ML18003B241

Audit of Pump & Valve Operability Assurance Program for Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant,Informal Rept

ML18003B241
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	04/30/1986
From:	Kido C, Magleby H, Stromberg H IDAHO NATIONAL ENGINEERING & ENVIRONMENTAL LABORATORY
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML18003B240	List: ML18003B241 ML18003B242
References
CON-FIN-A-6415 EGG-NTA-7165, NUDOCS 8605190422
Download: ML18003B241 (69)

Text

EGG-NTA-7165 Apr<1 1986 INFORAfALREPORT W

National':---'-';-:-:;:-'."..=:-.'":>> AUDIT OF THE PUMP AND VALVE OPERABILITY e

Engineering;,',,';;:-:,;:".'>>,=.".'; ASSURANCE PROGRAM FOR THE SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POMER PLANT w~,h~aI" p

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C. Kiddo Oepanment;. ';.";-;;-';";.":.;, .'.,",->'.;:,,".' H. M. Stromberg H. L. Mag1eby V

~~E'&aG'i~ Prepared for the Work perlonned under U,S, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DOE Contract No. DE-AC07-7S/D01570 8605190422 860514 PDR ADOCK 05000400 PDR

DISCLAIMER This book was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implktd, or assumes any ktgal liability or responsibility for the @curacy. completeness, or usefulness of any Information, apparatus. product or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. References herein to any specific commercial product, process, or senrice by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessmily consdtute or imply its endorsement. recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reffect those of the United S tates Government or any agency thereof.

EGG-NTA-7165 AUDIT OF THE PUMP AND VALVE OPERABiLITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM FOR THE SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Docket No. 50-400 C. K)do H. M. Stromberg H. L. Magleby Published April 1986 NRC Licensing Support Section Eng1neer1ng Analys1s D1v1s >on EG8G Idaho, Inc.

Idaho Falls, Idaho 83415 I

Prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comfsslon Washkngtog, D.C. 20555 Under DOE Contract No. DE-AC07-76ID01570 FIN No. A6415

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ABSTRACT The Shearon Harris Nuclear Generating Station wa's aud1ted December 3 to 6, 19B5 to determ1ne the adequacy of their Pump and Valve Operab111ty Assurance Program. Four concerns (one spec1f1c and three generic), which could not be resolved by the close of the aud1t, were subsequently resolved by the applicant in h1s January 27, 1986 subm1ttal. A new generic issue was ident1fied 1nvolving the apparent lack of qual1fication test data for some safety-related equ1pment. The applicant has comnitted to address this concern prior to fuel load. The results of th1s aud1t 1nd1cate that the app11cant has establ1shed and is 1mplement1ng a program that w1ll track all pumps and valves 1'mportant to safety from manufacture and in-shop testing through qual1f icat1on, 1nstallation, testing, ma1ntenance, and surveillance for the purpose of assuring cont1nued operab111ty of these components over the 11fe of the plant.

FOREWORD Th1s report is supplied as part of the "Equ1pment qualification Case Reviews" pro]ect that 1s being conducted for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission, Off1ce of Nuclear Reactor Regulat1on, Divis1on of Engineering,"

Equipment qualification Branch by the Engineering Analysis Div1sion of EGEG Idaho, Inc.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm1ssion funded th1s work under the authorization, 88R 20-l9-40-41-2, FIN Number A6415.

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SUMMARY

The Pump and Valve Operability Assurance Review Team {PVORT),

comprised of one member of the Nuclear Regulatory Comnission (NRC) staff and three EGIIKG personnel, conducted an on-s1te aud1t of the Shearon Harr1s Pump and Valve Operability Assurance Program dur1ng the week of Oecember 3 4

to 6, 1985. A representative sample of act1ve pumps and valves was selected for review and evaluation. These components are categorized as e1ther Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) or Balance of Plant (BOP), based upon wh1ch organizat1on was respons1ble for the purchase and installation of the component. Westinghouse is Shearon Harris'SSS vendor wh1le Ebasco, an arch1tectural engineering f1rm, 1s responsible for the BOP components.

The process used to evaluate the plant's overall Pump and Valve Operability Assurance Program 1ncludes: (a) becom1ng familiar w1th each selected component and the system 1n wh1ch 1t is installed, (b) understand1ng the component's normal and safety function, (c) v1sually 1nspect1ng the component's configuration and mounting, (d) rev1ew1ng those documents relating to the operab1lity of each selected component, (e) ensuring the appl1cant has an adequate document retrieval system, and (f) rev1ewing the applicant's preoperational test1ng and maintenance/sur vei 1 lance programs.

The results of the evaluation process are two-fold. Any component spec1fic defic1encies or concerns are identified and documented. Of greater 1mportance are any generic concerns, wh1ch may be 1dentif1ed, that could affect other components 1n the plant or poss1bly even extend to other plants.

During the PVORT review, a number of component spec1f1c concerns were ra1sed. All but one of these spec1f1c concerns was sat1sfactorily resolved during the aud1t by the appl1cant supplying add1t1onal 1nformat1on or demonstrating that administrat1ve procedures were in place &at would

I add<'ess them. The appl1cant committed to resolve the one component spec1fic concern prior to fuel load. In addition, the staff also requested that pr1or to fuel load the applicant confirm that: (a) all act1ve valves are correctly ident1fied 1n the FSAR, (b) all pre-service tests that are required before fuel load- have been completed, and (c) all pumps and valves

'I important to safety are properly qualified and 1nstalled. Shortly after the audit the applicant provided add1tional informat1on and commitments, which satisfactorily resolved the one specific and three generic issues.

. Th1s submittal was added to the docket file for Shearon Harris on January 27,, 1986.

However, a post-aud1t discussion to clarify applicant's submittal ra1sed a new gener1c concern. The new 1ssue is that the qualificat1on of some safety-related equipment does not appear to be 11nked to any test data. In order to resolve th1s concern, the staff requests that the.

applicant prior to fuel load (a) ident1fy all safety-related pumps and valves qualified by analys1s only, (b) )ustify the metho'd of qualification, (c) descr1be how the analyses have been ver1fied to demonstrate equipment operabil1ty, and (d) submit evidence show1ng that the Velan gate valves can be linked to qualification test data.

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III

CONTENTS ABSTRACT ................................;.............................

F OREWORD ...........;..................................................

S UNWARY o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ ~ ~ ~" ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

t' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

1 INTRODUCTION ..........;..............;...........................

2. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY ................................'...;......;

2.1 Nuclear Steam Supp'ly System (NSSS) Components ........

2.1.1 Component Cooling Mater to RHR HX Isolation Valve, 3CC-V165 SA ............ ...............

2.1.2 Reactor Coolant Drain Tank Level Control Valve, 2ML-L600SA-1 .......................... 9 2.1.3 Component Cooling Water Pump, APCC-1C-SAB .... 10 2.1.4 Cold Leg In)ection/RHR Return Line Isolation Valve, 2SI-V579 SA ........................... 13 2.2 Balance of Plant (BOP) Components ...........................

2.2.1 Turbine Driven AFM Pump Suction Line Check Valve, 3CE-V43SAB-1 .......................... 15 2.2.2 Containment Spray Additive Valve, 3CT-V88-SB-l 17 2.2.3 Emergency Service Mater Pump Isolation Valve from the Auxiliary Reservoir, 3SW-BlSA ....... 18 2.2. 4 AFM Pump Discharge Flow Control Valve, 3 AF-F3SA-1 20 2.2.5 Emergency Service Mater Pump, PIA-SA ......... 22 2.2.6 AFW Pump Turbine Steam Supply Isolation Valve, 2HS-V95SA-1 ........................... 25 2.3 Other Equipment qualification Issues ....................... 27 2.3.1 Safety Evaluation Report (SER) Items ......... 28 2.3.2 Long Term Operability of Deep Draft Pumps .... 31 2.3.3 Operability of Turbine Driven AFM Pump PIX-SAB 32 2.3.4 Implementation of the Overall Program ........ 34 3 C 0 N C LU S I0 N ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

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~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 38

4. REFERENCES (NSSS COMPONENTS) 45

5. REFERENCES (BOP COMPONENTS)....................................... 50

TABLES l.. Pumps and Valves Selected. for the PVORT Aud1t .;.................. 4

2. Status of SER Items for Pump and Valve Operab111ty Assurance ..... 29

3. Sumnary of PVORT Aud1t .......................................... 39

AUDIT OF THE PUHP AND VALVE OPERABILITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM FOR THE SHEARON HARRIS GENERATING STATION 1 . INTRODUCTION The Equipment qualification Branch (EgB) performed a two-step review of the Pump and Valve Operability Assurance Program being 1mplemented by the Shearon Harr1s Nuclear Generat1ng Station. The purpose of th1s rev1ew was to determ1ne whether Shearon Harr1s'rogram is adequate to ensure that pumps and valves 1mportant to safety w111 operate when required during the life of the plant under normal and acc1dent conditions. Shearon Harris is a 900-HMe pressurized water reactor (PMR) located 20 miles southwest of Raleigh, North Carolina.

The first step was a review of Section 3.9.3.2 of the applicant's Final Safety Analys1s Report (FSAR). This information was general in nature, however, and by itself was not adequate to properly determine the scope of the appl1cant's overall equipment qualification program as 1t perta1ns to pump and valve operab1lity. The results of this FSAR review appeared as 1nput to Shearon Harr1s'afety Evaluat1on Report (SER). The resolution of all open SER issues was accompl1shed prior to or concurrently with the on-site audit.

The second step of the review was an on-site audit to assess the applicant's overall program, wh1le 1t was being 1mplemented. A Pump and Valve Operab111ty Review Team (PVORT) cons1sting of engineers from the EgB and the Idaho Nat1onal Engineering Laboratory (INEL-EGKG) conducted an audit from December 3 to 6, 1985 of a representative sample of 1nstalled pump and valve assembl1es and the1r supporting qualification documents at the appl1cant's plant s1te. Based upon the results of the FSAR review and the on-site audit, the PVORT was able to determ1ne whether the applicant's overall program conforms to the current licens1ng criteria presented in Sect1on 3.10 of the Standard Review Plan (SRP). Conformance w1th SRP 3.10 criteria is requ1red in order to sat1sfy the appl1cable portions of General

Des1gn Cr1ter1a (GDC)', 2, 4, 14, and 30 of Append1x A to 10 CFR 50 as well as Append1x 8 to 10 CFR 50.

'h Sect1on 2 of th1s report presents the bas1c'methodology used to evaluate Shearon Harr1s'verall equ1pment qual1f1cat1on program as well as a d1scuss1on of the concerns ra1sed dur1ng the evaluat1on of the selected components and other qual1f1cat1on 1ssues. Sect1on 3 presents the staff's conclus1ons concern1qg the aud1t. Sect1ons 4 and 5 present the references for the NSSS and BOP components, respect1vely.

2. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY'n order to evaluate the adequacy of Shearon Harris'ump and Valve Operability'Assurance Program and the extent to which 1t is be1ng implemented, the PVORT conducted an audit at the plant site December 3 to 6, 19S5. The first phase of the on-s1te audit consisted of the applicant

.presenting ihe ma)or element of his overall equ1pment qualificat1on applicable elements of the program had been (or would be) 1mplemented for the set of selected components. By performing a detailed review on a diverse set of components, the PVORT 1s attempting to 1dentify concerns that may be generic to the appl1cant's overall program. Table l presents a 11st of pumps and valves selected for the PVORT aud1t.

As the first step of the deta1led review of the selected components, the PVORT conducted a plant walkdown of each component accompanied by

,cognizant licensee personnel. .One purpose of th1s walkdown was to obtain informat1on that could later be compared with the evidence of qual1f1cation contained in each component's document package. Some examples of walkdown informat1on that was compared with relevant documents are: (a) name plate data versus design and purchase spec1fications, (b) installed configuration and mounting versus the conf1gurat1on and type of mounting that was tested

,(or assumed in an analys1s), (c) local equipment environment (includ1ng the environment that could result from an accident) versus the environment enveloped during required testing, (d) system interfaces versus energy or fluid requ1rements, and (e) installed funct1onal accessories versus actual n

equipment tested. In addition, a second purpose of the walkdown was to evaluate each selected component in order to determ1ne whether any operability concerns may have been overlooked up to that point in t1me.

Examples of such concerns are: (a) the potent1al for flooding, (b) component misapplication, (c) the potent1al for p1pe whip or miss1le damage, and (d) the potent1al for personnel interact1ons that could inadvertently cause a component to become 1noperable.

TABLE l. PUHPS AND VALVES SELECTED FOR THE PVORT AUDIT NSSS Com onents BOP Com onents 3CC-Vl65SA Component Cooling 3CE-V43SAB-1 Turb1ne Driven AFM Mater to RHR HX Pump Suction Line Check Isolat1on Valve Valve 2WL-L600SA-l Reactor Coolant 3CT-VSSSB-l Containment Spray Dra1n Tank Level =Add1t1ve Valve Control Valve 3SM-BlSA'mergency Service Isolat1on Valve from Mater'ump APCC-lC-SAB Component Cooling Mater Pump the Aux111ary Reservo1r 2SI-V579SA Cold Leg 3AF-F3SA-1 AFM Pump Discharge Flow In]ection/RHR Control Valve Return L1ne Isolation Valve PlA-SAa Emergency Serv1ce Mater Pump 2HS-V95A-lb AFM Pump Turbine Steam Supply Isolat1on Valve Note: The app11cant has six weeks to prepare document packages for all but the surprise components; for those he has only a few days. The contents of the document package for the surpr ise components 1s an 1ndicator of: (a) the applicant's ability to-retrieve documents in a t1mely manner, and (b) the completeness of his central files.

a. The applicant prov1ded a separate presentation concern1ng the deep draft pump issue (refer to IE Bullet1n 79-l5) for th1s component.

b. Surprise component The app11cant 1s informed of th1s component only a few days prior 'to the on-s1te audit.

The document rev1ew portion of the au41t was conducted after the completion of the applicant's program presentat1on and the walkdown of the selected components. One purpose of the document rev1ew was to ver1fy that the pr1nciple's establ1sned in Shearon Harris'rogram had been (or would be) uniformly implemented. Therefore, the document package for each of the aud1t components was reviewed to ensure that, as a m1nimum, each package conta1ned t4e follow1ng:

o A purchase specification that reflects design and functional requirements o Results of 'applicable.1n-shop tests Evidence that'he component was sub]ected to a qualif1cat1on plan that addressed:

Pre-ag1ng Sign) f1cant ag1ng mechanisms (1f applicable)

'C Normal and accident loads (including seismic and hydrodynam1c loads)

Acceptance cr1teria requ1ring operabil1ty both during and after an event Identifiable safety margins (d1fference between design basis parameters and the test parameters used for equipment qual 1 f 1 ca t1on )

o Appl1cable preoperat1onal test procedures o Similarity statements, where the qual1ficat1on of a s1milar equipment is used to qualify the installed equipment (if app1 1 cab l e)

o Ev'idence that maintenance/survei 11ance pract1ces incorporate qual.1ficat1on and operabil1ty concerns.

In addition', a second purpose of the document review was to ensure that an auditable 11nk existed between the documents in .the package and that,all documents had been rev1ewed and approved by personnel having a work1ng knowledge of equipment qualification issues and concerns.

h Those documents not present 1n the aud1t component package were requested by the PVORT. Shearon Harris'imely response to these requests and their ability to comp1le a complete package for the surprise components were cons1dered to be pos1tive indicators of the acceptab1lity of the applicant's central file system.

The rema1nder of Sect1on 2 .1s devoted to d1scussing any concerns raised by the PYORT as a result of the equipment and 1ssues rev1ewed during the on-site aud1t. Sect1ons 2.1 and 2.2 present the evaluation of the NSSS and BOP components, respectively. Section 2.3 sumnarizes the status of other equ1pment qualificat1on issues relat1ng to pump and valve operability.

2.1 Nuclear Steam Su l S stem NSSS Com onents 2.l.l Com onent Coolin Mater CCM to RHR HX Isolat1on Valve 3CC-Vl65 SA Audit Status: 0 en await1n resolution b a 11cant 2.1.1.1 Com onent Oescr1 tion. This component is a 12-1nch gate valve manufactured by Velan (Model l2 GM32 SB) powered by a Lim1torque motor operator (Nodel SHB-00-10). The valve 1s located 1n the aux111ary bu1ld1ng at the 236 ft level. The valve 1s normally closed to isolate CCM-Flow from RHR Heat Exchanger l. After the des1gn bases event, the valve opens to pass flow through .the RHR HXl.

There are redundant torque sw1tches to prevent the actuator from exceeding the spec1f1ed torque setting. Likew1se, there are redundant limit sw1tches which read the linear travel of the valve 1tem to ensure full open and closed pos1tions. Upon loss of power the valve will fa11 as 1s.

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2.1.1.2 Com onent Malkdown. The walkdown of th1s component revealed one m1nor anomally, wh1ch was adequately resolved dur1ng the aud1t. The observation was that a caution tag spec1fying the type of lubricant to be used, was found to be mounted ups1de-down on the exterior of the actuator.

The applicant explained that the tag was placed there by the utility's prevent1ve maintenance crew. It is an internally generated program which 1

1s used for ass1stance in the maintenance of Lim1torque actuators.

Regardless of its or1entation, the tag will perform its function of informing the maintenance personnel of the type of grease/lubricant used w1thin the actuator. All Limitorques have been lubr1cated in accordance

,w1th the environmental specifications requir1ng EXXON EP-0. The applicant's d1scuss1on of th1s procedure in this voluntary prevent1ve ma1ntenance program satisfactor1ly resolved th1s walkdown observat1on.

I 2.l.l.3 Document Rev1ew. The rev1ew of the qualif1cation documents 'evealed

[.1-15 that the qual1fication of this component was addressed by a combinat1on of s1milar1ty and stress analyses. The apparent lack of any qualification test data to substantiate valve operabil1ty was d1scussed with the appl1cant. Mestinghouse, who supplied the Velan valve, recomnended that th1s valve undergo addit1onal static deflect1on operab111ty test1ng 1n order to comply w1th the Mestinghouse Pump and Valve Operability Program. The appl1cant declined the proposal for test1ng and instead 1nstructed Mestinghouse to perform a static deflection analysis.

Rev1ew of the stress reports ind1cated that the allowable stress limits and structural clearances were not exceeded when a conservative 5 g load was applied to the valve assembly. The requ1red design load is 3 g hor1zontal and 2 g vert1cal. The Limitorque SHB-00-10 operator was qual1fied by type tests us1ng the SHB-0 and SHB-000 models. These operators met all acceptance cr1ter1a assoc1ated with the type test sequence 1n IEEE 323-1974. In addit1on the applicant prov1ded ev1dence of startup tests performed at the plant to measure valve stroke times, .sw1tch set t1ngs, and motor voltage and insulation. However, these star tup tests

.were conducted at less than design load conditions.

At the conclusion of the site audit, the PVORT identified a specific issue which the appl1cant must resolve prior to fuel load.. The confirmatory issue is that valve 3CC-V165 has not been qualified by test1ng. Therefore, 1n lieu of, testing, the applicant shall ]ustify the ability of this valve assembly to operate as required under its des1gn load cond1tions. If qualification by s1m1larity is used, the appl1cant shall 1nclude a descript1on of other tests performed as well as the bas1s for establish1ng the similarity of the installed valve w1th the valve tested.

Evidence of test data, as'ell as complet1on of the startup and pre-operat1onal tests, w111 provide conf1dence that the valve will operate as requ1red.

Shortly after the audit the appl1cant explained 1n a January 27, 1986 letter* that valve 3CC-V165 is not requ1red to operate unt11 approx1mately 2G minutes follow1ng a large LOCA. Dur1ng the worst postulated event (LOCA and SSE), the value 1s normally closed and w11l not rece1ve any LOCA loads, only SSE loads. Since the valve disc w1ll already be pressed firmly aga1nst 1ts seat, the appl1cant predicts that the SSE loads will not adversely affect the functional1ty of the valve internals. This clareficat1on of the valve's safety function plus the on-site rev1ew of the valve assembly analys1s and valve actuator test reports prov1de conf1dence that valve 3CC-Vl65 will function as requ1red.. Therefore, the specific confirmatory issue for valve 3CC-V165 1s cons1dered to be closed.

However, a new generic open 1ssue arose from a post-audit discuss1on ~

with the appl1cant on February 21, 1986. The open issue 1s that the qualification of some safety-related equ1pment does not appear to.be 11nked to any test data. In order to resolve this 1ssue, the appl1cant shall submit the appropr1ate information requested in Sect1on 3.

• Letter from A. 8. Cutter, V1ce President, Nuclear Engineering and L1censing Carol1na Po~er and L1ght Company, to H. R. Denton, D1rector, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission, Se1smic uglification and Pump and Valve 0 erabil1t Reviews, NLS-85-463, January 27, 1986.

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2.1.1.4 ~stndtn s. No spectftc operabtltty concerns renatried after the evaluation of this component.

2.1.2, Reactor Coolant Drain Tank Level Control Valve 2ML-L600SA-1 Audit 2.1.2.1 Com onent Descri tion.- Th1s component is a three-inch a1r operated.'globe valve manufactured by Copes Vulcan (Hodel 3RA92 RE). The valve is located in the liqu1d,waste process system inside the conta1nment building at the 230 ft level. Dur1ng normal operat1on the value controls the level in the reactor coolant dra1n tank (RCDT) by d1verting water to the boron .recycle system. The safety function of the valve 1s to close for conta1nment isolat1on. Upon loss of power to the operator the valve fails closed wh1ch is the fa11-safe position.

2.1.2'.2 Com onen't Malkdown. The walkdown of this component revealed one anomaly, wh'hach was resolved before the close of the aud1t. The flow d1rection could not be found on the valve body or ad)acent piping. The applicant presented the layout draw1ng and component sketch which confirmed that the valve was properly 1nstalled. In addition, since the valve had already been released for test1ng, an 1mproper configuration would have been read1ly identified by the variance from des1gn parameters.

2.1.2.3 Document Review. The rev1ew of the qualificat1on documents

[l6-28] revealed that the qualification of th1s component was addressed by a comb1nation of tests, analyses, and similarity statements.

2 The valve assembly was analyzed using a l60 1nch operator compared to 2

the 100 inch operator installed. Se1smic loads oF 3 gH and 2 gV were applied, envelop1ng the 2.1 g (H/H/V) design'specif1cation value. The resulting stresses and deflections were found to be w1thin the ASIDE Sect1on III acceptance criteria. A static deflection test, performed at 5.66 g us1ng the larger operator, yielded valve opening and closure times of 2e4 and 1 seconds compared to the spec1fied 11mit of 10 seconds maximum; The test using the larger operator was considered to be acceptable s1nce the mounting conf1gurat1ons of both operators are identical. The or1ginal limit sw1tches provided for the valve were

replaced w1th NAMCO EA-180 ser1es for inside conta1nment environmenta'1 qualif1cation requirements. The 11m1t switches will be replaced every 20 years as specified by the plant maintenance procedures wh1ch invoke the manufacturer's technical manual.The station staff chose to seal the conduit connect1ons of the ASCO soleno1d valves 1n order to eliminate problems with moisture 1ntrusion. Th1s act1on was taken 1n lieu of the manufacturer's recommendation to use a properly vented conduit/]unction box system. The applicant's decis1on appears to be conservat1ve and should not detract from the qual1f1ed life of the component.

2.1.2.4 ~F'Ind)n s. No spectf1c operabt11ty concerns rematned after the evaluation of this component.

2.1.3 Com onent Coolin Mater Pum APCCO-1C-SAB Audit Status: Closed 2.1.3.1 Com anent Oescr1 tion. This component is a horizontal, centrifugal, 9150 gpm pump manufactured by Pacif1c Pumps (Model DSK, 16 x 18 in., l stage) with an 1nduct1on dripproof 800 h.p. electric motor dr1ver manufactured by Mestinghouse Electric (Model Life Line D, HSOP).

The pump 1s located 1n the Auxil1ary Building at the 236-ft level. This pump is one of three l00 percent capacity pumps 1n the component cool1ng

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water system all of which are in parallel with each other. Nor'mal system operation requ1res only one pump in operat1on at a t1me however, two pumps must be ava1lable to meet single fa1lure criter1a. The normal operation of th1s system 1nvolves one pump operating to supply cooling water to NSSS heat exchangers. During coo11ng down of the plant, two pumps are requireg. The emergency function 1s to supply cooling water to the safeguard pumps. On the receipt of an "S" or station blackout s1gnal two pumps start up.

2.1.3.2 Com onent Malkdown. The walkdown of this component identified seven concerns all of which were resolved before the close of the audit, The first concern involved what appeared to be a temporary mod1fication that was made to the pump power supply connection box. The problems were that a temporary cover had been installed and some of the cover hold down screws had not been installed. The appl>cant investigated .

th1s 1tem and found that the original cover had been removed and a temporary installed while work was being perFormed in the cabinet. The appl1cant demonstrated that the correct cover would be installed. Second, the power cable connect1ons at the motor did not appear to'e complete because a flexible conduit was hanging free 1n the a1r. The appl1cant 1nvestigated the problem and found that the motor has the'capab1lity of receiving power from more than one source. At the time of the walkdwon, the applicant had not decide4 how the motor was to be wire4 up. The plant engineering personnel reviewed and resolved the problem. A field change request was generated that resulted 1n the flexible conduit being removed and the holes capped. Third, an RTD w1re on the inboard motor bearing had been broken- ofF. The appl1cant 1nvestigated the broken wire and found that the deficiency had been identified earlier. The appl1cant also found that the w1re had been repaired between the time of the audit team's tour and their investigation. Fourth, some anchor bolts on a stanchion 1nstalle4 in the vic1nity of the pump appeare4'o be too long and at an uneven he1ght.

The applicant demonstrated that the bolts had been 1nstalled'n accordance with design requ1rements. The fifth concern 1dent1fied dur1ng the walkdown involved some "0" rings that had been taped to a vent pipe'on the top of the pump. The concern was that the "0" rings had been taped there for use dur1ng ma1ntenance and then had not been used. The applicant explained that 'the "0" r1ngs had been taped in place so that they would not be lost dur1ng maintenance act1v1ties.'owever, when the maintenance had been performed the "0" rings were replaced with spares that met the same requirements. The applicant will remove the extra 0-r1ngs from the vent pipe. S1xth, a construct1on hold tag for vent p1pe installat1on was found to be hung on the vent pipe. The concern was that the tag had been hung, the work'performed, and the tag had not been removed. To correct this lack of tag control, the applicant processed a proce4ure change that requ1red the tags to be removed prior to equipment turnover. The final problem

'involved lock1ng pins that had been installed on a var1able spring support on the pump suction before the pump had been tested. The concern was that w1th the pins 1nstalled, there was a potent1al for the 1nstallation to exceed 1ts stress lim1ts. The app11cant'nd1cated that the testing with the p1ns 1nstalled had been evaluated before the testing was started.

Proof that the evaluat1on had been performed was prov1ded. Documentation was reviewed, which found the applicant's d1scuss1on and evaluation to be acceptable.

2.1.3.3 Document Review. The review of the qualificat1on documents [29-48] revealed that the qualification of this component was addressed by a combination of tests, analyses and operational test1ng'. The pump was qualified by performing shell hydrostatic, exploratory v1brat1on, thermal and mechanical aging, bearing temperature, vibration levels, seal leakage, and flow performance test1ng. The se1sm1c qual1fication was done by analysis. The motor was qualified for mechanical loads by analys1s.

The qual1fication for aging and env1ronmental cond1tions was demonstrated by similar1ty using generic type test results.

During the document review, five concerns were 1dent1fied. The first concern involved special pump bolt torqueing requirements that were identif1ed in the qualification documents. It was not clear that these requirements were ident151ed for ma1ntenance. The applicant ind1cated that these requ1rements were identif1ed in a corrective maintenance procedure.

The second concern 1nvolved the lube o11 requirements for the pump. The pump apparently required special oil but it was not clear that the correct o11 had been identified for ma1ntenance. The applicant demonstrated that the correct o11 had in fact been identified. The third concern involved a pump flow curve that was not included in a qualification document package for all component cool1ng water pumps. The appl1cant 1nd1cated that the or1g1nal pump des1gn document would have allo~ed the pump discharge pressure to be h1gh enough to overpressur1ze the component cooling water system 1f the pumps were deadheaded. Consequently, mod1f1cat1on of the pump impellers was requ1red to prevent system overpressurizat1on. Once the impellers were changed, new pump flow curves had to be prov1ded. The document package that was reviewed was the presentation of the new curves.

The package addressed spare pumps as well. The appl1cant provided evidence that the pumps w1th flow curves had been 1nstalled and that the pump m1ss1ng a curve was a spare and not requ1red. The fourth problem involved the aging of the motor. The aging test performed on the motor 1dent1fied that the motor had a lifet1me of five years. It was not clear 1f th'

I ma1ntenance specified that the motor had to be replaced at a five year .

1nterval. The applicant stated that-the motor was qualif1ed for the life of the plant. The original ag1ng qualificat1on was done at the most conservat1ve cond1tion. When the l1fetime was found to be that short of the plant design life a more. realistic approach was 'used. The requal1f ication considered environmental and aging cond1tions that the motor would more likely exper1ence. 'After the aud1t this approach'was discussed with equipment qualification experts who 1ndicated that this is 'n industry accepted practice. The final concern 1volved'a d1screpancy 1n the humidity qualification of the motor. The humidity referenced 1n two documents was d1fferent and 1t was not clear which value was the correct. The applicant determined the correct humidity and prov1ded proof that 1t was within the acceptance cr1teria.

II 2.1.3.4 ~Ftndtn s. No other speciftc operabtlSty concerns rema1ned after the evaluat1on of th1s component.

2.1.4 Cold Le In ection/RHR Return Line Isolation Valve 2SI-V579 SA Aud1t Status: .

Closed 2.1.4.1 Com cnent Oescri tion. This component 1s a 10 inch gate valve manufactured by Westinghouse (Model 10001GM99FNB020) w1th a motor operator manufactured by L1m1torque (Model SB-2-60). The valve 1s located 1n the safety in)ection system ins1de the Auxil1ary Building at the 251-ft level. The valve is normally open in the discharge l1ne from the RHR pump downstream of the RHR heat exchanger. The normal funct1on of the valve 1s to remain open for cold leg in)ection and recirculat1on. The safety function is to close for containment 1solation and hot leg recircalation.

There are redundant torque sw1tches to prevent the actuator from exceed1ng the spec1fied torque setting. Likewise., there are redundant limit switches wh1ch read the linear travel of the valve stem to ensure full open and closed pos1t1ons. Upon loss of power, the valve will fai.l as 1s, wh1ch is the fail safe position. The valve 1s required to be operable for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after event in1t1ation.

13

2.1.4:2 Com onent Walkdown. The walkdown of this component discovered an equipment mod1fication tag in place. Upon quest1oning, the applicant explained that a general work order had been generated to provide external 11m1t switches for redundant pos1tion 1ndication on var1'ous valves. The modification was complete for the valve inspected and the tag w1ll be removed upon completion of the modification for the rema1ning valves. The vendor drawing and documentation were found to be cons1stent with the installed value assembly 1nclud1ng the two new external 11mit sw1tches.

2.1.4.3 Document Review. The review of the qualif1cat1on 9-661 documents 1

revealed that the qualificat1on of this component was addressed by a combination of tests, analyses, and similar1ty statements.

The L1m1torque operator was included in the gener1c design group of SHB-0 operators qualif1ed by type tests for Class lE serv1ce outs1de primary conta1nment. The static deflection test results for gener1c 4 and l2-1nch valve assembl1es were used to qualify the 10-1nch valve by sim1larity.

Startup test data of the 1nstalled valve demonstrated that the actual stroke time of 10.6 seconds satisfied the l5 second requirement. The stress analysis of the valve assembly met the cr1teria of the 1974 ASIDE code, Sect1on III. Hydrostatic tests at 2500 ps1 measured 5.0 cc/hr leakage compared to the specified lim1t of 30 cc/hr. In addit1on,, th1s valve was generically qual1fied to design cond1tions of 2500 ps1g and 650'F although the actual operating condit1ons are l00 to 400 psig and 100 to 350 F. Consequently, the valve is conservatively overqualified for its spec1fied service cond1t1ons. Westinghouse eng1neers d1sc'ussed the1r test program for evaluat1ng the effects of d1fferential pressure and flow rate upon the valve closure loads. 'Their results concluded that the requ1red closing thrust is d1rectly related to the differential pressure present during the closing stroke. In addit1on within the constra1nts of their test; the flow rate d1d not s1gnif1cantly affect the clos1ng load.

Westinghouse used these test results to ensure that the SB-2-'60 operator was capable of overcoming valve stem fr1ction losses during closure.

14

k s

The NAHCO EA-180 l1m1t switches completed 'the full IEEE 323-1974 test sequence including caustic spray environment. Th1s degree of qualif1cat1on is conservative for 1ts 1ntended applicat1on on valve 2SI-V579 SA, since the valve lies outside pr1mary containment. The stat1on staff maintenance personnel conf1rmed that maintenance procedures have been written wh1ch invoke the manufacturer's recomnendations for replacement of limited, life.

components.

2.1.4.4 ~F'Ind1n s. No other spec1ft coperabtltty concerns remmtned after the evaluat1on of this component.

2;2 Balance of Plant BOP Com onents 2.2.1 Turbine Driven Auxiliar Feedwater Pum Suction Line Check Valve 3CE-V43SAB-l Audi t Sta tus: Closed 2.2.l.l Com onent Descr1 t1on. Th1s component is an e1ght-inch Duo-Wafer Check valve manufactured by TRM emission (Hodel Kl5SPF-Ul2) and 1s located near the turbine driven auxil1ary feed pump in the Aux111ary Bu1ld1ng at elevat1on level 236 ft. The valve 1s in the 11ne from the condensate storage tank to the suction of the steam driven aux111ary feed pump. The valve prevents backflow 1n the suct1on l1ne of the turbine driven pump when the motor driven aux111ary feedwater pumps are operated with the turbine driven pump 1dle. The valve opens to allow flow in the suction line when the turbine dr1ven pump is operated. The valve is normally closed but must open when aux111ary feedwater is to be suppl1ed by the turbine driven pump.

2.2.1.2 Co onent Walkdown. The valve was verified to be an 8 in.

TRW emission valve.. The valve was verified to be bolted between two mating flanges and, therefore, only sub)ected to compress1ve stress. The valve was also ver1fied to be pipe supported. One anomaly was observed 1n the installation. Three plugs were observed to be in place on the top of the valve. On the bottom of the valve two plugs were in place and one hole was observed without a plug. Subsequent discuss1ons with the 11censee revealed the open hole was for a 11fting eye bolt. However, w1th.this hole located l5

on the bottom the drain hole would be located on the top..The licensee stated the dra1n is not used s1nce the pipinq system is prov1ded with low point dra1ns and the valve is not installed at a low point. Also, the licensee stated that the either orientation was acceptable for value operat1on. After studying the valve draw1ng the explanation was cons1dered acceptable and the anomaly resolved.

2.2.1.3 Document Rev1ew. The review of the documents [1-1l ]

revealed that the operab111ty qualification of the valve was based on normal operating tests and seismic analys1s. The valve design condit1ons were 150 psig at l40 F wh1ch exceed the most severe acc1dent cond1t1on of l30 psig at 125'F. 'he se1sm1c design requirements were for 3.0 g hor1zontal and 2 g verticals. The se1sm1c analys1s demonstrated the valve could stand loads much 1n excess of the requirement.

The review of the seism1c analys1s revealed that only the natural frequency of the valve body was calculated and the natural frequency of the duo-wafer discs were not addressed; The licensee reply to this question was that the check valve manufacturer does not evaluate the natural frequency=-of the d1scs since the developed stresses are extremely low. In addit1on, the spr1ng and we1ght of the water serve to keep the discs against the seats when the valve.is performing 1ts check funct1on. 'The reply was cons1dered sat1sfactory and the quest1on resolved.

The review also revealed that the des1gn specification identified des1gn end loads for the valve. The end loads were not considered 1n the analys1s. The l1censee reply to this quest1on was that the check valve is bolted between two mat1ng flanges and is, therefore, only sub)ected to a compressive load induced when the bolts are t1ghtened. Th1s load has been cons1dered in the se1smic analyses. The requ1rement to consider the end load should have been deleted from, the general specificat1on when the specificat1on was ut111zed to purchase wafer check valves; The reply was cons1dered satisfactory and the quest1on resolved.

The PVORT Form reported the acceptable leak rate as 320 liters/hr.

The Des1gn Spec1f1cat1on H-70 requires seat tightness per HSS-SP-61. The 16

allowable leak rate per this standard would be 320 mill111ters per hr. The 11censee acknowledged the error. The results, of the leak test for the valve was 5.33 cc/min or 319.8 m111111ters per hour wh1ch is acceptable and the question resolved.

2.2.1.4 ~ffnd)n s. All" questions were sattsfaotort ly resolved and no specif1c operab111ty concerns rema1ned after the evaluat1on of th1s component.

2.2.2 Containment S ra Chemical Addit1ve Valve 3CT-VBBSB-l Aud1t Status: Closed 2.2.2.1 -Com onent Oescri t1on. This component is a 2 inch motor operated globe valve manufactured by Yarway. (Model 5515-F3168). The operator 1s a gear motor operator manufactured by Philadelph1a Gear L1mitorque Corp. (Yodel SHB-00-15). The valve is located 1n the reactor aux111ary building at elevat1on 219 ft and 1s installed on the 11ne from the conta1nment spray add1t1ve tank to the eductor that adds chemicals to the conta1nment spray water. The valve opens 100 seconds after a containment spray actuation s1gnal. The delay allows the operator to decide if the borated NaOH from the containment spray add1t1ve tank needs to be in)ected into the containment spray.

2.2.2.2 Com onent Malkdown. The valve and operator were verified to be the size and models specif1ed. The valve was verified to be pipe supported. The operator was ver1fied to be supported by the valve but, in addit1on, the operator was found to have a brace from the operator to an anchor. There was some concern that motion of the p1pe from thermal expans1on, seism1c loads and acc1dent loads could 1ntroduce excessive loads on the valve operator or the valve because the brace would restrain movement of the actuator. The support 1dentification .1s CT-H-497.

Calculations (Number 3048-6) were provided by the applicant verifying that the valve and pipe loads were acceptable. The concern was, considered resolved.

, 2.2.2.3 'ocument Revie~. The rev1ew of the documents [12-16]

revealed that the valve assembly was qualified by a comb1nation of tests and analysis..The valve body was qualified by stress analysis which demonstrated that the valve parts, yoke, actuator connection bolts, valve body, and valve stem had acceptable stress levels. The L1m1torque operator was qua11fied by test. The document prov1ded to ver1fy the acceptance was Reference l5. The document demonstrated qual1ficat1on for a series of Limitorque operators. Model SMB-00-15 was 1ncluded in the ser1es. The report indicated that the tests performed to qual1fy the series of operators included thermal ag1ng, mechanical aging, radiation exposure, seismic dwell test, hydrostat1c tests, seat leakage test and valve closure tests.

The des1gn bas1s event conditions were identified as 10 psig and 105'F. The valve is a 1500 lb valve which is qualified for loads much in excess of these cond1t1ons. The valve was.1denti fied to be acceptable for NaOH service.

2.2.2.4. Flnd~nqs. All questions vere sattsfactortly resolved and no specific operab111ty concerns remained after the evaluat1on of this component.

2.2.3 Emer enc Service Water Pum Isolation From the Auxiliar Reservoir 3SW-81SA Audit Status: Closed 2.2.3.1 Co onent Descri tion. This component 1s a 30-in. butterfly valve manufactured by Jamesbury Corporation (Model 8229-MT) w1th a motor operator manufactured by Lim1torque (Model SMB 00/10 H2BC). The valve is 1nstalled 1n the Emergency Service Water and Cool1ng Tower Makeup Intake Structure. There. are two valves in redundant loops each capable of supply1ng the necessary flow. The valve's normal position is open to allow flow from the auxil1ary reservo1r. The safety pos1t1on is open for a loss of offs1te electrical power or safety in]ection actuat1on signal. Th1s valve 1s closed if the Emergency Serv1ce Water Pumps take a suct1on from the main reservoir.

18

2.2.3.2 Com onent Malkdown. Our ing the walkdown of thi s component, three operability concerns were 1dentified all of wh1ch were resolved before the close of the aud1t. The f1rst concern 1nvolved some temporary wires that had been attached to the motor operator. The applicant was asked to explain the purpose of the wires and to indicate when the installation would be made permanent. The applicant researched the 1nstallation and found that the wires were connected to motor space heaters. The space heaters are not necessary for normal operation,.

however, they are used during normal construct1on and startup. The temporary connections will be removed soon after these act1vities are completed. The second problem found dur1ng the walkdown was that some condu1t covers had not been installed. The appl1cant demonstrated that the miss1ng conduit covers would be 1dent1fied and installed during the bu11 ding walkdown.

The third walkdown concern 'involved water that had collected in the pit where the valve was 1nstalled, subsequently damag1ng the actuator. The applicant was asked to 1dentify the cause of the flooding, the corrective act1ons taken to restore 'the component to a qual1f1ed state, and the protect1ve measures taken to prevent a recurrence. The appl1cant explained that a large rainfall had caused a berm surrounding the aux111ary reservo1r to fa11. At that t1me the pipeline to the reservoir was still disconnected

( i.e., open) due to construction activit1es. The rainwater then entered the valve p1t through the open pipes, flooding the valve and actuator. The applicant sh1pped the damaged actuator to the vendor for repair and requalification, before 1t was re1nstalled. Oocumentation was later reviewed which supported the applicant's discussion.

The PVORT rev1ewers pointed out to the appl1cant that some residual water st1ll remained 1n the pit, although the water d1d not contact the valve assembly. There d1d not appear to be any method for removing the water nor any means of mon1tor1ng the water, level to alert the plant operator of a submergence hazard. Upon investigation, the applicant explained that a portable pump will be used t'o remove all water from the pit. Normal plant ope. at1ng procedures requ1re an aux111ary operator to perform a dally walkdown of the Emergency Service Rater and Cool1ng Tower 19

Makeup Intake Structure. Furthermore, the scenario for a recurrence of flooding has been el1minated, because the pipes have been connected up as specified and the berm has been reinforced. The corrective and preventive measures taken by the appl1cant appear to be adequate to address the operab1lity concerns d1scussed above.

2.2.3.3 Document Review. The review of the qualif1cat1on

[17-31]

documents 1ndicated that qual1ficat1on of this component was addressed by a comb1nation of tests, analyses and similarity. The valve was qual1f1ed for seismic loads by analysis. The Lim1torque was qual1fied by sim1lar1ty using the results of seismic tests performed on a similar unit. Additional vendor test1ng was performed on the valve and actuator.

The test1ng included ag1ng, acc1dent env1ronment operat1on, hydrostatic, seat leakage and environmental testing. All vendor test1ng was completed satisfactorily without any anomalies.

The Limitorque actuator was qualified for env1ronmental condit1ons by s1milarity. The Limitorque actuator env1ronmental qualificat1on report was prepared cover1ng a family of actuators that shared the same design features, materials, standards, and tolerances. The discuss1on presented 1n the qualificat1on report adequately addressed s1milarity qualificat1on.

2.2.3.a ~Ftndtn s. No specsftc operabtttty concerns rematned after the evaluation of this .component.

2.2.4 Aux1liar Feedwater Control Valve 3AF-F3SA-l Audit Status: Closed 2.2.4.1 Com onent Oescri tion. This component 1s a 3 1nch globe valve with a electro-hydraul1c actuator. The valve is manufactured by Masoneilen (Model. 50-41412). The operator is a M1lliampere Hydramotor Actuator and is manufactured by ITT. General Controls (Model NH92J8002F).

The valve is located 1n the d1scharge line of the 1B-SB motor dr1ven aux111ary feedwater pump 1n the aux1liary bu111ng at elevation 26l ft. The valve 1s used to regulate flow from the lB-SB motor driven pump to prov1de a regulated flow balanced with the flow from the other motor driven pump.-

Auxiliary feedwater is normally prov1ded by the motor dr1ven pumps dur1ng 20

start'-up, hot-standby and cold shutdown. Auxil1ary feedwater 1s also required for accidents such as loss of main feedwater., steamline rupture and loss of coolant accident. The valve must function for all of thes'e events. Also the valve must be able to close to protect against feedwater header or mainsteam header rupture. Upon loss of power the valve will fail open to ensure an auxiliary feedwater path.

2.2.4.2 Com onent Malkdown. The walkdown of this component ver1f1ed that the 1nstalled valve assembly 1s the same as the equipment purchased.

The valve was ver1fied to be mounted in and supported by a hor1zontal pipe. There was one anomaly d1scovered dur1ng the walkdown, wh1ch was adequately resolved by discussions with the applicant. A flow direct1on tag, which was, spot welded to the valise body, was observed to be 1nstalled upside down. If the tag was turned upright, the flow arrow would point in the oppos1te direct1on, indicating that the valve was 1nstalled backwards.

Upon review of the system draw1ngs, the applicant confirmed that the observed orientat1on of the valve body 1s correct. The appl1cant originally 1ntended to mount the tag upright on the other s1de of the valve body to ind1cate the proper flow direct1on. However, access to that side was limited. Therefore, the tag was mounted 1n its present locat1on to 1nd1cate the proper flow direction, although the valve manufacturer's trademark 1s now ups1de down. Th1s explanation adequately resolved the walkdown concerns.

[32-35]

2.2.4.3 Oocument Review. The rev1ew of the documents revealed that the valve assembly was qualified by a comb1nation of analyses and test. A mathematical model was made of the valve and operator assembly and the fundamental natural frequency was computed to be 15.57 Hz. The Fundamental frequency measured from the str1ke test was 19.14 Hz. The agreement was considered to suffic1ent to ver1fy the acceptab111ty of the model. The assembly was analyzed for the specified seismic motion at the 26l ft level 1n the auxil1ary building. The computed stresses were acceptable and the maximum load was calculated to be 1.5 g. Static tests were run w1th a conservative 4 g load and the stroke time met the acceptance cr1teria.

21

The system accident condit1ons were specified as l275 psig and 100 F.

The valve des1gn conditions were l600 ps1g at 125'F. The max1mum hP for the valve was stated as 5 ps1 on the Operability Assurance Review Form (Reference 33) but the Des1gn Specification (Reference 34) requ1red 1085 psig. The applicant indicated the 5 ps1 was an error and the valve did meet the 1085 psig requ1rement. This contention was ver1f1ed since the valve passed the required leak test with a 4P of.1600 psig.

During the environmental qualification tests after exposure to temperature, radiation, steam and pressure, the valve d1d not funct1on properly. Several modificat1ons were made to the operator and the valve successfully passed the tests. In response to our request for verificat1on v

that these modifications had been made to the operators of the valves that are installed 1n the plant, a Certification of Conformance was provided that cert1fed that. the ITT General Controls NH90 actuators had been, retrofitted 1n accordance w1th the Operator gualification Report.

2.2.4.4 ~Flndtn s. All questtons vere sattsfactortly resolved and no specific operability concerns rema1ned after the evaluation of th1s s

component.

2.2.5 Emer enc Service Mater ESM Pum PlA-SA Audit Status: Closed 2.2.5.l Com onent Descri t1on. Th1s component is a centrifugal, vert1cal "deep draft" 21500 GPM pump manufactured by Hayward Tyler (Model 32x420SOl) and 1's dr1ven by a vert1cal induction, 1300 HP motor manufactured by General'Electric Company (Model 5K6356XC2lA). The pump 1s located 1n the Emergency Service Mater Intake Structure at the 262-ft level. There are two 100 percent capac1ty pumps, only one wh1ch 1s needed to sat1sfy the water requirements for plant shutdown. Normally, the ESM pumps draw suction from the Aux111ary Reservoir, although the main reservoir can be used if necessary. The normal state of the ESM pump is standby for auto-start. The safety function is to start automat1cally on loss of offs1te power or in the event of a safety in]ection s1gnal. The lineup of valves required for the switchover from the normal service water 22

pumps to the ESM pumps is automatic following the startup of the ESM pumps. The ESM pump is required to remain operable for 30 days post accident.

2.2.5.2 Com onent Malkdown. The walkdown of this component re'vealed two anomal1es, both of which were satisfactorily explained by plant personnel. First, a def1ciency tag was attached to the pump motor. Plant maintenance personnel explained that a temporary gasket had been installed in the motor terminal box while awa1ting the qualified replacement gasket.

Mhen the work request is completed,- the deficiency tag w111 be removed and attached to the completed work request. Documentation was rev1ewed, wh1ch substantiated th1s explanat1on in' sat1sfactory manner.

Second, the seal water supply l1ne was found to be sl1ghtly. rusted and partially immersed 1n a pool of water created by the pump cover plate. The Ebasco engineers expla1'ned that th1s problem was previously ident1fied earl1er by the vendor. As recommended by the vendor, a design change has been in1tiated to prov1de a 1/2 inch hole 1n the pump base plate, permitting drainage to the pump suct1on bay below'. The p1pe w1ll be carefully exam1ned and repaired or replaced as necessary. Documentation was reviewed, which substant1ated the explanation. However, the PVORT noticed that the work order was written the day after the on-s1te walkdown. Upon quest1oning, the maintenance engineer speculated that the pump vendor d1d not cons1der th1s modificat1on to be a high pr1or1ty item, poss1bly account1ng for the "less-than-prompt" act1on taken to process the work order. The PVORT ment1oned the possib111ty that the work order would not have been written 1f the PVORT had not raised the concern dur1ng the walkdown. This matter was d1scussed pr1vately with other PVORT rev1ewers.

Although, there were other isolated cases of recently dated work orders, the PVORT did not. consider this observation to be a licensing 1ssue because (1) the overall qual1ficat1on. program is very comprehens1ve tying together the respons1bil1t1es of many disciplines and (2) the generation of the work orders as well as prompt document retrieval typifies the ability of the appl1cant to 1mplement his program. The PVORT d1d remind the appl1cant that his program must be v1gorously pursued by knowledgeable personnel on all levels for the 11fe of the plant.

23

.2 5 5 . Th \ f h 552

• 5-5 1

fl 11 hl addressed by a comb1nat1on of tests, analysis, and operat1ng exper1ence.

The motor was qualified for mechan1cal loads by analys1s. gualification of the motor for aging,and environmental cond1t1ons was demonstrated by s1m1larity, using generic type test results. The pump was qualif1ed by analys1s, shop tests, and pre-operat1onal tests. The pump performance curves were still be1ng developed from the pre-operat1onal test data and w1ll be compared with the design spec1f1cat1on.

The ESM pumps lA and 18 exper1enced material fa1lures to the bearings result1ng from inadequate seal, water in]ection. The loss of pump d1scharge pressure and flow occurred dur1ng operation of the lA ESM pump on September 5, 1985. Subsequent inspection by the appl1cant revealed that the pump shaft sheared at the pump upper bear1ng .due to extreme overheating. The bearing and shaft sleeve were destroyed and no further conclusions could be drawn from their failure. Subsequent inspections of the 1B ESM pump revealed overheat1ng damage to the upper pump bearing which could have lead to a similar pump fa1lure.

~

Upon reassembly of pump lA the bear1ng hous1ng was d1scovered to be slightly "hour-glass." shaped by 30 mils compared to the nom1nal diameter of 6.623 1nches. Oue to the absence of any metal discolorat1on, the "hour-glass" shape was cons1dered to be a construct1on anomaly rather than the result of overheating. The problem was corrected by honing the 1ns1de d1ameter of the hous1ng.

Upon further 1nvest1gation, the applicant determined, that pr1or to the reported fa1lure ne1ther pump had been operated with seal in)ection flows spec1f1ed by the pump manufacturer. Pending the des1gn and construct1on of the permanent seal water p1ping system,"seal in)ection water was prov1ded by a temporary configurat1on us1ng th'e f1re protection water system. This temporary system fa1led to'del1ver the stated cooling needs of 10 GPH at 125 psig required by the bearing. This configurat1on was used for over approximately 12 months of intermittent pump operation.

24

The final des'1gn for seal in]ection rel1ed upon a booster pump when the ESM pump was in standby or start1ng and an ESW screen wash pump when the ESW pump was runn1ng. A relief. valve set at ll8 ps1g upstream of the cyclone separator lifted whenever the booster pump was used. In order to prevent the rel1ef valve from lifting, the reduced ESM pump d1scharge pressure (100 psig) was used as the sole source of seal in)ection flow.

The lA pump failure occurred -during th1s interval.

The corrective act1on taken by the applicant was to remove the r'elief valve and qual1fy the seal in)ection line to the design pressure (225 psig) of the booster pump. The final report on th1s matter w1ll be 1ssued by March 1, 1986 upon completion of the testing of both ESW pumps as requ1red by IE bullet1n 83-05. The PVORT requested a copy of the f1nal report as confirmation that the pump failure problem has been addressed 1n a satisfactory manner.

The applicant's response'o IE Bulletin 79-15 "Long-Term Operability of Deep Draft Pumps" was reviewed. Long-term operation was demonstrated by a 78 hour9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br /> continuous run after the modificat1on to the seal in]ection system was completed., By also implementing the v1bration analysts program and maintenance/surveillance program, the applicant has sat1sf1ed the Licensing-Rev1ew Group.II guidelines, endorsed by NRC-EgB staff.

The favorable results of the walkdown and document review, as well as the on-going discuss1ons and clarifications with stat1on staff, provide confidence that the component will function as required for the life of the plant.

2.2.5.4 ~Ftndtn s. No spectftc operabtltty concerns rematne4 after the evaluat1on of, this component.

I 2.2.6 Auxiliar Feedwater AFM Pum Turbine Steam Su 1 Isolation Valve 2MS-V95A-1 Audit Status: Closed 2.2.6.1- Com onent Descr1 tion. This component is a 6-1nch gate valve manufactured by Anchor Darling Valve Company (Hodel SC-2) w1th a Lim1torque 25

motor operator (Model SMB-00-l5). Valve 2MS-V95A-l is located in the Reactor Auxiliary Building/Main Steam Tunnel at the 261 foot elevation.

This valve 1s an isolation in the steam supply line from steam generator "1 C" to the aux1liary feedwater pump turb1ne. The normal pos1t1on for this valve 1s closed. There are two safety positions associated with this valve; one open and the other closed. The open posit1on is provided when the valve is required to open on the receipt of an AFN actuation signal.

The closed posit1on .is provided when the valve receives an isolat1on signal on a main steam l1ne break.

2.2.6.2 Com onent Malkdown. The walkdown of th1s component led to two concerns, both of wh1ch were satisfactor1ly addressed before the close of the aud1t. The f1rst concern 1nvolved an actuator that had a plastic tag mounted that ind1cated only Mob1l Type 28 grease could be used. The concern was that the correct grease would not be identified in the lubricat1on procedures. The applicant demonstrated that lubr1cation was being performed in accordance with manufacturer's. requ1rements and IEB 79-03. The lubricat1on procedures had not been completed yet, however, the procedure that will be used 1n their preparat1on was presented. It was determined that the procedure should be adequate enough to determine the necessary lubrication requ1rements. The second concern 1nvolved a blue RFT (Released For Transfer) which had been altered by hav1ng RFT crossed out and ET (Equ1pment Transfer) penciled in. The concern was that the tag was being used for purposes for which it was not .intended. The applicant demonstrated that the changes had been made in accordance w1th the startup manual which was found acceptable.

d <<d\

2.2.6.

addressed I 57-7 by a comb1nation

. T PI 1

d I' q 1R*<<

of tests, analyses, and similar1ty. Se1smic tests were performed on the actuator and analysis on the valve. Vendor tests included aging accident env1ronment, hydrostat1c and seat leakage.

~r It was found that all vendor testing was completed satisfactorily w1thout any anomal1es. It was noted that the L1mitorque actuator was qualified by similarity. The Limitorque actuator environmental 26

qualification report was prepared covering a family of actuators that shared the same design features, ma'ter1als, standards, and tolerance. The documentation presented adequately addressed qualif1cat1on by similar1ty.

There were three concerns 1dent1f1ed during the document review, all of wh1ch were resolved before the close of the audit. The f1rst concern involved a document change not1ce wh1ch had been initiated to change the safety tra1n designat1on. It was not clear why th1s had been done. The appl1cant researched the issue and determined that the change was made to meet the requ1rements of a cold shutdown w1thin 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> in accordance w1th the 11mit1ng s1ngle failure cr1teria 1dentif1ed 1n Shearon Harr1s document RSB-B-l. The second concern involved a non-conformance report (NCR) which had been generated aga1nst some material spec1f1cat1ons. There vere two .

problems assoc1ated with th1s NCR. One was that the NCR in the package had not been rev1ewed and signed off. The appl1cant found that although the NCR had keen completed and s1gned off, the wrong copy had been 1ncluded in the qualif1cation package. The signed off copy w1ll be restored to its proper location. The other problem was that the vendor deviated from the spec1fication during component manufacture. It was not clear why the deviat1on was acceptable. The applicant researched the problem and determined that the spec1f1cations had been upgraded to a new version of the ASIDE Code which superceded the. old requirements. Since the requirements were deleted from the new spec1fications, the vendor's deviat1on was found acceptable.

2.2.6.4 ~Flnd1n s. No spectfto operabtltty concerns rematned atter the evaluation of th1s component.

2.3 Other E u1 ment ual1ficat1on Issues This section summarizes the status of other issues relat1ng to pump and valve operab111ty that were addressed by the PVORT. The following d1scuss1ons combined with the deta1led rev1ew of selected equ1pment provide additional basis for PVORT's conclus1ons concerning. the applicant's overall program.

27

2.3.l Safet Evaluation Re ort SER Items Status: Closed The PVORT reviewed the Shearon Harris FSAR and formulated quest1ons and concerns that appeared in the preliminary SER dated October 6, 1983.

At that time -the PVORT requested the applicant to provide add1tional information 1n order to better clar1fy his program as well as to detect and address any'a]or def1cienc1es. Additional comaents were d1scussed at a pre-aud1t meeting held March 21, l984. Table 2 sumnarizes the status of the five SER 1tems. Two of these 1ssues (Items l and 2) were addressed a

adequately by the appl1cant 1n a response dated Nay 29,.1984. In th1s letter, the appl1cant comm1tted to provide the requested 1nformat1on in the form of new or. amended tables and expanded d1scussion in the appropr1ate sect1ons of the FSAR. The ma1ntenance program was also d1scussed dur1ng the audit from an overall programmatic level as well as from the component level. The remaining three 1tems (3, 4, and 5) were addressed dur1ng the s1te aud1t December 3 to 6, 1985.

SER Items 3, 4, and 5 were resolved by the applicant's d1scussions and clarificat1ons of h1s equipment qualificat1on program. Regarding Item 3, the appl1cant pointed out that the load cond1tions and acceptance criteria are already described in the FSAR for general categories of equipment.

However, the spec1fic load and cond1tions must be exam1ned on a component level. The results of the component rev1ews ind1cated that the appl1ed conditions and criteria were consistent with the FSAR. Regarding Item 4, the applicant 1ndicated that he did not use the guidelines of the draft standards, but would consider them when they are 'approved. It is the PVORT's belief that Shearon Harris'umps and valves do meet the requ1rements of the codes and standards that were 1n effect at the time of purchase, and that the appltcant's reluctance tu revteu draft standards does not const1tute a 11cens1ng 1ssue'. Regard1ng Item 5, the information.

requested is 1nd1rectly referenced in the FSAR Append1x 3.9 D (Inserv1ce

a. Letter from S. R. Zimaerman, General manage, Nuclear Licensing Sect1on, Carolina Power and Light Company, to H. Denton, 01rector, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm1ss1on, ~Ho e Creek Generatin Station E uioment ualif1cat1on, Nay 29, 1984.

28

TABLE 2. STATUS OF SER ITEMS FOR PUHP AND VALVE OPERABILITY ASSURANCE a F1nd1ng/

SER Items Res olut 1 on Status

l. All active safety-related valves Sati s factory Closedb including those valves smaller than two inches 1n s1ze, should be included in the.Shearon Harris pump and valve operab111ty program.

2. Clarification of ho~ ag1ng was Satisfactory Closedb 1ncorporated in the quali f icat1on process should be conta1ned 1n the FSAR.

In add1tion, the applicant should ceanit to establish a ma1ntenance and surveillance program to ma1ntain equ1pment in a qualified status throughout the 1 1 f e of the plant. The cri teria for the maintenance and surve1llance program should be contained in the FSAR.

3. The FSAR should be amended to clearly Satisfactory Clos edc show the loads and conditions cons1dered 1n the qual1ficat1on of safety related pumps and valves.

4. The extent to ~h'ich draft standards ANSI/ASIDE ()NPE-1 (N55l.l), gNPE-2 (N551.2) gNPE-3 (N551.3), gNPE-4 (N555.4) and issued standard ANSI/ASME B.16.41 are used needs to be clearly stated 1n the FSAR. In add1tion, the applicant's position with respect to Regulatory Guide 1.148 must also be indicated in the FSAR.

29

TABLE 2.'(continued) a Finding/

SER Items Resolution Status

5. The FSAR should be amended to show the Satisfactory Closedc extent to which operat1onal testing is be1ng used to meet the requirements of SRP Sect1on 3.l0. The extent to which operational testing is performed at. full flow and temperature condit1ons'hould be shown.

a. The Shearon Harris Prelim1nary Safety Evaluation Report (PSER) 1tems for pump and valve operab111ty assurance were 1dentif1ed 1n a PSER dated October 6, 1983 and were supplemented by. specific comnents d1scussed at a pre-audit meet1ng held March 21, 1985.

b. Th1s item was adequately resolved based on information subm1tted by the applicant 1n a letter "Shearon Harris Nuclear Po~er Plant Unit No. l, Docket No. 50-400 Equ1pment qualification," letter from S. R. Zimnerman; Manager, Nuclear L1censing Section, Carolina Po~er and L1ght, Serial No. NLS-84-201, to H. R. Denton, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, USNRC, May 29, l984.

c. This 1tem was adequately resolved based on informat1on rev1ewed by the staff during the s1te aud1t December 3 to 6, 1985. The applicant comnitted to close out this item in a manner and t1me frame that 1s acceptable to the staff.

30

Pump and Valve Test1ng Program), Chapter 14 (startup testing) and Chapter 16 (Plant Techn1cal Spec1ficat1ons).'he PVORT reviewed the pre-operational test procedures for selected components within the context of the aud1t. Drafts of the IST procedures were reviewed briefly to confirm that the IST program w1ll comply with the ASIDE Section XI requirements. In add1tion the applicant discusse'd h1s maintenance surve1llance program which ensures that each component will be maintained 1n its qualified state for the 11fe of the plant. In su+nary, the PVORT bel1eves that the applicant has, by way of appropriate commitments and clarifications, adequately addressed all five SER 1tems as they relate to, pump and valve operab111ty.

2.3.2 Lon Term 0 erabilit of Dee Draft Pum s Status: Closed IE Bulletin 79-15 was 1ssued July ll, 1979 as the result of industry-wide problems associated with the long term operat1on of deep draft pumps. Plants under construct1on were required to 1dent1fy such pumps, provide operating history, and verify the pump's ability to operate w1thout incurring vibration-1nduced problems. At the t1me of the bulletin, Shearon Harris was in a pos1t1on only to identify the types of pumps used, s1nce operating history was unavailable. As a followup to the1r original response, the PVORT asked the applicant to review and compare h1s deep draft pump qualificat1on program to the NRC's suggested guidel1nes conta1ned 1n a memorandum regard1ng the L1censing Review Group-II Issue 9-RSB. The appl1cation stated that long-term operab1lity of the service water and cool1ng tower pumps 1s demonstrated by (l) us1ng the vendor recomnended 1nstallat1on procedures; (2) testing and verifying des1gn features; (3) over 12 months of 1ntermittent operation and (4) the ability to perform ma1ntenance and repa1r of the pumps. Maintenance of the pump,was evident..in. the work done to invest1gate a pump shaFt failure due to overheat1ng of the bearings (see discussion in Sect1on 2.2.5). The subsequent mod1fication to the seal water in]ection system restored design flow to the bearings. Cont1nuous runs up to 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br /> have since been achieved w1thout any evidence of abnormal performance.

31

The vendor sketch and discussions with the station staff 1ndicate that vibrat1on of the pump has been addressed. The pump shaft has bear1ngs located every 8 feet within the pump column. Tge column 1s laterally braced every 15 feet by four pinned connect1ons mounted to the structural I

wall. The applicant's v1brat1on analys1s program for rotat1ng equ1pment includes the ESM pumps. Vibration measurements are taken at the top and bottom of the pump motor on a schedule that is cons1stent w1th ASIDE Section XI requirements. V1bration test data, 'taken w1th.the motor loaded and unloaded, did not change s1gn1ficantly and were sign1f1cantly less than the manufacturer's acceptance cr1teria.

Debris 1s controlled by screens 1n the main and aux111ary reservoirs, which supply water to the pump suction bay.'here is no debr1s screen on the suct1on bell of the ESM pump. However, the pump suction bay can be dra1ned 1f necessary to perform maintenance activit1es.

In su+nary, the PVORT believes that the program.descr1bed by the applicant meets the 1ntent of the NRC's suggested gu1delines for long term operability of deep draft pumps.

-2.3.3 0 erab111t of Turbine-Driven AFM Pum PIX-SAB Status: Closed NUREG ll54 was issued as the result of an invest1gat1on of a loss of main and aux111ary feedwater event experienced at the Davis Besse plant on June 9, 1985. A contr1buting factor to this event was excessive moisture content 1n the driving steam to the AFM pump turb1ne, as well as the difficulty of re-establishing steam flow following the turbine overspeed trip. The report implied that the operab1lity of turb1ne-driven AFM pumps could be s1milarly affected at other nuclear plants.- Consequently, the PVORT aud1ted AFM. pump PIX-SAB in order to invest1gate the plant specific features and preventive measures in place at Shearon Harris. The review of this component focussed primar1ly on NUREG 1154 related concerns, s1nce a detailed rev1ew of a similar component had been performed by the PVORT reviewers at another plant in November 1985.

32

2.3.3.l Com onent Oescri tion. This component consists of a centrifugal pump manufactured by Ingersoll Rand w1th a Terry Turb1ne manufactured turbine drive (Hodel GS-N2). The auxiliary feedwater pump is located 1n the Auxiliary 8ui lding at the 236 foot elevat1on. Th1s pump is part of the Aux111ary Feedwater. (AFW) System which supplies feedwater to the steam generators during emergency s1tuations. There are 'three redundant loops in the AFW System; one loop has a steam turbine dr1ven feed.

pump and the other two loops have electr1c motor driven feed pumps. All three pumps, are normally in standby. The safety function of this pump 1s to start and prov1de feedwater to the steam generators in the event of a 11ne break, loss of main feedwater or reactor-turb1ne tr1p.

2.3.3.2 Com onent Walkdown. Our1ng the walkdown of the turbine dr1ven aux111ary feedwater pump, three operabil1ty concerns were 1dentified, all of wh1ch.were adequately addressed before the close of the audit. The first problem found dur1ng the walkdown was that the tr1p and throttle valve installation d1d not appear to be adequate to allow easy operation after an overspeed tr1p. The appl1cant demonstrated operat1on was assured by using a safety grade motor operator and electrical power supply both of wh1ch have been des1gned to prov1de suff1cient force to open the valve with full d1fferential pressure.

The second 1ssue was to determine the ease with which the valve could be reset after a turbine trip. The appl1cant demonstrated that there are two overspeed trips associated with the aux111ary overspeed turb1ne; one mechan1cal and one electronic as well as other trips. The applicant also demonstrated that all tr1ps except the mechanical trip causes the trip and throttle valve to trip in a way that it can be reset and opened from the contro'l room. The mechan1cal overspeed tr1p causes a latch mechan1sm to operate wh1ch requires an operator to reset it locally. After the trip mechan1sm is reset, the trip and throttle valve can be operated locally or from the. control room. The des1gn of this installation appears to be adequate to assure easy valve operation after any type of trip.

The third issue was to deteimine if the appl1cant could assure turbine operation when the turb1ne dr1ving steam 1ncludes moisture. The applicant 33

studied the problem and demonstrated that (a) sufficient protect1ons had been designed into the piping to prevent any moisture'rom reach1ng the turbine and (b) sufficient loop redundancy has been des1gned 1nto the aux1liary feedwater system to prevent system fa1lure in the event there is moisture 1n the steam. The applicant also demonstrated that the Westinghouse Owner's Group is rev1ewing the Davis Besse inc1dent and that any problem areas identif1ed would be reviewed for applicability at Shearon Harris.

2.3.3.3 Document Rev1ew: The only documents rev1ewed for this component were the ma1ntenance requ1rements. During the seismic test1ng of the Terry turbine, trouble was exper1enced with some turbine casing bolts coming loose. Terry Turbine Company performed a study and determined that 1t was necessary to put Lokt1te on the bolts and torque them periodically.

Originally the torque1ng was to be performed annually. The applicant was asked about th1s requirement. The applicant reviewed this requirement and discussed it with Terry Turbine personnel. The applicant's conclus1on was that a second se1sm1c test had been performed in 1978 and that the torqueing requirements for the turbine installed at Shearon Harr1s should be interpreted as a requ1rement to test annually a sampl1ng of accessible turbine bolts with particular attent1on g1ven to pressure-reta1ning bolts.

If a number of bolts prove to be loose, then all turbine bolt1ng, accessible and inaccessible, would require retorque1ng. The torqueing frequency was 1dentif1ed 1n the vendor technical manual wh1ch the applicant had comnitted to 1nvoke for performance of the maintenance,. This explanat1on was found to be acceptable.

2.3.3.4 ~Ftndtn s. No spectrtc operabtltty concerns rematned. after the evaluation of this component.

2.3.4 Im lementation of the Overall Pro ram Status: Closed Pendin Resolution b A licant The PVORT's eva equation of the applicant's overall qualificat1on program was based on many factors, 1ncluding the FSAR review, resolution of SER items, pre-aud1t correspondence, and the on-site review of selected 34

equ1pment. Another 1mportant factor was the follow-up evaluation of the applicant's administrative programs that are 11nked to equipment qualificat1on. The PVORT evaluated these programs during the on-s1te aud1t. Th1s evaluation enabled the PVORT to gain a better perspect1ve of the programmatic scope and implementation of the applicant's overall equipment qual1fication program. for example, the PVORT's concern about deep draft pump operabil1ty led to d1scussions of the applicant's v1bration analysis program,.1n-service test procedures, preventive ma1ntenance procedures, and qual1ty control program. Throughout the audit, 1t was apparent that the applicant's document control system was suff1ciently complete and organized to retrieve the documents necessary to support these discuss1ons. The programs mentioned above enhance the PVORT's confidence the appl1cant's overall program can ensure that all pumps and valves important to safety will operate as requ1red for the life of the plant.

The PVORT's evaluation of the applicant's overall program was not ent1rely absent of qualificat1on issues, however. The PVORT did ident1fy three generic 1ssues, wh1ch were d1scussed w1th the applicant at'the exit meeting. Shortly after the audit the applicant subm1tted a letter dated January 27, l986* wh1ch resolved these three issues. The three gener1c issues as well as the1r resolutions are d1scussed below.

At the 'conclusion of the audit, it was apparent that the Shearon Harris list of active valv'es was not totally up-to-date. In preparation for the site aud1t the PVORT used the FSAR tables of active pumps and valves, supplemented by 1nformation conta1ned 1n'he master equ1pment l1st. A number of discrepancies were discovered in the FSAR tables. The applicant prov1ded annotated pages of the fSAR to represent

<<Letter from A. B. COtter, V1ce President, Nuclear Engineering and Licensing Carolina Power and Light Company, to H. R. Denton, 01rector, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm"ss1on, Seismic uglification and Pu and Valve 0 erabilit Reviews, NLS-85-463, January 27, 1986.

35

the complete lists of pumps and valves. However, the master 11st was not updated 1n a s1m1lar'manner. For example, the flow control valve k

2RH-F500SN-1 was listed as an active valve on the master list, yet West1nghouse and CP&L considered this valve as non-act1ve. The PVORT invest1gated their reasons for claiming this valve as non-active.

~

The valve 2RH-F500SN-1 is an 8 inch butterfly manufactured by F1scher Continental (Model 7613) with an integral actuator. The valve 1's located on the bypass line around the RHR HXl, and 1s normally closed. 'The valve is opened to balance the flow and.prevent 1nitial thermal shock to the heat exchanger. As thermal equ1librium 1s reached the valve gradually closes directing all the flow through the heat exchanger. Upon loss of power, the valve w111 fall closed which is the fail safe position. Westinghouse engineers stated the 2RH-F500SN-l is not act1ve because the des1gn basis for Shearon Harris .is- hot shutdown. The hot shutdown temperature and pressure cond1t1ons is above the 350 F and 425 psig level at wh1ch the RHRS 1s placed into .operation. The cool1ng capacity of the RHR system is 50, F per hour wh1ch 1s less than the allowable lim1t of 100'F per hour for the reactor coolant system. Conta1nment'1solat1on in the event or an RHR line break is prov1ded by safety-related act1ve valves. Redundancy 1s provided by a duplicate RHR trairi.

The PVORT accepted the applicant's reason for declaring valve 2RH-F500 SN as non-active. However, it was apparent that a complete 11st of active valves has not been docketed in the FSAR. Therefore, the first gener1c issue presented to the applicant at the ex1t meet1ng was- to confirm that all active valves are correctly 1dentified in the FSAR.

In.his January 27, 1986 letter the appl1cant committed to revise the FSAR tables upon .completion of the staff reviews. Th1s comnitment satifactor1ly resolved the first gener1c 1ssue.

The staff requires that all equipment 1mportant to safety be properly qualiHed prior to fuel load. However, the PVORT aud1t was conducted months in advance of the expected fuel load date before the applicant had been able to qualify, test, and install all of h1s equipment. The 36

'I appl1cant d1d provide evidence that the documentation and installat1on was complete for approximately 85 percent of the Shearon Harr1s equ1pment at the t1me of the audit. The remaining 15 percent is scheduled to be completed pr1or to fuel load. Sim1larly, some preoperational tests remain to be completed. The hot.functional tests were scheduled to commence later in the month.

Therefore, the second generic issue presented to the appl1cant at the exit meeting was to confirm that all pre-serv1ce tests required to be completed before fuel load have been performed.

In his January 27, 1986 letter the applicant comnitted to complete the pre-serv1ce testing pr1or to power operat1on. This comm1tment sat1sfactorily resolved the second generic issue.

F1nally, the th1rd generic issue was that all pumps and valves important to safety are properly qual1fied pr1or to fuel load. Complete qualification 1ncludes, but it is not limited to, confirmation that (a) the associated documentation is complete and readily access1ble, (b) the equipment 1s properly installed, and (c) the appropr1ate adm1nistrative procedures have been performed as required.

In his January 27, 1986 letter the appl1cant comm1tted to complete the qualification of all safety-related pumps and 'valves prior to fuel load.

Th1s comnitment satisfactor1ly resolved the third gener1c issue.

However, during a telephone conference held February 21, 1986, 1t was apparent that the qualif1cation of some safety-related equipment might not be linked to any test data. The staff cons1der th1s concern to be a issue, which the applicant must resolve by subm1tt1ng the new'eneric appropr1ate information for staff review and approval.

Section 3 summarizes the three gener1c issues mentioned above, the one specif1c concern mentioned in Section 2.l.l, the resolut1ons of these items, as well as the new generic 1ssue involv1ng qualification test data.

37

3. CONCLUSION The Equ1pment qualification personnel for Shearon Harr1s are deal1ng with the equipment qualification issue in a positive manner. The PVORT has reached this conclusion because the appl1cant has: (a) provided adequate documentation to demonstrate'qualif1cation of a representative sample of

'umps and valves important to safety, (b) established admin1strative programs to determ1ne, mon1tor, and ma1ntain equ1pment operability for th' 11fe of the plant, (c) demonstrated an adequate central file system by the timely retrieval of 1nformation requested by the staff, (d) demonstrated that he corresponds closely w1th the NSSS vendor, architect-engineer, and equipment suppl1ers concern1ng deta1ls of construct1on, design, maintenance, util1ty policy, and plant operation, and (e) demonstrated overall accountability by comm1tting the appropr1ate personnel to implement these pol 1 cits and programs.

Based on the results of the on-s1te audit, the PVORT concludes that an appropr1ate Pump and Valve Operability Assurance Program has been def1ned and 1s being 1mplemented at Shearon Harris. The cont1nued 1mplementation of this program should provide adequate assurance that all pumps and valves 1mportant to safety will perform their safety-related funct1ons as requ1red for the 11 fe of the plant.

Table 3 presents a sunmary of the audit results. By the close of the on-s1te audit, all but one specific and three gener1c concerns had been resolved. These concerns were resolved by the applicant 1n a January 27, 1986 letter. However, a new gener1c issue was subsequently 1dentif1ed.

The following 1s a status of all unresolved pump and valve operab1lity concerns and the appl1cant's comm1tments:

S ecif1c Conf irmator Issue:

l. The l2-inch Velan gate valve (3cc-Vl65) was qualified by analys1s onl'y. The applicant should prov1de test data demonstrating the ability of this valve assembly to operate as requ1red under 1ts 38

TABLE 3. Slk+IARY OF PVORT AUDIT fOR THE SHEARON HARRIS NUCI.EAR POWER) PLANT Plant I.D.

Nuncle r ~Cam onent Fuucl lan ~Flndin r Resolutions Status Rmnarks 3CE-V43SAB- I Auxiliary feed pump Valve is normal Iy closed. Closed Specific concerns were resolved during (BOP) suction check valve Valve opens when auxiliary the audit.

(TRW mission 0 inch feedwater is supplied by wafer check). steam driven feed pump.

3CT-VBB5B-1 Containment spray additive Valve nnrmal ly c losed. Closed Specific Concerns were resolved during (BOP) valve. (Yarway 2 inch Valve opens to allow borated the. audit.

motor operated globe). sodium hydroxide solution to go the containment spray

~ater. Valve fails as is.

3SW-DISA-I Emergency service Valve is normally open Closed Specific concerns were resolved during (BOP) water intake screening to allow flow from the audit.

structure isolation auxiliary water reservoir valve. (Jamesbury to ESW pump. Valve 30 inch motor closes if main Reservoir operated butterfly). is used as water source.

Valve fails as is.

3AF-F3SA-I Aux FW pump discharge Valve is normally open. Closed Specific concerns were resolved during (BOP) flow control valve ' Valve closes to isnlate the audit.

(Hasoneilan 3 inch S.G.. FW header in event electro-hydraulic globe). of rupture of FW header or main steam header. Valve fails open.

P IA-SA Emergency servl(e Mater Pump is normally at stanrlby. Closed Specific concerns were resolved during (BOP) pump (Hayward Tyler Pump starts automatically on the audit.

30 VSN vertical loss of offsite pnwer or centrifugal 21500 GPH). upon safety in)ection signal.

Pump supplies cooling water to equipment required for safe plant shutdown.

TABLE 3. (continued)

Plant I.O.

Number Oescri tion Co onent Function F Indi~n s Resolutions Status Remarks 2HS-V95A Auxiliary feed pump , Valve is normally closed. Closed Specific concerns were resolved during (BOP) turbine steam supply Valve opens for operation of the audit.

isolation valve (Arichor AFII pump turbine upon Darling 6 inch motor init iat ion s igna1. Valve operated flex-wedge gate). fails as is.

3CC-V165 SA Component cool ing water Valve is normally closed Notea Note" Closed Valve was qualifiea by analysis only.

(NSSS) to RIIR IIX isolation valve to isolate CCW flow from Applicant shall provide test data (Velan 12 inch motor 'RHR IIX I. Valve opens after demonstrating the ability of this valve operated gate). event to pass flow through assembly to operate as required under its RIIR IIX. Valve fails as is. design load conditions. This issue was resolved by the applicant's letter dated

'January 27. 1906.

2ML-L600SA Reactor coolant drain tank Valve is normally open and Closed Specific concerns were resolved during (NSSS) (RCDT) control valve controls level in RCOT by the audit.

(Copes-Vulcan 3 inch diverting water to boron air operated globe). ~ recycle system. Valve closes to isolate the RCDT for its safety function. Valve fails closed.

APCC-1C-SAB Component cool ing water Pump is normally operating. Closed Specific concerns were resolved during (NSSS) pump (Pacific OSK Pump supplies component the audit.

centrifugal 11000 6PH). cooling water to varinus NSSS heat exchangers.

251-V579A Cold leg injection and Valve is normally open in Closed 'pecific concerns were resolved during (NSSS) RIIR return line isolation discharge line from RIIR the audit.

valve (Westinghouse 10 inch pump downstream of RIIX motor operated gate). for cold leg Injection and rec ircul at ion. Val ve closes for containment isolation and hot Ieg recirculation. Valve fails as is.

IABLE 3. (continued)

Plant I.O.

Number ~Desert lion Nesolutlons Stetus Itemarks ALL PINPS At(0 VALVES Operate as required during Note" e Note Open Generic issues "d. e. and f" were IHI'ORTANT TO SAFETY the life of the plant under resolved by the applicant's letter dated normal and accident January 27, 1986.

conditions

a. (SPECIFIC ISSIIE) Tlute applicant did not provide any test data to qualify the valve. Tl>e appl fcant shall provide test data demonstrating the ability of this valve assembly to operate as required under its design load conditions.

b. At the conclusion of the site audit, the PVORT sunntarized the speciffc and generic confirmatory Issues, as well as the actions necessary to resolve them prior.to fuel load.

c. The qualification status will be "closed," upon resolution of the specific and qeneric confirmatory issues.

d. (GENERIC ISSUE) AL the conclusion of the PVORT audit, it was apparent that a complete 'list of active valves had not been provided in the FSAR. The applicant shall confirm that all active valves are correctly identified fn the FSAR.

e. (GENERIC ISSUE) Some pre-service tests required to be completed prior to fuel load have not yet been performed. The applicant sitaII confirm that al I appropriate pre-service tesLs have been completed prior to fuel load.

(GEtIERIC ISSUE) Some pumps and valves important to safety have noL been canpietely qualified and installed. The applicant shall confirm Liat all pumps and valves important to safety are completely qualified and installed prior to fuel load. Also, the applicant shall confirm that the original loads used; tn tests and analyses tu qualify pumps and valves important to safety are not exceeded by any new loads (i.e. design load reconciliation).

g. (GENERIC ISSUE) The qualification of some safety-related equipment does not appear to be linked to any test data. The applicant sttaII (1) identify all safety-related pumps and valves qualified by analysis only; (2) )ustify the method of qualification; (3) describe how the analyses can demonstrate equipment operability, and (4) sulxnit evidence tttat the Velan gate valves can be linked to quaifffcatfon test data.

des1gn load conditions. The appl1cant shall 1nclude a descript1on of the test performed as well as the bas1s for establ1shing the similarity of the installed valve w1th the valve tested.

Resolution: Shortly after the aud1t the applicant explained in a January 27, 'l986 letter that valve 3CC-Vl65 1s not required to operate unt1l.appr1x1mately 20 minutes following a'arge LOCA. Our1ng the worst postulated event (LOCA and SSE), the valve is normally closed and w1ll not rece1ve any LOCA loads, only SSE loads. Since the valve d1sc will already be pressed f1rmly against 1ts seat, 'the applicant pred1cts that the SSE loads will not adversely affect the functional1ty of the valve internals. Th1s clarefication of the valve's safety funtion plus the on-site rev1ew of the valve assembly analysis and valve actuator test reports prov1de confidence that valve 3CC-V165 will funct1on as required. Therefore the specific conf1rmatory issue for valve 3CC-V165.1s considered to be closed.

I Generic 0 en Issue:

l. The appl1cant has not been able to prov1de qualificat1on test data for Velan valves (12GM32SB and 6GM62FB) and Fisher Valve 18BH32. The staff suspect that the qual1fication of other safety-related equipment might not be linked to any test data as well. In order to resolve this 1ssue, the applicant shall subm1t the appropriate 1nformation for staff rev1ew prior to fuel load..

a. Ident1fy all safety-related pumps and valves that have been qualified by analysis only.

b. Justify. the method of qual1fication, 1n l1eu of provid1ng ver1fication by test.

c. Oescribe how the qual1f1cat1on analyses have been verified to demonstrate equipment 'operab111ty.

42

d. Subm1t evidence that the qual1ficat1on of Velan gate valves can be linked to test data.

Evidence of qualificaiion by testing can be submitted 1n the form of actual test reports for prototype equipment, or sim1larity analyses which reference existing test data. A copy of the test reports being c1ted by the applicant should be 1ncluded for staff review.

Generic Conf1rmator Issues:

l. At the conclus1on of the PVORT aud1t, 1t was apparent that a complete 11st of act1ve valves had not been provided in the FSAR. The appl1cant shall conf1rm that all act1ve valves are correctly identified in the FSAR.

Resolution: In the January 27, 1986 letter the applicant committed to rev1se the FSAR table when the staff reviews are complete.

2. At the t1me of the aud1t, most construction tests had already been completed. However, the hot functional tests were scheduled to commence later 1n the month. The appl1cant shall conf1rm that all pre-serv1ce tests that are required before fuel load have been completed.

Resolution: In the January 27, 1986 letter the appl1cant coneitted to complete pre-service testing prior to power operation.

3. At the time of the audit, approx1mately lO to 15 percent of all pumps and valves 1mportant to safety had not been qualified. The applicant shall confirm that all pumps and valves 1mportant to safety are properly qual1fied and installed. In add1tion, the appl1cant shall prov1de.wr1tten confirmation that the orig1nal loads used in tests or analyses to qual1fy pumps and valves 1mportant to safety are not exceeded by any new loads, such as those imposed by a LOCA (Hydrodynamic loads) or as-built conditions.

43

Resolution: In the January 27, 1986 letter the applicant committed to complete the qualification of all safety-related active pumps and valves prior to fuel load.

4. NSSS REFERENCES i

i'SOLATION VALVE 3CC-'V165 SA

1. Westinghouse, Pro ect S ecificatioh Motor 0 crated Valves, 952065, Revision 5, August 21, 1985.

2. Westinghouse, General S ecification Motor 0 crated Valves, 678852, Revision 2, March 14, 1977

3. Velan, General Arran ement Drawin , 83816-S, Revision E.

4. Velan, 12"-150 Cast Carbon Steel and 10"-150 For ed Carbon Steel Bolted Bonnet Motor 0 crated Gate Valves Nuclear Class 2 and 3, OR-1041A, Revision 2, March 26, 1976

5. Limitorque, uglification T e Test Re ort Limitor ue Valve Actuators for Class 1E Service Outside Primar Containment, 600461-80003, June 7, 1974.

6. Aero-Nav., Re ort of Seismic Test On SMB-0-25 Motor Actuator for-Actuator For L m tor ue or .. . anuary , 9

7. Franklin Institute, Seismic uglification Re ort, FC 3879, September 1974.

8. Carolina Power and Light Company (CPhL), Inservice Ins ection Revision D, PLP-604, March 29, 1984.

9. CPS., ASME Section XI Pum and Valve Pro ram Plan, ISI-203, November 4, 1985.

10. CPEL, Revision 1 Inservice Testin of Valves Revision 0, ISI-801; September 24, 1985.

ll. CPKL, CCW S s 0 er. Modes 1-4 Revision 1, OST-1016, September 5, 1985.

12. CPSL, S stem Prep . Revision 0, 1-4080-P-01, November 2, 1985.

13. CPSL, Motor Driven VLV 0 erators Revision 6, 1-9000-E-06, August 16, 1985.

14. CPKL, Insulation Resistance Portion of Initial Checkout of Elec.

Motors Revi.sion 7, 1-9000-E-07, August 23, 1985.

15. CPEL, Limitor ue Valve Actuator Revision 0 with A/C 0/2, CM-M0051, February 27, 1985.

REACTOR COOLANT DRAIN TANK LEVEL CONTROL VALVE 2ML-L600SA-1

16. Mestinghouse, Pro ect S ecification Control Valves, 678959, Revision 2, Ju y

'17. Mestinghouse, General S ecification Control Valves, 678844, Revision 2, Narch 0, 19

18. Copes-Vulcan, Seismic Anal sis Air 0 er.'ontrol Valve, 10.3.030, Revision 5, January 27, 1984.

19. Copes-Vulcan, Static Deflection Test Results, SD-95374, Revision 1, Hay 7, 1982.

20., Mestinghouse, General Arran ement Drawin , D-169447, October 15, 1985.

21. NAHCO, ual. of EA 180 Series Limit Switches for use in Nuclear Power in Com liance with IEEE Stds. 323-1974 382-1972 and 344-1975, 'lants gTR 105, Revision 3, August 20, 1981.

. 22. ASCD, Re ott on uglification of ASCD Catalo NP-1 Solenoid Valves for Safet-ea e ca ons in uc ear ower eneratin tat ons; AgR-67368, Revision 1, August 19, 1983.

23. CP&L, Inservice Ins ection Revision 0, PLP-604, parch 29, 1984.

24. CP&L, ASME Section XI Pum and Valve Pro ram Plan Revision 1, ISI-203, November , 98 .

25. CP&L, Inservice Testin of Valves Revision 0, ISI-801, September 24, 1985.

26. CP&L, OP. Surv. Test Revision 0, OST-1104, May 10, 1985.

27. CP&L, Radioactive E ui . Drain S s. Prep Revision 0, 1-6240-P-01, July 2, 1985.

28. CP&L, Reactor Coolant Drain TK Pum A&8 Disch . Revision 1, 1-6240-C-01, July 3, 1985.

46

COHPONENT COOLING WATER .PUHP A C - - A

29. Mest1nghouse, Lubr1cant and Bearin Re ort for Hedium 'ar e and Chem um Hotors, N 4 , une 2 ,

30. Crane Packing Co, Seal Performance Testin for Nuclear Power Plant Safet In ection S stems, Bulletin 3462.

31. Pac1f1c Pumps, Des1 n Anal sis Re ort,. K 387, Revision 1, July 29, 1976.

32. Westinghouse, E-S ec. Cl. 3 Pum s General, 678910, Rev1s1on 1,

.Hay 16, 197G.

33 Mestinghouse, Auxiliar Pum Htr s. General, 677474, Rev1sion 0, Harch 13, 1972.

'4.

Mestinghouse, Auxiliar Pum Htrs. C L ual. of M Cl. 1E Pum Hotors for CP&L Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Un1t l & 2 Revis1on 1, 952351, Revision 0, October 20, 1973.

Westinghouse, E u1  ; ual. Test R t. M LHD Htr. Insulat1on, MCAP 8687 Supp. 2 A02A, July 1981.

36. Mest1nghouse, E u1 . ual. Data Pck -Lar e Pum Hotors outside AP 557, 55 - E-A,

37. M LHD, Seismic Anal s1s of Com onent Coolin Pum Hotors, Seismic S.O.

74F18588, December 23, 1976.

38. CP&L, Inservice Ins ect1on Revision 0, RPL-604, Harch 29, 1984.

39. CP&L, ASHE Sect. XI Pum & Valve Pro ram Plan Revis1on 1, ISI 203, November 4, 198 .

40. CP&L, Inserv1ce Test1n of Pum s Revision 0, ISI 800, April 16, 1985.

41. CP&L, Com onent Coolin Mater S s. 0 erabilit Hodes 1-4 Revision 1, OST-1016, September 5, 1985.

42. CP&L, S stem Prep . Revision 0, 1-4080-P-Ol, November 20, 1985.

43. CP&L, 6.9 KV Breaker Prep ., 1-4080-P-02.

44. CP&L, Motor & Cont. Test Records Revision 7, 1-9000-E-05, August 23, 98

45. CP&L, Insulation Resistance Test Revis1on 3, 1-9000-E-07, April 2, 984.

46. CP&L, V1bration Testin Revision 3, 1-900-E-10, Hay 16, 1984.

47. CP&L, Mechanical Pum Checkout Revision 0, 1-900-M-01, July 22, 1982.

48. CP&L, Pachflc T e Osk Sixteen b 18 1nches RO M/AC Ol, CM-M0004, August 24, 1984.

48

COLO LEG INJECTION/RHR RETURN LINE

49. Mestinghouse, Pro ect S eci f ication Hotor 0 crated Valves, 952065, Revision 4, August, 9 9.

50. West1nghouse, General S ecifications Motor 0 crated Valves, 678852; Revis1on 4, Harch 4, 9

51. Mest1nghouse, General Arran ement Orawin , 2074908, Rev1s1on 1, July 9, 1985.

~ 52. Mestinghouse, Stress Re or t for Mestin house Class 1 6" and Lar er Gate Valve, EH-5405, Revis1on 1, Hay 27, 1980.

53. Mest1nghouse, 0 erab111t Test Re ort for M Nuclear Gate Valve, EH-4995, January

54. Lim1torque, ualificat1on T e Test Re ort Lim1tor ue Valve Actuators for Class lE Service Outside Pr1mar Coo ant, 00461-B0003, June 7, 1974.

55. Aero-Nav., Re ort of Seism1c on SHB-0-25 Motor Actuator for L1mitor ue

~Car ., 5720, January 5, 1975.

56. NAHCO, ual. of EA-180 Series Limit 'Sw1tches for use in Nuclear Power Plants in Com 11ance with IEEE Stds. 323-1974 382-1972 344-1975, l}TR 105, Rev1sion 1, August 28, 1980.

57. CP&L, Inserv1ce Ins ection Revis1on 0, PLP-604, March 29, .1984.

58. CP&L, ASHE Section XI Pum and Valve Pro ram Plan Revis1on 1, ISI-203, November 4, 1985.

59. CP&L, Inservice Test1n of Valves Rev1sion 0, ISI-801, September 24, 1985.

60. CP&L, RHR Pum 0 er. Revis1on 1, OST-1008, July 18, 1985.

61. CP&L, RHR Pum 0 er. Modes 4-6 Rev1s1on 0, OST-1108, January 1, 1985.

62. CP&L, RHR Cold Prep Test Rev1sion 2, 1-2085-P-01, September 5, 1985.

63. CP&L, LO HO SI Prep Test Revision 0; 1-2085-P-03, Hay 30, 1985.

64. CP&L, HTR Driven Valve 0 rs Revision 6, 1-9000-E-06, August 16, 1985.

65. CP&L, In1tial Chk out of Elec. Motors Revis1on 7, 1-9000-E-06, August 23, 98 .

66. CP&L, L1m1tor ue Valve Act Rev1sion 0 with A/C 0/1, CM-M0052, February 5, 1985.

49

4 I

5. BOP REFERENCES TURBINE-ORIVEN AFW PUMP SUCTION LINE

, CHECK VALVE 3CE-V43SAB-l

1. CP&L, Inservhce Ins ect1on Rev1shon 0, PLP-604, Harch 29, 1984.

r

2. CP&L, ASME Section XI Pum and Valve Pro ram Plan Rev1s1on 1, ISI-203, November 4, 1985..

3. CP&L,,Inserv)ce Teston of Valves Revision 0, ISI-801,

~,

September 24, 1985.

4. CP&L, HTR Aux FM PMP Revts1on 1, OST-1011, August 31, 1985.

5.

6.

7.

i'l TRM II, CP&L, TRM Check Valves Rev1s1on Hhss1on, Certificate of Com 0 w1th A/C 0/1, CH-H0018, June 7, 1985.

NY435139 11ance I fi i), i 5, i 8, 3, NY435139 (Item 6),

March 6, 1980.

8. TRQ H)ss1on, H drostattc Test Re ort, NY435139 (Item 6),

August 5, 1980.

9. TRM Hhss.)on, Sehsm1c Stress Anal s1s for TRM H1ss.Ion Ouo-Check Check Valves, September 18, 1919.

10. Ebasco Serv1ce Inc., Mafer Check Valves, CAR.SH.70, July 3, 1981.

ll. 'RW June Hhss1on, Mafer 1980.

Check Valve 8" 150 lb, 1364.4683 (Rev1s)on 4),

26, CONTAINHENT SPRAY AOOITIVE VALVE, 3C -VBB-SB-

12. Ebasco Service Incorporated, General S echfhcat1on for 2" and Smaller SS Valves, CAR-SH-H36Y, Hay 2, 984.

13. Yarway Corporat1on, Two Inch 1500 lb. SW SS Motor 0 crated Globe Valve, 1364-48717, Sep em er

14. 'Yarway Corporation, Selsm1c Anal s1s of Yarwa Cor orat1on 2" Melbond Motor1zed Valve Fh . 5515B-F316H Class 2 and 3, 013, 958540-01, September 24., 1979.

15. L1m1torque Corporation, L'hm1tor ue Valve Actuator ualhfhcathon for Nuclear Power Stat1on, B0058, January ll, 1980.

16. Yarway Corporation, Yarwa Globe Valve ual1t Assurance Oocumentat1on

~packa e, NY435056-19, auue 3, 1983.

50

EHERGENCY SERVICE -MATER PUHP ISOLATION VALVE FROH THE AUXILIARY RESERVOIR, 3SM-B1SA

17. John Henry Associates, Inc, Seismic uallflcatlon of Valves Covered b Ebasco Services P.O. NY 4350 an or e Addendum 0, June 7, 1983.

18. Llmltorque Corporation, Llmltor ue Valve Actuator uglification for Nuclear Po~er Station Service Re ort, B0058, January 11, 1980.

19. CP&L, Inservlce Ins ection 'Revision 0, PLP-604, Harch 29, 1984.

20. CP&L, ASHE Section XI Pum and Valve Pro ram Plan Revlslon 1, ISI-203, November 4, 1985.

21. CP&L, Inservlce Testln of Valves Revision 0, ISI-801, September , 9

22. CP&L, HTR Driven Valve 0 erators Revision 6, 1-9000-E-06, August

23. CP&L, Initial Chk out of Elec. Motors Revision 7, 1-9000-E-07, August

24. CP&L, Jamesbur Butterf1 Mafer S here Valves Revlslon 1 with A/C 1/1,

,CH-H009 &L, une , 9

25. CP&L, Jamesbur Butterfl Mafer S here Valves Revision 0 with A/C 0/1, CH-HOO , une 0, 198 .

26. CP&L, Jamesbur butterf1 Mafer S here Valve Revision 1, CH-H007, November 28, 984.

27. Jamesbury Corporation, Jamesbur Valve A Doc Pk , NY435082-1, August 17, 1979.

28. Jamesbury Corporation, Cert. of Com liance, NY435082-1, July 18, 1979.

29. CP&L, Llmltor ue Valve Actuator Revision 0 with A/C 0/2, CH-H0051, February 27, 1985.

30. Jamesbury, Butterf1 Valve Outline Dw . 30" 150 lb HO, 1364-2900 (R8), September 20, 1982.

31. Ebasco Service Inc., S ec. Butterf1 Valves, CAR.SH.H44, Revision 8, January 20, 1984.

AFW PUHP OISCHARGE FLOM CONTROL VALVE, 3AF- 3SA-1

32. Ebasco, S eclflcatlon for Hlscellaneous Control Valves, CAR5H, H66-H, Revision , ebruary 4, 9 51

33. Hasoneilan, Seismic Anal sis of 3-inch ANSI Class 900 Masoneilan 40000 Series Contro with N rorno or c uator, pr

34. General Controls, Elector-H draulic 0 erator uglification Re ort, NH90, March 14, 197 .

35. ITT General Controls, Certification of Conformance-Reference Contract 99773, ITTGC Jab Order 4 . une . 9 EHERGENCY SERVICE MATER PUHP PlA-SA

36. CP&L, Inservice Ins ection Revision 0; .RPL-604, March 29, 1984.

37. CP&Le Inservice Ins ection Revision 0, RPL-604, March 29, 1984.

38. CP&L, ASHE Section XI Pum & Valve Pro ram Plan Revision 1, ISI-203,

.November 4, 9

39. CP&L, Inservice Testin of Pum s Revision 0, ISI-800, April 16, 1985.

40. CP&L, Emer enc Service Mater 0 erabilit Honthl Interval Modes 1-2-3-4-5-6 Revision 1, OST-1015, September 12, 1985.

41. CP&L, Vibration Testin Revision 3, 1-9000-E-10, Hay .16 1984.

42. CP&L, Motor & Control Test Record Revision 7, 1-9000-E-05, August 23, 1985.

43. CP&L, Insulation Resistance Revision 3, 1-9000-E-07, April 25, 1984.

44, CP&L, Pum 0 erational Test, 1-4065-H-07,

45. CP&L, Pum Endurance Test Revision 0, 1-4065-M-02, September 10, 1984.

46. CP&L, S stem Prep . Revision 0, 1-4065-P-01, July 31, 1985.

47. Ebasco, ESM Pum A Doc Pk , NY435182, Hay 21, 1981.

48. Hayward Tyler, HTPC Certifications, NY435182, (Pages 3-7) May 14, 1981.

49. Hayward Tyler,. H drostatic and Performance Re orts, NY435182 (Pages 16-23), Hay 21, 1981.

50. CP&L, Ha ard T ler Vert Turbine. Pum VSOL. Revision 0, CH-M0014, October 17, .1984.

51. McDonald Engineering Analysis Company, Incee Seismic-Stress Anal sis

'of ASME Section III Class 3 Pum s, HE-780, August 29, 1980 Revised April 25, 1981.

52. Small AC Motor Department G.E. Company, ualif. Re ort G.E. Electric Vertical Induction Motors for Class 1E Emer . SW Pum s, 492HA108, August 15, 1980 Revised June 24, 1981.

52

53. HcDonald Engineering Analysis Company, Inc., Seismic-Stress Anal sis of Vertical Hotor, HE-779, August 23,1980.

54. Ebasco Service Inc., Centrifu al Pum s, CAR-SH-H67H, January 18, 1984.

55. Hayward Tyler Pump Co.', E.S.M. Pum Outline Dw , 1364-7370, June 8, 1981.

56. 'E.S.M. Pum Sect Dw , 1364-43477, July 24, 1981.

AFM PUHP TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE . 2HS-V95A-1

'57. Anchor Darling, Seismic Anal ses Re ort for Ebasco Ta Numbers 2HS-VBSB-1 2HS-V95A-1 2HS-V8SB-2 2HS-V95A-2, S.O. E-5796 Rev. C, November 6, 1979.

58. Limitorque Corp., Limitor ue Valve Actuator uglification for Nuclear Power Station Service Re ort, 80058, January 11, 1980.

59. CP&L, Inservice Ins ection Revision 0, PLP-604, Harch 29, 1984.

60. CP&L, ASHE Section XI Pu and Valve Pro ram Plan Revision 1, ISI-203, November 4, 1985.

61. CP&L, Inservice Testin of Valves Revision 0, ISI-801, September 24, 1985.

62. CP&L, Hotor Driven Aux FM Pum 0 er. Revision 1, OST-1011, August 31, 1981.

63. CP&L, Hotor Driven Valve 0 erators Revision 6, 1-9000-E-06, August 16, 1985.

64. CP&L, Initial Chk out of Elect. Hotors Revision 7, 1-9000-E-07, August 23, 1985.

65. CP&L, Anchor Darlin Gate Valve Revision 0 with A/C 0/2, CH-H0067, January 10, 1985.

66. Anchor Darling, Anchor Darlin Valves, NY435013, July ll, 1979.

67. Anchor Darling, Gate Valve A Doc. Pk , NY435013 (Item 3).

68. Anchor Darling, Cert. of Com liance, NY435013 ( Item 3), Harch 02, 1976.

69. Anchor Darling, Cert. of Com liance, NY435013 (Item 3),

February 25, 1976.

70. Anchor Darling, H drostatic Test, NY435013 ( Item 3), February 26, 1976.

71. Anchor Darling, Hotor Performance Data, NY435013 ( Item 3).

53

72. CP5L, 'L1m1tor ue Valve Actuator Rev1s1on 0 v1th A/C 0/2, CN-M0051, Feburary

73. Ebasco Serv1ces Inc., H1 h Pressure Allo 5 Carbon Steel Valves, CAR-SH-H32A Rev1s1on 7, e urary , 983.

74. Anchor-Darl1ng, 6" 900 lb Gate w/Motor 0 ., 1364-94275.

54

(~

NAC FOAM $ 2$ ILLNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1. AEFOAT NUMSEA IArOFROOOY TICIC. JOrr VOr FIA. /IOotl 1244I ~

NACM 1102, BIBIJOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET t

2201. 2202 EGG-NTA-7165 SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON TNE A'EVEASE 2 TITLE ANO SUSTITLE 2. LEAVE SLAHII Audit of the Pump and Valve Operability Assurance Program for the Shearon HaPris Nuclear Power Plant o O*TE AEtORT COMFLETEO YEAR MONTH S.AUTHOAISI April 1986 OATS REFORT ISSUEC C. Kido, H. H. Stromberg, H. L. Magleby

' MONTH S.

YEAR April 1986 T. tEAfGAMING ORGANIZATIONNAME ANQ MAILINGAOQRESS lloorooot& CooN 4. tAOIECTITASCIWOAICUNIT NUMSER EGSG Idaho, Inc. 9. FIN OR GRANT HUMSEA Idaho Falls, ID 83415 A6415, Project IV IIL StON$ OAINQ ORGANIZATIONNAME ANO MAILINQAOORESS IIOCRFFOZ4t COOOI I la. TYtE Of REFORT Di.vision of BWR. Licensing Technical Evaluation Report Office of Nuclear .Reactor Regulation IL tEAIOO COVEAEO IIOCIOORO CNCasl U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 I SUttLEMENTARYNOTES

12. AS STR ACT (200 werw or IROI The Shearon Harris Nuclear Generating Station was audited December 3 to 6, 1985 to determine the adequacy of their Pump and Valve Operability Assurance Program. Four concerns (one specific, and three generic), which

. could not be resolved by the close of the audit, were subsequently resolved by the applicant in his January 27, 1986 submittal. A new generic issue was identified involving the apparent lack of qualification test data for some safety-related equipment. The applicant has committed to address this concern prior to fuel load. The results of this audit indicate that the applicant has established and is implementing a program that will track all pumps and valves important to sa'fety from manufacture and in-shop testing through qualification, installation, testing, maintenance and surveillance for the purpose of assuring continued operability of these components over the life of the plant.

14 OOCUMEHT ANAI YSIS A KEYWOAOS/OESCAltTOAS 1$ , >VAILASILITY STATEMENT Unl imi ted

14. SECUAIT CLASSIFICATION I too ooorl f

o. I'OEHTI I ERSIOtEH.EHOEO ~ EAMS Unc1'assi 1 TFO rroorrl fi ed Unclassified IZ.,'CUMSEA OF FAGE$

1$ . F RICE

0 I