ML18016A981
| ML18016A981 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 05/28/1999 |
| From: | Landis K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Scarola J CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9906140206 | |
| Download: ML18016A981 (81) | |
See also: IR 05000400/1999011
Text
CATEGORY 2
REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
CESSION NBR:9906140206
DOC.DATE: 99/05/28
NOTARIZED: NO
DOCKET 'I
ACIL:50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Carolina
05000400
AUTH.NAME
AUTHOR AFFILIATION
LANDIS,K.D.
Region
2
(Post
820201)
RECIP.NAME
RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
SCAROLA,J.
Carolina Power
& Light Co.
SUBJECT: Announces safety sys design
& performance capab'ility insp
scheduled for 990719-23
6 0802-06,under
insp rept
50-400/99-11.Forwards
info requested
for HHSZ
& LHSZ sys.
DISTRIBUTION CODE:
IEOlD
COPIES
RECEIVED:LTR J
ENCL J
SIZE:
TITLE: General
(50 Dkt)-Insp Rept/Notice of VioOLation Response
NOTES:Application for permit renewal filed.
05000400
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ERNAL: LMITCO MARSHALL
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NUDOCS FULLTEXT
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PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE. TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DZSTRZBUTZON LIS:
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ENCL
17
May 28, 1999
Carolina Power 8 Light Company
ATTN:
Mr. James Scarola
Vice President - Harris Plant
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
P. O. Box 165, Mail Code: Zone
1
New Hill, NC 27562-0165
SUBJECT:
SAFETY SYSTEM ENGINEERING INSPECTION (NRC INSPECTION REPORT
NO. 50-400/99-11)
Dear Mr. Scarola:
The purpose of this letter is to announce
a safety system design and performance capability
inspection at your Harris facilitywhich is scheduled
for July 19 - 23 and August 2 - 6, 1999. The
inspection will be conducted using Inspection Procedure 71111, "Safety System Design and
Performance Capability", and willsupport the pilot for the new inspection oversight process.
A
team of six inspectors will perform the inspection.
The designated team leader, Joseph J.
Lenahan, will make arrangements
with your staff to discuss the inspection plan in more detail.
The inspection objective will be to evaluate the capability of the high head safety injection
(HHSI) and low head safety injection (LHSI) systems to perform safety functions required by
their design bases.
The team will require the information outlined in the enclosure for the HHSI
and LHSI systems to review in preparation for the inspection.
Please contact Mr. J. Lenahan at
(404) 562-4625 prior to preparing the requested information. This information will be needed by
July 6, 1999,
in order to support the inspection effort.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Ifyou have any questions regarding this
inspection, please contact Mr. K. Landis at (404) 562-4605 or Mr. J. Lenahan.
Sincerely,
Original signed by Joseph Lenahan for
Kerry D. Landis
Kerry D. Landis, Chief
Engineering Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket Nos. 50-400
License Nos. NPF-63
Enclosure:
Information Requested for High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) and
Low Head Safety Injection (LHSI) Systems
cc w/encl: (See page 2)
9906i40206
990528
ADOCK 05000400
8
CP8L
cc w/encl:
Terry C. Morton, Manager
Performance Evaluation and
Regulatory Affairs
CPB 9
Carolina Power & Light Company
P. O. Box 1551
Raleigh, NC 27602-1551
Chris L. Burton
Director of Site Operations
MC: Zone1
Carolina Power & Light Company
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
P. O. Box 165
New Hill, NC 27562-0165
Bo Clark
Plant General Manager-Harris Plant
Carolina Power 8 Light Company
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
P. O. Box 165
New Hill, NC 27562-0165
Donna B. Alexander, Manager
Regulatory Affairs
~
Carolina Power 8 Light Company
'Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
P. O. Box 165, Mail Zone
1'ew
Hill, NC 27562-0165
Johnny H. Eads, Supervisor
Licensing/Regulatory Programs
Carolina Power & Light Company
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
P. O. Box 165, Mail Zone
1
New Hill, NC 27562-0165
William D. Johnson
Vice President 8 Corporate Secretary
Carolina Power 8 Light Company
P. O. Box 1551
Raleigh, NC 27602
John H. O'eill, Jr.
Shaw, Pittman, Potts 8 Trowbridge
2300 N. Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037-1128
Mel Fry, Director
Division of Radiation Protection
N. C. Department of Environmental
Commerce & Natural Resources
3825 Barrett Drive
Raleigh, NC 27609-7721
Karen E. Long
Assistant Attorney General
State of North Carolina
P. O. Box 629
Raleigh, NC 27602
Public Service Commission
State of South Carolina
P. O. Box 11649
Columbia, SC 29211
Chairman of the North Carolina
Utilities Commission
P. O. Box 29510
Raleigh, NC 27626-0510
Robert P. Gruber
Executive Director
Public Staff NCUC
P. O. Box 29520
Raleigh, NC 27626
Vernon Malone, Chairman
Board of County Commissioners
ofWake County
P. O. Box 550
Raleigh, NC 27602
Richard H. Givens, Chairman
Board of County Commissioners
of Chatham County
P. O. Box 87
Pittsboro, NC 27312
3
Distribution w/encl
L. Plisco, Rll
B. Bonser, Rll
J. Coley, Rll
R. Laufer, NRR
R. Baldwin, Rll
J. Lenahan, Rll
D. Jones, Rll
D. Thompson, Rll
PUBLIC
NRC Resident Inspector
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
5421 Shearon Harris Road
New Hill, NC 27562-9998
QFFIGE
SIGNATURE
NAME
DATE
RII:DRS
nahan:pd
/99
RII:DR
KLa
I
5/
/99
RII:DRP
BBonser
/99
5/
/99
5/
/99
5/
/99
5/
/99
CO
s
0
0
YS
NO
s
0
S
NO
S
NO
S
NO
0
GIALREGQRD c
Y
DOGUMENT NAME:S ADRS'iEBiHARSSEI1.WPD
INFORMATIONREQUESTED FOR THE HIGH HEAD SAFETY INJECTION (HHSI)
AND LOW HEAD SAFETY INJECTION (LHSI) SYSTEMS
Site specific administrative procedures related to standard operation, abnormal operation,
and emergency operation of the HHSI and LHSI systems.
Design criteria for the HHSI and LHSI Systems in addition to support systems and
interfaces.
HHSI and LHSI Technical Specification requirements and associated
surveillance
test/calibration procedures.
HHSI and LHSI systems piping and instrumentation drawings; one line diagrams;
electrical schematics; wiring and logic diagrams.
A list of engineering calculations (Electrical, Instrumentation and Controls and
Mechanical/Nuclear) applicable to the HHSI and LHSI systems.
A list of plant modifications to the HHSI and LHSI systems implemented since plant
licensing.
A list of Adverse Condition Reports and Condition Reports initiated since 1990 affecting
the HHSI and LHSI systems.
List of current open temporary modifications and operator work arounds involving
operation of the HHSI and LHSI systems.
System Health Report and Performance Trends for the HHSI and LHSI systems.
Maintenance Rule Performance criteria for the HHSI and LHSI systems.
Documentation of corrective and preventive maintenance activities, including the
maintenance rule event log, performed on the HHSI and LHSI systems in the past 12
months.
Copies of applicable sections of changes to the UFSAR (which have yet to be docketed)
for the HHSI and LHSI systems.
An index of drawings for the HHSI and LHSI systems.
Copies of self-assessment
performed on the HHSI and LHSI systems in the last 24
months.
The system description and operator training module for the HHSI and LHSI systems.
PRA Fault Tree Data for the HHSI and LHSI systems.
Enclosure
Distribution Sheet
Distri95.txt
Priority: Normal
From: Elaine Walker
Action Recipients:
RidsNrrPMRLaufer
RidsNrrDlpmLpdii2
R Laufer
NRR/DLPM/LPD2-2
Copies:
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OK
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Internal Recipients:
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External Recipients:
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Total Copies:
Item: ADAMSDocument
ID: 003694160
Subject:
IR-99-008 Harris - Integrated
~
~
Page
1
Distri95.txt
Body."
ADAMS DISTRIBUTIONNOTIFICATION.
Electronic Recipients can RIGHT CLICKand OPEN the firstAttachment to View
the Document in ADAMS. The Document may also be viewed by searching for
Accession Number ML0036941 60.
IE01 - General (50 Dkt)-tnsp Rept/Notice ofViolation Response
( for use by HQ)
Docket: 05000400
Page 2
\\ ~
NR 20
20gg
Carolina Power 8 Light Company
ATTN: Mr. James Scarola
Vice President - Harris Plant
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
P. O. Box 165, Mail Code: Zone
1
New Hill, NC 27562-0165
SUBJECT:
NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 50-400/99-08
Dear Mr. Scarola:
On February 19, 2000, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at
your Shearon Harris facility. The enclosed report presents the results of that inspection.
The
results of that inspection were discussed with you and other members of your staff on
February 24, 2000.
The inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to
safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of
your license.
Within these areas, the inspection consisted of a selective examination of
procedures and representative
records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has determined that a low risk significance
violation of NRC requirements occurred. The issue was entered into your corrective action
program, and is discussed
in the summary of findings and in the body of the attached inspection
report. This issue, which involved the failure to maintain the required water level above stored
fuel assemblies,
was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements, but because of its
low safety significance the violation is not cited. Ifyou contest this non-cited violation you should
provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your
denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC
20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of
Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and
the NRC resident inspector at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant.
CP8L
2
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its
enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
Sincerely,
/RA/.
Brian R. Bonser, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket No.:
50-400
License No.:
Enclosure: Integrated Inspection Report
cc whencl: (See page 3)
~ ~ 0
CP8L
V
q ~
cc w/encl:
Terry C. Morton, Manager
Performance Evaluation and
Regulatory Affairs
CPB 9
Carolina Power & Light Company
Electronic Mail Distribution
Chris L. Burton
Director of Site Operations
Carolina Power & Light Company
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
Electronic Mail Distribution
Robert J. Duncan
Plant General Manager-Harris Plant
Carolina Power 8 Light Company
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
Electronic Mail Distribution
Donna B. Alexander, Manager
Regulatory Affairs
Carolina Power 8 Light Company
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
Electronic Mail Distribution
Johnny H. Eads, Supervisor
Licensing/Regulatory Programs
Carolina Power 8 Light Company
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
Electronic Mail Distribution
William D. Johnson
Vice President 8 Corporate Secretary
Carolina Power 8 Light Company
Electronic Mail Distribution
Peggy Force
Assistant Attorney General
State of North Carolina
Electronic Mail Distribution
Public Service Commission
State of South Carolina
P. O. Box 11649
Columbia, SC 29211
Chairman of the North Carolina
Utilities Commission
P. O. Box 29510
Raleigh, NC 27626-0510
Robert P. Gruber
Executive Director
Public Staff NCUC
P. O. Box 29520
Raleigh, NC 27626
Vernon Malone, Chairman
Board of County Commissioners
of Wake County
P. O. Box 550
Raleigh, NC 27602
Richard H. Givens, Chairman
Board of County Commissioners
of Chatham County
Electronic Mail Distribution
Distribution w/encl: (See page 3)
John H. O'eill, Jr.
Shaw, Pittman, Potts 8 Trowbridge
2300 N. Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037-1128
Mel Fry, Director
Division of Radiation Protection
N. C. Department of Environmental
Commerce 8 Natural Resources
Electronic Mail Distribution
MAR-17-2888
89:48
NRC
HARRIS PLANT
9193628E'AB
P. Bii81
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OFFICE
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NO
YES
NO
YES
N
3
/2000
YE
3/
/2000
OFFICIALRECORD COPY
DOCUMENT NAME'. C:U-ILESURF
rg94889 08.wpd
TOTAL P.81
NAR-17-2888
18: 49
843 383 6441
P.Bir81
CPSL
Distribution w/encl:
R. Laufer, NRR
PUBLIC
OFFICE
SIGNATURE
DRP/Rll
Gmacoonald:vg
DRP/RII
DRP/RII
RHagor
DRS/RII
DThompson
DRS/Rll
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DATE
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YES
NO
3/
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3/
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YES
NO
YES
NO
3/
/2000
3// ///2000
YES
NO
YES
NO
YES
YES
NO
OFFICIALRECORD COPY
DOCUMENT NAME: C:tWINDOWS>TEMPtgwprlntt99 08.wpd
TOTAL P.Bi
CP8L
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Dis(Tibution w/encl:
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DOCUMENT NAME: G:WARRISNeport$ 9 08.wpd
1
I
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMMISSION
REGION II-
Docket No:
License No:
50-400
Report No:
50-400/99-08
Licensee:
Carolina Power & Light (CP8L)
Facility:
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1
Location:
5413 Shearon Harris Road
New Hill, NC 27562
Dates:
November 21, 1999 - February 19, 2000
Inspectors:
Approved by:
J. Brady, Senior Resident Inspector
R. Hagar, Resident Inspector
D. Thompson, Safeguards
Inspector (Sections 3PP1, 3PP2, and
4OA2)
J. Kreh, Emergency Preparedness
Inspector (Section 1EP1 and
4OA2)
A. Hutto, Resident Inspector, H.B. Robinson Plant (Section 1EP1)
B. Bonser, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure
'
I
SUMMARYOF FINDINGS
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1
NRC Inspection Report 50-400/99-08
The report covers a thirteen-week period of resident inspection.
In addition, it includes the
results of announced inspections by a regional safeguards
inspector and a regional emergency
preparedness
inspector.
The significance of issues is indicated by their color (GREEN, WHITE, YELLOW, RED) and was
determined by the Significance Determination Process as discussed
in the attached summary of
the NRC's Revised Reactor Oversight Process.
~GREEN. A non-cited violation was identified for multiple failures to maintain Spent Fuel
Pool water level 23 feet above stored boiling water reactor (BWR) fuel assemblies
as required
by Technical Specification 3.9.11.
Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-400/1999-01-00 had
reported that nine BWR assemblies
had not been fullyseated in the spent fuel storage racks
because
on each of the affected assemblies,
a channel fastener had caught on the top of the
storage racks.
The safety significance of the violation is low because the depth of the water
above the top of the active fuel was never less than 23 feet. Therefore, the violation did not
affect the ability of the water barrier to absorb 99 per cent of the assumed
iodine gap activity that
could be released from a rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly.
(Section 4OA4.2)
II
4
Re ort Details
The unit operated at 100% of rated thermal power from the beginning of this inspection period
until December 14, when the unit was manually tripped (shut down) following a failure of the "A"
condensate
pump. After repairs to that pump and several other components were completed,
the unit was,returned to full power on December 17. The unit remained at full power through the
end of the inspection period.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones:
Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity
The inspectors reviewed the following emergent items, as described in the referenced
Work Requests/Job
Orders (WR/JOs) and/or Action Requests
(ARs), to verify that the
licensee had taken the necessary
steps to demonstrate that emergent work activities
were adequately planned and controlled to avoid initiating events, and to verify that the
licensee ensured the functional capability of accident mitigation systems:
99-AGAQ1
Feed train problems that caused
00-AAAI1
A emergency diesel generator alarms due to circuit card problems
b.
Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
1R04
E ui ment Ali nment
For the systems identified below, the inspectors reviewed plant documents to determine
correct system lineup, and observed equipment to verify that the system was correctly
aligned:
~ Main steam system (steam generator power-operated relief valves and safety relief
valves),
k
~ "A"emergency diesel generator,
~ Residual heat removal system
~ "A"Auxiliaryfeedwater and turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater systems
0
For the emergency service water system, the inspectors reviewed various documents to
determine the correct system lineup, including plant procedures,
drawings, and the
updated Final Safety Analysis Report.
In addition, the inspectors reviewed outstanding
maintenance work requests on the system and performed a walkdown to identify any
discrepancies
between the existing system equipment lineup and the correct lineup. The
inspectors also reviewed related Condition Reports (CRs) to verify that the licensee had
properly identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating
events or impact mitigating system availability
b.
Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
1R05
Fire Protection
Ins ection Sco
e
The inspectors reviewed current action requests, work orders, and impairments
associated with the fire suppression system.
The inspectors reviewed the status of
ongoing surveillance activities to determine whether they were current to support the
operability of the fire protection system.
The inspectors also observed the fire protection
detection and suppression equipment in the cable spreading rooms, the "A"and "B"
safety-train electrical switchgear rooms, and the control room to determine whether any
conditions or deficiencies existed which would impair the operability of that equipment.
In addition, the inspectors inspected the licensee's compensatory measures that were in
place while the diesel-driven fire pump was out of service in late November.
The inspectors observed the performance of the plant fire brigade during their response
to a fire in the laundry area of the waste processing building on February 15. The fire
began in and was confined to a clothes dryer that was being used to launder anti-
contamination clothing.
Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
1R09
Inservice Testin
IST ofPum sand Valves
For the inservice tests listed below, the inspectors reviewed the test procedures to
ensure that the procedures were consistent with applicable American Society of
Mechanical Engineers (ASME) code requirements.
The inspectors also observed
performance of the tests and/or reviewed related records, to verify that testing was being
conducted in accordance with the'procedures.
These reviews were completed for the
following IST tests:
Number
Rev.
Title
OST-1411
OST-1104
11
"AuxiliaryFeedwater Pump 1X-SAB and 1AF-68, 1AF-106, 1AF-
87 Forward Flow Operability Test"
15
"Containment Isolation Inservice Inspection Valve Test Quarterly
Interval Modes
1 - 6"
OST-1056
6
OST-1215
21
"Containment Ventilation Isolation Valve ISI Test Quarterly
Interval" for 1CP-6
"Emergency Service Water System Operability Train "B"
Quarterly" for 1SC-37
OST-1111
12
"AuxiliaryFeedwater Pump 1X-SAB Operability Test Monthly"
b.
Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
1R11
Licensed 0 erator Re uglification
The inspectors reviewed licensed operator performance during the January
11 graded
emergency-plan exercise.
b.
Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
1R12
Maintenance Rule Im lementation
For the equipment issues described in the CRs and ARs listed below, the inspectors
reviewed the licensee's implementation of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65) with
respect to the characterization of failures, the appropriateness
of the associated
a(1) or
a(2) classiTication, and the appropriateness
of either the associated
a(2) performance
criteria or the associated
a(1) goals and corrective actions:
AR 1717
CR 98-00728
A Demineralized water system transfer pump failure (CR 99-
00038)
Duration of preventive maintenance on safety injection system
valves exceeded unavailability criteria for system 2080
1
'&
AR 16143
AR 4187
AR 8596
AH-4Afailed to start in low speed during OST -1010
Incorrect installation of the shuttle valve assembly on the "A"
preheater bypass valve air intensifier
Failure of an isolator card, in the circuit which indicates flow
rate in the."A" essential service water header
b.
Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
1R13
Maintenance Work Prioritization 8 Control
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's risk impact assessments
for removing from
service those components associated with the emergent work items listed in Section
1R03. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's consideration of the risk significance
of work in the fuel handling building.
While completing the Maintenance Rule implementation inspection of a failure of the
demineralized water system transfer pump (AR 1717/CR 99-00038), the inspectors
noted that the licensee had initiated corrective action to address inappropriate work-
prioritization practices.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures for managing
the work process (ADM-NGGC-0104, "Work Management Process," Rev. 8), and for
managing risk associated with maintenance activities (WCM-001, "On-Line Maintenance
Risk Management," Rev. 6), to verify that the licensee had implemented the identified
corrective action, and that the corrective action had been effective in preventing
recurrence.
b.
Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
1R15 0 erabilit
Evaluations
a.
Ins ection Sco
e
For the operability evaluations described in the Engineering Service Request (ESR) listed
below, the inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the evaluations to ensure that
operability was properly justifie and the subject component or system remained
available, such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred:
ESR No.
Rev. No.
Title
99-00451
96-00321
99-00465
00-00016
00-00033
0
"Fire Wrap Discrepancy"
0
This evaluation was referenced in a 12-2-99 Night
Order related to an E-6B reactor auxiliary building
, exhaust fan pressure transmitter,and control problem.
"Jogging Emergency Service Water Traveling Screen
Motors"
"1BD-45 Stroke Time Evaluation"
"Operability Determination for Valves 1SP-948 and
00-00045
00-00047
"[Essential Services Chilled Water] [net positive
suction head] Operability Determination"
"Controlotron Flow Measurement on [Charging/Safety
Injection Pump] Recirculation Line"
b.
Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
1R16 0 erator Workarounds
a.
Ins ection Sco
e
During this inspection period, several times each week, the inspectors reviewed the
licensee's list of identified operator workarounds to determine whether any identified
workarounds affected either the functional capability of the related system or human
reliability in responding to an initiating event.
During these reviews, the inspectors
specifically considered whether any identified workaround affected the operators'bility to
implement abnormal or emergency operating procedures.
In addition, the inspectors
attended a licensee meeting on November 30, in which licensee management
reviewed
each identified workaround.
The inspectors also reviewed the December 29 report of the
licensee's monthly audit of identified operator workarounds, which included the licensee's
assessment
of the cumulative impact of those workarounds.
The inspectors specifically
reviewed Workaround ¹255, "Vent Stack Radiation Monitors Become Inoperable AfterA
Reactor Trip Due To Loss Of Power."
b.
Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
1R19
Post Maintenance Testin
For the post-maintenance
tests listed below, the inspectors reviewed the test procedure
and either witnessed the testing.and/or reviewed test records to determine whether the
. scope of testing adequately verified.that the work performed was correctly completed and
demonstrated that the affected equipment was functional and operable.
OST-1 024
"On-site Power Distribution
Verification"
OST -1191
OST-1007
"Steam Generator [power operated
relief valve] and Block Valve
Operability Test"
"[Chemical 8 Volume Control
System/Safety Injection] System
Operability Test Train "A"Quarterly
Interval Modes 1-4"
Test Procedure
Number
Title
MPT-M0037
"Limitorque Actuator Magnesium
Rotor Inspection"
Related maintenance task
Preventive maintenance on
refueling water storage tank to
"B" isolation valve, 1SI-323
(AGND002)
Repair to 7.5kva
uninterruptible power supply to
the Sll instrument bus (99-
AIFJ1)
Calibration of "B" power
operated relief valve set point
(AGVH-001)
Preventive maintenance
on
the actuator for.1CS-182, an
isolation valve on the
recirculation line associated
with the A charging/safety
injection pump (PM-M0014)
b.
Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
1R20
Refuelin
and Outa
e Activities
The inspectors reviewed the outage plan and prioritization of the work associated with the
December 14-15, 1999, forced outage following a reactor trip. The review focused on the
work which the licensee needed to complete before achieving criticality and synchronizing
the unit to the grid. The inspectors also attended the Plant Nuclear Safety Committee
meeting that reviewed those priorities. The inspectors observed the startup process to
determine whether mode change prerequisites were followed.
~
r
.b.
Observations and Findin s
'o
findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
1R22
Surveillance Testin
a.
Ins ection Sco
e
For the surveillance tests listed below, the inspectors examined the test procedure and
either witnessed the testing and/or reviewed test records to determine whether the scope
of testing adequately demonstrated that the affected equipment was functional and
operable:
Number
Rev.
Title
OST-1124
EST-221
OST-1007
MST -I0202
16
"Train "8" 6.9 KV Emergency Bus Under Voltage Trip Actuating
Device Operational Test"
16
"Diesel Generator 1B-SB Engine Control Cabinet Inspection,
Pneumatic Logic Device Replacement and Thermostat
Calibration"
9
"Type C [Local Leak Rate Test] of Containment Purge Makeup
Penetration (M-57)"
18
"[Chemical 8 Volume Control System/Safety Injection] System
Operability Test Train "A"Quarterly Interval Modes 1-4"
5
"Containment Spray Recirculation Sump 1A Level Loop
Calibration"
b.
Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
1R23
Tem ora
Plant Modifications
a.
Ins ection Sco
e
The inspectors reviewed the following ESRs to determine whether system
operability/availability was affected, that configuration control was maintained, and that
post installation testing was performed:
e
99-00378
99-00230
"Temporary Disable of Annunciators ALB-8/5-5Aand
5-5B." This modification disabled the C reactor
coolant pump standpipe level alarm due to a
grounding problem inside containment.
"Temporary Coredrill Cover" This modification
provided temporary fire protection and security
barriers on a vital area wall while the wall was being
modified.
b..
Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP1
Drill Exercise
and Actual Events
The inspectors reviewed the objectives and scenario for the Shearon Harris Nuclear
Power Plant biennial, full-participation emergency preparedness
2000 exercise to
determine whether they were designed to suitably test major elements of the licensee's
During the period January 10-13, 2000, the inspectors observed and evaluated the
licensee's performance in the exercise, as well as selected activities related to the
licensee's conduct and self-assessment
of the exercise.
The exercise (rescheduled from
September 21, 1999) was conducted on January 11, 2000 from 12:30 p.m. to 5:05 p.m.
Licensee activities inspected during the exercise included those occurring in the Control
Room Simulator, Technical Support Center, Operational Support Center, and Emergency
Operations Facility. The NRC's evaluation focused on the risk-significant activities of
event classification, notification of governmental authorities, onsite protective actions,
offsite protective action recommendations,
and accident mitigation activities. The
inspectors also evaluated command and control, the transfer of emergency
responsibilities between facilities, communications, adherence to procedures,
and the
overall implementation of the emergency plan. The inspectors attended the post-exercise
critique to evaluate the licensee's self-assessment
process,
as well as the presentation of
critique results to plant management.
In addition, the inspectors observed a training drill on February 1.
Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
3.
SAFEGUARDS
Cornerstone: Physical Protection
3PP1
Access Authorization
The inspectors interviewed representatives
of licensee management
and escort
personnel concerning their understanding of the Behavior Observation portion of the
personnel screening and Fitness For Duty (FFD) program.
In interviewing these
personnel the inspectors reviewed the effectiveness of their training and abilities to
recognize aberrant behavioral traits.
b.
Observations and Findin'
No findings were identified during this inspection.
3PP2
Access Control
The inspectors observed access control activities on February 14 and 15, 2000, and the
seven day equipment testing on February 15, 2000.
In observing the access control
activities the inspectors assessed
whether officers could detect contraband before it was
introduced into the protected area.
Additionally, the inspectors assessed
whether the
officers were conducting access control equipment testing according to regulatory
requirements.
b.
Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
4.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA2 Performance Indicator Verification
Ph sical Protection Cornerstone
.1
Protected Area Securit
E ui ment Performance Indicator
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's program for the collection and submittal of data for
the Protected Area Equipment Performance Indicator(PI). Specifically, a random
sampling of the licensee's tracking, trending, and analysis of perimeter security
equipment problems coupled with alarm history logs and problem identification reports
10
sampling of the licensee's tracking, trending, and analysis of perimeter security
.equipment problems coupled with alarm history logs and problem identification reports
were reviewed.
b.
Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
.2
Personnel Screenin
Pro ram Pl
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's program for the collection and submittal of data for
the Personnel Screening Program Pl. Specifically, a random sampling of logged events
relating to the access authorization personnel screening program were reviewed.
b.
Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
.3
Fitness For Dut
FFD /Personnel Reliabilit Pro ram Pl
a.
Ins ection Sco
e
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's program for the collection and submittal of the
semiannual FFD/Personnel Reliability Program Pl, laboratory error reports, and a
random sampling of logged events relating to the FFD program.
b.
Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
Emer enc
Pre aredness
Cornerstone
.4
Emer enc
Res
onse Or anization
ERO Drill/Exercise Pl
a.
Ins ection Sco
e
On November 30, 1999, the inspectors assessed
the accuracy of the Pl for ERO drill and
exercise performance (DEP) through review of documentation relative to an ERO full-
scale drill held on October 14, 1999, and two licensed-operator requaiification (LOR) drills
conducted on October 20, 1999.
In addition, the inspectors reviewed and discussed the
licensee's methodology for calculating the DEP Pl.
t
b.
Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
1
I
l
h
11
.5 '.
On November 29, 1999, the inspectors assessed
the accuracy of the Pl for ERO drill
participation through review of source records for selected individuals (approximately
10 percent) from the roster of key ERO personnel as of September 30, 1999.
b.
Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
.6
Alert and Notification S stem Reliabilit
Pl
a.
Ins ection Sco
e
On November 29, 1999, the inspectors assessed
the accuracy of the Pl for alert and
notification system (ANS) reliability through review of the licensee's records of annual full-
cycle tests, quarterly growl tests, and biweekly silent tests of its siren system in the
10-mile radius around the Harris Plant.
Records from January
1, 1998 to the present
were selectively reviewed, with a focus on test results since June 1, 1999.
b. 'Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee actions following the December 14, 1999, manual reactor trip following the loss of the "A"condensate
pump. The inspectors evaluated the
response of the mitigating systems and whether required notifications had been made.
b.
Observations and Findin s
Allmitigating systems performed as required.
No findings were identified and
documented through this inspection.
4OA4 Other
Closed
Licensee Event Re ort LER: 50-400/1999-009-00:
Reactor Trip and Auxiliary
Feedwater Actuation. The December 14, 1999, manual reactor trip resulted from low
steam generator level. The low steam generator level was caused by the loss of the "A"
condensate
pump motor, due to a ground fault, resulting in loss of the "A"feed train. The
total loss of one feedwater train resulted in a condition where steam generator levels
could not be maintained even with a designed runback of reactor power. Operators
AI
0
12
- manually tripped the reactor when steam generator levels approached the automatic trip
setpoint.
Allmitigating systems performed as designed.
No findings were identified and
documented through this inspection.
Closed
LER: 50-400/1999-001-00:
Spent Fuel Pool water level not maintained greater
. than 23 feet above stored boiling water reactor (BWR) fuel assemblies.
This LER
reported a violation of Technical Specification 3.9.11 for failing to maintain spent fuel pool
water level 23 feet above the top of the fuel assemblies..
Nine BWR fuel assemblies
had
not been fullyseated
in the spent fuel storage racks because
a fuel assembly channel
fastener had caught on the top of the fuel rack. The licensee's review of operating logs
showed that Technical Specification 3.9.11 had not been met on numerous occasions
from August 14, 1997, until January 6, 1999. This violation is being treated as a non-cited
violation, consistent, with the Interim Enforcement Policy for pilot plants.
This violation is
in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 99-00050.
This violation
is designated as NCV 50-400/99-08-01, Spent Fuel Pool water level not maintained
greater than 23 feet above stored fuel assemblies.
The inspectors considered that this violation could have significance with respect to the
potential release of radioactive materials only ifit affected:
~
the frequency of a significant event that could cause a release of radioactive materials
from a stored fuel assembly,
the availability or operability of a system or feature designed to mitigate the effects of
such a release, and/or
4
~
the integrity of a system or feature that acts as a barrier against such a release.
The inspectors assessed
the impact of this violation in each of those areas, as follows:
General
The inspectors noted that the only effect of this violation was that several fuel
assemblies were not fullyseated in their respective channels in the spent fuel racks
because the assemblies were suspended
approximately 4 inches above the bottom of the
rack by interactions between assembly channel fasteners and the walls of the spent fuel
rack channels.
The tops of the affected assemblies thus extended approximately 4
inches higher in the pool than they would have ifthe assemblies
had been fullyseated.
Th
iii d
h
lii'hh
dpi
documented
in ESR 99-00013, "Evaluation of Boiling Water Reactor Fuel Assemblies
Supported by Channel Fastener," Revision 0, and noted that the licensee determined that
a seismic event or breaking of the channel fastener could cause or allow the suspended
fuel assemblies to fall unimpeded to the bottom of the racks.
However, the licensee also
determined that such a fall would not affect the structural integrity of either the affected
assembly or the rack channel into which the affected assembly would fall. The inspectors
found that the licensee's determination included a sound technical basis, and that the
conclusions were adequately supported.
Since the only effect of this violation would not
increase the likelihood of damage to an affected assembly, the inspectors concluded that
13
this violation did not increase the frequency of a significant event that could cause a
release of radioactive materials from a stored fuel assembly.
Miti atin
s stems
The inspectors visually examined the fuel pool configuration, and
observed that no part of any system or feature designed to mitigate the effects of events
, in the fuel pool is located at or near the tops of the spent fuel racks.
The only effect of the
,violation was.that the tops of the affected assemblies extended approximately 4 inches
higher in the pool than they would ifthe assemblies
had been fullyseated,
and since no
part of a mitigating system is located at or near the area that could be affected by the
violation, the inspectors considered that the violation had no effect on any system or
feature designed to mitigate events in the fuel pool.
Th
I
Id
dh
hi
Il
I
I
Ih
against the release of radioactive materials from the Spent Fuel Pool, as follows:
hf:Th
T
h
f
2
dpf
f
2
h
p
the fuel assemblies.
The Technical Specification bases state that a minimum water
depth of 23 feet above the top of the active fuel is required to satisfy the licensing-
basis requirement for removing 99% of the assumed
iodine gap activity that could be
released from a rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly.
The inspectors considered the
reason the Technical Specification value was measured at a point above the top of
the active fuel was because
it is easier to measure from the top of the fuel assembly.
The top of the active fuel is not readily observable from the outside of the fuel rods.
The licensee's analysis calculated where the theoretical top of the active fuel was and
determined that the subject violation did not reduce the depth of water above the fuel
to less than the 23 foot value in the licensing basis.
The inspectors concluded that the
subject violation did not have any measurable affect on the effectiveness of the fission
product absorbing water barrier.
- Th
Il
I
I df
If
II
hf
approximately 4 inches above the assembly positions assumed
in fuel pool
subcriticality analyses.
The inspectors noted that during the period of this violation,
the Spent Fuel Pool configuration included two barriers to prevent criticality: one
barrier was that a neutron-absorbing
material had been incorporated into the rack
channel walls, and the other was that a relatively high concentration of a neutron-
absorbing material (> 2000 ppm Boron) had been dissolved in the water in the pool.
2
The licensee's evaluation showed that the active portion of the fuel was still
surrounded by neutron absorber in the 4 inch extended position. The Boron
concentration in the pool was essentially unchanged during the period of the violation.
Consequently, the inspectors considered that there had been no effect on the
subcriticality barrier.
Assembl
Inte rit
The licensee's visual examination of the spent fuel racks, as
documented
in the subject ESR, revealed that the violation had not damaged the
integrity of either the affected assemblies or the corresponding rack channels.
0
I
Because the subject violation:
14
~
had no effect on the frequency of any initiating event,
~
had no effect on any mitigating system or feature,
~
did not have any measurable
affect on the effectiveness of any barrier against the
release of radioactive materials,
the inspectors concluded that the risk significance of the subject violation was well below
the threshold for increased regulatory response,
and have therefore designated its risk
significance as GREEN.
.3
Closed
LER: 50-400/1999-002-00:
Reactor trip due to not removing a temporary device
from a relay following calibration. The non-safety relay caused a loss of production but
did not introduce a safety issue.
All mitigating systems performed as designed.
.4
Closed
LER: 50-400/1999-006-01: Containment Isolation Valve Technical Specification
Noncompliance.
This item was addressed
in Inspection Report 50-400/99-04 and
included in violation 50-400/99-04-03.
.5
Closed
LER: 50400/1999-004-00:
Unit trip due to the degraded condition of a steam
generator water level flow control valve. This reactor trip was reviewed in Inspection
Reports 50-400/99-01 and 50-400/99-02.
.6
Closed
VIO: 50-400/01014:
The inspectors reviewed the proposed and implemented
corrective actions that the licensee had taken to avoid further regulatory concerns with the
Access Authorization Program and determined that the corrective actions were
acceptable.
4OA5 Mana ement Meetin s
.1
Exit Meetin
Summa
The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management
on
February 24, 2000. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any of the material examined during the
inspection should be considered proprietary.
No proprietary information was identified.
15
PARTIALLIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
. B. Bonser, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 4
R. Laufer, Harris Project Manager, NRR
Licensee
D. Alexander, Regulatory Affairs Manager
K. Altman, Major Projects Manager
C. Burton, Site Operations Director
B. Clark, Harris Plant General Manager at the beginning of this inspection period
R. Duncan, Harris Plant General Manager at the end of this inspection period
R. Field, Nuclear Assessment Manager
T. Hobbs, Acting Operations Manager
J. Holt, Outage and Scheduling Manager
G. Kline, Harris Engineering Support Services Manager
T. Natale, Training Manager
K. Neushaeffer, Plant Support Services Manager
J. Scarola, Harris Plant Vice President
B. Waldrep, Maintenance Manager
E. Wills, Environmental & Radiation Control Manager
I~
16
~Oened
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
50400/1 999-08-01
Closed
Spent Fuel Pool water level not
'aintained
greater than 23 feet above
stored fuel assemblies
(Section 40A4)
50-400/1 999-009-00
50400/1 999-001-00
50-400/1 999-002-00
50-400/1 999-006-01
50-400/'I 999-004-00
50<00/1 999-08-01
50-400/01014
LER
LER
LER
LER
LER
Reactor Trip and AuxiliaryFeedwater
Actuation (Section 40A4)
Spent Fuel Pool water level not
maintained greater than 23 feet
above stored BWR fuel assemblies
(Section 40A4)
Reactor trip due to not removing a
temporary device from a relay
following calibration (Section 40A4)
Containment Isolation Valve
Technical Specification
Noncompliance (Section 40A4)
Unit trip due to the degraded
condition of a steam generator water
level flowcontrol valve
(Section 40A4)
Spent Fuel Pool water level not
maintained greater than 23 feet
above stored fuel assemblies
(Section 40A4)
Failure to comply with the
Regulations in 10 CFR Part 73 and
the provisions of the Harris Security
Program related to the Access
Authorization Program in four
examples (Section 40A4)
Discussed
None
'
1
17
NRC's REVISED REACTOR OVERSIGHT PROCESS
The federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) revamped its inspection, assessment,
and
enforcement programs for commercial nuclear power plants. The new process takes into
account improvements in the performance of the nuclear industry over the past 25 years and
improved approaches
of inspecting safety performance at NRC licensed plants.
The new process monitors licensee performance in three broad areas (called strategic
performance areas): reactor safety (avoiding accidents and reducing the consequences
of
accidents ifthey occur), radiation safety (protecting plant employees and the public during routine
operations), and safeguards
(protecting the plant against sabotage or other security threats).
The process focuses on licensee performance within each of seven cornerstones of safety in the
three areas:
Reactor Safety
Radiation Safety
~ Occupational
~ Public
Safeguards
To monitor these seven cornerstones of safety, the NRC uses two processes
that generate
information about the safety significance of plant operations: inspections and performance
indicators.
Inspection findings willbe evaluated according to their potential significance for
safety, using the Significance Determination Process,
and assigned colors of GREEN, WHITE,
YELLOWor RED. GREEN findings are indicative of issues that, while they may not be desirable,
represent little effect on safety. WHITE findings indicate issues with some increased importance
to safety, which may require additional NRC inspections.
YELLOWfindings are more serious
issues with an even higher potential to effect safety and would require the NRC to take additional
actions.
RED findings represent an unacceptable
loss of safety margin and would result in the
NRC taking significant actions that could include ordering the plant shut down.
Performance indicator data willbe compared to established criteria for measuring licensee
performance in terms of potential safety.
Based on prescribed thresholds, the indicators will be
classified by color representing incremental degradation in safety: GREEN, WHITE, YELLOW,
and RED. The color for an indicator corresponds to levels of performance that may result in
increased NRC oversight (WHITE), performance that results in definitive, required action by the
NRC (YELLOW), and performance that is unacceptable
but still provides adequate protection to
public health and safety (RED). GREEN indicators represent performance at a level requiring no
additional NRC oversight beyond the baseline inspections.
The assessment
process integrates performance indicators and inspection so the agency can
reach objective conclusions regarding overall plant performance.
The agency will use an Action
Matrix to determine in a systematic, predictable manner which regulatory actions should be taken
18
C
based on a licensee's performance.
As a licensee's safety performance degrades,
the NRC will
take more and increasingly significant action, as described in the matrix. The NRC's actions in
response to the significance (as represented
by the color) of issues willbe the same for
performance indicators as for inspection findings.
More information can be found at: http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index. html.
> ~
I
Distri17.txt
Distribution Sheet
Priority: Normal
From: Esperanza
Lomosbog
Action Recipients:
RidsNrrPMRLaufer
RidsNrrDlpmLpdii2
R Laufer
NRR/DLPM/LPD2-2
Internal Recipients:
C-TNN
RidsOgcRp
RidsNrrDripRexb
RidsNrrDipmOlhp
RidsNrrDipmIipb
RidsManager
RidsEdoMailCenter
RidsAcrsAcnwMailCenter
RGN
2 .FILE
01
OGC/RP
OEMAIL
NRR/DRIP/REXB
NRR/DIPM/OLHP
NR
WXBM4'~NQ E~
DEDRO
Copies:
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
.1
1
1
1
1
1
1
OK
OK
Not Found
Not Found
Not Found
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
Not Found
Not Found
Not Found
OK
Not Found
Not Found
Not Found
Not Found
Not Found
Not Found
Not Found
External Recipients:
NRC
NOAC
INEEL Marshall
Not Found
Not Found
Not Found
Total Copies:
Item:
ADAMS Package.
Library:
ID: 003670960
Subject:
General
(SO Dkt)-Insp Rept/Notice of Violation Response
Page
1
odp:
DR ADOCK 05000400
0
Distri17.txt
Docket:
05000400,
Notes: Application for permit renewal filed.
Page
2.
December
17,1999
EA 99-273
Carolina Power 8 Light Company
ATlN: Mr. James Scarola
Vice President - Harris Plant
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
P. O. Box 165, Mail Code: Zone
1
New Hill, NC 27562-0165
SUBJECT:
NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 50-400/99-07
Dear Mr. Scarola:
On November 20, 1999, the NRC completed an inspection at your Shearon Harris facility. The
enclosed report presents the results of that inspection.
The results of that inspection were
discussed with you and other members of your staff on November 23, 1999.
The inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to
reactor safety, radiation safety, verification of performance indicators, and compliance with the
Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
Within these areas,
the inspection consisted of a selective examination of procedures and representative
records,
observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.
As identified in the report, no findings
were identified during this inspection.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its
enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR).
Sincerely,
(Original signed
by B.
R. Bonser)
Brian Bonser, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket No.:
50-400
License No.:
Enclosure:
Inspection Report
cc whencl: (See page 2)
CP8L
cc w/encl:
Terry C. Morton, Manager
Performance Evaluation and
Regulatory Affairs
CPB 9
Carolina Power & Light Company
Electronic Mail Distribution
Chris L. Burton
Director of Site Operations
Carolina Power 8 Light Company
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
Electronic Mail Distribution
Bo Clark
Plant General Manager-Harris Plant
Carolina Power & Light Company
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
Electronic Mail Distribution
Donna B. Alexander, Manager
Regulatory Affairs
Carolina Power 8 Light Company
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
Electronic Mail Distribution
Johnny H. Eads, Supervisor
Licensing/Regulatory Programs
Carolina Power 8 Light Company
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
Electronic Mail Distribution
William D. Johnson
Vice President 8 Corporate Secretary
Carolina Power 8 Light Company
Electronic Mail Distribution
Peggy Force
Assistant Attorney General
State of North Carolina
Electronic Mail Distribution
Public Service Commission
State of South Carolina
P. O. Box 11649
Columbia, SC 29211
Chairman of the North Carolina
Utilities Commission
P. O. Box 29510
Raleigh, NC 27626-0510
Robert P. Gruber
Executive Director
Public Staff NCUC
P. O. Box 29520
Raleigh, NC 27626
Vernon Malone, Chairman
Board of County Commissioners
of Wake County
P. O. Box 550
Raleigh, NC 27602
Richard H. Givens, Chairman
Board of County Commissioners
of Chatham County
Electronic Mail Distribution
Distribution w/encl: (See page 3)
John H. O'eill, Jr.
Shaw, Pittman, Potts 8 Trowbridge
2300 N. Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037-1128
Mel Fry, Director
Division of Radiation Protection
N. C. Department of Environmental
Commerce 8 Natural Resources
Electronic Mail Distribution
CP8L
Distribution w/encl:
R. Laufer, NRR
PUBLIC
3
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OFFICIALRECORD COPY
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DOCUMENT NAME: G:WARRIStRe ort$907 drp.wpd
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12/
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DEC-16-1999
13: 35
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Distribution w/encl:
R. Laufer, NRR
PUBLlC
OFFICE
SIGNATURE
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DRP/RII
JBrady
DRP/Rll
Hagar
DRS/RII
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DATE
E-MAILCOPY'2/
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YESN
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12/
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YES
OFFICIALRECORD COPY
DOCUMENTNAME: G:WARRISNopoh$ 9 07.wpd
TOTAL P.81
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket No:
License No:
50-400
Report No:
50<00/99-07
Licensee:
Carolina Power 8 Light (CP8 L)
Facility:
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1
Location:
5413 Shearon Harris Road
New Hill, NC 27562
Dates:
October 10 - November 20, 1999
Inspectors:
J. Brady, Senior Resident Inspector
R. Hagar, Resident Inspector
E. Testa, Senior Radiation Specialist (Sections 2PS2, 2PS3,
4OA2.1, and 4OA2.2)
Approved by:
B. Bonser, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects
~wL~03c>>'I ~
J
Enclosure
SUMMARYOF FINDINGS
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1
NRC Inspection Report 50400/99-07
The report covers a six-week period of resident inspection.
In addition, it includes the results of;
an announced inspection by a regional radiation specialist.
No findings were identified during this inspection period.
0
Re ort Details
The plant operated at 100% of its licensed power level throughout this inspection period, except
on November 6, when power was reduced to 80% for approximately 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br /> to enable testing
of the main turbine control valves. After those valves were successfully tested, the plant was
returned to 100% power.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones:
Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity
1R01
Adverse Weather Pre arations
R
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's preparations for cold weather as described in
procedure AP-301, "Adverse Weather," Revision 24, to verify that those preparations
limited the risk of weather related initiating events, ensured accessibility to accident
mitigation system equipment, and adequately protected accident mitigation systems from
adverse weather effects.
b.
Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
1R
a.
Ins ection Sco
e
The inspectors reviewed the following emergent items, as described in the referenced
Work Requests/Job
Orders (WR/JOs) and/or Action Requests (ARs), to verify that the
licensee had taken the necessary steps to demonstrate that emergent work activities
were adequately planned and controlled to avoid initiating events, and to verify that the
licensee ensured the functional capability of accident mitigation systems:
AR 8767
High suspended
particulate matter in the emergency diesel'generator
fuel-oil day tank
99-AIFM1
Diesel-driven fire pump lube oil contamination
b.
Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
0
1R04
E ui mentAli nment
S
For the main feedwater system, the inspectois reviewed plant documents to determine
correct system lineup, and observed equipment to verify that the system was correctly
aligned. The inspectors also reviewed related Condition Reports (CRs)to verify that the
licensee had properly identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could
cause initiating events or impact mitigating system availability.
b.
Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
1R05
Fire Protection
The inspectors reviewed current ARs, work orders, and impairments associated with the
fire suppression
system.
The inspectors reviewed the status of ongoing surveillance
activities to determine whether they were current to support the operability of the fire
protection system.
In addition, the inspectors observed the fire protection detection and
suppression equipment in the A & B switchgear rooms to determine whether any
conditions or deficiencies existed which would impair the operability of that equipment.
b.
Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
1R09
Inservice Testin
of Pum
s and Valves
Ins ection Sco
e
For the inservice tests listed below, the inspectors reviewed the test procedures to
ensure that the procedures were consistent with applicable American Society of
Mechanical Engineers (ASME) code requirements.
The inspectors also observed
performance of the tests and/or reviewed related records, to verify that testing was being
conducted in accordance with the procedures.
These reviews were completed for the
following IST tests:
Number
Rev.
Title
OST 1018
8
"Main Steam Isolation and Main Feedwater Isolation Valves
Operability Test Quarterly Interval Mode 1"
EST 229
0
"Remote Position Indication Test for 1SP-62"
OST 1214
20
"Emergency Service Water System Operability Train A
Quarterly Interval Modes 1-2-3-4"
b.
Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
1R12
Maintenance Rule Im lementation
For the equipment issues described in the CRs and ARs listed below, the inspectors
reviewed the licensee's implementation of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65) with
respect to the characterization of failures, the appropriateness
of the associated
a(1) or
a(2) classification, and the appropriateness
of either the associated
a(2) performance
criteria or the associated
a(1) goals and corrective actions:
Document
Title/Descri tion
CR 99-01695
1-4A1 Feeder Breaker Failure
CR 99-01699
E-61-A Low Flow Trip
CR 98-02984
'A'rain Residual Heat Removal Pump inoperability
AR 4187
AR 8233
'A'reheater Bypass Valve Shuttle Valve Sleeve Assembly
Containment Ventilation Isolation Radiation Monitor Functional
Failure
b.
Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
1R13
Maintenance Work Prioritization & Control
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's assessments
of the risk impacts of removing
from service those components associated with the emergent work items listed in
Section 1R03. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's consideration of the risk
significance of work in the fuel handling building.
0
4
b.
Observations and Findin s
The inspectors observed that the licensee's on-line risk-assessment
tool was not
applicable to activities in the fuel handling building, since it only can be used to assess
the risks associated with operating the plant with fuel in the reactor vessel.
The
inspectors also observed that the shutdown risk-assessment
tool was not being used
while the reactor was operating.
Therefore, the licensee's programs and procedures did
not require the licensee to conduct appropriate risk assessments
for activities in the fuel
handling building. The licensee initiated AR 0008170 to address this observation.
No
findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
1R15 0 erabilit
Evaluations
a.
Ins ection Sco
e
For the operability evaluations described in the Engineering Service Requests (ESR)
listed below, the inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the evaluations, to
ensure that operability was properly justified and the subject component or system
remained available, such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred:
99-0220
99-00437
0
Reactor Vessel Level Indication System (RVLIS) Train B
Plasma Display
E-88-B Operability Determination
b.
Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
1R16 0 erator Workarounds
S
The inspectors reviewed the operator work-around titled "Manual fillof the 'O'eactor
Coolant Pump standpipe", to determine whether the functional capability of the related
system or human reliability in responding to an initiating event was affected. The-
inspectors specifically considered whether the workaround affected the operators'bility
to implement abnormal or emergency operating procedures.
b.
Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
0
1R19
Post Maintenance Testin
For the post-maintenarice tests listed below, the inspectors reviewed the test procedure
and either witnessed the testing and/or reviewed test records to determine whether the
scope of testing adequately verified that the work performed was correctly completed
and demonstrated that the affected equipment was functional and operable:
Test Procedure
Number
Rev.
Title
OST-1038
10
"Sampling, Chemical Addition and
Main Steam Drain Systems ISI
Valve Test Quarterly Interval
Modes 1-4"
Related maintenance task
Repair of Target Rock reed
switch
FPT-3010
OST-1024
8
"Engine Driven Main Fire Pump
Operability Test Weekly Interval
Modes: All"
8
"On-site Power Distribution
Verification Weekly Interval
Modes 1-6"
Diesel driven fire pump fuel
leak
Repair of Sll inverter
b.
Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
1R22
Surveillance Testin
For the surveillance tests listed below, the inspectors examined the test procedure and
either witnessed the testing and/or reviewed test records to determine whether the scope
of testing adequately demonstrated that the affected equipment was functional and
operable:
Number
Rev.
Title
EST-0221
OST 1045
MST- I0143
8
"Type C Local Leak Rate Test of Containment Purge Make-up
Penetration (M-57)"
14
"ESFAS Train B Slave Relay Test Quarterly Interval
Modes 1-4"
6
"Steam Generator A Narrow Range Level Loop (L-0474)
Operational".
OST-1111
OST-1122
12
"AuxiliaryFeedwater Pump 1X-SAB Operability Test Monthly
Interval Modes 1-3"
2
"Train A 6.9 KV Emergency Bus Undervoltage Trip Actuating
Device Operational Test and Contact Check Modes 1-6"
b.
Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
1R23
Tem ora
Plant Modifications
Ins ection Sco
e
The inspectors reviewed the temporary plant modification described in ESR-00378,
Revision 0, Temporary Disable of Annunciators ALB-8/5-5Aand 5-5B, to determine
whether its implementation had adversely affected the operability and/or availability of
the affected system.
(The disabled annunciators are associated with a standpipe
associated with seal leakoff flowfrom the reactor coolant pump pressure seals.)
b.
Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
.
1EP1
Drill Exercise
and Actual Events
The inspectors observed an emergency response training drill conducted on October 14,
to verify licensee self-assessment
of classification, notification, and protective-action-
recommendation development.
b.
Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
C),
2.
RADIATIONSAFETY
Cornerstones:
2PS2
Radioactive Material Shi
in
8
The inspectors reviewed and observed the licensee's performance in the radioactive
material shipping area.
Spent fuel handling and shipping records were reviewed to
ensure that doses to the public associated with fuel shipments and onsite storage were
minimized.
b.
Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
2PS3
Radiolo ical EnvironmentalMonitorin
Pro ram
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's performance in implementing the
Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program, as required by Technical
Specifications and the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.
b.
Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
4
OTHER ACTIVITIES
40A2
Performance Indicator Verification
.1
Occu ational Radiation Safet
Performance Indicator Verification
'
The inspectors verified the Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness performance
indicator (Pl) for the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone through September
1999. The inspectors reviewed data reported to the NRC and sampled plant records in
the corrective action program.
b.
Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
.2
Public Radiation Safet
Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified the RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent Occurrence Pl for the
Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone through September,
1999. The inspectors
reviewed data reported to the NRC, plant calculations, and selected independent offsite
dose calculations and observations.
The inspectors also sampled related plant records
in the corrective action program.
b.
Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
.3
Reactor Safet
Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified the Pls listed below through September,
1999.
Cornerstone
Performance Indicator
Safety System Unavailability, Emergency AC Power
Safety System Unavailability, High Pressure Safety Injection
Safety System Unavailability, Residual Heat Removal
Safety System Unavailability, AuxiliaryFeedwater
Safety System Functional Failures
Reactor Coolant System Specific Activity
Reactor Coolant System Leakage
Containment Leakage
To verify the performance indicator data, the inspectors reviewed Licensee Event
Reports, information contained in the licensee's maintenance-rule
database,
plant
chemistry data, operator logs, and containment leak rate test results.
b.
Observations and Findin s
During the inspection, several minor errors were identified in the Pl data for each safety
'ystem
unavailability performance indicator submitted to the NRC.
The licensee
documented those errors in Action Request (AR) 008984.
The licensee also found some
errors in the calculation of the containment leakage performance indicator. The licensee
documented those errors in AR 008908008908
Correcting the errors did not result in either a
change of Pl color or a significant change in the Pl value.
Since these errors were not
significant in that no change in the NRC's action would have resulted from this data, and
were not willfulthis is a minor violation not subject to formal enforcement action.
For the other Pls verified through this inspection, no findings were identified and
documented.
40A4
Other
Closed
Escalated Enforcement Item EEI 50-400/99-010-01
99-010-02
99-010-03
99-010-04
and 99-010-05: Access authorization apparent violations. By letter EA 99-
273 dated November 23, 1999, access authorization EEls 50400/99-010-01, 99-010-02,
99-010-03, and 99-010-04 were dispositioned as four examples of a violation associated
with a GREEN issue for the Harris facility. This violation is identified as 50400/01014,
failure to comply with the regulations in 10 CFR Part 73 and the provisions of the Harris
Physical Security Program related to the Access Authorization Program.
EEI 50-400/99-
010-05 was dispositioned as a violation of minor significance and was not subject to
formal enforcement action.
4OA5 Mana ement Meetln s
Exit Meetin
Summa
The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management
on
November 23, 1999. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
I
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any of the material examined during the
inspection should be considered proprietary.
No proprietary information was identified.
10
PARTIALLIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
NRC
B. Bonser, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 4
R. Laufer, Harris Project Manager, NRR
Licensee
D. Alexander, Regulatory Affairs Manager
A. Barbee, Acting Training Manager
C. Burton, Director of Site Operations
B. Clark, Harris Plant General Manager
J. Cook, Outage Manager
R. Field, Nuclear Assessment
Manager
T. Hobbs, Acting Operations Manager
J. Holt, Outage and Scheduling Manager
G. Kline, Harris Engineering Support Services Manager
J. Scarola, Harris Plant Vice President
B. Waldrep, Maintenance Manager
E. Wills, Environmental 8 Radiation Control Manager
11
~Oened
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
50-400/01014
Failure To Comply With The Regulations In 10 CFR Part 73 And The Provisions Of The Harris Physical
Security Program Related To The Access
Authorization Program In Four Examples.
Closed
50-400/99-010-01
50-400/99-010-02
50400/99-010-03
50-400/99-010-04
50<00/99-010-05
EEI
EEI
Failure To Review And Evaluate Background
Information For Persons Granted Unescorted
Access (Section 4OA4).
Continuation OfThe Granting Unescorted Access
Authorization (Section 4OA4).
Failure To Maintain Original Data On Which The
Licensee Granted Unescorted AAAuthorization For
Five Years (Section 4OA4).
Failure To Log Safeguards
Events Within 24 Hours
Of Discovery (Section 4OA4).
Failure To Document Individuals'raining In
Accordance With Licensee Requirements (Section
4OA4).
Discussed
None
J