ML18037A040
| ML18037A040 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 09/21/1984 |
| From: | Mangan C NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP. |
| To: | Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NMP2L-0166, NMP2L-166, NUDOCS 8409250363 | |
| Download: ML18037A040 (77) | |
Text
REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR;8909250363 DOC CHOATE: 84/09/21 NOTARIZED!. NO DOCKET' FACIL:50-410 Nine Mile Point Nuclear Stations Unit 2i Niagara Moha 05000410 AUTH BYNAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION MANGANgC~ Ve Niagara Mohawk Power Corp+
REC IP ~ NAME RECIPIENT, AFFILIATION SCHWENCER p A ~
Licensing Branch 2'UBJECT:
Forwards responses to FSARquestions,Info submitted to.aid review, of,license application for resolution, of Questions' 260.51r410.34r410.37i421>10i421>43 L 430,,23 will be included in next FSAR amend.
DISTRIBUTION CODE j B0010 COPIES RECEIVED+LTR
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'.,SIZES"
'ITLE:
l.icensing 'Submittal:
PSAR/FSAR Amdts-8, elated Correspondence<
NOTES:PNL icy FSAR'S 8
AMDTS ONLY, 05000410 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME NRR/DL/ADL NRR LB2" LA INTERNAL; ADM/LFMB IE FILE1 IE/OEPER/IRB 35 NRR/DE/AEAB NRR/DE/EHEB NRR/DE/GB 28
'NRR/DE/MTEB 17 NRR/DE/SGEB 25.
NRR/OHFS/LQB 32 NRR/DL/SSPB NRR/OS I/ASB NRR/DSI/CSB.
09 NRR/DSI/METB 12 N
AB 22 G FI 04 AMI/MIB
-EXTERNAL; ACRS 41 DMB/DSS (AMDTS)
LPOR 03 NSIC 05 NOTES!
COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
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0 1
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2 1
1 1
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RECIPIENT IO CODE/NAME NRR LB2 BC HAUGHEYzM 01-ELD/HDS3 IE/DEPER/EPB
-36'E/DQASIP/QAB21 NRR/DE/CEB 11 RR/DE/EQB 13 RR/DE/MEB 18 NRR/DE/SAB 24 NRR/DHFS/HFEB40 NRR/OHFS/PSRB NRR/OSI/AEB 26 NRR/DSI/CPB 10 NRR/DSI/ICSB 16" NRR/DS I'/PSB 19 NRR/DS I/RSB RGN1 BNL(AMDTS ONLY)
FEMA REP DIV 39 NRC PDR 02 NTIS
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M V Hllkek!RA IJ 3 9 ~og@Q'g NIAGARAMOHAWKPOWER CORPORATION/300 ERIE BOULEVARDWEST, SYRACUSE, N.Y. 13202/TELEPHONE (315) 474-1511 September 21, 1984 (NMP2L 0166)
Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief Licensing Branch No.
2 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Re:
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Docket-No.
50-410
Dear Mr. Schwencer:
Enclosed for your use and information are the Nine Mile Point Unit 2 responses to several Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Final Safety Analysis Report questions.
This information has been previously discussed with your staff and is submitted to aid your review of the Unit 2 license application for the resolution of these questions.
This information includes responses to questions 260.51, 410.34, 410.37, 421.10, 421.43, 430.23.
The enclosed will be included in the next Final Safety Analysis Report Amendment.
Very truly yours, NLR:ja Enclosure xc: Project File (2)
C.
V.
Man n
Vice President Nuclear Engineering 8 Licensing 840926
~
. pgQO0410 pg6g 84Q921 pOR AOO
- pOR, A
h M
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
)
(Nine Mile Point Unit 2)
)
Oocket No. 50-410 AFFI DAVIT C.
V. Mangan, being duly sworn, states that he is Vice President of Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation; that he is authorized on the part of said Corporation to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission the documents attached hereto; and that all such documents are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.
Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public in and for the State of New York and county of rirf
, this ~l-day of o
f 1984.
N~w Notary Public in and for
- County, New York My Commission expires:
~14~a ~ saih ia 4'41"9'9 3
Cammhdaa faaaas aimah ~
L>>
r
<<M4 Q)T2N4 n
TQtets.cH.N qtshgno,~ b,lhlsJA
-8 ~C. itsy<>>) ~mt<3 na<meinog )fj>
A part of the RCIC system (page 7 of 26), the return test line piping to the condensate. storage tank beyond the second isolation valve, is shown as "gA require-ments N/A."
This is a potential secondary containment bypass leak path and should be subject to the pertinent gA requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix 8 during the operations phase.
Similarly, 2 parts of the reactor system (page 1 of 26) are shown as.(}A requirements N/A.
The other
~
reactor internal structures whose failure could reduce the functioning of the reactor system to an unacceptable safety level should have the pertinent gA requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix 8 applied per Regulatory Position 4
The reactor insulation should not be capable of excessive debris formation and should also have the pertinent gA requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix 8 applied during the operation phase.
On page 16 of 26 the radwaste building, the standby gas treatment
- building, and the PHP exterior flood protection berms are shown as
"(}A requi rement H/A."
These items should also have the pertinent gA requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix 8
applied during the operations phase.
-0
- 5609250363
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR NUREG"0737 Enclosure 2
Clarificat:ion I'tern 12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17'.
18..
- '19;.
20.
' '21.
22.
Chal 1enges to and failure of relief valves ADS actuation Restart of core spray and LPCI RCIC suction Space cooling for HPCZ and RCIC Power on pump seals.
Common reference level ADS valve, accumulators, and associated equipment and, instrumentation Emergency plans (and related equipment)
Equipment and other items associated with the 'emergency support facilities Inplant Zz radiation monit:oring Control-room habitability ZI.K.3(16)
ZI.K.3(18)
II.K.3(21)
ZZ.K.3(22)
II.K.3(24)
ZI.K.3(25)
II.K.3(27)
ZI.K.3(28)
III.A 1.1/
IIZ.A.2 ZIZ.A.1.2 ZZZ.D.3.3 III.D.3.4
RESPONSE
The response to each request is listed as follows:
pq <4 al.
See revised Table 3.2-1 (Note 28~).
a2.
Table 3.5-22 provides the details of the barriers to withstand tornado-generated missiles.
No other interior structural components are
.listed as barriers since they have not been used. (Spy Q~gq)
(pg I1) a3.
See revised TabZe 3.2-1aand Note 29.
- a4.
See revised Table 3.2-1.(P$ 1~0<~ ~~+)
a5.
See revised Table 3.2-1.(pq3) a6.
See revised Tab3.e
- 3. 2-1 > For Appl lasalale S)a%~
- KAcl, No~ 3,a.
a7.
There are numerous structures,
- systems, and components which are within the scope of Regulatory Positions C2 and C3 of Regulatory Guide 1.29.
Amendment 9
QZcR F260.51-6 March 1984
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR These items ape discussed in Sections 3.5. 1. 1.4, 3.7, and 3.8.~Srl-COW~~~
aB.
See revised Table 3.2-1.(fdotC 53) aS.
See revised Table 3.2-1.(pgbe) a10.
See revised Table 3.2-1.
( p$ +e) all. The Digital
. Radiation Monitoring System (DRMS) is included in Table 3.2-1 in the Process Radi'ation Monitors section.
There is no portable safety-related adioactivity moni oring equipment used it Unit 2.
C,6 Foakllo+
a12.
Fixed radioactivity sampling equipment is, part of
'. " 'the DRMS
- (which..is alieady included in FSAR Table:3'.2-l)... 'For cIarification
- of instrument samp'ling lines, see revised Table 3.2-1.
There is no.
- portable safety-related air or liquid radioactivity sampling equipment used at Unit 2.
'S O'ea+a+
gQ )
. a13. Portable - equipment which is not; safety related is used to
=
perform radioactivity
'ontamination-.
measurement and
- analysis, and therefore is not included in Table: 3.2-1.
(S S,C R,d ~N 7V) a14.
See response toTItem 13,.
a15.. There are no portable safety-related instruments used at Unit 2.
The instrument
- storage, calibration, and maintenance:
program is not related to the classification of equipment and structures, and therefore is not included in Table 3.2-.1.
Equipment and structure classification site administrative procedures ar'e used to ensure the proper storage, cal'ibration, and maintenance of portable instruments. )Sing pos)~s+ pg) a16.
a17.
Personnel decontamination facilities are not safety
- related, since they are not associated with, systems used to prevent or mitigate. the consequences of an offsite radiation release, and therefore are not included in Table: 3.2;1.(gn.gce&w*$ 4[)
Respiratory protect'n.
equipment
's not safety related.
Any testing equipment will be portable and not be safety relat'ed Ptt07 A ~3 Amendment
QEcR'260'*.51-7'arch.
1984
~'
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR a20.
See revised Table 3.2-1 (Note 29).
bl.
See revised Table 3.2-1 al8. Contamination control is provided for in administrative procedures.
The equipment used to perform radioactivity contamination measurement and analysis is portable and is not safety related.
(sat, rJcm a~)
a19.
See revised Table 3.2-1(hJokg 39/
()cg. 1 a cInI3 lz)
Auxiliar AC Power S stem a)
See revised Table 3.2-1 (pI( )5')
y b)
See revised Table 3.2-1 (pq:(5')
- ==
c)
See revised Table 3.2-QI5e) d)
See revised Table 3.2-1(pg) Se) +~d~i p e).
See revised Table 3.2-1 ()sg)~a] +6$ flfTQ f) see revised Table 3.2-1 (pr(fs'a)) QsrsIS)-g g)
See revised Table 3.2-1 (pg Ig)
P b)'ee revised Table 3.2-1.()aII )Sd) i)
See revised Table 3.2-1 (pg )S a) j )
.see revised Table 3.2-1 ((act I a~ (a W ~W+la3) ZsSSIsTO II)
See revised Table 3.2-1 (fr( )0)
Z1ISSICT Q DC Power S stem a)
See revised Table 3.2-1(Pq )4) b)
see revised Table 3.2-1()pg l)s) SSC (ss0na(l 3 I c) see revised Table 3.2-1 cbyIg (g )$) )aa I
1St Q.GovtJ d)
See revised Table'3 2
1 ~
g I [g) WWp s< A Sf bovg e)
See revised Table 3.2-1 (+
)))
f)'ee revised Table 3.2-1 (pg I) +Incr LeT')
Amendment 9
QEcR F260. 51-8 March 1984
INSERT A The voltage rectifiers and static switches are part of the uninterruptable power supplies.
INSERT B
Cable splices are not used (except the containment penetrations which are QA Category 'I.).
Connectors and terminal blocks are QA Category I and are considered part of emergency cables listed on Table 3.2.-1.
The only underground safety related cabling is HPCS and the bar rack heater cables which are QA Category I.
INSERT C
Conduit and cable tray which are not, Class IE but whose failure could affect safety related equipment, are seismically supported (Se'e Note 34).
INSERT 0 Safety related protective relays are part of electrical panels listed in Table 3.2.-1.
INSERT E
Safety related load sequencing logic and relays are part of electric panels listed in table-3.2.,-1.-
INSERT F
Safety related OC motors are listed 'with the system in which the valves are located.
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR b2.
b3.
a)
The control room HVAC system components are included under HVAC Systems.
(Pg AS) b)
See revised Table 3.2-1. (PQ S3 c)
See revised Table 3.2-1.
Control room habitability system dampers are included as a
part of Ductwork and Accessories, Essential under the HVAC Systems heading. (pet )5')
RCIC test line bypass leakage will not occur; therefore, this has been categorized QA non-applicable. t,Pg I)
RPV insulation, reflective and encapsulated, is not (si< v~ ~so See revised Table: 3.2-1.
b4.
All safety-related instrumentation.
and controls (Z&C).described in FSAR-Sections 7.1 through 7.6 and.
other safety-related Z&C for.safety-related-systems meet the quality assurance requirements of
~
s
These safety-related I&C are listed in FSAR Table 3.2-1, as, for'--
- example, "electzical modules with safety function,"
or "instrument modul~s with, saf ety function. "
Zn
-Table 3.2-1, the designation "I" indicates that these safety-related.
Z&C meet the quality assurance requirements of
- 10CFR50, Appendix B, as described in FSAR Chapter 17 (see Note 31).
The General Elect ic quality assurance program is described in NED0-11209-04A, Nuclear Energy Business Operations BWR Quality Assurance Program Description, dated December 31, 1982.
This program has been accepted by the NRC as meeting the quality assurance requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix B.
cl.
c2.
c3.
The.
safety zelief valves (SRVs) perform the function of reactor coolant system vents and are identified in Table 3.2-1 under Nuclear Boiler System.
See revised Table. 3.2-1. (4++ 2.g See revised Table 3.2-1.- (Jdet'c. 3Q)
Amendment 9
Q&R F260'.51-9 March 1984
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR c4.
cS.
c6.
c7.
c8.
c9.
c10.
cll.
See revised Table 3.2-1 (Note 31)
See revised Table 3.2-1. (P$ ~~)
The containment isolation study is in Section 1.10, Item II.E.4.2+
s
~cl*v~ ee ai la al aalll6d jeeccatge'ecci 4ll Iorsero s>,a 4epsae4'ssA) NA+
See revised Table 3. 2-1~
P<<gA~
I
(-pp 8')
The equipment',
and instrumentation changes, if any, made to comply with this item are contained in Table 3.2-1 under line items as "Electrical Modules with Safety Function" or "Instrumentation Nodules with Safety Function."
-aa The equipment and instrumentation changes, if any,'ale to comply with this item are contained in
'able 3:2-1 under line items as "Electrical Modules:
with.Safety Function" or "Instrumentation Modules.--.;:
with Safety Function."
~ A a
The equipment and instrumentation changes, ff any-:;,"
made to comply with this item are'ontained.
.'in'hble 3.Z-l under line items as "Electrical Modules with Safety Function" or "Instrumentation Nodules f~
with Safety Function."
The equipment and instrumentation changes, if any, made to comply. wiW this item are contained in Table 3.2-1 under line items as "Electrical Nodules with Safety Function" or Instrumentation Modules with Safety Function."
cl2.
The equipment and instrumentation changes, if any, made to comply with this item.
are contained in Table 3.2-1 under line items as "Electrical Modules with Safety Function". or "Instrumentation Modules with Safety Function."
cl3.
The equipment and'instrumentation changes, if any, made to. comply with this item are cohta'ned in Table 3.2-1 under. line items as "Electrical Modules with-Safety Function" or "Instrumentation Modules with Safety Function;"
cl4.
The equipment and instrumentation changes, if any, made to comply with this item are contained.
in Table 3.2-1 under line items as "Electrical Modules Amendment 10 QSR F260.51-10 April 1984
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR 4
with Safety Function" or "Instrumentation Modules with Safety Function."
c15.
The equipment and instrumentation changes,.if.
- any, made to comply with this item are contained in Table 3.2-1 under HVAC System.
c16.
The equipment and instrumentation changes, if any, made to comply vith this item are contained in Table 3.2-1 under line items as "Electrical Modul'es with Saf ety Function" or "Instrumentation Modules with Safety Function."
c17.
The equipment and instrumentation changes, if any, made to. comply with this item are contained in Table-3'.2-1 under. line items as "Electrical Modules with, Safety Function" or,."Instrumentation Modules vith. Sya'fehy Function. "
c18... The equipment and instrumentation changes, if any, made to comply with this item are contained in Table 3~2-1 under line items as "Electrical Modules'ith, SaZeky Function" or Instrumentation Modules with.Safety'unction See revised. Table
- 3. 2-1.
c19.: Emergency, plans
(.and
" related equipment) are not safety'-'elated.
Administrative procedures ensure the proper storage; calibration, and maintenance qf s
emerge'ncy plans(and related equipment) g~~ 4o0 >
~(
y
~
c20.
Equipment and other items-associated vith the
'mergency support facilities are not safety related.
Administrative procedures ensure the proper storage, calibratiop, and maintenance of emergency supp'crt yacility.(~e ~cQ 2g) c21.
See-revised Table 3..2-1.
(Bet IA&t c22.
Required items are included under the HVAC Systems heading and are defined further in Section 6.4, Habitability. (p ~ ~g)
Amendment 9
QGR F260.51-11 March 1984
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR 3.2 CIASSIFICATION OF STRUCTURES,
- SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS 3.2. 1 Seismic Classification The seismic classification for Unit 2 structures,
- systems, and components is listed in Table 3.2-1.
The,classification meets the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.29,
~ except as otherwise noted in the table.
C Seismic Category I structures,
- systems, and components are those necessary to ensure:
1.
The integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB).
2.
The capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.
The capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in potential offsite exposures comparable to the guideline exposures of 10CFR100.
Seismic Category I
structures,
- systems, and components, including their foundations and supports, are designed to withstand the effects of a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) and remain functional.
The term Category I Structures used elsewhere in this section means Seismic Category Structures as defined herein..
All Seismic Category I structures,
- systems, and components are analyzed for the loading conditions of the SSE and the operating basis earthquake (OBE).
Since the two earthquakes have different intensities, the design of Seismic Category I structures, components, equipment, and systems to resist each earthquake and other loads is based on levels of material stress or load factors, whichever are applicable, and provides margins of safety appropriate for each earthquake.
The margin of safety provided for structures, components, and systems important to safety for the SSE is sufficiently large to assure that their design functions are not jeopardized.
For further details of seismic design criteria, refer to the following sections:
Seismic Design 3.7 Amendment 9
3.2-1 March 1984
Nine"Mile Point'nit 2 FSAR Sei smic
'esign'esign of Category I'Structures Mechanical Systems and Components Seismic Qualification of Category I Instrumentation and Electrical Equipment
'.7 3.8 3.9 3.10 Design Assessment Report for Hydrodynamic I,oads Appendix 6A 3.2.2 System Quality Group Classifications System quality group cia'ssifications, as defined in Regulatory Guide 1,.26, have. been, determined for each
- water, steam, or radioactive wastecontaining component of those applicable fluid systems. relied upon to:
1.
Prevent or mitigate the consequence of accidents and malfunctions originating within the RCPB.
2.
Permit shutdown of the reactor and maintain it in the safe. shutdown condition.
3.
Contain radioactive material.
a A tabulation of. quality group classifications for each component so defined--is shown in Table 3'.2-1 under'he heading Quality Group Classification.-
Corresponding design and fabrication requirements are provided in'able 3.2-2.
Figure 3.2-1 depicts the relative locations of these components along with their quality group classifications.
boundaries for each safety-related
- system, refer to the
'system diagram given in the applicable system sec'tion of this FSAR.
Table 3.2-4 identifi.es the code, code edition, and addenda used in the construction of each Quality Group A
(ASME Section
- III, Class I) component in the reactor coolant pressure boundary.
3.2.3 Quality Assurance Structures,
- systems, and components whose safety functions require conformance. to the. quality assurance requirement of
- 10CFR50, Appendix B, are summarized in Table 3.2-1 under the Amendment 9
I 3 2~2 March 1984
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR heading Quality Assurance Requirement.
The quality assurance program is described in Chapter 17.
3.2.4 Correlation of Safety Classes with Industry Codes The design of plant equipment is commensurate with the safety importance of the equipment.
- Hence, the various safety classes have a gradation of design requirements.
The correlation of safety classes with other design requirements is summarized in Tables 3.2-2 and 3.2-3.
Amendment 9
3
~ 2 3
March 1984
trine Nile Point Unit 2 PSAR TABLE 3-2-1 EQUIPHENT AND STRUCTURE CLASSIFICATION X
'L3 5y Scope of SLrBRlI Location Electrical Classifi-cation Seismic Category Quality Group Classifi-cation Quality Assurance Tornado Requirementc3>>
Protection Notes
( 9 Reactor System heactor vessel Reactor vessel support sk1.rt Reactor vessel appurtenances, pressure retaining portions CRD housing supports Reactor internal structures, engineering safety features Reactor iiir;ernal structures, other Control rods Control rod drxves Core support structur:e Fuel assemblies Reactor vessel stabilizer Reactor vessel insulation Huclear Boiler System GE GE GE GE GE GE GE GE P
PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC Hh Nh NA Hh Hh Hh Hh NA Nh HA HA NhIIIII Nh h
Nh h,
Hh Nh Hh Hh Nh Hh Hh Hh Hh HhIIIII HA P
P P
P P
P P
P P
CL>
c.i (3'3o)
(~~~
Instrumentation conderising chambers SRV air accumulators
- Piping, SRV discharge
- Piping, mar.n steam within outermost isolation valve Pape supports, mairi steam within outermost.isolation valve Pipe whip restraints, main
- steam, arid feedwater
- Piping, feed water within outermost isolation valve Piping, other RCPB piping within outermost isolation valve Piping, instrumentation beyond outermost isolation valve Sa fety/r e lief valves hmendmen t 9
PC PC PC PC PC~ RB PC RB, TB PC Nh HA Nh NA Nh Nh 1E I or Nh I
1 of 26 h
B C
Bor D
h I or NA I
P C31 P
C31 C3>
~
Harch 1984
Hine Mile Point Unit 2 PSAB TABLE 3 2-1 EQUIPMENT AHD STRUCTURE CLASSIPICATIOH.
- Valves, naiU stean isolation valves (NSIV)
- Valves, feedwater isolation valves Valves, 'other isolation valves ana within outernost isolation. valve Valves, instruaentatxon oeyond outernost isolation valve Instrunentation nodules with safety functior.
Electr)cal nodules'ith safety 'function Cable, cable trays, and faor~-
cated supports with safety function.-
T-Quenchers 4
Recirculation Svstem Scope of Suqqvy GE GE Location PC,BB PC,BB PC~ BB RB RB
'~
NB~ M PC Electrical Classifi-cat).on 1E 1E Ha 1E lE Nh Seismic CategorI I or hh Quality Group Classifi-cation e
h' B or D
Hh Nh C
pape,~'{
Quality Assur ance Tornado RL)ouireuent(~i) Protection Notes lor Hh P).ping, essential Pipe suspension, recirculation line Pipe restraints, recirculation line Pumps Valves, essential, includxng 'containment isolation Piping and valves, other Puap aotors Electrical nodules with safety function Cable, cable trays, and fabri-cated supports witn safety function LMPG set Piping, hydraulic lines hnendment 9
GE GE P
GE P
&C C~ BR~M N
PC~ RB NA Hh Non-lE 1E lE Hon-1E Nh 2 of 26 NAI I
HAI A,B Nh h
A~B~C Nh Nh D
HAI I
NA HA P
P P
P (3)
Q (~a March 1989
Hine ilile Point Unit 2 FSAR TABLE 3.2-1 EQUIPHEHT AND STRUCTUDE CLASSIFICATION 32.33 3Q CRQ hygx.aglhc System Scope of Supply 1.ocation Electrical Classi fi-cation Seismic Category Quality Group Cla sifi-cation Qual it y Assurance 1'ornado Reguireuent<aj)
Protection Notes
) s
- Valves, scram discharge volume lines Valves, insert and withdrav lines" Valves, otber Pip).ng, scram discharge volume lines P).ping, insert and withdraw lines Piping, other
~
Hydraulic control unit CRD puaps,, filters and straine rs Electric modules vitl. safety function.
Cable, cable trays, and fab-ricated supports with safety function
'cram discharge volume header GE P
GE,P P
.)E GE PB RB RB RB PC, RB RB RB C,RS,N 1E Nh Hon-18
'Nh Nh NA HA Non-1E 1E lE I
Nh I
HAI NA B
D 8
D.
,Special D
Nh NA I
HA I
NhI NA P
D te)
Standby L quid Contr.I System
---y Standby liquid control storage tank Pumps Pump motors Valves, explosive Valves, isolation and within primary cortainment
- Valves, beyond isolation valves
- Piping, downstream of explosive valves
- Piping, upstream of explosive valves Electrical modules with safety function Amendmeu t 9 GE GE GE GE jC,RB PC, RB RD Hh Hh lE 1E 1E Hh Hh 3 of 26 II I
8 B
Hh A
IIII P
P P
P Harch 1984
Nine Nile Point Unit 2
PShP Cable, cable trays, and fab-ricated supports vitb safety function Test tank Pipinq and valves, other Scope of SJuLBLX P
P Location C.~Rb, N electrical Classifi-cation Seislic Category Nh Nh ThBLE 3. 2-1 (Cont)
Quality Group Classifi-cation Nh 44)'53 >8 J
Quality hssur ance Requicement< a>>
D Tornado Protection Notes I s hoendnent 9
3a of 26 March 1980
0 0
Nine Hile Point Unit 2 PSAR TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont) l) 3EiE3 '39,)
Neutron HonitorincC System Piping, TIP Valves, isolation, TIP subsystem Electrical modules,
- IRH, SRH, and APRH
- Cable, IRH,
- SRH, and APRH Reactor Protecti~on S stem Electrical modules Cable Leak Detection S stem Scope of Sup~i@
P,GE GE P
Location PC, RB RB RB PC< RB C~ PC~RB~T C,PC,RB,T Electrical Classifi-cation NA Non-1E 1E 1E 1E 1E Seismic Category I
~
NA Quality Group Classifi-cation NA NA Qualit Assurance Tornado
~Re uirement Protection P
P P
P Notes Temperature elements (sensors)
Temperature switches Pressure transmitters Pressure switches Differential temperature switches Cifferential pressure switches Cifferential pressure transmitters Flow transmitters Differential flow switches Primary containment radiation monitors (containment atmosphere monitoring system)
Drywell floor and equipment.
drain tank level transmitters Reactor building floor drain sump level switches Reactor building equipment drain tank level switches
. Differential flow summers Timer switches GE GE GE GE GE GE GE P
GE GE PC, RB~ H C
C C
C RB C
RB RB
,RB RB H
H 1E 1E 1E 1E 1E 1E lE 1E Non-1E Non-1E Non-1E 1E 1E
'NA NAII NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NAII P
P P
P P
P P
P P
P 4 of 26
Hine Nile Point Unit 2 PShR ThBLE 3.2-1 (Cont)
Scope of Supply Location Electrical Classifi-cation Seismic Category Quality Group Classifi-cation Qualit y hssurance Tornado Reauirement<~<
1 Protection Notes I s ECCS pump room flood level svitches Pover Supplies P
GE lE 1E Hh Hh P
P brea Process anu 2ftluent Radiation Hjnitors P
GE Honsafety plant area monitors Hain steam line monitors Process ventilation moritors for control room and reactor building vzth isolation signals P
Process and ef fluent liquid monitors on service vater system P
High-range containment area monitors (NUTMEG-0737, Item II.F 1)
P Effluent monitors vith high-range capabilitxes (NUREG-0737, Item II. P. 1)
P Nonsafety process anu effluent monitors on li-quid and gaseous
- radvaste, reactor and turbine voter, ci'rculating vater, speut fuel cooling and cleanup, and standby gas treatment (normal dryvell purge) systems i?
- Cable, c able tra y',
aud fabricated supports vith safety function P
RB,H,T M
N RB~C PC TgH RBe HiTi4 C,RO Hon-lE 1E 1E Non-1E Hon-lE NhI Hh Hh Nh Hh HhI P~Nh P
P~HR Pe HR Heat exchangers, primary side GE Heat exchangers, secondary side GE C
hmendment 9
5 of 26 Harch 1984
Hine Nile Point Unit 2 FShR ThBLE 3.2-1 tCont)
(33. '33 3W)
Scope of Supply L~oc gio8 Electrical Classifi-cRgioB Seismic Category Quality Group Classifi-cation Quality assurance Tornado pe31uiIement<*3> ggotection Hotes r
Piping, connected to RCPB vithin outermost isolation valves Piping, other Pumps Pump motors Pump suction strainers in suppression pool Containment spray nozzles Valves, isolation, RCPB Valves, other Electrical.'modules vith safety function Cable, cable trays, and fabricated supports vith safety function Pipe vhip restraints P'P GEi P GE,P P
P P
P GE P
P PCiRB PC ORB RB RB PC PC PCiRB PC ORB RB CiRBr H PC Nh Hh Hh 1E Nh Hh 1E 18 1E Hh IIII I
III h
8 8
Hh" 8
8 h
8 Hh Nh IIII IIII P
P P
P P
P P
P P
P Cm) hmendment 12 5a of 26 June 1980
Nine Nile P
e Point Gnit 2 PSAR TABLE 3.2-1-1 (Cont)
Loc~gon PC iRB RB RB RB PCi RB RB CiRB,N PC PC, RB RB RB N
RB RB PCiRB RB CiRBiN Scope of
$o M-Pres sur S
SHpBQI oM-rQ Core S
S r
SRraI g PCS n
S S~ SIstes l
Piping, other Pumps P
Pump motors P
Valves is l GE,P V l oth GEiP Electrical mod P
modules vith P
y unction e, cable tra fabricated su P
supports ety function p restraints P
g -pressure Co N
h-R Co P
R Core~sraI~HPCS m
g, onnected to RCPB a ves rmost isola-g, other pin P
p ng, return t 0
P secon isolation Pumps Pump motors P
Valvves, isolati GE iP Valves, other GEiP Electrical modu P
modules Mith P
C'bl y
unction a
e, cable tra fabricated su GE RB vith safetety function Electrical Classifi-cation Nh Nh Hh 1E 1E 1E 18 Nh Nh Hh Hh HA lE IE 1E Seismic CategorI IIII I
NhIIII Quality Group Classifi-cation h
B B
Hh h
B Hh Hh h
B B
NA A
B Quality Assurance
~girementc*1>
Re IIIIII HhIIII P
P P
P P
P C51 Cel P
P P
P Tornado otection H
s Pr otes
Hine Nile Point Onit 2 FSAR TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont) 3K 3s 3't Scope of SuRB~l Loc~ion Reactor Core Isolation Cool ina (RCIC1 Svstea Electrical Classifi-cation Seismic CategogI Quality Group Classifi-cation Quality Assurance Tornado ReauireaentCa1)
Protection Hotes
- Piping, connected to RCPB within outermost isola-tion valves Piping, other Piping< return test line to condensate storage tank beyond second isolation valve
- Pumps, RCIC and system pressure System pressure pump motor C.
Valves isolation, BCPB Valves, other Electrical modules with safety function Cable, cable trays, and fabricated supports with safety function Pipe whi p restraints P
p GE~ P P
GE P
P PC ~ RB RB RB~H RB RB RB PC~NB RB RB C ~ RB~N PC~RE Hh Hh Hh Hh 1E Hh 1E 1E Nh IIIII B
Hh Nh B
Nh Nh NA IIIII P~HR P
P P
P P
P P
CV) 1)
Puel preparation machine General purpose grapple GE GE RB RB Hh Nh I
Nh Nh Nh CO)
Reactor Vessel Service Eauipaent Steam line plugs Dryer and separator sling and head strongback In~vssel SBgvice ggRiRaEnt Control rod grapple GE RB RB RB Nh Nh Nh Nh Nh C 4)
Ca)
Amendment 13 7 of 26 August 1980
Bine Bile Point Unit 2.FShB ThBLE 3 2-1 (Cont)
EC~ulillg XSBiBBeBt Refuelinqteguipuent platforu asseably Refueling 'hello vs Spent fuel-pool liner Scope of SHBRly GE P
P J,option
'B RB RB Electrical Classifi-cation Hl Hh Hl Seisnic
~Cat gogy Quality Group Classifi-cat~n Hh.
~
Hh:
Hl Quality hssurance
~ Tornado appp+~epotte
~ > ~protect on lie~a I
HhI Fuel storage racks Fuel storage container JQKBsfB~aRagBBeB~Systess
~BRjQ RBgyastg SysteB GE,P BB GE RB I
Hh P
P C9)
Tanks and vessels Beat erchangers Piping Valves Punps P
P P
P P
BBPM M
BBP M RBPM BBPM Hh Hl Hh Hon-1E Hon-)E Hh Hl Hh Hh Hl D
D D
D D
Hh Hl Hh Hh Hh P~ HR HR PPHR PPHR P~HB C ao C aa)
C 11)
C aa)
C 11)
Tanks and vessels Beat erchangers diping Valves Puups
$.9 Y
Of/- as S stem Tanks and vessels Heat erchangers Piping Valves Punps Hechanical nodules P
P P
P P
'M M
M M
M T
T T
T T
Hh Hh Hh Hon-1E Hon-1E Hh Hh Hh Hon-1E Hon-1E Hh'h Hh Hh Hh Hh Hh Hh Hl Hh Hh Hh D
D D
D D
D 0
D D
D D
Hh Hh Hl Hh Hh Hl Hh Hh Hh Hh Hl HB HB HR HR HR C 11 aa)
C 11 C 11 aa)
C 11 aa)
C 11 aa)
C 11)
C 11)
C 11)
C 11)
C 11)
C 11) huendnent 13 8 of 26 lugust 1980
Hine Nile Point Unit 2 PShR ThBLE 3.2-1 tCont)
~gator )step Cleanup S~ste Scope of SHPP/X LocBtj,pp Electrical Classifi-cation Seismic Catego);I Quality Group Classifi-.
cati Quality hssurance Tornado pe~pirementC*4 Protection Notes Vessels, filter/deminera-lizers Heat exchangers, reactor water sides Heat exchanger, cooling water side Piping, within outermost isolation valves
- Piping, beyond outermost isolation valves Piping, auxiliary Pumps Pump motors Valves, isolation and within outermost isolation valves Valves,. beyond outermost isolation valves Valves, auxiliary Electrical modules with safety function Cable, cable trays, and fabricated supports with safety function Pipe whip restraiats P
P GE GE a) GE b) P GE RB PCiRB RB HiRBiTiM RB RB PCiRB BB RB RB Ci RBi N PC,RB Hh Hh Hh Hoa-1E 18 Hon-1E Hon-1E Hon-1E 1E Hh I
Hh Hh Hh I
Hh Hh Hh h.
C D
C Hh C
C D
Hh Nh I
Hh Nh Hh I
HhI Hh p
Cm>
P PiHR P
P P
Sample panel piping station and control panel Other piping tubiag,
- valves, and com ponen ts Puel Pool Coolina and Cleanup System l Pool Cleanup Subsvstem Vessels, filter demineralizers hmendment 13 RB,T RB Non-1E Hh Non-1E Hh 9 of 26 Nh Hh HR (w) hugust 1984
Nine Nile Point Unit 2 FSAR TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont)
Scope of Sup)R1I Location Electrical Classifi-cation Seismic Category Quality Group Classifi-cation Quality Assurance Tornado Reuuicement(~i)
Protection Notes Ig Piping Valves
- Pumps, holding and mixing Fuel Pool Coolina Subsvstem
- Tanks, skimmer surge Heat exchangers Pumps~ cooling P
P P
P P
P RB RB RB RB RB RB NA Hon-1E Non-1E NA HA Hh NA HA NA D
D D
C C
C NA NA HA P
P P
Amendment 9
9a of 26 Harch 1984
Hine Nile Point Bnit 2 FSAF.
TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont)
Pump motors Piping, safety-related Piping, nonsafety-related Valves, bafety-related Valves, nonsafety-related Valves, containaent isolation Contrgl Rooa Pangls Scope of Supply a
P P
P P
P I.ocatxgn RU PC, RB PC, RB PCiRB PC,RB PC,RB Electrical Classifi-cation 1E Hh HA 1E Hon-18 Seismic Category II NAI HA Ouality
- Group, Classifi-catior.
Hh BiC
'D' BiC D,
Quality Assurance Rp 0 uire m e nt r II NhI Tornado Protection Notes P
P D
P Electrical mouules with safety function Cable, cable trays, and fabricated supports with safety function Local Control Panels and Racks C
1E Electrical nodules with safety fun'ction Cable, cable trays, and fabricated supports vith safety function Remote shutdovn panel Controls/instruments vith safety function instruments nonessential
(; (, ('
CiRB C
C,g C
GEiP FB 1E lE (E'on-IE II I
Hh Nh Nh
'QA.
Nh P
P 10 Instrument 'Air System ADS accumulators ADS piping lines betveen accuaulators and safety-related eguipaent ADS valves in lines betveen accumulators and safety-related equipment ADS piping lines for long-tera aakeup from outside
'he standby gas treatment building (nitrogen system)
Amendment 10 10 of 26 April 198'
Nine Nile Point Unit 2 FSAP TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont)
Scope of SuPRZX Location Electrical Classifi-cation Quality
- - Gro.up Seismic Classifi-Cateaory cation equal ity Assurance Tornado Pequirement<>>>
Protection Notes ADS valves for long-term makeup from outside the standby qas treatment building (nitrogen system)
ADS piping containment isolation ADS valves "ontainment isolatidn ADS instrumentation Vessels,.accumulators, supporting safety-related equipment Pipinq in'ines betveen accumulators and safety-related eguipment Valves in 'ines betveen accumulators and safety-relatea equipment Piping containment isolation Valves containment isolation Electrical modules vith safety function
- Cables, cable trays, and fabricated supports vith safety function Pipinq, nonessential Valves, nonessential P
P P
P P
P RBr0 PC,RB PC ORB PCrRB PC,RB PC,PB PC,RB PCrRB PC,RB PC, RB CD PC,RBrN, Tr PrSr~
CrDCrRBrHr TrPrS AN Nh 1E 1E HA 1E HA lE lE Nh Hon-1E I
NA
~ 8
'8 C,HA C
Nh Hh D
I IrNA I
Hh P
P P
P P
D NP Dr HP Amendment 1G 10a of.26 April 1990
ttine Nile Point Unit 2 PSAR TABLE 3. 2-1 (Con t)
Other eg uipment Scope of PP X
Su I
Location P
RE~ T Electrical Classifi-cation Nh Seismic CategorI Quality Group Classifi-cation Quality Assurance Tornado Reauirement<>>
> Protection hotes P~NR
~ Service and Breathing hir Systems Piping, containment i-.olation
- Valves, containment isolation Electric modules with safety futction
- Cables, cable trays, and fabricated supports with safety function Piping, other
- Valves, other Other equipment Service ttater System P
P P
P PC~ Ru PC,RB PC ~ RB PC~ RE C ~ PC~ RB~ H~
T~P~S~d C,PC~RB ~ N, T~P~S~tt T
Nh lE 1E Nh Hon-1E I
tth hh B
B Nh Hh D
I Nh HA Nh P
P P
P,NR P~HR Piping, for essential components Piping, for nonessential components Valves, for essential components Valves, for nonessential components Pumps Pump motors Strainers, self-cleaning
'Electrical modules, with safety function Cable, cable trays, and fabricateao supports with safety function C, tl ~ P, B B ~ S H,P,BB~T C,H~P~BB,S P
P P
P tt, P,BB ~ T P
P P
C~ tt,P, HB~S P
C,N ~ P,RN ~ S Nh Nh Hon-1E Nh 1E 1E 1E Nh HAIII D
C C
C Nh NhIII P~ HR P~NR P
P P
heactor gghlding Closgg LooP Cooling Mater SIstem
- Pxping, between containment isolation valves Piping, for essential components Amendment 9
PC, RB PC, RB 11 of 26 Harch 1980
Nine Nile Point Unit 2 PSAR TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont)
Pipinq, for. nonessential components Scope of Sulkily Location PC~88, T Electrical Classifi-cation Seismic Category Nh Quality Group Classifi-cation Nh P~NR
{}ua1ity Assur ance Tornado Reguirement<3a)
Protection Notes 1~
f Amendment 9
11a of 26 Narch 1984
Nine Hile Point Unit 2 FSAR TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont)
Valves, isolation Valves, for essential components.
Valves, for nonessential components Pumps Heat exchangers Expansion tank and strainers Scone of
~Su i~le Location PC, RB RB PCr RBd T RB RB RB Electrical classifi-cation 1E 1E Non-1E Hon-1E NA NA Seismic Catego~r Nh Hh NA Nh Quality Group Classifi-cation
=. D D
D D
Quality Assurance Requirements Hh Nh NA Hh Tornado Protection Pd NR P
P P
Hotes
'lutbiue Build~is closed ioo coolie Mater s stem Piping Valves Heat exchangers Pumps T,W TdH T
T Hh NA Hon-lE Nh NA HA Non-1E Hh D
D
'D NR NR HR HR Hain steam piping between outermost isolation valves up to but not including turbine stop valves Hain steam branch piping to first valve capable of timely 'actuation Hain turbine bypass piping up to bypass valve First valve that is normally closed or capable of auto-matic closure in branch piping connected to main steam and turbine bypass piping Turbine stop valves, turbine control valves, and turbine bypass valves Hain steam leads from turbine control valve to turbine casing Feedwater and condensate system beyond long-term isolation valve RBd.Td H RBd T Non-1E Non-1E Nh NA NR NR (15
$ 41 C13$
C131 C1%)
C15 17)
C15,1V)
C 141 12 of 26
Nine tlile Point Brit 2 FSAR TABIE 3. 2-1 (Cont)
Scope of sitRDly
~
Condensatg Storage and Transfer
'ystem Location Electrical-Classifi-cation Seismic Category Duality Group Classifi-catiori anality Assurance Tornado F~g~lirLt eLtr>> > Protection.
Nates I Q Condensate storage tank P
Piping P
Valves and other components P
Standhy Gas Treatment System tl N~P~RB~T~N N~P~80, T~M Hh NA lion-1E Hh Hh NA tth Hh Nh t!R l'R Nm Filter units, including electrical heating coils Automatic valves Piping and manual valves, essential Piping and manual valves, nonessential hll other components, essential hll other components, nonessential P
P tt tl ~ RD N,RB N,RB N,RB 1E 1E Non-lE Hh
- NA e
"6 Hh Hh MA NA Drimary Containment Pu"ge System Automatic isolation vaives Piping and manual valves, essential All other-components, essential hll other components, nonessential RB NA Non-1E Nh Hh C
tlA P
diesel Generator Sy"toms Piping, fuel oil Valves, fuel oil Pumps, fuel oil Pump motors, fuel oil system Day tanks Diesel fuel storage tanks
- Piping, air. startup, essential Valves, ait startup, essential Piping, air startup, nonessential Amendment g
P P
P D
P P
P O~S 0~S S
S S
S S
S Hh 1E Nh lE Hh Nh Nh 1E IIIIIIII Nh 13 of 2C C
C C
Hh C
C
~
C C
IIIIIIII
!Ih D
P D
P p
P D
P Narcb 1934
Bine Bile Point Unit 2 FSA>
TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont)
Scope of Suor lv Location.
Electrical Classifi-cation Seismic category Ouality Group Classifi-cation 3z. 3> sf
)
. nuality Assurance
>eguirement(>>)
<ornado Prot ection Hots s I>
Coapressors, air startup Beceivers, air startup Standby diesel-generators HPCS diesel-qenerator P
S D
S P~GE S
GE S
Hon-12 HA 12 12 hhIII D
C B
B HhIII P
D P
n i(PCS diesel Cenegaior Cooping L'ater System Hept exchanger Piping and valves, engine mounted Pipinq and'valves, other GE GE S
S Hh Hh HA C
C25)
(?6)
HPCS Diesel Generator Lube Oil System 4
N Beat exchanger Piping and valves
S Nh Hh 1E C25)
C25)
C25)
(26)
( 26)
( 26)
/PCS Diesel Generator Combustion Air I and Exhaust System ntake Silencers Pipinq Filter GE P
GE S
S S
Hh Hh Hh Hh C
(25)
P P
P C 26)
Amendment 9
13a of 26 Harcl:
1980
Nine Nile Point Unit 2 PShR ThBLE 3.2-1 (Cont)
Scope of 01CSgl 95rOIhCAWI' s4~
HBB I Electrical modules with safety function Cable, cable trays, and fabricated supports with safety function LgcBtgoR S ~ 5 S~H Electrical Classifi-Seismic Quality Group Classifi-cation Quality ass urance Tornado Require eat<3 ~ )
~P otectioh Note@
Sumps Pumps Piping, containment isolation Piping, other Valves, containment isolation Valves, other Tanks BB~C, T~ W~
P~S~H RB~C~ T~ W~
P~S~H PC,RB RB~C~T~W~
P~S~H ~ 5 PC~NB RBr CeT+Ve P~S~H RB Hon-1E Hh 1E Non-1E I
Ha 8
D 8
D I
Na I
Ha P~HR P~HR P
P~NR Recombiners Piping, essential Valves, essential Piping, containment isolation Valves, containment isolation Pire Protection SYstems Water spray deluge systems Sprinkler systems Carbon dioxide systems Balon systems Portable and wheeled ertinguishers amendment 13 P
P P
P P
RB PC~ 88 PC~88 PC~NB PC~BB PC~RB~C~T~
W,H,O RB ~ C~T~W~
P~S~H C~T~H~RB C~W RB~C~T~W~
P~H ~ S 1E Na 18 Hh 1E Hon-1E Non-1E Hon-1E Hon-1E lu of 26 IIIII Hh Hh 8
8 88' IIIII Hh Hh Ha Ha Na P
P P
P P
P~HB Ps NR P~NR P~HR P~HR august 1981I
Hine Hile Point Unit 2 FShB ThBLE 3.2-1 (Cont)
Foam systems Piping and yalves, containment isolation Scope of SupplY
=- Location T
PC~ED Electrical Classifi-cation Hon-1E Seismic CategorY Quality Group Classifi-cation D
B Quality hssurance Tornado Reauirement<>>)
Protectio'n Hotes I s HR hmendment 9
lpga of 26 Harch 1989
Hine 5ile Poiat Unit 2 PSAR TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont)
LlVAC SYstems Scope of SuBHgY Location Electrical Classifi-cation Seismic CategorY Quality Group Classifi-cation W3a, Sq Quality Assurance Tornado Reauirement<~L>
Protection Hotes P
P P
P P
Hot mater heating/glycol piping aud specialties Heat exchanqers, steam to water Heating coils, essential Heatinq coils, nonessential hir filters, essential hir filters, aonessential pans aau motors, essentiai pans and motors, nonessential Ductvork and accessories, essential Ductwork and accessories, nonessential Liquid chillers, essential P
Liquid chillers, nonessential P
Chilled mater pumps, pipiag and accessories, essential P
Chilled mater pumps, piping and accessories, nonessential P
hir conditioning uaits, essential P
hir conditioniag units, nonessential Unit coolers, esseatial Unit coolers, nonessential Cooliuq coils Unit hea ters, electric C
5 C,T,H C~RB~P~S PC,T,P BB,T,M RB~C~T~M BB~T,M T
C C~BB~N~H C,H RB,N AT,M, 5~P,S g~S~N C~HtRB~T~P~
M,H,S C~ RB~ PC~ P~ S C,RB,PC~P~
S~H~T,M,H~O lE Hon-1E Hon-1E Hon-1E 1E Hon-1E Hon-1E Hon-1E Hoa-1E HlL 1E Hon-1E Hh Hh lE Hon-1E 1E Non-1E I
Hh HlLI Hh Hh Hh HhI NhI Nh I
Hh I
Hh C
D D
C D,
D D
D Hh D
C D
C D
C D
I Hh NlLI Nh NA Hh Nh HhI HhI Hh I
Nh I
Hh P
HB P~HB P
P~NB P~HR P
HR P
HP HB P
P~HB P
P~HR P
P~HB P
P~HB 13.8 kV emergency switchqear
- 4. 16 kV emergency svi tchgear 600 V eherqency centers lg~J, Amendment 9
H,C,RB H~C,RB H~C~BB 1e 1E 15 of 26 TiP TiP Harch 1984
Nine Nile Point Unit 2 PSAB ThBLE 3.2-1 (Cont) 600 V emergency motor control centers 600 V emergency distribution panels 120 V, 208/120 V and 120/240 V emergency distributxon panels Emergency distribution transformers'ontainment electrical penetrations 120 V ac emergency, uninterruptible pouer supply systems Emergency cables Emergency cable trays,
- conduits, and fabricated supports Scope of SuBBly Location N,C,BB N~C,BB N,C BB N~ CURB N~C, BB N~C~BB N~C~Rh Electrical Classifi-cation 1E 1E lE Seismic Category Quality Group Classifi-cation Nh Nh Nh, Nh Nh Nh Quality hssurance Tornado Regoiteeoot<ett p~rotectio Notes TiP TiP Tip TiP TiP TiP T,P TiP hmendmen t 9 15a of 26 Narch 1984
Hine Nile Point Unit 2 PSAR TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont) 125-V DC Po
'S t
QRJ.
125-V dc eaecgeacy batterie 125-V dc eaergency battery chargers 125-V dc emtecgency suitchgear 125-V dc aotoc control centers 125-V dC eaergency distribution panels Eaergency cables Eaecqency cable trays,
- conduits, and fabricated suppocts
+a)VIVV~ eever tr&OnS Scope of Supply iocdtjon N~C,BB HiCiRB N~C~RB N,COBB N~C,BB N~C~ RB N~C,BB Electrical Classi.fi-cation 1E lE 1E 1E Seisaic Category Quality Group Classifi-caglon Nh Quality Assur ance Tornado Reauiceaent<>>1 Protection Hotes Reactor building polac crane RB Hon-1E I
C ax)
Ciyig Sfhgctgcgs Priaary containaent Reactor building, including fuel storage facilities aad auxiliary bays Badvaste building Control building Diesel generator building Turbine building, iacluding heater.bay Naia stean tunnel portion of turbine building Service building, including foaa roon Screenu'el 1 sec vice u a ter puaphoupe Screenuell building, superstructure Intake structures and tunnels NA NA Nh Hh N!L RB
, 'H C
S 0
Nh Hh Hh Nh
'h IIII Nh Nh Hh.
Hh Hh Nh Hh I
HhII Hh Nh Ca@)
Can)
C ae 1C 4LA Cool Aaendaent 11 16 of 26 June 1980
Nine Nile Point Unit 2 FSAR TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont)'ischarge tunnel and diffuser Hain stack Off-qas roon Electrical tunnels, with safety-related cable Homal switchgear building Auxiliary boiler building Standby gas treatnent buildinq Transforner founaations and fire walls Scope of SRRRII Nh HA HA HA NA Hh l.ocation 0
0 N
electrical Classxfi-cation Hh Hh Hh HA Seisnic category NhII I
Hh Hh Quality Group Classifi-cation HA Nh Nh Nh Hh Nh Nh Quality Assurance Reggirement~a<
HhI Nh I
Hh Hh Tornado Protection Notes T
HR NB NB Anendment 9
16a of 26 Harch 1984
Hine Nile Point Unit 2 PSAB TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont)
Bailroad access lock Railroad passage to turbine builging Electrical bay Conaensate storage tank buildinq Access pas'sagavay, Unit 2 turbine building to administration buildxng Cooling tover'nd flume Regeneration and condensate demineralizer rooms Auxiliary service building, substructure Auxiliary service building, superstructure Demineralized vater storage and I aste ueutralizinq tank building Shorefront revetment aitcb PNP exterior flood protection berms Roof and storm drainage systems Spent fuel pool and UA~
Scope of Supply Nh Hh Hh Nh Nh Hh Hh I.ocation N
0 5
0 0
RBuSr TsHt C~ N~ P~H~0 Pls Electrical Classifi-cation Hh Hh HA Nh Hh Nh Seismic Category
~I Hh Hh Hh Hh Nh Hh Hh Nhr >>1 Hh Hh
~
Quality Group Classifi-cat'ion Nh Hh HA Kh Hh Nh Nh Hh Hh Hh" Nh Hh l
Quality Assurance Beg uiremen t< 3 r >
Nh Nh Nh Nh NA Hh HhI I
Hh Tornado Protection Notes Is C 491 Nrscellaneous Radiation ProtectioB gguipment and Programs Portable radioactivity monitoring equipmer.t Baaioactivity sampling eguipyent Baaioactivity contamination measurement and. analysis equipment Personnel monitoring equipment Instrument storaqe, calibration, ar d maintenance program Amer dmen t 9 Hon-1E Hon-1E Non-lE Non-1E Nh 17 of 26 Hh Hh Nh Nh Hh Nh ss C3V)
HB HR
(> Q)
HB
(>'tj
~a
{3 '4)
Narch 1980
Nine Nile Point Unit 2 PShR TkBLE 3.2-1 (Cont)
Scope of SuRRly Location Electrical Classifi-cation Seismic Category Quality Group Classifi-cation z.34>E Quality kssurance Tornado Re uirementC>i~
Protection Rates I 9 Decontamination facilxties Respiratory protection equipment Contamination control eguipment Inpiant I> monitoring equipment (HUREG-0737, item Ily.o.3;3)
TIS~M~d M
Hon-1E Non-1E Nh Nk Nh Nh Nh NR NR (gg) hnenument 9
17a of 26 Har ch 1984
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR I
TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont)
Ke s to Abbreviations KEY TO SCOPE OF SUPPLY:
GE = General Electric P
= Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation KEY TO LOCATION:
PC = Primary containment RB = Reactor building M
= Any other location 0
= Outdoors. onsite.
S
= Diesel generator building T
= Turbine building W-
= 'Radwaste building C
= Control building N
= Norma/. switchgear. building P
= Sc "eenwell building KEY TO EIECTRICAL CZASSIFICATION:
1E
= Electrical equipment that meets the quality assurance standards of NRC guidelines and IEEE-323-1974.
Non-lE = Electrical equipment that is not required to meet 1E requirements.
NA
= Not applicable because the. equipment is not electrical.
KEY TO SEISMIC CATEGORY The equipment and structures are constructed in accordance with the requirements for Category I
structures and components (Section 3.7).
The seismic requirements for the SSE are not applicable to the equipment.
No specific design is made to resist seismic forces.
- However, each system and component and its supporting elements is reviewed for proper anchorage
- and, load carrying capability under seismic forces and evaluated on the basis of sound engineering judgement to ensure that failure of this class of equipment does not affect the operation of any Category I equipment or cause detrimental damage to Category I structures.
18 of 26
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont)
KEY TO QUALITY GROUP CIASSIFICATION:
A, B,
= NRC quality group classification as defined C,D in Regulatory Guide 1.26.
The equipment is constructed in accordance with the codes listed in Table 3.2-2.
N/A
= Quality group classification is not applicable to this equipment.
KEY TO QUALITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENT:
NA
= Equipment meets the QA requirements of 10CFR50, in accordance with the QA program described in Chapter 17.
= QA requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix B are not applicable to this equipment.
KEY TO TORNADO PROTECTION:
T P
= Designed for tornado protection.
= Tornado protection provided by virtue of location within a tornado-protected structure.
= Tornado protection is not provided.
Notes
'.'Application of.Category I design criteria is limited to those reactor vessel internals that are part of engineered safety
- features, such as the core spray piping, core spray sparger, and hardware.
'These reactor vessel internal structures include the steam separators, steam
- dryers, and miscellaneous hardware items.
< 3) a b.
c
~
1-in or smaller liquid line RCPB are Quality Group B and Lines equivalent to that are part of the Category I.
All instrument lines connected to the RCPB and utilized to actuate and monitor safety systems are Quality Group B
from the outer isolation valve or process shutoff valve (rootvalve) to the sensing instrumentation.
All instrument lines connected to the RCPB and not utilized to actuate and monitor safety systems are Quality Group D from the outer isolation valve or 19 of 26
0
Nine Mile Point. Unit 2 FSAR TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont) the process shutoff valve (root valve) to the sens-ing instrumentation.
d.
All other instrument lines:
2) 3)
through the root valve are of the same classification as the system to which they are attached.
beyond the root valve, if used to actuate a
safety system, are of the same classification as the system to which they are attached.
beyond the root valve, if not used to actu'ate a safety
- system, may be Quality Group D.
e
~
All sample lines from the outer isolation valve or the process root, valve through the remainder-of the sampling system 'are Quality Group D.
'4'Recirculation system pipe restraints are not required to function (i.e., restrain a pipe) during an earthquake.
These restraints are designed to withstand an SSE without loss of functional capability.
'The CRD insert and withdraw lines from the drive flange up to and including the first valve on the hydraulic control unit (HCU) are Quality Group B.
'The HCU is a
GE factory-assembled engineered module of
- valves, tubing, piping, and stored water which controls a
single CRD by the application of precisely timed sequences of pressures and flows to accomplish slow-insertion or withdrawal of the control rods for power control and rapid insertion for reactor scram.
Although the
- HCU, as a
- unit, is field installed and connected to process
- piping, many of its internal parts differ markedly from process piping components because of the more complex functions they must provide.
- Thus, although the codes and standards invoked by Group A, B, C,
and D pressure integrity quality levels clearly apply at all levels to the interfaces between the HCU and the connecting conventional piping components (e.g.,
pipe
- nipples, fittings, simple hand valves), it is considered that they do not apply to the specialty parts (e.g.,
solenoid
- valves, pneumatic components, and instruments)
The design and construction specifications for the HCU do invoke such codes and standards as can be reasonably Amendment 7
20 of,26,.
December 1983
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont) applied to individual parts in developing required quality
- levels, but these codes and standards are supplemented with additional requirements for these parts and for the remaining parts and details.
For example, 1) all welds are LP inspected, 2) all socket welds are inspected for gap between pipe and socket bottom, 3) all welding is performed by qualified welders,.and
- 4) all work is done in accordance with written procedures.
Quality Group D is generally applicable because the codes and standards invoked by that group contain clauses that permit the use of manufacturer's standards and proven design techniques not explicitly defined within the codes for "Quality Groups A,
B', or C.
This is supplemented by the QC technique's. previously described.
~
~
1
'~'The RCIC 'turbine does not fall within the applicabl'e design codes.
To assure that the turbine is fabricated to standards commensurate with safety and performance requirements, GE has established specific design requirements for this component as follows (all'eferences below to the ASME Boiler and Pressure 'essel Code Section III are to the 1968 edition):
d.
a.
All pressure-containing castings and fabrications are hydrotested at 1.5 x design pressure.
b.
All high-pressure castings are radiographed according. to:
ASTM E-94 E-14 for maximum feasible volume E-71, 186, or 280 for Severity Level 3
c.
As-cast surf'aces are magnetic particle or liquid penetrant
. tested.
according to ASME Section III, Paragraph N-323.4 or N-323.3.
Wheel and 'haft'orgings are ultrasonically tested according to ASTM A-388.
e.
Butt welds are radiographed and magnetic particle or liquid penetrant tested according to ASME Section III, Paragraph N 626 or N 627, respectively.
f.
GE is 'o be notif'ed of major repairs and records maintained thereof.
g.
Record system and traceability is according to ASME
~'oiler and Pressure Vessel C'ode,Section III, Appendix IX, Paragraph IX-225.
h.
Control and identification is according to ASME Section III, Appendix-IX, Paragraph IZ-226.
i.
Procedures conform to ASME Section III, Appendix IX, Paragraph IX-300.
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 CESAR TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont) j.
Inspection personnel are qualified according to ASME Section III, Appendix IX, Paragraph IX-400.
'These items are classified as Seismic NA (except from seismic evaluation) because they suspend from a
cable that dampens out the transmission of floor response spectra.
'The fuel storage container is classifi'ed as Seismic-NA (exempt from seismic evaluation) because it is isolated from the seismic excitation.
Iiquid radwaste system atmospheric storage tanks made of
..fiberglass
-are, designed,, constructed, and tested in accordance 'ith the requirements of, ASTM D 3299-74 or NBS PS 69 (Section 11.2).
. 'Although Regulatory Guide 1.26 is not applicable, the equivalent quality group classification for radwaste management systems is Quality Group D.
The radwaste management systems are designed, constructed, and tested in accordance with the QA provisions of Regulatory Guide 1.143.
z 'Waste solidification system components are designed, fabricated inspected, and tested in accordance'ith Topical Report No.
WPC-,VRS-1P (Section 11.4).
This report.
was prepared by the Werner and Pfleiderer Corporation, supplier of the waste= solidification system for Unit 2, and has been accepted by the NRC for reference in license applications.
'The main
- steam-. lines between the outermost containment isolation valve up to the turbine stop
- valve, the main turbine bypass lines up to the turbine bypass
- valve, and all branch lines connected to these portions of the main steam and turbine bypass lines up to the first valve capable of timely actuation are Quality Group D.
These sections of pipe meet all of the pressure integrity requirements of Quality Group D
-plus the following additional" requirements:
All longitudinal and c'cumferential butt weld joints are radiographed (or ultrasonically tested to equivalent standards)
Where size or configu-ration does not permit effective volumetric examination, magnetic particle or liquid penetrant 22 of 26
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR TABIE 3.2-1 (Cont) b.
examination may be substituted.
Examination procedures and acceptance standards are at least equivalent to those specified in ANSI B31.1.0.
All fillet and socket welds are examined by either magnetic particle or liquid penetrant methods.
All structural attachment welds to pressure-retaining materials are examined by either magnetic particle or liquid penetrant methods.
Examination proce-dures and acceptance standards are at least equivalent to those specified in ANSI B31.1.0.
c The main steam line (MSL) from its outer isolation valve up to and including the.
.turbine stop valve.
and all branch lines 2 1/2 inches in diameter and
- larger, up to and including the first valve (including restraints) is d'esigned by the use of an appropriate dynamic seismic-system analysis to withstand OBE and DBE design loads in combination with other appropriate loads within the limits specified for Quality Group B
pipe in ASME Section III.
The mathematical model for the dynamic seismic analyses of the MSI and branch line piping includes the turbine stop valves and piping beyond the stop valves including the piping to the turbine casing.
The dynamic input loads for design of the MSL are derived from a time history model analysis (or an equivalent method) of the reactor and applicable portions of the turbine building.
The turbine building, housing the MSLs, may undergo some plastic deformation under the DBE, however, the plastic deformation will be limited to a
ductility factor (defined as the ratio between the maximum displacement and the yield displacement) of 2
and an elastic multi-degree-o f-freedom system analysis will be used to determine the input to the MS'he stress allowable and associated deformation limits for piping will be in accordance with Quality Group B requirements for the OBE and DBE loading combinations.
The MSL supporting structures (those portions of the turbine building) are such that the MSL and its supports can maintain their integrity within the Quality Group B
requirements under the Category I seismic loading condition.
Amendment 7.
23 of 26 December 1983
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR TABIE 3. 2-1 (Cont) d.
The high integrity classification of the MSL from its outer isolation valve up to and including the turbine stop valve and all branch lines 2 1/2 in and larger, up to and including the first valve (as tabulated in this table, Power Conversion
- System, Items 1 through 6,
and Note.
.'4) is an acceptable equivalent of the integrity requirements of Quality Group B.
The turbine stop valves and the piping beyond the stop valves to the -turbine casing are not classified to Category I
requirements.
- However, the turbine stop valves, and appropriate portions of the piping beyond the stop valves (including their restraints) are included in the mathematical model for the
,dynamic seismic analyses. indicated in Note 13c.
e.
All inspection records will..be maintained for the life of the station and will include data pertaining to qualification of inspection personnel, examination procedures, and examination results.
The first valve capable of timely actuation in branch lines connected to the MSI,s between the outermost containment isolation valve and turbine stop valve and in.branch lines connected to turbine bypass line up to the turbine bypass valve. will meet all the pressure integrity requirements of Quality Group D'lus the following additional requirements:
a ~,
b.
Pressure-retaining components of all cast parts of valves of a
size'nd.
configuration for which volumetric examination methods. are effective will be radiographed.
Ultrasonic examination to equivalent standards may be used as an alternate to radiographic methods.
If size or configuration does not permit effective volumetric examination, magnetic particle or liquid penetrant methods may be substituted.
Examination procedures and acceptance standards will be at least equivalent to those specified, in ANSI B31.1.0.
All inspection records will be etained for the life of the station and will include data pertaining.
to the qualification of inspection personnel, examination procedures, and examinat'n results.
Amendment 6
24 of26 December 1983
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont)
~ 'A number of turbine generator components, including the stop and control valves, turbine bypass valve chest, and high-pressure turbine casing are made of a special GE proprietary alloy (copper-bearing carbon steel) that has no assigned ASME or ASTM material number.
All welding to this material will be performed to the technical and quality requirements of the GE installation requirements.
These requirements match or exceed those given in Note 13 of this table.
~'A certification will be obtained from the vendors of the turbine stop valves and turbine bypass valves that all cast pressure-retaining parts of a
size and configuration for which volumetric examination methods are effective have been exam'ined by radiographic me'thods by qualified personnel.
Ultrasonic examination to equivalent standards may be used as an alternate to radiographic methods.
Examination procedures and acceptance standards will be at least equivalent to those specified as supplementary types of examination in ANSI B31.1.0, Paragraph 136.4.3.
'~7'The turbine stop and control
- valves, turbine bypass valves (including the bypass valve chest),
and main steam leads between the stop and control valves and the high-pressure turbine casing are fabricated under the requirements of GE.'s GEZ 4982A, General Electric Large Steam Turbine-Generator Quality Control Program.
The turbine stop and control valves and the main steam leads to the turbine chest will. be installed to GE technical and quality requirements equivalent to the fabrication requirements.
The erection activity is of a quality level generally equivalent to QA Category I.
In addition to a swine) check valve inside containment and a positive acting check valve outside
'containment similar to an Atwood-Morrill boiler feed check valve as described in Catalog 63,Section I, a third valve with high leaktight integrity will be provided in each line outside containment.
The spring loaded piston operator of the positive acting check valve will be held open by air pressure during normal operation.
Fail-open solenoid valves will be used to release air pressure to permit the check valve piston operator to close.
The positive acting check valve and the high leaktight integrity isolation valve will be remote manually Amendment 12 25 of 26 June 1984
Nine Mile Point Unit: 2 CESAR TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont) operated from the control room using signals that indicate loss of feedwater flow.
The classification of the feedwater lines from the reactor vessel to and including the third isolation valve will be Quality Group A; beyond the third valve will be Quality Group D.
~'The condensate storage tank is designed, fabricated, and tested in accordance with the requirements of ASTM D 3299-74 or NBS PS 15-69.
The radwaste building is designed and constructed in full compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.143.
The radwaste building has been designed to withstand loads associated with the SSE.
P
'~.The standby gas treatment
. building is designed. and constructed in accordance with seismic and'A Category I requirements up.to el 286 ft only.
'~~'The reactor building polar crane (RBPC) is designed to withstand the spectrum of
. tornado-generated missiles (Section 3.5.1.4)..
The metal siding above the refueling floor is designed to withstand the
- wind
. loading generated by'a tornadic event.
This precludes RBPC from exposure to tornadic wind loading.
'~~'The revetment ditch system
, has been analyzed for the combination of (1) the instantaneous lake level at el.'48.8 ft due to 25-year flood and an
- SSE, and (2) 'the instantaneous.
lake level at el 249.5 ft due to. 100-year flood and. an, OBE, and the factors" of safety are 1'.07 and
- 1. 51, respectively; therefore,.
the:
revetment ditch system is sufficiently stable.
Pseudo-static stability analyses with seismic coefficients of 0.15
'(SSE) and 0.075 (OBE) were performed using the Lease II program.
The Modified Bishop's method-was adopted for the
- analyses, and the minimum factor of safety was searched for each aforementioned case.
The critical failure surface was found to be on the lake side slopes.
'~~'Examples of the Quality Group B essential valves in the recirculation system are the following:
Lease II User's
- Manual, "Slope Stability Analysis" by P.J
~ Trudeau and J.T. Christian, August -1980, Stone
& Webster Engineering Corporation Amendment 13 26 of 26 August, 1984
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont) 1.
Valves
- F001, F002,
- F009, F013,
- F014, and F017 for pump seal purge line (inside containment) to recirculation pump.
2.
Valves
- F019, F020,
- F021, F022, and F059 for sample line from recirculation loops.
3.
Vent valves
- F025, F026,
- F068, and F069 for remote operated valves.
4.
Valve F079 for pump seal staging line.
Examples of the Quality Group C essential piping and valves in. the. recirculation system are the following:
1.
Pump seal leak detection piping up'o and including valve F086..
2...
Recirculation motor-cooling water piping inside containment including valves
- F007, F085, and F082.'.
Recirculation motor bearing cooling water piping inside containment.
4.
Pump seal cooling water piping inside containment including valves F081 and F087.
'Examples of
- Quality Group D
nonessential piping, and valves in the recirculation system are the following':
1,.
Pump.
seal purge piping (outside containment) to recirculation pump including valves F008, 'F016, and F015.-
2.
Recirculation pump seal
- staging piping including valves F084 and F088.
3.
Pump seal leak detection piping beyond valve F086.
'This equipment conforms to ANSI Standard B31. 1 and IEEE 344-71 seismic requirements.
To
-qualify as equivalent to ASME Section III, Class 3 standards, the
. equipment. will be pressure tested at above normal operating pressures.
Amendment 9
26a of 26 March 1984
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR TABLE 3.2-1
{Cont)
'Effluent monitors meet the environmental'ualification and quality assurance requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 2.
The quality assurance classifications for the biological shielding and the post-accident shielding are consistent
'ith the classifications of the structures in which they are located.
'The classification of a structure described herein also applies to all major structural components of that structure, unless: noted otherwise. herein.
'~4'Reactor pressure vessel stabilizers are constructed in accordance with ASME III, 1977 Edition through Summer 1978
- Addenda, except that for installation, the requirements of Paragraph NF-4600 of ASME III,. 1974 Code.
are applicable.
' All saf ety-related instrumentation and controls
{ ISC) described in FSAR Sections 7.1 through 7.6 and
.other safety-related ISAAC for-safety-related systems meet, the quality assurance requirements of
These safety-related ISC are listed in FSAR Table 3.2-1, as, for
- example, "electrical modules with safety function," or "instrument modules with safety function."
In Table 3.2-1, the designation "I" indicates that these safety-related IGC meet the quality assurance
. requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix B, as described
-in ZSAR Chapter 17.
'~~'The stair tower attached to the exterior side of the secondary containment wall in the southeast corner o'
the reactor building is a non-Category I structure.
~The reactor water cleanup system classification meets Standard Review Plan 5.4.8, paragraph II.3.
Amendment 13 26b of 26 August 1984
FOOTNOTE 32 Those structures, components and equipment described by Regulatory 1.29 Section C2 and C3 are described in FSAR Sections 3.5.1.1.4, 3.7 and 3.8.
The pertinent provisions of the operational guality Assurance Program apply.
FOOTNOTE 33 All containment Isolation valves not specifically.listed in the table are Seismic and guality Assurance Category I.
See table 6.2-56 for additional.
information on these valves.
FOOTNOTE 34 Pertinent provisions, of the Operational guali.ty,Assurance Program apply to:
1.
Portable radioactive monitoring equipment used for emergency purposes.
2.
Air and liquid sampling equipment for emergency purposes.
3.
Portable equipment which is used to perform radioactivity contamination, measurement and analysis.
4.,
Personnel
'monitoring and.decontamination equipment including TLD's, whole body counter.
5..
Instrumentation
- storage, calibration and maintenance for instruments used during emergencies.
6.
Respiratory protection equipment including testing.
7.
Modifications to roof and site drainage systems and grading used for handling the Probable Maximum Precipitation.
8.
Reactor vessel steam dryer and steam separator and miscellaneous hardware.
9.
Post Accident Sampling System.
10.
Emergency plans and related equipment/components/structure described in the Emergency Procedures.
ll.
Conduit and cable tray which are not Class IE but whose failure could affect safety related equipment.
12.
Reactor Pressure Vessel Insulation.
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR 5.2 INTEGRlTY OF REACTOR COOlANT PRESSURE BOUNDARY This section discusses measures employed to provide and maintain the integrity.'f -the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) for the plant design lifetime.
5.2.1 Coma'liance with Codes and Code Cases 5.2.1.1 Comp3,iance with 10CFR50, Section 50.55a g4Q Table shows compl'iance with 10CFR50.
Code editions, applicable
- addenda, and component dates are in accordance with 10CFR50.55a.
5.2.1.2 Applicable Code Cases The reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and appurtenances, and the RCPB piping,
- pumps, and valves are designed, fabricated, anc tested in accordance with 0he applicable edition of the ASME
- Code, including addenda that were mandatory at the
'orde date for the applicable components.
Regulatory Guides 1.84'nd 1.85 'rovide a lis of ASME design and fabrication code cases that have been ap-oved by the regulatory 'taff.
Code cases on this list may be use" for design, fabrication, or installation until annulled.
Annulled cases are considered active for eauipment that ha:.
been contractually committed to fabrication prior to th annulment.
The various ASME code cases that were aiblied to components in the RCPB are listed in Table 5.2-1.
5.2.2 Overpressure Protection This section provides evaluation of the systems tha protec=
the RCPB from overpressurization.
5.2.2.1 Design Basis Overpressure protection is provided in conformance wit.
- 10CFR50, Appendix A, General Design Criter'on 15.
Safety/relief valves are in conformance with ASM:-
Sect'on ill, Article NB-7000.
Preoperational and startup instructions are given in Chapter 14.
5.2.2.1.1 Safety Design Bases The nuclear pressure-relief.
system had been designed:
5.2-1
Nine 'Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F410.34 (9.3.1)
Verify that the
'nstrument air ystem is designed in accordance with ANSI MC11.1-1976 (ISA S7.3).
Discuss how the system complies with the criteria of this standard.
RESPONSE
See revised Section 9.3.1 Amendment 5
QocR F410.34-1 October 1983
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F410.37(9.3.1)
Provide a discussion of the maintenance and periodic testing program for each instrument air system to assure compliance with the requirements of ANSI MC11.1-1976.
Specify the maximum time between testing of the compressed air system in the discussion.
RESPONSE
Maintenance of the instrument air system will consist of routinely blowing down air receivers and moisture drains during shift rounds' The actual system utilizes nonlubricated cylinder compressors followed by a refrigerant dryer rather than a dessicant dryer.
Therefore,
.no foreign material is expected to be injected into the system.
- However, to ensure clean
- air, a
sample that meets the requirements of ANSI Mal.1-1976 for particle size and oil content will be performed on an annual basis.
Amendment 11 Q&R F410.37-1 June 1984
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 CESAR The automatic depressurization system is safety-related, and all pressure-retaining components of the system are
- designed, constructed, and inspected in accordance with the applicable requirements of ASME Section III, Division 1, Subsection ND for Class 3 components, and Subsection NC for Class 2 components.
Not included in this safety-related classification are the nitrogen gas storage
- tanks, equipment, and components located in the yard outside the reactor building.
Piping segments that penetrate the primary containment and serve as a
containment boundary are designed to Safety Class 2, Category I requirements.
The loss of nitrogen gas for. instrumentation and controls causes
'gas-operated valves to fail'o appropriate safe positions.
In the event that the nitrogen gas supply from the nitxogen gas storage tanks is lost, a
7-day supply is available to the accumulators from ADS nitrogen receiver tanks 2IAS*TK4(Z-) and 2IAS*TK5(Z-).
In addition, there are provisions for.recharging the ADS nitrogen receiver tanks through its individual supply lines located in a
missile-protected area outside the standby gas txeatment building from special emergency tube trailer supply connections.
These
- special, emexgency recharging lines are part of the GSN system and are classified Seismic Category I, Safety Class 3.
Power Generation Bases The automat'ic depressurization system is designed to "supply
- clean, dry, oilfree nitrogen gas at 185 psig to the selected group of seven main steam safety relief valves and their respective accumulators located inside the reactor primary containment.
This designated group of ADS safety relief valves and accumulators is divided into two subgroups with three and four valves and accumulators in each subgroup.
Each subgroup is supplied with nitrogen gas from one of two separate.
ADS receiver tanks'ach ADS receiver tank is supplied with nitxogen. gas at 365 psig from a bank of six horizontal, high-pressure nitrogen gas storage tanks located outside the reactor building.
Nitrogen gas supplied for instrumentation and controls meets or exceeds the equivalent ai r quality requirements established for safety-related contxol air systems (SRCAS) by ANSI MC11. 1-1975 (ISA-$7. 3),
Quality-Standard for Instrument Air.
~&9'(>i 4 All piping, 'alves, and fittings associated with the automatic depressurization syst: em are of stainless steel materials.
- Also, the system will be given.
a.'omplete Amendment 12 9.3-11 June 1984
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR 9.3. 1.5 Instrument Nitrogen System 9.3.1.5.1 Design Bases Safet.
Desi n Basis Instrumentation and control systems located inside reactor primary containment are supplied with nitrogen at 120 psig from the instrument nitrogen system (GSN).
IAS designation is retained for these systems which nitrogen gas exclusively during normal plant operation.
the gas The are Instrumentation and control systems located inside the reactor primary containment, except as described in Section 9.3.1.4.5, are not safety related.
However, all piping, valves, and fittings located in Category I areas are seismically analyzed and supported in accordance with safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) design requirements so that their failure will not damage safety-related equipment.
For containment penetrations and items within the containment
- areas, see Section 3.2.
Power Generation Desi n Bases Nitrogen gas for instrumentation and control systems located inside the reactor primary containment areas is supplied from the vapor spaces of two 11, 000-gal liquid nitrogen vertical storage tanks maintained under a constant pressure of approximately 200 psig.
The liquid nitrogen tanks are located in the yard area, north-northeast of the reactor
- building, alongside the railroad access lock.
From the liquid nitrogen tanks nitrogen flows through an active bank of finned ambient vaporizers, a trim heater for heating to 70 F, and a
200/120 psig pressure-reducing station.
An instrument nitrogen receiver is provided inside the reactor building for additional storage capacity.
Nitrogen gas for instrumentation and controls inside the primary containment is distributed from this nitrogen receiver.
A nitrogen gas backup supply connection is provided from the high-pressure nitrogen gas storage cylinders to the instrument nitrogen receiver through a
365/110 psig pressure-reducing station.
Although instrum'entation and control systems within the reactor primary containment are nonsafety-related, the nitrogen gas supplied for these systems meets or exceeds the quality requirements of ANSI MC11.1-1975 (ISA-S7.3), Quality Standard for Instrument
- Air, for use with safety-related Amendment 12 9.3-lie
(,A~ED 0PCQ~y l5~il l4 )
June 1984
I Q +~~
A444~~~l h)<c a a,ac
~~ Z sou) ~
oq ~R.c.<c.
)n iv-~nT'M LbG~
C MQC the length of time the operator. will be required to hold the RCIC initiation button 'in a depressed condition to assure injection into the reactor.
The concern isthat if the manual initiation button is depressed only momentarily the opening of the RCIC injection valve will not be sealed in and reactor injection will not occur.
The NRC has recently indicated tha they feel this design may not satisfy IEEE-279, Paragraph 4.16, which requires the s stem com The logic for the RCIC injection valve E51-F013 is shown in Attachment 1.
Contacts of relays K3, K20, and K40 must all be closed for F013 to open in response to a manual initiation signal or a low reactor water level 2 signal.
Relay K3 is a momentary contact relay which is energized when the manual initiation button, is depressed or when.,reactor water level is below Level 2.
Relay K20 is"energized when the turbine trip and throttle valve is -partially or fully open.
Since the trip and throttle valve is open during system standby the contacts of relay K20 will already be closed when RCIC is started..
Relay K40 is energized when the steam admission valve E51-F045,is fully closed.
Since F045 is closed when the system is on standby the contacts of K40 are open at that time.
Given this logic, to manually initiate RCIC and assure the injection valve opening is sealed in, the operator must maintain the initiation switch in a depressed condition until valve F045 comes off its seat causing closure of relay K40 contacts.
A red-valve position indicating light ill inform the operator when F045 has start'ed to open.
At this t
m he initiation switch can be released since the seal-in circuit in the MCC for valve F013 will now drive it to the full open position.
Limit switch LS6 energizes relay K40 when valve F045 is fuUy closed.
Depending on the adjustment of this limit switch, it is not expected to take more than 1-2 seconds for relay K40 to be deenergized and its contacts closed when F045 starts to open.
This is the time required for the operator to hold the initiation button down to assure vessel injection.
As explained in the above the contacts of relay K3 in the initiation logic have to be closed only 1 to 2 seconds before the injection valve opening logic is sealed in for automatic initiation.
For an actual transient event requiring the RCIC system (i.e., loss of feedwater events) reactor water level will be below: the initiation level for well over this time required to seal-in the injection valve logic, since water level will not'egin to recover until the RCIC and/or HPCS is initiated.
It is GE's position that this meets the intent of IEEE-279 in that the, RCIC system initiation will go to completion when required for it to perform its safety function.
A momentary Level 2 lasting less that 1 to 2 seconds is. considered very unlikely and could only occur if feedwater flow is reestablished in=time to. reverse the water ievel drop.
In thi's case it would be'preferable not to initiate RCIC, thereby avoiding injection of, cold water into the reactor.
In conclusion, GE considers the current RCIC design to be adequate and that it satisfies IEEE-279, Paragraph
- 4. 16.
Requiring the operator to hold the button for 1 to 2 seconds for a manual start does not impose a
hardship on the operator.
Normally, on a manual start the operator will stay with RCIC for at least 30 seconds or more to verify turbine speed, flow and valve positions.
Operating procedures will include a
precaution statement for the operator to ensure that he holds the manual initiation switch/button for RCIC unti 1 the valve position indicator shows the valve is opening.
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NINE NILE POINT 2 FSAR OUEST ION 421.43 If control systems are exposed to the environment resulting from the rupture of reactor coolant lines, steam lines, or feedwater lines, the control systems may malfunction in a manner which would cause consequences to be more severe than assumed in safety analyses.
ISE Information Notice 79-22 discusses certain non-safety grade or control equipment, which if subjected to the adverse environment of a high energy line
- break, could impact the safety analyses and the adequacy of the protection functions performed by the safety-related systems.
The staff is concerned that a similar potential may exist at light water facilities now under construction.
You are, therefore, requested to perform a review per the IEE Information Notice 79-22 concern to determine what, if any, design changes or operator actions would be necessary to assure that high energy line breaks will not cause control system failures to complicate the event beyond the FSAR analyses.
Provide the results of your review including all identified problems and the manner in which you have resolved them.
RESPONSE
The specific "scenarios" discussed in the above referenced Information Notice are to be considered as examples of the kinds of interactions which-might occur.
Your review should consider analogous interactions as relevant to the Bl'R design'.
KC: pes/1188-12 I/24/S4
HIGH. ENERGY LINE BREAK AhD CONTROL SYSTEM FAILURE EVALUATION INTRODUCTION IE Informa tion Notice 79-22 identifies the concern that the performance of nonsafety grade equipment subjected to an adverse environment could impact the protective functions performed by safety grade equipment.
The purpose of this analysis is to determine if a malfunction of a nonsafety control system, associated with a high energy line break, might result in a aevete event not bounded by pdAR Chapter
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METHODOLOGY The HELB/control system failure evaluation will be analyzed as follows:
l.
Identify all nonsafety control systems and components within these 'ystems which'ay 'impact critical reactor.
parameters (water level, pressure, power).
2.
Establish the criteria for energy lines, break postulation, and consequence evaluation.
3.
Identify critical nonsafety grade components located in areas of high energy piping..
4.
Postulate breaks in these areas and determine the resultant effects on the components.
5.
Evaluate the events to determine if the event is bounded by FSAR Chapter
- 15. If not bounded, additional analysis or a cor-rective action will be taken.
NONSAFETY CONTROL SYSTEMS All plant nonsafety. control systems are i'ncluded in the initial evalua-tion for HELB.
The following criteria is used for the elimination of systems from the initial list prior to performing a
detailed HELB analysis.
1.
Dedicated inputs into the process
- computer, as well as the com-puter itself.
2.
Control systems which have no direct or indirect interac ion with reactor operating, parameters.
Examples are communica-
- tions, lighting, ventilation for exterior buildings, machine shop systems, refueling or'maintenance
- systems, etc.
3.
Control systems that do interact or interface with reactor operating
- systems, but which cannot affect the reactor param-eters either directly or indirectly.
C3/12}77/367/5YH
4.
Electrical
- systems, the loss of which will result in a condi-tion similar to total or partial loss of offsite power.
Ex-amples include the station trans formers, ac instrument
- power, and dc instrument power.
5.
Systems which are not used during normal power operation.
For
- example, refueling
- systems, turning gear, and turbine bearing
.lift pumps.
6.
Safety systems or safety portions of control systems.
7.
Mechanical and structural type systems.
Examples include structural steel,
- turbines, cranes, etc.
All control components, including power
- sources, within systems not eliminated by the above criteria are evaluated for component elimination by the following criteria prior to the final HELB analysis.
l.
Instruments'hich provide only indication or position status information are excluded from'the detailed analysis.
2.
Components which provide passive inputs into the control logic, examples of which are arming-type permissives which require additional manual action to command equipment to operate, are excluded from the detailed analysis.
3.
.Instruments and other dedicated inputs to the process computer are excluded from the detailed analysis.
4.
Position switches on air-and motor-operated valves which are
,not interlocked with other equipment but rather provide posi-tion indication or position status to the process computer are.
excluded from the detailed analysis.
5.
Mechanical type components, such as structural
- steel, tanks, and pipes are not considered "components" which can fail.
How-
- ever, associated instruments,
- taps, tubing, and control compo-nents not eliminated by Items l through 4
and physically located on the above mechanical components, are evaluated.
PIPE BREAK CRITERIA The pipe break criteria is taken directly f om FSAR Section 3.6.
Pi e Criteria High'nergy piping is defined as including those systems or portions of systems in which the maximum operating temperature exceeds 2000F or the maximum operating pressure exceeds 275 psig during normal-full power operation.
Those lines that operate-above these limits for only a relatively short pe riod of time (less than 2.percent) to perform their intended func>>
- tion, are classified, as moderate
~ energy.
and, excluded from con-sideration.
C3/1 21 7 7/367/5YH 2
2.
Break Postulation High energy pipes are assumed to break only at terminal ends and at each intermediate pipe fitting or weld attachment.
Each longitudinal or circumferential break in high energy fluid sys-tem piping is considered separately as a
single postulated initial event occurring during normal plant conditions.
Conse uence Evaluation Pipe breaks are evaluated for the effects of pipe whip, jet impingement, and environmental effects.
a.
~Pi e Whi Pipe whip is assumed to occur in the plane defined by the piping geometry and to cause movement in the direction of the jet reaction..'.
Jet Im in ement Jet impingement loads are determined by taking the jet force as being constant at all effective distances
- from, and normal to, the break area and by assuming that the jet stream diverges.conically at a solid angle of 20 degrees.
ANALYSIS 1.
Utilizing current plant
- drawings, the nonsafety control components and high energy systems will be located in particular. zones.
2.
In small zones it will be assumed that any HELB would incapacitate all nonsafety control components in the zone.
3.
In large zones the effect of a high ene gy line break on each compo-nent will be evaluated based'pon the pipe criteria.
4.
Postulate breaks and evaluate the effects on the controls equipment.
5.
Compare postulated effects with events as reported in FSAR Chapter 15 to determine if they are bounded.
6.
If not
- bounded, determine if protection or relocation of the con-trols equipment is appropriate.
~a~
If requiredt additional analysisht.o determine if the effect is signif'cant and then a corrective action vill be taken.
8.
Draft final report.
C3/12177/367/5YH
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F430.23 (SRP S.l, 8.3.1)
Regarding separation of electrical circuits:
Describe the separation of non lE circuits from associated circuits and Class lE circuits.
Also address the qualification and identification of the associated circuits.
b.
c
~
d.
In FSAR Section 8.3.1.4.2 you state that if the required 6 inch separation cannot be maintained between circuits on terminal boards a fire resistant barrier is provided between
-the terminals or an analysis is made to establish that a fire in one divisional circuit inside the panel will not. disable both divisions.
Identify the areas where an analysis is used and provide the analysis results for staff review.
I Does the electrical. penetration separation discussed in Section 8.3.1.4.2,'result in 3 ft. horizontal and 5 ft..
vertical clearance between redundant Class lE circuits and Class 1E and non-Class lE circuits?
Justify the routing of redundant Class 1E ci'rcuits in the east vertical cable chase and the routing of Class 1E and non-Class 1E circuits in the second and third electrical tunnels.
Your response should address position C.S of R.G. 1.75.
e.
Is flexible conduit utilized as a barrier in the, NSSS or non-NSSS portions of the plants?
If so identify the areas where it is used and. the separation distances maintained.
Describe the-separation provided for the.RPS circuits.
g, FSAR appendix 9A, section 9.A.3.7.3, addresses the means used to route cables into the control building and through the cable routing areas within the control building.
Provide a
comparable description in FSAR Chapter 8
which addresses-the cable separation used in those areas to meet the IEEE 384-1974 and R.G. 1.75 requirements. 'o these areas contain
. high energy equipment or piping (high or moderate energy) that could be a
potential source of missiles or pipe whip?
Are
'ower cables routed through the area?
Amendment 7
QEcR F430.23-1 December 1983
POWER SYSTEM BRANCH (PSB)
COMMENTS:
a.
Your response on associated circuits should describe the identification and color coding used for these circuits.
Oo the circuits become associated because of inadequate separation distances or by virtue of being connected to the Class 1E power system?
Verify that the associated circuit is routed only with the division to which it is associated down to an isolation device.
b.
Your response to this question states that to date there are no cases where analysis has been used to justify less tnan 6-in. separation.
Verify that this response includes cabinets located in the PGCC.
c.
Response
OK d.
In accordance with position C.B of R.G.
1.75 verify that the electrical tunnels and vertical cable chases are ventilated.
e.
Your. response, indicates that flexible conduit is used as a barrier in NSSS panels to achieve required separation.
Provide an analysis supported by tests which indicate the flex conduit is a suitable barrier and describe the separation maintained between the flex conduit and external circuit.
We also understand that a fire retardant tape will be used as a barrier in PGCC cabinets.
Provide an analysis supported by tests which indicate the tape is a suitable barrier and describe the separation maintained between the tape and external circuit.
RESPONSE
See revised Sections 8.3.1.4.1 and 8.3. 1.4.2 for response to parts a, c, d, e, f and g.
RESPONSE
TO PSB COMMMENTS:
A)
See revised Section 8.3. 1.4. 1 b)
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