Similar Documents at Salem |
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Category:GENERAL EXTERNAL TECHNICAL REPORTS
MONTHYEARML20217A9931999-09-30030 September 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data ML20196H8621999-06-30030 June 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data, June 1999 Rept ML18107A3151999-04-30030 April 1999 Submittal-Only Screening Review of Salem Generating Station Individual Plant Exam for External Events (Seismic Portion), Rev 1 ML18106A6821998-06-24024 June 1998 Revised Charting Our Future. ML18106A6681998-06-17017 June 1998 Charting the Future. ML18106A2571998-01-19019 January 1998 Nuclear Business Unit Future Objectives. ML18106A2131997-12-15015 December 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Rev to TS to Adopt Option B of 10CFR50,App J,For Type B & C Testing & Modify Existing TS Wording for Previous Adoption of Option B on Type a Testing ML18102B3331997-02-28028 February 1997 Rev 0 to Cfcu Return Piping Inside CTMT,221F Temp Effect. ML20133D2201996-12-0606 December 1996 Root Cause Analysis of Struthers-Dunn Operate-Reset Relay Latch Failures for Salem Generating Station ML20133D2251996-10-30030 October 1996 Struthers-Dunn Model 255XCXP Relay Root Cause Evaluation for Salem Nuclear Generation Station ML18102A3231996-07-0101 July 1996 Reg Guide 1.121 Assessment of Indications at Salem Unit 2. ML18102A1591996-06-0404 June 1996 Fuel Handling Accident Analysis Radiological Evaluation. ML20101M6601996-03-24024 March 1996 Supplemental Submittal in Response to NRC GL 87-02/USI A-46, 'Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical & Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors.' ML18102A1321996-03-15015 March 1996 Change 2EC-3332 to Rev 0 to Design Analysis, 125 Vdc Battery Charger Replacement. ML18102B0201996-02-28028 February 1996 Rev 0 to Evaluation of Structures for Increased Temps Due to Updated Main Steam Line Break. ML20129K1031995-07-10010 July 1995 Exam of Fasteners from Salem Nuclear Generating Station ML18101A7481995-05-19019 May 1995 Safe Shutdown Equipment List Rept for Salem Generating Station Units 1 & 2 ML18101A7491995-04-25025 April 1995 Relay Evaluation Rept, Volumes 1 & 2, for Salem Generating Station Units 1 & 2 ML18101A7501995-04-20020 April 1995 Seismic Evaluation Rept, for Salem Generating Station ML20134K1031995-03-24024 March 1995 Organizational Effectiveness Assessment Rept for Sngs, ML18102B6541995-03-24024 March 1995 Organizational Effectiveness Assessment Rept for Plant, Redacted Version ML18101A4391994-12-21021 December 1994 Fire Protection Review of Salem Reactor Coolant Pump Oil Collection Sys, Dtd 941221 ML20134C5791994-10-23023 October 1994 Salem/Maint SC.MD-GP.SW-0001(Q) Svc Water Silt Survey, Rev 5 ML18106B0541994-01-31031 January 1994 Criticality Analysis of Salem Units 1 & 2 Fresh Fuels Racks. ML18100A7971993-12-23023 December 1993 Simulator Four-Year Certification Rept. ML20069M2221993-10-15015 October 1993 Flux Thimble Thermocouple Ultrasonic Profilometry & Eddy Current Encircling Coil Insp of Stored Thimble Tubes Jul-Aug 1993 ML18100A6281993-09-16016 September 1993 Updated Page A4-4 of Boric Acid Concentration Reduction Effort Technical Bases & Operational Analysis, Changing Figure Numbers A5-1 & A5-2 to A4-1 & A4-2 at End of First Paragraph ML18100A6801993-08-20020 August 1993 Engineering Evaluation of Sgs 1 & 2 Control Room Evacuation for Fire Induced MOV Hot Shorts as Discussed in NRC Info Notice 92-018. ML20045B8801993-05-21021 May 1993 Boric Acid Concentration Reduction Effort Technical Bases & Operational Analysis for Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2. ML18100A3401993-04-28028 April 1993 Licensing Rept for Spent Fuel Storage Capacity Expansion Pse&G,Salem Generation Station,Units 1 & 2. ML18096B3561993-02-11011 February 1993 Cycle 8 Peaking Factor Limit Rept. ML20135A8141992-12-29029 December 1992 Control Room Overhead Annunciator Lock-Up of 921213 ML18096B1661992-11-13013 November 1992 Rev 1 to Fracture Toughness Analysis for Salem Units 1 & 2 Reactor Pressure Vessels to Protect Against Pressurized Thermal Shock Events,10CFR50.61. ML18096B0081992-09-0202 September 1992 Analytical Data Rept, for Project 28173 ML18096A8061992-06-17017 June 1992 Rev 0 to Salem Unit 2 Response to Generic Ltr 92-01,Rev 1, 'Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity.' ML18096A8051992-06-17017 June 1992 Rev 0 to Salem Unit 1 Response to Generic Ltr 92-01,Rev 1, 'Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity.' ML18096A5831992-03-31031 March 1992 Rev 1 to Estimated Frequency of Loss of Off-Site Power Due to Extremely Severe Weather & Severe Weather for Salem & Hope Creek Generating Stations. ML18095A5151990-07-31031 July 1990 Vol 1 to Spring 1990 NDE of Selected Class 1 & Class 2 Components of Salem Generating Station,Unit 2. ML18095A3691990-07-26026 July 1990 Unit 1 Decommissioning Rept. ML18095A3681990-07-26026 July 1990 Unit 2 Decommissioning Rept. ML18095A3791990-07-20020 July 1990 Decommissioning Rept of Philadelphia Electric Co. ML18094B2241989-12-28028 December 1989 Simulator NRC Certification, Vols I-III ML18094A3551989-04-30030 April 1989 Assessment of Impacts of Salem & Hope Creek Generating Stations on Kemps Ridley (Lepidochelys Kempi) & Loggerhead (Carretta Caretta) Sea Turtles. ML20086U2571989-03-31031 March 1989 Estimated Frequency of Loss of Offsite Power Due to Extremely Severe Weather & Severe Weather for Salem & Hope Creek Generating Stations ML18093B2021988-09-30030 September 1988 Special Rept on Spare CRD Mechanism Weld Refurbishments. ML18093A7601988-02-18018 February 1988 Appendix R/Breaker Coordination as-Found Review (Pre-Audit 1987). ML18093A5471987-12-10010 December 1987 Breaker Coordination W/Respect to External & Internal Hazards. ML18093A4531987-10-14014 October 1987 Justification for Continued Operation of Salem Units 1 & 2 W/Outstanding Fire Protection Concerns. ML18093A4131987-10-0101 October 1987 Justification for Continued Operation of Salem Units 1 & 2 W/Outstanding Fire Protection Concerns. ML18093A3781987-09-16016 September 1987 Rev 7 to, Westinghouse Engineering Svcs Rept for Salem Nuclear Generating Station Units 1 & 2 Concerning RHR Sys Mid-Loop Operation Re NRC Generic Ltr 87-12. 1999-09-30
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217A9931999-09-30030 September 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data ML18107A5581999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 991014 Ltr ML18107A5571999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 991014 Ltr ML18107A5301999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990913 Ltr ML18107A5311999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990913 ML18107A5031999-08-26026 August 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990729,determined That SG Blowdown RMs Setpoint Was non-conservative.Caused by Inadequate ACs for Incorporating Original Plant Licensing Data Into Plant Procedures.Blowdown Will Be Restricted.With 990826 Ltr ML18107A5201999-08-12012 August 1999 Rev 0 to Sgs Unit 2 ISI RFO Exam Results (S2RFO#9) Second Interval,Second Period, First Outage (96RF). ML18107A4811999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990813 Ltr ML18107A4821999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990813 Ltr ML18107A4691999-07-28028 July 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 990714,determined That Limit Switch Cables Were Subject to Multiple Hot Shorts in Same Fire Area.Caused by Inadequate Original Post Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis.All Limit Switch Cables for MOVs Were Reviewed.With 990728 Ltr ML18107A4441999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990605,surveillance for Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) Was Missed.Caused by Human Error.Qptr Calculation Was Performed & Personnel Involved Have Been Held Accountable IAW Pse&G Policies.With 990706 Ltr ML18107A4211999-07-0202 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990605,11 Containment Declared Inoperable. Caused by Valves 11SW72 & 11SW223 Both Leaking.Procedure S1.OP-ST.SW-0010(Q) Was Enhanced to Provide Specific Instructions to Ensure Proper Sequencing.With 990702 Ltr ML18107A4331999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-002-01:on 990405,determined That 2SA118 Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Found in 2SA118 valve.2SA118 Valve Was Cycled Several Times & Seat Area Was Air Blown in Order to Displace Foreign Matl.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A4321999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-006-01:on 990501,determined That There Was No Flow in One of Four Injection Legs.Caused by Sticking of Valve in Safety Injection Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve Was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A5211999-07-0101 July 1999 Rev 0 to Sgs Unit 2 ISI RFO Exam Results (S2RFO#10) Second Interval,Second Period,Second Outage (99RF). ML18107A4351999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990713 Ltr ML18107A4341999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990713 Ltr ML20196H8621999-06-30030 June 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data, June 1999 Rept ML18107A3951999-06-17017 June 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990520,reactor Tripped from 100% Power,Due to Negative Flux Trip Signal from Nuclear Instrumentation. Cause Has Not Been Determined.Discoloration Was Identified on One of Penetrations.With 990617 Ltr ML18107A3661999-06-0909 June 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990513,unplanned Entry Into TS 3.0.3 Was Made.Caused by Human error.Re-positioned Creacs Supply Fan Selector Switches & Revised Procedures S1 & S2.OP-ST.SSP-0001(Q).With 990609 Ltr ML18107A3551999-06-0202 June 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990504,failure to Meet TS Action Statement Requirements for High Oxygen Concentration in Waste Gas Holdup Sys Occurred.Caused by Inability of Operators. Existing Procedures Will Be Evaluated.With 990602 Ltr ML18107A3441999-06-0101 June 1999 Interim Part 21 Rept Re Premature Over Voltage Protection Actuation in Circuit Specific Application in Dc Power Supply.Testing & Evaluation Activities Will Be Completed on 990716 ML18107A3541999-06-0101 June 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990501,HHSI Flow Balance Discrepancy Was Noted During Surveillance.Caused by Sticking of Check Valve in SI Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve 21SJ17,was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990601 Ltr ML18107A3681999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1.With 990611 Ltr ML18107A3721999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 2.With 990611 Ltr ML18107A2931999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990413,determined That Number 12 Auxiliary Bldg Exhaust Fan Was Rotating Backwards.Caused by mis-wiring of Motor Due to Human Error by Maint technician.Mis-wiring Was Corrected & Fan Was Returned to Svc.With 990512 Ltr ML18107A2781999-05-10010 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990411,automatic Actuation of ESF Occurred During Reactor Vessel Head Removal in Support of Refueling Operations.Caused by High Radiation Condition.Containment Atmosphere Was Monitored.With 990505 Ltr ML18107A2791999-05-0404 May 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990406,all Salem Unit 2 Chillers Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Human Error.Lessons Learned from Event Were Communicated to All Operators by Including Them in Night Orders.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2741999-05-0303 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990405,determined That Containment Isolation Valve Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Blocking Valves from Closing.Check Valve Mechanically Agitated.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A3711999-04-30030 April 1999 Corrected Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1 ML18107A3151999-04-30030 April 1999 Submittal-Only Screening Review of Salem Generating Station Individual Plant Exam for External Events (Seismic Portion), Rev 1 ML18107A2991999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Unit 1.With 990514 Ltr ML18107A2971999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Unit 2.With 990514 Ltr ML18107A2351999-04-23023 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990330,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Setpoint Variance Which Is Result of Aging.Valves Were Adjusted & Retested to Ensure TS Tolerance.With 990423 Ltr ML18107A2881999-04-0707 April 1999 Rev 0 to NFS-0174, COLR for Salem Unit 2 Cycle 11. ML18107A1821999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990414 Ltr ML18107A1831999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990414 Ltr ML18106B1471999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990228,reactor Scram Was Noted as Result of Turbine Trip.Caused by Operator Error.Lesson Plans Revised to Explicitly Demonstrate Manner in Which Valve Functions. with 990329 Ltr ML18106B1021999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Salem Unit 2.With 990315 Ltr ML18106B1011999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Salem Unit 1.With 990315 Ltr ML18106B0931999-02-25025 February 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee,Part Number SS-6-T.Caused by Crack Due to Improper Location of Heated Bar.Only One Part Out of 7396 Pieces in Forging Lot Was Found to Be Cracked.Affected Util,Notified ML18106B0701999-02-16016 February 1999 LER 98-015-00:on 981208,inadvertent Discharge Through RHR Relief Valve During Startup Was Noted.Caused by Operator Performing Too Many Tasks Simultaneously.Appropriate Actions Have Been Taken IAW Policies & Procedures.With 990216 Ltr ML18106B0551999-02-0101 February 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Matl Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee,Part Number SS-6-T.Defect Is Crack in Center of Forging.Analysis of Part Is Continuing & Further Details Will Be Provided IAW Ncr Timetables.Drawing of Part,Encl ML18106B0561999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 2.With 990212 Ltr ML18106B0571999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1.With 990212 Ltr ML20205P1671999-01-31031 January 1999 a POST-PLUME Phase, Federal Participation Exercise ML18106B0441999-01-29029 January 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee Part Number SS-6-T.Caused by Crack in Center of Forging. Continuing Analysis of Part & Will Provide Details in Acoordance with NRC Timetables ML18106B0491999-01-28028 January 1999 LER 98-007-01:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Caused by Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking.Replaced Affected Tubing.With 990128 Ltr ML18106B0401999-01-18018 January 1999 LER 98-016-00:on 981219,ECCS Leakage Was Outside of Design Value.Caused by Leakage Past Seat of 21RH34 Manual Drain. Valve 21RH34 Was Reseated.With 990118 Ltr ML18106B0251998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Salem Unit 2.With 990115 Ltr 1999-09-30
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35t.l NUCLEAR OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE SIXTH QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 26r 1985 Membership:
Dr. M. B. Gottliebr Chairman Dr. s. Levy Dr.* K. c. Rogers Admiral E. P. Wilkinson Dr. w. F. Witzig
- --850 5060026 8 50429 I
PDR R
ADOCK 05000272 PDR ..
PAGE 1 NUCLEAR OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE SIXTH QUARTERLY REPORT The sixth regular meeting of te Nuclear Oversight Committee was held on-~-March 11 and 12, 1985 at the Salem Plant of Public Service Electric and Gas Company. All members attended the full meeting
- Introductio'n Over the last two years, PSE&G has made major commitments and allocations of resources to improve the level of excellence of its nuclear activities. Indeed, few if any other u. s.
companies have committed greater effort or resources to the upgrading of their performance. Many PSE&G programs are taking
- shape and acquiring a focus, and performance is improving.
NOC was pleased to see the implementation of several important organization and personnel changes, including the formation of a Change Control Board and task forces on availability and outage management, and notes with positive expectations the appointment as Vice President - Nuclear of Corbin McNeill, a man with an outstanding record and reputation.
Improved performance is exemplified by the excellent recent operating level achieved by Salem I, the number of hours of operation without a lost time accident, and the reduction of Licensee Event Reports.
Despite these good efforts and results, there are a number of areas that require further attention. These are enumerated here and discussed further (except for items 3 and 6) in the body of the report. NOC requests that each of these topics be addressed in the PSE&G response:
- 1. The management responses to the NRC and the NOC are, in many cases, inadequate.
- 2. The changes made so far in improving engineering support for operations represent an improvement but are not sufficient.
The creation of the Change Control Board is a step in the right direction in reducing the backlog of Design Change Requests and in assuring that high priority tasks are promptly dealt with, but this step alone does not seem to have resolved the backlog. There is a similar problem with DCPs.
The proposed processes for dealing with minor changes are too complex and too time consuming.
PAGE 2
- 3. The establishment of an Outage Manager to plan and oversee outaqe work is a step in the right direction and
_shows promise of becoming an effective function. One element that is still missinq is establishment of a method and authority to determine which tasks will ~nd wiil not be performed during outages.
- 4. Too many decisions are being made by committees rather than be designated reponsible individuals. As an example, there has been no apparent guidance by management in the establishment of criteria to guide the Change Control Board. Another most critical task in outage planning is the decision on tasks to be included or excluded. A priority system needs to be formulated with a clear designation of authority.
- 5. While most of the Action Plans have been completed on time, some of the remaining ones seem to be slipping.
Two of the plans may have been overambitious, with resource allocations and completion times not commensurate with anticipated benefits. The NOC continues to be interested as to the intent of PSE&G with respect to the implementation of the Action Plans, and whether this implementation can be achieved within anticipated budget levels.
- 6. The number of reviews and audits continues to grow to a point where they may be interfering with operations.
The NOC notes the tentative plans to create a new Nucle.ar Safety Advisory Board (NSAB) for Salem and another for Hope Creek, and suggests reconsideration of that decision, eliminating at least the Salem NSAB and perhaps creating the Hope Creek NSAB for a limited period.
- 7. *The NOC received its first briefing on the Hope Creek Project and Transition Plans. Overall the work seems to be going along well and on schedule: however, the NOC has some concerns particularly in the area of contingency planning. *
- 8. In the area of safety and reliability, the NOC recommends that management examine the functions of the various organizations performing work in these areas within the Nuclear Department in order to eliminate
- unnecessary duplication and possible consolidation of functions. Both responsibility and accoutability could be improved and clarified by such actions.
It seems to the NOC that organization and staffing for the new Safety Review Management organization are not moving along as rapidly as previously indicated.
PAGE 3
- 1. PSE&G's Responses to NRC and NOC The BOC is not satisfied with the PSE&G response to its last quarterly report. The delay of implementation of Action Plans and of designating cognizant engineers within the Salem Plant, the lack of.~-. specific details of the Nuclear Engineering realignments ~hat are t~ be put in place to give greater engineering support to operations, and precisely how minor DCRs wirl be evaluated and processed were unclear in the PSE&G written response. These matters are brought up once more for attention later in this report.
The response to the criticisms enumerated in the SALP report provide another example. Responsibility for the overall response is not closely assigned although it was, for example, recognized that the Engineering Department was responsible for some of the elements. The NOC urges the early assignment of overall responsibility for a prompt, careful and full response to such challenges, if the image of PSE&G is to improve.
- 2. Engineering Support for Operations In order to imp~ove engineering support for operations, two changes are proposed by PSE&G. First, there would be the establishment of a Nuclear Engineering Station Support (NESS) organization reporting administratively to the Assistant General Manager - Salem Operations and to the Assistant General Manager -
- Nuclear Engineering, for technical guidance. Under this system, station personnel would be assigned responsibility for sub-system or component cognizance. It is not clear to the NOC that such a system will meet-the needs. Under the proposed plan the cognizant engineers are not permitted to define or to carry out engineering changes -- no matter how minor the changes. The NOC points out that highly competent engineers are needed to carry out the function of "cognizant engineer" and that it would be difficult to attract and to keep a person with the requisite talents. Moreover, it is not clear that the cognizant engineer's talents would be well utilized. The cognizant engineer should have a greater role to play.
The second change involves the creation of *a new kind of Design Change Request, the Minor DCR, in order to permit changes to be made in a more expeditious fashion. However, when the NOC was given a block diagram of the processes that would be involved, the NOC concluded that much more simplification was needed. One question that was unresolved: Do minor DCRs have to receive the blessing of the Change Control Board?
In this connection, it came to the attention of the NOC that there are many items included in the Technical Specifications that really do not belong there. Steps should be taken to remove or modify there items.
PAGE 4 While the Nuclear Department is fortunate i~ having an unusually larqe and competent enqineering staff, that staff will, irr support of Salem operations and Hope Creek start-up, need to prioritize its tasks through a living schedule. Furthermore, future engineering needs should be carefully defined and considered before making final decisions about changes in resource allocations.
4... Management Decisions The NOC repeatedly encounters situations where committee concensus seems to be applied in cases where mangement decisions should apply. Two such cases came up during the last meeting.
The new Change Control Board (CCB) has been assigned the tasks of reviewing the Design Change Requests (DCR) and the Design Change Packages (DCP) with the objective of reducing the backlog to a reasonable and achievable number. As far as the NOC could ascertain, no criteria was specified by management to the CCB. As a result, less than one-third of the DCRs have been eliminated by the CCB so that the backlog is still unrealistically large. As of the last NOC meeting the DCPs had not yet been reviewed, but the present backlog represents a serious problem. Management must take a stronger and better defined position to resolve the DCR and DCP backlog.
A similar conclusion appertains to the Outage Planning process. No responsibility has been assigned or process defined for deciding which outage DCPs will be implemented during outages. This is an important question which might well go all the way up to the Vice President - Nuclear for final decisions.
It should be further noted that decisions on DCPs have a maj6r influence on outage planning so that early decisions are a necessity.
- 5. Action Plans While most of the Action Plans (21) are now complete, eight are still open. Two, 2.4.1 and 2.6.3, are delayed and the NRC has been so notified. Several others are in jeop~rdy. These are reviewed below:
2.4.1, Plant Cleanliness. The original schedule called for completion by December 31, 1984. The present schedule calls for co~pletion by September 30, 1985. The delay is due mainly to a shortage of manpower caused by the back-to-back Salem I, Salem II outages. However, NOC notes that even though the process is not yet complete, striking improvements are apparent.
PAGE 5 2.6.3, Redu~ing the Number of Backlogged Maintenance Items.
The original schedule called for completion January 31, 1985.
Th~ present schedule is May 31, 1985. The backlog was reduced from a peak of 1584 work orders in January 1984 to 341 in July 1984. However, that number has now slipped above the target 400, and renewed_efforts should be- and are being applied to bring that number down-- to acceptable levels.
- In the area of 2.2.2, Commitment Tracking, it has seemed to the NOC from the outset that this program represented an overreaction and that some scaledown is justified. The NOC, at a previous meeting, recommended that PSE&G review its decision to review all documents dating back to the beginnings of Salem I to find out whether any commitments made over the many years had not been met. In the light of actual experience and the magnitude of the task, NOC recornmeded that this commitment be reviewed. The NOC is not aware of PSE&G's decision on this matter.
Similarly, 2.7.3, Management Information System, representing an attempt to get all interrelated information on to one large computer program, encompasses a task that is indeed massive. The NOC is not aware of any organization that has succeeded in operating such a completed integrated system. It is likely that more modest objectives will represent a more practical approach that can be im~lemented within a time scale that would produce a more cost-effective solution.
While both of these steps would repres~nt reductions in the level of implementation of Action Plans, it should not be inf erred that the NOC favors a general backing-down in the Action Plan implementation efforts. _Ouite to the contrary, the NOC is concerned that the gains expected, and in some cases alr~ady realized, from the whole Action Plan effort be not dissipated either by intent or by neqlect. The NOC wishes to continue to monitor these efforts.
- 7. Hope Creek The reports received by the NOC on the Hope Creek project status were very positive and encouraging. The PSE&G staff involved are highly capable and experienced, and there appears to be in place a strong team organization ~hat will move smoothly into the operations phase of the project. The PRIDE, SAFETEAM, and DART programs that have been put in place to deal with various aspects of the turn-over of the plant to PSE&G from the contractor are all commendable.
The NOC called attention to the types of problems that other utilities have had in the final months before nuclear fuel loading, particularly stressing the Independent Design Verification Program, Construction Assessment activities, and the advisability of maintaining close contacts between PSE&G and the NRC during the last months prior to licensing. The NOC stressed the importance of contingency planning in the final stages of the project.