05000272/LER-1980-031, Forwards LER 80-031/99X-0

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Forwards LER 80-031/99X-0
ML18082A723
Person / Time
Site: Salem 
Issue date: 07/08/1980
From: Librizzi F
Public Service Enterprise Group
To: Grier B
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML18082A724 List:
References
NUDOCS 8007150672
Download: ML18082A723 (6)
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LER-1980-031, Forwards LER 80-031/99X-0
Event date:
Report date:
2721980031R00 - NRC Website
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PS~G Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Place Newark, N.J. 07101 Phone 201/430-7000 Mr. Boyce H. Grier Director of USNRC July 8, 1980 Off ice of Inspection and Enforcement Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Grier:

LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 80-31/99X Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 1 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.2.a, we a.re submitting ECCS Actuation Report for Reportable Occurrence 80-31/99X.

This report is required within ninety (90) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

~~

F. P. Librizzi General Manager -

Electric Production CC:

Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement (30 copies)

Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control (3 copies)

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95-2001 (200M) 2-78 J

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Report Number:

80-31/99X Report Date:

7/08/80 Occurrence Date:

6/09/80 Facility:

Salem Generating Station Unit 1 EVENT:

Public Service Electric and Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Appendix A Technical Specification, Section 6.9.2, requires the reporting of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Actuations within 90 days of their occurrence.

To date, we have experienced twelve (12) such actuations.

The purpose of this report is to describe the circumstances surrounding Safety Injection No. 12.

Details of Safety Injections Nos. 1 thru 11 are contained in Report Nos.

ECCS/77-01, 77-26/990, 77-29/990, 78-04/990 and 78-74/990 previously submitted.

DISCUSSION/CONCLUSION:

The referenced Westinghouse letter documents the acceptability of fifty (50) Safety Injection transients at a RWST temperature of 40°F.

As the RWST temperature during this injection was 90°F, the transient does not approach the severity of the design basis transient and, as such, is acceptable.

REFERENCES:

1.

ECCS Actuation Report No. 80-31/99X, Attachment 1

2.

Westinghouse Burl 3461 letter, dated 12/13/76, Attachment 2 Prepared By M. J. Murphy Manager'- S'&iem Generating Station SORC Meeting No.

47-80 i !

I

ATTACHMENT 1 TO ECCS ACTUATION REPORT NO. 80-31/99X IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Failure of Steam Pressure Transmitters Resulting in a Safety Injection CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 Reactor Power 100%

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 0844 hours0.00977 days <br />0.234 hours <br />0.0014 weeks <br />3.21142e-4 months <br />, lightning struck the south penetration area causing a transient on 7 Main Steam Pressure Transmitters with 2 failing.

The transient caused a high steam line differential reactor trip signal and a safety injection.

The Emergency Instruction, Safety Injection Initiation, was implemented, the safety injection was determined to be inadvertent and terminated at 0848 hours0.00981 days <br />0.236 hours <br />0.0014 weeks <br />3.22664e-4 months <br /> using Emergency Instruc-tion, Recovery from Safety Injection.

Total injection time was four minutes.

During satisfactory accident loading of the safeguards equipment, the Steam Generator level, with 11 and 12 Auxiliary Feed Pumps operating, decreased to the low low level alarm setpoint of 11% starting 13 Auxiliary Feed Pump automatically.

The 13 Auxiliary Feed Pump tripped on overspeed and was declared inoperable at 0851 hours0.00985 days <br />0.236 hours <br />0.00141 weeks <br />3.238055e-4 months <br /> and Action Statement 3.7.1.2 was entered.

Feed water flow was maintained by 11 and 12 Auxiliary Feed Pumps and Steam Generator level was returned to normal.

At approximately 0851 hours0.00985 days <br />0.236 hours <br />0.00141 weeks <br />3.238055e-4 months <br />, 11, 12, 13 and 14MS167, Main Steamline Isolation Valves were closed hydraulically by the operators.

The 11, 13 and 14MS167 valves indicated shut with 12MS167 valve still indicated open, and an emergency closure was initiated which required longer than the required five second closure time.

At 0859 hours0.00994 days <br />0.239 hours <br />0.00142 weeks <br />3.268495e-4 months <br />, 12MS167 was declared inoperable and Action Statement 3.7.1.5 was entered.

It was determined that a required reactor coolant sample could not be obtained within the required 2 -

6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after a reactor trip.

The sample was obtained at 1556 hours0.018 days <br />0.432 hours <br />0.00257 weeks <br />5.92058e-4 months <br />, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 6 minutes later.

As a result of the safety injection, the Boron Injection Tank (BIT) became inoperable since the injection reduced the boron concentration to below that allowed by Technical Specification 3.5.4-1.

Boron was added to the BIT and at 1900 hours0.022 days <br />0.528 hours <br />0.00314 weeks <br />7.2295e-4 months <br /> with the boron concentration at 20,157 ppm, the Action Statement was terminated.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Lightning causing a Transient on Steam Line Pressure Transmitters.

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ATTACHMENT 1 TO ECCS ACTUATION REPORT NO. 80-31/99X 2 -

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The cause of the reactor trip/safety injection was a lightning stroke which apparently penetrated_ the zone of direct stroke protection and struck in the vicinity of the containment building at the south penetration area.

We believe the stroke hit #12 and #14 main steam vent pipes which extend above the penetration area roof and the surge was carried into the building via piping connections.

The lightning induced transients signals from four pressure transmitters in the south penetration and one transmitter in the north penetration area, coupled with the failure of the two transmitters was sufficient to complete the safety injection logic.

No. 13 Auxiliary Feed Pump overspeed trip was caused by a broken governor feedback linkage guide pin.

Governor control was lost and resulted in overspeed.

The reactor coolant sample was delayed due to a diaphram failure of 1CV277 Reactor Coolant Letdown line isolation valve actuator.

The valve failed in the fail-safe position, closed.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The failed pressure transmitters were replaced.

The channels were verified operable by satisfactory performance of channel function.al tests.

The governor feedback linkage was repaired and 13 Auxiliary Feed Pump was verified operable by. a satisfactory operational test.

The 12MS167 valve actuators were inspected and no deficiences were noted other than loss of pydraulic oil f~om the normal valve actuating system.

The oil reservoir was filled and the valve was stroked and timed satisfactorily.* The diaphram in the 1CV277 valve actuator was replaced and the valve was stroked to verify operability.

The failed transmitters are being examined to determine the components that failed.

An investigation into the availability of suitable surge protection equipment and an evaluation of implementing surge suppressors has been initiated, along with additional direct stroke protection for the* outer penetration areas.

Results will be reported when available.

FAILURE DATA:

Rosemont Pressure Transmitters Model 1153A-GA-9A92-PD Prepared By ~-*_M_._._J __

._M u_r~p-*h_y~~

SORC Meeting No. *..

  • 47-*so Manager -

Saleiri'Generating Station

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  • Mr._ R. D. R1~e
- Chief Mechanical Er.gfr.eer Electric Engineering Cepart:r.ent Publfc Service Electric & Gas cc::r,,any 60 Park Place Newark, New Jersey 07101

Dear Mr. Rip;:ie:

OFC 1 t3 i9i6

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SALEM NUCLEAR GENEAAT!NG SlATICN UNITS NUMBER 1 ANO 2 Safety Injection (SI) Transient Oesian Basf s Curing the recent pre-critfc:a1 testing phase, the p1ant was subjected to three (3) inadvertent Safety Injection (SI) initiation events, whic:h we understand resulted in scme water being injected into the F.eactor Coolant Loop.

We also understar.d tr.at t~e NRC has ver:a1ly asked for the design t~~sient basis for Sa1Q~ for this ty~e ~f event

  • While we hav.e not specifically analyzed ~alem for this ty~e of transient, we are confident that our ongoing plant analysis associat:c with AS:*!E Section III mere than demonstrates that the ~cent three (3) SI's will ha'le no detri.menta1 effect on Salem.

Our ccnclus~cn is based en tt:e fcl-la~ing ratic_nale.

~e have analyzed suffic~ent Section III pip.ir.g similar to yours with the 1-1/Z" SI nozzles to SI e'lents c:an be. accomodated \\"4ithcut exceedir.g lfmits at the SI nozzle.

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sys.ems lnc u~1n9 ?~~1~g shew t~at fiftj (S~) such the apprcpriate s:ress.

These ~na1ysis we~ based en t!ie nozzles being !~ejected to a 40aF ~ater transient whic:h is probably far worse than the act~a1 transient.seen at Sal em.

T!ie results of these ~r:alys'fs are in tl~:! p~cess cf ~e'fn; fcr.:a.1 'i::d fer sub.ilittals to the W~C for Sect'fon !II "tar.ts.

ATTACHMENT NO. 2

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Thus fn spite of the or1gina1 Sa1em design basis using 31.l~iping cedes whidl did not specifically require transient design ca1cu1aticns fer the subject transient, we te11eve that our more recent analysis prcvices a sound ba.sis for acceptability of the Salen piping.

  • Very tru1y yours, WESTINGHOUSE: E'i..ECTRIC CCR?OAAT!ON

~~

J. P. Sluss, Manager Sa1~ Project

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R. O. Rippe, 3L D. J. Jagt, lL c. F. Barclay, lL J. J

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