ML21088A203
| ML21088A203 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 02/12/2021 |
| From: | Greg Werner Operations Branch IV |
| To: | Entergy Operations |
| References | |
| Download: ML21088A203 (128) | |
Text
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 295018 (APE 18) Partial or Complete Loss of CCW /
Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER:
AA2.04 System flow Tier 1
Group #
1 K/A AA2.04 Rating 2.9 Revision 1
Revision Statement:
Edited the initial conditions to say 3 days after a refueling outage.
Updated Explanation statement.
Question:
76 Initial Conditions:
MODE 1 100% Power (BOL), 3 days after a 21 day Refueling Outage.
SFC-E1A, Fuel Pool Cooler A In-Service Spent Fuel Temperature is 130°F A Plant transient has resulted in the following indications:
The CCP System has stabilized.
(1) Which Safety Loop(s) Of CCP have lost CCP System Flow?
(2) IAW AOP-11, Loss of Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water, the CRS should FIRST prioritize aligning _(2)_.
(1)
(2)
A. DIV 1 ONLY SSW B to the CRD Pump Bearing Cooler B. DIV 1 ONLY SSW A to the Fuel Pool Cooler A C. DIV 1 and DIV 2 SSW B to the CRD Pump Bearing Cooler D. DIV 1 and DIV 2 SSW A to the Fuel Pool Cooler A
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Answer:
C Explanation:
Based on light indication, the CCP system experienced an extreme low pressure condition of <56 psig in the DIV 1 safety loop that is possibly due to system leak. This signal will cause an isolation of both Safety Loops(DIV 1 and DIV 2) and SSW Standby Service Water system automatically initiates and can be supplied to the CCP safety related components at the discretion of the Operations Shift Manager or Control Room Supervisor (AOP-0011, Loss of Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water, Subsequent Operator Actions). The Safety-related loads are the RHR Pump Seal Coolers and Fuel Pool Coolers. The B safety loop also provides cooling to the CRD pumps bearing cooler. The CRD pumps receive a trip signal if a <56 psig is receive in either safety loop due both safety loops losing CCP system flow.
From R-STM-0115:
From AOP-11:
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Restoration of the CRD system is more time critical than restoring cooling of the Spent Fuel Pool. With the CRD pumps tripped due to the <56 psig signal charging water pressure has dropped, and accumulator faults will start occurring. After 2 faults occur, the crew has a minimum of 20 minutes to restore cooling back to the CRD system and start a CRD pump. The Spent Fuel Pool at the EOL will take over 50 hours5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br /> to reach 200°F Distracters:
A. This distractor is stating that ONLY DIV1 safety loop will be isolated due to the <
56 psig isolation signal. This is plausible due the fact only DIV 1 valves will isolate, however, there are DIV 1 valves that isolate the DIV 2 safety loop as well. The applicant may only think that the DIV 1 loop is isolated due to divisional separation criteria.
B. This distractor is stating that ONLY DIV1 safety loop will be isolated due to the <
56 psig isolation signal. This is plausible due the fact only DIV 1 valves will isolate, however, there are DIV 1 valves that isolate the DIV 2 safety loop as well. The applicant may only think that the DIV 1 loop is isolated due to divisional separation criteria.
C. Correct Answer D. First part is correct, But the CRD System is more critical then Spent Fuel Cooling.
K/A Match The applicant is required to determine and/or interpret CCP system after a PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER.
Technical
References:
AOP-11 R-STM-0115 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:
NONE Learning Objective:
RLP-STM-115 Obj.4 Question Source:
Bank #
(note changes and attach parent)
Modified Bank #
New X
Question Cognitive Level:
Memory / Fundamental Comprehensive /
Analysis X
10CFR Part 55 Content:
43(b)5
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Level of Difficulty:
3 SRO Only Justification:
PRA Applicability:
N/A
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 295024 High Drywell Pressure / 5 2.1.32 Ability to explain and apply system limits and precautions.
Tier 1
Group #
1 K/A 2.1.32 Rating 4.0 Revision 1
Revision Statement:
Rewrote the entire question to better meet the K/A Question:
77 Per TS B 3.6.5.4 Drywell Pressure, The limitation on _(1)_ Drywell-to-Primary Containment differential ensures Drywell INTERNAL Pressure Differential will not exceed its design basis limit of _(2)_ psid during a postulated LOCA due to differences in water level of the Suppression Pool and the Weir Annulus.
(1)
(2)
A. positive 20 B. positive 25 C. negative 20 D. negative 25 Answer:
D Explanation:
From TS B 3.6.5.4:
Drywell-to-primary containment differential pressure shall be -0.3 psid and 1.2 psid.
The limitation on negative drywell-to-primary containment differential pressure ensures that changes in calculated peak LOCA drywell pressures due to differences in water level of the suppression pool and the drywell weir annulus are negligible. The limitation on positive drywell-to-primary containment differential pressure helps ensure that the horizontal vents are not cleared with normal weir annulus water level.
From USAR 6.2:
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Distracters:
A.
See B and C B.
Plausible due to being the correct design basis internal differential pressure.
C.
Plausible due to the correct Tech Spec pressure.
D.
Correct Answer K/A Match The applicant is required to have the ability to explain and apply the of this systems limitations and precautions.
Technical
References:
TS 3.6.5.4 STM-57 USAR 6.2.1.1.3 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:
NONE Learning Objective:
RLP-STM-57 Obj.13 Question Source:
Bank # ADD old question (note changes and attach parent)
Modified Bank #
New X
Question Cognitive Level:
Memory / Fundamental X
Comprehensive /
Analysis
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination 10CFR Part 55 Content:
43(b)2 Level of Difficulty:
3 SRO Only Justification:
PRA Applicability:
N/A
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 295025 (EPE 2) High Reactor Pressure / 3 Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to HIGH REACTOR PRESSURE:
EA2.05 Decay heat generation Tier 1
Group #
1 K/A EA2.05 Rating 3.6 Revisio n
0 Revision Statement:
Question:
78 Initial Conditions: MODE 1, 100% Power A large Main Condenser leak has caused Condenser vacuum to degrade.
The ATC operator placed the Mode Switch in the Shutdown position when Main Condenser vacuum reached 23Hg/Vac, and reported the following:
Main Condenser vacuum has lowered to 5Hg/Vac.
The increase of Reactor Pressure caused by Decay Heat Generation will be controlled by the cycling of _(1)_ Low-Low Set SRV(s).
The CRS should direct an RPV Level band of _(2)_.
(1)
(2)
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination A. One 10 to 51 inches B. One
-20 to 51 inches C. Two 10 to 51 inches D. Two
-20 to 51 inches Answer:
B Explanation:
(1) The Plant has been scrammed due to lowering Main Condenser and ALL control rods went in from the scram report. Decay Heat will account for the majority of Reactor Power which will be less than 1% after scram. An SRV has the capacity to pass 7% Reactor Power. So only one SRV will be cycling to relieve pressure from decay heat steam generation (2) From the Scram Report, EOP-1 was entered on Level 3. Normal Level band in EOP-1 is 10 to 51 inches. Main Condenser lowering below 8.5 Hg/Vac will cause the MSIVs to isolate. The expanded level band of -20 to 51 inches simplifies control of RPV injection systems during emergencies when the RPV is isolated.
Distracters:
A.
Plausible due to one SRV cycling to relieve pressure created decay heat generation, but the level band should be expanded from the normal band to accommodate for shrink and swell from SRV operation.
B.
Correct Answer.
C.
Plausible due to the fact the applicant may assume the normal level band for EOP-1 is required in this situation, and this is the incorrect amount of SRVs cycling to control pressure generated from decay heat.
D.
Plausible due to the correct level band being directed, but this is the incorrect amount of SRVs cycling to control pressure generated from decay heat K/A Match The applicant must have the ability to determine how SRVs are required to control High Reactor Pressure generated by decay heat.
Technical
References:
USAR 5.2-12
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination EOP-1, RPV CONTROL Bases Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:
NONE Learning Objective:
Question Source:
Bank #
(note changes and attach parent)
Modified Bank #
New X
Question Cognitive Level:
Memory / Fundamental Comprehensive /
Analysis X
10CFR Part 55 Content:
43(b)5 Level of Difficulty:
3 SRO Only Justification:
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination PRA Applicability:
N/A
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 295026 (EPE 3) Suppression Pool High Water Temperature / 5 2.2.22 Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.
Tier 1
Group #
1 K/A 2.2.22 Rating 4.7 Revisio n
1 Revision Statement:
Changed 110°F to 100°F as suggested Question:
79 Initial Conditions: MODE 1, 100% Power At time 0800, the RCIC system was started IAW STP-209-6310, RCIC QUARTERLY PUMP AND VALVE OPERABILITY TEST.
While the RCIC system is in operation, Suppression Pool Average Temperature shall be less than or equal to _(1)_ per TS 3.6.2.1.
If Suppression Pool Average Temperature is verified the first time as required per Condition A of TS 3.6.2.1, then it MUST be verified the SECOND TIME within _(2)_.
(1)
(2)
A. 100°F 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> B. 100°F 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> C. 105°F 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> D. 105°F 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> Answer:
D Explanation:
Part 1 of the question is above the line Tech Spec information:
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination RCIC is a steam driven system that exhausts to the Suppression Pool, adding heat.
Part 2 of the question is based on the applicants knowledge of generic LCO SR 3.0.2:
Condition A of TS 3.6.2.1 states the following:
SR 3.0.2 states the following:
Verifying Suppression Temperature is 110°F qualifies for the 25% extension after the first one is performed, so each verification after qualifies for the 25% extension.
Distracters:
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination A.
100°F applies is the incorrect temperature. Verification of the required action of Condition A qualifies for the 25% extension per SR 3.0.2 after the first one is performed.
B.
100°F applies is the incorrect temperature. Verification of the required action of Condition A qualifies for the 25% extension per SR 3.0.2 after the first one is performed C.
105°F applies is the correct temperature for this situation, however, verification of the required action of Condition A qualifies for the 25% extension per SR 3.0.2 after the first one is performed D.
Correct Answer.
K/A Match The K/A states Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits Suppression Pool High Water Temperature and TS 3.6.2.1 deals directly with Suppression Pool Temperature LCOs.
Technical
References:
TS 3.6.2.1 and SR 3.0.2 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:
NONE Learning Objective:
RLP-STM-0057 Obj.9 Question Source:
Bank #
(note changes and attach parent)
Modified Bank #
New X
Question Cognitive Level:
Memory / Fundamental Comprehensive /
Analysis X
10CFR Part 55 Content:
43(b)2 Level of Difficulty:
3 SRO Only Justification:
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination PRA Applicability:
N/A
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 295031 (EPE 8) Reactor Low Water Level /
2 2.1.23 Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation.
Tier 1
Group #
1 K/A 2.1.32 Rating 4.4 Revision 1
Revision Statement:
Added the abnormal situation of lowering RPV level to the question.
Question:
80 Initial Conditions: MODE 3 GOP-2, POWER DECREASE/PLANT SHUTDOWN, states the following:
WHEN RPV pressure has been lowered to below _(1)_ psig, THEN place one loop of RHR in Shutdown Cooling IAW SOP-0031, Residual Heat Removal.
During the plant shutdown a Loss of Coolant Accident has resulted in a lowering Reactor Water Level.
IAW Tech Spec bases, the RHR Shutdown Cooling System will isolate on Level 3 to ensure that _(2)_.
(1)
(2)
A. 135 RPV water level does not drop below top of active fuel B. 135 offsite dose limits of 10 CFR 50.67 are NOT exceeded C. 150 RPV water level does not drop below top of active fuel D. 150 offsite dose limits of 10 CFR 50.67 are NOT exceeded Answer:
A Explanation:
RHR Shutdown Cooling cannot be placed in service until RPV pressure is below the cut in pressure interlock of 135 psig per GOP-2, POWER DECREASE/PLANT SHUTDOWN:
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Tech Spec Bases B3.3.6.1 5.b states:
Distracters:
A. Correct Answer B. Plausible due to 135 psig being the correct RPV pressure to place RHR Shutdown Cooling in service. Ensuring that offsite dose limits of 10 CFR 50.67 are not exceeded are part of the basis behind the level 3 isolation during MODES 1,2, and 3 when pressure is greater than or equal to 135 psig per tech specs. The question specifically says RPV below 135 psig.
C. The applicant may confuse the 150 psig applicability for RCIC with the 135 psig cut in pressure permissive.
D. The applicant may confuse the 150 psig applicability for RCIC with the 135 psig cut in pressure permissive.
K/A Match The applicant must have the ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation. The integrated procedure GOP-2 is directing actions from SOP-31.
Technical
References:
GOP-2 SOP-31 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:
NONE
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Learning Objective:
Question Source:
Bank #
(note changes and attach parent)
Modified Bank #
New X
Question Cognitive Level:
Memory / Fundamental Comprehensive /
Analysis X
10CFR Part 55 Content:
42(b)(5)
Level of Difficulty:
3 SRO Only Justification:
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination PRA Applicability:
N/A
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 600000 (APE 24) Plant Fire On Site / 8 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to PLANT FIRE ON SITE:
AA2.07 Whether malfunction is due to common-mode electrical failures Tier 1
Group #
1 K/A AA2.07 Rating 3.0 Revisio n
2 Revision Statement:
Changed distractor answer from Open Phase to Undervoltage.
Update the 10 CFR 55.43 Question:
81 The RPS Electric Power Monitoring System is provided to isolate the RPS bus from the motor generator (MG) set or an alternate power supply in the event of _(1)_, which could lead to an excessive current draw and potential electrical fire if the normal circuit breakers would fail to trip on overcurrent.
If the SINGLE Fire Alarm in the vicinity of the RPS MG sets was in alarm and NOT VERIFIED, an Unusual Event, HU4.2, would be declared within _(2)_ minutes of the initial fire alarm.
(1)
(2)
A. Overvoltage 15 B. Overvoltage 30 C. Undervoltage 15 D. Undervoltage 30 Answer:
D Explanation:
- 1. Electrical Protection Assemblies (EPAs) protect the RPS buses from voltage and frequency anomalies that may damage RPS components. Each power source to the RPS Buses has two EPAs in series to provide redundant protection for the buses Either EPA can disconnect the bus from a power source where an overvoltage, undervoltage, or under-frequency condition exists.
- 2. Per HU4.2 in EIP-2-1:
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Distracters:
A.
Overvoltage detection is provided for individual buses, and the 15 min time is not correct. The 30 min time is correct B.
Overvoltage detection is provided for individual buses.
C.
Undervoltage detection is the correct instrumentation but the 15 min time is not correct. The 30 min time is correct.
D.
Correct Answer K/A Match The applicant must possess the ability to determine which common mode electrical failure could potentially cause a fire.
Technical
References:
EIP-2-1 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:
NONE Learning Objective:
RCBT-EP-SRORMED.1.6
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Question Source:
Bank #
(note changes and attach parent)
Modified Bank #
New X
Question Cognitive Level: Memory / Fundamental Comprehensive /
Analysis X
10CFR Part 55 Content:
43(b)(2)
Level of Difficulty:
3 SRO Only Justification:
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 700000 (APE 25) Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances / 6 2.4.45 Ability to prioritize and interpret the significance of each annunciator or alarm.
Tier 1
Group #
1 K/A 2.4.45 Rating 4.3 Revisio n
0 Revision Statement:
Question:
82 Initial Conditions: MODE 1, 100% Power.
Inclement weather has caused Grid Oscillations; the MCR has entered AOP-64, Grid Disturbances.
The Following two alarms are in:
- P808-86A-H01, GRID TROUBLE
There is a confirmed visual indication of an Open Phase Event on RTX-XSR1D.
Which of the following actions should have the HIGHEST priority?
A. Adjust MVARS to maintain voltage at Fancy Point.
B. Normal start of Div 2 Diesel Generator and parallel with the grid.
C. Reduce the amount of 1250 hp motors powered from RTX-XSR1D to 3.
D. Emergency start Div 2 Diesel Generator and perform a dead bus transfer.
Answer:
D Explanation:
The station had to enter AOP-64 due a grid disturbance and with receipt of multiple alarms. The GRID TROUBLE alarm is in due to grid voltage being below 225.86 Kv, and the PFD STA SVCE RTX-XSR1D TROUBLE alarm is in due to Open Phase detection. The grid voltage is stable but low 225 Kv and there has been visual
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination evidence from the field of an Open Phase on RTX-XSR1D which supplies power to the Div 2 bus.
AOP-64 states:
Distracters:
A. Plausible due to Adjusting VARS is a subsequent action of AOP-64 to maintain grid voltage between 224.25Kv and 242 Kv. Currently grid voltage is 225 Kv and stable which is in this acceptable range.
B. Plausible due to performing a Normal start of the Diesel Generators is a subsequent action of AOP-64 if grid voltage cannot be maintained above 224.25 Kv.
C. Plausible due to reducing the amount of 1250 hp motors powered from RTX-XSR1D to 3 is an Operator Action listed in the Alarm Response Procedure for the GRID TROUBLE alarm.
D. Correct Answer K/A Match The applicant must have the ability to prioritize alarms brought in due a grid disturbance.
Technical
References:
AOP-64 ARP-P808-86 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:
NONE Learning Objective:
RLP-OPS-AOP064.1.03 Given key plant parameters, determine the appropriate operator response. (3)
Question Source:
Bank #
(note changes and attach parent)
Modified Bank #
New X
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Question Cognitive Level:
Memory / Fundamental Comprehensive /
Analysis X
10CFR Part 55 Content:
43(b)5 Level of Difficulty:
3 SRO Only Justification:
PRA Applicability:
N/A
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 295008 (APE 8) High Reactor Water Level
/ 2 Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to HIGH REACTOR WATER LEVEL:
AA2.05 Swell Tier 1
Group #
2 K/A AA2.05 Rating 3.1 Revision 0
Revision Statement:
Question:
83 Initial Conditions: MODE 1, 100% Power A Loss of Offsite Power has occurred. All automatic actuations/isolations have been verified.
ATC operator gives the following report:
INITIALLY, Opening an SRV in this condition will cause indicated Reactor Water Level to _(1)_.
The CRS should direct a Reactor Water Level band of _(2)_.
(1)
(2)
A. Increase 10 to 51 inches B. Increase 45 to 100 inches
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination C. Decrease 10 to 51 inches D. Decrease 45 to 100 inches Answer:
B Explanation:
A Loss of Offsite Power event will result in a Reactor Scram, MSIVs isolating, loss of Recirc Pumps, and loss of all Normal Feed to the RPV. From the Scram report given, the crew will enter EOP-1 on Level 3. In this condition, opening an SRV will result in a swell of indicated RPV water level. Due to the loss of the Recirc Pumps, the CRS should issue the Natural Circulation level band of 45 to 100 inches From EOP-1:
Distracters:
A.
Level would increase due to swell from opening an SRV. The Normal level band should not be issued with NO forced circulation.
B.
Correct Answer C.
Level would NOT decrease due to swell from opening an SRV. The Normal level band should not be issued with NO forced circulation D.
Level would NOT decrease due to swell from opening an SRV. The Natural Circulation level band is the correct level band with no forced circulation.
K/A Match The applicant should have the ability to determine the affect swell will have on RPV water level.
Technical
References:
EOP-1 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination NONE Learning Objective:
Question Source:
Bank #
(note changes and attach parent)
Modified Bank #
New X
Question Cognitive Level:
Memory / Fundamental Comprehensive /
Analysis X
10CFR Part 55 Content:
43(b)(5)
Level of Difficulty:
3 SRO Only Justification:
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination PRA Applicability:
N/A
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 295020 (APE 20) Inadvertent Containment Isolation / 5 & 7 2.1.7 Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.
Tier 1
Group #
2 K/A 2.1.7 Rating 4.7 Revisio n
1 Revision Statement:
Added more supporting information in the question explanation to support the higher priority of IAS.
Question:
84 A loss of power to a Motor Control Center (MCC) has led to following indications:
An Inadvertent Isolation of Containment would result due the closure of the _(1)_
Containment Isolation Valves.
The CRS should place the HIGHEST priority on restoring _(2)_ to Containment IAW AOP-10, Loss of RPS.
(1)
(2)
A. Inboard CCP B. Inboard IAS C. Outboard CCP
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination D. Outboard IAS Answer:
D Explanation:
The loss of the MCC has caused a loss of RPS A. This is apparent from ALL the A solenoid lights for each division of RPS being extinguished. A loss of RPS A would result in an Inadvertent isolation of the Outboard containment isolation valves. IAS -
MOVF106 is an Outboard isolation valve that supplies instrument air to primary Containment. The Outboard CCP valves would isolate as well.
Recirc Seal Purge which is provided from CRD would not isolate From AOP-11, Loss CCP:
CAUTION If both seal purge flow and cooling water flow are lost to the Reactor Recirc Pump(s) with coolant temperature greater than 200°F, the pump(s) must be tripped, the seal staging valve(s) B33-FVF075A(B) must be closed, and the isolation valves closed as soon as possible. Seal damage may occur if the recirc pump is not tripped within 2 minutes and isolated within 30 minutes. (CR-RBS-2010-00017 CA 25)
A loss of one RPS would require entry into AOP-10.
SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS FOR LOSS OF RPS BUS A NOTE Reopening of IAS-MOV106 must be done in a timely manner to prevent the Inboard MSIVs from closing.
(BASED STIMULATOR VALIDATION):
INSERTING A LOSS OF RPS A MALFUNCTION
- 1. Inboard MSIVs(located in the Drywell) would close within 7 minutes if IAS is not restored, causing a Complicated Scram.
- 2. Recirc Pump High Motor temperature alarm will come in after 8 minutes.
IAS restoration is a higher priority than CCP.
Distracters:
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination A. Inboard isolation valves would not close due to a loss of RPS A. CCP restoration is a high priority due to the Recirc Pumps, but IAS is higher due to keeping the Inboard MSIVs open.
B. Inboard isolation valves would not close due to a loss of RPS A. IAS restoration is the highest priority due to keeping the Inboard MSIVs open.
C. Outboard isolation valves would close due a loss of RPS A. IAS restoration is the highest priority due to keeping the Inboard MSIVs open.
D. Correct Answer K/A Match The applicant must possess the ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation Technical
References:
AOP-10 R-STM-0508 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:
NONE Learning Objective:
Question Source:
Bank #
(note changes and attach parent)
Modified Bank #
New X
Question Cognitive Level:
Memory / Fundamental Comprehensive /
Analysis X
10CFR Part 55 Content:
43(b)(5)
Level of Difficulty:
3 SRO Only Justification:
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination PRA Applicability:
N/A
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to SECONDARY CONTAINMENT VENTILATION HIGH RADIATION:
EA2.01 Ventilation radiation levels Tier 1
Group #
2 K/A EA2.01 Rating 3.2 Revision 1
Revision Statement:
Added information about SRO only Question:
85 Initial Conditions: Mode 1, 100% Power A UNISOLABLE steam leak has resulted in the following indications:
PARAMETER CURRENT VALUE ISOLATION SETPOINT RMS-RE110 AUX BLDG 8.02E+07 uCi/ml 6.02E-03 uCi/ml PARAMETER CURRENT VALUE ALERT EAL SETPOINT RMS-RE125 MAIN PLANT 7.02E+07 uCi/sec 9.63E+06 uCi/sec EOP-3 (SC-2 OPERATING VALUES)
PARAMETER CURRENT VALUE MAX SAFE VALUE RMS-RE219 RCIC EQUIP RM 8.7E+02 mR/hr 9.5E+03 mR/hr RMS-RE215 RHR C EQUIP RM 5.2E+02 mR/hr 9.5E+03 mR/hr E31-R608 RCIC RM TEMP 205°F 200°F E31-R608 RWCU RM TEMP 190°F 200°F (1) What action(s) IAW OSP-51,EMERGENCY AND TRANSIENT RESPONSE SUPPORT PROCEDURE, should be taken to reduce the Offsite Radioactivity Release Rate?
(2) When would Emergency Depressurization be required?
A. (1) Manually initiate both trains of Standby Gas Treatment (2) After RCIC EQUIP RM area radiation levels reach Max Safe value B. (1) Manually initiate both trains of Standby Gas Treatment (2) After RWCU RM TEMP reaches Max Safe value C. (1) Manually initiate one train of Standby Gas Treatment (2) After RCIC EQUIP RM area radiation levels reach Max Safe value
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination D. (1) Manually initiate one train of Standby Gas Treatment (2) After RWCU RM TEMP reaches Max Safe value Answer:
B Explanation:
- 1. Based on the parameters, the RMS-RE110 has exceeded its isolation value and requires a manual isolation of the Auxiliary Building and a manual initiation of Both trains of Standby Gas Treatment.
From EOP-3:
From OSP-53:
- 2. From EOP-3:
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination ED is required when ONE parameter listed in SC-2 exceeds its MAX SAFE limit in 2 or more areas. The RCIC has already exceeded its MAX SAFE temp, and it requires another room(ie RWCU) to exceed 200°F.
Distracters:
A. Plausible due to Manually Initiating Both trains of Standby Gas Treatment is the correct action. RCIC room rads exceeding MAX SAFE value does not meet the requirement for ED per EOP-3.
B. Correct Answer C. Both Trains of Standby Gas Treatment should be initiated per OSP-53.
D. Both Trains of Standby Gas Treatment should be initiated per OSP-53 K/A Match The applicant should possess the ability to determine and/or interpret ventilation radiation levels as they apply to SECONDARY CONTAINMENT VENTILATION HIGH RADIATION and the actions require.
Technical
References:
EOP-3 OSP-53 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:
NONE Learning Objective:
RLP-LO-0515.1.06
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Given an EOP-3 flow chart and plant conditions, determine the next action required to be implemented.
Question Source:
Bank #
(note changes and attach parent)
Modified Bank #
New X
Question Cognitive Level:
Memory / Fundamental Comprehensive /
Analysis X
10CFR Part 55 Content:
43(b)5 Level of Difficulty:
3 SRO Only Justification:
TASK # 200006005002,DETERMINE IF EMERG DEPRESSURIZATION IS REQUIRED/ANTICIPATED, is an SRO ONLY task at RBS.
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination From NUREG 1021:
Emergency RPV depressurization is considered an emergency contingency procedure.
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination PRA Applicability:
N/A
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 209001 (SF2, SF4 LPCS) Low-Pressure Core Spray Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the LOW-PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations:
A2.06 Inadequate system flow Tier 2
Group #
1 K/A A2.06 Rating 3.2 Revisio n
1 Revision Statement:
Changed the CFR link to 43.5 Question:
86 Initial Conditions: MODE 1, 100% Power The following sequence of events occurs:
- 1. Double-ended rupture (DER) of a Recirculation Pump A suction line. The design basis accident (DBA) for Containment pressure and also for the Containment heat removal system.
- 2. A loss of offsite power. Div 2 Diesel Generator fails to start and remains out of service during the entire transient.
NOTE: ONLY INJECTION SYSTEMS AVAILABLE ARE THE ONES LISTED IN THE TABLE BELOW:
Post Accident Parameters:
PARAMETERS INDICATED VALUES RPV LEVEL
-205 inches and stable RPV PRESS 15 psig and lowering CTMT PRESS 7.8 psig and rising SUPP POOL LEVEL 21.5 ft SUPP POOL TEMP 110°F and rising LPCS 900 gpm LPCI A 5050 gpm SLC A 43 gpm
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination HPCS 4500 gpm Long term operation of the LPCS system in this condition would cause damage to the_(1)_.
Based on the Post Accident Parameters, the CRS should direct _(2)_.
(1)
(2)
A. Pump impeller Exit all EOPs and Enter all SAPs B. Pump impeller Place RHR A in Suppression Cooling C. Motor windings Exit all EOPs and Enter all SAPs D. Motor windings Place RHR A in Suppression Cooling Answer:
A Explanation:
(1) The LPCS Pump is operating in a minimum flow condition. With the injection valve closed, indicated flow would 0 gpm due to the location of the flow meter.
P&L 2.1 of SOP-32 states: To avoid impeller wear, minimize the time LPCS Pump is operated on minimum flow withE21-F005, LPCS INJECT ISOL VALVE closed.
(2) Based on the Post Accident Parameters, Adequate Core Cooling is not assured. At -211inches, It requires over 5000 gpm from either HPCS or LPCS to achieve Spray Cooling. ALC-13 and ALC-14 of EOP-1 states if Adequate Core Cooling cannot be restored to Exit all EOPs and Enter all SAPs.
Distracters:
A. Correct Answer.
B. Part 1 of this distractor is correct, Part 2 is not. The applicant may assumed that Adequate Spray Cooling is assured due to combined Spray flow(LPCS+HPCS) being greater than 5000 gpm.
C. LPCS Pump running in a low flow condition would cause Pump damage, High flow condition would drive higher current which could potentially damage motor windings.
D. LPCS Pump running in a low flow condition would cause Pump damage, High flow condition would drive higher current which could potentially damage motor windings.
K/A Match The applicant must possess the ability to (a) predict the impacts of inadequate flow on the LOW-PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination conditions or operations.
Technical
References:
EOP-1 EOP-2 SOP-32 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:
NONE Learning Objective:
RLP-STM-0205.
Question Source:
Bank #
(note changes and attach parent)
Modified Bank #
New X
Question Cognitive Level:
Memory / Fundamental Comprehensive /
Analysis X
10CFR Part 55 Content:
43b(5)
Level of Difficulty:
3 SRO Only Justification:
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination PRA Applicability:
N/A
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 215003 (SF7 IRM) Intermediate-Range Monitor Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the INTERMEDIATE RANGE MONITOR (IRM) SYSTEM; and (b)based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations:
A2.05 Faulty or erratic operation of detectors/system Tier 2
Group #
1 K/A A2.05 Rating 3.5 Revisio n
2 Revision Statement:
Added CHR 43.5 and LOD 2 to the question explanation Question:
87 Initial Conditions: MODE 2 IRM C is inoperable and bypassed Reactor is below the point of adding heat Erratic detector operation caused IRM A to spike to a value of 118/125.
(1) What automatic action occurred from the IRM A spike?
(2) With BOTH IRM A and C inoperable, what action is required IAW TS/TRM?
A. (1) Rod Block ONLY (2) Place one channel in trip B. (1) Rod Block ONLY (2) Transition to MODE 3 C. (1) Rod Block and Half Scram (2) Place one channel in trip D. (1) Rod Block and Half Scram (2) Transition to MODE 3 Answer:
A Explanation:
From STM-503:
Rod Block occurs at >108/125 and Scram when >120/125.
118/125 will only cause a Rod Block.
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel. With the second channel inoperable. Condition A is the first required action.
After 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> if not able to place channel in trip, then with both IRMS inoperable, that means 2 IRMS for the RPS A trip system is inoperable and 2 IRMS for the Rod Block function.
From TRM 3.3.1.1:
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination 3 out 4 IRMS are required for the A trip system. With 2 inoperable, action H needs to be entered.
From TS 3.3.1.1:
From TRM 3.3.2.1:
6 out 8 IRMS are required to be operable. With only two inoperable, the required amount of channels exist no action required.
Distracters:
A.
Correct Answer B.
The correct automatic action, but wrong initial TS/TRM action C.
Wrong automatic action, but correct TS/TRM action D.
See B and C K/A Match The applicant must possess the ability to predict the impacts of a faulty or erratic IRM and based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations.
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Technical
References:
TS 3.3.1.1 TRM 3.3.1.1 and 3.3.2.1 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:
TS 3.3.1.1 TRM 3.3.1.1 and 3.3.2.1 Learning Objective:
Question Source:
Bank #
(note changes and attach parent)
Modified Bank #
New X
Question Cognitive Level:
Memory / Fundamental Comprehensive /
Analysis X
10CFR Part 55 Content:
43(b)5 Level of Difficulty:
2 SRO Only Justification:
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination PRA Applicability:
N/A
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 223002 (SF5 PCIS) Primary Containment Isolation/Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff G2.4.8 Knowledge of how abnormal operating procedures are used in conjunction with EOPs.
Tier 2
Group #
1 K/A G2.4.8 Rating 4.5 Revision 0
Revision Statement:
Question:
88 Initial Conditions: MODE 1, 100% Power A steam leak in the Main Steam Tunnel (MST) has caused the following alarms:
(A)
(B)
(1) Which alarm is associated with the isolation of the MSIVs due to MST High Temperature?
If a primary system is discharging into the MST, The CRS should direct the manual initiation of a_(2)_ within 10 MINUTES IAW with AOP-3, Automatic Isolations.
(1)
(2)
A. A Control Room Charcoal Filter Train B. A Standby Gas Filter Train C. B Control Room Charcoal Filter Train D. B Standby Gas Filter Train Answer:
A Explanation:
Both annunciators are associated with MST high temperature. (A) Comes in at 173°F and will cause an isolation of the MSIVs, RWCU, and RCIC. (B) Comes in at 144°F to signal a potential entry into EOP-3, Secondary Containment, and denoted by the double red diagonal lines.
AOP-3 states the following:
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination A MST steam leak is outside of Secondary Containment, and would require initiation of a Control Building Filter Train.
Distracters:
A.
Correct Answer B.
The annunciator is the correct associated with MST High isolations, but Standby Gas Treatment would only affect the Secondary Containment Boundary.
C.
The annunciator is the one associated with EOP-3 entry and not isolations, Control Building Filter Train is the correct system to initiate in this condition.
D.
The annunciator is the one associated with EOP-3 entry, but Standby Gas Treatment would only affect the Secondary Containment Boundary K/A Match The applicant must have the knowledge of how abnormal operating procedures are used in conjunction with EOPs.
Technical
References:
AOP-3 EOP-3 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:
NONE Learning Objective:
Question Source:
Bank #
(note changes and attach parent)
Modified Bank #
New X
Question Cognitive Level: Memory / Fundamental Comprehensive /
Analysis X
10CFR Part 55 Content:
43(b)5
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Level of Difficulty:
3 3
SRO Only Justification:
PRA Applicability:
N/A
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 259002 (SF2 RWLCS) Reactor Water Level Control Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the REACTOR WATER LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations:
A2.02 Loss of any number of reactor feedwater flow inputs Tier 2
Group #
1 K/A A2.05 Rating 3.5 Revision 2
Revision Statement:
Changed the second part of the question to make it SRO level based on deciding on TRM actions to use.
Rewrote the question to meet the K/A better Question:
89 Initial Conditions: MODE 1, 100% Power Feedwater Flow Transmitter Level, C33-FTN002A, suffers a ruptured diaphragm.
The Feedwater Level Control System will respond and cause Reactor Water Level to
_(1)_.
(2) After the Feedwater Master Level Controller is placed in manual IAW AOP-6, CONDENSATE/FEEDWATER FAILURES, what action should the CRS direct to restore the Feedwater Master Level Controller in automatic IAW SOP-9, REACTOR FEEDWATER SYSTEM?
(1)
(2)
A. Increase Alternate Feedwater Level Control Signals B. Increase Transfer Three Element to Single Element Control Transfer C. Decrease Alternate Feedwater Level Control Signals D. Decrease Transfer Three Element to Single Element Control Transfer Answer:
B Explanation:
From STM-107:
Loss of input signals to the Feedwater Level Control System.
- Loss of a Feedwater Flow Signal
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination The complete loss of one feedwater flow signal causes the feedwater control system to see 50% less feedwater flow, though actual feedwater flow has not changed. This results in a large steam flow/feed flow mismatch. The Feedwater Level Control System tries to increase feed flow (by opening the FW REG VLVs) to reduce the steam flow/feed flow mismatch. This causes reactor water level to increase. Since reactor level takes precedence in this logic system over steam flow/feed flow mismatch (level dominant), the level detectors sense this increase in level, compare it to the level setpoint and create an error signal which begins to close the FW REG VLVs back to their original position.
The FWLC circuitry uses several inputs to determine the control signal that needs to be sent to the FW REG VLV controllers. The Feedwater Level Control System utilizes the following:
- Three element control, which utilizes steam flow, feedwater flow, and vessel water level.
- Single element control, utilizes vessel water level only as an input signal.
Distracters:
A.
Plausible because water level will increase with the failed flow input. Swapping to a different level input will not remove the failed flow input B.
Correct Answer C.
See A and D D.
Plausible because the action directed is correct, but the water level response is not.
K/A Match The applicant must have the Ability to (a) predict the impacts loss of any number of reactor feedwater flow inputs on the REACTOR WATER LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations:
Technical
References:
STM-107 SOP-9 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:
NONE Learning Objective:
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Question Source:
Bank #
(note changes and attach parent)
Modified Bank #
New X
Question Cognitive Level:
Memory / Fundamental Comprehensive /
Analysis X
10CFR Part 55 Content:
43(b)5 Level of Difficulty:
3 3
SRO Only Justification:
PRA Applicability:
N/A
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 261000 (SF9 SGTS) Standby Gas Treatment 2.2.25 Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.
Tier 2
Group #
1 K/A 2.2.25 Rating 4.2 Revision 0
Revision Statement:
Question:
90 Initial Conditions: Mode 1, 100% Power TS 3.6.4.3 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System requires _(1)_ SGT subsystems to OPERABLE.
TS B 3.6.4.3,Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System, requires _(2)_ SGT subsystem(s) to maintain the secondary containment at a negative pressure with respect to the environment and to process gaseous releases.
(1) (2)
A. 1 1
B. 1 2
C. 2 1
D. 2 2
Answer:
C Explanation:
This is directly from TS B 3.6.4.3
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination A.
Per Tech Specs, Both Standby Gas Trains are required to be OPERABLE, but only one is needed during a DBA to perform the key safety function.
B.
Per Tech Specs, Both Standby Gas Trains are required to be OPERABLE, but only one is needed during a DBA to perform the key safety function C.
Correct Answer D.
Per Tech Specs, Both Standby Gas Trains are required to be OPERABLE, but only one is needed during a DBA to perform the key safety function K/A Match The applicant must possess the knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.
Technical
References:
TS B 3.6.4.3 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT)
Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:
NONE Learning Objective:
RLP-LO-STM-0257 Obj.9 Identify the Technical Specifications, Technical Requirements Manual, and/or Bases requirements for the Standby Gas Treatment System. (9)
Question Source:
Bank #
(note changes and attach parent)
Modified Bank #
New X
Question Cognitive Level:
Memory / Fundamental X
Comprehensive /
Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content:
43(b)2 Level of Difficulty:
3 3
SRO Only Justification:
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination PRA Applicability:
N/A
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 201005 (SF1, SF7 RCIS) Rod Control and Information 2.2.36 Ability to analyze the effect of maintenance activities, such as degraded power sources, on the status of limiting conditions for operations.
Tier 2
Group #
2 K/A 2.2.36 Rating 4.2 Revisio n
0 Revision Statement:
Question:
91 Initial Conditions: MODE 1, 100% Power Maintenance activities have caused the Turbine Bypass Valves to fail open.
First Stage Turbine Pressure will _(1)_ as a result.
IAW TS 3.3.2.1, Control Rod Block Instrumentation, how will this affect the operability of the Rod Withdrawal Limiter?
(1)
(2)
A. Increase It will remain OPERABLE B. Increase It will need to be declared inoperable C. Decrease It will remain OPERABLE D. Decrease It will need to be declared inoperable Answer:
D Explanation:
The opening of the BPVs will rob steam flow from the Main Turbine, and the Turbine Control Valves will respond by closing to maintain Pressure setpoint. This will result in a decrease in First Stage Turbine Pressure. First Stage Turbine pressure is utilized to determine Reactor Power by RC&IS. The Rod Pattern Controller is in control of rod movements until Reactor Power reaches Low Power setpoint of 27.5%, and the Rod Withdrawal Limiter Controls rod movement after.
At 100%, the High Power setpoint (HPSP) of 67.9% power is in effect limiting rod motion to 2 notches before inserting a rod block.
From TS B 3.3.2.1
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Distracters:
K/A Match A. First Stage Turbine Pressure will decrease in response to BPV opening.
B. First Stage Turbine Pressure will decrease in response to BPV opening.
C. The Rod Pattern Controller operability will not be affected by the BPV failing open.
D. Correct Answer Technical
References:
R-STM-0500 TS 3.3.2.1 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:
NONE OE Learning Objective:
Question Source:
Bank #
(note changes and attach parent)
Modified Bank #
New X
Question Cognitive Level:
Memory / Fundamental Comprehensive /
Analysis X
10CFR Part 55 Content:
43(b)(2)
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Level of Difficulty:
3 SRO Only Justification:
PRA Applicability:
N/A
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 272000 (SF7, SF9 RMS) Radiation Monitoring 2.4.35 Knowledge of local auxiliary operator tasks during an emergency and the resultant operational effects Tier 2
Group #
2 K/A 272000 2.4.35 Rating 4.9 Revision 0
Revision Statement:
Question:
92 An instrument bus failure has caused Containment vent valves to be inoperable.
To reduce Containment Pressure per EOP-2, PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL, Enclosure _(1)_ should be installed to vent containment locally by the building operator.
IAW EOP-2, when the building operator vents containment locally, the release will be monitored via _(2)_ radiation monitors.
NOTE:
ENCLOSURE 21, EMERGENCY CONTAINMENT VENTING AND DEFEATING CONTAINMENT VENT PATH ISOLATION INTERLOCKS ENCLOSURE 25, DEFEATING PRIMARY CONTAINMENT VENT AND PURGE ISOLATION INTERLOCKS (1)
(2)
A.
21 fixed B.
21 portable C.
25 fixed D.
25 portable Answer:
B Explanation:
Per EOP-5, Enclosure 21, EMERGENCY CONTAINMENT VENTING AND DEFEATING CONTAINMENT VENT PATH ISOLATION INTERLOCKS, provides instructions for venting the Primary Containment via the 171 Airlock inner door seals (which is operated locally by the building operator).
Per Enclosure 21 step 3.6.7 step 7. ARRANGE for RP to sample Aux Bldg. vent path release and then OPEN 171 Aux Bldg. doors to outside. By opening these doors a direct release path to outside is established. RP is the only monitor established during this release.
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Distracters:
(1) Enclosure 25 is plausible if applicant confuses the purpose to provide instructions for defeating the Primary Containment Vent and Purge RPV low level, High Drywell pressure AND High Radiation isolation interlocks.
(2) Fixed radiation monitors is plausible if applicant confuses airlock operation with venting the Primary Containment via the Hydrogen Purge System via the Main Plant Exhaust per Enclosure 21.
K/A Match The applicant must have knowledge of the building operator actions while installing 1 and the resulting plant lineup to determine the method of radiation monitoring.
Technical
References:
1, EMERGENCY CONTAINMENT VENTING AND DEFEATING CONTAINMENT VENT PATH ISOLATION INTERLOCKS Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:
None Learning Objective:
RLP-HLO-516, Upon completion of this lesson, the trainee will be able to demonstrate knowledge of the purpose and installation requirements of the EOP Enclosures and the plant response when installed as directed by the EOPs.
Question Source:
Bank #
(note changes and attach parent)
Modified Bank #
New X
Question Cognitive Level:
Memory / Fundamental X
Comprehensive /
Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content:
43(b)(4)
Level of Difficulty:
3 SRO Only Justification:
The applicant must have knowledge of when to implement enclosures, including how to coordinate these with the building operator and RP for monitoring the release.
PRA Applicability:
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 286000 (SF8 FPS) Fire Protection Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM ; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations:
(CFR: 41.5 / 45.6)
A2.01 System logic failure: Plant-Specific Tier 2
Group #
2 K/A A2.01 Rating 2.9 Revisio n
0 Revision Statement:
Question:
93 Initial Conditions: MODE 1, 100% Power The following Fire suppression system has lost its automatic actuation capability:
A Fire watch shall be established in _(1)_.
TRM actions require a/an _(2)_Fire watch for this area.
(1)
(2)
A. 30 mins hourly B. 30 mins continuous C. 60 mins hourly D. 60 mins continuous Answer:
D Explanation:
- 1. A Fire watch must be establish within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> per TRM 3.7.9.2
- 2. From SOP-37:
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Distracters:
A. 30 mins would be the time required to verify a single Fire alarm IAW EIP-2-1.
This area has redundant equipment that could be affected by a fire.
B. 30 mins would be the time required to verify a single Fire alarm IAW EIP-2-1.
C. This area has redundant equipment that could be affected by a fire, thus it requires a continuous fire watch.
D. Correct Answer K/A Match The applicant must have the ability to (a) predict the impacts of a System logic failure:
on the FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM ; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations:
Technical
References:
SOP-37 TRM 3.7.9.2 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:
Redacted version of TRM 3.7.9.2 Learning Objective:
Question Source:
Bank #
(note changes and attach parent)
Modified Bank #
New X
Question Cognitive Level: Memory / Fundamental Comprehensive /
Analysis X
10CFR Part 55 Content:
43(b)2 Level of Difficulty:
3 SRO Only Justification:
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination PRA Applicability:
Ranked#8 Fire Zone
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 2.1.15 Knowledge of administrative requirements for temporary management directives, such as standing orders, night orders, operations memos, etc.
Tier 3
Group #
N/A K/A 2.1.15 Rating 3.4 Revision 0
Revision Statement:
Question:
94
_(1)_ is an instruction to Operations personnel from Operations Management of continuing applicability.
Night orders may be written by _(2)_ based on a telephone conversation from any Operations Management.
(1)
(2)
A. Night Orders any licensed operator B. Night Orders Shift Manager C. Standing Orders any licensed operator D. Standing Orders Shift Manager Answer:
D Explanation:
Per EN-OP-112, Night and Standing Orders, STANDING ORDER - an instruction from Operations Management (OM/AOM) of continuing applicability to Operations personnel.
Night Orders may be written by the Shift Manager (SM) based on a telephone conversation from any of the above individuals.
Distracters:
(1) Night Orders is plausible if applicant confuses definition NIGHT ORDER - an instruction to Operations personnel from Operations Management (Operations Manager (OM), Assistant Operations Manager (AOM), which has short-term applicability (i.e., overnight or weekends).
(2) Any licensed operator is plausible if applicant confuses requirement with other licensed operator duties.
K/A Match
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination The applicant must have knowledge of the requirements for issuing night orders and understand the purpose of night orders and standing orders.
Technical
References:
EN-OP-112, Night and Standing Orders Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:
None Learning Objective:
None Question Source:
Bank #
(note changes and attach parent)
Modified Bank #
New X
Question Cognitive Level:
Memory / Fundamental X
Comprehensive /
Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content:
43(b)(5)
Level of Difficulty:
2 SRO Only Justification:
The applicant must have knowledge of the shift manager responsibilities during the approval and issuing of night orders.
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination PRA Applicability:
N/A
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 2.1.3 Knowledge of shift or short-term relief turnover practices.
Tier 3
Group #
N/A K/A 2.1.3 Rating 3.9 Revision 1
Revision Statement:
Added LOD, SRO justification, and CFR Question:
95 Per EN-OP-115-03, Shift Turnover and Relief, in the case of illness or unexpected absence, SM ENSURE a shift member is held over and replacement personnel arranged to restore the shift complement within _(1)_.
When in Mode 1, the following personnel assume the shift at turnover:
OSM - SRO & STA qualified CRS - SRO qualified STA - SRO & STA qualified ATC/BOP/UO - 3 different Qualified ROs If the STA must leave due to illness, will minimum shift crew composition be met?
(1)
(2)
A. 1 Hour NO B. 1 Hour YES C. 2 Hours NO D. 2 Hours YES Answer:
D Explanation:
Per EN-OP-115-03, Shift Turnover and Relief, in the case of illness or unexpected absence, SM ENSURE a shift member is held over and replacement personnel arranged to restore the shift complement within two hours.
Per TRM 5.0, The Shift Technical Advisor (STA) position may be filled by an on-shift shift manager (OSM) or Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) provided the individual meets the STA qualifications for the dual role position specified below and five (5) licensed operators are on shift.
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Distracters:
(1) 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> is plausible if the applicant confuses the numerous required tech spec requirements to be completed in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
(2) No is plausible if applicant confuses the minimum staffing requirements and dual role position requirements for STA.
K/A Match Applicant must have knowledge of the minimum staffing requirements, dual role requirements, and how long the shift manager has to restore the shift complement.
Technical
References:
EN-OP-115-03, Shift Turnover and Relief TRM 5.0, Administration Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:
None Learning Objective:
RLP-HLO-02026,
- 6. State the normal shift staffing requirements, including titles and numbers of persons required.
- 8. State who may authorize deviation s in the shift complement.
Question Source:
Bank #
(note changes and attach parent)
Modified Bank #
New X
Question Cognitive Level:
Memory / Fundamental Comprehensive /
Analysis X
10CFR Part 55 Content:
43(b)2 Level of Difficulty:
2 SRO Only Justification:
The applicant must have knowledge of TRM bases and how to apply them.
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination PRA Applicability:
N/A
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 2.2.11 Knowledge of the process for controlling temporary design changes.
Tier 3
Group #
N/A K/A 2.2.11 Rating 3.3 Revision 1
Revision Statement:
Added SRO justification statement.
Question:
96 Who has the responsibility of maintaining overall administrative control of installed Temporary Modifications?
A. Shift Manager B. Operations Manager C. Systems & Components Manager D. The General Manager Plant Operations (GMPO)
Answer:
A Explanation:
Pe EN-DC-136, Temporary Modifications, the Shift Manager, with the concurrence of the Engineering Director, or designee, and a completed 50.59 screening prior to implementation, may direct the installation or removal of a Temporary Modification to the plant on an emergency basis without approved controlling documentation, as long as the Temporary Modification does not adversely affect nuclear safety.
Distracters:
All other distractors are plausible due to positions held in the organization.
K/A Match Applicant must know the process for controlling temporary design changes and the personnel involved in the process of getting one approved.
Technical
References:
EN-DC-136, Temporary Modifications Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:
None
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Learning Objective:
Question Source:
(note changes and attach parent)
Modified Bank #
New X
Question Cognitive Level:
Memory / Fundamental X
Comprehensive /
Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content:
43(b)3 Level of Difficulty:
3 SRO Only Justification:
The applicant must have knowledge of the administrative processes for temporary modifications.
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination PRA Applicability:
N/A
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 2.2.37 Ability to determine operability and/or availability of safety related equipment.
Tier 3
Group #
N/A K/A 2.2.37 Rating 4.6 Revision 0
Revision Statement:
Question:
97 If a surveillance with a 7-day required frequency was discovered on day 10 not completed, per Tech Spec SR 3.0.3, equipment should be declared _(1)_ until the required surveillance is completed satisfactorily The required surveillance should be completed within _(2)_.
(1)
(2)
A. OPERABLE 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> B. OPERABLE 7 days C. INOPERABLE 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> D. INOPERABLE 7 days Answer:
B Explanation:
Per Tech Spec SR 3.0.3, if it is discovered that a Surveillance was not performed within its specified Frequency, then compliance with the requirement to declare the LCO not met may be delayed, from the time of discovery, up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or up to the limit of the specified Frequency, whichever is greater. The frequency required frequency is 7 days which is greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Distracters:
(1) INOPERABLE is plausible if the applicant believes the equipment is INOPERABLE immediately upon discovery of missed surveillance requirement.
(2) 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is plausible if the applicant confuses the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> requirement with the frequency requirement whichever is greater.
K/A Match The applicant must determine system operability based on a missed surveillance requirement and state the delay period allowed to complete the missed surveillance.
Technical
References:
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Tech Spec SR 3.03 Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:
None Learning Objective:
RLP-LO-0416,
- 20. State the allowable actions if a surveillance is not performed within its specified frequency in accordance with SR 3.0.3.
- 21. State the basis for the 24-hour delay before entering an LCO if a surveillance frequency is exceeded in accordance with SR 3.0.3.
Question Source:
Bank #
(note changes and attach parent)
Modified Bank #
New X
Question Cognitive Level: Memory / Fundamental X
Comprehensive /
Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content:
43(b)(2)
Level of Difficulty:
3 SRO Only Justification:
The applicant must apply the requirements of SRs in accordance with the rules of SR 3.0.3.
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination PRA Applicability:
N/A
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 2.3.15 Knowledge of radiation monitoring systems, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey instruments, personnel monitoring equipment, etc.
Tier 3
Group #
N/A K/A 2.3.15 Rating 3.1 Revision 1
Revision Statement:
Changed from LOD 3 to 2 Question:
98 The offsite radioactivity release rate monitored to enter EOP-3, Secondary Containment and Radioactivity Release Control, is _(1)_.
Per EOP-3, Emergency Depressurization should be performed before the offsite release rate reaches a _(2)_.
(1)
(2)
A. Gaseous ONLY General Emergency B. Gaseous ONLY Site Area Emergency C. Gaseous OR liquid General Emergency D. Gaseous OR liquid Site Area Emergency Answer:
A Explanation:
Per EPSTG*0002, EOP-3, Radioactivity Release Control, the site Emergency Plan specifies Alert action levels for liquid as well as gaseous offsite radioactivity releases.
However, it is not possible for a primary system (as the term is defined in the EOPs/SAPs) to generate a liquid offsite radioactivity release. Since this subsection is based on a primary system discharging into an area outside the primary and secondary containments, the Alert entry condition only includes gaseous offsite radioactivity releases.
Per EOP-3, Step RR-4, before the offsite radioactivity release rate reaches a General Emergency Step RR-5, EOP-1 Step RR-6, Emergency Depressurization is required.
Distracters:
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination (1) Gaseous OR liquid is plausible if applicant confuses different EAL entry requirements per table A-1 Effluent Monitor Classification Thresholds. Table A-1 contains gaseous and liquid classification thresholds, but the liquid only has UE level thresholds.
(2) SAE is plausible because it is one level below General Emergency when declaring Emergencies. Applicant may confuse General Emergency requirement with SAE.
K/A Match The applicant must have knowledge of the radiation monitoring systems used for effluent monitoring to determine the Emergency Action Level for EOP entry.
Technical
References:
EPSTG*0002, EOP-3, Radioactivity Release Control EOP-3, Secondary Containment and Radioactivity Release Control Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:
None Learning Objective:
RLP-LO-0515 Rev 0, Objective 6: Given EOP-3 flowchart and plant conditions, determine the next action required to be implemented.
Question Source:
Bank #
(note changes and attach parent)
Modified Bank #93 2018 NRC X
New Question Cognitive Level:
Memory / Fundamental X
Comprehensive /
Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content:
43(b)(4)
Level of Difficulty:
2 SRO Only Justification:
The applicant must have the knowledge of EOP-3 diagnostic step and decision point to transition to emergency depressurization based on high offsite release rate.
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination PRA Applicability:
2018 NRC Bank Question
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 2.4.30 Knowledge of events related to system operation/status that must be reported to internal organizations or external agencies, such as the State, the NRC, or the transmission system operator.
Tier 3
Group #
N/A K/A 2.4.30 Rating 4.1 Revision 0
Revision Statement:
Question:
99 The Long Notification Message Form (LNMF) is sent out for any significant changes to
_(1)_.
No more than _(2)_ should be exceeded between any two LNMFs.
NOTE:
PAR - Protective Action Recommendations (1)
(2)
A. PAR 1 Hour B. PAR 2 Hours C. Plant Conditions 1 Hour D. Plant Conditions 2 Hours Answer:
D Explanation:
Per EIP-2-006, Emergency Implementing Procedure, the Long Notification Message Form (LNMF) is used for providing State and local authorities follow-up information.
The LNMF is sent out as soon as possible following a SNMF. The LNMF is also sent out for any significant changes to plant conditions that do not require an emergency escalation or change in PARs. No more than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> should be exceeded between any two LNMFs.
Distracters:
Per EIP-2-002, the NRC is required to be notified immediately after notifying state and local authorities and not later than one hour after declaring the emergency.
Distractors are plausible if applicant confuses requirements for the SNMF and LNMF.
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination K/A Match Applicant must have knowledge of SM responsibilities and time requirements associated with the LNMF during a plant emergency.
Technical
References:
Per EIP-2-006, NOTIFICATIONS EIP-2-002, CLASSIFICATION ACTIONS Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:
NONE Learning Objective:
RCBT-EP-SRORMED, Objective 6: State the conditions and time limit to classify an event. (6)
Question Source:
Bank # 2018 NRC Exam X
Modified Bank #
New Question Cognitive Level:
Memory / Fundamental X
Comprehensive /
Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content:
55.43(b)(5)
Level of Difficulty:
3 SRO Only Justification:
Applicant must have knowledge of emergency plan criteria and regulator limits during a plant emergency that requires a LNMF and update.
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination PRA Applicability:
N/A
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination Examination Outline Cross Reference Level SRO 2.4.40 Knowledge of SRO responsibilities in emergency plan implementation.
Tier 3
Group #
N/A K/A 2.4.40 Rating 4.5 Revision 0
Revision Statement:
Question:
100 At time 1630, indications are present in the Main Control Room which require an emergency declaration.
Offsite notifications to state and local agencies must be made no later than _(1)_.
The NRC must be notified no later than _(2)_.
(1)
(2)
A.
1645 1730 B.
1645 1745 C.
1700 1730 D.
1700 1745 Answer:
D Explanation:
Per EIP-2-001, 5.4 The assessment, classi"cation, and declaration of an emergency condition is expected to be completed within 15 minutes after the availability of indications (i.e. plant instrumentation, plant alarms, computer displays, or incoming verbal reports) to plant operators that an EAL has been exceeded.
Per EIP-2-002, Attachment 1, 3 Direct the Communicator to notify the following:
3.1 Offsite authorities - Within 15 minutes of the declaration using the Short Notification Message Form (SNMF).
3.2 NRC - Immediately after notifying state and local authorities and not later than one hour after declaring the emergency.
1630 + 15 minutes for declaration = 1645 1645 + 15 minutes for notification of offsite agencies = 1700
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination 1645 + 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> for notification of NRC = 1745 Distracters:
(1) 1645 is plausible if applicant confuses declaration time with notification time.
(2) 1730 is plausible if applicant confuses 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> start time with indications present not declaration time.
K/A Match SRO is responsible to ensure all notifications to offsite agencies and NRC must be made on time during emergency plan implementation.
Technical
References:
EIP-2-001, CLASSIFICA TI0N 0F EMER GENCIES EIP-2-002, CLASSIFICATION ACTIONS Handouts to be provided to the Applicants during exam:
None Learning Objective:
RCBT-EP-SRORMED, Objective 6: State the conditions and time limit to classify an event. (6)
Question Source:
Bank # 2012 NRC X
(note changes and attach parent)
Modified Bank #
New Question Cognitive Level:
Memory / Fundamental Comprehensive /
Analysis X
10CFR Part 55 Content:
43(b)(5)
Level of Difficulty:
3 SRO Only Justification:
The applicant must have knowledge of Emergency Implementation Procedures to ensure the Emergency is classified and declared within the required time.
2021 RBS SRO NRC Examination PRA Applicability:
N/A 2012 NRC Bank Question (First part of question removed to make answers more plausible. Not enough changes to label modified.)
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RPS Instrumentation TR 3.3.1.1 RIVER BEND TR 3.3-1 Revision 127 (6i)
TR 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION TR 3.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation
NOTE-------------------------------------------------------------
The following surveillance requirement applies to Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1.1. Failure to meet this surveillance requirement requires entry into Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1.1.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.3.1.1.1 - 3.3.1.1.15 (Not Used)
TSR 3.3.1.1.16
NOTE-----------------------------------
Enter Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1.1 for Functions 9 and 10 if this surveillance requirement is not met.
Verify that all bypass valves are closed t 40% RTP.
OR Verify the bypass channel is placed in the conservative condition (non-bypass).*
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 12 hours TSR 3.3.1.1.17 - 3.3.1.1.18 (Not Used)
- As discussed in BASES of TS 3.3.1.1 functions 9 and 10.
RPS Instrumentation TR 3.3.1.1 RIVER BEND TR 3.3-2 Revision 48 (9i)
Table 3.3.1.1-1 (page 1 of 3)
Reactor Protection System Instrumentation FUNCTION APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS REQUIRED CHANNELS PER TRIP SYSTEM CONDITIONS REFERENCED FROM REQUIRED ACTION D.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS NOMINAL SETPOINT/
RESPONSE TIME
- 1.
- a.
Neutron Flux High 2
3 H
SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.4 SR 3.3.1.1.6 SR 3.3.1.1.7 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 120/125 divisions of full scale 5(a) 3 I
SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.5 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 120/125 divisions of full scale
- b.
Inop 2
3 H
SR 3.3.1.1.4 SR 3.3.1.1.15 NA 5(a) 3 I
SR 3.3.1.1.5 SR 3.3.1.1.15 NA
- 2.
Average Power Range Monitors
- a.
Neutron Flux High, Setdown 2
3 H
SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.4 SR 3.3.1.1.7 SR 3.3.1.1.8 SR 3.3.1.1.11 SR 3.3.1.1.15 15% RTP
- b.
Flow Biased Simulated Thermal Power High 1
3 G
SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.2 SR 3.3.1.1.3 SR 3.3.1.1.8 SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.11 SR 3.3.1.1.14 SR 3.3.1.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1.17 SR 3.3.1.1.18 (b) 0.09sec(c)(d)
(continued)
(a)
With any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies.
(b)
Nominal Values specified in COLR. Nominal value modification required by the COLR due to reduction in feedwater temperature may be delayed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
(c)
Not including simulated thermal power time constant specified in the COLR.
(d)
Response time shall be measured from the detector output or from the input to the first electronic component in the channel.
(e), (f), (g) (h) not used this page
RPS Instrumentation TR 3.3.1.1 RIVER BEND TR 3.3-3 Revision 142 (9ii)
Table 3.3.1.1-1 (page 2 of 3)
Reactor Protection System Instrumentation FUNCTION APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS REQUIRED CHANNELS PER TRIP SYSTEM CONDITIONS REFERENCED FROM REQUIRED ACTION D.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS NOMINAL SETPOINT/
RESPONSE TIME
- 2.
Average Power Range Monitors (continued)
- c.
Fixed Neutron Flux -
High 1
3 G
SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.2 SR 3.3.1.1.8 SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.11 SR 3.3.1.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1.18 118% RTP
< 0.09 sec(d)
- d.
Inop 1,2 3
H SR 3.3.1.1.8 SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.15 NA
- 3.
Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure High 1,2 2
H SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.10 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1.18 1094.7 psig TL < 0.35 sec (h)
- 4.
Reactor Vessel Water Level Low, Level 3 1,2 2
H SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.10 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1.18 9.7 inches TL < 1.05 sec (h)
- 5.
Reactor Vessel Water Level High, Level 8(e) t 23.8% RTP 2
F SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.10 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1.18 51 inches TL < 1.05 sec (h)
- 6.
Closure(e) 1 8
G SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1.18 8% closed
< 0.09 sec
- 7.
Drywell Pressure High 1, 2 2
H SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.10 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 1.68 psid (continued)
(a), (b), (c), (f), (g) not used this page (d)
Response time shall be measured from the detector output or from the input to the first electronic component in the channel.
(e)
This function automatically bypassed with the reactor mode switch not in RUN.
(h)
TL = Tx + Tc; where:
TL = Measured total response time of the isolation system instrumentation Tx = Hydraulic response time of the channel sensor measured upon initial installation Tc = Measured response time of the logic circuit excluding the channel sensor The given numerical value is the acceptance criterion for TL.
In case the sensor is replaced or refurbished, a hydraulic response time test must be performed to determine a revised value for Tx.
RPS Instrumentation TR 3.3.1.1 RIVER BEND TR 3.3-4 Revision 78 (9iii)
Table 3.3.1.1-1 (page 3 of 3)
Reactor Protection System Instrumentation FUNCTION APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS REQUIRED CHANNELS PER TRIP SYSTEM CONDITIONS REFERENCED FROM REQUIRED ACTION D.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS NOMINAL SETPOINT/
RESPONSE TIME
- 8.
Scram Discharge Volume Water Level High
- a. Transmitter/Trip Unit 1, 2 2
H SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.10 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 49 inches 5(a) 2 I
SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.10 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 49 inches
- b. Float Switch 1,2 2
H SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 47.32 inches for LSN013A, B 45.44 inches for LSN013C, D
5(a) 2 I
SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 47.32 inches for LSN013A, B 45.44 inches for LSN013C, D
- 9.
Turbine Stop Valve Closure t 40% RTP 4
E SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.10 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1.16 TSR 3.3.1.1.16 SR 3.3.1.1.18 5% closed (g) d 0.06 sec
- 10. Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure Low t 40% RTP 2
E SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.10 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1.16 TSR 3.3.1.1.16 SR 3.3.1.1.18 530 psig (g) d 0.07 sec(f)
- 11. Reactor Mode Switch Shutdown Position 1, 2 2
H SR 3.3.1.1.12 SR 3.3.1.1.15 NA 5(a) 2 I
SR 3.3.1.1.12 SR 3.3.1.1.15 NA
- 12. Manual Scram 1, 2 2
H SR 3.3.1.1.5 SR 3.3.1.1.15 NA 5(a) 2 I
SR 3.3.1.1.5 SR 3.3.1.1.15 NA (a)
With any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies.
(b), (c), (d), (e), (h) not used this page (f)
Measured from start of turbine control valve fast closure.
(g)
The Turbine First Stage Pressure nominal setpoint is 188.2 psig with an Allowable value 199.4 psig.
Control Rod Block Instrumentation TR 3.3.2.1 RIVER BEND TR 3.3-5 Revision 5 (15i)
TR 3.3.2.1 Control Rod Block Instrumentation TLCO 3.3.2.1 The control rod block instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.2.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
According to Table 3.3.2.1-1.
ACTIONS
NOTE-------------------------------------------------------------
- 1.
Separate Condition entry is allowed for the channels not required by the Technical Specifications.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
One or more required channels inoperable.
A.1 Enter the Condition referenced in Table 3.3.2.1-1 for that channel.
Immediately B.
As required by Required Action A.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.2.1-1.
B.1
NOTE---------
Applicable if only one required channel of the Function is inoperable.
Enter Condition C.
AND B.2
NOTE----------
Applicable if more than one required channel of the Function is inoperable.
Enter Condition C.
7 days Immediately C.
As required by Required Action A.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.2.1-1.
OR As required by Condition B.
C.1 Place at least one of the inoperable channel(s) in the tripped condition.
1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (continued)
Control Rod Block Instrumentation TR 3.3.2.1 RIVER BEND TR 3.3-6 Revision 5 (15ii)
ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D.
As required by Required Action A.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.2.1-1.
D.1.1 Verify Control Rod Block capability is maintained for the applicable function.
AND D.1.2 Place at least one INOPERABLE channel in the tripped condition.
OR D.2 Initiate a control rod block.
1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 24 hours 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />
Control Rod Block Instrumentation TR 3.3.2.1 RIVER BEND TR 3.3-7 Revision 5 (17i)
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
NOTE-------------------------------------------------------------
- 1.
Refer to Table 3.3.2.1-1 to determine which TSRs apply for each Control Rod Block Function.
- 2.
When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> provided the associated Function maintains control rod block capability.
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.3.2.1.1 - 3.3.2.1.6 (Not Used)
TSR 3.3.2.1.7 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION 184 days TSR 3.3.2.1.8 - 3.3.2.1.9 (Not Used)
TSR 3.3.2.1.10
NOTE-------------------------------
Enter LCO 3.3.2.1 Condition A if this surveillance requirement is not met.
Verify that all bypass valves are closed.
Initially, prior to > 20%
RTP.
AND 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, thereafter TSR 3.3.2.1.11 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK.
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> (continued)
Control Rod Block Instrumentation TR 3.3.2.1 RIVER BEND TR 3.3-8 Revision 18 (17ii)
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.3.2.1.12
NOTE--------------------------
Not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after entering MODE 2 (12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after IRMs are on range 2 for SRMs).
Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.
Within 7 days prior to entering MODE 2 from a shutdown exceeding 7 days duration AND 7 days for IRMs AND 31 days for SRMs TSR 3.3.2.1.13
NOTE------------------------------
For APRM neutron flux - High, Setdown, not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after entering MODE 2.
Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.
92 days TSR 3.3.2.1.14 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.
Within 7 days prior to entering MODE 2 from a shutdown exceeding 7 days duration TSR 3.3.2.1.15 Calibrate the trip unit 92 days (continued)
Control Rod Block Instrumentation TR 3.3.2.1 RIVER BEND TR 3.3-9 Revision 128 (17iii)
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.3.2.1.16
NOTES----------------------------------
- 1. Neutron detectors and Reactor Recirc Flow Reference transmitters, as applicable, may be excluded.
- 2. For SRMs, IRMs, and APRM neutron flux - High, Setdown, not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after entering MODE 2.
Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
184 days TSR 3.3.2.1.17 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
24 months TSR 3.3.2.1.18 Calibrate the Recirc Flow Reference transmitters.
24 months
Control Rod Block Instrumentation TR 3.3.2.1 RIVER BEND TR 3.3-10 Revision 61 (18i)
Table 3.3.2.1-1 (Page 1 of 2)
Control Rod Block Instrumentation FUNCTION APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS REQUIRED CHANNELS PER TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS REFERENCED FROM TLCO REQUIRED ACTION A.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS NOMINAL SETPOINT ALLOWABL E VALUE
- 1.
Rod Pattern Control System
- a.
Rod withdrawal limiter (a)
(b) 2 2
ENTER LCO 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.1.1 SR 3.3.2.1.6 SR 3.3.2.1.9 TSR 3.3.2.1.7 TSR 3.3.2.1.10 SR 3.3.2.1.2 SR 3.3.2.1.5 SR 3.3.2.1.7 SR 3.3.2.1.9 TSR 3.3.2.1.10
- b.
Rod pattern controller 1(c),2 2
ENTER LCO 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.1.3 SR 3.3.2.1.4 SR 3.3.2.1.5 SR 3.3.2.1.7 SR 3.3.2.1.9
- 2.
Reactor Mode Switch Shutdown Position (d) 2 ENTER LCO 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.1.8
- 3.
Low Power Setpoint (b),(c),2 2
ENTER LCO 3.3.2.1 TSR 3.3.2.1.11 27.5 +/- 3%
RTP 27.5 +/- 7.5%
- 4.
High Power Setpoint
> HPSP 2
ENTER LCO 3.3.2.1 TSR 3.3.2.1.11 67.9% RTP (k) d 68.2%
- 5.
Average Power Range Monitors
- a.
Flow Biased Neutron Flux - High 1
6 B
TSR 3.3.2.1.13 TSR 3.3.2.1.14 TSR 3.3.2.1.16 TSR 3.3.2.1.18 j
j
- b.
Inoperative 1,2 6
B TSR 3.3.2.1.13 TSR 3.3.2.1.14 NA NA
- c.
Downscale 1
6 B
TSR 3.3.2.1.13 TSR 3.3.2.1.14 TSR 3.3.2.1.16 5% RTP t 3% RTP
- d.
Neutron Flux - High, Setdown 2
6 B
TSR 3.3.2.1.13 TSR 3.3.2.1.14 TSR 3.3.2.1.16 12% RTP d 14% RTP (continued)
Control Rod Block Instrumentation TR 3.3.2.1 RIVER BEND TR 3.3-11 Revision 86 (18ii)
Table 3.3.2.1-1 (Page 2 of 2)
Control Rod Block Instrumentation FUNCTION APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS REQUIRED CHANNELS PER TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS REFERENCE D FROM TLCO REQUIRED ACTION A.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS NOMINAL SETPOINT ALLOWABLE VALUE
- 6.
Source Range Monitors
- a.
Detector not full in(e) 2 3
B TSR 3.3.2.1.12 TSR 3.3.2.1.16 NA NA 5*
2**
C TSR 3.3.2.1.12 TSR 3.3.2.1.16 NA NA
- b.
Upscale(f) 2 3
B TSR 3.3.2.1.12 TSR 3.3.2.1.16 1 x 105cps d 1.6 x 105cps 5*
2**
C TSR 3.3.2.1.12 TSR 3.3.2.1.16 1 x 105cps d 1.6 x 105cps
- c.
Inoperative(f) 2 3
B TSR 3.3.2.1.12 NA NA 5*
2**
C TSR 3.3.2.1.12 NA NA
- d.
Downscale(g) 2 3
B TSR 3.3.2.1.12 TSR 3.3.2.1.16 t 0.7 cps(i) t 0.5 cps(i) 5*
2**
C TSR 3.3.2.1.12 TSR 3.3.2.1.16 t 0.7 cps(i) t 0.5 cps(i)
- 7.
- a.
Detector not full in 2, 5*
6 B
TSR 3.3.2.1.12 NA NA
- b.
Upscale 2, 5*
6 B
TSR 3.3.2.1.12 TSR 3.3.2.1.16 108/125 division of full scale d 110/125 division of full scale
- c.
Inoperative 2, 5*
6 B
TSR 3.3.2.1.12 NA NA
- d.
Downscale(h) 2, 5*
6 B
TSR 3.3.2.1.12 TSR 3.3.2.1.16 5/125 division of full scale t 3/125 division of full scale
- 8. Scram Discharge Volume Water level-high 1, 2, 5*
2 D
TSR 3.3.2.1.13 TSR 3.3.2.1.15 TSR 3.3.2.1.17
- a. LISN602A 18.00" d 21.12"
- b. LISN602B 18.00" d 21.60"
- 9. Reactor Coolant System Recirculation Flow Upscale 1
2 D
TSR 3.3.2.1.13 TSR 3.3.2.1.14 TSR 3.3.2.1.16 TSR 3.3.2.1.18 114% of rated flow d 117% of rated flow With any control rod withdrawn. Not applicable to control rods removed per Technical Specification LCO 3.10.5 or 3.10.6.
OPERABLE channels must be associated with SRM required OPERABLE per Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1.2.
(a)
THERMAL POWER > HPSP.
(b)
THERMAL POWER > 35% RTP and d HPSP.
(c)
With THERMAL POWER d 10% RTP.
(d)
Reactor mode switch in the shutdown position.
(e)
This function is not required if detector count rate is t 100 cps or the IRM channels are on range 3 or higher.
(f)
This function is not required when the associated IRM channels are on range 8 or higher.
(g)
This function is not required when the IRM channels are on range 3 or higher.
(h)
This function is not required when the IRM channels are on range 1.
(i)
Provided the Signal to noise ratio is t 2.0, otherwise trip setpoint of t 3.0 cps and allowable t 1.8 cps.
(j)
Allowable Values and Nominal Values specified in COLR. Allowable and nominal value modifications required by the COLR due to reduction in feedwater temperature may be delayed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. The trip setting for this Function must be maintained in accordance with TLCO 3.2.4.
(k)
To address feedwater temperature reductions, set at first stage turbine pressure equivalent to 60.0 % RTP.
Spray and/or Sprinkler Systems TR 3.7.9.2 RIVER BEND TR 3.7-15 Revision 5 (15viii)
TR 3.7.9.2 Spray and/or Sprinkler Systems
NOTE--------------------------------------------------------------
The Operating License, NPF-47, may require prior NRC approval for changes to this Technical Requirement.
TLCO 3.7.9.2 The following spray and sprinkler systems shall be OPERABLE:
SYSTEM LOCATION ELEVATION IDENTITY
- a.
Control Bldg. Cable Chases 116'0" AS-6A 98'0" AS-6B 70'0" AS-6C, WS-6A, WS-6B, WS-6C 115'0" WS-7A, WS-7B
- b.
Cable Tunnels 67'6"/70'0" WS-8D, WS-8E, WS-8F, 67'6"/70'0" WS-8G, WS-8H, WS-8K, 67'6"/70'0" WS-8L, WS-8M, WS-8N
- c.
Auxiliary Bldg., RCIC 70'0" PS-1, WS-19 Pump Room 141'0" WS-4A, WS-4B, WS-20, AS-12
- d.
Diesel Generator Bldg.
98'0" PS-2A, PS-2B, PS-2C
- e.
Fuel Bldg.
95'0" AS-5 148'0" WS-5A, WS-5B APPLICABILITY:
Whenever equipment protected by the spray or sprinkler systems is required to be OPERABLE.
Spray and/or Sprinkler Systems TR 3.7.9.2 RIVER BEND TR 3.7-16 Revision 128 (15ix)
ACTIONS
NOTE--------------------------------------------------------------
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each required spray or sprinkler system.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
One or more of the above required spray or sprinkler systems inoperable.
A.1 Establish a continuous fire watch with backup fire suppression equipment for those areas in which redundant systems or components could be damaged AND A.2 Establish an hourly fire watch patrol for other areas.
1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 1 hour SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.7.9.2.1 Verify that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) in the flow path is in its correct position.
31 days TSR 3.7.9.2.2 Cycle each testable valve in the flow path through at least one complete cycle of full travel.
12 months TSR 3.7.9.2.3 Perform a system functional test which includes simulated automatic actuation of the automatic systems and verify that the automatic valves in the flow path actuate to their correct positions on a simulated actuation test signal.
18 months TSR 3.7.9.2.4 Cycle each valve in the flow path, that is not testable during plant operation, through at least one complete cycle of full travel.
24 months (continued)
River Bend Station RO Written Answer Key Question #
Answer 76 C
77 D
78 B
79 D
80 A
81 D
82 D
83 B
84 D
85 B
86 A
87 A
88 A
89 B
90 C
91 D
92 B
93 D
94 D
95 D
96 A
97 B
98 A
99 C
100 C