ML18022A778
| ML18022A778 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 03/01/1990 |
| From: | Richey R CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| HO-900021-(O), NUDOCS 9003080358 | |
| Download: ML18022A778 (62) | |
Text
ACCELERATED D UTION DEMON TION SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR:9003080358 DOC.DATE: 8~
Q NOTARIZED: NO FACIL:50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Un', Carolina AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION RICHEY,R.B.
Carolina Power
& Light Co.
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Doc ment Control Desk)
DOCKET 05000400
SUBJECT:
"10CFR50.59 Re t of Changes to Procedures
&/or Plant Mods for 1989.i" 900301 tr.
l DISTRIBUTION CODE:
IE47D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:
TITLE: 50.59 Annual Report of Changes, Tests or xperiments Made W/out Approv NOTES:Application for permit renewal filed.
05000400 I
RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-1 LA BECKER,D INTERNAL: ACRS AEOD/DSP/TPAB NRR/DOEA/OEAB11 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT RGN2 FILE 01 EXTERNAL: LPDR NSIC COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
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1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-1 PD AEOD/DOA NRR/DLPQ/LHFB11 gJ)RE PRPB11 G PILE 02 NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL 5
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1 NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASIEt CONTACI'HE.DOCUMENI'ONTROLDESK, ROOM P1-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINA'IKYOUR NAMEFROM DISIRIBUTION LISIS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED1 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:
LTTR 25 ENCL 23
,r coal Caroljna power 8 Ught Cotnpany P. O. Boa 165 ~ New Hill, N. C. 27562 R. B. RICHEY Manager Harrla Nuclear Project r MAR 3
1990 Letter Number.'HO-900021 (0) 10CFR50.59 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:
NRC Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400 LICENSE NO. NPF-63 REPORT IN ACCORDANCE WITH 10CFR50.59 Gentlemen:
In accordance with 10CFR50.59, the following report is submitted for the year of 1989.
This report contains brief summaries of changes to procedures and/or plant modifications, which change the plant as it is described in the FSAR.
There were no tests or experiments conducted during this
- interval, which are not described in the FSAR and require reporting in this report.
Very truly yours, R. B. Richey, Manag Harris Nuclear Proj ct MGW:tbb Enclosure cc.'Mr. S.
D. Ebneter (NRC RII)
Mr. J.
E. Tedrow (NRC SHNPP) 90030~q0q,g PDR ADOCK 05000400 R
/pe]~
MEM/HO-9000210/1/OS1
CHANGE TO PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE:
PCR-004105, Spent Fuel'ask Basket Storage FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
This plant modification installs a set of
- flanges, along with a spectacle blind between these
- flanges, in pipe (Line f 7SF12-151"2+3) of the fuel pool cleanup system located in the Fuel Handling Building.
These flanges and blind will separate the operational and nonoperational portion of this
- system, to support the use of portions of the piping in treating fuel pool water in the Unit 2/3 transfer canal.
The canal area is being used to store fuel cask baskets.
This modification provides storage for two (2)
PWR fuel, baskets and two (2)
BWR fuel baskets which are used in conjunction with the 1F-300 spent fuel shipping cask.
The storage location for the baskets will be the north (former Units 2 and
- 3) fuel transfer canal.
The fuel baskets will be stored under water in the bottom of the transfer canal.
Storage of the fuel baskets within the transfer canal will be freestanding.
- Also, included in this modification is a basket lifting rig (chain "hoist) to be used in conjunction with the Fuel Handling Building auxiliary crane and the fuel basket lifting yoke assembly during the transfer of the basket from the cask loading pool to the fuel transfer canal.
This chain hoist is being provided so that the hook of the auxiliary crane does not have to travel under water during transfer of the basket.
Storage racks for the fuel basket lifting rig and fuel basket lifting yoke are being provided in the cask head and yoke storage area.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
Piping and components affected by this change are classified as nonsafety related.
The flange and spectacle blind installation will provide pressure boundary integrity for the operational side of the fuel pool clean up system associated with the Unit 2 fuel transfer canal.
The fuel baskets are used in conjunction with the 1F-300 spent fuel shipping cask when stored in the former Unit g2 and
$3 transfer canal.
The fuel baskets are not considered to be safety related.
The structure and canal liner were evaluated for the loading imposed by the fuel baskets and found acceptable.
The existing Fuel Handling Building auxiliary utilized for the transfer of fuel baskets between pool and the fuel transfer canal.
The design auxiliary crane is 12 tons which is much greater of the PWR and BWR fuel baskets.
crane will be the cask loading capacity of the than the weight
.9003080358; MEM/HO-9000210/2/Osl
The travel path of the fuel baskets between the cask loading pool and transfer canal is not over spent fuel.
This travel path is enveloped by the safe load paths analysis and will be controlled administratively.
The basket lifting rig (chain hoist) and fuel basket lifting yoke are nonsafety and nonseismic.
These two (2) items neither provide nor support any safety system function.
This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR.
Therefore, no unreviewed safety question exists.
REFERENCE:
Figures 1.2.2-55, 1.2.2-56, 9.1.3-3 Sections 9.1.3, 9.1.4 MEM/HO-9000210/3/OS1
'CHANGE TO PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE:
PCR-003909 Fuel Handling Building Unloading Area Monorail Hoist FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
This plant modification adds a monorail hoist to the Fuel Handling Building Unloading Area.
The hoist will be used to dismantle external components of the spent fuel shipping
- cask, such as the valve box cover, and attach the cask lifting trunnions.
The boom has a 180'wing so that it may be (1) positioned over the railcar to perform the tasks described above or (2) positioned parallel to the unloading bay during the raising or lowering of the cask through the elevation 286.00'quipment hatch.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
The Fuel Handling-Building is a
reinforced concrete seismic category I structure.
Facilities for storing,
- moving, and handling both new fuel and spent fuel are contained in the Fuel Handling Building.
Also housed in the Fuel Handling Building are secondary waste and reactor auxiliary building equipment (both safety related and nonsafety related).
The monorail hoist neither provides or supports any safety system function (plant or shipping cask).
The fuel handling activities and equipment described in Section 9.1 of the FSAR will not be impacted by this change.
This modification will not impact the fuel handling accidents described in Section 15.7.4 and 15.7.5.
A seismic event is not considered during operation of the monorail hoist.
- However, a
5 to 1 safety factor on the rated hoist load of 1 ton has been used for all monorail structural calculations.
The physical location of the monorail hoist preclude the carrying of loads over the fuel storage areas.
When not in operation failure during a postulated seismic event is precluded due to the 5 to 1
safety factor used in design.
Therefore, structures,
- systems, and equipment important to safety will not be impacted.
This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents,.nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR.
Therefore, no unreviewed safety question exists.
REFERENCE:
Figure 1.2.2-55 MEM/HO-9000210/4/Osl
CHANGE TO PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE 'FSAR TITLE:
PCR"004434, 480V Circuit Breaker Replacement FUNCTION
SUMMARY
This plant modification replaced discontinued ITE molded case circuit breakers, 600 volt AC, 225 amp 3 pole in 480V MCCs 1A22-SA, 1B22-SB, 1A34-SA, and 1834-SB with Westinghouse model KD3225 480V molded case circuit breakers.
NRC Bulletin No.
88-10 "Nonconforming Molded Case Circuit
'Breakers" identified that some companies have supplied refurbished circuit breakers to the Nuclear Industry which do not meet the characteristics of a new breaker from the original circuit breaker manufacturer (CBM).
Therefore, the bulletin required that breakers which could not be traced back to the CBM either be tested to provide a
reasonable assurance that they meet the required characteristics or be replaced with a circuit breaker traceable to the CBM.
The ITE type breakers installed in 480V MCC lA22-SA Compartments lA and 2A, 480V MCC 1B22-SB Compartments 2A and 3A (Fuel Handling Building El.
236) and 480V MCC lA34-SA Compartments 1A and 2A, 480V MCC 1B34"SB Compartments 2A and 3A (Reactor Auxiliary Building El. 286) are considered suspect as they were supplied by a
Company identified by the NRC as having supplied refurbished breakers and cannot be traced back to the CBM.
The modification is required to provide a replacement breaker and to immediately replace the suspect breakers in MCC compartments noted above.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
The loads associated with these breakers are considered part of the safety related AC system and have not changed.
These breakers are part of the safety related containment fan cooler motor feeder circuits.
The fan cooler motors are located in the Reactor Containment Building (RCB) and are fed by way of the 480V Electrical Containment Penetrations.
These MCC breakers provide sufficient backup protection for the associated electrical penetration circuits.
Calculations have been reviewed to assure coordination of the MCC breakers with the upstream power center feeder will be maintained.
The new molded case circuit breaker type KD3225 will limit the maximum I squared t at the penetration to a value less than that required for thermal damage to penetration conductors based on evaluation of calculations.
The current versus time curves for the fan cooler motor feeder circuits are given in Figure 8.3.1-8 of the FSAR.
Because of the breaker type change, this figure will be required to be revised to reflect not only the existing JL Type breaker but also the new Westinghouse breaker Type KD3225.
MEM/HO"9000210/5/OS1
This change does not increase the probability or consequences of, analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR.
Therefore, no unreviewed safety question exists.
REFERENCE:
Figure 8.3.1-8 MEM/HO-9000210/6/OS1
CHANGE TO PLANT AS DESCRIBED "IN THE'FSAR TITLE:
PCR-003427, Flow measurement capability for spent fuel pool cooling system.
FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
This plant modification adds flow measuring devices in order to measure the flow rate on the Spent Fuel Cooling Pumps 1&4A-SA and l&4B-SB located on 236'levation Fuel Handling Building.
Testing requiring flow measurement is required on a quarterly basis per the Inservice Testing Program required by ASME Section XI.
The Fuel Pool Cooling System (FPCS) provides two 100X capacity cooling loops capable of removing residual heat from the spent fuel.
Each loop consists of a fuel pool heat exchanger, a fuel pool cooling
- pump, and a fuel pool strainer, and is capable of cooling the new and spent fuel pools.
The FPCS is designed to keep the temperature of the pool at or below the pool concrete design temperature (150'F) under all conditions.
The fuel pool cooling piping is seismic Category 1
and designed to ASME B&PV Code,Section III Class 3 requirements.
In order to monitor Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps 1&4A-SA and 1&4B"SB discharge flow rate, ITT Barton Model 227A flow indicators have been installed.
The flow rate across flow element FE-41SF-5110AS and FE-41SF-5110BS will supply the input to the flow indicators.
These flow indicators will be identified as FI-41SF-5110AS for pump 1&4A-SA and FI-41SF"5110BS for pump 1&4B"SB.
Both flow indicators will be located at 236'levation Fuel Handling Building adjacent to instrument rack F-R2 and will be seismically qualified and installed (Quality Class B).
Each indicator has an input range of 0-500 INWC and a square root scale indication of 0-5500 gpm.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
The instrument mounting
- supports, tubing
- supports, and valve supports are seismically designed (Seismic Category 1).
The Barton Model 227A transmitters have been seismically qualified.
Material compatibility of the Fuel Pool Cooling System is maintained.
The
- piping, equipment, and components in contact with the fuel pool water are austenitic stainless steel.
Compatibility with the design
- pressure, temperature and chemistry of the system were considered in material selection.
The other materials and equipment meet the design specifications as required.
MEM/HO-9000210/7/OS1
This change does not increase the -probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR.
Therefore, no unreviewed safety questions exists.
REFERENCE:
Figure 9.1.3-01 MEM/H0-9000210/8/OS1
CHANGE TO PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE:
PCR"003908, Fuel Handling Building Decontamination Pit Monorail Hoist FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
This plant modification adds a monorail hoist to the Fuel Handling Building.
The hoist will be used to support a spreader bar and two air wrenches over the cask decontamination pit for the tensioning/detensioning of the cask head stud nuts.
The boom has a 180'wing so that it may be (1) positioned over the cask decontamination pit to perform the task described above or (2) positioned parallel to "N" line wall so that the shipping cask may be lowered into or raised from the cask decontamination pit.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
The Fuel Handling Building is a
reinforced concrete seismic category I structure.
Facilities for storing, moving, and handling both new fuel and spent fuel are contained in the Fuel Handling Building.
The monorail hoist neither provides or supports any safety system function (plant or shipping cask).
The fuel handling activities and equipment described in Section 9.1 of the FSAR and the fuel handling accidents described in Section 15.7.4 and 15.7.5 of the FSAR are not impacted by this modification.
This crane will not be used to handle new or spent fuel.
The physical location of the monorail hoist precludes the earring of its load over the fuel storage areas.
The rated capacity of the crane is 1/2 ton (actual hoist capacity is 1 ton).
A seismic event is not considered during operation of this crane.
When not in operation, failure during a
postulated seismic event is precluded since loadings due to seismic accelerations would be less than lifting loading.
Based on the above structures,
- systems, and equipment important to safety will not be impacted.
This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR.
Therefore, no unreviewed safety questions exists.
REFERENCE:
Figures 1.2.2-55 and 1.2.2"58 MEM/HO-9000210/9/OS1
CHANGE TO PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE:
PCR-003942, Relocation of Carbon to Stainless Joint in Liquid Waste Processing System (LWPS) Drain Piping FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
This plant modification relocates a carbon to stainless weld joint in the Turbine Building (TB) drain piping.
Check valve 7WS-V37-1 is a stainless steel valve located in line 7WS4-113 between the Turbine Building Industrial sumps and the low conductivity holding tanks.
The down stream piping carries caustic and acid chemicals from Condensate Polisher Regeneration.
The downstream piping is also stainless steel.
On the upstream side of the valve, the valve is welded to carbon steel pipe.
This mod moves the carbon to stainless interface further upstream in the TB drain piping.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
The TB floor drainage systems do not serve any safety function and are classified as non-nuclear safety.
Replacing carbon pipe with stainless will reduce the possibility of mechanical failure due to corrosion if the check valve leaks.
This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accidents or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR.
Therefore, no unreyiewed safety question exists.
REFERENCE:
Figure 11.2.2-08 MEM/H0-9000210/10/OS1
CHANGE TO PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN 'THE FSAR TITLE:
PCR-003405, Laundry and Hot Shower Pump Low Suction Trip FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
This plant modification installed an orifice in the Laundry and Hot Shower (LATHS) mixing pump discharge line of the Liquid Waste Processing System (LWPS).
The purpose of the orifice is to prevent pump run out.
The orifice is sized to reduce the flow through the pumps to its design basis of 200 gpm.
A relocation of a
pressure transmitter tap is necessary because of the orifice.
PT 6154 will be placed upstream of the orifice such that it can indicate pump discharge pressure.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
The L&HS is a
subsystem of the LWPS.
The addition of an orifice into the piping system will not alter the function of the LATHS System.
The modification to the discharge piping included conservative assumptions for the rating of the new flanges and selection of materials which are compatible with the LATHS fluids.
Through the use of approved 'materials and common piping components the probability of pipe rupture and release of radioactivity is not increased.
This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR.
Therefore, no unreviewed safety questions exists.
REFERENCE:
Figure 11.2.2-5 MEM/80-9000210/11/OS1
CHANGE TO PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE:
PCR-001731, Installation of Flow Elements and Thermowells on the Steam Generator Blowdown System (SGBDS)
FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
This plant modification installs three flow elements and three thermowells in the steam generator blowdown system at the following locations.'1)
Steam generator blowdown flash tank steam outlet line (steam element).
- 2) Steam generator blowdown flash tank liquid outlet downstream of condensate cooling mixing chamber (liquid element).
3)
Condensate cooling water inlet line to steam generator blowdown mixing chamber (condensate element).
Three thermowells are also installed directly downstream of each flow element.
The steam element consists of an 8" 304 stainless steel Venturi with 1/2" stainless steel isolation valves on each of the two differential pressure measurement taps.
The liquid element consists of a 6" 304 stainless steel Venturi with 1/2" stainless steel isolation valves on each of the two differential pressure measurement taps.
The condensate element consists of a 2" stainless steel nozzle with 1/2" stainless steel isolation valves on'ach of the two differential pressure measurement taps.
The flow elements are installed to more accurately measure.
blowdown flow.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
The affected portion of the SGBDS has no safety related function.
The support loads and thermal piping considerations have been satisfied based on analysis.
The structural integrity of the supports and the piping system is maintained through proper structural analysis.
The
- safety, reliability, and operability of the blowdown and condensate systems is in no way impaired as a result of these pipe support modifications.
This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR.
Therefore, no unreviewed safety questions exists.
REFERENCE:
Figure 10.1.0-6, Sections 10.4.8.2 and 10.4.8.3 MEM/HO-9000210/12/OS1
~ ~
The replacement handwheels have been
- designed to Seismic Category 1
requirements to ensure that they will not fail and prevent the subject valves from closing.
These handwheels are locked in the neutral position during Modes 1,
2, 3,
and 4
and therefore would only be used during Modes S and 6.
This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR.
Therefore, no unreviewed safety questions exists.
REFERENCE:
Figure 10.1.0-06 MEM/HO-9000210/16/OS1
'CHANGE TO PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE:
PCR-001703, Essential Chilled Water Supply, AH-93 FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
This plant modification redirects the air flow in the Rod Control Cabinets (RCC) room.
The RCC room was experiencing higher than design room temperature of 80'F, although
,it remained within the Technical Specification limit of 104'F.
The higher than design temperature is attributed to under estimated heat loads within the room.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
The air flow pattern in the room has been redirected to allow 76X of supply air to be delivered to the RCC area and to allow exhaust air to be drawn from the heat load area around the Motor/Generator (M/G) sets.
The remaining 24X of supply air is directed at the M/G sets to prevent formation of a "dead air space."
The return ductwork revisions result in a new longest run (the existing supply longest run remains unchanged),
and revisions to static pressure calculations.
All ductwork is constructed and installed as safety
- related, seismically supported.
The original calculation was re-evaluated and, revisions were made to the calculation to more accurately predict the heat balance of various areas are included in the PCR.
The air flow to the RCC room has been increased from approximately'800 CFM to 5800 CFM.
To accommodate this increased air flow, the air flow to SWGR Room B has been correspondingly decreased.
Heat loads in SWGR Room B
were previously overestimated.
Therefore a reduction in air flow to= that area is justifiable.
Space design temperatures remain unchanged.
Total system flow is not changed.
The increased air flow rate to the RCC room does not adversely affect closure reliability of fire dampers AC-FDAS27-1 and AC-FDAS28-1.
This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR.
Therefore, no unreviewed safety questions exists.
REFERENCE:
Sections 9.4 and 9.5A MEM/HO-9000210/13/OS1
CHANGE TO PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE:
PCR-003922, Steam Generator Blowdown System Valve Replacement FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
This plant modification replaced four gate valves in the steam generator blowdown (SGBD) system.
Valves 1BD-117, 1BD-118, and 1BD-121 were replaced with a gate valve design incorporating double disc seat design.
The previous valves had solid wedge discs.
Valve 1BD-81 was replaced with a gate valve design incorporating double disc design.
This gate valve was manufactured from stainless steel; Two settling tank drain transfer pump expansion joints and one pipe hanger was redesigned by this modification to allow for thermal growth of the piping and to support the additional weight of the replacement valves.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
The replacement components are designed in accordance with the original specification with additional design inputs to compensate for bending due to thermal growth and provide greater resistance to seat leakage from erosion.
Because of increased resistance to erosion and thermal
- growth, there is improved reliability of the system pressure boundary.
A failure of the settling tank and associated
- pumps, piping, pressure
- boundary, etc.,
cannot challenge steam generator inventory through any credible scenario since blowdown flow is regulated by physically
- separate, safety related components located upstream in the RAB.
A failure of the settling tank pressure boundary would cause the Turbine Building Elevation 240'o be filled with steam',
however, it would not affect the safe shutdown of the plant.
This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR.
Therefore, no unreviewed safety questions exists.
REFERENCE:
Figure 10.1.0-06 MEM/HO-9u00210/14/OSl
CHANGE TO PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE:
PCR-003045, Replacement of Actuator Assemblies on Blowdown Valves FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
This plant modification replaces the actuator assemblies on Steam Generator Blowdown Inboard Shell Isolation Valves 1BD-7 (2BD-V2 SB),
The existing actuators are air-to-open/air"to-close and are susceptible to air leakage which may prevent the valves from remaining closed during various accident scenarios.
The replacement actuators are air-to-open/spring-to-close and do not rely on motive air to close in normal and accident conditions.
The replacement actuators contain a smaller ported solenoid valve which will lengthen the valve stroke times to minimize the potential for column separation induced water hammer.
The solenoid valves on 1BD-7, 1BD-26, and 1BD-45 are to be relocated to the top of the actuator on the diaphragm case to minimize the heating effects from the valve body.
The modification also replaces the manual side-mount handwheel assemblies and stem connectors on steam generator blowdown valves 1BD-11 (2BD-Vll SA),
The previous manual handwheel assemblies were undersized and did not fully open the valves.
The handwheel assemblies were replaced but because they add additional weight to the valve, the pipe stress analysis is changed to reflect the new loads.
The replacement assemblies meet all design requirements of
'the original valves.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
The replacement actuators are designed in accordance with the original specification which requires IEEE (containment service) and seismic Category I qualification.
The springs on the actuator have been specified to close the valve under maximum system design differential pressures.
Because of the above, there is no reduction of the valves ability to close and stay closed under all expected conditions.
The valve will close and open approximately ten seconds longer than before to minimize the system's susceptibility to column separation during closure and rapid bubble formation followed by condensation induced water hammers during valve opening following long periods of system shutdown.
The new closure times provide adequate margin to stay well within the Technical Specification 60-second limit with allowance for valve wear and the different operating scenarios.
A failure of the solenoid valve or any air tubing on the valve actuator will cause the process valve to close.
Additionally, a failure of the power supply to the solenoid valve will also cause the process valve to close.
MEM/HO"9000210/15/OS1
CHANGE TO PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE:
PCR-004705, Loop Seal for Radiation Monitor REM-1MD-3528 FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
This plant modification involves the removal of the auto start function of radiation monitor REM-1MD-3528 and installs a
loop seal in pipe section 8MD4-119-1 to allow for continuous sampling by the radiation monitor.
REM-1MD-3528 is a liquid radiation monitor located in the Turbine Building.
When an industrial waste sump pump or a condensate pump area sump pump starts and generates an auto start signal to the radiation monitor a noise spike frequently results.
This noise spike generates a false high radiation alarm signal which closes the discharge valve to the yard oil separator and trips the sump pumps.
The auto start function for radiation monitor REM-1MD-3528 has been removed and the discharge pipe (8MD4-119-1) was modified to create a loop seal so that there will be adequate source of liquid to allow the radiation monitor to continually sample flow regardless of flow in the discharge pipe.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
The radiation monitor, the sump
- pumps, and the associated discharge piping are located in the Turbine Building.
This equipment is not safety
- related, however, the monitor is required to be operational per the Technical Specifications.
The radiation monitor and loop seal piping are upstream of the Liquid Waste Processing System boundary',
consequently, this modification does not affect any of the systems related to the initiation of a design basis accident as described in Chapter 15 of the FSAR.
The radiation monitor is not one of the safety related radiation monitors used to mitigate the effects of a
design basis accident as described in Chapter 15 of the FSAR.
This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR.
Therefore, no unreviewed safety questions exists.
REFERENCE:
Table 11.5.2-2 MEM/HO-9000210/17/OS1
CHANGE TO PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE:
PCR-001864, Containment Building High Humidity Alarm Setpoint Change FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
This plant modification changes the alarm setpoint of the moisture switches of the Containment Building Airborne Radioactivity Removal System (ARRS) to 80X relative humidity (RH).
The switches were previously set at 70X RH.
The high humidity annunciator, ALB-28 in the control room was continuously illuminated thereby giving no indication to increasing relative humidity inside containment.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
The purpose of the Containment Building ARRS is to remove airborne particulate radioactivity and reduce the concentration of radioactive iodine in the containment atmosphere.
- However, the system is not assumed to function during any design basis events.
The ARRS consists of two identical trains.
Each train has a
bank of medium efficiency filters, HEPA filters charcoal adsorbers, a fan, a
- damper, and temperature, flow and moisture elements.
- Normally, one train is operated continuously with the other train on standby.
Each ARRS filtration unit has a moisture element (ME-01-AR-7644-A and ME-01-AR-7644-B) located upstream of the charcoal adsorber.
The moisture elements are provided by American Instrument Company and have a range of 0-100X relative humidity.
The setpoint of the previous moisture switches was 70X relative humidity.
According to the adsorber manufacturer's information, the adsorber is capable of removing 99X of elemental and organic iodides during adsorption when operation at 70X RH and 150'F.
Based on sensitivity testing
- results, the use of the adsorber in an environment where the relative humidity is 80X rather than 70X has a negligible adverse affect on its efficiency.
Furthermore, since the ARRS is a "multipass" recirculation system, the effect of this change has no consequence.
The modification will not affect the efficiency and performance of the ARR system and will reduce the frequency or eliminate the subject high humidity alarms.
This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the
- FSAR.
Therefore, no unreviewed safety questions exists.
REFERENCE:
Table 9.4.7-1 MEM/HO-9000210/18/OS1
CHANGE TO PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE:
PCR-003416, Condenser Vacuum Pump Seal Water Modification FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
This plant modification implemented two separate changes to the Condenser Vacuum Pump Seal Water System.
One change removes a concentric pipe arrangement within the base seal water tank that forms a
water seal in the pump discharge line.
The purpose of this change is'o reduce condensate entrainment in the air exhausted from the condenser by the vacuum pumps The second change substitutes a continuous, metered (approximately one gpm) flow of makeup water to the Condenser Vacuum Pump Seal Water System in place of a float activated makeup water valve that admits water to the seal water system on low seal tank level.
-The continuous makeup flow is expected to maintain the water level in the seal tank at the overflow level.
The resulting feed and bleed operating mode for the seal water tank will maintain seal water temperature less than boiling.
Elimination of the water seal in the vacuum pump discharge line is expected to reduce the expulsion of seal water from the vacuum pump.
A primary benefit of this modification,
- however, is that the reduced amount of condensate in the vacuum pump discharge line will improve operation of the Condenser Vacuum Pump Effluent Treatment System.
Previously, there was too much moisture in the vacuum pump discharge line for the demister upstream of the filter bank to remove.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
As discussed in FSAR Chapter 1S, a reduction in condenser vacuum can lead to a turbine trip.
This evaluation assesses whether the proposed modification will increase or decrease the probability of loss of condenser vacuum.
The one gpm metered makeup flow is therefore more than sufficient to maintain seal water tank level and is expected to result in a continuous overflow from the seal water tank.
Vacuum pump seal water inventory is expected to remain constant or even increase.
The feed and bleed mode of operation will reduce seal water temperature and thereby improve vacuum pump operation.
A needle valve set to produce a one gpm flow rate is a simpler, hence more
- reliable, makeup water source than a float operated valve.
Based on the foregoing evaluation, this modification will improve operation of the condenser vacuum pumps and will not increase the probability of a loss of vacuum induced turbine trip event.
MEM/HO-9000210/19/OS1
This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR.
Therefore, no unreviewed safety questions exists.
REFERENCE:
Figure 10.1.0-4 MEM/HO-9000210/20/OS1
CHANGE TO PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE:
PCR-000365, Circulating Pump Seal and Bearing Water System FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
This plant modification removed solenoid valves
- SPWV31, SPWV33, and 8PWV35 in the potable water system controlling the flow of water to the circulating water pumps gland seals and bearings for cooling.
A new pump is added to supply additional water from the cooling tower basin to the circulating water pumps gland seals and bearing for cooling.
The new pump will be started and stopped by the same signals that were used to open and close the replaced solenoid valves.
A local control station has also been added to allow the pump to be
- started, stopped or to run continuously by manual control.
This modification also requires that a portion of the Instrument Air (IA) line be removed from the Cooling Tower Intake Structure.
This section of the Instrument Air Supply System is no longer utilized and can be capped at an isolation valve.
This allows the use of the existing supports to install the seal/bearing water supply line.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
The new seal water. pump is added to increase the reliability of'the Circulating Water Pumps (CWPs).
Potable water supplies additional flow at start up as a
back up if the seal water pump is lost.
Loss of all three CWPs will result in a loss of vacuum in the main condenser.
Loss of vacuum is an event analyzed in FSAR Chapter 15.
The addition of the new seal water pump will not increase the probability of occurrence of any accident but should decrease that probability by adding an additional supply of gland seal and bearing cooling water to the circulating water pumps.
The probability of occurrence of malfunction of equipment important to safety and the consequences of malfunction will not be changed since the new pump is fed from a nonsafety source and the circulating water pumps are not considered important to safety as noted in the design basis.
The possibility of an accident or the possibility for malfunction of equipment important to safety of a different type will'ot be changed for the same reasons.
The section of instrument air piping to be removed at the Cooling Tower Intake Structure is designed as nonsafety and nonseismic.
All instrument air components affected or removed are Quality Class E.
Since no instrumentation or equipment is connected to this section of IA line, no other components or equipment are affected.
MEM/HO-9000210/21/OS1
This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR.
Therefore, no unreviewed safety questions exists.
REFERENCE:
Figure 9.3.1-01 MEM/HO-9000210/22/OS1
CHANGE TO PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE:
PCR-003241, LTOPS Operation in Modes 1, 2, and 3
FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
This plant modification involves the addition of two switches on the Main Control Board to allow for the MANUAL block of the LTOPS circuitry in Modes 1, 2, and 3.
The basis for the design change is Westinghouse guidance that an unanalyzed condition may result during a
Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) or during a recovery from a Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) when the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) temperature in the faulted loop cold leg drops'elow the LTOPS auto-arming temperature.
This Westinghouse scenario results in saturation of the LTOPS circuitry and results in the opening of the affected pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) causing an unintended RCS depressurization during the MSLB 6 SGTR events.
These scenarios were not considered as a
possible worst single failure in the accident analyses which Westinghouse performed for Shearon Harris.
Upon receiving this information, the auto-arming for the two LTOPS PORVs was defeated by the removal of solid state circuit cards in process Instrument Cabinets.
Administrative controls were put in place to return LTOPS to operable status when the plant entered Mode 4.
This modification provides the manual "BLOCK" of the LTOPS permissive by means of two MCB switches rather than requiring the disconnecting of PIC cards.
In addition to the manual NORMAL/BLOCK switches added to the
- MCB, two additional annunciator windows are added which will alert the operator if either of the following conditions exist for the PORV LTOPS valves.
1.
The NORMAL/BLOCK switch is in the "BLOCK" position when the "LOW AUCTIONEERED" RCS temperature is at or below the LTOPS required arming setpoint.
2.
The NORMAL/BLOCK switch is in the "NORMAL" position when the "LOW AUCTIONEERED" RCS temperature is above the LTOPS required disable setpoint.
MEM/HO-9000210/23/OS1
4
SAFETY
SUMMARY
The relevant regulatory guidance permits either automatic or manual arming of the LTOPs.
This modification provides a method of obtaining the required blocking and enabling of the LTOPS function which eliminates the more cumbersome method of disconnecting and reconnecting/calibrating PIC cards.
With the exception of the benefit of the added alarm feature the modification provides the functionally equivalent arrangement of LTOPS arming/disarming circuitry as, previously existed.
No changes to Technical Specifications are required.
This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR.
Therefore, no unreviewed safety questions exists.
REFERENCE:
Sections 5.2 and 7.6 MEM/HO-9000210/24/OS1
CHANGE TO PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE:
PCR-000373, Chemical Feed Pump Additions to the Potable Water System FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
This plant modification added Zinc Phosphate also replaced the Sodium Hypochlorite (NaOCl) pumps with a modern chemical feed pump.
The original system did not address corrosion in the piping.
The addition of ZnP04 inhibits the corrosion in the potable water system.
The newer metering pumps are also more reliable, requiring less Operations and Maintenance time.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
The failure of the chemical feed pumps is not an initiating event for any analyzed event.
This modification enhances an existing chemical addition system by upgrading the Wallace-Tiernan Hypochlorinators to Prominet chemical feed pumps.
The existing pumps have been corroded by the NaOCl chemical solution.
The new pumps have specially designed internals that will not be affected by the NaOC1 solution.
The piping has been revised to PVC to prevent corrosion due to accumulation of concentrated NaOC1.
Overall the reliability of the system will be increased.
This modification also adds Zinc Phosphate addition pumps.
The Zinc Phospate is being added to inhibit corrosion in the underground ferrous pipe system.
Loss of the Zinc Addition Pumps will not shut down potable water.
All portions of these modifications are nonsafety, nonseismic.
This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR.
Therefore, no unreviewed safety questions exists.
REFERENCE:
Section 9.2.4 MEM/HO"9000210/25/OS1
CHANGE TO PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE:
PCR-002503, Local Instrumentation Needed at Condensate Pumps FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
PCR-002503 will install pressure differential indicators across the s'uction strainers for condensate pump A and B.
This installation will provide the capability to monitor the differential across each
- strainer, thus determining the cleanliness of each pump suction strainer.
The suction strainers and condensate pumps are part of the condensate and feedwater system.
The function of the condensate and feedwater system is to return water from the condenser to the steam generators.
The condensate pumps and suction strainers are located in the Turbine Building (Elevation 242').
Both condensate pumps are nonsafety (Q-Class E).
The suction strainers are in line between the condenser hotwell and the suction of the condensate pumps.
During start up, each strainer had a high differential pressure switch (0-10 psid).
These instruments (PDS-01CE-1923A and B) were used to determine if the strainer became clogged during start up testing.
Both switches provided an alarm and pump trip.
PCR-000851 removed the trip and alarm function of these switches and spared these instruments as PDS-01CE-1923AX and PDS-01CE-1923BX in instrument cabinet Tl-Cll located on Turbine Building Elevation 242'.
To monitor strainer differential pressure, differential pressure indicators PDI-01CE-1923A and PDI-01CE-1923B will be installed in place of the spared differential pressure switches.
Both indicators are a Meriam model 1124 (0-10 psid) and will be located in instrument cabinet Tl-Cll.
Both indicators are nonsafety and nonseismic and are Q-Class E.
Each indicator will use the existing sensing
- lines, root valves, and 5-valve manifolds that were previously used by PDS-1923AX and PDS-1923BX.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
The condensate and feedwater system is an initiating system for analyzed accidents.
- However, the addition of PDI"01E-1923A and PDI-01CE-1923B does not actuate or supply any initiating signal, nor do they affect any safety related components.
Both indicators are for local indication only and will be used to monitor pump suction strainer differential pressure.
This, change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR.
Therefore, no unreviewed safety questions exists.
REFERENCE:
Figure 10.1.0-4 MEM/HO-9000210/26/OSl
CHANGE TO PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE:
PCR-003066, Demineralized Water System Drains FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
This plant modification reroutes the discharge from the relief valves on the Anion Exchanger 1-4B-NNS and the Mixed Bed Exchangers 1-.4A-NNS and 1-4B-NNS vessels in the Water Treatment Building.
The discharge of the relief valves were connected to the vessels, overflow piping which is not pressurized and discharges into the caustic/acid equipment drainage system.
These vessels are a part of the Demineralized Water System (DWS).
SAFETY
SUMMARY
The materials selection for the relief valve discharge was the same as the original design.
This material is compatible with the system fluids.
The possibility for mechanical failure of the tanks, valves, piping, or system has not increased since the, original design conditions have not been changed.
The discharge of the relief valves was connected to the tank over flow piping which is not pressurized and discharges into the caustic/acid equipment drainage system.
The DWS serves no safety function.
It is not required to achieve safe shutdown or mitigate the consequences of an accident.
This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR.
Therefore, no unreviewed safety questions exists.
REFERENCE:
Figure 9.2.3-3 MEM/HO"9000210/27/OS1
CHANGE TO PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE:
PCR-003216, Condenser Vacuum Pump Flow Meter Additions FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
This plant modification adds three additional flow measuring devices to the condenser air evacuation system.
Two flow meters are added to the condenser vacuum pumps and are installed on each pump's discharge.
Another meter is installed in the steam generator wet lay-up drain line (7AE6-24-1) and will be used to monitor the manually controlled cooling air flow to the condenser vacuum pumps.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
The main condenser evacuation
- system, of which the condenser vacuum pumps is a part, is designed to establish and maintain condenser vacuum and to remove noncondensable gasses from the condenser during normal plant oper'ation.
The condenser evacuation system is classified as a
non-nuclear
- safety, nonseismic
- system, and is not required for safe shutdown of the plant.
Even though the condenser vacuum pumps are not required for safe shutdown of the plant, it indirectly impacts the RCS by virtue of a turbine trip on loss of vacuum and a
subsequent reactor trip.,
The effects of a
vacuum loss trip scenario is analyzed in FSAR Section 15.2.5.
The additional flow measuring instrumentation added to the condenser vacuum pumps will not increase the likelihood of loss of condenser vacuum.
Material to be used in this modification is equivalent and compatible to existing piping and components used in the initial design.
This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR.
Therefore, no unreviewed safety questions exists.
REFERENCE:
Figure 10.1.0-4 MEM/HO-9000210/28/OS1
CHANGE TO PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE:
PCR-002066, Secondary Waste Composite Sampler FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
This plant modification installs an automatic composite sampler upstream of the radiation monitor in the secondary waste release line.
A change to the Technical Specification that allowed continuous release of secondary waste requires a weekly composite sample to be collected proportional to the discharge flow.
The modification replaces a
temporary installation at the sampling sink.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
This is a nonsafety related system and is not required for safe shutdown of the plant.
A composite sample is one in which the quantity of liquid sampled is proportional to the quantity of liquid waste discharged and in which the method of sampling employed results in a specimen that is representative of the liquids released.
The automatic composite sampler is mounted in the discharge line of the secondary waste and gets it signal to grab a
sample from the flow transmitter mounted in the same line.
This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR.
This modification has no impact on the reliability of the components used to isolate the secondary waste discharge line in the event a
high radiation level is detected.
Therefore, no unreviewed safety questions exists.
REFERENCE:
Figure 11.2.2-8 MEM/HO-9000210/29/OS1
CHANGE TO PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE:
PCR-004649, Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Control Panel Temperature Alarm FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
The existing plant design had a temperature alarm for the diesel generator control panel which went to the local diesel generator engine control panel annunciator.
The modification added circuitry to cause a
Main Control Board EDG trouble alarm or Hi temperature in the engine control panel.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
The corrected wiring of the alarm thermostat and the addition of the alarm setpoint has increased the margin of safety by monitoring the temperature within the diesel generator control panel.
The alarm will provide notice of heat build up prior to the maximum allowed in the panel and will allow for corrective action before loss of a piece of equipment important to safety.
The probability or consequences of an accident has been decreased by the changes detailed in this PCR.
The material and installation methods are controlled by approved engineering
- design, procedures, and standards.
The addition is nonsafety related and in the event of a failure of the alarm to operate properly the probability or consequences of an accident will not have been increased from what was previously evaluated in the FSAR.
The changes in the PCR have helped to decrease the consequences of a malfunction in the diesel generator control panel by giving an early warning of trouble within the control panel to the operators in the control room.
This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR.
Therefore, no unreviewed safety questions exists.
REFERENCE:
Section 8.'3.1 MEM/HO-9000210/30/OS1
CHANGE TO PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE:
PCR-004615, Containment Recirculation Sump Level Instrumentation FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
The containment recirculation sump level instrumentation is provided as a
means to monitor automatic ESF functions for proper operation following an accident which floods the recirculation sumps (i.e.,
One instrument loop is provided for each recirculation sump (Loops 7160 A/B), and no automatic actuations are initiated by these instruments.
The operator is provided with local indication, MCB indication, and a low-level alarm if a containment-spray sump suction valve is open coincident with a low-level.
The indicators/transmitters are safety related, but the alarm function is not safety related.
Level Instrumentation Loop 7160B is being modified to eliminate indication errors caused by a
ground loop resulting from the normal PIC grounding and a
ground at the level element (LE-7160B-SB) in the containment sump.
This modification eliminates the normal PIC cabinet ground such that the only ground will be the one occurring at LE-7160B-SB.
This is accomplished by bypassing the PIC electronics with the
'-20 mA signal from LIT-7160B-SB, and routing this signal directly to a new indicator on the MCB compatible with the 4-20 mA signal.
The normal MCB and local indication will be present.
However, the nonsafety low-level alarm will no longer be provided to the operator.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
The primary function of these instruments is to allow the operator to verify proper ESF system operation, and does not effect automatic ESF functions.
The low level alarm is classified as nonsafety related and the indication is still provided such that an abnormal level can be detected.
No seismic concerns result from this PCR because the replacement indicator is essentially identical to the original indicator and both are seismically qualified.
No structural changes are required because the two indicators are physically interchangeable.
This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR.
Therefore, no unreviewed safety questions exists.
REFERENCE:
Section 6.3.1 and Figure 7.3.1-03 MEM/H0-9000210/31/OS1
CHANGE TO PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE:
PCR-000758, Acid/Caustic Injection Skids Secondary Waste System FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
This plant modification adds a "shot pot" to Processing Building.
The addition of the "shot pot" gives the system the capability to make small pH adjustments to the Secondary Waste System which allows quicker processing of secondary waste liquids.
This modification also adds a
demineralized water supply to the "shot pot" to allow flushing and also adds supports for all the piping added'AFETY
SUMMARY
The Acid/Caustic System maintains the correct pH of the fluids being processed through the Secondary Waste System.
The Secondary Waste System is a
part of the Liquid Waste Processing System (LWPS) which is an initiating system.
Failure of the LWPS is assumed as a result of a safe shutdown earthquake and results in the release of the contents of the LWPS into the Waste Processing Building.
Since this modification improves the ability of the Acid/Caustic System to maintain the correct pH of the fluids and the Acid/Caustic System is isolated from the Liquid Waste Process System by check valves, the failure mode and the probability for failure of the LWPS is not affected.
The probability of mechanical failure of the components added by this modification is the same as for the existing system components.
The new components material and pressure ratings meet or'xceed their line chemistry and pressure requirements.
This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR.
Therefore, no unreviewed safety questions exists.
REFERENCE:
Figure 9.2.3-1 MEM/HO-9000210/32/OS1
CHANGE TO PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN 'THE FSAR TITLE:
PCR-000220; Steam Generator Manway Studs/Nuts Change Out PCR-004038, Pressurizer Manway Studs/Nuts Change Out FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
These two plant modifications replaced the existing Westinghouse bolts and nuts on the pressurizer and steam generator manways with Klockner-Becorit studs and nuts.
These specially designed fasteners accept a stud tensioning system that simultaneously tensions all studs at once for an even distribution of torquing forces.
This provides for a more efficient joint makeup that is less susceptible to leakage.
It also overcomes the frequently encountered problem of galled bolts.
During outages this can cause considerable delays resulting in additional dose.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
The manway studs and nuts of the pressurizer and steam generators are the structural tie that holds the blind flange cover down.
The new stud/nut combination provides equivalent strength and reliability to assure the reactor system integrity.
The material compatibility is adequate by virtue of the type of material.
The new studs are SA193B7 as were the old bolts.
The original configuration did not use nuts but the SA194 material is an industry standard when used with SA193B7 studs.
Since both are in equivalent p-groups, galvanic corrosion is not a concern.
r The reliability of this flange connection is enhanced by virtue of the tensioning methodology.
Flange connections that are done by hand utilize a method of rotation around the bolt circle.
This individually tensions each element setting up local stresses which have the capability to provide areas for leakage.
The stud tensioning system torques all nuts at once providing for more uniform loading.
The more even the loading the better the seal.
This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR.
Therefore, no unreviewed safety questions exists.
REFERENCE:
Table 5.2.3-1 MEM/HO-9000210/33/OS1
CHANGE TO PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE:
PCR-001867, Service Water (SW)
Leakage Alarm Setpoint Check FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
This plant modification deletes the high flow alarm set points on the discharge lines of cooling coils of containment fan cooling units AH-1-4, component cooling heat exchangers 1A-SA and 1B-SB and condensers of HVAC chillers 1A-SA and 1B-SB.
The deletion requires disabling the light indications and alarm annunciations for high flow set points only in the control room.
There will not be any impact on low flow indications and alarms.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
Deletion of high flow arm set points for the components listed was evaluated.
It is acceptable to delete these set points without impacting the safety function of the systems involved.
The initial purpose of the high flow alarms was to identify a
service water line break downstream of the flow
'rifice.
Such a break will not affect the minimum cooling water requirements because the minimum service water required is still flowing through the affected components.
Flooding of the RAB has been evaluated.
All safety related equipment is either located above the calculated maximum flood elevation or is environmentally qualified for its environmental condition, including submergence.
Therefore, flood conditions cannot adversely affect safety related equipment.
No initiating systems will be affected by this evaluation.
A review of applicable portions of the FSAR showed no impact on the Emergency Service Water System (one of the mitigating systems).
The key safety
- features, i.e.,
release of radioactivity in the reactor auxiliary building in case the SW pipe downstream of flow element breaks was reviewed.
The SW piping going into, the containment is a
closed loop and is not open to containment atmosphere.
Based on single failure criteria break in the line downstream will not cause simultaneous break in the line upstream of flow element, i.e.,
no two failures can be postulated to occur in the line at the same time.
This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR.
Therefore, no unreviewed safety questions exists.
REFERENCE:
Sections 7.5.1, 9.2.1, and 9.2.8 MEM/H0-9000210/34/OS1
CHANGE TO PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE:
PCR-001539, Water Treatment Sodium Analyzer FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
This plant modification relocates the sodium monitor sample line for the Demineralized Water System (DWS).
The sample line was relocated from the waste liquid discharge line to the demineralized water supply line common to both exchangers upstream of the demineralized water storage tank.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
The DWS serves no safety function required to achieve safe shutdown or mitigate the an accident.
With the exception of distribution is located in the Water Treatment Building.
equipment involved in the modification cannot related equipment.
since it is not consequences of piping, the DWS The failure of affect safety This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR.
Therefore, no unreviewed safety questions exists.
REFERENCE:
Figure 9.2.3-3 MEM/HO-9000210/35/OS1
CHANGE TO PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN'THE FSAR TITLE:
PCR-002126, Digital Metal Impact Monitor System Change FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
This plant modification required that the digital metal impact monitor system (DMIMS) tape recorder channels be reassigned such that the accelerometers which detect unwanted loose particles within the same boundaries or location of the reactor coolant system are always recorded with the same tape head assembly.
No DMIMS channels are added or deleted.
Realignment of the DMIMS input channels to the tape channels will help facilitate evaluation of the recorded data.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
This change does not involve a safety-related or important to safety system.
Relocation of the cable/connector assemblies within the DMIMS cabinet does not create any electrical separation
- concerns, nor does it affect any seismic qualifications of the cabinet.
Tape recorder failure affects only the operation of the tape function.
DMIMS can be operated without the recorder.
In summary, investigation of the potential to adversely interact with or impact other safety systems reveals no potential safety hazards.
This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR.
Therefore, no unreviewed safety questions exists.
REFERENCE:
Figure 4.4.6-2, Section 4.4.6 MEM/HO-9000210/36/OS1
I
CHANGE TO PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE 'FSAR TITLE:
PCR-000827, Condensate Polisher Relief Valve FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
This plant modification to the Condensate Polishing Demineralizer System replaces the rupture disk located on the resin storage tank and the anion regenerative tanks with a resetting type pressure relief valve and installs a line to aid in resin loading.
The line uses the ammonia recycle pumps to load resin by recycling water through the cation regeneration tank.
Prior to the
- change, 25,000 to 30,000 gallons of demineralized water was used when the sluice and backwash pumps were used to load resin.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
The rupture disk are being replaced with a
resetting type relief valve of adequate capacity to prevent the system from being overpressurized maintaining its original protection from failure of tanks and components.
The material being used in this modification is compatible with the original design.
316 stainless steel is being used to replace polypropylene lined pipe where high PH water is and steel components at neutral PH locations.
The condensate polisher demineralizer system (CPDS) does not constitute a
potential radioactivity release path to the environment and has no safety-related function.
If the fluid being processed is radioactive due to leakage from primary to secondary, the system has the effect of concentrating the activity in the regeneration waste which is processed by the Waste Management System.
Failure of any component could compromise the CPDS operation, but would not affect any safety related equipment or prevent safe shutdown of the plant.
This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR.
Therefore, no unreviewed safety questions exists.
REFERENCE:
Figure 9.3.3-02 MEM/HO-9000210/37/OS1
CHANGE TO PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN'THE FSAR TITLE:
PCR-003993, Cask Purge System FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
This plant modification adds drain piping to the Cask Decontamination and
- Spray System.
The added drain provides for a
means to purge helium from the spent fuel cask
'during cask operations.
The modification installed a small branch line and valve in the existing vent connection between the floor drain system in the Fuel Handling Building (FHB) and the FHB HVAC System.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
The floor drain system in the FHB does not have any impact on safety related systems or equipment important to safety.
This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR.
Therefore, no unreviewed safety questions exists.
REFERENCE:
Figure 9.3.3-3 MEM/HO-9000210/38/OS1
CHANGE TO PROCEDURE AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE:
CM-M0094, Integrated Reactor Vessel Head (IRVH) and Upper Internals Removal FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
This procedure change resulted from the re-evaluation of the 1983 IRVH head drop analysis.
The 1983 analysis calculated potential damage to fuel cladding integrity, and reactor coolant loop piping and core cooling capability in the event of a 16 ft. IRVH drop through the air.
The initial analysis did not allow the refueling procedure to be conducted in accordance with the FSAR because the water level in the refueling cavity had to be maintained no less than 16 ft. from the bottom of the IRVH.
The sequence and method of IRVH removal and replacement had to be altered in order to remain within the boundaries established by the IRVH drop analysis.
The alteration affected site procedure CM-M0094, Integrated Reactor Vessel Head and Upper Internals
- Removal, because in order to lift the IRVH and not exceed the 16 ft. criteria the refueling cavity has to be filled as the IRVH is being raised.
The process of filling the cavity and not exceeding the 16 ft. criteria takes approximately 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> using the slow fillmethod to maintain water clarity. This keeps the IRVH suspended for an extended period of time in which crane problems could develop.
The revised head drop analysis was completed on August 24,
- 1989, and increased the analyzed drop distance to 27 ft.
This distance will allow filling of the refueling cavity after the IRVH has been removed and placed on the storage stand.
The revised analysis also allows cleaning of the vessel flange prior to suspending the IRVH over the vessel.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
The Shearon Harris vessel head drop evaluation has been completed for a drop height of 27 feet through air.
The evaluation shows that the conclusions of the 1983 analysis for a 16 ft. drop through the air remain valid, i.e.,
the fuel cladding integrity, and the reactor coolant loop piping core cooling capability are maintained.
A conservatively high nozzle impact load and reactor vessel displacement was developed based on the head landing concentrically on the reactor vessel mating flange.
The results of the evaluation show that the reactor vessel supports will permanently deform a
maximum of 0.28 inches with a total system displacement of 0.53 inches.
The maximum displacement of the reactor vessel will not have an affect on the ability of the reactor coolant loop piping and essential auxiliary piping to circulate borated water to the core and remove residual heat.
Stresses in the reactor vessel nozzles were shown to be within allowable limits.
MEM/H0-9000210/41/OS1
CHANGE TO PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE'FSAR TITLE:
PCR-001509, Waste Evaporator Concentrates Sample Sink FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
This plant modification provided a new Waste Evaporator Concentrates Sample sink/hood assembly in the 236'levation of the Waste Processing Building.
The new assembly will serve the Waste Evaporator l&2A-NNS.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
This modification is classified as non-Q and nonseismic (Class E).
As with the entire radioactive sampling
- system, the components added by this modification are not required to operate during a design basis accident.
The'new sample sink is located within the Waste Processing Building which is designed to contain the maximum total liquid inventory within the building in the event of an operating basis earthquake.
This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR.
Therefore, no unreviewed safety questions exists.
REFERENCE:
Figures 1.2.2-48, 9.2.3-2, 11.2.2-2 and Section 9.5A MEM/HO-9000210/39/OS1
CHANGE TO PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE:
PCR"004213, Outdoor Tank Area Drain System (TADS)
Pump Automatic Isolation FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
This plant modification installs spring-loaded check valves on the discharge of the TADS pump and modifies the pump logic.
The check valves are required to prevent possible siphoning and gravity draining of liquid through the tank area drain transfer pump when it is not running.
The check valve installation will also prevent loss of sample flow to REM-3530.
The pump logic change is being made to provide the ability to pump liquid to the Floor Drain System independent of the alarm/operation status of the Radiation Monitor REM"3530.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
Since the components being added are designed to exceed the design pressure and temperature of the TADS, a failure due to
~ overpressurization or temperature is not credible.
This section of the TADS is assumed to fail during a seismic event and release the liquid contents of the tank area drain system to the tank building where it is captured by the floor drain system for processing.
The failure of the check valves to prevent siphoning or the failure of the pump logic will not result in increased consequences of radioactive release over what is presently analyzed.
This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accidents or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR.
Therefore, no unreviewed safety question exists.
REFERENCE:
Figure 9.3.3-02 MEM/HO-9000210/40/OS1
The concrete underlying the reactor vessel supports was also evaluated.
The results show that although the impact load transferred through the supports is of longer
- duration, the resultant maximum load on the concrete is unchanged from the 1983 analysis and thus the underlying concrete can withstand a
27 foot drop through air.
In summation, the revised drop analysis decreases maintenance man-hours involved with head removal because personnel can remove the head to the storage stand without waiting for flooding of the refueling cavity.
CM-M0094 and Operations procedure GP-009, Refueling Cavity Fill, Refueling, and Drain down of the Refueling Cavity (Modes 5-6-5) are worked conjunctively to begin the refueling process.
This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR.
Therefore, no unreviewed safety questions exists.
REFERENCE:
Section 9.1.4.2.7 MEM/HO-9000210/42/OS1
)
CHANGE TO PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE:
PCR-000912, Installation of Pressure Gauges on Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIV) Nitrogen Accumulator Bottles and providing 3 Individual Alarm Windows for Low Pressure Warning FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
The MFIV's nitrogen accumulator bottles are provided with low pressure switches
- only, which have a
common annunciator window (ALB-16, 2-4) on the Main Control Board (MCB).
To determine which valve(s) has a
low (2100 psi) pressure alarm personnel must be dispatched to Terminal box B-5161 in the steam tunnel to lift leads and make continuity checks.
The appropriate.
bottle(s) must be recharged and a four-hour LCO declared, since no pressure indication is available to determine if the valve is still operable, i.e., ) 1800 psi in the accumulator.
This PCR installs permanent Q Class pressure gauges on the valve nitrogen bottles and separates the common low pressure alarm into three individual alarms.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
The alarm portion of this PCR is nonsafety.
The additional gauge serves no safety function', however, the nitrogen pressure retaining portions of the modification are required for MFIV operation.
Since this installation is Q Class with qualified parts, it is still bounded by the single-failure analysis of the original valve for operability.
Failure of a
gauge pressure boundary has the same consequences as the present nitrogen retaining parts and therefore does not change the accident consequences as analyzed in this FSAR for the loss of a
MFIV.
From this analysis, it can be determined that this modification will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident as evaluated in the FSAR, nor will the probability or consequences of an MFIV failure be increased since the gauge is Q Class with stainless steel tubing and seismically mounted.
The margin of safety is unaffected by this modification since no technical specification values are involved.
This change does not increase the probability or consequences'f analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR.
Therefore, no unreviewed safety questions exists.
REFERENCE:
Figures 7.3.1-08 Sheets 1, 2, and 3
MEM/HO-9000210/43/Osl
CHANGE TO PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE:
PCR-003764, LCO Digital Electro Hydrolic (DEH) Fluid Pressure Turbine Trip FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
This plant modification deletes the turbine trip due to low digital electro hydrolic (DEH) fluid pressure.
Four pressure switches monitored the fluid pressure and initiated the turbine trip.
In addition to the pressure
- switches, the trip circuit has interposing relays which are to be spared in place.
Since the test circuit is no longer needed the alarms and lights are being defeated by the installation of jumpers and the test valves are being removed.
Three of the pressure switches will be removed and the fourth pressure switch will remain in place.
The trip contacts of the fourth pressure switch will be disconnected but the annunciation contacts will still, provide annunciation to the control room.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
The PCR removes the low digital electro hydraulic pressure trip function is a Westinghouse recommendation.
Trips at other similar plants have resulted from momentary dips in pressure which occurred after overspeed protection controller (OPC) test button has been released or during transfer from throttle valve control to governor valve control.
An annunciator will remain and provide trip alarm information in the control room, where the unit will be manually tripped.
Other turbine trip functions are not impacted by this change.
The safety analysis bases have been reviewed and no initiating and mitigating systems or safety considerations are impacted by this change that are not included in existing analyses.
This change does not result in an unreviewed safety question.
REFERENCE:
Sections 15.2.3.1, 10.2.2.5, 7.2.1.1.2, Figure 7.2.1-1, 7.3.1-1, 10.2.2-10 MEM/H0-9000210/44/OS1
CHANGE TO PROCEDURE AS DESCRIBED IN THE 'FSAR TITLE:
PLP-106 Rev.
2, Technical Specification Equipment List Program; PCR-003955, Deletion of Main Steam Isolation Signal (MSIS) Logic from Isolation Drain Valves 1MS-336 and 1MS-354 FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
Two technical changes were made to the Technical Specification Equipment List Program.
- First, a
clarification is made to Attachment 5 Note 7, regarding isolation of containment penetrations with inoperable containment isolation valves.
The note is expanded to incorporate plant policy that the penetration may be isolated using the redundant containment isolation valves specified in the attachment, or other valves having the same safety and seismic design.classes may be
- used, provided each branch of the piping is isolated.
Check valves are specifically excluded from being used beyond the initial four hour period.
- Second, two valves are deleted from Attachment 8, which controls safety grade isolation valves in closed
- systems, which are not controlled as containment isolation valves in.
This attachment is an administrative control to ensure the assumptions made in the FSAR regarding isolation of these. penetrations is met assuming a
single failure.
Valves 1MS-336 and 1MS-354, steam drains on the TDAFW pump
This signal was deleted by PCR-3955.
The TDAFW pump dumps its exhaust steam to atmosphere, so the isolation of the header drains accomplishes no isolation function.
Based on the'eletion of the MSIS to these valves, no administrative control is required to ensure operability of these valves to isolate the penetration.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
These changes to the control of containment penetrations have no impact on the initiation of accidents analyzed in the FSAR,- and introduce no new operating conditions or equipment which could result in accidents or equipment malfunctions not previously analyzed.
Containment isolation is not required to mitigate any analyzed equipment failures.
The consequences of analyzed accidents are not increased by this
- change, since containment isolation is still implemented by this procedure.
There will be no increase in radiological releases by the deletion of the two MSIS valves in the TDAFW pump steam header.
The probability of equipment malfunction is not impacted by these
- changes, since the operational conditions of the valves is not
- changed, nor does this procedure address testing or inspection of the valves.
MEM/HO-9000210/45/OS1
The margin of safety defined in the basis of the Technical Specifications is not reduced by this
- change, since the containment isolation function continues to be met within the same operational constraints previously imposed under revision one.
,The deletion of the two TDAFM steam header valves does not impact Technical Specifications.
In conclusion, no unreviewed safety question is introduced by revision two of this procedure, within the identified scope of this evaluation.
The technical changes involve only clarification of Technical Specification action requirements, and deletion of two valves from administrative control which are not required by the FSAR.
REFERENCE:
Tables 16.3-5 and 16.3-8 MEM/H0-9000210/46/OS1
CHANGE TO PROCEDURE AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE:
PLP"106, Rev.
1 Change No.
4, Technical Specification Equipment List Program FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
Three changes were incorporated into FSAR Chapter 16.3 per PLP-106, Rev.
1 Change No. 4.
1.
Deletion of containment isolation valve 1SI-43.
2.
Change to footnotes in Table 16.3-7, Motor-operated Valve Thermal Overload Protection Bypass 3.
Change to applicability of footnote 3
in Table 16.3-5, Containment Isolation Valves SAFETY
SUMMARY
PCR-2992 eliminated containment isolation valve 1SI-43 and blank flanged the penetration.
The final configuration meets the design requirements for containment as specified in the SHNPP FSAR Chapter 6.
The safety function of 1SI-43 is to be closed to isolate containment, and so the new configuration also accomplishes this function.
No unreviewed safety question is introduced.
II A footnote in Table 16.3-7 identified those valves whose control circuit for bypass of thermal overload protection is integral with the actuation circuit for the safeguards function.
There are two categories of such
- valves, those which use a
separate set of contacts off the actuation relay to perform the bypass function,,
and those which simply direct the actuation signal into the circuit downstream of the protection contacts.
The existing footnote is therefore split into two separate notes identifying these two conditions.
No physical change to the facility has occurred.
This change is administrative in nature and is intended to clarify the testing requirements for the affected valves.
No unreviewed safety question is introduced.
A footnote in Table 16.3-5 identified those valves which could be opened only intermittently under "administrative control."
The footnote was applied to manual valves and to remote manual valves, and to some automatic isolation valves.
This change deletes the footnote for automatic isolation
- valves, since their position during normal operations does not affect the ability of the valves to close.
Similarly, the isolation capability of remote manual valves is not affected by their initial position, so this note was deleted for these valves.
For manual
- valves, an evaluation was done to determine which penetrations, normally closed during operation, may be required to be open periodically, and the MEM/HO-9000210/47/OS1
footnote was left applicable to these valves only, and eliminated from the others.
The footnote was also clarified to identify that these valves could be opened as allowed under the action statement of the Technical Specifications, or under administrative control established by the PNSC.
Under this
- change, therefore, the requirements of the specifications are met and the applicability of the footnote allowing administrative control to open valves is restricted.
No unreviewed"safety question is introduced.
REFERENCE:
Section 16.3 MEM/HO-9000210/48/OS1
CHANGE TO PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE:
PCR-001176, Venting of Hydrogen Header FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
This plant modification to the Hydrogen Gas System installs vent piping from the hydrogen header in the Reactor Auxiliary and Turbine Building.
This modification allows the RAB and turbine header to be purged to allow maintenance on the header and/or valves in the lines.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
The Hydrogen Gas System is a non-nuclear safety system.
- However, the possibility of a
hydrogen fire and/or explosion is of concern.
The location of the hydrogen vent is routed to the open 261'levation of the Turbine Building which is well ventilated where pockets of gas will not accumulate.
This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR.
Therefore, no unreviewed safety questions exists.
REFERENCE:
Figure 10.2.2-5 MEM/H0-9000210/49/OS1
CHANGE TO PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE:
PCR-003875, Feed Pump Seal Bleedoff Line Erosion and Hangers FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
This plant modification changes the material and pipe schedule (wall thickness) of the Steam Generator Feedwater Pumps'eal bleedoff line due to severe pipe erosion downstream of the flow orifices in the piping. It also adds a new isolation valve on each line downstream of the flow orifices and adds additional pipe hangers to lines 6CE3-72-1 and 6CE3-218-1.
In the past, the plant had water hammer after loss of heater drain pumps on line 6CE3-72-1 and 6CE3-218-1.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
This modification increased the pipe wall thickness and changed the material type to 304 stainless steel in the affected portion of the bleedoff line to 'educe the probability of further erosion.
The new material is compatible with the existing system piping and fluid.
The increased wall thickness will provide longer pipe system life.
The valves selected are of the same material and rating as the existing system valves on the same lines and therefore does not increase the probability of failure.
REFERENCE:
Figure 10.2.2-06 MEM/HO"9000210/50/OS1
CHANGE TO PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE:
PCR-000767, PSB-1 Undervoltage Relay Timer Setpoint Change FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
This plant modification reduced the setting of the first level time delay relays (device 2"1) associated with the 6.9 kv emergency switchgear PSB-1 undervoltage relays (device 27A).
Under this
- PCR, the time delay setting was reduced from 16 to 13 seconds delay.
The purpose of the proposed time delay setting change is to incorporate the new setting recommended by Revision 6 of SHNPP Electrical Calculation 55-JRG to ensure that, during an SI (safety injection),
separation from off-site power takes place with the shortest time delay possible upon sensing an undervoltage condition.
This will increase the reliability of the equipment in performing its function at a'ime when it is most needed.
Calculations have been performed to show that spurious separation from off-site power: due to motor starting transients will not occur with the reduced time delay setting.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
The first level time delay relay only provides a
trip signal if there has already been an accident (i.e., if an SI signal is present).
Therefore, if an SI signal is not present, reducing the setpoint of the first level time delay relay will, at
- worst, provide a
nuisance alarm if the undervoltage condition persists for a
time duration corresponding to the new (reduced) setpoint.
That is, under normal conditions, the first level time delay relay cannot cause a spurious separation from off-site power because it only provides an alarm under these conditions.
Adequate calculations exist to
- show that under worst case bus voltage conditions the worst case
- motor, (Normal Service Water Pump) acceleration time is 10 seconds.
Therefore, the proposed setting of 13 seconds would allow a sufficient buffer (safety margin plus relay tolerance) to ensure that inadvertent separation from off-site power during a
motor starting transient will not occur.
- Thus, equipment necessary to mitigate an analyzed accident will have power available from the preferred power source as long as its steady state voltage is within acceptable limits for the class lE equipment.
This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR.
Therefore, no unreviewed safety questions exists.
REFERENCE:
Section 8.3.1 MEM/H0-9000210/51/Osl
CHANGE TO PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN 'THE FSAR TITLE:
PCR-002257, Snubber Reductions FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
This plant modification deletes mechanical snubbers no.
BR-H-1564, BR-H-1691, and BR"H-2272 from the Boron Recycle System in the Reactor Auxiliary Building 162 (Common)
Elevations 236'-0 and 261'-0.
The snubbers were removed as part of a
snubber reduction effort to reduce maintenance cost and man-rem exposure during testing and repair work.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
This modification does not impact the function or operation of the Boron Recycle System.
The stress analysis and structural acceptability show that the deletion is acceptable.
This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR.
Therefore, no unreviewed safety questions exists.
REFERENCE:
Table 3.9.3-16 MEM/HO"9000210/52/Osl
CHANGE TO PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR TITLE:
PCR-002218, Snubber Reduction FUNCTIONAL
SUMMARY
This plant modification deletes mechanical snubbers no.
CT-H-361, CT-H-972 (Containment Spray System),
RH-H-351 (Residual Heat Removal System),
SI-H-1285, and SI-H-1288 (Safety Injection System) located in the
., Reactor Auxiliary Building Valve Chamber Elevation 190'-0.
The snubbers were removed as part of a
snubber reduction effort to reduce maintenance cost and man-rem exposure during testing and repair work.
SAFETY
SUMMARY
This modification does not impact the function or operation of the Containment
- Spray, Residual Heat
- Removal, and Safety Injection Systems.
The stress analysis and structural acceptability show that the deletions are acceptable.
This change does not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR.
Therefore, no unreviewed safety questions exists.
REFERENCE:
Table 3.9.3-16 MEM/HO-9000210/53/OS1
i~