ML18068A147

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NRC Response to Union of Concerned Scientists Comments Regarding Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2, High Pressure Coolant Injection Licensee Event Report 05000265/2017-001-00
ML18068A147
Person / Time
Site: Quad Cities  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 03/09/2018
From: Karla Stoedter
Division Reactor Projects III
To: Lochbaum D
Union of Concerned Scientists
References
LER-2017-001-00
Download: ML18068A147 (4)


See also: IR 05000265/2017001

Text

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

2443 WARRENVILLE RD. SUITE 210

LISLE, ILLINOIS 60532-4352

March 9, 2018

David A. Lochbaum

Director, Nuclear Safety Project

Union of Concerned Scientists

PO Box 15316

Chattanooga, TN 37415

SUBJECT: NRC RESPONSE TO UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS COMMENTS

REGARDING QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT 2, HIGH

PRESSURE COOLANT INEJCTION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

05000265/2017-001-00

Dear Mr. Lochbaum:

On July 26, 2017, the Region III office received a letter from you (ML17321A947) providing

comments based upon your review of Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000265/2017-001-00 for

Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2 (ML17194A817). This licensee event report is

related to an event that occurred on May 15, 2017. As stated in the report, the High Pressure

Coolant Injection (HPCI) system minimum flow valve did not open as expected during HPCI

system testing. Based upon our review of the LER and the specific HPCI system issue, the

inspectors concluded that the licensee immediately declared the HPCI system inoperable,

entered the appropriate Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation, replaced a

failed flow switch, and returned the HPCI system to service within the Technical Specification

allowed completion time.

As you are likely aware, letters to senior NRC officials are generally placed into ADAMS as

publically available documents unless there is a reason to exclude the letter from ADAMS.

Several weeks before your letter was received by our prior Regional Administrator, Cynthia

Pederson, the Quad Cities HPCI issue was under review by our resident inspectors. Shortly

after receiving your email, I and several members of the NRC staff conducted a phone call with

you to determine if our understanding of the issue was the same as yours. The result was that

we (you and the NRC) had a similar understanding of the issue and you provided no information

that would prompt us to modify our inspection of this issue; therefore, your letter was placed in

ADAMS as publically available. Ms. Pederson has since retired and Mr. K. Steven West has

been appointed as the Region III Regional Administrator. I have discussed your letter with him,

and he has authorized me to respond for him. This response will be placed into ADAMS as a

publically available document.

In your letter, you raised three concerns:

1. The licensee made two seemingly contradictory statements in the LER related to

whether the HPCI system minimum flow valve failure is an event or condition that could

have prevented the fulfillment of its safety function. Additionally, you questioned why the

licensee did not retract the LER if they determined that the event would not have

affected a safety function.

D. Lochbaum -2-

2. The licensee stated that the failure of the minimum flow valve to open did not contribute

to an increase in risk since the operation of the minimum flow valve was not modeled in

the plants Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). You referenced NUREG/CR-5934,

High Pressure Coolant Injection System Risk-Based Inspection Guide for Quad-Cities

Station, Units 1 and 2, and questioned whether this conclusion was appropriate.

3. The licensee stated that the HPCI system had a 10-minute mission time. You

questioned whether it is acceptable for the licensee to consider only one short-duration

design basis event and exclude all longer duration events when assessing safety

impacts.

The NRC staff has reviewed your concerns and provides our assessment below. We note that

the event described in the LER was under review by the NRC resident inspectors at the time we

received your letter.

Concern 1 - Contradictions Regarding Loss of Safety Function

The NRC reviewed the information provided in LER 2017-001, including the potential

contradictory information regarding the loss of safety function, and discussed this information

with the licensee. The NRC determined that the HPCI system was declared inoperable due to a

note in the surveillance procedure acceptance criteria. After declaring the HPCI system

inoperable, the licensee reported the HPCI system inoperability to the NRC in accordance with

the guidance provided in NUREG-1022, Event Report Guidelines, Revision 3, Section 3.2.7,

Event of Conditions that Could have Prevented the Fulfillment of a Safety Function. After

determining the cause of this event, the licensee performed an engineering evaluation as

discussed in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, and

concluded that this event did not constitute a safety system functional failure because the HPCI

system remained available to perform its specified safety function. This conclusion was based

upon information provided by General Electric demonstrating that the HPCI system would

continue to function even though the HPCI system minimum flow valve was not operating as

expected.

The NRCs review of the LER is documented in Section 4OA3 of Integrated Inspection

Report 05000254/2017004 and 05000265/2017004 (ML18047A566). The inspectors reviewed

the licensees engineering analysis and agreed with their conclusion that HPCI remained able to

perform its safety function. In this instance, despite the conclusion of licensees engineering

assessment, the NRC does not require retraction of LERs if the system is later determined to

have always been operable. The inspectors review retracted event notifications to validate the

licensees conclusions and basis for the retraction. In addition, the inspectors review the safety

system functional failure performance indicator once per year, and this event would be in the

scope of that review.

Concern 2 - Risk Perspectives

As noted in the LER, the licensee stated the HPCI minimum flow valve was not credited in the

plants PRA and therefore did not contribute to an increase in risk. The NRC staff agrees that

this statement alone would not be an adequate justification for determining the risk significance

of the event. However, the licensee also stated in the LER that the overall safety significance

and risk impact of the event was minimal due to the fact that the HPCI system was available to

perform its safety function.

D. Lochbaum -3-

The inspectors reviewed the licensees evaluation and found it to be in accordance with

NUREG/CR-5934. Specifically, Section 6.14 discusses that the medium risk aspect of a HPCI

minimum flow valve failure is due to a coincident normally open pump discharge valve failing

closed or becoming plugged. With respect to the issue discussed in the LER, the pump

discharge valve operated as expected. The NRC staff did not identify any additional concerns

with the licensees risk evaluation.

Concern 3 - Mission Time

As stated previously, the licensee ultimately determined that the HPCI system remained

operable and available to inject in the event of a loss of coolant accident. The NRC did not

identify any concerns with the licensees assessment. As part of the LER review, the NRC also

noted the statement regarding the HPCI mission time. This event and the condition of the

minimum flow valve had no impact on the HPCI systems function or the systems ability to

continue to run, and therefore the inspectors did not pursue the mission time statement further,

other than noting the 10 minute mission time was as described in the licensees UFSAR.

The 10 minute time is based on a limited set of event scenarios, as described in the licensees

fuel analysis, in which HPCI operates for 10 minutes and then other systems are used to

mitigate the postulated event. Finally, the NRC significance determination process generally

uses a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> mission time and if HPCI could not meet this mission time successfully due to a

performance deficiency, the NRC would assess the significance using this process and mission

time.

Thank you for communicating your comments to the Region III office. If you have any

questions, please contact me at 630-829-9731 or via e mail at karla.stoedter@nrc.gov.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Karla K. Stoedter

Chief, Branch 1

Division of Reactor Projects

D. Lochbaum -4-

Letter to David A. Lochbaum from Karla K. Stoedter dated March 9, 2018

SUBJECT: NRC RESPONSE TO UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS COMMENTS

REGARDING QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT 2, HIGH

PRESSURE COOLANT INEJCTION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

05000265/2017-001-00

DISTRIBUTION:

Jeremy Bowen

RidsNrrDorlLpl3

RidsNrrPMQuadCities Resource

RidsNrrDirsIrib Resource

Steven West

Darrell Roberts

Richard Skokowski

Allan Barker

DRPIII

DRSIII

ROPassessment.Resource@nrc.gov

ADAMS Accession Number: ML18068A147

OFFICE RIII RIII

NAME JHeller:lg KStoedter

DATE 3/1/2018 3/2/2018

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY