ML18016A878

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Advises of NRC Planned Insp Effort Resulting from Harris Plant Performance Review for Period Jan 98-99.Historial Listing of Plant Issues & Details of NRC Insp Plan for Next Eight Months Encl
ML18016A878
Person / Time
Site: Harris Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 03/23/1999
From: Brian Bonser
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To: Scarola J
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
References
NUDOCS 9904020279
Download: ML18016A878 (32)


Text

March 23, 1999 Carolina Power 8 Light Company ATTN:

Mr. James Scarola Vice President - Harris Plant Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant P. O. Box 165, Mail Code: Zone 1

New Hill, NC 27562-0165

SUBJECT:

PLANT PERFORMANCE REVIEW - SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

Dear Mr. Scarola:

On February 4, 1999, the NRC staff completed a Plant Performance Review (PPR) of the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant. The staff conducts these reviews for all operating nuclear power plants to develop an integrated understanding of safety performance.

The results are used by NRC management to facilitate planning and allocation of inspection resources.

PPRs provide NRC management with a current summary of licensee performance and serve. as inputs to the NRC's senior management meeting (SMM) reviews.

PPRs examine information since the last assessment of licensee performance to evaluate long term trends, but emphasize the last six months to ensure that the assessments reflect current performance.

The PPR for Harris involved the participation of all technical divisions in evaluating inspection results and safety performance information for the period January 1998 through January 1999. The NRC's most recent summary of licensee performance was provided in a letter of February 24, 1998, and was discussed in a public meeting with you on March 12, 1998.

As discussed in the NRC's Administrative Letter 98-07 of October 2, 1998, the PPR provides an assessment of licensee performance during an interim period that the NRC has suspended its Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) program. The NRC suspended its SALP program to complete a review of its processes for assessing performance at nuclear power plants. At the end of the review period, the NRC willdecide whether to resume the SALP program or terminate it in favor of an improved process.

Your facilitywas selected to be a pilot plant for the new reactor oversight process.

We willnotifyyou of any associated changes to planned inspections by separate correspondence in the near future.

During the last six months the unit remained on line until entering a refueling outage on October 23, 1998. A manual reactor trip was performed during the down-power to enter the outage when a malfunction occurred in the digital electro-hydraulic control system.

The unit returned to full power on December 3, 1998. On January 14, 1999, an automatic reactor trip occurred due to a technician's error during surveillance testing. The plant returned to full power on January 17, 1999.

Overall performance at Harris was acceptable and the plant continued to be operated in a safe manner.

Maintenance activities and surveillance testing were generally effective. Design engineering and engineering support performance was consistent.

Plant support activities continue to be performed well. Problem identification and corrective action activities were not always effective.

h

'7904020279 9'F0323 PDR ADOCK 05000400 6

PDR

CP&L Operations performance was consistent.

Operator response to transients and for planned evolutions was effective. Understanding of Technical Specifications has improved. Self assessment through audits and safety committee activities was geneially performed well; however, several exceptions in which the onsite review committee failed to perform adequate reviews indicate a possible decline in that area.

Examples of these exceptions include a failure to address a post-trip cooldown, and a failure to ensure that a violation response addressed the overall root cause.

Identification of problems was generally adequate but examples late in the period indicate a possible decline. Corrective actions have not always been effective. Examples included corrective actions for the reactor coolant system vacuum fillproblem, and corrective actions to resolve inadequacies identified with the October 1998 reactor trip post-trip review.

The initial operator license examination met NRC guidance and all license candidates passed.

The licensed operator training program was effective. The core inspection program is planned in the operations area.

Maintenance activities continued to be consistent and were effective in maintaining operational readiness.

Instrument calibration and surveillance testing were also performed effectively. Plant material condition was good and equipment performed reliably. Inservice inspection and inservice testing activities continue to be performed effectively. Safety assessments and quality verification involving equipment performance and maintenance activities were effective. The core inspection program is planned in the maintenance area.

Performance in the engineering area was consistent.

An increase in the backlog of engineering work was identified at the beginning of this assessment period. Management has taken steps to correct this. Engineering support to operations remained generally good with some deficiencies identified. Problem identification concerns were noted as shown by two examples of a failure to initiate nonconformance reports and a failure to perform quality assurance audits of off-site activities. Self-assessments performed were effective in identifying engineering performance deficiencies.

Corrective actions in response to assessment findings were generally acceptable.

The core inspections in the engineering area are planned.

The core inspections willinclude a Safety System Functional Inspection on the low head safety injection system that willfocus on implementation of the corrective action program, problem identification, and the engineering backlog.

The radiation protection (RP) program was consistent and effective. Good planning, communication, and use of technology for radiation protection activities were observed during routine operations and the recent refueling outage.

In the security area, personnel demonstrated that they were fullycapable of performing their duties on a day-to-day basis, as evidenced by the detection of an attempt to introduce a weapon into the protected area.

Additionally, security personnel were highly trained and equipped to respond to contingency events as demonstrated during security drills. Security equipment was well maintained as a result of excellent engineering support.

Security performance has been consistent and at a high level. Fire protection program performance was consistent.

Fire protection activities were conducted adequately.

The core inspections are planned in the plant support area.

A regional initiative inspection in the fire protection area is planned.

This inspection willfocus on corrective action for a previously identified fire protection program violation involving the failure to implement a penetration seal evaluation program.

Enclosure 1 contains a historical listing of plant issues, referred to as the Plant Issues Matrix (PIM), that were considered during this PPR process to arrive at an integrated view of licensee performance trends.

The PIM includes items summarized from inspection reports or other docketed correspondence between the NRC and Carolina Power 8 Light Company.

The NRC

CP&L

'3 does not attempt to document all aspects of licensee programs and performance that may.be functioning appropriately.

Rather, the NRC only documents. issues that the NRC believes warrant management attention or represent noteworthy aspects of performance.

In addition, the PPR may also have considered some predecisional and draft material that does not appear in the attached PIM, including observations from events and inspections that had occurred since the last NRC inspection report was issued, but had not yet received full review and consideration.

This material willbe placed in the PDR as part of the normal issuance of NRC inspection reports and other correspondence.

This letter advises you of our planned inspection effort resulting from the Harris PPR review. It is provided to minimize the resource impact on your staff and to allow for scheduling conflicts and personnel availability to be resolved in advance of inspector, arrival onsite.

details our inspection plan for the next eight months.

The rationale or basis for each inspection outside the core inspection program is provided so that you are aware of the. reason for emphasis in these program areas.

Resident inspections are not listed due to their ongoing and continuous nature.

We will inform you of any changes to the inspection plan.

If you have any questions, please contact me at (404) 562-4560.

Sincerely, (Original signed by B.

R. Bonser)

Docket No.: 50-400 License No.: NPF-63 Brian R. Bonser, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosures:

1. Plant Issues Matrix
2. Inspection Plan cc w/encls:

(See page 4)

CP&L cc w/encls:

T. C. Morton, Manager Performance Evaluation and Regulatory Affairs CPB 9 Carolina Power & Light Company P. O. Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602-1551 J: W. Donahue Director of Site Operations MC: Zone1

,Carolina Power & Light Company Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant P. O. Box 165 New Hill, NC 27562-0165 Bo Clark Plant General Manager-Harris Plant Carolina Power & Light Company Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant P. O. Box 165 New Hill, NC 27562-0165 D. B. Alexander, Manager Regulatory Affairs Carolina Power & Light Company Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant P. O. Box 165, Mail Zone 1

New Hill, NC 27562-0165 Johnny H. Eads, Supervisor Licensing/Regulatory Programs Carolina Power 8 Light Company Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant

'P. O. Box165, Mail Zone 1

New Hill, NC 27562-0165 William D. Johnson Vice President 8 Senior Counsel Carolina Power 8 I ight Company P. O. Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Mel Fry, Director Division of Radiation Protection N. C. Department of Environmental Commerce & Natural Resources 3825 Barrett Drive Raleigh, NC 27609-7721 Karen E. Long Assistant Attorney General State of North Carolina P. O. Box 629 Raleigh, NC 27602 Public Service Commission State of South Carolina P. O. Box 11649 Columbia, SC 29211 Chairman of the North Carolina Utilities Commission P. O. Box 29510 Raleigh, NC 27626-0510 Robert P. Gruber Executive Director Public Staff NCUC P. O. Box 29520 Raleigh, NC 27626 Stewart Adcock, Chairman Board of County Commissioners

of Wake County P. O. Box 550 Raleigh, NC 27602 Margaret Bryant Pollard, Chairman Board of County Commissioners of Chatham County P. O. Box 87 Pittsboro, NC. 27312 Distribution w/encls: (See page 5)

CP&L Distribution wlencls:

S. Collins, NRR J. Zwolinski, NRR W. Dean, NRR T. Boyce, NRR C. Thomas, NRR R. Laufer, NRR G. Tracy, EDO J. Lieberman, OE B. Bonser, Rll PUBLIC NRC Resident Inspector U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 5421 Shearon Harris Road New Hill, NC 27562-9998 OFFICE SIGNATURE NAME DATE DRP/RII GMacDonald:vg 3/

/99 g~ Barr 3/g

/99 A Bollslo 3/g /99 H. Christonson K.

/

9 3/

/99 3/

/99 COPY' YE NO YES NO E

NO YES NO YES NO OFFICIALRECORD COPY DOCU T NAME: I:N ARRIPRLPPR.

YES NO YES NO

Page:

1of7 Region II HARRIS United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Date: 03/24/1999 Time: 07:16:25 Date Source Functional Area Template ID 'ype Codes Item Description 01/30/1999 1998011 Pri: OPS NRC POS Pri: 18 Sec:

Sec:

Ter.

Following a reactor trip on January 14, operators followed emergency operating procedures and equipment performed as designed.

The trip was caused by an improperly performed preventive maintenance activity on a nonsafety<elated electrical bus relay.

01/30/1999 199801142 Prl: OPS NRC VIOIV Prl: 5B Sec:'ec:

3A Ter.

Two examples ofa violation were identified for failure to implement a post-trip review in accordance with the review procedure.

Proper plant response followingthe trip was not completely verified ond documented in the post trip review.

01/30/1999 199801141 Pri: OPS NRC Sec: ENG VIOIV Pri: 5A Sec: 5C Ter. 58 Violation (example 1) was identified for failure to promptly identifyand correct an adverse condition related to an inadequate post trip review report forthe 10/23/98 reactor trip. Example 2 wos identified for failure to properly classify as signmcant a condition adverse to quality, ond for failure to identify the cause of a significant condition adverse to quality involving the loss ofvalid reactor vessel level indication during reduced inventory operations.

12/19/1998 1998010 Pri: OPS NRC NEG Pri: lA Sec:

Sec: 3A Ter.

Operator performance during the period was mixed. Several examples of operator inattention resulted In unexpected equipment responses.

12/19/1998 1998010 Pri: OPS Sec:

NRC NEG Pri: 5A Sec: 5C Ter.

In general. self-assessment activities were being performed as required, and the appropriate management focus was being placed on self-assessment findings. A Post-trip/Safeguards Actuation Report review by the Plant Nuclear Safety Committee (PNSC) lacked sufficient questioning to address the post-trip cooldown.

Prior to the PNSC meeting. the Nuclear Assessment Section review of the report did not provide substantive comments.

Management involvement in the corrective action program forseverol events was insufficient to properly classify the events.

The result wos that adequate resources for investigation and root cause determination were not appropriately assigned.

12/19/1998 1998010 Pri: OpS Sec:

NRC NEG Pfi: 58 Sec: 5C.

Ter.

The event investigation related to an unexpected reactor vessel water level increase while in mid-loop.with no fuel In the reactor vessel was not well-handled.

12/19/1998 1998010 'ri:OPS Sec:

NRC POS.

Pri: lA Sec:

Ter.

Reactor stortup and power ascension was accomplished in accordance with applicable procedures.

The synchronization to the grid was the best performed at the site in the past three years, and could be termed a smooth synchronization.

ThIs was a significant improvement from past synchronizations. all of which had resulted in plant transients.

12/19/1998 1998010 Pri: OpS Sec:

NRC POS Pri: 1C Sec: 3A

'Ter.

The licensee's plons for and activities associated with reduced-Inventory operations were consistent with their commitments arising from Generic Letter 88-17 'Loss of Decay Heat Removal.'nC1OSure 1

Item Type (Compliance,Followup,Other), From 01/18/1 998 To 11/13/1999

Page:

2of7 Region II HARRIS United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Date: 03/24/1999

  • Time: 07:16:25 Functional Date Source Area Template ID Type Codes Item Description 12/19/1998 1998010 Pri: OPS Sec:

NRC POS Pri: 38 Effective simulator training helped operators achieve a well-coordinated reactor startup and a smooth synchronization to the grid.

Ter. 1A 12/19/1998 1998010 Pri: OPS Sec:

NRC POS Prl: 5A Sec: 58 Ter. 5C Ucensee management appropriately focused on resolving a previously identified adverse trend related to dearances that continued durtng this period. ANuclear Assessment Section special assessment on clearances was effective in focusing management attention on the clearance problems, and in helping to define which aspects of the clearance process were causing problems..

I2/07/1998 199800941 Prt: OPS Sec:

NRC NCV Prl: 3A Operator actions for an October 19 loss of component cooting water surge tank level event were appropriate, conservative. and in accordance with applicable procedures.

The licensee's investigation of this event was timely and thorough. Anonmted violation was issued for the licensee's failure to develop Ter adequate instructions for clearance restoration, which included filland vent for the C component coofing water pump pIping section.

11/07/1998 1998009 Prl: OPS Sec:

NRC POS Prl: 1B Sec: 58 Ter.

On October 23, the licensee appropriately initiated a manual reactor trip and turbine trip from a power level ofapproximately 90 percent, in response to an unexpected opening ofthe main turbine governor valves, which caused an uncontrolled power increase.

- The control room operators responded promptly to the unexpected conditions. and adequately handled the reactor trip in accordance withthe emergency operating procedures.

The licensee promptly made the notifications required by 10 CFR 50.72. Ihe licensee thoroughly reviewed the equipment problems which necessitated the reactor trip and promptly initiated corrective action.

11/07/1998 1998009 Pri: OPS Sec:

NRC POS Prl: 5A Sec:

Ter.

Doilytrending of adverse corKfitions was evident reflecting improvement in the trending program.

Self-assessment activities were focussed on the identification of safety issues.

09/26/1998 1998008 Pri: OPS Sec:

09/26/1998 1998008 Prl: OPS Sec:

NRC NEG Pri: 1A Sec: 5C Ter. 38 NRC POS Pri: IA Sec:

Ter.

Procedures were being appropriately followed. The operations procedures for synchronizing to the grid and~

starting a second feedwater pump needed improvement.

The procedure forsynchronizing to the grid cfid not always provide for a smooth transfer from the steam dumps to the main turbine. The procedure for starting a second feedwater pump required stable steam generator levels to place the feed regulating valves back in automatic.

This resulted in the opertor's attention being focused primanly on the feed regulating valves for an excessive period of time.

During the period. the conduct of operations was in accordance with applicable procedures.

Operational decision making during the down-power evolutions was conservative.

09/26/1998 1998008 Pri: OPS Sec:

NRC POS Prt: IC Sec: 5A Ter.

Self-assessment act Mties were being properly performed in accordance with procedural requirements.

Item Type (Compliance,Fottowup,Other),

From 01/18/1998 To 11/13/1999

Page:

3of7 Region II HARRIS United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Date: 03/24/1999 Time: 07:16:25 Functional Template Date Source Area ID Type Codes Item Description 01/30/1999 1998011 Pri: MAINT, NRC'OS Pri: 2A With respect to the equipment problems Identified during the unit's response to the October 23 reactor trip, the licensee had implemented and was continuing to implement the maintenance rule program in Sec:

acccordance with approved procedures.

Ter.

4 12/19/1998 1998010 Pri: MAINT NRC NEg Pri: 3A, The surveillance performances were generally conducted in accordance with applicable procedures.

One example, related to containment closeout, indicated a lack of attention to detaiL Ter.

12/19/1998 1998010 Pri: MAINT NRC pOS Pri: 3A The licensee's steam generator Inspections were conducted in a conservative manner.

Sec:

Sec:

Ter.

11/07/1998 1998009 Prl: MAINT NRC pOS Pri: 3A RFOB inservice examination activities observed on safety Injection system piping welds and steam generator tubes were performed in a skillfulmanner by knowledgeable examiners, using approved procedures.

Ter.

11/07/1998 1998009 Pri: MAINT NRC Sec:

Pri: 3A RFOB welding activities observed on a leaking control rod drive mechanism canopy seal weld and on the auxiTiary feedwater system piping were effectively controlled by approved proceduresfinstructions and performed by skillfulwelders.

In addition, the radiographIc processes observed during the filmreview forthe Ter:

AuxiliaryFeedwater (AFW)system were effectively performed in accordance with the approved procedure.

11/07/1998 1998009 Pri: MAINT NRC pOS Pri: 38 The steam generator nozzle dam installation training was considered a strength.

Sec:

Sec:

Ter.

09/26/1998 1998m Prl: MAINT NRC POS Pri: 28 The licensee does a good job. during the review and approval cycle for each work week schedu'le, of assessing the effects of planned activities on plant risk, as required by the Maintenance Rule.

Ter.

09/26/1998 1998008 Pri: MAINT NRC

pOS, Pri: 28 The on-line maintenance backlog was being better managed than ithad been in the previous two years.

Sec:

Sec:

Ter.

09/26/1998 1998008 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Pri: 3A The Surveillance tests were conductedin accordance with applicable procedures and proved operability of Sec:

the subject equipment.

Ter.

item Type (Compliance,Followup,Other), From 01/18/1998 To 11/13/1999

Page:

4of7 Region II HARRIS United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Funcfional Area Date: 03/24/1999 lime: 07:16:25 Functional Template Date Source Area ID Type Codes 'tem Description 09/26/1998 1998008 Prl: MAINT NRC PQS Pri: 3A Maintenance activities were performed in accordance with the work instructions. Thorough planning was Sec 38 evident in the process instrumentation control cabinet power supply replacement work packages in relation to identifiicatlon of potential problems.

Ter.

01/30/1999 199801143 Prl: ENG Sec:

NRC VIQli/

Prl: 4A Aviolation was identified for failure to develop an adequate design of the reactor coolant system with a vacuum skid attached, and for failure to adequately perform design verification functions.

Ter.

12/19/1998 1998010 Pri: ENG NRC PQS Pri: 48 Steam generator replacement project activities appeared to be progressing in a well-controlled manner.

Current staff forthe project appeared to provide a stgntficant experience data base.

Ter.

12/19/1998 1998010 Pri: ENG NRC pQS Pri: 4B Engineering was appropriately involved in the emergency service water piping inspection results and pump performance issues.

Resolution activities were being conducted, in accordance with requ!red procedures.

Sec:

Ter.

11/07/1998 1998009 Pri: ENG NRC NEG Pri: 4C Two weaknesses in the modifiicafionpackages reviewed were Identified concerning incomplete Sec 3A documentation of the safety evaluation for the AFN/steam supply isolation valve modification and failure to include testing of an isolation check vahre in the modification to the air supply to the preheater bypass Ter:

valves.

11/07/)998 1998009 Pri: ENG NRC PQS Pri: 4A The quality ofthe modifiications reviewed for RFQB was good.

Sec:

Sec: 3A Ter.

11/07/1998 1998009 Pri: ENG NRC PQS Pri: 48 The licensee's operability evaluation of the settlement of Electrical Manhole 70 was performed in accordance with NRC requirements.

Identification and evaluation of this Issue was a good example of proactive involvement of engineering support of facilities and equipment.

Ter.

11/03/1998 199800942 Pri: ENG NRC VIQIV Pri: 48 Aviolation was identifiied for failure to translate design requirements into maintenance procedures which speclfied service life and replacement frequencies forAgastat E7000 series relays.

Ter.

09/26/1998 1998008 Pri: ENG NRC NEG

. Pri: 58 Troubleshooting efforts associated with a trip of a heater drain pump were ineffective. The site troubleshooting procedure did not include sufficient guidance for planning and conducting troubleshooting activities to ensure a systematic and analytical approach to troubleshooting was used.

The licensee Ter:

recognized that inadequacy Item Type (Compliance,Followvp,Other), From 01/18/1998 To 11/13/1999

Page:

5 of 7 Region II HARRIS

'ate United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Functional Template Source Area ID Type Codes Item Description Date: 03/24/1999 Time: 07:16:25 09/26/1998 1998m@1 Pri: ENi Llcemee NCV Pri: 5A A Non-Cited Violationwas identified for failure to perform Quality Assurance audits of off-site activities.

Sec:

Sec: 3A Ter.

09/26/1998 199800842 Pri: EN@

LIcensee NCV Pri: 4B ANon<ited Violationwas identified for implementing an Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) without prior Commission approval.

The USQ involved a calculatedincrease in the dose consequences of a designbasis accident for the cycle 6 fuel load.

Ter.

09/26/1998 199800843 Pri: ENG Sec:

NRC VIOIV Prl: 5A AViolation was Identified for failure to document an incorrect safety evaluation as on adverse condition.

This Violationwas an example of a larger problem related to enforcement of corporate standards foroff-site actMtles..

Ter.

12/19/1998 1998010 Pri: pgSUP NRC I

Sec:

Pri: 2B The control of contamination and dose forthe site was good and was attributable to good teamwork between the various departments.

Some temporary shielding was being used as permanent shielding.

indicating a lack of management focus on the administrative aspects of the temporary shielding program.

However, the shielding was providing an appropriate ALARAfunction. This issue was identified as a minor violation.

12/19/1998 1998010 Pri: PLTSUP NRC MV Prl: 5A The fire brigade adequately responded to a fire that occurred november 25 on the 261-foot elevation of the auxiliary building in the motor for air handling unit AH-21, a non-safety related air handler. Aminor violation was identified for failure to initiate a condition report.

Ter.

12/19/1998 1998010 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Pri: 3A The performance ofsecurity and safeguards actMties was in accordance with applicable procedures and the Security Pian.

For the refueling outage. access and search activities were handled well.

Ter.

11/07/1998 1998009 Pri:PLTSUP NRC

POS, PrL1C 1heAsLowAsReasonablyAchievable(ALARA)programwaseffectiveinreducingsitecollectiyepersonnel radiation doses.

Ter.

I I/07/1998 199I9 Pri: PLTSUP

. NRC POS Pri: 3A The Inspectors concluded that the radiation protection activities were effective and performed in accordance with regulatory requirements.

Ter.

11/07/1998 1998009 Pri: PLTSUP NRC Sec:

POS Prl: 5A Areview of radiation protection items in the licensee's corrective action program concluded that the threshold for placing issues into the program was appropriate.

The analysis of problems was generally good with corrective actions to prevent recurrence prescribed.

Quality assurance reviews during the RFO Ter: 5C provided evidence the Harris staff was self-identifying problems and taking measures to improve performance and compliance.

Item Type (Compliance,Foliowup,Other), From 01/18/1998 To 11/13/1999

Page:

6 of 7 Region II HARRIS United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Date: 03/24/1999 Time: 07:16:25 Functional Template Date Source Area ID Type Codes Item Description 09/26/1998 1998008 Pri: PLTSUp NRC pQS Prl: IC The performance of security and safeguards activities were in accordance with applicable procedure and the security plan.

Ter.

09/26/1998 1998008 PrL PLTSUP NRC pQS Pri: IC Rre Protection equipment was being adequately maintained in accordance with procedures.

A fire brigade dril observed was adequately conducted and evaluated by licensee personneL Performance of the fire brigade demonstrated that they were adequately trained to control the fire.

Ter.

09/26/1998 1998008 Pri: pLTSUp NRC pQS Pri: 3A The control of contamination and dose forthe site was good and was attributable to good teamwork between the various departments.

Teamwork was exemplified by the tank desludging effort which reduced dose rates ln the floordroin tank area by a factor of approximately 100.

Ter.

Item Type (Compliance,Followup,Other), From 01/18/1998 To 11/13/1999

Page:

7of7 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Date: 03/24/1999 Time: 07:16:25 Legend Type Codes:

BU Bulletin CDR Construction DEV Deviation EEI Escalated Enforcement Item IFI Inspector follow-upItem LER Ucensee Event Report UC Ucensing Issue MISC Miscellaneous MV MinorViolation NCV NonCited Violation NEG Negative NOED Notice of Enforcement Discretion NON Notice of Non-Conformance P21 Part 21 POS Positive SGI Safeguard Event Report STR 'trength URI Unresolved item VIO Violation WK Weakness Template Codes:

IA Normal Operations

~

1B Operations During Transients 1C Programs and Processes 2A Equipment Condition 2B Programs and Processes 3A Work Performance 3B KSA 3C Work Environment 4A Design 4B Engineering Support 4C.

Programs and Processes SA Identification SB Analysis SC Resolution ID Codes:

NRC.

NRC Self Self-Revealed Ucensee Ucensee OPS MAINT ENG PLTSUP OTHER Operations Maintenance Engineering Plant Support Other Functional Areas:

EEls are apparent violations of NRC Requirements that are being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with'the General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action'Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. However, the NRC has not reached its final enforcement decision on the issues Identified by the EEls and the PIM entries may be modified when the final decisions are made.

URls are unresolved items about which more information is required to determine whether the issue in question is an acceptable item a deviation. a nonconformance, or a violation. A URI may also be a potential violation that is not likelyto be considered for escalated enforcement action. However. the NRC has not reached its final conclusions on the issues, and the PIM entries may be modified when the final conclusions are made.

Item Type (Compliance,Followup,Other), From 01/18/1998 To 11/13/1999

~

IE~

aP United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUES MATRIX by SALP Functional Area HARRIS 19-Mar-99 DATE TYPE(s)

SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)

ID'd ISSUE(s)

SMM CODES

,OPERATIONS";.. "-.- -'

8/15/98 Positive

IR 98-07 NRC.

Self-assessment activities were identifying issues for improvement.

12345 8/15/98 Positive 7/4/98 NCV 7/4/98 Positive 7/4/98 Positive 8/15/98 Positive IR 98-07 IR 98-07 NCV 98-06.01 IR 98-06 IR 98.06 NRC Whi!e completing a semi-annual operability test, non-licensed operator performance was effective and consistent with both procedural requirements and management expectations.

NRC Operations performance during the period was in accordance with required procedures.

NRC A noncited violation was identified for approving Technical Specification Interpretations PSI) which allowed the TS to be satisfied in ways other than those specified in the TS, without prior Commission approval.

SELF The Plant Nuclear Safety Committee meeting met procedural requirements and was appropriately focussed on safety. The Nuclear Safety Review Committee meeting was attended by the Chief Nuclear Officer and was appropriately focussed on safety. Nuclear Assessment Section Audits and a Performance Evaluation Section Assessment were thorough.

SELF During this period, operator knowledge and performance satisfied both management expectations and procedural requirements.

A OOOO B 0000 CH 00 1 234 A

B C

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00 1 234 A Hooo B 0000 Co 00 1

2 3

4 A

B C

A B

C 0000 0000 H

00 1 234 0000 OOOO Qx QQ 1

2 3

4 A EIOHO B OOOO Co 00 0

0 0

0 0

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5 0

0 0

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FROM: 1/18/98 TO: 3/19/99 Page1of 15 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated:

8/15/98

HARRIS 19.Mar-99 DATE TYPE(s)

SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)

IDid ISSUE(s)

SMM CODES 7/4/98 Positive 7/4/98 Negative 7/4/98 Positive 7/4/98 Positive 6/18/98 Positive 6/18/98 Positive 6/18/98 Negative IR 98-06 IR 98-06

'R 98.06 IR 98-06

'IR 98-04 IR 98-04 IR 98-04 SELF The operations night orders reviewed were determined to be in compliance viith applicable procedures.

One night order contained guidance which did not reflect current plant conditions.

NRC While hanging a clearance, operators encountered an inconsistency. between current procedural requirements and their recollection of procedural requirements.

In response to the Incident, operations management appropriately emphasized procedural compliance.

SELF During the completion of a quarterly surveillance test, operators followed the applicable procedure, used effective communications, and coordinated test activities well.

SELF Operations performance during the period was generally in accordance with plant procedures and exhibited the appropriate sensitivity to safety.

NRC Plant Nuclear Safety Committee discussions about one previous NRC violation were not focussed on ensuring that the licensee reponse addressed the overall root cause.

This shortcoming resulted in an NRC request for an additional response.

NRC Quality assurance activities were being conducted as required by procedures.

Identification of adverse conditions continued to be a strength.

NRC Control Room staffing and overtime usage met the requirements of the Technical Specifications. A new operations manager was selected who had been a licensed senior reactor operator at the H. B. Robinson Plant and met the TS requirements.

1 234 A 0000 B CIOCI 0 CH 00 1 234 A Boo B QCIEIQ Co 00 1 234 A

B C

H 0 Qx 0 OOOO 0

00 1234 A

B C

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C A

B C

Hooo Cl000 0

00 1 234 CI 0 0 0 OOOO 0

00 1 234 00 00 OOOO 0

00 1234 A 0000 B 0 CII-I 0 H

0CI 5

0 0

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5 0

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0 0

5 0

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FROM: 1/18/98 TO: 3/19/99 Page 2of 15 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated:

8/15/98

HARRIS 19.Mar-99 DATE TYPE(s)

SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)

ID'd ISSUE(s)

SMM CODES 6/18/98 VIO 6/18/98 Positive 5/11/98 Positive 5/11/98 Positive 5/11/98 Positive 5/11/98 NCV 5/11/98 VIO VIO98-04-01 IR 98-04 IR 9843 IR 98-03 IR 98-03 NCV 98-03-02 VIO 98.03-01 NRC One violation was identified for failing to hang a clearance tag as required by procedure.

NRC In general, the conduct of operations was professional and safety-conscious.

Routine activities were adequately performed. Operations shift crews were appropriately sensitive to plant equipment conditions and maintained a questioning attitude in relation to unexpected equipment responses.

NRC Operator performance over the last eight months improved significantly due to the creation of a better operafions environment.

Administrative distractions were removed from the control room and an hourly work scheduling system was implemented.

These Improvements a!lowed the operators to focus better on operating the plant, which significantly reduced errors.

LICENSEE Control room operators exhibited a questioning attitude, a clear understanding of Technical Specifications (TS), and a determination to properly implement TS requirements in relation to implementation of TS Interpretation 89-003. Operator performance during the period was good.

LICENSEE The inspectors also identified a non-cited violation for a failure to maintain equipment dearances as quality assurance records.

NRC.

A violation with two examples was identified by the inspectors for failures to properly classify condition reports as a significant in accordance with required procedures.

NRC Plant Nuclear Safety Committee discussions were appropriately focussed on safety and preventing recurrence of problems.

Identification of adverse conditions continued to be a strength.

A B

C 1 234 OOHQ 0000 0

00 1 234 A

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00 1 234 OOOO OOOO 0

00 1234 HQQxQ OOOO 0

00 1234 a OOOO B 0000 CH 00 1 234 A 0000 B 0000 Co 00 a HQOO B 0000 Co 00 1234 5

0 0

0 5

0 0

0 5

0 0

0 5

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0 5

0 0

5 0

0 0

5 0

Qx 0

FROM: 1/18/98 TO: 3/19/99 Page 3of 15 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated:

8/15/98

HARRIS 19-Mar-99 DATE TYPE(s)

SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)

ID'd ISSUE(s) 5/11/98 Positive

- IR 98.03 NRC Reponse to an electrical ground and containment fire alarms on a non-safety containment air handler was good.

SMM CODES 12345 5/11/98 Positive IR 98.03 NRC Operations performance during the period was acceptable and in accordance viith plant procedures.

a OOOO B HOOO Co 00 1

2 3

4 0

0 0

4/20/98 LE R 3/13/98 LER 2/28/98 Negative 2/28/98 VIO 2/28/98 Negative MAINT LER 98-005-00 LICENSEE Technical Specification verbatim non-compliance.

LER 98-004-00 IR 98-01 NRC Further review of the 'C'team generator blowdown system water hammer event that occurred In December 1997, revealed that failure to enter Technical Specification 3.7.8 Umiting Condition for Operation when a blowdown system isolation valve snubber was removed was an isolated case and did not result in a TS violation.

VIO 98.01-01 IR 98-01 LICENSEE The licensee identified an additional example of failing to ensure main control room chart recorders were properly marking and timing, which was identified as a violation. Corrective action for violation 50400/97-09-02 was not effective and additional corrective actions had been Identified from a root cause investigation of the additional occurrence.

The root cause investigation found that chart recorder timing had not been properly checked but itwas not addressed as an inappropriate act because the investigation was focused on marking only. This narrow focusing diluted the significance of the overall finding of the root cause investigation.

NRC Self-assessment activities were acceptable, even though the PNSC's discussion associated with a root cause investigation for a missed surveillance did not identify that a root cause had not been addressed.

LICENSEE Design deficiency related to inadequate runout protection for the turbine driven AFW pump.

A Hooo B

I IQOO Co 00 1 234 A Hooo OOHO CO 00 1234 A CICIOH B CIQOCI C 0 OCI 1 234 A

B C

H 0 0 0 0 O 0 O 0

CI0 1234 A QCIHO B OOOO CO 00 0

a 0

5 CI Qx 0

5 0

0 5

0 0 Q 5

0 Qx 1 234 5

A OQOOH-B 0 I I 0 CI Qx C

CI 000 FROM: 1/18/98 TO: 3/1 9/99 Page 4of 15 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated:

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HARRIS 19-Mar-99 DATE TYPE(s)

SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)

ID'd ISSUE(s)

SMM CODES 2/28/98 Negative 2/2198 Strength

.MAINTENANCE.-.',,';-%'" "

IR 98-01 IR 98-01 NRC Communications system alarm testing was being conducted as comitted to in the FSAR, although documented acceptance criteria was considered weak.

NRC Operations performance during the period was acceptable.

Operators appropriately responded to alarms and abnormal conditions.

12345 A OEIOQCI B CIOOQ 0 C 0 000 12345 A HQQOO B OCIOOO C

CI OCIO 8/15/98 Positive 8/15/98 Positive 8/15/98 Positive 7/4/98 VIO 8/15/98 Positive OPS IR 98-07 IR 98-07'R 98-07 IR 98-07 VIO98-06%2 NRC The periodic assessment performed by the licensee took into account component performance, condition monitoring, associated goals and preventive maintenance actiVities and met the requirements delineated in CP&L's procedure ADM-NGGC-0101, Maintenance Rule Program, revision 9. Corrective actions sampled were appropriately implemented.

NRC Maintenance on the containment spray check valves has been conducted in accordance viith applicable procedures, and has identified no adverse conditions associated with those valves.

NRC The surveillance testing was adequately conducted:

The operations and the maintenance personnel exhibited knowledge of the jobs, were professional

~ and accomplished their job cautiously and with plant safety in mind.

NRC The maintenance activities observedbe the inspector were done by well qualified and experienced workmen. The work was satisfactorily completed and was done using approved piocedures.

The craftsmen were very knowledgeable and skillful and performed their work ln a professional manner.

NRC One violation was identified for approving procedures which allowed Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements that specified performance 'during shutdown'o be performed at power without receiving prior Commission approvaL A o B.o c 0 1

0 0 CI HQO 00 2

3 4

A B

C A

B C

A B

C A

B C

0 0

CI 1

0 0

0 1

0 0

CI 1

000 HOQ 00 2

3 4

0 Qx 0 000 00 234 CIHQ 000 0CI 2

3 4

CI CI 0 QHCI 00 1 234 5

0 0

0 5

0 0

0 5

0 0

0 5

0 0

CI 5

0 0

0 FROM: 1/18/98 TO: 3/19/99 Page 5of 15 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated:

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HARRIS 19-Mar-99 DATE 7I4I98 Positive IR 98-06 A

TYPE(s)

SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)

ID'd ISSUE(s)

SELF Conservative decision maMng was observed during the performance of a surveillance.

SMM CODES 12345 7/4/98 7/4/98 7/4/98 6/18/98 Positive Positive Positive VIO OPS IR 98-06 IR 98-06 IR 98.06 URI 98-04-03 SELF Surveillance tests observed were conductedin a thorough and effective manner.

Procedures were followed and independent verification was performed to identify potential problems.

SELF Work obsewed was performed with the work package present and in active use.

Technicians were skillful,experienced and knowledgeable of their assigned tasks.

Maintenance activities were thorough and effective.

SELF Equipment condition, material condition, and housekeeping were acceptable.

NRC An unresolved item was opened in relation to technical specification surveillance requirements that were required to be accomplished at shutdown and were being conducted at power. One example was fdentified in relation to testing of the gross failed fuel detector component cooling water (CCWI isolation valves on Iow surge tank level. The licensee subsequently identified three other examples by the end of

. the period, as reported in LER 50<00/98-005. Violation 98-06-02 issued in IR 98-06.

A OQHOO B 00000 c 0 000 1 234 5

A OOOOO B OCIOOO c 0 CIClo 1

2 3

4 5

A OOOOO B 00000 co 000 12345 A OHOOO B QQOQ Q co 000 12345 A OOOO 0 B QOOCIO ~

c H 000~

6/18/98 Positive 6/18/98 Positive IR 98-04 IR 98-04 NRC Thirteen surveillances were adequately conducted.

Maintenance and operations personnel performing the suweillance were skillfuland knowledgeable.

NRC The six maintenance activities observed were being conducted with work packages present and in active use.

In addition, the participating technicians were experienced and knowledgeable.

A B

C 12345 OCIOxCI 0 OOH CI 0 0 000 12345 A'Clooo 0 B OOxHO Q c 0 CIQQ FROM: 1/18/98 TO: 3/19/99 Page 6of 15 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated:

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HARRIS 19-Mar-99 DATE

'YPE(s)

SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)

ID'd ISSUE(s)

SMM CODES 6/18/98

~

Positive 5/11/98 Positive 5/8/98 LER 2/28/98 Positive 2/28/98 Positive 2/28/98 VIO 5/11/98 Positive OPS IR 98-04 IR 98-03 IR 9843 LER 98-006-00 IR 98-01 IR 98-01 VIO9841-03 NRC Surveillance activities were adequately conducted.

NRC Maintenance activities were performed adequately.

Minorplanning deficiencies were noted on one of four maintenance activities observed.

LICENSEE Failure to perform inspection and preventive maintenance on molded case circuit breakers as required by Technical Specifications.

SELF Engineering performed an inspection of several Agastat relays in the load sequencers and inadequate solder connections were found and the relays were replaced.

NRC NRC Steam generator blowdown system water hammer events were reviewed by the maintenance rule expert panel after the December 1997 water hammer event and determined to have been appropriately evaluated.

The expert panel meeting on the issue was thorough and exh!bited a proper safety focus. The December event has prompted licensee management to question whether the steam generator blowdown system secondary chemistry performance criteria under the maintenance rule is sufficiently conservative to meet plant goals.

A failure to conduct a shutdown margin calculation as required by TS surveillance requirement 4.1.1.1.1.a when control rods were declared inoperable on January 29, 1998, was identified as a violation. The failure was due to inadequate communication by site management about a decision made in 1997 which clarified

'he linkbetween this surveillance requirement and TS 3.1.3.1.

NRC Equipment was being maintained in acceptable condition per plant procedures and housekeeping was effective in maintaining plant areas free of unnecessary materials or debris.

Equipment deficiencies were appropriately identified and were being scheduled and workedin accordance viiththe licensee's work scheduling system.

1 2

3 0 El 0 000 0

0 1

2 3

A B

C A QQB B 000 C 0 0

1 2

3 OQB OOCI 0

0 1

2 3

A B

C 000 OOB 0

CI 1

2 3

A B

C QQB 000 0

CI 1

2 3

A B

C A 000 B OBO C 0 0

1 2

3 B CI Ox 000 0

CI A

B C

4 5

00 0 CI 00 4

5 00 OO 00 4

5 00 0 CI 00 4

5 00 CI 0 Qx Q 4

5 00:: ~

4 5

00 CI B 00 4

5 00 00 CI Qx FROM: 1/18/98 TO: 3/19/99 Page 7of 15 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated:

8/15/98

HARRIS 19-Mar-99 DATE TYPE(s)

SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)

ID'd ISSUE(s)

SMM CODES 2I28/98 Strength IR 98-01 NRC The surveillance performances observed were adequately conducted.

12345 2/28/98 VIO 2/10/98 LER 1/29/98 LER 1/21/98 LER 2/28/98 NCV OPS OPS OPS VIO 98-01-01 NRC Fai'lure to followprocedures, example 2: Aviolation was identified for inadequate rod control system work instructions. The inadequate work instructions were the result of incomplete initial troubleshooting.

NCV 98-01-02 NRC Maintenance activities observed were generally adequate.

A paper wipe was found in the '8'iesel generator lube oil tank that was apparently left there during the 1997 refueling outage (RFO7). This was identified as a Non-Cited Violation for failing to establish adequate foreign material exclusion controls.

LER 97-021-02 LICENSEE TS surveillance procedure review project identified deficiencies. This revision is submitted to report an additional condition identified during the on-going TS surv.

procedure review proj. This condition involved the failure to properly test the non-safety related pressurizer pwr oper. relief valve; vio of TS surv req LER 98-002-01 LICENSEE Solid state protection system (P-11 Permissive) testing deficiency.

This supplement provided additional corrective action.

LER 98-003-00; VIO 98-LICENSEE Failure to perform shutdown margin calculation required by TS surveillance 01-03 requirements.

A 8

C QOHQ 0 OOOOO 0 000 1 234 5

A 8

C A

8 C

A 8

C 0CJ EI 0 0x oooao 0 000 1

2 3

4 5

000 0 Qx Qoxoo CI 0

Ciao 12345 Qx Q Qx 0 000 0 0

00 1 234 A OOEICICl Qooo El C 0 OCJQ 1 234 5

1/21/98 LER

,ENGINEERING.'-

OPS LER 98-002-00 LICENSEE Solid state protection system (P-11 Permissive) testing deficiency.

A 8

C A

8 C

0 0 Cl 0 0 0 0 Qx Cl 00 1 234 0000 OHOO 0

CJ0 Qx 0

0 Cl 0

0 FROM: 1/18/98 TO: 3/19/99 Page 8of 15 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated:

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HARRIS 19.Mar-99 DATE TYPE(s)

SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)

ID'd ISSUE(s)

SMM CODES 7/4/98 Positive 7/4/98 Positive 7/4/98 Weakness 7/4/98 Positive 7/4/98 VIO 7/4/98 VIO 8/15/98 Positive IR 98-07 IR 98-06 IR 9846 IR 98-06 IR 9846 VIO98-06-03 URI 98-06-04 NRC Five subject Engineering Service Requests (ESRs) were rejected for valid technical and/or administrative reasons.

No significant issues were dropped when these ESRs were rejected.

SELF The Nuclear Assessment Section assessments and the self-assessments performed by engineering section personnel were effective in identifying engineering performance defidendes, and were useful in providing insights to management.

Corrective actions in response to the findings were generally acceptable.

This was a positive observation.

NRC The licensee's planning and project management for the steam generator replacement project appeared to be comprehensive and well organized.

NRC The licensee's training for qualification of engineering personnel on 10 CFR 50.59 requirements was effective and complied with NRC requirements.

NRC Aviolation was identified for failing to followthe approved corrective action program in not initiating a condition report during the 1997 refueling outage for a deviation from the approved design in relation to brackets on the containment sump suction pipes. The root cause investigation for the containment sump bracket issue was thorough.

NRC For 15 of 16 unreviewed safety question determinations reviewed, the licensee's determination that the corresponding changes did not involve an unreviewed safety question were considered correct. An unresolved item was opened with respect to

.unreviewed safety question determinations as described in the safety evaluation for the cyde 6 reload. Violation 98-08.03issuedin IR 98-08.

NRC Aweakness was identified for the increase in the backlog of work in the Engineering section since 1996. However, at the present time, safety has not been impactedby the increase In work backlog.

12345 A

B C

A B

C OOOO 0000 0

CIB 1 234 CI 0 0 0 0000 0

0CI 1 234 0

0 0

A QCIOO B 0000 C 0 OB 1 234 0

0 0

A B

C A

B C

A B

C OQCI0 0000 0

BB 1 234 0000 000" 0 0

00 1

2 3

4 0 CI 0 0 0000 0

00 1 234 0

0 0

0 ~

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A 00000 B OQOCI CI C 0 B'OCI FROM: 1/18/98 TO: 3/19/99 Page 9 of 15 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated:

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HARRIS 19.Mar-99 DATE TYPE(s)

SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)

ID'd ISSUE(s)

SMM CODES 7/4/98 Negative URI 98-06-04 NRC For 19 safety evaluation forms reviewed, the licensee's determinations that an unreviewed safety question determination was not required were considered correct, although the bases for those determinations were typicallyweak. Similarly, the bases for unreviewed safety question determinations were weak in some cases.

The inspector's findings in this regard were consistent viith the findings described in a recent Nuclear Assessment Section assessment of this program. Discussed in IR 98-07 and IR 98-08.

1 2

3 4

5 a OOQHO B OOI-Ioo C

CI "Boo 7/4/98 Positive 7/4/98 Positive 5/11/98 Positive 6/18/98 Negative IR 98-06 IR 98-06 IR 98-04 IR 98-03 SELF The licensee's program for complying with 10 CFR 50.59 was consistent with that rule, and with Technical Specification 6.5.2.6. The licensee had established suitable programmatic guidance to ensure that the regulatory requirements of 10 GFR 50.59 would be met, and the information necessary for preparing adequate safety evaluations was available to licensee personnel.

SELF Engineering Service Request (ESR) 98-00134, Reactor Coolant Pump Long Term Operability viith Reduced Compartment Cooling, Rev. 0, was prepared in accordance with applicable procedures.

The ESR describes a valid analysis that concluded that operation of reactor coolant pump 'C's acceptable until the next refueling outage.

NRC An operability evaluation for reactor head vent valve 1RC-905 was conducted in accordance with required procedures.

However, it was not performed until approximately 8 months after the condition occurred due to management willingness to live with the out-of-service condition. This condition constituted an unecessary operational burden on plant operators.

NRC Nudear Assessment Section audits in Engineering were good.

A B

C CIQOO 0 CIOO Qx I

I 0 000 12345 1

2 3

4 5

a OOOOO B I-Iooo 0 C Q QoxQ 12345 a OOOOO B CIQOHO c 0 000 1 234 5

5/1 1/98 Positive 5/I 1/98 Positive IR 98-03 IR 98-03 NRC A 10 CFR 21 report on the turbine4riven auxiliary feedwater water pump governor valve stem was being adequately addressed.

NRC In general, engineering activities were being conducted adequately and in accordance viith required procedures.

A B

C A

B C

A B

C OOHQ OOOO 0

00 1 234 0000 0 0 Q Qx 0

00 1234 Oo Box 0000 CI Cl 0

~ ~

0 0

CI 5

0 0

0 FROM: 1/1 898 TO: 3/1 9/99 Page 10 of 15 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated:

8/15/98

HARRIS 19-Mar-99 DATE TYPE(s)

SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)

ID'd ISSUE(s)

SMM CODES 5/6/98 Negative TS amendment LICENSEE Slow licensee response to a staff RAI on TS amendment entitled 'delection of shutdown requirements from selected surveillances.

The staff requested, on several occasions since July 1997, fora response to the RAI. However, a response was not received until April 13, 1998, after the licensee identiTied an urgent need for the amendment.

The late response created the need for additional staff effort to ensure that the amendment was issued in an expedited manner.

The need to review and approve the amendment in an expedited manner was to preclude a potential plant shutdown.

1 2

3 4

A 0000 B OCIOO CQ 00 5

0 0

H 2/28/98 Negative 2/28/98 Positive 2/28/98 Positive 2/28/98

~

Positive 2/28/98 Weakness IR 98-01 IR 98-01 IR 98-01 IR 98-01 IR 98-01 NRC NRC NRC NRC

" NRC Condition report trending had not revealed a trend related to the blowdown events, which had resulted in a lack of management attention prior to the event. NRC IR 50-400/97-12 reviewed trending and concluded that inconsistent trending had contributed to the significance and longevity of some performance issues.

The steam generator blowdown water hammer event was an example consistent with those conclusions.

Management, including the Plant Nuclear Safety Committee, was appropriately focussed on determining the root cause of the December 1997 'C'team generator blowdown system water hammer event and ensuring corrective actions provide a permanent solution. The root cause investigation was appropriately rejected by the PNSC due to a lack of adequate detail related to why prior actions failed to resolve the problem:

Atrend in corporate procedure inadequacies was identified. Trending of corporate related adverse conditions was diluted because the condition reports were spread over the site corrective action data bases of three sites, rather than one data base.

The licensee had identified that trending program guidance in general was weak and was determining a course of action to improve it.

The short term operability determination for containment recirculation sump brackets was adequate.

It concluded that foreign material exclusion cover brackets installed duifng construction could remain in the sump and the sump would still perform its intended function. The conclusion was based on tack welds having been strength-tested during the outage (RFO7), on calculations which showed that ifthe brackets came loose they wouldn'1 be transferred into the sump, and that grout installed during RFO7 would hold the brackets in place.

The engineering operability evaluation for a paper wipe found ln the diesel generator lube oil suction tank was thorough.

1 234 A 0000 B 0000 CO 00 1 234 A 0000 B 0000 CQ 00 1 234 A 0000 B 0000 C

CI.00 1

2 3

4 a 0000 B 000 Qx CQ 00 1 234 5

ci ~

0 0

5 Qx 5

0 Qx 0

5 ri 0

.PLANT:SUPPORT P:::,."

A OOOO 0 B OOOHCI CO 000 FROM: 1/18/98 TO: 3/19/99 Page11of 15 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated:

8/15/98

HARRIS 19.Mar-99 DATE 8/15/98 Positive IR 98-07 TYPE(s)

SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)

ID'd ISSUE(s)

NRC Fire Protection activities were being adequately conducted in accordance with procedures.

SMM CODES 1234.5 8/15/98 Positive IR 98-07 NRC The performance of Security and Safeguards activitieis was in accordance with applicable procedures.

A 8

C 0000 0 00000 Ox 000 12345 7/4/98 Positive 7/4/98 Positive 7/4/98 Positive 6/18/98 Positive 8/15/98 Positive IR 98-07 IR 98-06 IR 98-06 IR 98-06 IR 98-04 NRC The control of contamination and dose for the site was good and was attributable to good teamwork between the various departments.

SELF Fire protection activities were being adequately conducted.

NRC The protected area barrier was observed to be in good condition. Isolations zones were of sufficient size and were free of objects.

SELF Participant performance in the July 9, 1998, drilldemonstrated an acceptable ability to respond to emergencies.

NRC The licensee's program for testing of continuous air monitors satisfied the specifications set forth in the Final Safety Analysis Report.

A 0000 8 0000 CH 00 1 234 A

8 C

A 8

C A

8 C

A 8

C 000 0 0000 Px QQ 1 234 0000 0000 H

00 1234 0 H0 0 0000 0

00 1234 0 000 OOHO 0

00 1 234 A 0000 8 IIQOO CH 00 0

0 ~

5 0

0 0

5 0

0 0

5 0

0 ~

5 0

0 0

5 0

0 0

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HARRIS 19-Mar-99 DATE TYPE(s)

SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)

ID'd ISSUE(s)

SMM CODES 6/1/98 Positive 6/18/98 Positive IR 98-04 IR 98-12 NRC NRC The inspectors found radiological controls to be in accordance with required procedures.

The general approach to the control of contamination and dose for the site was effective. Teamwork between the various departments continued to be a major contributor to the good control of dose.

Extensive corrective actions had been implemented and activities at the Corporate Office relating to the current Access Authorization (AA)and Fitness for Duty (FFD) programs were considered excellent. The licensee had currently implemented and staffed an organization that was very capable of managing and implementing the AA and FFD program requirements.

The site was very capable of continuing to provide assurance that the personnel who were granted unescorted access to the nuclear facilities met regulatoiy requirements.

The ANFFD audits were considered a strength.

1 234 5

a OOOOO B OClooo C

El 000 1 234 5

a OOOOO B 00000 CH 000 5/11/98 Positive 5/11/98 Positive 5/11/98

=

Positive 2/28/98 Strength 2/28/98 Strength IR 98-03 IR 98-03 IR 98-03 IR 98-01 IR 98-01 NRC The performance of security and safeguards activities was good.

NRC Fire protection activities were being adequately conducted.

NRC The control of contamination and dose for the site was good and was attributable to good teamwork between the various departments.

NRC The licensee's 1998 Nuclear Assessment Section assessment of the facility's fire protection program was of good quality and effective in identifying fire protection program performance to management.

Corrective actions in response to the identified assessment issues were being implemented and completion was anticipated in 1998.

SELF The fire barrier penetration seal installer was appropriately trained to accomplish fire barifer penetration seal installation work and QC inspectors were qualified to perform the appropriate verification for installation and repairs made to the fire barrier penetration seals.

A B

C 1

2 3

4 0 0 Ox 0 OOOO 0

00 1 234 A

B C

A B

C QooxCI OOOO 0

CI0 1 234 CI CI H CI 0000 0

00 1 234 A

B C

OOOO 0000 H

00 1 234 a CIOQCI B OCIHCI Co 00 5

0 0

0 5

0 0

0 5

0 0

0 5

Qx 0

0 5

0 0

0 FROM: 1/1 8/98 TO: 3/19/99 Page 13of 15 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated:

8/15/98

HARRIS 19-Mar-99 DATE TYPE(s)

SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)

ID'd ISSUE(s)

SMM CODES 2/28/98 Positive 2/28/98 Positive 2/28/98 Weakness 2/28/98 VIO 2/2N98 Strength 2/2N98 Strength 1/29/98 LER IR 98-01 IR 98.01 IR 98.01 VIO98-0144 IR 98-01 IR 98-01 LER 98-601-00 NRC NRC The surveillance inspection procedure for the fire barrier penetration seals was adequate.

The three most recent inspections had been satisfactorily implemented.

However, a large number of fire protection surveillance procedures continued to be implemented within the procedure grace period. An improvement over the results from previous inspections was noted, but continued management attention is needed to achieve the corrective action goal of timely surveillance performance.

The licensee did not perform engineering evaluations that followed the guidance of NRC GL 86-10 for deviations from fire barrier configurations qualified by tests.

This was considered an engineering program weakness.

NRC A violation was identified for failure to adequately implement and maintain the

. applicable fire protection program design control documentation requirements that demonstrated that the as-built configurations of fire barrier penetration seals P 3008, P 447A, and E 156 were bounded by the vendor's design and test documentation.

SELF The performance of security and safeguards activities were good. Security staff responded appropriately to the discovery of a gun during processing of employee belongings in the access area X-ray machine.

SELF The control of contamination and dose for the site was good and was attributable to good teamwork between the various departments.

LICENSEE Unescorted access granted to contract outage worker due to falsified Personal Histoiy Questionnaire (PHQ).

SELF The fire brigade demonstrated good response and fire fighting performance during a simulated fire brigade driliconducted during this inspection period.

A B

C A

B C

A B

C A

B C

A B

C 4

A B

C 0 CI 0 0 OHOQ 0

00 1 234 0 CI 0 H 0 CI 0 H 0

00 1234 000 H OOOH 0

00 1

2 3

4 0 Cl H 0 0000 0

00 1

2 3

4 QQHQ 0000 0

CI0 1 234 0 0H0 oooo H

0CI 1 234 A OQHQ B 0000 CO 00 1

2 3

4 5

0 0

0 5

0 a

5 0

CI 0

5 0

0 0

5 0

0 5

0 0

5 0

0 0

FROM: 1/18/98 TO: 3/19/99 Page14of 15 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated:

8/15/98

HARRIS 19-Mar-99 DATE TYPE(s)

SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)

ID'd ISSUE(s)

SMM CODES SMM Template Codes:

SALP Functional Areas:

ID Code:

1A 1B 1C 2A 2B 3A 3B 3C 4A 4B 4C SA SB 5C OPERATION PERFORMANCE - Normal Operations OPERATION PERFORMANCE - Operations During Transients OPERATION PERFORMANCE - Programs and Processes MATERIALCONDITION-Equipment Condition MATERIALCONDITION - Programs and Processes HUMANPERFORMANCE - Work Performance HUMANPERFORMANCE - KSA HUMANPERFORMANCE-Work Environment ENGINEERING/DESIGN - Design ENGINEERING/DESIGN - Engineering Support ENGINEERING/DESIGN -

Programs and Processes PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION8 SOLUTION - Identification PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION8 SOLUTION - Analysis PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION& SOLUTION - Resolution ENG ENGINEERING MAINT MAINTENANCE OPS OPERATIONS PLT SU PLANTSUPPORT SAQV SAFETY ASSESSMENT &QV LICENSEE LICENSEE NRC NRC SELF SELF-REVEALED EEls are apparent violations of NRC requirements that are being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. However, the NRC has not reached its final enforcement decision on the Issues identified by the EEls and the PIM entries may be modified when the final decisions are made.

Before the NRC makes its enforcement decision, the licensee willbe provided with an opportunity to either (1) respond to the apparent violation or (2) request a predecislonal enforcement conference.

URls are unresolved items about which more Information is required to determine whether the issue in question Is an acceptable item, a deviation, a nonconformance, or a violation.

However, the NRC has not reached its final conclusions on the Issues, and the PIM entries may be modified when the final conclusions are made.

FROM: 1/18/98 TO: 3/19/99 Page 15 of 15 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated:

8/15/98

HARRIS INSPECTION PLAN INSPECTION PROCEDURE/

TEMPORARY INSTRUCTION IP 81700 IP 82701 IP 83750 IP 92904, IP 93803 IP 82301 IP 84750 IP 86750 TITLE/PROGRAM AREA Security Emergency Preparedness Radiation Protection Fire Protection Foilowup

'ngineering Emergency Preparedness Radiation Protection NUMBER OF INSPECTORS PLANNED INSPECTION DATES 3/99 3/99 4/99-6/99 7/99 8/99 9/99 10/99 TYPE OF INSPECTION-COMMENTS Core Inspection Core Inspection Core Inspection Regional Initiative Inspection (Penetration seal evaluation program violation followup)

Core SSFI (Inspection of Low Head Safety Injection System)

Core Inspection Biennial Exercise Core Inspection Enclosure 2