 provides a summary of the regulatory commitments made in this submittal. Attachment 4 provides 4.16 kV emergency power lineup diagrams to facilitate the technical discussions contained this attachment. Attachment 5 provides an estimated schedule for the 3EA Transformer cable replacement project work during the 21-day extended one-time Completion Time period. Attachment 6 provides supporting load tables.

The need for this LAR is due to the fact that 27 electrical cables routed in an underground duct bank between the 3EA Emergency Auxiliary Transformer and the J-58 junction box serving the 3SU-E 4.16 kV feed switchgear are reaching the end of their dependable service life and are in need of replacement. This work is expected to take up to 21 days. The temporary changes to TS Sections 3.8.1 will be implemented as required to facilitate the necessary cable replacement modification work, which is expected to be completed by December 31, 2019. Should grid conditions or emergent work become a priority, then this cable replacement will be scheduled and completed no later than June 30, 2020.

License Amendment Request Technical Specification Section 3.8.1 Completion Time Extension DPR-44 and DPR-56 Page 2 of 32 2.0 DETAILED DESCRIPTION Current TS Requirements An excerpt from Section 3.8.1 of the PBAPS, Units 2 and 3, TS is provided below describing requirements from Conditions A and G. The other Conditions related to TS Section 3.8.1 have been intentionally omitted from the information described below, since they are not necessarily applicable to the requested changes. Condition A is entered when one offsite circuit is inoperable and Required Action A.3 specifies a 7-day completion time for restoring operability of the offsite circuit. In the event that the offsite circuit is not restored to an operable status within the required 7-day completion time, entry into Condition G is required. Condition G stipulates that if a Required Action and associated Completion Time of Conditions A, C, D, E, or F are not met, both PBAPS units would be required to be in Mode 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. The applicable TS requirements for PBAPS, Units 2 and 3, are noted below for reference.

Unit 2 AC SourcesOperating 3.8.1 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.1 AC SourcesOperating LCO 3.8.1 The following AC electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the Unit 2 onsite Class 1E AC Electrical Power Distribution System;

b. Four diesel generators (DGs) capable of supplying the Unit 2 onsite Class 1E AC Electrical Power Distribution System;

c. The qualified circuit(s) between the offsite transmission network and the Unit 3 onsite Class 1E AC electrical power distribution subsystem(s) needed to support the Unit 3 powered equipment required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System," LCO 3.7.3, "Emergency Heat Sink," and LCO 3.8.4, "DC Sources Operating"; and

d. The DG(s) capable of supplying the Unit 3 onsite Class 1E AC electrical power distribution subsystem(s) needed to support the Unit 3 powered equipment required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.6.4.3, LCO 3.7.3, and LCO 3.8.4.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

License Amendment Request Technical Specification Section 3.8.1 Completion Time Extension DPR-44 and DPR-56 Page 3 of 32 Unit 3 AC Sources Operating 3.8.1 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.1 AC Sources Operating LCO 3.8.1 The following AC electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Unit 3 Class 1E AC Electrical Power Distribution System;

b. Four diesel generators (DGs) capable of supplying the Unit 3 onsite Class 1E AC Electrical Power Distribution System;

c. The qualified circuit(s) between the offsite transmission network and the Unit 2 onsite Class 1E AC electrical power distribution subsystem(s) needed to support the Unit 2 powered equipment required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.6.3.1, "Containment Atmospheric Dilution (CAD) System," LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System," LCO 3.7.2, "Emergency Service Water (ESW) System and Normal Heat Sink," LCO 3.7.4, "Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation (MCREV)

System," and LCO 3.8.4, "DC Sources Operating"; and

d. The DG(s) capable of supplying the Unit 2 onsite Class 1E AC electrical power distribution subsystem(s) needed to support the Unit 2 powered equipment required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.6.3.1, LCO 3.6.4.3, LCO 3.7.2, LCO 3.7.4, and LCO 3.8.4.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

License Amendment Request Technical Specification Section 3.8.1 Completion Time Extension DPR-44 and DPR-56 Page 4 of 32 Units 2 and 3 AC SourcesOperating 3.8.1 ACTIONS

---

NOTE -----------------------------------

LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to DGs.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One offsite circuit A.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> inoperable. for OPERABLE offsite circuits. AND Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter AND A.2 Declare required 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> from feature(s) with no discovery of no offsite power offsite power to available inoperable one 4 kV when the redundant emergency bus required feature(s) concurrent with are inoperable. inoperability of redundant required feature(s)

AND A.3 Restore offsite 7 days circuit to OPERABLE status.

(Note: Other Conditions are intentionally omitted since they are considered unnecessary in support of the discussions for the proposed changes.)

G. Required Action and G.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time of Condition A, C, D, E, or F not met.

License Amendment Request Technical Specification Section 3.8.1 Completion Time Extension DPR-44 and DPR-56 Page 5 of 32 OR Required Action B.2, B.3, B.4.1, B.4.2, or B.5 and associated Completion Time not met.

Proposed Temporary One-Time TS Change TS LCO 3.8.1, Required Action A.3, will be modified as noted below to incorporate a footnote to extend the 7-day Completion Time on a temporary one-time basis for one inoperable offsite circuit to 21 days. The Completion Time will be modified by adding an (*) after the 7 days in TS LCO 3.8.1, Required Action A.3, to identify the incorporation of the new footnote. The footnote will be added to indicate that the extended 21-day Completion Time period for the affected inoperable offsite circuit may be entered for the specific task of installing and testing the replacement electrical cables.

The proposed footnote will read as follows:

(*) Or 21 days, to support installation and testing of new electrical cables routed between the 3EA Emergency Auxiliary Transformer and the J-58 junction box serving the 3SU-E 4.16 kV feed switchgear. The work shall be completed by June 30, 2020.

Prior to entry into the 21-day extended Completion Time, the SBO Line (i.e.,

33kV Conowingo AAC source) shall be verified available. During the 21-day Completion Time, the 33kV SBO Line shall be verified available once per shift.

If the SBO Line becomes unavailable after the initial seven (7) days while in the extended 21-day Completion Time period, it shall be made available within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, or the unit shall be brought to MODE 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and MODE 4 within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

An excerpt of the proposed change to TS for PBAPS, Units 2 and 3, depicting the new footnote is provided below.

License Amendment Request Technical Specification Section 3.8.1 Completion Time Extension DPR-44 and DPR-56 Page 6 of 32 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One offsite circuit A.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> inoperable. for OPERABLE offsite circuits.

AND Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter AND A.2 Declare required 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> from feature(s) with no discovery of no offsite power offsite power to available inoperable one 4 kV when the redundant emergency bus required feature(s) concurrent with are inoperable. inoperability of redundant required feature(s)

AND A.3 Restore offsite 7 days (*)

circuit to OPERABLE status.

(*) Or 21 days, to support installation and testing of new electrical cables routed between the 3EA Emergency Auxiliary Transformer and the J-58 junction box serving the 3SU-E 4.16 kV feed switchgear. The work shall be completed by June 30, 2020.

Prior to entry into the 21-day extended Completion Time, the SBO Line (i.e.,

33kV Conowingo AAC source) shall be verified available. During the 21-day Completion Time, the 33kV SBO Line shall be verified available once per shift.

If the SBO Line becomes unavailable after the initial seven (7) days while in the extended 21-day Completion Time period, it shall be made available within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, or the unit shall be brought to MODE 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and MODE 4 within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

License Amendment Request Technical Specification Section 3.8.1 Completion Time Extension DPR-44 and DPR-56 Page 7 of 32 This licensing action will provide needed changes to the PBAPS, Units 2 and 3, TS on a temporary one-time basis to allow for the replacement of 27 electrical cables from the qualified circuit between the offsite transmission network (3EA Emergency Auxiliary Transformer) and the onsite Class 1E AC electrical power distribution system (J-58 junction box serving the 3SU-E 4.16 kV feed switchgear).

3.0 BACKGROUND

Electrical Power Distribution System Description The AC power sources for the Class 1E AC Electrical Power Distribution System consist of the offsite power sources, and the onsite standby power sources (Diesel Generators (DGs)). As described by Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR)

Sections 1.5 and 8.4.2, the design of the AC electrical power system provides independence and redundancy to ensure an available source of power to the Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems.

The Class 1E AC distribution system is divided into redundant load groups, so loss of any one group does not prevent the minimum safety functions from being performed.

Each load group has connections to two qualified circuits that connect the unit to multiple offsite power supplies and a single DG.

The two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E AC Electrical Power Distribution System are supported by multiple, independent offsite power sources. One of these qualified circuits can be connected to either of two offsite sources: the preferred offsite source is the 230 kV Nottingham-Cooper line which supplies the plant through the 230/13.8 kV Startup (SU) and Emergency Auxiliary Transformer No. 2; the alternate offsite source is the auto-transformer (500/230 kV) at North Substation which feeds a 230/13.8 kV regulating transformer (Startup and Emergency Auxiliary Transformer No. 3), the 3SU regulating transformer switchgear, and the 2SUA switchgear. The aligned source is further stepped down via the 2SU Startup Transformer switchgear through the 13.2/4.16 kV Emergency Auxiliary Transformer No. 2. The other qualified circuit can be connected to either of two offsite sources: the preferred offsite source is the 230 kV Peach Bottom-Newlinville line which supplies a 230/13.8 kV transformer (Startup Transformer No. 343); the alternate offsite source is the auto-transformer (500/230 kV) at North Substation which feeds a 230/13.8 kV regulating transformer (Startup and Emergency Auxiliary Transformer No. 3) and the 3SU regulating transformer switchgear. The aligned source is further stepped down via the 343SU transformer switchgear through the 13.2/4.16 kV Emergency Auxiliary Transformer No. 3. In addition, the alternate source can only be used to meet the requirements of one offsite circuit. A detailed description of the offsite power network and circuits to the onsite Class 1E ESF buses is found in the UFSAR, Sections 8.3 and 8.4.

A qualified offsite circuit consists of all breakers, transformers, switches, interrupting devices, cabling, and controls required to transmit power from the offsite transmission network to the onsite Class 1E emergency bus or buses. The determination of the operability of a qualified source of offsite power is dependent upon grid and plant License Amendment Request Technical Specification Section 3.8.1 Completion Time Extension DPR-44 and DPR-56 Page 8 of 32 factors that, when taken together, describe the design basis calculation requirements for voltage regulation. The combination of these factors ensures that the offsite source(s), which provide power to the plant emergency buses, will be fully capable of supporting the equipment required to achieve and maintain safe shutdown during postulated accidents and transients.

The plant factors consist of the status of the Startup Transformers' (2SU, 343SU, 3SU) Load Tap Changers (LTCs), the status of the Safeguard Transformers (2EA and 3EA) and the alignment of the emergency buses on the Safeguard Buses (00A019 and 00A020). For an offsite source to be considered operable, its respective LTCs must be in service and in automatic.

The grid factors consist of actual grid voltage levels (real time) and the post trip contingency voltage drop percentage value. The minimum offsite source voltage levels are established by the voltage regulation calculation. The Transmission System Operator (TSO) will notify PBAPS when an agreed upon limit is approached.

The post trip contingency percentage voltage drop is a calculated value determined by the TSO that would occur as a result of the tripping of one PBAPS generator. The TSO will notify PBAPS when an agreed upon limit is exceeded. The voltage regulation calculation establishes the acceptable percentage voltage drop based upon plant configuration.

Due to the 3SU source being derived from the tertiary of the #1 Auto Transformer, its operability is influenced by both the 500 kV and 230 kV systems. The 2SU and 343SU sources operability is influenced only by the 230 kV system.

PBAPS unit post trip contingency voltage drop percentage calculations are performed by the PJM Interconnection Energy Management System (EMS). The PJM EMS consists of a primary and backup system. PBAPS will be notified if the real time contingency analysis capability of PJM is lost. Upon receipt of this notification, PBAPS is to request PJM to provide an assessment of the current condition of the grid based on the tools that PJM has available. The determination of the operability of the offsite sources would consider the assessment provided by PJM and whether the current condition of the grid is bounded by the grid studies previously performed for PBAPS.

Variations to any of these factors is permissible, usually at the sacrifice of another factor, based on plant conditions. Specifics regarding these variations are controlled by plant procedures or by condition specific design calculations.

The onsite standby power source for the four 4.16 kV emergency buses in each unit consists of four DGs. The four DGs provide onsite standby power for both PBAPS, Units 2 and 3. Each DG provides standby power to two 4.16 kV emergency buses, one associated with Unit 2 and one associated with Unit 3. A DG starts automatically on a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) signal (i.e., low reactor water level signal or high drywell pressure signal) from either Unit 2 or Unit 3 or on an emergency bus degraded voltage or undervoltage signal. After the DG has started, it automatically License Amendment Request Technical Specification Section 3.8.1 Completion Time Extension DPR-44 and DPR-56 Page 9 of 32 ties to its respective bus after offsite power is tripped as a consequence of emergency bus undervoltage or degraded voltage, independent of or coincident with a LOCA signal. The DGs also start and operate in the standby mode without tying to the emergency bus on a LOCA signal alone. Following the trip of offsite power, all loads are stripped from the emergency bus. When the DG is tied to the emergency bus, loads are then sequentially connected to its respective emergency bus by individual timers associated with each auto-connected load following a permissive from a voltage relay monitoring each emergency bus.

In the event of a loss of both offsite power sources, the ESF electrical loads are automatically connected to the DGs in sufficient time to provide for safe reactor shutdown of both units and to mitigate the consequences of a Design Basis Accident (DBA) such as a LOCA. Within 59 seconds after the initiating signal is received, all automatically connected loads needed to recover the unit or maintain it in a safe condition are returned to service. The failure of any one DG does not impair safe shutdown because each DG serves an independent, redundant 4 kV emergency bus for each unit. The remaining DGs and emergency buses have sufficient capability to mitigate the consequences of a DBA, support the shutdown of the other unit, and maintain both units in a safe condition.

The 3EA transformer (0BX04) is part of the auxiliary power systems described in Section 8.4 of the UFSAR. The auxiliary power system is designed to provide adequate power to operate all the plant auxiliary loads necessary for plant operation.

The safety objective of the auxiliary power system is to provide highly reliable power sources for loads which are important to station safety under accident conditions. The 3EA transformer is fed from the 343 Startup Transformer switchgear. This transformer normally supplies the E22 and E42 4.16 kV buses for Unit 2 and the E13 and E33 4.16 kV buses for Unit 3.

Per Design Basis Document (DBD) P-S-05, "4kV System," the 4.16 kV System supplies nominal 4160 V power to, or is available to supply power to, Class 1E and non-Class 1E components during all operating conditions. The primary components of the 4.16 kV System are the Emergency Auxiliary Switchgear Buses E12, E22, E32, E42 for Unit 2 and E13, E23, E33, E43 for Unit 3. Each Emergency Auxiliary Switchgear Bus can be supplied from any one of three common sources: Unit 2 Emergency Auxiliary Transformer (0AX04), Unit 3 Emergency Auxiliary Transformer (0BX04), and the DGs for that bus. The DGs supply the buses when the Emergency Auxiliary Transformers are unavailable as follows: E1 DG can supply the E12 and E13 buses; E2 DG can supply the E22 and E23 buses; E3 DG can supply the E32 and E33 buses; E4 DG can supply the E42 and E43 buses.

Project Schedule The scope of work during the 3EA cable replacement work includes replacing all 27 1000MCM aluminum cables with 750MCM copper cables. The project schedule starts with tagout application and runs through tagout removal. As outlined in Attachment 5, it is estimated that it will take up to 21 days to complete physical plant modifications in support of the cable replacement work.

License Amendment Request Technical Specification Section 3.8.1 Completion Time Extension DPR-44 and DPR-56 Page 10 of 32 Defense-in-Depth (DID) Strategy Defense-in-Depth (DID) will be assured using a designated Alternate AC (AAC) power source, the installed Station Blackout (SBO) line, to provide supplemental AC power to station Emergency Buses, as required to compensate for inoperable AC sources. Additional DID strategies include use of FLEX pumps and DGs (at 480 V Load Center level) to support safety functions following a loss of offsite power. There are three FLEX DGs rated at 500 kW, 600 Amp 480V each.

4.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

The 3EA transformer (0BX04) is part of the auxiliary power systems described in Section 8.4 of the UFSAR. The auxiliary power system is designed to provide adequate power to operate all the plant auxiliary loads necessary for plant operation.

The safety objective of the auxiliary power system is to provide highly reliable power sources for loads which are important to station safety under accident conditions. The 3EA Transformer is fed from the 343 Startup Transformer switchgear. This transformer normally supplies the E22 and E42 4 kV buses for Unit 2 and the E13 and E33 4.16 kV buses for Unit 3.

As previously noted, per DBD P-S-05, 4kV System, the 4.16 kV System supplies nominal 4160 V power to, or is available to supply power to, Class 1E and non-Class 1E components during all operating conditions. The primary components of the 4.16 kV System are the Emergency Auxiliary Switchgear Buses E12, E22, E32, E42 for Unit 2 and E13, E23, E33, E43 for Unit 3. Each Emergency Auxiliary Switchgear Bus can be supplied from any one of three common sources: Unit 2 Emergency Auxiliary Transformer (0AX04), Unit 3 Emergency Auxiliary Transformer (0BX04), and the DGs for that bus. The DGs supply the buses when the Emergency Auxiliary Transformers are unavailable as follows: E1 DG can supply the E12 and E13 buses; E2 DG can supply the E22 and E23 buses; E3 DG can supply the E32 and E33 buses; E4 DG can supply the E42 and E43 buses.

Safety/Seismic Classification:

The 3EA Transformer is a non-safety related component and the 4.16 KV non-segregated phase bus duct 00A20 is a passive safety-related component. The bus duct provides isolation between cables 0BX04R-Z which are non-safety related cables and the applicable breaker which is an active safety-related component.

Therefore, all affected Structure, Systems, or Components (SSCs) are classified as non-safety related. DBD P-S-05 Section 1.2 classifies System 54 (i.e., 4 kV System) as safety-related.

All systems and components affected by the proposed work are located in electrical manholes, conduit duct banks, and embedded conduit inside and outside the Radwaste Building and outside and west of Unit 3 Reactor Building. Per DBD P-T-01, "Structural," Section 3.3, electrical manholes and conduit duct banks are seismic Class II structures and the Radwaste Building is a seismic Class I structure. In License Amendment Request Technical Specification Section 3.8.1 Completion Time Extension DPR-44 and DPR-56 Page 11 of 32 addition, the 3EA Transformer is classified as a non-seismic component per UFSAR, Appendix C. Therefore, all affected SSCs are classified as non-seismic.

The new cables 0BX04R-Z will be 15 KV rated, consist of 1/C 750MCM copper, have 220 mils of Okoguard insulation (Ethylene Propylene - EPR), and an extruded semiconducting EPR insulation shield and shield copper tape. The termination points and routing of the new cables will remain the same as the existing design.

The new cable has higher insulation thickness compared to the existing cable. The EPR insulation is more suitable for this application compared to Cross-Linked Polyethylene (XLPE), since EPR has numerous advantages over the existing insulation including extra flexibility, reduced thermal expansion, and low sensitivity to water treeing. In addition, copper is a more efficient conductor of electrical current and requires smaller cross sections to carry the same amount of power as an aluminum conductor and is less susceptible to chemical reaction with water than aluminum. When moisture enters a cable with an aluminum conductor, the conductor reacts with moisture/water. This chemical reaction is of particular importance when it occurs between the strands of an aluminum conductor. When the wetted aluminum cable is heated, hydrogen gas is created, which accelerates corrosion. The hydrogen gas can force the water to the cable terminations, causing cable failure.

Five (5) of the 27 existing cables that were Tan-delta tested between 2012 and 2014 show signs of degradation based on their insulation resistance measurements and review of Tan-delta assessment criteria for XLPE cables provided in EPRI 2013 Technical Report, "Plant Engineering, Aging Management Program Guidance for Medium-Voltage Cable Systems for Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 1. After installation of the new cables, Tan-delta testing will be performed as described below.

The test results will be used as baseline data for cable aging management purposes in accordance with Procedure ER-AA-300-150, "Cable Condition Monitoring Program."

A Megger test will be performed on the new cables when on the reel and another Megger test will be performed after the cables have been pulled. In addition, Tan-delta monitoring tests will be performed on the new cables after they have been pulled and prior to connecting them to the busbar to establish baseline readings on the new cables for future test comparison. Furthermore, Tan-delta Withstand testing will be performed on the new cables after they have been pulled and prior to connecting the cables to the busbar in accordance with IEEE Standard 400.2. All Tan-delta tests will be conducted in accordance with Procedure ER-AA-300-150, "Cable Condition Monitoring Program," and Procedure MA-AA-723-335, "Tan Delta Cable Testing."

Similar changes from aluminum conductor to copper conductor cables have been recently completed at PBAPS in November 2018 to replace 13 kV cables routed between Unit 2 and Unit 3 Condensate pumps' transformers and Condensate pumps, and in March 2019 to replace 13 kV cables associated with #1 SU feed bus. An Engineering Change will be performed to evaluate cable pulling tensions and design analysis in support of the replacement of the 3EA Transformer's load cables. All work License Amendment Request Technical Specification Section 3.8.1 Completion Time Extension DPR-44 and DPR-56 Page 12 of 32 required to replace the cables and return the equipment to service is expected to be completed within the 21-day extended Completion Time.

Station Electrical Power Configuration During the Extended Completion Time Period Per UFSAR Sections 1.6.1.5, 8.3.2 and 8.4, plant start-up and the emergency auxiliary power is provided from three (3) independent sources of offsite power as follows:

1. The tap on the 230 kV Nottingham-Cooper line feeds the 230/13 kV regulating transformer (Startup and Emergency Auxiliary Transformer No. 2) at the station.

2. 13 kV from the tertiary winding on the 500/230 kV #1 auto-transformer feeds the 13/13 kV regulating transformer (Startup and Emergency Auxiliary Regulating Transformer No. 3) which connects to the 13 kV switchgear at the station.

3. 13 kV can be supplied from the 230/13 kV regulating transformer (Startup Transformer No. 343) which is supplied by the 230 kV Peach Bottom-Newlinville line and connects to the 13 kV switchgear.

This configuration will remain unchanged during the extended Completion Time period. Per UFSAR Section 8.4.5, each offsite power source noted above is stepped down from 13 kV to 4.16 kV through an emergency auxiliary transformer and is connected through interlocked circuit breakers to every 4.16 kV emergency switchgear bus. During normal plant operation, auxiliary power to the 4.16 kV emergency switchgear buses is supplied from two (2) preferred offsite sources via an emergency auxiliary transformer. Every 4.16 kV emergency switchgear bus is energized from one (1) of these two (2) sources at all times during normal operation.

This configuration will be temporarily changed during the proposed one-time extended Completion Time period as described below.

PBAPS plans on replacing all 27 cables from the 3EA Transformer to the J-58 junction box serving the 3SU-E 4.16 kV feed switchgear. This cable replacement is expected to take up to 21 days. During the proposed one-time Completion Time period, PBAPS Units 2 and 3, are expected to be in normal power operation (i.e.,

Mode 1). The 3EA Transformer 0BX004 will be taken out of service in accordance with Procedure SO 53.7.A, Appendix 8, "Removal of 343SU SWGR 00A004 and 343SU XFMR 00X011 from Service," to de-energize all 27 cables planned for replacement. The 4.16 kV emergency buses normally fed from the 3EA Transformer will be transferred to the 2EA Transformer in accordance with procedure SO 54.7.F, "4kV Switchgear Manual Transfer." No other modifications to the plant electrical power configuration are planned in support of the planned replacement of the 3EA Transformer load cables.

License Amendment Request Technical Specification Section 3.8.1 Completion Time Extension DPR-44 and DPR-56 Page 13 of 32 NOTES:

1. All 13 kV and 4.16 kV cables, within the power block, are installed in conduit.

Per UFSAR Section 7.1.6.1, cables serving ESF systems and Class 1E electrical systems are routed separately when duplicate or backup equipment is affected. Separation for these safety systems is achieved by routing through separate rooms or corridors where possible. Therefore, replacement of 3EA Transformer load cables will not impact 2EA Transformer load cables.

2. Per UFSAR Section 8.4.5, if neither offsite source is available, the 4.16 kV emergency switchgear buses are supplied from DGs as described in UFSAR Section 8.5, "Standby AC Power Supply and Distribution." In addition, per UFSAR Section 8.4.6.1, the 4.16 kV emergency switchgear buses supply all power required for safe shutdown of the units. Loss of both preferred offsite sources of power does not affect safe shutdown of the plant because emergency power can be supplied from four DGs. Furthermore, failure of any one DG does not impair safe shutdown because each DG serves an independent, redundant 4.16 kV bus for each unit. The remaining 4.16 kV buses have sufficient capacity to serve their respective loads, safely shut down the reactor, and maintain it in a safe condition.

NUREG-0800 Branch Technical Position 8-8 Requirements Considerations NUREG-0800, "Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR Edition," Branch Technical Position (BTP) 8-8, "Onsite (Emergency Diesel Generators) and Offsite Power Sources Allowed Outage Time Extensions," specifically discusses the DID aspects for onsite power sources from a deterministic perspective for proposed Allowed Outage Time (AOT) or Completion Time extensions. No changes are being proposed to the current AOTs for the onsite DGs. The following is a list of critical BTP 8-8 guidance and an explanation of how PBAPS plans to meet the guidance criteria, with the plant configuration described above:

a) The supplemental source must have the capacity to bring a unit to safe shutdown (cold shutdown) in case of a loss of offsite power (LOOP) concurrent with a single failure during plant operation (Mode 1).

Per Technical Specifications Bases (TSB) 3.8.1, the onsite standby power source for the four 4.16 kV emergency buses in each unit consists of four (4) DGs. The four DGs provide onsite standby power for both Unit 2 and Unit 3. Each DG provides standby power to two 4 kV emergency buses, one associated with Unit 2 and one associated with Unit 3. In the event of a loss of both offsite power sources, the ESF electrical loads are automatically connected to the DGs in sufficient time to provide for safe reactor shutdown of both units and to mitigate the consequences of a Design Basis Accident (DBA) such as a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). Within 59 seconds after the initiating signal is received, all automatically connected loads needed to recover the unit or maintain it in a safe condition are returned to service.

The failure of any one DG does not impair safe shutdown because each DG serves License Amendment Request Technical Specification Section 3.8.1 Completion Time Extension DPR-44 and DPR-56 Page 14 of 32 an independent, redundant 4.16 kV emergency bus for each unit. The remaining DGs and emergency buses have sufficient capability to mitigate the consequences of a DBA, support the shutdown of the other unit, and maintain both units in a safe condition. Ratings for the DGs satisfy the requirements of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.9, "Application and Testing of Safety-Related Diesel Generators in Nuclear Power Plants," since each of the four DGs have the following ratings: 2600 kW continuous, 3000 kW for 2000 hours0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br />, 3100 kW for 200 hours0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br />, 3250 kW for 30 minutes. The existing DG loading Calculation PE-0166, "Emergency Diesel Generator Loading for Cases defined by UFSAR," confirms the capability of the DGs to meet the shutdown load requirements. Per PE-0166, Section 2.1, the acceptance criteria for DG loading is to maintain the loads on each DG below the 2000-hour rating of 3000 KW for each time frame of the postulated accident. The tabulation list for the worst case loading of all four DGs for each time frame is provided in the answer to requirement g) below.

In addition to the four DGs, the Station Blackout (SBO) line is credited as an Alternate AC (AAC) source at PBAPS. Per UFSAR Sections 8.3.2.2 and 8.4.6.2, an AAC source is available in the event of an SBO condition, when offsite power sources and emergency DG power is not available to bring Units 2 and 3 to a safe shutdown condition and maintain that status. A dedicated 34.5 kV submarine/underwater cable, powered from the 33 kV bus at Susquehanna Substation, terminates at the SBO Substation at PBAPS. The power from the Susquehanna 33 kV bus is dependent only on operation of a minimum number of hydro-generation units at the Conowingo Power Station, which can be made available in one hour without any dependence on the transmission grid from which normal offsite power is supplied. A transformer steps down voltage to 13.8 kV and is available for connection to Unit 2 SUB 00A03C to maintain Units 2 and 3 in shutdown status. This AAC source is dedicated to PBAPS through a series of manual breaker and switch manipulations performed at both sites. Therefore, the SBO line (7000 kW per SSE Docket Nos. 50-277 and 50-278) has the capability of providing the necessary power to maintain Units 2 and 3 in a safe shutdown condition.

b) The permanent or temporary power source can be either a diesel generator, gas or combustion turbine, or power from nearby hydro units. This source can be credited as a supplemental source, that can be substituted for an inoperable EDG during the period of extended AOT in the event of a LOOP, provided the risk-informed and deterministic evaluation supports the proposed AOT and the power source has enough capacity to carry all LOOP loads to bring the unit to a cold shutdown.

As stated in response to item a above, the four DGs are credited as the supplemental source of AC power. The four DGs, each with a continuous rating of 2600 kW and a 30 minutes peak rating of 3250 kW, have enough capacity to carry all LOOP loads to bring the units to a cold shutdown. As a backup for the four DGs, and part of the DID strategy, the SBO line (7000 kW) can carry the LOOP loads as described in response to requirement a). The risk analysis insights noted in PB-LAR-026, "Risk Assessment Input for the Peach Bottom One-Time Technical Specification Change for the 3EA Cable Replacement," support the proposed temporary one-time extended Completion Time of 21 days for TS 3.8.1, Required Action A.3 for an inoperable offsite source.

License Amendment Request Technical Specification Section 3.8.1 Completion Time Extension DPR-44 and DPR-56 Page 15 of 32 Attachment 3 of this submittal contains compensatory actions that the station will perform during the physical work to replace the electrical cables.

c) Multi-unit sites that have installed a single AAC power source for SBO cannot substitute it for the inoperable diesel when requesting AOT extensions unless the AAC source has enough capacity to carry all LOOP loads to bring the unit to a cold shutdown as a substitute for the EDG in an extended AOT and carry all SBO loads for the unit that has an SBO event without any load shedding.

PBAPS is a dual-unit site that has installed a single AAC power source for the SBO event. As discussed above, the DGs and the SBO line have the capabilities to establish and maintain both units in a safe condition without load shedding. PBAPS does not credit the SBO line as a substitute/equivalent to an inoperable DG.

d) For plants using Alternate Alternating Current (AAC) or supplemental power sources discussed above, the time to make the AAC or supplemental power source available, including accomplishing the cross-connection, should be approximately one hour to enable restoration of battery chargers and control reactor coolant system inventory.

Supplemental Safety Evaluation (SSE) Docket Nos. 50-277 and 50-278, Section 2.4 states that Class 1E batteries have sufficient capacity to power all normal battery-backed monitoring, electrical systems and controls for the required SBO duration and recovery therefrom. The Class 1E batteries are capable of providing the required power during the first hour without recharging and will be charged with power from the AAC power source after the end of the first hour.

SSE Docket Nos. 50-277 and 50-278, section 2.8 states that station batteries and the AAC source will power equipment necessary to maintain adequate coolant system inventory to ensure that the core is cooled for the required coping duration (one hour). Power from the Susquehanna 33 kV bus (Conowingo Power Station) can be used as the AAC source and its greater capacity will allow establishing a Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and High Pressure Service Water (HPSW) pump for containment cooling on each unit during the second eight hours of the SBO duration.

Surveillance Test ST-O-57B-750-2(3), "125/250 VDC Station Battery Weekly Inspection," are procedures used to inspect Units 2 and 3 125/250 VDC station battery pilot cells and to determine operability of the batteries.

Aligning the DGs and the SBO line is considered a Time Critical Action (TCA) and requirements/guidelines to re-align the DGs and the SBO line are contained in Procedure OP-PB-102-106, "Operator Response Time Program at PBAPS,"

(Attachment 1, Action Numbers TCA-33 and TCA-48, respectively). Procedure OP-PB-102-106 establishes the process, controls, and methodologies to validate and document Operator TCAs and Time Sensitive Actions.

License Amendment Request Technical Specification Section 3.8.1 Completion Time Extension DPR-44 and DPR-56 Page 16 of 32 e) The availability of AAC or supplemental power source should be verified within the last 30 days before entering extended AOT by operating or bringing the power source to its rated voltage and frequency for 5 minutes and ensuring all its auxiliary support systems are available or operational.

All four DGs will be tested in accordance within the normal surveillance frequency prior to entering the extended Completion Time period per Procedure SO 52A.1.B, "Diesel Generator Operations," by bringing the power source to its rated voltage and frequency and ensuring all auxiliary support systems are available or operational.

This test will satisfy the requirement of fully loaded run of the DG connected to one of the 4.16 kV ESF busses. In addition, Procedure ST-O-51H-200-2, "Station Blackout Line Operability Verification," will be performed in advance to verify the operability of the SBO line.

f) To support the one-hour time for making this power source available, plants must assess their ability to cope with loss of all AC power for one hour independent of an AAC power source.

Per SE-11 bases, "Loss of Off-Site Power - Bases," Sections C.7 and E.5, essential DC batteries supply breaker control and protection for, Safety Relief Valve (SRV) solenoids, High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) control and Motor Operated Valves (MOVs), Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) control and MOVs, Main Control Room (MCR) indication, and DG logic. Following loss of a battery charger, two hours is the quickest the batteries would be expected to be depleted based on full-load and a worst-case battery environment. HPCI and RCIC are the steam-driven emergency feedwater pumps used as a coping mechanism to ensure sufficient reactor water inventory is maintained in the vessel to permit adequate core cooling.

Therefore, essential batteries will support the one-hour time to cope with loss of all AC power for one hour independent of an AAC power source.

In addition, Procedure SE-11.1, "Operating Station Blackout Line During a LOOP Event," provides instructions for operating the SBO line during a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) event when the station DGs are not capable of supporting operation of safe shutdown loads.

g) The plant should have formal engineering calculations for equipment sizing and protection and have approved procedures for connecting the AAC or supplemental power sources to the safety buses.

The existing DG loading Calculation PE-0166, "Emergency Diesel Generator Loading for Cases defined by UFSAR," confirms the capability of the DGs to meet the shutdown load requirements. Per PE-0166, Section 2.1, the acceptance criteria for DG loading is to maintain the loads on each DG below the 2000-hour rating of 3000 KW for each time frame of the postulated accident. The following tabulation lists the worst-case loading of all four DGs for each time frame:

License Amendment Request Technical Specification Section 3.8.1 Completion Time Extension DPR-44 and DPR-56 Page 17 of 32 Timeframe 0-10 MIN 10-60 MIN 60MIN E1 2759 kW 2726 kW 2833 kW E2 2913 kW 2392 kW 2905 kW E3 2805 kW 2744 kW 2807 kW E4 2427 kW 2584 kW 2746 kW DBD P-S-07, "Diesel Generator and Auxiliary Systems," discusses protective relaying for the DGs and calculation PE-0088, "Medium Voltage Switchgear Protective Devices," provides protection criteria and setting for medium voltage circuits.

During normal operations, Procedure SO 52A.1.B, "Diesel Generator Operations," is the controlling procedure to start and load the DGs onto any of the four 4.16 kV ESF buses. However, in an SBO event, Procedure SE-11.1 "Operating Station Blackout Line During a Loop Event," provides direction to align the SBO line. Procedure SE-11 attachments provide guidance on electrical back feeding, which allows for connecting more than one 4.16 kV ESF bus to the DG, if required. Moreover, Calculation PE-0154, "Station Blackout Voltage Regulation - Conowingo Source,"

performs a voltage drop study to determine the voltage drop under SBO conditions using the 33 kV feeder from Conowingo and establishes that the proposed arrangement will meet the electrical requirements of the plant.

h) The EDG or offsite power AOT should be limited to 14 days to perform maintenance activities. The licensee must provide justification for the duration of the requested AOT (actual hours plus margin based on plant-specific past operating experience).

PBAPS is requesting a temporary one-time 21-day Completion Time period.

Reference Attachment 5 of PB-LAR-026 for a detailed schedule of major installation activities planned in the 21-day Completion Time period. It is estimated that up to 21 days is required to replace all 27 electrical cables based on lessons learned from implementation of Engineering Change (EC) 555777 that replaced three (3) out of the 27 load cables associated with the 3EA Transformer. It took four (4) days to remove the existing three (3) cables and install and test three (3) new cables. In addition, the schedule for Medium Voltage (MV) cables recently replaced at PBAPS per ECs 625819, 626191, and 626878 were reviewed for reference. Based on plant Operating Experience (OPEX), lessons learned from implementation of ECs noted above, and walk down conducted with installers for the 3EA cables running from #3EA transformer 0BX004 to J-58 junction box to the 4.16 kV switchgear, the duration of the requested 21 days Completion Time period is justified.

i) The Tech Specs (TS) must contain Required Actions and Completion Times to verify that the supplemental AC source is available before entering extended AOT.

Procedure SO 52A.1.B, "Diesel Generator Operations," provides the direction for loading the DGs onto ESF buses. PBAPS will validate DG availability by starting DGs and loading onto an ESF bus within 30 days prior to entering the 21-day License Amendment Request Technical Specification Section 3.8.1 Completion Time Extension DPR-44 and DPR-56 Page 18 of 32 Completion Time period; therefore, the DGs will be verified available before entering the extended 21-day Completion Time period. In addition, Surveillance Test ST-O-51H-200-2, "Station Blackout Line Operability Verification," will be performed to verify the operability of the SBO line. Lastly, Surveillance Test ST-O-054-951-2, "Offsite and Onsite Electrical Power Breaker Alignment and Power Availability Check with A Start Up Source and/or EDG Inoperable," will be performed to demonstrate operable offsite circuits.

j) The availability of the AAC or supplemental power source shall be checked every 8-12 hours (once per shift).

The required offsite circuit operability will be verified once every eight (8) hours per Surveillance ST-O-054-951-2, "Offsite and Onsite Electrical Power Breaker Alignment and Power Availability Check with a Start Up Source and/or DG Inoperable," as required by TS 3.8.1 LCO Condition A, Required Action A.1. In addition, PBAPS will check the operability of the SBO line once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> (once per shift) in accordance with station procedures.

k) The extended AOT will be used no more than once in a 24-month period (or refueling interval) on a per diesel basis to perform EDG maintenance activities, or any major maintenance on offsite power transformer or bus.

The planned one-time extended 21-day Completion Time will be used once to support replacement of all 27 load electrical cables during the 3EA Transformer out-of-service window.

l) The preplanned maintenance will not be scheduled if severe weather conditions are anticipated.

Preplanned maintenance affecting DGs or operable offsite circuits will be assessed within existing Procedures/Processes WC-AA-101, "On-line Work Control Process,"

and WC-AA-104, "Integrated Risk Management." These processes will ensure that station Operations would not authorize performance of preplanned maintenance affecting DGs or operable offsite circuits during the extended Completion Time period if severe adverse weather conditions are expected.

m) The system load dispatcher will be contacted once per day to ensure no significant grid perturbations (high grid loading unable to withstand a single contingency of line or generation outage) are expected during the extended AOT.

At the time of implementation, station Operations will contact the grid operator (Load Dispatcher) once per day during the extended 21-day Completion Time period to ensure no significant grid disturbances are expected during the extended Completion Time period.

License Amendment Request Technical Specification Section 3.8.1 Completion Time Extension DPR-44 and DPR-56 Page 19 of 32 n) Component testing or maintenance of safety systems and important non-safety equipment in the offsite power systems that can increase the likelihood of a plant transient (unit trip) or LOOP will be avoided. In addition, no discretionary switchyard maintenance will be performed.

PBAPS will not conduct any discretionary testing or maintenance, which can increase the likelihood of a plant transient (unit trip) or LOOP, of safety systems and important non-safety equipment in the offsite power systems while in the extended 21-day Completion Time period. A LOOP High Risk Evolution (HRE) trigger in PARAGON or in the manual evaluation trees is activated if certain conditions are present (e.g.,

repeated station power line trips, severe weather, Transmission Operator (TSO) maximum emergency generation actions, offsite circuit low voltage alarms, below minimum unit trip contingency voltage limits). If advance notice is given on any of these conditions that can trigger a LOOP HRE from organizations such as the TSO or weather forecasters, the risk is evaluated for the periods when the condition is expected to occur. If a LOOP HRE is activated, actions are taken to suspend any switchyard activities that may be in progress.

In addition, no discretionary switchyard maintenance will be performed on protected equipment. Equipment will be protected in accordance with procedure OP-AA-108-117, "Protected Equipment Program."

o) TS required systems, subsystems, trains, components, and devices that depend on the remaining power sources will be verified to be operable and positive measures will be provided to preclude subsequent testing or maintenance activities on these systems, subsystems, trains, components, and devices.

See response to requirement Item n above. The remaining operable offsite circuit, DGs, and SBO line will be controlled as protected equipment. PBAPS will continue to operate the facility in accordance with approved technical specifications.

p) BWR Steam-driven emergency feedwater pump(s) (in the case of PWR units) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling and High-Pressure Coolant injection systems (in case of BWR units) will be controlled as protected equipment.

PBAPS is a Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) unit. HPCI and RCIC pumps on the operating units will be controlled as protected equipment for the duration of the Completion Time period.

Risk Analysis Insights A supporting risk assessment was performed and demonstrates that the reliability of offsite power is not significantly impacted during the proposed extension of the Completion Time from seven (7) days to 21 days.

This section provides Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) information to support t h e temporary one-time extension in the Completion Time for TS 3.8.1, Required Action A.3. 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4), "Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of License Amendment Request Technical Specification Section 3.8.1 Completion Time Extension DPR-44 and DPR-56 Page 20 of 32 Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants," requires that prior to performing maintenance activities, risk assessments shall be performed to assess and manage the increase in risk that may result from proposed maintenance activities. These requirements are applicable for all plant modes. The proposed License Amendment Request (LAR) will not result in any changes to the current configuration risk management program. The existing program uses a blended approach of quantitative and qualitative evaluation of each configuration assessed. Thus, the overall change in plant risk during maintenance activities is anticipated to be addressed adequately considering the proposed amendment.

This LAR is not a risk-informed request and, therefore, a risk evaluation is not required. This LAR is based on a deterministic evaluation centered on meeting BTP 8-8. However, to provide additional information, Exelon is providing risk insights related to the proposed change.

Although this technical analysis is based on a deterministic evaluation, a risk analysis was performed that demonstrated with reasonable assurance that the proposed TS changes are within the current risk acceptance guidelines in RG 1.177, "An Approach for Plant-Specific, Risk-Informed Decision making: Technical Specifications," for one-time changes. This ensures that the TS change meets the intent of the Incremental Conditional Core Damage Probability (ICCDP) and Incremental Conditional Large Early Release Probability (ICLERP) acceptance guidelines of 1.0E-05 (actual 3E-06 for Unit 2 and 1E-06 for Unit 3) and 1.0E-06 (actual 1E-07 for Unit 2 and 4E-07 for Unit 3), respectively. These guidelines were established for compatibility with the ICCDP and ICLERP limits of RG 1.177, which is applicable for configuration changes that require normal work controls. This acceptance guideline requires compensatory measures be implemented during the extended Completion Time, which are discussed in Attachment 3. The risk analysis was based on the ICCDP and ICLERPs for the unavailability of the 00A20 4kV Bus and the 00X11 343 Startup Transformer, which represents the plant configuration during the replacement of the 27 electrical cables that connect the 3EA Emergency Auxiliary Transformer to the J-58 junction box serving the 3SU-E 4.16 kV feed switchgear. The analysis was performed for each unit. No credit for additional proposed Risk Management Actions (RMAs) was given in the risk analysis. The configuration during the 3EA Transformer cable replacement impacts the electrical support system via the logic in the PRA model.

The identification of the RMAs was derived from a detailed review of the results of the risk assessment. None of the RMAs were credited in the base risk analysis; however, the identified compensatory actions would further lessen the overall risk incurred during the extended periods.

The additional compensatory actions that are outlined in Attachment 3 provide additional assurance that the risk associated with the Completion Time extension will be minimized.

License Amendment Request Technical Specification Section 3.8.1 Completion Time Extension DPR-44 and DPR-56 Page 21 of 32 Compensatory Actions PBAPS will implement several compensatory actions during the temporary one-time TS Completion Time extension to minimize risk to the station. The operable offsite circuit transmission line will be protected by the Transmission System Operator (TSO). PBAPS will protect equipment as described in Section 4 requirements n), o),

and p). PBAPS will check the operability of the SBO line once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> (once per shift) in accordance with station procedures in addition to the required offsite circuit operability which will be performed once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> as required by TS 3.8.1 LCO Condition A, Required Action A.1.

During the extended LCO authorized by the proposed license amendment, Operations shift crews will be briefed at beginning of each shift regarding the actions in response to a LOOP per applicable plant procedures. Also, all required Fire RMAs will be performed in accordance with site procedures that fulfill the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4).

5.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

5.1 Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria The proposed changes have been evaluated to determine whether applicable regulations and requirements continue to be met. Exelon has determined that the proposed changes do not require any exemptions or relief from regulatory requirements from the following current applicable regulations and regulatory requirements, which were reviewed in making this determination:

10 CFR 50.36, Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.36(c) provides that TS will include (LCOs which are "the lowest functional capability or performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of the facility. When a limiting condition for operation of a nuclear reactor is not met, the licensee will shut down the reactor or follow any remedial action permitted by the technical specifications until the condition can be met."

The proposed changes involve extending the Completion Time for TS 3.8.1 Condition A, Required Action A.3 from 7 days hours to 21 days on a one-time basis. The LCO itself remains unchanged, as do the required remedial actions or shut down requirements in accordance with 10 CFR 50.36. In addition,10 CFR 50.36 requires that a licensee's TS be derived from the analyses and evaluation included in the safety analysis report. The proposed changes do not affect PBAPS's compliance with the intent of 10 CFR 50.36.

10 CFR 50.63, Loss of all alternating current 10 CFR 50.63 requires that light water-cooled nuclear power plants licensed to operate be able to withstand for a specified duration and recover from an SBO.

The proposed changes do not alter PBAPS's duration (coping time) nor affect its compliance with the intent of 10 CFR 50.63.

License Amendment Request Technical Specification Section 3.8.1 Completion Time Extension DPR-44 and DPR-56 Page 22 of 32 10 CFR 50.65, Requirements for monitoring the effectiveness of maintenance at nuclear power plants 10 CFR 50.65 requires that performing maintenance activities (including but not limited to surveillance, post-maintenance testing, and corrective and preventive maintenance), the licensee shall assess and manage the increase in risk that may result from the proposed maintenance activities. The scope of the assessment may be limited to structures, systems, and components that a risk-informed evaluation process has shown to be significant to public health and safety. The maintenance activities associated with this project will be assessed and the increased risk will be managed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4). The proposed changes do not affect PBAPSs compliance with the intent of 10 CFR 50.65.

10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants The regulations in Appendix A to 10 CFR 50 establish minimum principal design criteria for water-cooled nuclear power plants. The current regulatory requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, considered applicable to the proposed change are GDC 5 (Sharing of Structures, Systems, and Components), GDC 17 (Electric Power Systems), and GDC 18 (Inspection and Testing of Electric Power System).

During the initial plant licensing of PBAPS, Units 2 and 3, it was demonstrated that the design of the PBAPS electrical distribution system met the regulatory requirements in place at that time. The draft GDC published in 1967 included Criterion 4 (Sharing of Systems) and Criterion 39 (Emergency Power for Engineered Safeguards), which would be considered pertinent to the proposed change. The GDC included in Appendix A to 10 CFR 50 did not become effective until May 21, 1971. The Construction Permits for PBAPS, Units 2 and 3, were issued prior to May 21, 1971; consequently, PBAPS, Units 2 and 3, were not subject to current GDC requirements (SECY-92-223, dated September 18, 1992).

However, subsequent reviews of PBAPS conforms with the intent of the current GDC 5, GDC 17, and GDC 18 requirements.

GDC 5 - Sharing of Structures. Systems. and Components "Structures, systems, and components important to safety shall not be shared between nuclear power Units unless it can be shown that such sharing will not significantly impair their ability to perform their safety functions including, in the event of an accident in one Unit, an orderly shutdown and cooldown of the remaining Unit."

The proposed changes comply with the intent of GDC 5.

License Amendment Request Technical Specification Section 3.8.1 Completion Time Extension DPR-44 and DPR-56 Page 23 of 32 General Design Criterion 17 - Electric Power Systems GDC 17 requires an onsite electric power system and an offsite electric power system shall be provided to permit the functioning of structures, systems, and components important to safety. The safety function for each system (assuming the other system is not functioning) shall be to provide sufficient capacity and capability to assure that (1) specified acceptable fuel design limits and design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not exceeded as a result of anticipated operational occurrences and (2) the core is cooled and containment integrity and other vital functions are maintained in the event of postulated accidents.

The onsite electric power supplies, including the batteries, and the onsite electric distribution system shall have sufficient independence, redundancy, and testability to perform their safety functions assuming a single failure.

Electric power from the transmission network to the onsite electric distribution system shall be supplied by two physically independent circuits (not necessarily on separate rights of way) designed and located so as to minimize to the extent practical the likelihood of their simultaneous failure under operating and postulated accident and environmental conditions. A switchyard common to both circuits is acceptable. Each of these circuits shall be designed to be available in sufficient time following a loss of all onsite alternating current power supplies and the other offsite electric power circuit, to assure that specified acceptable fuel design limits and design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not exceeded. One of these circuits shall be designed to be available within a few seconds following a loss-of-coolant accident to assure that core cooling, containment integrity, and other vital safety functions are maintained. Provisions shall be included to minimize the probability of losing electric power from any of the remaining supplies as a result of, or coincident with, the loss of power generated by the nuclear power unit, the loss of power from the transmission network, or the loss of power from the onsite electric power supplies.

The proposed changes comply with the intent of GDC 17.

General Design Criterion 18, Inspection and testing of electrical power systems GDC-18 requires that electric power systems that are important to safety must be designed to permit appropriate periodic inspection and testing of important areas and features, such as insulation and connections to assess the continuity of the systems and the condition of their components.

The proposed changes comply with the intent of GDC 18.

License Amendment Request Technical Specification Section 3.8.1 Completion Time Extension DPR-44 and DPR-56 Page 24 of 32 Other GDC Criteria Considered General Design Criterion 34, Residual Heat Removal "A system to remove residual heat shall be provided. The system safety function shall be to transfer fission product decay heat and other residual heat from the reactor core at a rate such that specified acceptable fuel design limits and the design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not exceeded.

Suitable redundancy in components and features, and suitable interconnections, leak detection, and isolation capabilities shall be provided to assure that for onsite electric power system operation (assuming offsite power is not available) and for offsite electric power system operation (assuming onsite power is not available) the system safety function can be accomplished, assuming a single failure."

The proposed changes comply with the intent of GDC 34.

General Design Criterion 38 - Containment Heat Removal "A system to remove heat from the reactor containment shall be provided. The system safety function shall be to reduce rapidly, consistent with the functioning of other associated systems, the containment pressure and temperature following any loss-of-coolant accident and maintain them at acceptably low levels. Suitable redundancy in components and features, and suitable interconnections, leak detection, isolation, and containment capabilities shall be provided to assure that for onsite electric power system operation (assuming offsite power is not available) and for offsite electric power system operation (assuming onsite power is not available) the system safety function can be accomplished, assuming a single failure."

The proposed changes comply with the intent of GDC 38.

General Design Criterion 44, Cooling Water "A system to transfer heat from structures, systems, and components important to safety, to an ultimate heat sink shall be provided. The system safety function shall be to transfer the combined heat load of these structures, systems, and components under normal operating and accident conditions. Suitable redundancy in components and features, and suitable interconnections, leak detection, and isolation capabilities shall be provided to assure that for onsite electric power system operation (assuming offsite power is not available) and for offsite electric power system operation (assuming onsite power is not available) the system safety function can be accomplished, assuming a single failure."

The proposed changes comply with the intent of GDC 44.

License Amendment Request Technical Specification Section 3.8.1 Completion Time Extension DPR-44 and DPR-56 Page 25 of 32 Other Requirements/Guidance Considered 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants 10 CFR 50 Appendix B and the licensee quality assurance programs establish quality assurance requirements for the design, manufacture, construction, and operation of structures, systems, and components.

Regulatory Guide 1.93, Availability of Electric Power Sources Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.93 provides guidance with respect to operating restrictions, including AOTs, if the number of available onsite DGs and offsite power sources is less than that required by the TS. The proposed changes have been evaluated in accordance with RG 1.93 and have been found to be acceptable for extending the Completion Time to 21 days.

Regulatory Guide 1.155, Station Blackout RG 1.155 describes a method acceptable to the NRC staff for complying with the Commission regulation that requires nuclear power plants to be capable of coping with an SBO event for a specified duration. The proposed changes have been evaluated in accordance with RG 1.155 and have been found to be acceptable.

Regulatory Guide 1.174, An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.174 describes a risk-informed approach, acceptable to the NRC, for assessing the nature and impact of proposed permanent licensing-basis changes by considering engineering issues and applying risk insights. This regulatory guide also provides risk acceptance guidelines for evaluating the results of such evaluations. Although the proposed changes are being technically justified via a deterministic approach and this is not a risk informed submittal, the proposed changes have been evaluated in accordance with RG 1.174 and have been found to be acceptable.

Regulatory Guide 1.177, An Approach for Plant-Specific, Risk-Informed Decision-making: Technical Specifications RG 1.177 describes an acceptable risk-informed approach specifically for assessing proposed permanent TS changes in Completion Times. This regulatory guide also provides risk acceptance guidelines for evaluating the results of such evaluations.

One acceptable approach to making risk-informed decisions about proposed TS changes is to show that the proposed changes meet the five key safety principles stated in RG 1.174 and RG 1.177 shown below.

License Amendment Request Technical Specification Section 3.8.1 Completion Time Extension DPR-44 and DPR-56 Page 26 of 32

1. The proposed change meets the current regulations unless it is explicitly related to a requested exemption or rule change.

2. The proposed change is consistent with the defense-in-depth philosophy.

3. The proposed change maintains sufficient safety margins.

4. When proposed changes result in an increase in core-damage frequency (CDF) or risk, the increases should be small and consistent with the intent of the Commission's Safety Goal Policy Statement.

5. The impact of the proposed change should be monitored using performance measurement strategies.

Although the proposed changes are being technically justified via a deterministic approach and this is not a risk informed submittal, the proposed changes have been evaluated in accordance with RG 1.177 and have been found to be acceptable.

Regulatory Guide 1.200, An Approach for Determining the Technical Adequacy of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for Risk-Informed Activities RG 1.200, Revision 1, describes one acceptable approach for determining whether the quality of the PRA, in total or the parts that are used to support an application, is sufficient to provide confidence in the results, such that the PRA can be used in regulatory decision-making for light-water reactors. The guidance is intended to be consistent with the NRCs PRA Policy Statement and subsequent, more detailed, guidance in RG 1.174. It is also intended to reflect and endorse guidance provided by standards-setting and nuclear industry organizations. In RG 1.200, as in RG 1.174, the quality of a PRA analysis used to support an application is measured in terms of its appropriateness with respect to scope, level of detail, and technical acceptability.

Although the proposed changes are being technically justified via a deterministic approach and this is not a risk informed submittal, the proposed changes have been evaluated in accordance with RG 1.200 and have been found to be acceptable.

NUREG 0800, Branch Technical Position (BTP) 8-8, Onsite (Emergency Diesel Generators) and Offsite Power Sources Allowed Outage Time Extensions The NRC evaluates AOT extension requests for onsite or offsite power sources to allow on-line maintenance on DGs that would normally be performed during refueling outages or maintenance of offsite power source(s) such as a transformer or bus. The on-line maintenance can help reduce the risk for loss of power during plant refueling outages when refueling activities are conducted. The NRC evaluates the licensees request for AOT extensions from deterministic as well as PRA perspectives.

Consistent with the Commissions final policy statement, it is expected that a license amendment request for an onsite or offsite AOT extension will contain a License Amendment Request Technical Specification Section 3.8.1 Completion Time Extension DPR-44 and DPR-56 Page 27 of 32 PRA assessment. However, this BTP specifically discusses the defense-in-depth aspects for onsite and offsite power sources from a deterministic perspective. A supplemental power source should be available as a backup to the inoperable DG or offsite power source, to maintain the defense-in-depth design philosophy of the electrical system to meet its intended safety function. The supplemental source must have capacity to bring a unit to safe shutdown (cold shutdown) in case of a LOOP concurrent with a single failure during plant operation (Mode 1).

NUREG-1784, "Operating Experience Assessment - Effects of Grid Events on Nuclear Power Plant Performance," dated December 2003, notes the changes in electric grid performance post-deregulation, and that the duration of LOOP events has increased and the probability of a LOOP, as a consequence of a reactor trip, has increased. This evaluation was done before the August 14, 2003, blackout in the Northeast. The lessons learned from this blackout event indicate that restoration of offsite power will take longer than previously considered, indicating that post-deregulation conditions challenge grid reliability. The NRC's objective of requiring an extra (i.e., supplemental) power source for an inoperable EDG or offsite power source is to avoid a potential extended SBO event during the period of an extended AOT and to enable safe shutdown (cold shutdown) of a unit if normal power sources cannot be restored in a timely manner.

PBAPS meets the intent of BTP-8-8 by proposing additional DID actions and procedures and using a currently installed AAC power source (SBO line) to provide supplemental AC power to station Emergency Buses, as required to compensate for inoperable AC sources. Additional DID strategies include use of FLEX pumps and Diesel Generators (at 480 V Load Center level) to support safety functions following a LOOP.

In conclusion, based on the considerations discussed above, (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

5.2 Precedent Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 - Issuance of Amendment Re:

Revision to Technical Specification 3.8.1, AC Sources-Operating, for Extension of the Completion Time for the Offsite Circuits on a One-Time Basis from 72 Hours to 14 Days (TAC Nos. ME2546 and ME2547), dated October 29, 2010 (ML102810130).

Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2 - Issuance of Amendment for Technical Specification 3.8.1, AC (Alternating Current) Sources-Operating One-Time Extension of Emergency Diesel Generator Completion Times and Suspension of Surveillance Requirements (Emergency Situation) (EPID L-2017-LLA-0392), dated November 26, 2017 (ML17328B072).

License Amendment Request Technical Specification Section 3.8.1 Completion Time Extension DPR-44 and DPR-56 Page 28 of 32 Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2 - Issuance of Amendments Revising Technical Specifications Section 3.16, "Emergency Power System," for a Temporary 21-Day Allowed Outage Time, dated October 5, 2018 (ML18261A099).

5.3 No Significant Hazards Consideration Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, "Application for amendment of license, construction permit, or early site permit," Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon) is requesting amendments to Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56 for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS), Units 2 and 3, respectively, in the form of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS). Specifically, Exelon is requesting a temporary one-time extension of the Completion Time for Technical Specifications (TS) Section 3.8.1, "AC Power - Operating."

Condition A.3, from seven (7) days to 21 days. This temporary one-time TS change is needed to allow sufficient time to perform physical modification work to replace 27 cables from the 3EA Emergency Auxiliary Transformer to the J-58 junction box serving a 4.16 kV switchgear. Exelon has concluded that the proposed changes to PBAPS, Units 2 and 3, TS Section 3.8.1, to extend the Completion Time of Required Action A.3 on a temporary one-time basis from seven (7) days to 21 days does not involve a Significant Hazards Consideration.

Exelon has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed changes in accordance with the three (3) standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, Issuance of amendment, as discussed below.

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

No. The proposed temporary one-time change to extend the Completion Time for TS 3.8.1, Required Action A.3, will not increase the probability of an accident, since the proposed Completion Time extension in the time duration that one qualified offsite circuit is out of service has no direct physical impact on the plant.

The proposed inoperable offsite circuit limits the available redundancy of the offsite electrical system to a period not to exceed 21 days. Therefore, the proposed TS change does not have a direct impact on the plant that would make an accident more likely to occur due to extended Completion Time. Other sources of offsite and onsite power remain available.

During transients or events which require these systems/subsystems to be operating, there is sufficient capacity in the operable systems/subsystems to support plant operation or shutdown. Therefore, failures that are accident initiators will not occur more frequently than previously postulated as a result of the proposed temporary one-time TS change.

In addition, the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) will not be increased. With one offsite circuit inoperable, the consequences of any postulated accidents License Amendment Request Technical Specification Section 3.8.1 Completion Time Extension DPR-44 and DPR-56 Page 29 of 32 occurring on Unit 2 or Unit 3 during the proposed one-time Completion Time extension are bounded by the previous analyses as described in the UFSAR.

The minimum equipment required to mitigate the consequences of an accident and/or safely shut down the plant will be operable or available during the extended Completion Time period of 21 days.

A risk evaluation has also been performed for the temporary one-time 21-day Completion Time extension. The evaluation concluded that the probability of a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) for the proposed configuration is very low.

Therefore, the proposed change does not significantly increase the probability of an accident previously evaluated because: a) the emergency buses continue to be fed from a reliable offsite source and; b) the effect of the proposed configuration on the probability of a LOOP is very low.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed change create possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

No. The proposed temporary one-time change to extend the Completion Time for TS 3.8.1, Required Action A.3, will not create the possibility of a new or different type of accident since it will only extend the time period that one of the offsite circuits can be out of service; the extension of the time duration for one offsite circuit being inoperable has no direct physical impact on the plant and does not create any new accident initiators. Other sources of offsite and onsite power remain available. The systems involved are accident mitigation systems.

The possible impacts that the inoperable equipment may have on supported systems was previously analyzed in the UFSAR. The impact of inoperable support systems was also previously assessed, and any accident initiators created by the inoperable systems were evaluated. Extending the duration of the Completion Time does not create any additional accident initiators for the plant.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

No. The existing TS Completion Time limit of seven (7) days for one offsite circuit inoperable was established to ensure that sufficient safety-related equipment is available for response to all accident conditions and that sufficient decay heat removal capability is available for a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) coincident with a LOOP on one unit and simultaneous safe shutdown of the other unit. Although a very slight reduction in the margin of safety might be incurred during the proposed one-time extended Completion Time period, this slight reduction is judged to be minimal due to the low probability of an event License Amendment Request Technical Specification Section 3.8.1 Completion Time Extension DPR-44 and DPR-56 Page 30 of 32 occurring during the extended period. Other sources of offsite and onsite power remain available and operable during the 21-day extended period along with maintaining the availability of essential Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)/decay heat removal capability. The very slight reduction in the margin of safety resulting from extending the Completion Time from seven (7) days to 21 days when an offsite circuit is inoperable is not considered significant, since the remaining operable offsite circuit, the emergency Diesel Generators (DGs),

the Station Blackout (SBO) line, and the FLEX DGs are available and provide an effective defense-in-depth plan to support the station electrical plant configurations during the extended 21-day Completion Time period.

The proposed TS change to extend the Completion Time does not affect the acceptance criteria for any analyzed event, nor is there a change to any safety limit. The proposed TS change does not affect any Structures, Systems or Components (SSC) or their capability to perform their intended functions. The proposed change does not alter the manner in which safety limits, limiting safety system settings, or limiting conditions for operation are determined. Neither the safety analyses nor the safety analysis acceptance criteria are affected by this change. The proposed change will not result in plant operation in a configuration outside the current design basis. The margin of safety is maintained by maintaining the capability to supply emergency buses with a redundant, separate, reliable offsite power source, and maintaining the onsite power sources in their design basis configuration.

Operations personnel are fully qualified and trained to respond to, and mitigate, a Design Basis Accident (DBA), including actions needed to ensure decay heat removal systems are available while PBAPS, Units 2 and 3, are in the operational electrical configurations described within this submittal. Accordingly, existing procedures are in place that address safe plant shutdown and decay heat removal for situations applicable during the extended one-time Completion Time period.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

5.4 Conclusions There are no changes being proposed in this amendment application such that commitments to the regulatory requirements and guidance documents above would come into question. The evaluations documented above confirm that PBAPS will continue to comply with all applicable regulatory requirements.

In conclusion, based on the considerations discussed above, (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or the health and safety of the public.

License Amendment Request Technical Specification Section 3.8.1 Completion Time Extension DPR-44 and DPR-56 Page 31 of 32 Based on the above evaluation, Exelon concludes that the proposed amendment presents no significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, paragraph (c), and accordingly, a finding of no significant hazards consideration is justified.

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

A review has determined that the proposed amendment would change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR 20, or would change an inspection or surveillance requirement. However, the proposed amendment does not involve: (i) a significant hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types or a significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite, or (iii) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the proposed amendment meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed amendment.

7.0 REFERENCES

1. NUREG-0800, Branch Technical Position (BTP) 8-8, Onsite (Emergency Diesel Generators) and Offsite Power Sources Allowed Outage Time Extensions, dated February 2012.

2. Regulatory Guide 1.160, Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 3, dated May 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML113610098)

3. CC-AA-309-101, Engineering Technical Evaluations

4. IEEE Standard 400.2-2013, IEEE Guide for Field testing of Shielded Power Cable Systems Using Very Low Frequency (VLF)

5. IEEE Standard 1185-2010, IEEE Recommended Practice for Cable Installation in Generating Stations and Industrial Facilities

6. EPRI Aging Management Program for MV Cable Medium-Voltage Cable Systems for Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 1

7. SE-11, Loss of Offsite Power

8. SE-11.1, Operating Station Blackout Line During A Loop Event License Amendment Request Technical Specification Section 3.8.1 Completion Time Extension DPR-44 and DPR-56 Page 32 of 32

9. SO 52A.1.B Diesel Generator Operations

10. UFSAR Section 8.4, Auxiliary Power Systems

11. OP-PB-102-106, Operator Response Time Program at Peach Bottom

12. ST-O-51H-201-2, Station Blackout Line 3.8.1 B.1 Verification

13. ST-O-51H-200-2, Station Blackout Line Operability Verification

14. ST-O-054-951-2, Offsite and Onsite Electrical Power Breaker Alignment and Power Availability Check with A Start Up Source and/or EDG Inoperable

15. WC-AA-101, On-line Work Control Process

16. WC-AA-104, Integrated Risk Management Program

17. Procedure OP-AA-108-117, Protected Equipment Program

18. Engineering Changes 625819, 626878, 627711

Attachment 2 Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2 and 3 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56 Markup of Technical Specifications Pages Unit 2 Unit 3 3.8-2 3.8-2

AC Sources Operating 3.8.1 ACTIONS

---

NOTE-----------------------------------------

LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to DGs.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One offsite circuit A.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> inoperable. for OPERABLE offsite circuits. AND Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter AND A.2 Declare required 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> from feature(s) with no discovery of no offsite power offsite power to available inoperable one 4 kV when the redundant emergency bus required feature(s) concurrent with are inoperable. inoperability of redundant required feature(s)

AND A.3 Restore offsite 7 days (*)

circuit to OPERABLE status.

(continued)

(*) Or 21 days, to support installation and testing of new electrical cables routed between the 3EA Emergency Auxiliary Transformer and the J-58 junction box serving the 3SU-E 4.16 kV feed switchgear. The work shall be completed by June 30, 2020.

Prior to entry into the 21-day extended Completion Time, the SBO Line (i.e., 33kV Conowingo AAC source) shall be verified available. During the 21-day Completion Time, the 33kV SBO Line shall be verified available once per shift.

If the SBO Line becomes unavailable after the initial seven (7) days while in the extended 21-day Completion Time period, it shall be made available within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, or the unit shall be brought to MODE 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and MODE 4 within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

PBAPS UNIT 2 3.8-2 Amendment No. 277XXX

AC Sources Operating 3.8.1 ACTIONS

---

NOTE ------------------------------------

LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to DGs.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One offsite circuit A.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> inoperable. for OPERABLE offsite circuits. AND Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter AND A.2 Declare required 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> from feature(s) with no discovery of no offsite power offsite power to available inoperable one 4 kV when the redundant emergency bus required feature(s) concurrent with are inoperable. inoperability of redundant required feature(s)

AND A.3 Restore offsite 7 days (*)

circuit to OPERABLE status.

(continued)

(*) Or 21 days, to support installation and testing of new electrical cables routed between the 3EA Emergency Auxiliary Transformer and the J-58 junction box serving the 3SU-E 4.16 kV feed switchgear. The work shall be completed by June 30, 2020.

Prior to entry into the 21-day extended Completion Time, the SBO Line (i.e., 33kV Conowingo AAC source) shall be verified available. During the 21-day Completion Time, the 33kV SBO Line shall be verified available once per shift.

If the SBO Line becomes unavailable after the initial seven (7) days while in the extended 21-day Completion Time period, it shall be made available within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, or the unit shall be brought to MODE 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and MODE 4 within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

PBAPS UNIT 3 3.8-2 Amendment No. 280XXX

Attachment 3 Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2 and 3 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56 Summary of Regulatory Commitments License Amendment Request Technical Specification Section 3.8.1 Completion Time Extension Summary of Regulatory Commitments DPR-44 and DPR-56 Page 1 of 3

SUMMARY

OF REGULATORY COMMITMENTS The following table identifies commitments made in this document related to the compensatory measures that will be implemented in support of the temporary one-time Technical Specifications (TS) change to extend the Completion Time associated with TS 3.8.1, Required Action A.3. (Any other actions discussed in the submittal represent intended or planned actions. They are described to the NRC for the NRCs information and are not regulatory commitments.)

COMMITMENT TYPE COMMITTED DATE COMMITMENT OR "OUTAGE" ONE-TIME ACTION PROGRAMMATIC (YES/NO) (YES/NO)

All Emergency Diesel Prior to entering Yes Generators (EDG) will be the temporary tested in accordance with one-time 21-day SO 52A.1.B, "Diesel extended Generator Operations," Completion Time within 30 days prior to entry period.

into the temporary one-time 21-day CT period.

ST-O-51H-200-2, "Station Prior to entering Yes Blackout Line Operability the temporary Verification," will be one-time 21-day performed to verify the extended operability of the Station Completion Time Blackout (SBO) line within period.

30 days prior to entry into the temporary one-time 21-day Completion Time period.

Operability of the SBO line Throughout the Yes will be verified once per one-time 21-day shift in accordance with extended station procedures. Completion Time period.

License Amendment Request Technical Specification Section 3.8.1 Completion Time Extension Summary of Regulatory Commitments DPR-44 and DPR-56 Page 2 of 3 COMMITMENT TYPE COMMITTED DATE COMMITMENT OR "OUTAGE" ONE-TIME ACTION PROGRAMMATIC (YES/NO) (YES/NO)

Preplanned maintenance Throughout the Yes affecting Emergency Diesel one-time 21-day Generators (EDG) or extended operable offsite circuits will Completion Time be assessed within existing period.

process to ensure that station Operations will not authorize performance of pre-planned maintenance affecting EDGs or operating offsite circuits during the temporary one-time 21-day extended Completion Time period if severe adverse weather conditions are expected.

During physical Throughout the Yes modifications for 3EA one-time 21-day Transformer cable extended replacement, Operations Completion Time will contact the grid period.

operator (Load Dispatcher) once per day during the temporary one-time 21-day Completion Time period to ensure no significant grid disturbances are expected during the extended Completion Time period.

No discretionary switchyard Throughout the Yes maintenance will be one-time 21-day performed on protected extended equipment. Equipment will Completion Time be protected in accordance period.

with OP-AA-108-117, "Protected Equipment Program."

License Amendment Request Technical Specification Section 3.8.1 Completion Time Extension Summary of Regulatory Commitments DPR-44 and DPR-56 Page 3 of 3 COMMITMENT TYPE COMMITTED DATE COMMITMENT OR "OUTAGE" ONE-TIME ACTION PROGRAMMATIC (YES/NO) (YES/NO)

Peach Bottom will not Throughout the Yes conduct any discretionary one-time 21-day testing or maintenance of extended safety systems and Completion Time important non-safety period.

equipment in the offsite power systems during the temporary one-time 21-day extended Completion Time period.

Operations will perform ST- Throughout the Yes O-054-951-2, "Offsite and one-time 21-day Onsite Electrical Power extended Breaker Alignment and Completion Time Power Availability," check period.

with a Start-up Source and/or EDG Inoperable,"

every 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> during the temporary one-time 21-day extended Completion Time period.

Operations will protect High Throughout the Yes Pressure Coolant Injection one-time 21-day (HPCI) and Reactor Core extended Isolation Cooling (RCIC). Completion Time period.

This is a temporary one-time change during the performance of the electrical cable replacement modification work between the 3EA Emergency Auxiliary Transformer and the J-58 junction box serving the 3SU-E 4.16 kV feed switchgear for Peach Bottom, Units 2 and 3.

ATTACHMENT 4 License Amendment Request Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2 and 3 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56 4.16 kV Emergency Power Line-up Diagrams

4KV Emergency Power U3 13KV SU BUS U2 13KV SU BUS Lineup during CT Period 3 SU-E 2 SU-E OPEN Breaker Position CLOSE 3 EMER 2 EMER AUX XFMR AUX XFMR 3 SU-E 4KV Feed Area of Cable Replacement E12 BUS E22 BUS E32 BUS E42 BUS E312 E12 E212 E322 E22 E222 E332 E32 E232 E342 E42 E242 E313 E13 E213 E323 E23 E223 E333 E33 E233 E343 E43 E243 E13 BUS E23 BUS E33 BUS E43 BUS 2 SU-E 4KV Feed

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...\_u000t4k\simo\e1s1.pbs.0022 Mar. 21, 2019 13:39:29 ATTACHMENT 5 License Amendment Request Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2 and 3 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56 3EA Transformer Cable Replacement Project Schedule Cable Replacement Project Schedule Page 1 of 1 3EA Transformer Cable Replacement Project Schedule Activity Estimated Task Estimated Project Task Duration Finish No. Start Date (Hours) Date 1 Apply Tag Outs 21 11/13/19 11/14/19 Contingent: Duct Bank Repair Excavate, Form, Set 2 72 11/14/19 11/17/19 and Pour Mobilize and Access Manholes, Transformer and 3 6 11/17/19 11/17/19 Switchgear 4 Perform Asfound Testing 18 11/17/19 11/18/19 5 Cut and Remove Cables 56 11/18/19 11/20/19 6 Inspect and Clean Out Conduits 27 11/20/19 11/21/19 Contingent: Modify Rigging Set Points for Pull 7 24 11/21/19 11/22/19 Calculations 8 Pull New Cables 72 11/22/19 11/25/19 9 Install Stress Cone Terminations 66 11/25/19 11/28/19 10 Perform Asleft Testing 28 11/28/19 11/2919 11 Contingent: Retesting 8 11/29/19 11/29/19 12 Contingent: Weather Impacts 24 11/29/19 11/30/19 13 Reterminate Cables 42 11/30/19 12/02/19 14 Remove Tagout and Perform Acceptance Testing 24 12/02/19 12/03/19 Total 3EA Transformer Cable Replacement Work 488 11/13/19 12/03/19

ATTACHMENT 6 License Amendment Request Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2 and 3 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56 Load Tables - PBAPS 1E Switchgear Schedule

Attachment 6 Load Tables - PBAPS 1E Switchgear Schedule Calculation PE-0205 Load Study for The Station Auxiliary Power System PBAPS provides loading on each major bus of the station Auxiliary power system. Load tabulations below are made for each Motor Control Center, Load Center, and Switchgear corresponding to various Plant operating modes. Results of this calculation are used to determine loading on the Unit Auxiliary transformers, Start-Up transformers, and Emergency Auxiliary transformers and forms the basis for the short circuit and voltage regulation studies.

Load Tabulation:

See pages below.

Page 1

PBAPS 1E SWTG SCHEDULE CALC PE-0205 PAGE : 1 of 4 Attachment 1 REV : 9 PAGE DATE :

PRINT DATE : 3/27/2019 BUS : 20A015 / E12 BUS LOADING KVA AMPS @ 4160 V VOLTAGE : 4160 V START-UP 415.52 57.67 LOCATION : E12 EMERGENCY AUXILIARY SWITCHGEAR NORMAL OPERATION 413.18 57.34 NORMAL SHUTDOWN 651.08 90.36 SOURCE BUS : LONGTERM SHUTDOWN 2244.57 311.52 FEEDER BKR : UNIT TRIP 2190.69 304.04 BKR SETTING : LOCA T = 0 Sec 536.01 74.39 CABLE AMPACITY : T < 600 Sec 2858.46 396.71 T > 600 Sec 3185.55 442.11 MARGIN

SUMMARY

( LOADING VS RATING ) :

SU NO NS LS UT LOCA 0s <600s >600s

% FEEDER BKR LOADING

% CABLE LOADING Refer to calculation text for Bus Specific Comments CALC PE-0205 As-Designed Calculations Used 2

CALC PE-0205 PAGE : 2 of 4 Plant : PBAPS Attachment 1 REV : 9 BUS : 20A015 / E12 PRINT DATE : 3/27/2019 PAGE DATE :

SU NO NS LS UT L1 L2 L3 BKR EQUIP LOAD HP/ PF Rated Rated NO NO DESCRIPTION KVA EFF RUN KW KVAR LF OC LF OC LF OC LF OC LF OC LF OC LF OC LF OC 1501 00A020 BUS FEED 1502 2AP039-DR CRD WTR PP 250 0.88 0.9 211.93 102.64 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 1 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1503 0AG012 E1 DIESEL GENERATOR 1504 2AP037-DR CORE SPRAY PUMP 600 0.93 0.87 481.29 272.76 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 1 1.00 0 1505 E124 FEEDER FOR BUS: E124 1506 2AP035-DR RHR PUMP 2000 0.93 0.91 1604.30 730.94 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 1 1.00 1 1.00 0 1.00 1 1.00 1 1507 2AP042-DR HP SERVICE WTR PP 1000 0.93 0.9 802.15 388.50 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 1 1508 00A019 BUS FEED CALC PE-0205 As-Designed Calculations Used 3

CALC PE-0205 PAGE : 3 of 4 Plant : PBAPS Attachment 1 REV : 9 BUS : 20A015 / E12 PRINT DATE : 3/27/2019 PAGE DATE :

START-UP NORMAL OP NORM S/D LONG S/D BKR EQUIP LOAD NO NO DESCRIPTION KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA 1501 00A020 BUS FEED 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1502 2AP039-DR CRD WTR PP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 211.93 102.64 235.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 1503 0AG012 E1 DIESEL GENERATOR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1504 2AP037-DR CORE SPRAY PUMP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1505 E124 FEEDER FOR BUS: E124 367.19 194.51 415.52 365.27 193.12 413.18 367.46 194.36 415.70 429.21 219.29 481.99 1506 2AP035-DR RHR PUMP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1604.30 730.94 1762.97 1507 2AP042-DR HP SERVICE WTR PP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1508 00A019 BUS FEED 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Totals 367.19 194.51 415.52 365.27 193.12 413.18 579.39 297.01 651.08 2033.51 950.24 2244.57 CALC PE-0205 As-Designed Calculations Used 4

CALC PE-0205 PAGE : 4 of 4 Plant : PBAPS Attachment 1 REV : 9 BUS : 20A015 / E12 PRINT DATE : 3/27/2019 PAGE DATE :

UNIT TRIP LOCA T = 0 Sec LOCA T < 600 Sec LOCA T > 600 Sec BKR EQUIP LOAD NO NO DESCRIPTION KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA 1501 00A020 BUS FEED 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1502 2AP039-DR CRD WTR PP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1503 0AG012 E1 DIESEL GENERATOR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1504 2AP037-DR CORE SPRAY PUMP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 481.29 272.76 553.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 1505 E124 FEEDER FOR BUS: E124 377.67 202.27 428.43 480.24 238.07 536.01 486.99 242.33 543.96 476.12 236.49 531.62 1506 2AP035-DR RHR PUMP 1604.30 730.94 1762.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 1604.30 730.94 1762.97 1604.30 730.94 1762.97 1507 2AP042-DR HP SERVICE WTR PP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 802.15 388.50 891.28 1508 00A019 BUS FEED 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Totals 1981.97 933.22 2190.69 480.24 238.07 536.01 2572.58 1246.04 2858.46 2882.57 1355.93 3185.55 CALC PE-0205 As-Designed Calculations Used 5

PBAPS 1E SWTG SCHEDULE CALC PE-0205 PAGE : 1 of 4 Attachment 1 REV : 9 PAGE DATE :

PRINT DATE : 3/27/2019 BUS : 30A015 / E13 BUS LOADING KVA AMPS @ 4160 V VOLTAGE : 4160 V START-UP 324.31 45.01 LOCATION : E13 EMERGENCY AUXILIARY SWITCHGEAR NORMAL OPERATION 320.89 44.54 NORMAL SHUTDOWN 340.29 47.23 SOURCE BUS : LONGTERM SHUTDOWN 2080.36 288.72 FEEDER BKR : UNIT TRIP 2101.53 291.66 BKR SETTING : LOCA T = 0 Sec 363.29 50.42 CABLE AMPACITY : T < 600 Sec 2682.73 372.33 T > 600 Sec 3015.70 418.54 MARGIN

SUMMARY

( LOADING VS RATING ) :

SU NO NS LS UT LOCA 0s <600s >600s

% FEEDER BKR LOADING

% CABLE LOADING Refer to calculation text for Bus Specific Comments CALC PE-0205 As-Designed Calculations Used 6

CALC PE-0205 PAGE : 2 of 4 Plant : PBAPS Attachment 1 REV : 9 BUS : 30A015 / E13 PRINT DATE : 3/27/2019 PAGE DATE :

SU NO NS LS UT L1 L2 L3 BKR EQUIP LOAD HP/ PF Rated Rated NO NO DESCRIPTION KVA EFF RUN KW KVAR LF OC LF OC LF OC LF OC LF OC LF OC LF OC LF OC 1501 00A020 BUS FEED 0.00 0.00 1502 E13A4 FEEDER FOR BUS: E13A4 1503 0AG012 E1 DIESEL GENERATOR 1504 3AP037-DR CORE SPRAY PUMP 600 0.93 0.87 481.29 272.76 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 1 1.00 0 1505 E134 FEEDER FOR BUS: E134 1506 3AP035-DR RHR PUMP 2000 0.93 0.91 1604.30 730.94 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 1 1.00 1 1.00 0 1.00 1 1.00 1 1507 3AP042-DR HP SERVICE WTR PP 1000 0.93 0.9 802.15 388.50 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 1 1508 00A019 BUS FEED CALC PE-0205 As-Designed Calculations Used 7

CALC PE-0205 PAGE : 3 of 4 Plant : PBAPS Attachment 1 REV : 9 BUS : 30A015 / E13 PRINT DATE : 3/27/2019 PAGE DATE :

START-UP NORMAL OP NORM S/D LONG S/D BKR EQUIP LOAD NO NO DESCRIPTION KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA 1501 00A020 BUS FEED 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1502 E13A4 FEEDER FOR BUS: E13A4 14.59 7.33 16.33 14.59 7.33 16.33 14.59 7.33 16.33 14.59 7.33 16.33 1503 0AG012 E1 DIESEL GENERATOR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1504 3AP037-DR CORE SPRAY PUMP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1505 E134 FEEDER FOR BUS: E134 266.33 154.72 308.01 263.39 152.98 304.59 279.34 164.14 324.00 260.82 153.12 302.45 1506 3AP035-DR RHR PUMP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1604.30 730.94 1762.97 1507 3AP042-DR HP SERVICE WTR PP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1508 00A019 BUS FEED 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Totals 280.92 162.05 324.31 277.98 160.31 320.89 293.93 171.47 340.29 1879.71 891.39 2080.36 CALC PE-0205 As-Designed Calculations Used 8

CALC PE-0205 PAGE : 4 of 4 Plant : PBAPS Attachment 1 REV : 9 BUS : 30A015 / E13 PRINT DATE : 3/27/2019 PAGE DATE :

UNIT TRIP LOCA T = 0 Sec LOCA T < 600 Sec LOCA T > 600 Sec BKR EQUIP LOAD NO NO DESCRIPTION KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA 1501 00A020 BUS FEED 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1502 E13A4 FEEDER FOR BUS: E13A4 14.59 7.33 16.33 14.59 7.33 16.33 14.59 7.33 16.33 14.59 7.33 16.33 1503 0AG012 E1 DIESEL GENERATOR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1504 3AP037-DR CORE SPRAY PUMP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 481.29 272.76 553.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 1505 E134 FEEDER FOR BUS: E134 279.09 164.01 323.71 302.26 170.40 346.98 306.74 173.76 352.54 301.23 170.79 346.28 1506 3AP035-DR RHR PUMP 1604.30 730.94 1762.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 1604.30 730.94 1762.97 1604.30 730.94 1762.97 1507 3AP042-DR HP SERVICE WTR PP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 802.15 388.50 891.28 1508 00A019 BUS FEED 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Totals 1897.98 902.28 2101.53 316.85 177.73 363.29 2406.92 1184.79 2682.73 2722.27 1297.56 3015.70 CALC PE-0205 As-Designed Calculations Used 9

PBAPS 1E SWTG SCHEDULE CALC PE-0205 PAGE : 1 of 4 Attachment 1 REV : 9 PAGE DATE :

PRINT DATE : 3/27/2019 BUS : 20A016 / E22 BUS LOADING KVA AMPS @ 4160 V VOLTAGE : 4160 V START-UP 343.00 47.60 LOCATION : E22 EMERGENCY AUXILIARY SWITCHGEAR NORMAL OPERATION 316.26 43.89 NORMAL SHUTDOWN 343.00 47.60 SOURCE BUS : LONGTERM SHUTDOWN 359.94 49.96 FEEDER BKR : UNIT TRIP 325.83 45.22 BKR SETTING : LOCA T = 0 Sec 332.46 46.14 CABLE AMPACITY : T < 600 Sec 3005.49 417.12 T > 600 Sec 1196.61 166.07 MARGIN

SUMMARY

( LOADING VS RATING ) :

SU NO NS LS UT LOCA 0s <600s >600s

% FEEDER BKR LOADING

% CABLE LOADING Refer to calculation text for Bus Specific Comments CALC PE-0205 As-Designed Calculations Used 10

CALC PE-0205 PAGE : 2 of 4 Plant : PBAPS Attachment 1 REV : 9 BUS : 20A016 / E22 PRINT DATE : 3/27/2019 PAGE DATE :

SU NO NS LS UT L1 L2 L3 BKR EQUIP LOAD HP/ PF Rated Rated NO NO DESCRIPTION KVA EFF RUN KW KVAR LF OC LF OC LF OC LF OC LF OC LF OC LF OC LF OC 1601 00A020 BUS FEED 1602 2BP035-DR RHR PUMP 2000 0.93 0.91 1604.30 730.94 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 1 1.00 0 1603 0AP057-DR EMER SERV WTR PP 250 0.91 0.85 204.95 127.01 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 1 1.00 1 1604 2BP037-DR CORE SPRAY PUMP 600 0.93 0.87 481.29 272.76 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 1 1.00 1 1605 E224 FEEDER FOR BUS: E224 1606 0BG012 E2 DIESEL GEN 1607 2BP042-DR HP SERVICE WTR PP 1000 0.93 0.9 802.15 388.50 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1608 00A019 BUS FEED 1609 0AP163-DR ESW BSTR PP 250 0.91 0.85 204.95 127.01 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 CALC PE-0205 As-Designed Calculations Used 11

CALC PE-0205 PAGE : 3 of 4 Plant : PBAPS Attachment 1 REV : 9 BUS : 20A016 / E22 PRINT DATE : 3/27/2019 PAGE DATE :

START-UP NORMAL OP NORM S/D LONG S/D BKR EQUIP LOAD NO NO DESCRIPTION KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA 1601 00A020 BUS FEED 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1602 2BP035-DR RHR PUMP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1603 0AP057-DR EMER SERV WTR PP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1604 2BP037-DR CORE SPRAY PUMP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1605 E224 FEEDER FOR BUS: E224 296.14 173.06 343.00 272.63 160.29 316.26 296.14 173.06 343.00 309.48 183.80 359.94 1606 0BG012 E2 DIESEL GEN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1607 2BP042-DR HP SERVICE WTR PP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1608 00A019 BUS FEED 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1609 0AP163-DR ESW BSTR PP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Totals 296.14 173.06 343.00 272.63 160.29 316.26 296.14 173.06 343.00 309.48 183.80 359.94 CALC PE-0205 As-Designed Calculations Used 12

CALC PE-0205 PAGE : 4 of 4 Plant : PBAPS Attachment 1 REV : 9 BUS : 20A016 / E22 PRINT DATE : 3/27/2019 PAGE DATE :

UNIT TRIP LOCA T = 0 Sec LOCA T < 600 Sec LOCA T > 600 Sec BKR EQUIP LOAD NO NO DESCRIPTION KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA 1601 00A020 BUS FEED 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1602 2BP035-DR RHR PUMP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1604.30 730.94 1762.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 1603 0AP057-DR EMER SERV WTR PP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 204.95 127.01 241.11 204.95 127.01 241.11 1604 2BP037-DR CORE SPRAY PUMP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 481.29 272.76 553.21 481.29 272.76 553.21 1605 E224 FEEDER FOR BUS: E224 280.74 165.37 325.83 284.50 172.02 332.46 389.61 229.35 452.11 346.93 203.92 402.42 1606 0BG012 E2 DIESEL GEN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1607 2BP042-DR HP SERVICE WTR PP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1608 00A019 BUS FEED 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1609 0AP163-DR ESW BSTR PP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Totals 280.74 165.37 325.83 284.50 172.02 332.46 2680.15 1360.07 3005.49 1033.17 603.69 1196.61 CALC PE-0205 As-Designed Calculations Used 13

PBAPS 1E SWTG SCHEDULE CALC PE-0205 PAGE : 1 of 4 Attachment 1 REV : 9 PAGE DATE :

PRINT DATE : 3/27/2019 BUS : 30A016 / E23 BUS LOADING KVA AMPS @ 4160 V VOLTAGE : 4160 V START-UP 568.90 78.96 LOCATION : E23 EMERGENCY AUXILIARY SWITCHGEAR NORMAL OPERATION 556.98 77.30 NORMAL SHUTDOWN 567.74 78.80 SOURCE BUS : LONGTERM SHUTDOWN 549.23 76.23 FEEDER BKR : UNIT TRIP 565.29 78.45 BKR SETTING : LOCA T = 0 Sec 605.24 84.00 CABLE AMPACITY : T < 600 Sec 2979.49 413.51 T > 600 Sec 1197.47 166.19 MARGIN

SUMMARY

( LOADING VS RATING ) :

SU NO NS LS UT LOCA 0s <600s >600s

% FEEDER BKR LOADING

% CABLE LOADING Refer to calculation text for Bus Specific Comments CALC PE-0205 As-Designed Calculations Used 14

CALC PE-0205 PAGE : 2 of 4 Plant : PBAPS Attachment 1 REV : 9 BUS : 30A016 / E23 PRINT DATE : 3/27/2019 PAGE DATE :

SU NO NS LS UT L1 L2 L3 BKR EQUIP LOAD HP/ PF Rated Rated NO NO DESCRIPTION KVA EFF RUN KW KVAR LF OC LF OC LF OC LF OC LF OC LF OC LF OC LF OC 1601 00A020 BUS FEED 1602 3BP035-DR RHR PUMP 2000 0.93 0.91 1604.30 730.94 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 1 1.00 0 1603 3AP039-DR CRD WTR PP 250 0.88 0.9 211.93 102.64 1.00 1 1.00 1 1.00 1 1.00 1 1.00 1 1.00 1 1.00 1 1.00 1 1604 3BP037-DR CORE SPRAY PUMP 600 0.93 0.87 481.29 272.76 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 1 1.00 1 1605 E234 FEEDER FOR BUS: E234 1606 0BG012 E2 DIESEL GEN 1607 3BP042-DR HP SERVICE WTR PP 1000 0.93 0.9 802.15 388.50 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1608 00A019 BUS FEED 1609 E23A4 FEEDER FOR BUS: E23A4 CALC PE-0205 As-Designed Calculations Used 15

CALC PE-0205 PAGE : 3 of 4 Plant : PBAPS Attachment 1 REV : 9 BUS : 30A016 / E23 PRINT DATE : 3/27/2019 PAGE DATE :

START-UP NORMAL OP NORM S/D LONG S/D BKR EQUIP LOAD NO NO DESCRIPTION KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA 1601 00A020 BUS FEED 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1602 3BP035-DR RHR PUMP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1603 3AP039-DR CRD WTR PP 211.93 102.64 235.48 211.93 102.64 235.48 211.93 102.64 235.48 211.93 102.64 235.48 1604 3BP037-DR CORE SPRAY PUMP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1605 E234 FEEDER FOR BUS: E234 243.18 143.67 282.45 233.09 138.06 270.91 242.29 142.89 281.29 233.65 119.31 262.35 1606 0BG012 E2 DIESEL GEN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1607 3BP042-DR HP SERVICE WTR PP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1608 00A019 BUS FEED 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1609 E23A4 FEEDER FOR BUS: E23A4 45.98 23.05 51.43 45.73 22.71 51.06 45.98 23.05 51.43 45.98 23.05 51.43 Totals 501.09 269.36 568.90 490.75 263.42 556.98 500.20 268.58 567.74 491.56 245.00 549.23 CALC PE-0205 As-Designed Calculations Used 16

CALC PE-0205 PAGE : 4 of 4 Plant : PBAPS Attachment 1 REV : 9 BUS : 30A016 / E23 PRINT DATE : 3/27/2019 PAGE DATE :

UNIT TRIP LOCA T = 0 Sec LOCA T < 600 Sec LOCA T > 600 Sec BKR EQUIP LOAD NO NO DESCRIPTION KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA 1601 00A020 BUS FEED 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1602 3BP035-DR RHR PUMP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1604.30 730.94 1762.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 1603 3AP039-DR CRD WTR PP 211.93 102.64 235.48 211.93 102.64 235.48 211.93 102.64 235.48 211.93 102.64 235.48 1604 3BP037-DR CORE SPRAY PUMP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 481.29 272.76 553.21 481.29 272.76 553.21 1605 E234 FEEDER FOR BUS: E234 240.32 141.35 278.81 286.20 141.90 319.44 338.81 170.31 379.20 321.96 158.84 359.01 1606 0BG012 E2 DIESEL GEN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1607 3BP042-DR HP SERVICE WTR PP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1608 00A019 BUS FEED 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1609 E23A4 FEEDER FOR BUS: E23A4 45.98 23.05 51.43 45.23 22.05 50.32 45.23 22.05 50.32 45.23 22.05 50.32 Totals 498.23 267.04 565.29 543.36 266.59 605.24 2681.56 1298.70 2979.49 1060.41 556.29 1197.47 CALC PE-0205 As-Designed Calculations Used 17

PBAPS 1E SWTG SCHEDULE CALC PE-0205 PAGE : 1 of 4 Attachment 1 REV : 9 PAGE DATE :

PRINT DATE : 3/27/2019 BUS : 20A017 / E32 BUS LOADING KVA AMPS @ 4160 V VOLTAGE : 4160 V START-UP 517.64 71.84 LOCATION : E32 EMERGENCY AUXILIARY SWITCHGEAR NORMAL OPERATION 516.88 71.74 NORMAL SHUTDOWN 518.53 71.96 SOURCE BUS : LONGTERM SHUTDOWN 1463.83 203.16 FEEDER BKR : UNIT TRIP 1404.53 194.93 BKR SETTING : LOCA T = 0 Sec 485.32 67.36 CABLE AMPACITY : T < 600 Sec 3044.19 422.49 T > 600 Sec 1524.66 211.60 MARGIN

SUMMARY

( LOADING VS RATING ) :

SU NO NS LS UT LOCA 0s <600s >600s

% FEEDER BKR LOADING

% CABLE LOADING Refer to calculation text for Bus Specific Comments CALC PE-0205 As-Designed Calculations Used 18

CALC PE-0205 PAGE : 2 of 4 Plant : PBAPS Attachment 1 REV : 9 BUS : 20A017 / E32 PRINT DATE : 3/27/2019 PAGE DATE :

SU NO NS LS UT L1 L2 L3 BKR EQUIP LOAD HP/ PF Rated Rated NO NO DESCRIPTION KVA EFF RUN KW KVAR LF OC LF OC LF OC LF OC LF OC LF OC LF OC LF OC 1701 00A020 BUS FEED 1702 2CP035-DR RHR PUMP 2000 0.93 0.91 1604.30 730.94 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 1 1.00 0 1703 2CP037-DR CORE SPRAY PUMP 600 0.93 0.87 481.29 272.76 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 1 1.00 0 1704 20A017 E3 DIESEL GEN 1705 E324 FEEDER FOR BUS: E324 1706 0BP057-DR EMER SERV WTR PP 250 0.91 0.85 204.95 127.01 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 1 1.00 1 1707 2CP042-DR HP SERVICE WTR PP 1000 0.93 0.9 802.15 388.50 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 1 1.00 1 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 1 1708 00A019 BUS FEED 1709 0BP163-DR ESW BSTR PP 250 0.91 0.85 204.95 127.01 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 1 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 CALC PE-0205 As-Designed Calculations Used 19

CALC PE-0205 PAGE : 3 of 4 Plant : PBAPS Attachment 1 REV : 9 BUS : 20A017 / E32 PRINT DATE : 3/27/2019 PAGE DATE :

START-UP NORMAL OP NORM S/D LONG S/D BKR EQUIP LOAD NO NO DESCRIPTION KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA 1701 00A020 BUS FEED 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1702 2CP035-DR RHR PUMP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1703 2CP037-DR CORE SPRAY PUMP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1704 20A017 E3 DIESEL GEN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1705 E324 FEEDER FOR BUS: E324 452.61 251.19 517.64 452.11 250.52 516.88 453.52 251.39 518.53 290.87 161.31 332.61 1706 0BP057-DR EMER SERV WTR PP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1707 2CP042-DR HP SERVICE WTR PP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 802.15 388.50 891.28 1708 00A019 BUS FEED 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1709 0BP163-DR ESW BSTR PP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 204.95 127.01 241.11 Totals 452.61 251.19 517.64 452.11 250.52 516.88 453.52 251.39 518.53 1297.97 676.83 1463.83 CALC PE-0205 As-Designed Calculations Used 20

CALC PE-0205 PAGE : 4 of 4 Plant : PBAPS Attachment 1 REV : 9 BUS : 20A017 / E32 PRINT DATE : 3/27/2019 PAGE DATE :

UNIT TRIP LOCA T = 0 Sec LOCA T < 600 Sec LOCA T > 600 Sec BKR EQUIP LOAD NO NO DESCRIPTION KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA 1701 00A020 BUS FEED 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1702 2CP035-DR RHR PUMP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1604.30 730.94 1762.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 1703 2CP037-DR CORE SPRAY PUMP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 481.29 272.76 553.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 1704 20A017 E3 DIESEL GEN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1705 E324 FEEDER FOR BUS: E324 449.47 248.81 513.74 425.78 232.90 485.32 430.02 235.19 490.13 346.95 185.32 393.34 1706 0BP057-DR EMER SERV WTR PP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 204.95 127.01 241.11 204.95 127.01 241.11 1707 2CP042-DR HP SERVICE WTR PP 802.15 388.50 891.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 802.15 388.50 891.28 1708 00A019 BUS FEED 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1709 0BP163-DR ESW BSTR PP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Totals 1251.62 637.31 1404.53 425.78 232.90 485.32 2720.55 1365.90 3044.19 1354.04 700.83 1524.66 CALC PE-0205 As-Designed Calculations Used 21

PBAPS 1E SWTG SCHEDULE CALC PE-0205 PAGE : 1 of 4 Attachment 1 REV : 9 PAGE DATE :

PRINT DATE : 3/27/2019 BUS : 30A017 / E33 BUS LOADING KVA AMPS @ 4160 V VOLTAGE : 4160 V START-UP 273.78 38.00 LOCATION : E33 EMERGENCY AUXILIARY SWITCHGEAR NORMAL OPERATION 273.41 37.95 NORMAL SHUTDOWN 519.03 72.03 SOURCE BUS : LONGTERM SHUTDOWN 1062.98 147.53 FEEDER BKR : UNIT TRIP 1162.45 161.33 BKR SETTING : LOCA T = 0 Sec 228.68 31.74 CABLE AMPACITY : T < 600 Sec 2551.80 354.15 T > 600 Sec 1070.97 148.64 MARGIN

SUMMARY

( LOADING VS RATING ) :

SU NO NS LS UT LOCA 0s <600s >600s

% FEEDER BKR LOADING

% CABLE LOADING Refer to calculation text for Bus Specific Comments CALC PE-0205 As-Designed Calculations Used 22

CALC PE-0205 PAGE : 2 of 4 Plant : PBAPS Attachment 1 REV : 9 BUS : 30A017 / E33 PRINT DATE : 3/27/2019 PAGE DATE :

SU NO NS LS UT L1 L2 L3 BKR EQUIP LOAD HP/ PF Rated Rated NO NO DESCRIPTION KVA EFF RUN KW KVAR LF OC LF OC LF OC LF OC LF OC LF OC LF OC LF OC 1701 E333 BUS FEED 1702 3CP035-DR RHR PUMP 2000 0.93 0.91 1604.30 730.94 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 1 1.00 0 1703 3CP037-DR CORE SPRAY PUMP 600 0.93 0.87 481.29 272.76 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 1 1.00 0 1704 0CG012 E3 DIESEL GEN 1705 E334 FEEDER FOR BUS: E334 1706 3BP039-DR CRD PUMP 250 0.9 0.85 207.22 128.43 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 1 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1707 3CP042-DR HP SERVICE WTR PP 1000 0.93 0.9 802.15 388.50 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 1 1.00 1 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 1 1708 E233 BUS FEED CALC PE-0205 As-Designed Calculations Used 23

CALC PE-0205 PAGE : 3 of 4 Plant : PBAPS Attachment 1 REV : 9 BUS : 30A017 / E33 PRINT DATE : 3/27/2019 PAGE DATE :

START-UP NORMAL OP NORM S/D LONG S/D BKR EQUIP LOAD NO NO DESCRIPTION KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA 1701 E333 BUS FEED 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1702 3CP035-DR RHR PUMP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1703 3CP037-DR CORE SPRAY PUMP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1704 0CG012 E3 DIESEL GEN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1705 E334 FEEDER FOR BUS: E334 246.49 119.15 273.78 246.24 118.82 273.41 248.40 120.18 275.94 155.89 72.02 171.72 1706 3BP039-DR CRD PUMP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 207.22 128.43 243.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 1707 3CP042-DR HP SERVICE WTR PP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 802.15 388.50 891.28 1708 E233 BUS FEED 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Totals 246.49 119.15 273.78 246.24 118.82 273.41 455.62 248.60 519.03 958.04 460.52 1062.98 CALC PE-0205 As-Designed Calculations Used 24

CALC PE-0205 PAGE : 4 of 4 Plant : PBAPS Attachment 1 REV : 9 BUS : 30A017 / E33 PRINT DATE : 3/27/2019 PAGE DATE :

UNIT TRIP LOCA T = 0 Sec LOCA T < 600 Sec LOCA T > 600 Sec BKR EQUIP LOAD NO NO DESCRIPTION KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA 1701 E333 BUS FEED 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1702 3CP035-DR RHR PUMP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1604.30 730.94 1762.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 1703 3CP037-DR CORE SPRAY PUMP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 481.29 272.76 553.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 1704 0CG012 E3 DIESEL GEN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1705 E334 FEEDER FOR BUS: E334 244.35 117.60 271.17 205.96 99.37 228.68 213.13 104.24 237.26 163.33 74.99 179.72 1706 3BP039-DR CRD PUMP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1707 3CP042-DR HP SERVICE WTR PP 802.15 388.50 891.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 802.15 388.50 891.28 1708 E233 BUS FEED 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Totals 1046.50 506.09 1162.45 205.96 99.37 228.68 2298.72 1107.94 2551.80 965.48 463.48 1070.97 CALC PE-0205 As-Designed Calculations Used 25

PBAPS 1E SWTG SCHEDULE CALC PE-0205 PAGE : 1 of 4 Attachment 1 REV : 9 PAGE DATE :

PRINT DATE : 3/27/2019 BUS : 20A018 / E42 BUS LOADING KVA AMPS @ 4160 V VOLTAGE : 4160 V START-UP 714.66 99.19 LOCATION : E42 EMERGENCY AUXILIARY SWITCHGEAR NORMAL OPERATION 714.28 99.13 NORMAL SHUTDOWN 716.83 99.49 SOURCE BUS : LONGTERM SHUTDOWN 539.87 74.93 FEEDER BKR : UNIT TRIP 714.66 99.19 BKR SETTING : LOCA T = 0 Sec 619.62 85.99 CABLE AMPACITY : T < 600 Sec 2938.47 407.82 T > 600 Sec 1115.10 154.76 MARGIN

SUMMARY

( LOADING VS RATING ) :

SU NO NS LS UT LOCA 0s <600s >600s

% FEEDER BKR LOADING

% CABLE LOADING Refer to calculation text for Bus Specific Comments CALC PE-0205 As-Designed Calculations Used 26

CALC PE-0205 PAGE : 2 of 4 Plant : PBAPS Attachment 1 REV : 9 BUS : 20A018 / E42 PRINT DATE : 3/27/2019 PAGE DATE :

SU NO NS LS UT L1 L2 L3 BKR EQUIP LOAD HP/ PF Rated Rated NO NO DESCRIPTION KVA EFF RUN KW KVAR LF OC LF OC LF OC LF OC LF OC LF OC LF OC LF OC 1801 00A020 BUS FEED 1802 2DP035-DR RHR PUMP 2000 0.93 0.91 1604.30 730.94 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 1 1.00 0 1803 2DP037-DR CORE SPRAY PUMP 600 0.93 0.87 481.29 272.76 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 1 1.00 1 1804 2DP042-DR HP SERVICE WTR PP 1000 0.93 0.9 802.15 388.50 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1805 2BP039-DR CRD WTR PP 250 0.88 0.9 211.93 102.64 1.00 1 1.00 1 1.00 1 1.00 1 1.00 1 1.00 1 1.00 1 1.00 1 1806 E424 FEEDER FOR BUS: E424 1807 0DG012 E4 DIESEL GEN 1808 00A019 BUS FEED CALC PE-0205 As-Designed Calculations Used 27

CALC PE-0205 PAGE : 3 of 4 Plant : PBAPS Attachment 1 REV : 9 BUS : 20A018 / E42 PRINT DATE : 3/27/2019 PAGE DATE :

START-UP NORMAL OP NORM S/D LONG S/D BKR EQUIP LOAD NO NO DESCRIPTION KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA 1801 00A020 BUS FEED 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1802 2DP035-DR RHR PUMP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1803 2DP037-DR CORE SPRAY PUMP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1804 2DP042-DR HP SERVICE WTR PP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1805 2BP039-DR CRD WTR PP 211.93 102.64 235.48 211.93 102.64 235.48 211.93 102.64 235.48 211.93 102.64 235.48 1806 E424 FEEDER FOR BUS: E424 417.22 236.34 479.51 416.97 236.01 479.13 419.12 237.37 481.68 264.72 150.86 304.68 1807 0DG012 E4 DIESEL GEN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1808 00A019 BUS FEED 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Totals 629.15 338.99 714.66 628.90 338.66 714.28 631.06 340.02 716.83 476.65 253.50 539.87 CALC PE-0205 As-Designed Calculations Used 28

CALC PE-0205 PAGE : 4 of 4 Plant : PBAPS Attachment 1 REV : 9 BUS : 20A018 / E42 PRINT DATE : 3/27/2019 PAGE DATE :

UNIT TRIP LOCA T = 0 Sec LOCA T < 600 Sec LOCA T > 600 Sec BKR EQUIP LOAD NO NO DESCRIPTION KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA 1801 00A020 BUS FEED 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1802 2DP035-DR RHR PUMP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1604.30 730.94 1762.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 1803 2DP037-DR CORE SPRAY PUMP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 481.29 272.76 553.21 481.29 272.76 553.21 1804 2DP042-DR HP SERVICE WTR PP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1805 2BP039-DR CRD WTR PP 211.93 102.64 235.48 211.93 102.64 235.48 211.93 102.64 235.48 211.93 102.64 235.48 1806 E424 FEEDER FOR BUS: E424 417.22 236.34 479.51 333.65 191.07 384.49 337.89 193.36 389.30 285.05 159.79 326.79 1807 0DG012 E4 DIESEL GEN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1808 00A019 BUS FEED 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Totals 629.15 338.99 714.66 545.58 293.71 619.62 2635.41 1299.70 2938.47 978.28 535.19 1115.10 CALC PE-0205 As-Designed Calculations Used 29

PBAPS 1E SWTG SCHEDULE CALC PE-0205 PAGE : 1 of 4 Attachment 1 REV : 9 PAGE DATE :

PRINT DATE : 3/27/2019 BUS : 30A018 / E43 BUS LOADING KVA AMPS @ 4160 V VOLTAGE : 4160 V START-UP 389.02 53.99 LOCATION : E43 EMERGENCY AUXILIARY SWITCHGEAR NORMAL OPERATION 388.64 53.94 NORMAL SHUTDOWN 398.58 55.32 SOURCE BUS : LONGTERM SHUTDOWN 250.47 34.76 FEEDER BKR : UNIT TRIP 397.69 55.19 BKR SETTING : LOCA T = 0 Sec 378.68 52.56 CABLE AMPACITY : T < 600 Sec 2695.48 374.09 T > 600 Sec 912.23 126.60 MARGIN

SUMMARY

( LOADING VS RATING ) :

SU NO NS LS UT LOCA 0s <600s >600s

% FEEDER BKR LOADING

% CABLE LOADING Refer to calculation text for Bus Specific Comments CALC PE-0205 As-Designed Calculations Used 30

CALC PE-0205 PAGE : 2 of 4 Plant : PBAPS Attachment 1 REV : 9 BUS : 30A018 / E43 PRINT DATE : 3/27/2019 PAGE DATE :

SU NO NS LS UT L1 L2 L3 BKR EQUIP LOAD HP/ PF Rated Rated NO NO DESCRIPTION KVA EFF RUN KW KVAR LF OC LF OC LF OC LF OC LF OC LF OC LF OC LF OC 1801 E343 BUS FEED 1802 3DP035-DR RHR PUMP 2000 0.93 0.91 1604.30 730.94 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 1 1.00 0 1803 3DP037-DR CORE SPRAY PUMP 600 0.93 0.87 481.29 272.76 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 1 1.00 1 1804 3DP042-DR HP SERVICE WTR PP 1000 0.93 0.9 802.15 388.50 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1805 E43A4 FEEDER FOR BUS: E43A4 1806 E434 FEEDER FOR BUS: E434 1807 0DG012 E4 DIESEL GEN 1808 E243 BUS FEED 1809 00P186-DR EMER CLG WTR PP 250 0.91 0.85 204.95 127.01 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 CALC PE-0205 As-Designed Calculations Used 31

CALC PE-0205 PAGE : 3 of 4 Plant : PBAPS Attachment 1 REV : 9 BUS : 30A018 / E43 PRINT DATE : 3/27/2019 PAGE DATE :

START-UP NORMAL OP NORM S/D LONG S/D BKR EQUIP LOAD NO NO DESCRIPTION KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA 1801 E343 BUS FEED 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1802 3DP035-DR RHR PUMP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1803 3DP037-DR CORE SPRAY PUMP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1804 3DP042-DR HP SERVICE WTR PP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1805 E43A4 FEEDER FOR BUS: E43A4 2.55 1.72 3.08 2.55 1.72 3.08 2.55 1.72 3.08 2.55 1.72 3.08 1806 E434 FEEDER FOR BUS: E434 336.52 188.98 385.95 336.27 188.64 385.57 345.06 193.29 395.51 215.08 122.25 247.40 1807 0DG012 E4 DIESEL GEN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1808 E243 BUS FEED 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1809 00P186-DR EMER CLG WTR PP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Totals 339.07 190.69 389.02 338.82 190.36 388.64 347.61 195.01 398.58 217.64 123.97 250.47 CALC PE-0205 As-Designed Calculations Used 32

CALC PE-0205 PAGE : 4 of 4 Plant : PBAPS Attachment 1 REV : 9 BUS : 30A018 / E43 PRINT DATE : 3/27/2019 PAGE DATE :

UNIT TRIP LOCA T = 0 Sec LOCA T < 600 Sec LOCA T > 600 Sec BKR EQUIP LOAD NO NO DESCRIPTION KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA KW KVAR KVA 1801 E343 BUS FEED 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1802 3DP035-DR RHR PUMP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1604.30 730.94 1762.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 1803 3DP037-DR CORE SPRAY PUMP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 481.29 272.76 553.21 481.29 272.76 553.21 1804 3DP042-DR HP SERVICE WTR PP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1805 E43A4 FEEDER FOR BUS: E43A4 2.55 1.72 3.08 2.55 1.72 3.08 2.55 1.72 3.08 2.55 1.72 3.08 1806 E434 FEEDER FOR BUS: E434 344.15 193.09 394.62 328.16 182.73 375.61 330.90 183.62 378.43 312.14 171.14 355.98 1807 0DG012 E4 DIESEL GEN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1808 E243 BUS FEED 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1809 00P186-DR EMER CLG WTR PP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Totals 346.70 194.81 397.69 330.72 184.45 378.68 2419.05 1189.04 2695.48 795.98 445.62 912.23 CALC PE-0205 As-Designed Calculations Used 33