Text

NRC Response to PSEG Contested NCV in Inspection Report 05000272/2017003 and Associated Backfit Claims - EA-17-198
	ML18134A337
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	05/14/2018
From:	Jimi Yerokun; Division of Reactor Safety I
To:	Sena P; Public Service Enterprise Group
	Yerokun J
References
	EA-17-198 IR 2017003
	Download: ML18134A337 (14)
	v • d • e

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

2100 RENAISSANCE BOULEVARD, SUITE 100

KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406-2713

May 14, 2018

EA-17-198

Mr. Peter P. Sena, III

Chief Nuclear Officer

PSEG Nuclear LLC - N09

P.O. Box 236

Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO CONTESTED NON-CITED VIOLATION DOCUMENTED IN

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INSPECTION REPORT

05000272/2017003 AND ASSOCIATED BACKFIT CLAIMS

Dear Mr. Sena:

On December 14, 2017, PSEG Nuclear LLC (PSEG) provided a written response

(ML17348A477) 1 to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Inspection Report 05000272/2017003 and 05000311/2017003 (ML17319A152) issued on November 14, 2017,

concerning an inspection completed at the Salem Generating Station (Salem) Unit 1.

Specifically, the letter contested a Green non-cited violation (NCV)05000272/2017003-02 that

was issued because PSEG did not ensure that the backup air particulate detector (APD)

containment isolation valves (CIV), those associated with penetrations required to be closed

during accident conditions, were unisolated intermittently under appropriate administrative

controls in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.3.1. Your letter stated that the

administrative controls PSEG put in place to govern these open CIVs had been, in fact,

adequate. You also asserted that this NCV was based, in part, upon new staff positions and, as

such, you challenged the NCV as a backfit. The details of the NRC review of your response

and claims are provided in the Enclosure and are summarized below.

The NRC acknowledged receipt of your December 14, 2017, letter in our January 8, 2018,

response letter to PSEG (ML18009A953) in which we stated our intent to perform an

independent assessment of your assertions. This letter transmits our assessment of the original

enforcement decision that dispositioned this issue as a non-cited violation of Technical

Specifications 3.6.1.1 and 3.6.3.1, to determine if it was valid. This review was performed by

NRC staff members who possess relevant regulatory knowledge, but who did not participate in

the inspection documented in Inspection Report 05000272/2017003, which contained the

contested violation. In addition, the staff engaged the Committee to Review Generic

Requirements (CRGR) to ensure that the proposed response was consistent with agency policy

and guidance for addressing backfit claims. The NRC confirmed that PSEG did not implement

adequate administrative controls as described in TS Bases 3.6.3.1. Specifically, the NRC

determined that PSEG did not station a dedicated operator at the valve controls to close the air

1 Designation refers to an Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) accession number. Documents referenced in this letter are

publicly-available using the accession number in ADAMS at https://adams.nrc.gov/wba/ For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRCs Public

Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by e-mail to pdr.resource@nrc.gov.

P. Sena 2

particulate detector (APD) backup containment isolation valves (CIVs) to isolate the

containment if required. The intent of the administrative controls is to allow for penetrations to

be opened intermittently without operable automatic CIVs; the administrative actions, if

implemented adequately, would result in rapid isolation of the penetration by a dedicated

individual. In this case, the NRC determined that the administrative controls, as actually

implemented by PSEG, would not have restored containment integrity in a timely manner during

accident conditions. Thus, these controls were inadequate for the opening of these valves.

This inadequacy, which persisted for 21 days, constituted a violation of the requirements of TS 3.6.1.1, through the failure to implement effective administrative controls with TS 3.6.3.1. Thus,

the original NCV stated in NRC Inspection Report 05000272/2017003 and 05000311/2017003

issued on November 14, 2017 is upheld, as modified in the conclusion section of the enclosure.

The NRC determined that the NCV was not a backfit because the description of these

administrative controls in the Salem Technical Specification Bases does not represent a new

standard or a change in interpretation. However, this review did identify that the NCV, as

documented, could result in confusion regarding the need for a dose consequence analysis

associated with administrative controls. The NRC determined the dose consequence analysis

completed by PSEG in response to inspector questions and referenced in the NCV

documentation was not required. Therefore, the enforcement section of the original violation

and associated inspection report will be re-issued under separate correspondence to remove

reference to the dose consequence analysis completed by PSEG. Should you wish to appeal

this denial of your claim of a backfit, your appeal should be submitted in writing, within 30 days

of the date of this letter, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control

Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the

Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Salem Generating

Station.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding,

of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and PSEGs December 14,

2017, response will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public

Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's

Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible

from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic

Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Jimi T. Yerokun, Director

Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos. 50-272

License Nos. DPR-70

P. Sena 3

Enclosure: NRC Staff Assessment of Contested

NCV 05000272/2017003-02 and

Associated Backfit Claims

cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ

ML18134A337

Non-Sensitive Publicly Available

SUNSI Review

Sensitive Non-Publicly Available

OFFICE RI/DRP RI/DRS RI/DRS RI/DRP RI/ORA

NAME SBarber FArner CCahill FBower BBickett

DATE 04/05/2018 04/11/2018 04/11/2018 04/11/2018 04/06/2018

OFFICE RI/ORA NRR OE RI/DRS

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for HQ OE

DATE 04/11/2018 04/09/2018 04/10/2018 05/11/2018

NRC STAFF ASSESSMENT OF CONTESTED NCV 05000272/2017003-02

AND ASSOCIATED BACKFIT CLAIMS

The NRC staff reviewed the information provided in PSEGs letter and enclosure dated

December 14, 2017 (ML17348A477), to determine whether non-cited violation (NCV)05000272/2017003-02 remains valid. This review was performed by NRC staff members who

possess relevant regulatory knowledge, but who did not participate in the inspection

documented in Inspection Report 05000272/2017003 (ML17319A152). A second, previously

uninvolved NRC staff member, who possesses relevant regulatory knowledge, independently

reviewed PSEGs backfit claims. In performing this assessment, the NRC reviewers relied upon

the documents listed in the Reference Section of this Enclosure and consulted with other NRC

staff members, also independent from the original enforcement decision, including members of

the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR).

A. BACKGROUND

On November 14, 2017, the NRC issued Inspection Report 05000272/2017003 documenting a

Green NCV of Technical Specifications (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.1.1,

Containment Integrity, when PSEG did not ensure that the air particulate detector (APD)

backup containment isolation valves (CIVs), associated with penetrations required to be closed

during accident conditions, were unisolated intermittently under appropriate administrative

controls. Specifically, backup manual CIVs associated with the APD sampling system were

opened and left continuously open for 21 days, under tagging instructions that would have

resulted in an actual open penetration outside of containment during certain design basis

accidents; further, PSEG had not evaluated the adequacy of the tagging instruction to ensure

that radiological dose consequences would remain in conformance with the licensing basis.

Technical Specification (TS) compliance was restored on January 4, 2017, when PSEG

restored the normal APD sample valve configuration.

In a December 14, 2017 letter, PSEG asserts that the tagging instructions and other guidance

established were sufficient to ensure that the requirements of Technical Specification 3.6.3.1

and 3.6.1.1 were met and denied this NCV. Attachment 1 to PSEGs letter also raises

additional considerations related to unintended safety consequences and backfit concerns. This

assessment was performed to review the entire range of PSEGs assertions, including the

backfit claims.

B. ORIGINAL ENFORCEMENT DECISION

Inspection Report 05000272/2017003 described the violation as follows:

Technical Specification LCO 3.6.1.1 action statement requires that without primary containment

integrity, restore containment integrity within one hour or be in at least Mode 3 within the next

six hours and Mode 5 within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . TS 1.7 defines CONTAINMENT

INTEGRITY as all penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either

capable of being closed automatically, or otherwise closed by manual valves, except for valves

that are open under administrative control as permitted by TS 3.6.3.1.

Technical Specification 3.6.3.1, Action 1, requires that with one or more containment isolation

valves inoperable, maintain at least one isolation valve operable in each affected penetration

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1

that is open, and within four hours either restore the inoperable valve(s) or isolate the affected

penetration, or be in at least Mode 3 within the next six hours and in Mode 5 within the following

30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . Action 1 is modified by Note 1, which states that penetration flow paths, except for

the containment purge valves, may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.

Contrary to the above, from December 8, 2016, to January 4, 2017, PSEG did not ensure that

the APD backup CIVs, associated with penetrations required to be closed during accident

conditions, were unisolated intermittently under appropriate administrative controls. Specifically,

the CIVs were opened continuously for this 21 day period, without entry into LCO Action 3.6.3.1,

Action 1. Additionally, the administrative controls applied consisted of a tagging instruction and

a turnover note for one of the two licensed operators at the controls to remotely close the CIVs

from the control room in accordance with the emergency operating procedure (EOP). The valve

configuration would have resulted in an actual open pathway outside of containment during

design basis accidents; however, PSEG had not evaluated the adequacy of the tagging

instruction to ensure radiological dose consequences would remain in conformance with the

licensing basis. PSEG entered this issue in the CAP as NOTFs 20751423 and 20777663. TS

compliance was restored on January 4, 2017, when PSEG restored the normal APD sample

valve configuration. Because this violation was of very low safety significance (Green), and was

entered into PSEGs CAP, this issue was treated as an NCV consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of

the Enforcement Policy.

C. LICENSEE POSITION

PSEG describes the function of containment APD monitors and the actual valve alignment in

detecting the presence of radionuclides in the containment atmosphere. The APD is located

outside of containment and is supplied with containment air through two one-inch diameter

sample lines. One sample line is equipped with normally open air operated CIVs identified as

1VC7, 8, 11 and 12 that automatically close in response to accident conditions. These valves

include inboard and outboard CIVs which will automatically close if a Containment Phase A

signal (4 psig - nominal) is received. A parallel flow path is also provided that is equipped with

normally closed air operated valves (AOV) identified as 1VC9, 10, 13 and 14. These are the

backup remote operated CIVs described in the NCV. These backup CIVs can be closed

remotely from the control room by operation of multiple switches and will not automatically close

if a Containment Phase A signal is received. These backup CIVs are the valves in question for

compliance with Technical Specification 3.6.3.1.

In the December 14, 2017 letter, PSEG respectfully requested that this NCV be withdrawn

because, as they assert, the administrative controls put in place to govern the opening of these

remote manual CIVs were adequate. They also noted that operating in a manner that keeps

important monitoring equipment like the APD in service promoted public health and safety, and

the unintended consequence of this violation could adversely impact safety by encouraging

licensees to disable such equipment.

On April 9, 2018, PSEG issued Licensee Event Report (LER) 2016-06-01, in which they revised

the duration that the backup CIVs were open. Specifically, they stated that on December 8,

2016, the Containment Air Particulate Detector (APD), Normal Containment Isolation Valves

(CIV) were closed to support a planned maintenance activity and the backup manual isolation

valves were opened under administrative controls. On December 29, 2016, a Temporary Lift to

the Work Clearance Document was performed that restored power back to the Normal

Containment Isolation Valves (CIV). Once power was restored, the CIVs were surveilled

Enclosure

2

satisfactorily and the backup isolation valves were closed. The backup isolation valves were

open for 21 days. On January 4, 2017, a full release of the Work Clearance Document was

performed. The 27 days addressed in the NCV takes into account the start date of the work

window (December 8, 2016) until the Work Clearance Document was fully released (January 4,

2017). The 27 day period was also documented in LER 2016-06-00. Thus, the actual duration

the backup CIVs were continuously open was 21 days and this document was revised to reflect

that duration.

D. NRC STAFF REVIEW

The NRC staff carefully reviewed PSEGs position as it applied to the following circumstances

related to the validity of NCV 05000272/2017003-02.

PSEG Review Points:

1. Adequacy of the Tagging Instructions

PSEG asserts that the tagging instructions were written to comply with the TS bases of LCO 3.6.3.1 (B3.6.3.1). The TS bases provide a description of appropriate administrative

controls that include stationing a dedicated operator in constant communication with the

control room, at the valve controls, with instructions to close the valves in an accident

situation and in an environment that does not preclude successful operation. Here, PSEG

considers the dedicated operator to be a control room operator, who was required to be in

the control room by technical specifications and was provided with instructions to manually

close the remote-manual CIVs through the normal response path within emergency

operation procedures (EOPs) if a Phase A containment isolation signal occurs. PSEG

asserts by virtue of the Salem licensing basis, the operator's presence in the control room

met the administrative requirements for constant communication and for a safe environment

to enable the action.

The NRC reviewers note that LCO 3.6.3.1 requires that each CIV be operable when

operating in modes 1, 2, 3 and 4. Note 1 to this LCO allows intermittently opening CIVs

under administrative controls. The basis section of this LCO (B3.6.3.1) explains that

opening of locked or sealed closed CIVs on an intermittent basis under administrative

controls includes three considerations:

1) Stationing a dedicated individual, who is in constant communication with the control

room, at the valve controls;

2) Instructing the dedicated individual to close the valves in an accident situation; and,

3) Assuring that environmental conditions will not preclude access to close the valves

and that this action will prevent the release of radioactivity outside of containment.

The NRC reviewers find that the administrative controls provided by PSEG did not fully meet

the TS Bases because the operator was not dedicated, and as stated in the TS bases, was

not stationed at the valve controls to close the valves upon a containment isolation signal.

In this context, that dedicated operators primary function should have been to close the

valve immediately without delay, if a containment Phase A condition occurred. In this

instance, there was no unique operator that was designated to close these valves; further,

an operator had not been stationed at the valve controls for this capability throughout the

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3

entire 21 day duration when the administrative controls were in place. This action, as

implied by a control room operator, was a shared responsibility by all operators on shift

and was discussed during routine shift turnover, along with many other plant status items

and plant conditions. The TS basis intent of providing the ability to open penetrations,

without automatic CIVs, assumes that a dedicated operator is stationed in the field in

continuous communication with the control room who could be directed to close the

unisolated containment isolation penetration flowpath immediately without delay, if

conditions warranted it. To provide adequate protection, PSEG would have had to

designate an operator in the control room whose primary function would have been to

rapidly close these valves upon recognition of a Phase A containment isolation signal. This

was not performed, and thus, the established administrative controls were inconsistent with

the description of appropriate administrative controls as contained in TS B3.6.3.1.

The NRC performed a historical search of NRC violation history to determine if there were

any similar events related to licensees failure to implement adequate administrative controls

for TS-related containment isolation valves. A similar issue was identified as occurring at

Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) Watts Bar Unit 1 facility, and was documented in Notice

of Violation (NOV) 50-390/96-11-02 (Accession Nos.: Legacy Library (LL) 9612170331,

(LL) 9701060232 and ML072610656). This NOV documented that, contrary to the TS, a

dedicated operator was not stationed at the valve controls when intermittently un-isolating a

penetration in accordance with TS 3.6.3. In their response, TVA acknowledged that

operations personnel did not consult the TS 3.6.3 basis for the definition of administrative

controls which resulted in them failing to station an operator with no other duties at the valve

controls. The NRC determined this to be similar to the current case for which there was

likewise no dedicated operator stationed at the valve controls.

2. Adequacy of the Technical Evaluation

PSEG argues that a technical evaluation of radiological dose consequences or timing of the

manual action to close the remote manual CIVs was not required. The NRC reviewers

agree that there is not an explicit requirement to perform radiological dose consequence

assessment in the TS. This technical evaluation would not be needed if appropriate

administrative controls were established, because the applicable open penetration paths

would be isolated in a rapid manner to protect containment integrity.

3. Sufficiency of Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) Guidance

In Reference 2, PSEG construes the position of the NRC inspectors to be that the technical

evaluation was inadequate because it assumed the expected time for operators to reach a

step in the EOPs mandating verification of Phase A isolation would be ten (10) minutes,

instead of thirty seconds. The NRC stated that a number of steps preceding step 10 of 1-

EOP-TRIP-1, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection" would divert operators to other EOPs.

Step 10 directs operators to verify that 1VC7, 8, 11 and 12 (the automatic CIVs) are closed.

However, the EOP flow path directs operators to close the remote-manual CIVs for each

diversion out of 1-EOP- TRIP-1 as detailed below:

Step 2 of 1-EOP-TRIP-1 directs operators to confirm that the reactor is tripped. If the

reactor is not tripped, they are directed to functional recovery procedure, 1- EOP-

FRSM-1, "Response to Nuclear Power Generation", to take higher priority actions

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4

related to anticipated transient without scram (ATWS). Step 7 of 1-EOP- FRSM-1

directs operators to 1-EOP-APPX-3, "SI Verification". Step 3 of 1-EOP- APPX-3

directs operators to close Phase A CIVs.

Step 4 of 1-EOP-TRIP-1 directs operators to 1-EOP-LOPA-1 "Loss of all AC

Power", if all 4kV vital electric buses are not energized. Step 22 of 1-EOP-LOPA-1

directs operators to close the automatic CIVs. At this point, the tagging instructions

would alert operators that the remote-manual CIVs should be closed.

Step 5 of 1-EOP-TRIP-1 directs operators to 1-EOP-TRIP-2, "Reactor Trip

Response" only if a safety injection (SI) is not required, in which case a Phase A

actuation is neither required nor desired. A continuous action step in 1-EOP- TRIP-

2 returns operators to 1-EOP-TRIP-1 if a SI has been initiated. Therefore,

operators would return to a procedure that directs verification of Phase A

actuations.

Each diversion prior to 1-EOP-TRIP-1, step 10 addresses higher priority accident symptoms

and directs verification of Phase A actuations at the most appropriate time.

The NRC reviewers discussed the timing for the completion of the procedure steps for each

of these EOPs with an NRC Operations Engineer to estimate the timing of completing these

steps. Historically, experience indicates that the implementation of each of these

procedures would have taken by reasonably proficient licensed operators in the area of

several minutes, potentially up to 10 minutes. Their conclusion is that a Phase A

containment isolation would likely have been verified or manually completed in less than 10

minutes from event initiation.

Reference 9, Table 6.2-10 provides the required closure time of less than 10 seconds for the

APD CIVs that would normally receive a closure signal during a containment Phase A

isolation actuation. To provide an equivalent level of protection Salem operators would have

to have implemented the administrative controls effectively with a dedicated operator at the

station controls rapidly closing the backup manual CIVs, thereby minimizing any impact of a

release prior to the closure function. It is recognized that 10 seconds would not be

achievable in the establishment of these controls, but that a dedicated stationed operator

would have nonetheless ensured relatively rapid closure.

The EOPs were written assuming that an open containment isolation pathway did not exist;

however, in these circumstances, a steam-water mixture at 47 psig containment pressure

would result in an almost immediate breach of containment integrity through this pathway

based on a configuration created by PSEG for work control purposes. This is why

implementing appropriate administrative controls as designated in the TS basis with the

intent of prompt isolation precludes the need for review of timing considerations of EOPs,

dose assessments, and any other technical evaluations.

4. LCO 3.6.3.1 and Associated Notes

PSEG asserts that the NRC stated the action statement with LCO 3.6.3.1 must be entered

to take advantage of Note 1 because the notes appear below the line that separates the

LCO and associated applicability from the required actions to be taken if the LCO is not met

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5

while operating in an applicable Mode. The location of the Note in the Salem LCO is

consistent with NUREG-1431, Standard Technical Specifications Westinghouse Plants.

PSEG contends that this interpretation set forth in the NCV is contrary to Salems

longstanding practice of invoking Note 3 to the same LCO when opening containment

pressure vacuum relief valves 1VC5 and 1VC6 to reduce containment pressure. They note

that this activity was conducted thousands of times over the life of the plant without entering

the action statements of LCO 3.6.3.1.

The Salem TS states that containment integrity exists, in part, when:

All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:

1) Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valve

system, or

2) Closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in

their closed positions, except for valves that are open under administrative control as

permitted by Specification 3.6.3.1.

From this definition, it follows that in order for containment integrity to exist, open manual

isolation valves are required to be under the administrative controls as permitted by

Specification 3.6.3.1. LCO 3.6.3.1 requires that CIVs are operable. According to the Salem

Technical Requirements Manual, the remote manual backup valves are CIVs and, as such,

are required to be operable. However, PSEG asserts that at no time during this

maintenance activity were the valves inoperable. They also assert that the backup CIVs

were open and capable of being closed by a dedicated reactor operator in the control room,

who was given adequate instructions and an environmentally secure location.

The NRC agrees with this assertion that the Note regarding administrative controls may be

applied to an open manual isolation valve without a corresponding entry into the

LCO 3.6.3.1 action statements. These valves are not designed with an automatic closure

feature that is tested and timed in accordance with the normal surveillance program.

However, the definition of containment integrity invokes the application of administrative

controls for an open manual isolation valve. Therefore, invoking Note 1 for administrative

controls would be acceptable without TS entry, and the containment pressure vacuum relief

valves implementation of Note 3 would also allow this without TS entry.

5. Backfit Claims

In Reference 2 and as confirmed in a telephone conversation held between the NRC and

PSEG on February 16, 2018, PSEG makes the following three specific backfit claims. An

independent backfit reviewer was assigned to review PSEGs backfit claims in accordance

with Management Directive 8.4, Management of Facility-Specific Backfitting and Information

Collection (ML12059A460).

a. Evaluating Dose Consequences

Given the structure of the NCV as written, PSEG claims it is being required to take

corrective actions that include evaluating dose consequences whenever CIVs are

opened under administrative controls.

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6

In reviewing this contention, the NRC backfit reviewers agreed that an explicit

requirement to perform radiological dose consequence assessment when opening CIVs

under administrative controls as described in the TS and TS Bases does not exist. The

backfit reviewers acknowledge that requiring a dose consequences assessment to open

the CIVs under administrative controls as allowed by the TS would represent a new or

different staff position and imposing this as a requirement upon PSEG would constitute a

backfit. To ensure that the discussion of the dose analysis in the enforcement section of

the NCV is not misconstrued or interpreted as a backfit, it will be removed from the

revised enforcement section of NCV 05000272/2017003-02.

b. Application of a Thirty Second Time Limit

Given the structure of the NCV, as issued, PSEG claims it is being required to apply a

thirty second time limit to manually close a CIV that is opened under administrative

controls.

In reviewing this contention, the NRC backfit reviewers recognize that there is not a

specific requirement to close remote CIVs within 30 seconds to meet the application of

effective administrative controls as described in the TS Bases 3.6.3.1. Under

appropriate administrative controls, in the case of an event that necessitates primary

containment isolation, the intent is rapid isolation, where actions are taken with primary

duties of a dedicated operator to implement isolation when a containment isolation signal

is recognized at the onset of the accident. Imposing a 30 second time limit as a

requirement upon the PSEG would represent a new or different staff position and would

constitute a backfit.

The reviewers did not find any reference to 30 seconds in the enforcement section of the

NCV 05000272/2017003-02 that would necessitate removal to avoid a fixed time limit

construed or interpreted as a backfit.

c. Interpretation of Intermittent Inconsistent with Past Station Practices

Given the structure of the NCV, as issued, PSEG claims that the NRC invoked an

interpretation of intermittent that was inconsistent with long-standing station precedent.

The backfit reviewers evaluated the violation, as restated in the beginning of this

evaluation, and did not identify any additional requirements implied or imposed on

PSEG. Specifically, as cited in the original NCV:

PSEG did not ensure that the APD backup CIVs, associated with penetrations

required to be closed during accident conditions, were unisolated intermittently under

appropriate administrative controls.

The TS allowance of intermittent operation, however, is conditioned upon the application

of appropriate administrative controls specified in the TS Bases. Given that appropriate

administrative controls which included a dedicated operator were not employed, the

condition of the valves could not be returned to their closed base state when a

containment isolation signal would be required to be recognized at the onset of the

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7

accident as described in the TS bases. The backfit reviewer concluded that this did not

represent a new or different staff position. Hence, this did not represent a backfit in

accordance with 10 CFR 50.109. Further, the NRC reviewers note that PSEG provides

no evidence to support the position that the NRC had previously issued or relied upon a

definition of intermittent otherwise inconsistent with common usage.

E. CONCLUSION

LCO 3.6.1.1 requires that CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY be maintained when operating in modes

1, 2, 3 and 4. Surveillance requirement (SR) 4.6.1.1.a1 is associated with this LCO and

requires that each containment manual valve or blind flange that is located outside containment

and required to be closed during accident conditions is closed, except for containment isolation

valves that are open under administrative controls.

Furthermore, LCO 3.6.3.1 requires that each CIV be operable when operating in Modes 1, 2, 3

and 4. Note 1 to this LCO allows intermittently opening CIVs under administrative controls. The

basis section of TS for this LCO explains that opening of locked or sealed closed CIVs on an

intermittent basis under administrative controls includes three considerations:

1. Stationing a dedicated individual, who is in constant communication with the control

room, at the valve controls;

2. Instructing the dedicated individual to close the valves in an accident situation; and

3. Assuring that environmental conditions will not preclude access to close the valves and

that this action will prevent the release of radioactivity outside of containment.

As stated in the Enforcement section of Reference 1, Contrary to the above, from December 8,

2016, to January 4, 2017, PSEG did not ensure that the APD backup CIVs, associated with

penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions, were unisolated intermittently

under appropriate administrative controls.

Specifically, this review found that the valves were not open on an intermittent basis with

appropriate administrative controls applied. The administrative controls appropriate for this

condition are described in the Salem Technical Specification Bases and these controls do not

represent a new standard or a change in interpretation. The intent of the TS bases is such that if

valves are open under administrative controls, but do not have automatic closure signals during

a postulated safety injection or design bases accident, they are to be opened intermittently with

assurance that a dedicated operator will be in place to isolate them as a primary duty of that

operator when an accident signal occurs. Additionally, intermittently un-isolating these valves,

which do not receive automatic closure, is allowed; this recognizes that redundancy is lost in the

automatic closure capability of a CIV and, as such, allowance for intermittent reliance on

operator action to ensure the containment integrity must be maintained.

In this case, if PSEG had established administrative controls as described in the TS bases, they

would have met the intent of the TS and there would have been no potential impact on the

design bases or current licensing bases for the facility. It is recognized that following the above

would have resulted in a dedicated operator being assigned, with his or her primary duty to

isolate the containment penetration as soon as an accident was be recognized by closing the

valves immediately at the valve controls. This would have resulted in a rapid isolation of the

path in a timeframe consistent with the current licensing basis.

Enclosure

8

This review also determined the dose consequence analysis completed by PSEG in response to

inspector questions and referenced in the NCV documentation was not required. Consistent

with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0611.05.02.a, information on the dose

consequences was added to the description section of the finding documentation to enable an

informed, independent reader to understand the actual or potential impact to safety from this

NCV. However, IMC 0611.05.04.b.1 states, in part, that the enforcement section should

document the disposition of the violation by stating what requirement was violated and how it

was violated. The dose consequence analysis was not required and should not have been

included in the enforcement section of the four-part finding documentation. Therefore,

consistent with IMC 0611.13.04, the original violation and associated inspection report will be

re-issued under separate correspondence to remove reference to the dose consequence

analysis completed by PSEG from the enforcement section of the documentation for NCV 05000272/2017003-02. The enforcement section of the finding documentation will also be

revised to indicate that the administrative controls implemented by PSEG were not adequate

when compared to those described in TS Bases 3.6.3.1.

Therefore, the reviewers conclude that PSEGs failure to adequately implement the

requirements for stationing a dedicated operator to close the backup CIVs and their continuous

opening of these valves for 21 days was a non-cited violation of the requirements in TS 3.6.3.

Also, to ensure the backfit claims made by PSEG in Section 6.a. were adequately addressed,

any reference to not evaluating the adequacy of the tagging instruction to ensure radiological

dose consequences would remain in conformance with the licensing basis are hereby removed

from the enforcement section below. Thus, the enforcement section of the original NCV stated

in NRC Inspection Report 05000272/2017003 and 05000311/2017003 issued on November 14,

2017, is upheld, with the following modifications:

Revised Enforcement Section of NCV 05000272/2017003-02

Technical Specification LCO 3.6.1.1 action statement requires that without primary containment

integrity, restore containment integrity within one hour or be in at least Mode 3 within the next

six hours and Mode 5 within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . TS 1.7 defines CONTAINMENT

INTEGRITY as all penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either

capable of being closed automatically, or otherwise closed by manual valves, except for valves

that are open under administrative control as permitted by TS 3.6.3.1.

Technical Specification 3.6.3.1, Action 1, requires that with one or more containment isolation

valves inoperable, maintain at least one isolation valve operable in each affected penetration

that is open, and within four hours either restore the inoperable valve(s) or isolate the affected

penetration, or be in at least Mode 3 within the next six hours and in Mode 5 within the following

30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . Action 1 is modified by Note 1, which states penetration flow paths, except for the

containment purge valves, may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.

Contrary to the above, from December 8, 2016, to December 29, 2016, PSEG did not ensure

that the pathway containing the APD backup CIVs, associated with penetrations required to be

closed during accident conditions, were unisolated intermittently under appropriate

administrative controls. Specifically, the TS Bases for TS 3.6.3.1 described stationing a

dedicated operator at the valve controls, under continuous communication with the control

room, such that rapid isolation of the valves would take place to ensure that the penetration

pathway would have been isolated in a timely manner. PSEG entered this issue in the CAP as

NOTFs 20751423 and 20777663. TS compliance was restored on December 29, 2016, when

Enclosure

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PSEG restored the normal APD sample valve configuration. Because this violation was of very

low safety significance (Green), and was entered into PSEGs CAP, this issue is being treated

as an NCV consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy. (NCV 05000272/2017003-

02, Violation of Containment Integrity Technical Specification)

F. REFERENCES

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Inspection Report 05000272/2017003 and

05000311/2017003 dated November 14, 2017 (ML17319A152).

PSEG Nuclear LLC (PSEG) written response to NRC Inspection Report 05000272/2017003 and

05000311/2017003, dated December 14, 2017 (ML17348A477)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Response Letter to Disputed Non Cited Violation

dated January 8, 2018 (ML18009A953)

Charter Committee to Review Generic Requirements, Revision 8, March 2011, (ML110620618)

CRGR Informal Review Comments to Region I Regional Administrator (acting) David Lew,

(ML18128A069)

Technical specifications; 10 CFR 50.36; 2017.

Salem Unit 1 Technical Specifications 1.7

Salem Unit 1 Technical Specifications 3.6.1.1.

Salem Unit 1 Technical Specifications 3.6.1.3

Notice of Violation 50-390/96-11-02 at Watts Bar Unit 1, which noted that a dedicated operator

was not stationed when intermittently un-isolating a penetration in accordance with

TS 3.6.3. (Accession Nos.: Legacy Library (LL) 9612170331, (LL) 9701060232 and

ML072610656).

Accident Source Term; 10 CFR 50.67; 2017.

Salem Generating Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR)

Safety Evaluation Report for Implementation of Accident Source Term Changes to select Salem

Technical Specifications and UFSAR, dated February 17, 2006 (ML060040322).

Enclosure

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