ML18239A241
| ML18239A241 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 08/03/2018 |
| From: | Vincent Gaddy Operations Branch IV |
| To: | Entergy Operations |
| References | |
| Download: ML18239A241 (27) | |
Text
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 Rev. 11 Facility: RBS Exam Date: 2018-07 1
2 3
Attributes 4
Job Content 5
6 Admin JPMs ADMIN Topic and K/A LOD (1-5)
U/E/
S Explanation I/C Cues Crit Scope Overlap Perf.
Key Minutia Job Link Focus Steps (N/B)
Std.
A1 CO 2.1.37 4
S
-Each JPM step should be numbered.
-Add if any to end of initiating cue.
[RBS 6/8/2018: Added if any to end of initiating cue Numbered each JPM step]
[RBS 6/27/2018: Corrected editorial comments and changed task standard to require six of the discrepancies.]
[NRC 7/3 - Ready to Administer]
A2 CO 2.1.7 2
X E
S
-Each JPM step should be numbered 1, 2,3 Also include the relevant procedure step in the action block eg 4.1.
[COMMON TO ALL JPMS]
-Steps 4.1 and 4.3.2 Task step standards need to be more specific to ensure that the applicant passes the JPM by calculating the right values.
4.1: Applicant determines that thermal power was less than 77.6% by calculating between 29 - 30% thermal power.
4.3.2: Applicant determines total loop flow in running loop is <
33 kgpm by calculating 7.00 kgpm.
[RBS 6/9/2018: made steps 4.1 and 4.3.2 task step standards more specific. Numbered steps and added procedure steps in action blocks of all JPMs ]
[RBS 6/27/2018: Corrected validation time. Corrected band for loop flow on answer key to 6.98 - 7.02.]
[NRC 7/3 - Ready to Administer]
A3 EC 2.2.14 1
U S
-On step 1 standard, explicitly list the 6 components which require posting.
-Its not clear to me where the applicant is deriving the correct answers for step 2, e.g. location / component.
-Task Standard is too generic. Need to be more specific than with sufficient detail. Include the specific 6 components in task standard, and documents location and type of posting in accordance with answer key.
-The RCIC doors need to somehow be differentiated - not appropriate to omit the door location from the critical portion of step.
-Given that this is an open reference portion of the exam, I dont think its appropriate to redact the Door Number / Area /
Component column of OSP-0022 Attachment 15. And given that, this seems to be direct lookup, e.g. little discriminatory value. Recommend a second part to this JPM exercising additional knowledge of station processes.
[RBS 6/10/2018: removed redacting from OSP-22 reference. Added the specific components to step one of
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 Rev. 11 the JPM. Made step two standard specific. Added an additional step to have the applicant explain how the protective posting is applied to the control room switches.]
[NRC 7/3 - Remove bullet at end of 1st initiating cue.
There is no Second Initiating Cue Sheet included with the JPM. Include and make a different color. ]
[RBS 7/10: Removed bullet at end of 1st initiating cue. The second initiating cue is a separate document that states on the cover page Print on different colored paper-no staples or holes. Also added a cue on step 2 that states When applicant completes documenting the protected equipment on the worksheet, provide him with Second Initiating Cue. (copied with different color paper as a separate document)]
[NRC 7/12 - The header on the 2nd initiating cue sheet says JPM A8 - fix to A3]
[RBS 7/13: header on 2nd cue corrected.]
A4 RC 2.3.7 2
S
-Why does step 1 direct examiner to tell applicant JPM Complete?
-Make identification of the correct task (2) critical.
[RBS 6/10/2018: revised evaluator cue in step 1 to None.
Revised trip ticket to indicate Task is a critical element by highlighting it in yellow.
[RBS 6/27/2018: Updated validation time to 15 minutes.
Changed task to be performed a visual inspection vice venting to remove water proof requirements. Step 1 defined single set of anti-Cs. Made the expected dose critical and gave a band 67-68 based on 30 minute estimated completion time.]
[NRC 7/3 - Ready to administer. Ensure RWP cover page does not say Inactive]
[RBS 7/10: Verified RWP cover sheet marked as ACTIVE]
A5 CO 2.1.37 4
X E
S
-Apply all changes to RO portion as directed in JPM A1.
-The SRO portion is not really administrative, it is operational in nature, EOP usage. Replace with an administrative task.
[RBS 6/14/2018: All changes to RO portion corrected. Still working on SRO task change.]
[RBS 6/15/2018: Added additional SRO task to develop plan to insert rods to meet separation criteria.]
[RBS 6/27/2018: Changed task standard rod requirements to be inserted and require 4 rods to be inserted.]
[NRC 7/3 - Make the below redactions to the task standard (highlighted):]
and identify six of the rod pattern discrepancies that do not meet the rod pattern criteria for meeting reactor
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 Rev. 11 shutdown status in accordance with the answer key.
Given initial conditions and references, Determine the minimum number of control rods on the Enclosure 26 Figure 2 Worksheet that need to be fully inserted to correct the separation criteria discrepancies. Applicant must identify on the worksheet a minimum of four control rods that need to be inserted per the Answer Key and as shown below.
[NRC 7/3 39 in task standard should be 36-29. Also remove the asterisk after 16-25]:
[36-17 OR 36-39]
[NRC 7/3 - on answer key, expand explanation near 36-29 and 40-33 to:
Must insert one of these rods for minimum, plus one rod in the adjacent perpendicular pair.
Ensure 2nd handout is a different color than first handout.
[RBS 7/10-18: Made redactions to the task standard to delete of the and a minimum of. Also deleted minimum of in step 3. Changed 36-39 to 36-29 in task standard and step 3. On answer key, expanded explanation near 36-29 and 40-33 to:
Must insert one of these rods for minimum, plus one rod in the adjacent perpendicular pair.]
[NRC 7/12 - on 2nd cue sheet and on the examiners file, capitalize and underline the word MINIMUM ]
[RBS 7/13: Capitalized and underlined the word MINIMUM on the 2nd cue sheet and the examiners file.]
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 Rev. 11 A6 CO 2.1.36 3
x E
S Remove ? at end of each sentence in Initiating Cues. They are directions not questions.
-I prefer not to just hand out to the applicants Tech Specs 3.3, 3.6, 3.9. Id prefer to have full copies of the tech specs available for the applicants for them to use as needed, and navigate based on their knowledge.
-On submittal of final exam, provide me with 2 files: The JPM file, and a single pdf file for each JPM that includes the handouts they will receive.
-Be more specific about the tech spec requirement in step 1 standard and evaluator note.
-Step 1 clarify that it is step 2.7 of ATTACHMENT 1, FUEL HANDLING PREREQUISITE CHECKLIST, which contains TS 3.3.1.2 guidance.
-Step 2, spell out OPDRV.
-Steps 1 and 2, include the requirement to IDENTIFY what requirement is satisfied or not satisfied, e.g. specific tech spec requirement.
-Task standard: add. As required by TS 3.3.1.2. and per TS 3.6.1.10 applicability
-Task Standard, removable should be removal
[RBS 6/10/2018: Removed ? at end of each sentence in Initiating Cues. Added in cue for applicant to identify what requirement is satisfied or not satisfied, e.g. specific tech spec requirement. Revised answer sheet and JPM steps to support identification of reference used. Revised task standard by adding. As required by TS 3.3.1.2. and per TS 3.6.1.10 applicability. Replaced removable with removal. Added to Step 1 that it is step 2.7 of ATTACHMENT 1, FUEL HANDLING PREREQUISITE CHECKLIST, which contains TS 3.3.1.2 guidance. Step 2 added that Attachment 2 title APPLICABLE MODE 5 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.]
[RBS 6/27/2018: Corrected editorial changes in overview.
Added FHP procedure to step 1 standard. Added tech spec insert after step 2. Added FHP to worksheet answer key.]
[NRC 7/3 - Ready to administer]
A7 EC 2.2.18 3
S
-Include the actual answers in the Task Standard, avoid just saying per key if avoidable. This is true for all JPMs where that is feasible; the verbiage of the task standard may be the most important part of the JPM.
-Include a marked up copy of Attachment 1, 2, 6 for examiner
[RBS 6/10/2018: -Included the actual answers in the Task Standard. Also revised A2 and A9 task standard and checked other admin JPMs and added specific answers where practical. Included excerpts under JPM steps of marked up copy of Attachment 1, 2, 6 and Overall Risk definition for examiner]
[RBS 6/27/2018: Validation time 15 minutes. Changed font on answer key to match handout.]
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 Rev. 11
[NRC 7/3 - Ready to administer]
A8 RC 2.3.4 2
E S
-For handouts that occur in stages, print them on different colored paper.
-Why is it necessary to tell the applicant based on 5 REM CDE guideline in the initiating cue? Should the applicant not know this?
-Non-action procedure comment: Duration of Exposure (minutes) axis is on a logarithmic scale?? Not the most user friendly.
-This JPM would be more discriminatory if the KI Administration Form had a YES answer circled to one or more of the questions regarding allergies, but the exposed individual DOES choose to take KI when approved. The applicant would have to know that he is not permitted to authorize KI administration without Radiological Coordinators or Radiological Assessment Coordinators authorization, per EIP-2-012.
[RBS 6/10/2018: Deleted based on 5 REM CDE Guideline.]
[RBS 6/27/2018: Corrected graph plot on step 1. Fixed second cue. Deleted 3rd cue. On the KI form changed shell fish to seafood.]
[NRC 7/3 - Ready to administer. Ensure cover sheets filled out and signed for all JPMs]
A9 EP 2.4.30 3
S
-Is applicant expected to fill out Event Notification Worksheet?
It would be cleaner if he/she was asked to check the applicable boxes and explain each answer on the Notification worksheet itself, rather than providing a separate answer sheet. Also more operationally valid.
[RBS 6/10/2018: Revised JPM to use NRC form 361 instead of Answer Sheet. Revised front matter, Cue, Steps, Standards, and Form 361 Answer Key to support this change. Deleted separate answer sheet.]
[RBS 6/27/2018: Answer key added X to first column.
Task standard changed OR to AND for RCIC AND Containment Isolation Signals. Corrected answer key the same.))
[NRC 7/3 - Ready to administer]
1 Simulator/
In-Plant Safety Function &
K/A JPMs S1 1 201003 A2.02 3
X E
S
-Every Step should have a JPM step as well, i.e. JPM Step 1, 2, 3.
-Put a colon after the procedure step number, before the verbiage.
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 Rev. 11
-Remove the repeated verbiage from step 7.3 in subsequent steps after 1. Just list STP-052-01 7.3.2, 7.3.3, ETC.
Common to subsequent steps and other JPMs.
-Will applicant be using control room copy of CONTROL ROD OVERTRAVEL alarm response procedure, or will examiner give him a copy? If so, make it a different color than initial handout.
-Is applicant expected to know to re-attempt to complete the surveillance after re-coupling rod? May need an examiner note after re-coupling to prompt applicant to re-attempt, if not.
-Make task standard more specific: Applicant successfully performs rod 16-29 repositioning from 48 to 46 and back to 48, attempts to withdraw past position 48 and identifies rod decoupling, recouples rod 16-29, and successfully completes rod coupling check.
[RBS 6/5/18: Added step numbers and colon after the procedure step number. Removed the repeated verbiage.
Added cue to prompt applicant to re-perform coupling check. Made standard more specific. The applicant will use the alarm response procedure in the simulator.]
[NRC 6/8: Terminating Cue at end of JPM should really say Termination Criteria. JPM otherwise ready for validation.]
[RBS 6/14/2018: Termination Criteria updated.]
[RBS 6/27/2018: Validation time 10 minutes. N/Ad partially withdrawn control rods on STP. Provided SOP-71 for coupling check in student handout.]
[NRC 7/5 - Step 13 cue, modify to If applicant does not re-perform coupling check, The CRS desires you to complete the surveillance. ]
[RBS 7/10: Updated step 13 cue.]
[NRC 7/12 - ready to administer]
S2 2 256000 A4.01 2
S
-Explain alt path in Task Overview.
-Include procedure step numbers and JPM step numbers.
-Include the procedure step number which directs checking and closing CNM-FV114 in the alt path.
[RBS 6/5/18: Explained alternate path in overview.
Included step numbers and procedure numbers for each item.]
[NRC 6/8: Add to end of task standard: prior to any Reactor Feedwater Pumps tripping. JPM otherwise ready for validation.]
[RBS 6/14/2018: Modified task standard.]
[RBS 6/27/2018: Added step 8 to close vent valve.]
[NRC 7/5 - Remove from step 7 the cue : JPM is complete when CNM-FV114 is placed in manual and closed. since there is now a step 8.]
[RBS 7/10: Changed cue in step 7 to N/A.]
[NRC 7/12 - ready to administer]
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 Rev. 11 S3 3 241000 A4.07 2
S
-Task standard needs to be more specific.
- Is there a surveillance completion sheet that the applicant can use to verify that surveillance requirement acceptance criteria are satisfied?
-Make step 8 critical.
[RBS 6/5/2018: Task standard modified to be more specific. Step 8 noted as critical step. The surveillance cover sheet has the signatures required to close out the surveillance. There is a flowchart that is used to properly fill out the coversheet and ensure all of the requirements are met. This form is used to document that the requirements are met, not a listing of the requirements.
The procedure states the requirements for each step and when the step is completed the operators will initial that the system responded as required per the procedure. The final review will verify that all of the blanks have been initialed and all of the required data is annotated.))
[NRC 6/8: When was new DEHC system installed? Specify the date in the task overview to highlight that this JPM tests on a plant priority, a new modification. Otherwise JPM appears ready for validation.]
[RBS 6/14/2018: Added information to task overview.]
[RBS 6/27/2018: Added clarification for step 10. May be completed performing A, B, or C. Corrected step 1.]
[NRC 7/5 - Step 10: on reflection, if the applicant has the ability to satisfy the step himself by performing 10.a or 10.b in the simulator, then that is preferable to cueing the applicant that step 10.c is completed locally. Eliminate the step 10.c language from the step standard, and change the cue to: If requested to perform step 10.c., inform the applicant that another operator is NOT immediately available to check relays at H13-P691 / -P692. The applicant will be expected to use process computer to satisfy 10.a or 10.b. Also remove reference to another operator standing by in the initiating cue.]
[RBS 7/10: Changed step 10 standard and cue. Removed note for 10.c. from initiating cue.]
[NRC 7/12 - remove 10.c was completed by another operator from step 11 standard. Change cue to Independent Verification completed.]
[RBS 7/13: Step 11 standard corrected.]
S4 4 209001 A1.01 3
E S
-What is the procedural direction that specifies the alternate path response? Required by NUREG 1021.
-notes: applicant may attempt to open the injection valve
[RBS 6/5/2018: Added procedural direction for the alternate response. Corrected note.]
[NRC 6/8: Put periods after the step numbers.
Add to step 3 standard, verified LPCS injection flow
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 Rev. 11 Step 4 reads as a separate alternate path. Is this intended? If so, it should be critical, and identified as alternate path #1, and described in the task overview, and the task standard updated accordingly Step 5: OSP-53 Attachment 5 is not listed as one of the handouts or references in the front matter. Is this supposed to be provided to the applicant by the examiner? Should the initiating cue direct the applicant to use this procedure to terminate HPCS injection?]
Step 6: This JPM is being performed by ROs and SROs alike, and reading EOPs is an SRO function. Therefore state in the initial conditions that EOP-1 Step RL-3 is being performed, and include the step verbiage and Table L-1.
Also include a cue: IF ASKED which table L-1 preferred injection system to use, state The CRS directs you to restore injection using the most expeditious preferred injection system available. ]
[RBS 6/14/2018: Formatting of step numbers is updated.
Updated step 3 standard. Step 4 was corrected as no longer an alternate path. There is no value added for this and depending on when the HPCS injection valve is closed, the applicant may not even recognize the min flow valve failed to close. OSP-53, Attachment 5 was added to handouts. Added cue to step 6 and added EOP information to turnover.]
[RBS 6/27/2018: Added to task standard prior to RPV water level reaching -162.]
[NRC 7-5: STEP 6 standard, modify to:
Once E22MOVF004 stroked fully closed, the applicant rotated the hand switch clockwise to the OPEN position to restore HPCS flow prior to RPV level reaching -162 ]
[RBS 7/10: Changed step 7 standard.]
[NRC 7/12 - ready to administer]
S5 5 223001 A1.08 2
S
-What was changed to make this modified?
-Make step 4 critical. Add and secures from Suppression Pool makeup lineup to the task standard.
[RBS 6/5/2018: Changed step 4 to critical. Corrected task standard to include secure lineup. The original bank JPM was an alternate path. HPCS tripped and required RCIC to be started to makeup suppression pool level.]
[NRC 6/8: JPM Step 4 reads as an alternate path, requiring the applicant to correct an automatic action that failed to occur. Is this intended? If so the JPM is alt path, Step 5 is critical, and the numbers on the outlines are different. I dont believe it is necessary for this to be an alt path JPM.]
[RBS 6/14/2018: Removed alternate path for min flow valve.]
[RBS 6/27/2018: Added SOP for swapping suctions to handout. Removed unnecessary initial conditions. Added
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 Rev. 11 evaluator note at the beginning to ensure only the digital display is used.]
[NRC 7-5: Step 6 standard: add, and fully closed valve]
[RBS 7/10: Corrected step 6 standard.]
[NRC 7/12 - ready to administer]
S6 7 212000 A4.01 2
S
-Title is Div I Manual Scram Pushbutton Functional Test.
-Task standard has to be more specific.
-Is there a surveillance sheet where the applicant verifies acceptance criteria are met?
[RBS 6/5/2018: Changed title. Made task standard more specific. Included surveillance coversheet with test procedure.]
[NRC 6/8: ok]
[RBS 6/27/2018: Made step 3 on page 8 critical and added requirement to task standard.]
[NRC 7-5: There are no JPM step numbers on each step, only procedure step numbers. Add JPM step numbers.]
[RBS 7/10: Added step numbers.]
[NRC 7/12 - ready to administer]
S7 8 223001 A2.01 3
E S
-This JPM is written as alternate path but is not credited as alt path on ES-301 JPM outline. It changes all the numbers, and exceeds the allowed number of alt path for SRO-Us.
-Place all the step 5.14.1 valves in a list in a single step and bold the valves that need to be manipulated.
-Clarify what the alternate path is in the task overview.
-Alt path seems to start earlier in the JPM than as listed in the guide.
[RBS 6/6/2018: Modified JPM to remove alternate path.
The task is still the same, but the faulted valves are no longer faulted. Placed all the step 5.14.1 valves in a single step. None of the valves require manipulations.]
[NRC 6/8: The results page, 8 of 9, is the page for JPM S-8, not S-9.]
[RBS 6/14/2018: Corrected page 8/9.]
[RBS 6/27/2018: Corrected title on page 4. Changed S8 to S7 on student handout.]
[NRC 7-5: ready to administer]
S8 9 233000 A4.04 2
S
-Why are the other valves in step 4.4.10 not included for manipulation in this JPM/\\? Are the manipulated locally?
[RBS 6/6/2018: Other valves in step 4.4.10 are operated locally.]
[NRC 6/8: ok]
[RBS 6/267/2018: New JPM. Updated task overview.
Added procedure note between steps 7 and 8. Added note for indications for alternate path. Added step 6.1.9.]
[NRC 7-5: ready to administer]
P1 5 219000 A1.02 3
S
-Task standard: RHR B is in service cooling the suppression pool at greater than 1100 gpm, in accordance with AOP-0031.
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 Rev. 11
[RBS 6/6/2018: Modified the task standard.]
[NRC 6/11: Step 8 (5.12.6), applicant will want to know what desired cooling is. Is the RHR HX B BYP VLV 48B as-found condition fully open?
Lets evaluate including in initiating cue to maximize suppression pool cooling or something equivalent, which would cue the applicant to fully close bypass valve, if thats operationally valid. This should be a critical step and the task standard adjusted accordingly. Otherwise recommend a direction for how much bypass valve should be throttled.]
[RBS 6/14/2018: Included in cue to maximize cooling.
Updated cue in front of JPM and turnover sheet. Also made step critical.]
[RBS 6/27/2018: Changed validation time to 10 minutes.
Step 2 Standard should be HX B not A. Added note for indications on step 7. Added requirements in setup to have keys ready for room to remote shutdown panels.]
[NRC 7/5 - Step 8 Standard, specify rotated counterclockwise to the fully closed position.
Step 8 cue: add RED light OFF and GREEN light ON (when fully closed).
Task Standard, add with RHR HX flow maximized, in accordance with AOP-0031]
[RBS 7/10: Updated step 8 standard and task standard.]
[NRC 7/12 - ready to administer]
P2 4 217000 A2.04 3
X E
S
-TIME CRITICAL - how many minutes have elapsed since reactor was scrammed? Some time would be required to egress the control room and get into the RCA. Operator wouldnt have a full 10 minutes after entering RCA.
[RBS 6/6/2018: Modified the task standard to allow 9 minutes 30 seconds to complete the task once in the RCA.]
[NRC 6/11: ok]
[RBS 6/27/2018: Corrected typo in cue.]
[NRC 7/5 - ready to administer]
P3 6 264000 A4.04 2
x E
S
-Need to reference the procedural direction for tripping the EDG, as required by NUREG 1021.
-Specify WHY the EDG is being started in the cue sheet.
[RBS 6/6/2018: Added to cue reason for diesel start. E22-PNLS001/A2 is the ARP required to be entered when the alternate path is entered. The first operator action listed is to verify the diesel generator has tripped.]
[NRC 6/11: Specify in Initial Conditions which procedure is in use (I know its below in Initiating Cue but makes sense to also have it in the first section being read).
Step 2: is there supposed to be a note? Says if.
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 Rev. 11 Is there a time frame by which the DG should be tripped to prevent damage?]
[RBS 6/14/2018: Added noun name to procedure in initial conditions and cue. There is not supposed to be note.
Moved the note to the cue section.
The time required to trip to prevent damage is something I will have to research and get back with you on.]
[RBS 6/27/2018: Validation time 8 minutes. Changed student handout for ARP to be single page not entire book. Marked up procedure 4.4.1-4.4.3. Added notes for step 3 for indications.]
[NRC 7/5 - Move the following part of the Step 2 Cue to Step 3 Cue instead: After 15 seconds of observing Engine Control Panel E22 PNLS001 indications, cue loud alarming condition and point E22-PNLS001/A2, OVERSPEED is lit. If applicant is in diesel room, cue applicant of alarming sound.
Also, cue the examiner to hand the applicant the E22-PNLS001/A2 ARP handout separately, after applicant locates ARP book, in step 3]
[RBS 7/10: Moved cue for alarming condition to step 3.
Added note for examiner to give ARP handout after book is located.]
[NRC 7/12 - remove in previous step from end of step 3 standard, since the alarm cue was moved to step 3]
[RBS 7/13: corrected standard for step 3.]
ES-301 12 Form ES-301-7 Rev. 11 Instructions for Completing This Table:
Check or mark any item(s) requiring a comment and explain the issue in the space provided using the guide below.
- 1.
Check each JPM for appropriate administrative topic requirements (COO, EC, Rad, and EP) or safety function requirements and corresponding K/A. Mark in column 1.
(ES-301, D.3 and D.4)
- 2.
Determine the level of difficulty (LOD) using an established 1-5 rating scale. Levels 1 and 5 represent an inappropriate (low or high) discriminatory level for the license that is being tested. Mark in column 2 (Appendix D, C.1.f)
- 3.
In column 3, Attributes, check the appropriate box when an attribute is not met:
The initial conditions and/or initiating cue is clear to ensure the operator understands the task and how to begin. (Appendix C, B.4)
The JPM contains appropriate cues that clearly indicate when they should be provided to the examinee. Cues are objective and not leading. (Appendix C, D.1)
All critical steps (elements) are properly identified.
The scope of the task is not too narrow (N) or too broad (B).
Excessive overlap does not occur with other parts of the operating test or written examination. (ES-301, D.1.a, and ES-301, D.2.a)
The task performance standard clearly describes the expected outcome (i.e., end state). Each performance step identifies a standard for successful completion of the step.
A valid marked up key was provided (e.g., graph interpretation, initialed steps for handouts).
- 4.
For column 4, Job Content, check the appropriate box if the job content flaw does not meet the following elements:
Topics are linked to the job content (e.g., not a disguised task, task required in real job).
The JPM has meaningful performance requirements that will provide a legitimate basis for evaluating the applicant's understanding and ability to safely operate the plant. (ES-301, D.2.c)
- 5.
Based on the reviewers judgment, is the JPM as written (U)nacceptable (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)nhancement, or (S)atisfactory? Mark the answer in column 5.
- 6.
In column 6, provide a brief description of any (U)nacceptable or (E)nhancement rating from column 5.
Save initial review comments and detail subsequent comment resolution so that each exam-bound JPM is marked by a (S)atisfactory resolution on this form.
ES-301 13 Form ES-301-7 Rev. 11 Facility: RBS Scenario: 1 Exam Date: 2018-07 1
2 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
10 Event Realism Cred.
Reqd Actions Verifiable actions LOD TS CTs Scen.
Overlap U/E/S Explanation
[RBS 6/27/2018: Added LCO 3.5.3 and HPCS as protected equipment to turn over sheet. Added TS 3.6.1.3 condition A to event #1. Added procedure titles as needed. Changed event 1 to instrument malfunction. Revise booth role play in event #1 for the failed instrument. Added note and protected equipment to page 11 and 12 for event #3. Added role play for high indication of condensate filter DP and inability to open CNM-AOV200 to bypass the filters.]
[NRC 7/6 - Event 1 D-1 and D-2 both need to be updated with TS 3.6.1.3, and 3.5.3.A removed due to already in the initial conditions. ]
[NRC 7/6 - CT-1 requires at least 7 SRVs be open to satisfy the CT. However in Scenario 3, CT-2 also requires an emergency depressurization, but contains background documentation justifying 5 SRVs as the minimum required to satisfy the CT. Compare the two and make them consistent with each other, if the justification for both is equivalent.]
[RBS 7/10:
Updated Event 1 D-1 and D-2 for tech specs.
Updated CT-1 to be similar to scenario 3 based on EPSTG guidance.]
[NRC 7/12 - Scenario ready for administration]
1 x
S
-What physical malfunction causes the alarms to come in / requires a RCIC trip? Specify.
Page 10 - what position performing actions?
-Why list actions of H13-P601/21A/A01 instead of H13-P601/21A/C01, which is the ARP the D-2 says the crew is responding to?
[RBS 6/7/2018: Added description of RCIC trip. Clarified position actions. Corrected ARP reference.]
[NRC 7/6 - Event 1 D-1 needs to be updated with TS 3.6.1.3, and 3.5.3.A removed due to already in the initial conditions.]
[RBS 7/10:
Updated Event 1 D-1 and D-2 for tech specs.]
2 S
-Use CRS under position, not SRO. Common to all.
-Is there any procedural guidance to bypass APRM, LPRM, Restore APRM, etc? This guidance is not in the ARPs referenced.
[RBS 6/7/2018: Replaced all references to CRS not SRO. Added note per EN-OP-115 that no procedure is required for routine actions such as bypassing nuclear instruments.]
[NRC 6/11: Specify who the CRS is directing to bypassLPRM 06-15D. Is this component physically modeled in the simulator?]
If APRM F is going to be returned to service, place it in bold as a verifiable action consistent with other parts of scenario guide. ]
[RBS 6/14/2018: Clarified roles for bypassing LPRM in D-2 and bolded verifiable actions.]
ES-301 14 Form ES-301-7 Rev. 11 3
DEC 14 S
- Not necessary to wait 5 minutes to make report back to CRS when directed in field. 1 or 2 minutes is sufficient.
-Are there actual procedure steps that direct the required response / power reduction? Include.
-Specify what OSP-53 is and the attachment #.
[RBS 6/7/2018: Changed time delay to 2 minutes for reports from the field. Clarified the guidance for power reduction per OSP-53.]
4 x
E S
-It seems like TS 3.8.9.E would take precedence since the DIV III Distribution system is INOP which is causing HPCS and SSW PP 2C to be INOP the required action of which is to enter TS 3.5.1.B and 3.7.1.E.
-Will crew consider entering TS 3.8.1.C due to Div III DG INOP?
-Re-evaluate the expected TS entries with the Operations rep.
-How long does crew have to trip the DG running without SSW?
-Is there not a Loss of Class 1E Bus abnormal operating procedure, to satisfy RG 1.33 6.c Loss of electrical power (and/or degraded power sources)?
[RBS 6/14/2018: Tech Spec 3.8.9 should be entered and then 3.5.1 and 3.7.1 entered. D-1 and D-2 have been updated. RBS has several AOPs regarding electrical malfunctions: AOP-4, Loss of Offsite Power; AOP-10, Loss of One RPS Bus; AOP-14, Loss of 125 VDC; AOP-50, Station Blackout; AOP-64, Degraded Grid; and AOP-65, Extended Loss of AC Power.]
[NRC 7/6 - During validation week it was determined that TS 3.5.3.B was also applicable due to 3.5.3.A no longer satisfied w/ HPCS unavailable. Need to add to D-1 and D-2]
[The D-1 only lists 2 of the applicable tech specs, and the scenario activities narrative on page 4 only lists 3 - all sections need to reflect all applicable tech specs]
[Was it determined why NNS SWGR 1C LOCKOUT occurred / corrected?]
[RBS 7/10: Verified all tech spec actions included in the D-1 and D-2. All sections have all 4 tech spec entry requirements. The NNS SWGR 1C LOCKOUT was the simulator malfunction used.
There is not currently a malfunction for the smaller bus. A DR will be written when the examination is complete to request additional electrical bus faults for individual buses.]
5 S
- Need to list the actual actions by step in the AOP-1, AOP-2, EOP-1, AOP-6 procedures.
[RBS 6/8/2018: Actions are listed by steps in procedures.]
[NRC 6/11: In other events, it appears that expected verifiable operator actions are bolded to separate them from non-action steps. If that is the intent, then be consistent and apply that to all events and all scenarios]
[RBS 6/14/2018: Verifiable actions have been bolded.]
6 x
DEC 14 E
S
--Include a list of ECCS initiations and isolations being verified? AOP-3 actions?
-Designate actions by the step number directing them, e.g. L-1, L-3, P-3, P-5 etc.
-Specify the start time for the 15 minute CT limit.
-You have steps for maximizing CRD and initiating SLC but dont state what is directing these actions to take place. *The D-2 needs to document the procedurally-directed response flowpath.*
-Dont call the enclosures Event 9, 10, 11, just refer to them as attachments. OK to have them at the end as you have done though.
-Include the titles of Encl 16, 20, 32 in the event 6 D-2
[RBS 6/8/2018: Created Attachment 1 for AOP-1 Initiation and Isolation Verifications. Added step numbers to actions in D-2. Enclosures are listed as attachments. Titles of enclosures are included in D-2. Added note to critical task for start of 15 minute timer.]
ES-301 15 Form ES-301-7 Rev. 11 GENERIC: Can there be an event-specific header which stays at the top of each page?
GENERIC: Events should be documented sequentially in the order steps are expected to occur, regardless if it results in a shift between operators from step to step. Do not just summarize the actions that each operator is expected to perform in one block, as has been done with event 1; List the procedure step being performed and who its being performed by. List the tech specs at the point in the event after the malfunction has occurred, after the malfunction has been addressed, typically at the end - not at beginning like with event 1.
GENERIC: Id like Procedural transitions to be more explicitly highlighted. Here is one example of how it could look:
[NRC 6/11: In other events, it appears that expected verifiable operator actions are bolded to separate them from non-action steps. If that is the intent, then be consistent and apply that to all events and all scenarios Label event 6 as Event No. 6 / 7 / 8. ]
[RBS 6/14/2018: Verifiable actions are bolded. Event 6 labeled as 6 / 7 / 8.]
7 x
S
-Make events 6,7,8 all one smooth flowing section. No need for separate sections for events 7 and 8 since they happen in parallel with event 6.
[RBS 6/8/2018: Events 6-8 are combined in D-2.]
8 S
-Make the termination criteria parameter-based. E.G. The scenario may be terminated when low pressure sources are injecting and restoring RPV level above -162 inches, or at lead examiner discretion.
[RBS 6/8/2018: Modified termination criteria.]
[NRC 6/11:
Identify the CTs as Critical Task 1 and 2. Its not necessary to repeat the critical task step after step include it in the step that ultimately accomplishes it.
Move the termination criteria to the end of event 6 / 7 / 8, before the attachments start.
GENERIC: Add the following verbiage to the Critical Task page. NOTE: An unintentional or unnecessary RPS or ESF actuation may result in the creation of a post-scenario Critical Task, if that actuation results in a significant plant degradation or significantly alters a mitigation strategy.]
[RBS 6/14/2018: Corrected CT annotations. Moved termination criteria. Critical Task Page has note.]
ES-301 16 Form ES-301-7 Rev. 11 GENERIC: Every event needs to have a transition criteria to the next event, e.g., Proceed to the next event when LPRM 06-15D is bypassed and APRM F is returned to service, or at Lead Examiners discretion.
GENERIC: There is a lot of excess white space in the D-2 guides. Use the page space better to reduce constant flipping of pages.
GENERIC: Add the following verbiage to the Critical Task page. NOTE: An unintentional or unnecessary RPS or ESF actuation may result in the creation of a post-scenario Critical Task, if that actuation results in a significant plant degradation or significantly alters a mitigation strategy.
ES-301 17 Form ES-301-7 Rev. 11 Facility: RBS Scenario: 2 Exam Date: 2018-07 1
2 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
10 Event Realism/
Cred.
Required Actions Verifiable actions LOD TS CTs Scen.
Overlap U/E/S Explanation
[RBS 6/27/2018: Removed original event #4 for DG oil level. Moved original event #2 to event #3. Moved original event#3 to event #2. Renumbered the remaining events.
Revised event numbers throughout. Added entry into EOP-2 Primary Containment Control on: Drywell temp, Suppression Pool Temp and Suppression Pool level, page 16.]
[NRC 7/9: For CT-1 definition, instead of saying all of the following must be met:, state Level/Power Conditions exist when ALL of the following are met:]
[RBS 7/10: CT-1 updated on D-1 and D-2.]
[NRC 7/12 - Last outstanding item is revised CT-3]
[RBS 7/13: Added CT-3 to D-1 and D-2 as appropriate. Also added a note to enclosure 24 that MSIVs would only be manually opened if >8.5 inches vacuum.]
[NRC 7/12 - Scenario ready for administration]
1 X
S Specify that the affected function in table 3.3.5.1-1 IS 3.D CST Level-LOW.
[RBS 6/8/2018: Added table information to D-1 Event 1.]
[NRC 6/12: BOP actions says report the upscale failure of should be downscale.]
[RBS 6/14/2018: Bolded steps as required in D-2. Added note to CT page. Corrected BOP report to downscale. Verified booth report was correct.]
2 S
3 X
S
- Specify what specific monitor RE-13A is in event 3 D-2.
-There are no Tech Specs listed or credited for event 3 on D-1, but D-2 lists several.
[RBS 6/8/2018: Annotated on event 3 RMS-RE13A. The tech spec call for this malfunction is not required for the bean count. I would like to count the manipulation for the BOP, but not the tech spec call. I had the information in the D-2 if applicant entered tech specs, the examiner would have the correct information.]
[NRC 6/12: If a Tech Spec is applicable to the malfunction it has to be credited.]
[RBS 6/18/2018: Updated D-1 and D-2 to reflect Tech Spec entry.]
4 X
S EVENT DELETED POST-VALIDATION 4
5 S
-Specify in Event 5 top of page RPV Level Xmitter. Include alpha-numeric designator for the component.
-Are there any actions performed in AOP-6?
[RBS 6/8/2018: Clarified RPV Level transmitter alpha-numeric designator. AOP-6 Immediate action is to manually control the feedwater level control system and/or reduce reactor power to mitigate any level transient. The crew will have to make manual control per SOP to swap channels.]
[NRC 7/9 - Does TRM 3.3.7.3 apply to this event? If so, needs to be documented and credited on D-1 and D-2 all sections, and ES-301-5/6. If not, provide a brief examiner note why TR 3.3.7.3 is not applicable.]
ES-301 18 Form ES-301-7 Rev. 11
[RBS 7/10: TRM 3.3.7.3 does not apply because the instrument has failed high and provided the high level trip signal required.]
5 6
DEC 14 S
-Include automatic scram setpoint as a reference for examiners.
[RBS 6/8/2018: Added note for automatic scram.]
6 7
X E
S
-roll 7 8 and 9 into one.
-Refer to the Critical Tasks in the D2 as Critical Task 1 and 2.
-Page 18, when stating Installs Enclosures 10 state what enclosures are, and put in list form. Its OK to leave the enclosures at the end of the scenario but dont call them Events 10, 11, etc, Just list them as the enclosures they are.
-Need a better explanation of the ATWS and what the response will be. Do rods insert manually? What happens when SCRAM - RESET - SCRAM encl 12 is performed? What is the ultimate success path for this scenario - scramming by installing enclosures or injecting SLC?
Feel free to use examiner notes liberally where necessary.
[RBS 6/8/2018: Event 7-9 are combined. Corrected D-2 to refer to critical task properly.
Corrected D-2 to properly refer to enclosures by name and procedure number. Added a note to D-1 and D-2 explaining success path for ATWS.]
[NRC 6/12: At beginning of event 7 label Event No. 7 / 8 / 9 Start of Event 7 - EOP-1, RPV ControL Consistent with how other events are treated, place expected verifiable actions in bold Fix format of list of enclosures on pgs 17 and 18. Some lines have a space between them, some dont.
Which enclosures are installed by the booth? It looks like all of the enclosures in the list are assigned to the BOP in the body of the guide, and in the attachments they are assigned to both the ATC and BOP. Deconflict.
Specify what component IAS-MOV106 is in BOP actions pg 17. Same line references event 13, which was renamed. Revise.
Not necessary to repeat the critical task verbiage multiple times. Sufficient to state it once at the point it is expected to be completed.
In Enclosure 10 step 3.3 add examiner note stating which fuses should be pulled, or all.
Move termination criteria to end of main body of D-2, before Attachments.]
[RBS 6/14/2018: Properly labeled event 7-9. Added L. Bolded all verifiable actions.
Fixed formatting on pages 17 and 18. Added noun name on page 17 for IAS-MOV106.
Corrected CT listing in D-2. Added note at top of Enclosure 10 explaining fuse removal.
The enclosures will be started by the ATC or BOP. All actions performed on the main control room panels are completed by the applicants (all switch manipulations). All back panel actions such as removing relays or fuses will be performed by the booth. The
ES-301 19 Form ES-301-7 Rev. 11 See GENERIC comments from scenario 1 and apply.
Quantitative Attributes Table: Regular EOP entry is EOP-1, RPV Control. Contingency EOP is EOP-1A, RPV Control-ATWS, Level/Power leg.
[RBS 6/8/2018: Corrected GENERIC comments from scenario 1. Corrected attributes table.]
applicants will mark up the enclosures up to the back panel actions and we will have an instructor on the side and they will give the enclosure marked up to him and request the fuses removed or relays removed. The instructor will then call the booth on a headset and let us know to install the enclosure. Once we have installed the enclosure the instructor will mark up the procedure with the appropriate back panel actions completed and then raise his hand signaling to the crew the enclosure is installed. The ATC/BOP will then retrieve the marked up enclosure and continue with his actions.]
7 8
S
-On D-1: MSIVs FAIL to close
-D-1 says there are 3 CTs but D-2 lists only CT-1 and CT-2.
[RBS 6/8/2018 corrected D-1 to align with D-2.]
- [NRC 7-9: Per Validation Week comments, we identified this malfunction is a CRITICAL TASK #3 due to a major compromise of the Containment fission product barrier. Crew must close MSIVs prior to. (need to determine objective criteria)].
However
[NRC: How does this event mesh with the EOP-1A RLA-3/4 guidance that if any MSL is open, insert enclosures to bypass interlocks to maintain MSIV open? What Im asking is, is the expectation that the crew will recognize MSIVs failed to close, take action to close them, then insert enclosure 24 to re-open MSIVs? Or, is the crew expected to recognize MSIVs failed to close automatically, but install enclosure 24 to keep them open anyway?]
So
[NRC: If the crew is expected to re-open MSIVs as part of Enclosure 24, then it probably isnt a critical task that they be manually shut. Lets clear up the expected response though.]
[RBS 7/10: Enclosure 24 is used to defeat the RPV Low level 1 MSIV and MSL drains isolation signals. This does not override the low vacuum isolation signal. The purpose of Enclosure 24 is to keep the MSIVs open while intentionally lowering RPV water level to reduce power during an ATWS. A new critical task will be added. The scenario will need to be run to verify bounding criteria.]
[NRC 7/12 - Standing by, consider increasing the rate of vacuum loss after the ATWS commences so that the MSIV trip setpoint of 8.5 inches is reached sooner. Consider the bounding criteria could be when the design pressure of the condenser boot is exceeded.]
8 9
X SEP 16 S
-Need objective termination criteria for the scenario.
[RBS 6/8/2018: Clarified termination criteria.
[NRC 7-9: make termination criteria SLC is injecting and rod insertion has commenced, or at lead examiner discretion.
[RBS 7/10: Termination criteria changed.]
ES-301 20 Form ES-301-7 Rev. 11 Facility: RBS Scenario: 3 Exam Date: 2018-07 1
2 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
10 Event Realism/Cred.
Required Actions Verifiable actions LOD TS CTs Scen.
Overlap U/E/S Explanation
[RBs 6/27/2018: Noted which exhaust fan is to be swapped to in event #3.
Shortened time delay for field report for event #2 rod drift. Clarified control room indications and field report for event #4. Added alarm and postage stamp to event
- 4. Added note to Event #6 FWS Level controller failure. Added monitored case for 16-37 fully inserted. Added RMP sheet for rods to be withdrawn.]
[NRC 7/9 - Compare CT-2 with scenario 1 CT-1 and make the minimum SRVs required consistent, i.e. 5 or 7?]
[RBS 7/10: Revised Scenario 1 CT-1 to be consistent with scenario 3 CT.]
[NRC 7/12 Ready to Administer]
1 SEP 16 S
Event 1 scenario activities states Start SBT Report SBT is typically performed via validation, not actual exam administration. Is this just a reference to the data-capture mehodology you are using?
[RBS 6/8/2018: This is the program we use to capture the data during the scenarios.]
2 x
S
[NRC 6/12: Be consistent about bolding the expected verifiable actions in all steps]
[RBS 6/14/2018: All verifiable actions are bolded. ]
3 S
Fix all the unused page space by fixing formatting of the D-2 guide.
[RBS 6/8/2018: Changed font size and got rid of white space.]
4 x
S
[NRC 6/12: Is there any control room indication when the LPCS pump breaker trips open?]
[RBS 6/14/2018: The BOP will get an alarm that the LPCS pump breaker trips. The other indication will be that the green light for the LPCS pump breaker will turn off.]
5 S
[RBS 6/8/2018: Replaced SRO with CRS as required.]
6 S
A 2 minute wait for reporting field conditions when directed is acceptable.
[RBS 6/8/2018: Changed reporting time to 2 minutes.]
7 x
SEP 16 S
In some scenarios, expected actual manipulations are bolded, in some events they are not. Be consistent. E.g. page 19 ATC actions
[RBS 6/8/2018: Corrected to be consistent.]
[NRC 6/12: Do applicants need to request room temperatures from booth? Do they have indication of room temperature on plant computer?]
[RBS 6/14/2018: Applicants will need to request temperatures from the booth. The temperatures are located on a back panel not modeled in the simulator.]
ES-301 21 Form ES-301-7 Rev. 11 See Generic Comments from Scenarios 1 and 2.
8 S
Roll 8 and 7 into one event. Event 9 can stay as a stand-alone since it is triggered later in the major event response.
[RBS 6/8/2018: Combined events 7 and 8.]
9 x
DEC 14 S
Need termination criteria.
[RBS 6/8/2018: Termination criteria clarified.]
[NRC 6/12: Delete reference to Event 10 on page 17 Modify CT-2 to within 15 minutes following any SEC CTMT parameter ]
[RBS 6/18/2018: Deleted reference to Event 10 on page 17. Modified CT-2.]
[NRC 7/9 - On RCIC Room Temp Chart specify that start time is 5 minutes after SCRAM, i.e. 7 min = 7+5 = 12 min after scram.]
[RBS 7/10: Added note that alarm is 5 minutes after scram.]
ES-301 22 Form ES-301-7 Rev. 11 Facility: RBS Scenario: 4 Exam Date: 2018-07 1
2 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
10 Event Realism/Cred.
Required Actions Verifiable actions LOD TS CTs Scen.
Overlap U/E/S Explanation
[RBS 6/27/2018: Corrected feedwater pump A to C throughout. Corrected SOP-50 to SOP-59 in event #3. Added note to event description of event #3. Added note to TS entry condition that only applies while in lockout for event #3. Added back panel role play for event #5, FWS-P1C. Added failure of DFR-AOV102 to isolate on the 1.68 psid signal as event #11. Added attachment 3 for AOP-3 isolation verification.
Added FWS-P1C min flow in manual and open 80%.]
[NRC 7/9 - On CT page, merge NOTE about unintentional RPS or ESF actuation into asterisked
- statement immediately after table. Same for all scenarios. Make fonts of these note the same size as well.]
[RBS 7/10: Notes were merged and added to all scenarios.]
[NRC 7/12 Ready to Administer]
1 S
Ensure that if this scenario is run that the same people are not in the same positions, as there are 2 events with a control rod withdrawal, although they end differently.
Can we make initial power lower so that we dont actually make the transition to MODE 1?
Id rather not be going back and forth between Modes during the scenario.
[RBS 6/8/2018: The schedule does not duplicate personnel standing ATC position.
Only BOP is positioned is duplicated for RO applicants. Power is at 4%, but they crew will never shift to mode 1. They will not meet the requirements to shift to Mode 1.]
[NRC 6/12: Initial Conditions says 5% power, not 4%.
Make expected verifiable actions bold consistent with other scenarios and events]
[RBS 6/14/2018: Initial conditions corrected to 4%. Verifiable actions are bolded in D-2.]
2 S
Include transition criteria at end of events.
[RBS 6/8/2018: Transition criteria included at the end of events.]
3 x
S
[NRC 7/9 - In my notes I had written are there steps before SOP-59 5.3.10 which realign fan lineup? Are there additional actions the crew takes before the documented steps? If so, include]
[RBS 7/10: Added SOP-43 direction to refer to SOP-59 to secure standby gas train.]
4 x
S What is directing removal of control power fuses for RHR pumps B/C breakers? Include actual procedure steps.
[RBS 6/11/2018: Added SOP-31, P&L 2.1.3 reference for removing control power fuses.]
[NRC 6/12: Specify what procedure SOP-31 is.]
[RBS 6/14/2018: Added noun name to SOP-31.]
5 S
Is there procedural direction for any of these actions?
[RBS 5/11/2018: Added reference to AOP-6.]
ES-301 23 Form ES-301-7 Rev. 11
[NRC 7/9 - Event 5 In CRS actions change discovered open to discovered closed.
In Event Title in header change open to closed.]
[RBS 7/10: Changed Event 5 CRS actions and Event title to closed.]
6 SEP 16 S
Are Feed Pumps B and C expected to start on this, but failed to? D-2 makes it sound that way.
[RBS 6/11/2018: B and C Feed Pumps are not expected to auto start, but they are expected to be available to start if needed. The pumps will not manually start, causing the loss of all feed pumps.]
[NRC 6/12: Clarify in ATC actions that Feed Pumps B and C fail to start in MANUAL.]
[RBS 6/14/2018: Clarified ATC actions.]
7 X
S 8
S When does the Main Turbine Bypass Valve fail open? Delayed after scram or immediate?
[RBS 6/11/2018: Bypass valve fails open when mode switch is taken to shutdown to manually scram the reactor.]
[NRC 6/12: Include note describing when booth will take action to secure BYP EHC Pumps, if at all.]
[RBS 6/14/2018: Included Booth role play for securing pumps.]
9 DEC 14 S
Roll events 9 and 10 steps together in D-2. Can remain separate on D-1.
[RBS 6/11/2018: Events 9 and 10 are combined in D-2.]
10 X
S What is purpose of asterisk
- after Lower pressure to minimize effects of the leak
- Rename Events 11 and 12 as attachments, not separate events. Include names of attachments in D-1 where referenced.
Include termination criteria. The scenario may be terminated when condensate is restoring RPV level above -162 inches, or at lead examiner discretion.
[RBS 6/11/2018: Asterisk was removed. Changed Events 11 and 12 to attachments 1 and 2. Included termination criteria.]
[NRC 6/12: When including numbered steps, place a period between number and verbiage, e.g. 1. Start any available, not 1 Start any available.
Fix grammar in CT-2 Note 2 - required with RPV level cannot be restored.
inhces CT-2 Note 2: The crew cannot enter Emergency Depressurization prior to -162 inches.
Should this say -187 inches?
Page 21 replace RO with ATC]
[RBS 6/14/2018: Numbered steps are modified. CT-2 and note for CT-2 corrected.
ES-301 24 Form ES-301-7 Rev. 11
ES-301 25 Form ES-301-7 Rev. 11 Instructions for Completing This Table:
1 Use this table for each scenario for evaluation.
2 Check this box if the events are not related (e.g., seismic event followed by a pipe rupture) OR if the events do not obey the laws of physics and thermodynamics.
3, 4 In columns 3 and 4, check the box if there is no verifiable or required action, as applicable. Examples of required actions are as follows: (ES-301, D.5f) x
opening, closing, and throttling valves x
starting and stopping equipment x
raising and lowering level, flow, and pressure x
making decisions and giving directions x
acknowledging or verifying key alarms and automatic actions (Uncomplicated events that require no operator action beyond this should not be included on the operating test unless they are necessary to set the stage for subsequent events. (Appendix D, B.3).)
5 Check this box if the level of difficulty is not appropriate.
6 Check this box if the event has a TS.
7 Check this box if the event has a critical task (CT). If the same CT covers more than one event, check the event where the CT started only.
8 Check this box if the event overlaps with another event on any of the last two NRC examinations. (Appendix D, C.1.f) 9 Based on the reviewers judgment, is the event as written (U)nacceptable (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)nhancement, or (S)atisfactory? Mark the answer in column 9.
10 Record any explanations of the events here.
In the shaded boxes, sum the number of check marks in each column.
x
In column 1, sum the number of events.
x
In columns 2-4, record the total number of check marks for each column.
x
In column 5, based on the reviewer's judgement, place a checkmark only if the scenario's LOD is not appropriate.
x
In column 6, TS are required to be 2 for each scenario. (ES-301, D.5.d) x
In column 7, preidentified CTs should be 2 for each scenario. (Appendix D; ES-301, D.5.d; ES-301-4) x
In column 8, record the number of events not used on the two previous NRC initial licensing exams. A scenario is considered unsatisfactory if there is < 2 new events. (ES-301, D.5.b; Appendix D, C.1.f) x
In column 9, record whether the scenario as written (U)nacceptable, in need of (E)nhancement, or (S)atisfactory from column 11 of the simulator scenario table.
ES-301 26 Form ES-301-7 Rev. 11 Facility: RBS Exam Date: 2018-07 Scenario 1
2 3
4 5
6 7
8 11 Event Totals Events Unsat.
TS Total TS Unsat.
% Unsat.
Scenario Elements U/E/S Explanation 1
8 0
2 0
2 0
0 E
2 9
0 3
0 3
0 0
E 3
9 0
2 0
2 0
0 E
4 10 0
2 0
2 0
0 E
Instructions for Completing This Table:
Check or mark any item(s) requiring comment and explain the issue in the space provided.
1, 3, 5 For each simulator scenario, enter the total number of events (column 1), TS entries/actions (column 3), and CTs (column 5).
This number should match the respective scenario from the event-based scenario tables (the sum from columns 1, 6, and 7, respectively).
2, 4, 6 For each simulator scenario, evaluate each event, TS, and CT as (S)atisfactory, (E)nhance, or (U)nsatisfactory based on the following criteria:
- a.
Events. Each event is described on a Form ES-D-2, including all switch manipulations, pertinent alarms, and verifiable actions. Event actions are balanced between at-the-controls and balance-of-plant applicants during the scenario. All event-related attributes on Form ES-301-4 are met. Enter the total number of unsatisfactory events in column 2.
- b.
TS. A scenario includes at least two TS entries/actions across at least two different events. TS entries and actions are detailed on Form ES-D-2. Enter the total number of unsatisfactory TS entries/actions in column 4. (ES-301, D.5d)
- c.
CT. Check that a scenario includes at least two preidentified CTs. This criterion is a target quantitative attribute, not an absolute minimum requirement. Check that each CT is explicitly bounded on Form ES-D-2 with measurable performance standards (see Appendix D). Enter the total number of unsatisfactory CTs in column 6.
7 In column 7, calculate the percentage of unsatisfactory scenario elements:
8 If the value in column 7 is > 20%, mark the scenario as (U)nsatisfactory in column 8. If column 7 is 20%, annotate with (E)nhancement or (S)atisfactory.
9 In column 9, explain each unsatisfactory event, TS, and CT. Editorial comments can also be added here.
Save initial review comments and detail subsequent comment resolution so that each exam-bound scenario is marked by a (S)atisfactory resolution on this form.
2 + 4 + 6 1 + 3 + 5100%
ES-301 27 Form ES-301-7 Rev. 11 Site name: RBS Exam Date: 2018-07 OPERATING TEST TOTALS Total Total Unsat.
Total Total Unsat.
Explanation Edits Sat.
Admin.
JPMs 9
1 4
4 Sim./In-Plant JPMs 11 0
5 6
Scenarios 4
0 4
0 Op. Test Totals:
24 1
13 10 4%
Instructions for Completing This Table:
Update data for this table from quality reviews and totals in the previous tables and then calculate the percentage of total items that are unsatisfactory and give an explanation in the space provided.
- 1.
Enter the total number of items submitted for the operating test in the Total column. For example, if nine administrative JPMs were submitted, enter 9 in the Total items column for administrative JPMs.
For scenarios, enter the total number of simulator scenarios.
- 2.
Enter the total number of (U)nsatisfactory JPMs and scenarios from the two JPMs column 5 and simulator scenarios column 8 in the previous tables. Provide an explanation in the space provided.
- 3.
Enter totals for (E)nhancements needed and (S)atisfactory JPMs and scenarios from the previous tables. This task is for tracking only.
- 4.
Total each column and enter the amounts in the Op. Test Totals row.
- 5.
Calculate the percentage of the operating test that is (U)nsatisfactory (Op. Test Total Unsat.)/(Op. Test Total) and place this value in the bolded % Unsat. cell.
Refer to ES-501, E.3.a, to rate the overall operating test as follows:
x satisfactory, if the Op. Test Total % Unsat. is 20%
x unsatisfactory, if Op. Test Total % Unsat. is > 20%
- 6.
Update this table and the tables above with post-exam changes if the as-administered operating test required content changes, including the following:
x The JPM performance standards were incorrect.
x The administrative JPM tasks/keys were incorrect.
x CTs were incorrect in the scenarios (not including postscenario critical tasks defined in Appendix D).
x The EOP strategy was incorrect in a scenario(s).
x TS entries/actions were determined to be incorrect in a scenario(s).