ML18053A357
| ML18053A357 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 04/22/1988 |
| From: | Burgess B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18053A354 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-255-88-08, 50-255-88-8, GL-86-07, GL-86-7, IEB-88-001, IEB-88-1, IEIN-87-021, IEIN-87-023, IEIN-87-024, IEIN-87-034, IEIN-87-040, IEIN-87-041, IEIN-87-042, IEIN-87-21, IEIN-87-23, IEIN-87-24, IEIN-87-34, IEIN-87-40, IEIN-87-41, IEIN-87-42, NUDOCS 8805030349 | |
| Download: ML18053A357 (12) | |
See also: IR 05000255/1988008
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I II
Report No. 50-255/88008(DRP)
Docket No. 50-255
Licensee:
Consumers Power Company
212 West Michigan Avenue
Jackson, MI
49201
Facility Name:
Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant
Inspection At:
Palisades Site, Covert, Michigan
Inspection Conducted:
March 3 through April 4, 1988
Inspectors:
Approved By:
E. R. Swanson
N. R. Wil 1 i ams en
T. V. Wa~.9 ch,1
.
/
// J/ I
/'
//,11 I /':,-/,1,{.lA?,(A/vrl(J
si~/o*~sr,--ch~T flL
Reactor Projects Section 2A
Inspection Summary
License No. DPR-20
Date
Inspection on March 3 through April 4, 1988 (Report No. 50-255/88008(DRP))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors and
Region III staff of followup of previous inspection findings; operational
safety; maintenance; surveillance; physical security; radiological protection;
bulletins; generic letters; information notices; and quarterly management
meeting.
Results:
Of the areas inspected two violations were identified.
The first
involves inadequate evaluation and documentation of an issue involving an
unreviewed safety question.
The second involves an improperly performed
surveillance test where technician performance was not adequate .
8805030349 880422
ADOCK 05000255
Q
1.
2 .
l -
DETAILS
Persons Contacted
Consumers Power Company (CPCo)
D. P. Hoffman, Plant General Manager
- J. G. Lewis, Technical Director
- W. L. Beckman, Radiological Services Manager
- R. D. Orosz, Engineering and Maintenance Manager
- R. M. Rice, Operations Manager
- D. W. Joos, Administrative and Planning Manager
C. S. Kozup, Licensing Engineer
- R. A. Vincent, Plant Safety Engineering Administrator
- D. J. Malone, Licensing Analyst
- R. E. McCaleb, Quality Assurance Director
R. A. Fenech, Operations Superintendent
T. J. Palmisano, Plant Engineering Supervisor
- Denotes those present at the Management Interview on April 4, 1988.
Other members of the Plant staff, and several members of the Contract
Security Force, were also contacted briefly.
Followup on Previous Inspection Findings:
(Closed) Violation 255/85003-21(DRP):
A QA audit had an inadequate
categorization of
110bservations
11 compared to
11 Findings
11 ; furthermore,
it appeared that Observations that required corrective actions were not
being tracked.
The licensee has amended his definition of
110bservation
11
and will continue to classify Observations and Findings according to
their significance.
However, those Observations that are considered to
be conditions adverse to quality and not corrected prior to the issuance
of the report will be documented on an Action Item Record (AIR) and
tracked to completion and trended via the Corrective Action System.
The licensee states that procedures are in place to assure personnel
follow-up on AIRs and to perform a completion review prior to closeout
of the document.
The inspector reviewed a number of QA audit reports and
the categorization of Observations and Findings and "conditions adverse
to quality" seems adequate.
This Violation is closed.
(Closed) Open Item 255/85013-08(DRP):
Failure of the 2400 volt breakers
to effect a fast transfer of vital loads to the startup transformer.
This open item was the result of failures documented in LERs 84001,
84015, -and 85005.
The event described in LER 85031 also involved the
failure of the 2400 volt breakers to transfer load,
LER 85031 was closed
in Inspection Report 255/88005, Paragraph 9, and that closure satisfies
Open Item 255/85013-08, also.
This Open Item is closed .
2
(Open) Open Item 255/85030-02(DRP):
Revise Test Procedure R0-65 so that
the testing of the both HPSI train check valves will be congruent with
ASME Code Section XI, Article IWV-3522, which states that the pressure
differential for equivalent flow shall be no greater than that observed
during the preoperational test.
The preoperational testing was done with
the flow going into all four loops and the flow thru each check valve
being measured.
However, the present version of the test procedure calls
for the check valves being tested one at a time, hence putting the full
head of the pump across just one check valve until it opens.
The licensee
has stated that they are evaluating a revision to Test Procedure R0-65
such that the pressure differential across the check valves during testing
will be congruent with the pressure during preoperational testing.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 255/86005-02(DRP):
Licensee to submit a study
and planned corrective action for Region III review by June 30, 1986,
regarding the problem of local leak rate test failures.
The study
results and the corrective action plan were submitted on time.
(Closed) Open Item 255/86035-157(DRP):
Improve the testing of the High
Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) pumps through a combination of better
instrumentation and enhanced procedures.
As reported in Inspection
Report 87032, the improved procedures had been completed but a vibration
problem with the newly-installed precision-type discharge pressure gauges
still remained.
The licensee has now corrected the vibration problem and
this Open Item is closed.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 255/87005-08(DRP):
Licensee could not identify
the relief valve which protects against overpressure on the Low Pressure
Safety Injection pump discharge line, if there were thermal expansion of
the water in the line due to a sudden increase in room temperature.
The
necessity for such a relief valve is documented in FSAR Section 6.1.2.2,
Paragraph 6.
Relief Valve RV-3162 (see Drawing 203, Sheet 2, Rev. 8,
3/13/87) has been identified by the licensee as the valve which provides
the necessary protection.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 255/87005-09(DRP):
Five instrument isolation
valves, which the Engineered Safeguards System Checklist required to be
positioned open, were missing from Drawing M-203 Sheet 2 (Revision 4).
Four of the missing valves had been added to M-203 as Rev. 7 and the
fifth valve was added whe-ri~ Rev. 9 was issued.
The inspector also
verified that all five valves are in the Equipment Data Base of the
Advanced Maintenance Management System.
(Closed) Open Item 255/87018-03:
Facility Change 623; Auxiliary Feedwater
Nozzle Modification.
The inspection report identified a concern about
the lack of consideration of differential thermal stresses on the steam
generator internals caused by removal of the sparger.
The licensee
1 s
re-evaluation report concludes that the auxiliary feedwater will be
sufficiently warmed by either the secondary side water or, if the water
level has dropped to expose internals, by the wall of the steam generator.
The inspector reviewed the drawing of the steam generator and internal
configuration to verify these feedwater heating methods.
3
(Closed) Open Item 255/87018-04:
Facility Change 576; Install 2
11 Auto
Isolation Valve on Penetration No. 33.
Historically, this issue was
discovered in 1982 when a discrepancy between the containment isolation
requirements of the FSAR and the operating procedures was discovered.
A
letter of {nterpretation was sent to the NRC explaining that since other
nuclear plants have Technical Specifications (TS) allowing certain manual
containment isolation valves to be open during plant operation, that
Palisades intends to continue sampling the Safety Injection Tanks through
the series, manual, containment isolation valves.
The licensee also
committed to submit a TS change request to formally resolve the issue.
This penetration was listed in Table 5-2 of the original FSAR as a Class
C-3 penetration.
Class C-3 includes penetrations that
11 *** are never
opened during power operation.
These lines contain two normally closed
manual valves in series.
A mechanical lock on each valve will ensure the
valve is not left open or inadvertently opened during power operation.
11
Since this penetration must be opened at least monthly to perform the
sampling of the Safety Injection Tanks required by the Technical
Specifications, it should have been Class C-2 which would require two
automatic isolation valves in series.
This is what this facility change,
as approved by the PRC, would have accomplished.
The safety evaluation,
which received appropriate reviews, did not identify that the discrepancy
was an unreviewed safety question (URSQ).
This constitutes a violation
of 10 CFR 50.59 requirements to document the bases for a determination
that an URSQ does not exist or receive Commission approval for the change
(violation 255/88008-0l(DRP)).
The prior inspection report raised the concern that the modification, as
described in the safety evaluation and facility change package reviewed
and approved by the PRC, was not completed and the remaining incomplete
portion was aborted without being re-evaluated and approved by PRC.
The
portion that was not completed included the automatic isolation that was
needed to conform to the FSAR.
In response to the open item another
evaluation was performed and concluded that this penetration, as
presently modified, conforms to the FSAR.
This conclusion is based
on the updated FSAR that was revised in the Fall of 1987 to match the
modified penetration.
The basis for this FSAR change was the 1982
licensee letter interpreting the TS, to which the NRC had never formally
responded since they were expecting a TS submittal for review.
By not
completing this change and revising the FSAR, the licensee has granted
itself an exception to the approved criteria in the FSAR.
(Closed)
Open Item 255/87018-05:
Facility Change 445-2; Install Motor
Operators on MSIV Bypass Valves.
The inspection report identified a
deficiency in the safety evaluation, in that it did not address
inadv~rtent or spurious operation of the motor-operated valve.
The
re-evalu~tion addresses this issue satisfactorily .
4
(Closed)
Open Item 255/87018-06:
Facility Change 676; Supports for
Nozzle of HC 23 -3
11 adjacent to SIRW Tank.
The inspection report found
that this evaluation did not address any seismic consideration or any
loss in safety margin because of the degraded pipe.
The re-evaluation
identifies that seismic stresses both for the OBE and SSE were included
in the analyses but not explicitly mentioned in the original evaluation.
With regard to the margin of safety, the re-evaluation concluded that the
margin of safety is not reduced but no satisfactory basis is provided.
However, discussions with the licensee determined that this modification
is temporary until the next refueling outage.
The piping will then be
restored to a condition equivalent to the original design.
(Closed)
Open Item 255/87018-07:
Facility Change 564; Addition of
Alternate Safe Shutdown Panel C-150A.
The evaluation for this change did
not address separation or isolation of the instrumentation or controls
for class IE circuits. It also did not assess whether any of these items
should be added to Technical Specifications.
The re-evaluation states
that the panel is located in the left channel penetration room and all
class IE circuits for the panel are left channel.
It also states that
Technical Specifications for this equipment have been proposed in a
submittal to NRC dated November 21, 1985.
(Closed)
Open Item 255/86035-153:
Upgraded Training. An upgraded
training program was conducted in 1988. The training program slides,
training material and the revised Procedure No. 3.07, Rev. 1, Safety
Evaluations, were reviewed by the inspector.
Both the training material
and the procedure include pending FSAR changes, Technical Specification
changes, design changes, and License Amendments as resource material to
be used by the evaluator.
A listing of these pending changes is maintained
current.
The training slides do not specifically address the qualifications
of the designated evaluation reviewer.
However, the training and the
final examination, as well as Procedure 3.07, include these qualifications,
i.e., the reviewer be a PRC member or alternate.
The revised procedure
satisfactorily takes into account the weaknesses identified in Inspection
Report 255/86035.
Approximately 150 personnel have been trained with this revised procedure
and upgraded training program.
An additional 60 to 90 people from the
General Office are going to be trained also.
The licensee is planning to
provide requalification training on a 2 year frequency.
One violations and no deviations were identified.
3.
Operational Safety
a.
Routine Inspections
The inspectors observed control room activities, discussed these
activities with plant operators, and reviewed various logs and other
operations records throughout the inspection.
Control room indicators
and alarms, log sheets, turnover sheets, and equipment status boards
were routinely checked against operating requirements.
Pump and
5
valve controls were verified to be proper for applicable plant
conditions.
On several occasions, the inspectors observed shift
turnover activities and shift briefing meetings.
Tours were conducted in the turbine and auxiliary buildings, and in
the central alarm station to observe work activities and testing in
progress and to observe plant equipment condition, cleanliness, fire
safety, health physics and security measures, and adherence to
procedural and regulatory requirements.
A portion of the inspection
activities were conducted at times other than the normal work week.
An ongoing review of licensee corrective action program items at
the Deviation Report level was performed.
b.
Boric Acid System
Background
During a routine NRC inspection in June of 1980, the inspector
identified that the concentrated boric acid (BA) system was
susceptible to a single active failure preventing BA addition during
accident conditions.
Power supplies to flowpath valves and the BA
pumps (P-56A, P-56B) are such that during a Main Steam Line Break
(MSLB) accident with loss of offsite power and failure of the 1-1
Diesel Generator, the the only concentrated BA flowpath is from the
11 BA storage tank, thru pump P-56A to the suction of the
charging pumps.
If either the T-53A storage tank or the P-56A pump
are inoperable, then no BA flowpath exists to perform the _function
of making the reactor subcritical (USAR G.1.2.1, 14.4).
As in 1980,
Technical Specification (TS) 3.2 requires that only one BA transfer
pump be operable, and allows either of the BA storage tanks to be
out of service for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
With either T-53A or P-56A out of
service the system is single failure prone, and the susceptible
condition can exist for Tank T-53A for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or indefinitly for
the pump P-56A.
Licensee resolution of this issue took the form of verbal
commitments to submit appropriate technical specifications, and
implementation of Standing Order No. 28 which directs the selection
of T-538 for routine BA usage.
The potential inoperability of pump
P-56A was apparently not an immediate concern because it was supposed
that the charging pump could draw water through the idle pump.
The
licensee actions were reviewed and approved by the NRC and the NRC
requested submittal of appropriate TS.
E1tent
On March 7, 1988, the system engineer recognized the incongruity of
the lack of a pump Limiting Condition for Operation and the importance
of the operability of P-56A during the above MSLB scenario.
He also
recalled that the P-56A pump had been out of service from October 19
through November 9, 1987 for maintenance and initiated a Deviation
Report.
6
The Licensee decided that the event was not reportable under lOCFR
50.72 in that it did not constitute an unanalyzed condition nor a
condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety
function of a system needed to investigate the consequences of an
accident.
This decision was based on an informal evaluation of the
MSLB analysis which indicated that adequate margin was provided by
the actuation of a single High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI)
pump. Using similar logic, the licensee does not plan 'to submit an
LER.
The licensee's reinitiation of corrective action on the pump
operability is a result of a more conservative view and the
realization that prior assumptions were not validated by testing.
Specifically, it has not been demonstrated that the charging pumps
can draw-adequate BA flow through an. idle pump, and the pump being
inoperable (as during 1987) may result in the isolation of the BA
fl owpa th.
The licensee revised the Standing Order No. 28 on April 8, 1988
to direct treatment of the P-56A transfer pump as required to be
operable at all times when the reactor is critical. A modification
to the power supplies which will eliminate the single failure
concern is planned for the 1988 refueling outage.
A TS submittal
is also expected by the end of 1988.
Conclusion
Removal of the A train concentrated boric acid system from service
is contrary to the current MSLB analysts assumptions.
An engineering
evaluation by the licensee concluded that adequate reactivity control
is provided by the HPSI system; however, this evaluation is not
substantiated by test data.
c.
Inadvertent Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Start
On March 27, 1988 at about 12:50 p.m., the C sensor channel of the
Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation System (AFAS) lost power.
The AC
power into the power supply was verified energized, but no DC output
was indicated.
At 1:30 p.m. the channel was bypassed.
Later, at
11:25 p.m., operators were attempting to reset lights on one of the
two actuation channels and inadvertently pressed the test button,
actuating the AFAS and starting the P-8A AFW pump.
After control
room operators verified that the actuation was spurious, the pump
was turned off.
No steam generator level control problems resulted,
and the licensee determined that the amount of cold water injected
was not deleterious from a thermal stress standpoint.
Corrective actions planned by the licensee will address the human
error from both the knowledge/training aspect and procedural and
human factors considerations.
7
d.
Safety Injection Sequence (SIS) Failure Evaluation
An engineering review by the licensee determined that a loss of
coolant accident coincident with loss of offsite power and a single
active failure of one channel of the SIS relays would result in
either of the following consequences.
The service water (SW)
non-critical header isolation (CV-1359) would not close and only the
P-7B service water pump would start.
Failure of the other channel
would result in two service water pumps running, but a containment
air cooler service water valve (CV-0867) would .not close.
Evaluations by the licensee determined that the susceptibility to
the postulated single failure is acceptable based on other cooling
systems availability (containment spray); the delayed need for
cooling to the Component Cooling Water heat exchangers after sump
recirculation (20 minutes); and adequate time and procedures
controlling operator action.
The NRC had reviewed these susceptibilities under the SEP topic IX-3
review, and also following recent SW System testing and flow balancing
in 1986/early 1987 and found them acceptable.
Additional review will be conducted of the planned LER.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Maintenance
The inspectors reviewed and/or observed the following selected work
activities and verified whether appropriate procedures were in effect
controlling removal from and return to service, hold points, verification
testing, fire prevention/protection, radiological controls, and
cleanliness where applicable:
a.
Main Feed Pump Turbine
11 K-7A
11
Steam Trap Drain Line Repair
( FWS-24801705).
b.
Troubleshooting AFAS Channel C Power Failure (FWS 24801931).
c.
Fan V-24B Thermostat Replacement (SPS-24703560, SC-87-298).
d.
Replacement Of Temperature Indicator Number 1487 on 1-2 Diesel
(EPS-24800192).
- ~
e.
Replacement Of Instrument Hoses On 1-2 Diesel Control Panel
(EPS-24703195).
f.
Lubrication Of Fan V-24D (VAS 24706074).
No v1olations or deviations were identified.
8
5.
Surveillance
The inspectors reviewed surveillance activities to ascertain compliance
with scheduling requirements and to verify compliance with requirements
relating to procedures, removal from and return to service, personnel
quilifications, and documentation.
The following test activities were
inspected:
a.
b.
c.
d.
ME-12
MI-39
DW0-1
SH0-1
Battery Checks.
Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation System Logic Test.
Daily Control Room Surveillance.
Operators Shift Surveillance.
During performance of the AFAS Logic Test, the technicians were observed
to be conducting the test improperly and had signed off steps where
correct actuation logic had not occurred.
The technicians had not
performed this monthly test recently and were apparently unfamiliar with
the required output from the actuation module.
An incorrect test button
was being pressed.
This was apparently due to a combination of confusion
and poor labeling.
(This same poor labeling contributed to the AFAS
actuation discussed in Paragraph 3.c.) The technicians had both signed
off the procedure indicating that three status lights had lighted when
they had not.
The technicians apparently believed that they had obtained
the required output indication and called the system engineer when the
inspector questioned the results.
The INPO certified training program
provided documented on-the-job training qualification for the performance
of surveillance tests, but the certification was based on the satisfactory
performance of a selection of tests which did not include MI-39.
ANSI
Standard N18.7-76 section 3.3 states that training shall
11 *** assure that
suitable proficiency is achieved and maintained.
11
It was also noted that
although an inadvertent actuation had occurred during the performance of
the test on September 1, 1987, that corrective action action identified
to improve the procedure had not been included in the January, 1988
biennial review.
The above constitutes a violation of the TS procedural
compliance requirements of section 6.8.1 as outlined in the Appendix
(Violation 255/88008-02(DRP)).
One violation and no deviations were identified.
6.
Physical Security
The inspectors observed physical security activities at various
locations throughout the protected and vital areas including the Central
and Secondary Alarm Stations.
Periodic observations of access control
actiiities including proper personnel identification, badging and
searches of personnel, packages and vehicles were conducted.
The
inspectors verified appropriate security force staffing and operability
of search equipment.
Protected and vital area boundaries were toured
to verify maintenance of integrity.
Illumination was verified to be
adequate to support patrol and Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) monitor
observations.
CCTV monitor clarity and resolution were also observed.
The inspectors periodically verified that appropriate compensatory
measures were taken for degraded or inoperable equipment and breached
boundaries.
9
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Radiological Protection
The inspectors made observations and had discussions concerning
radiological safety practices in the radiation controlled areas
including: verification of radiation levels and proper posting; accuracy
and currentness of area status sheets; adequacy of and compliance with
selected Radiation Work Permits and high radiation procedures; and the
ALARA (As Low As is Reasonably Achievable) program.
Implementation of
dosimetry requirements, proper personnel survey (frisking) and
contamination control (step-off-pad) practices were observed.
Health
Physics logs and dose records were routinely reviewed.
The licensee has completed the testing phase of the PCM-lA personnel
contamination monitors and has developed a policy for dealing with the
expected low levels of contamination that will now be identified.
These
devices are viewed as a positive enhancement to the Radiation Protection
Program.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
NRC Bulletins
(Closed) NRC Bulletin 88-01:
Defects in Westinghouse Circuit Breakers.
The licensee determined that none of the subject breakers are in use in
IE applications at Palisades.
Two DS-416 breakers are in use supplying
the asphalt solidification system for which appropriate reviews and
actions will be taken separate from the NRC Bulletin requirements.
The
licensee
1 s response was dated March 14, 1988.
9.
On March 20, 1986 the NRC issued Generic Letter 86-07, transmitting
NUREG-1190 regarding the November 21, 1985 San Onofre Unit 1 loss of
power and water hammer event.
During this event all inplant ac power was
lost for* 4 minutes; all steam generator feedwater was lost for 3 minutes;
a severe water hammer caused by check valve failures was experienced; all
indicated steam generator water levels dropped below scale; and the
reactor coolant system experienced an unnecessary cooldown transient.
The inspector verified that the licensee 1 s program for review and
assignment of action was appropriately implemented, and that sufficient
distribution of the information concerning the event had been accomplished.
Of the actions identified as a result of the event, the only action
remaining relates to the check valve failures.
The licensee has
incorporated the guidance and recommendations of INPO SOER 86-03 and
the EPRI document,
11Application Guidelines for Check Valves in Nuclear
Power Plants
11 , into their Valve Improvement Pr9gram.
Under contract to
Palisades, Combustion Engineering has completed an evaluation of the flow
criteria for each check valve identified in the program.
Additional
evaluation criteria are being considered along with various methods for
verifying check valve integrity and condition in the formulation of the
continuing program.
10
Specific actions are being tracked under Action Item Record A-SA-87-10,
which has an assigned completion date of December 1, 1988.
10.
Information Notices
The inspector reviewed licensee action on the following Information
Notices in order to verify receipt, appropriate review, distribution, and
timely corrective actions.
(Closed) IN 87-21:
11Shutdown Order Issued Because Licensed Operators
Asleep While On Duty
11 *
The licensee and individual licensed operators
received the IN, but no action was documented as having resulted from the
information.
(Closed) IN 87-23:
"Loss of Decay Heat Removal During Low Reactor Coolant
Level Operation".
Action on this IN and INPO SER 15-87, resulted in a
number of procedural enhancements and a modification to provide an alarm
indicating impending loss of shutdown cooling.
(Closed) IN 87-24:
"Operational Experience Involving Losses of Electrical
Inverters
11 *
Fans had been added as a result of prior Pali sades events
and inverter replacement is planned.
(Closed) IN 87-34:
11 Single Failures in Feedwater Systems".
Action on
this issue, specifically the low pressure suction trip subsystem, is
still not complete, but tracked under the licensee's corrective action
program.
(Closed) IN 87-40:
"Backseating Valves Routinely to Prevent Packing
Leakage".
The licensee's evaluation references Administrative Procedure
4.02 "Equipment Control" as providing adequate instructions concerning
the proper method for backseating valves and for the identification of
valve damage.
Distribution was not made to the operator requalification
training program or to the "read and sign" file since the licensee had
taken action after a similar Palisades event.
(Closed) IN 87-41:
Circuit Breakers
11 *
size.
"Failures of Certain Brown Boveri Electric (BBE)
Palisades does not have any BBE breakers of the 4KV
(Closed) IN 87-42:
11Diesel Generator Fuse Contacts".
Palisades PT fuse
drawers were found to already have the knife switch contacts recommended
by GE as corrective action.
During the review of the above IN 1 s it was determined that the Training
Revision Tracking Committee was functioning, meeting weekly with
multidiscipline membership, and making acceptable determinations as to
which generic communications are desirable for inclusion into the
various plant training programs.
Action on IN 1 s continues to be assigned
and tracked by the Plant Safety Engineering group.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11
11.
Management Meeting
A quarterly management meeting to review the status and progress of the
Palisades plant was conducted on March 31, 1988 at the Palisades site.
Consumers* Power Company (CPC) was represented by Messrs. 0. P. Hoffman,
J. G. Lewis, W. E. Garrity, K. W. Berry and others of the staff; and the
NRC was represented by Messrs. E. G. Greenman, W. G. Guldemond, M. P.
Phillips, B. L. Burgess, T. V. Wambach, and others of the staff.
The
meeting consisted of presentations by CPC covering an update on the
corrective action plan to restore the original design margin to the
Component Cooling Water and Service Water Systems, the scope of work
planned for the 1988 refueling outage, and a summary of the last INPO
evaluation.
12.
Management Interview
A management interview was conducted on April 4, 1988, upon conclusion of
the inspection.
The scope and findings of the inspection were discussed.
The inspector emphasized the importance of timely corrective action and
management oversight as the keys to preventin_g licensing roadblocks and
violations like the ones discussed in Paragraphs 2 and 5.
The inspector
also discussed the likely information content of the inspection report
with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during
the inspection.
The licensee did not identify any such documents/processes
as proprietary .
12