ML18003B242

Sqrt Visit Rept, Informal Rept

ML18003B242
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	03/31/1986
From:	Bridges T, Harris B, Singh J IDAHO NATIONAL ENGINEERING & ENVIRONMENTAL LABORATORY
To:	NRC
Shared Package
ML18003B240	List: ML18003B241 ML18003B242
References
CON-FIN-A-6415 EGG-EA-7181, NUDOCS 8605190429
Download: ML18003B242 (46)

Text

I ) EGG-EA-7181 March 1986 r'"'"

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SHEARON HARRIS 1 SORT VISIT REPORT

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EGG-EA-7181 SHEARON HARRIS 1 SQRT VISIT REPORT

'. J. N. Singh L. Bridges B. L. Harris Published March 1986 EG&G Idaho, Inc.

Idaho Falls, Idaho 83415 Prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington D.C. 20555 Under DOE Contr act. No. DE-AC07-76ID01570 FIN No. A6415

ABSTRACT EG8G Idaho is assisting the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in evaluating Carolina Power and Light Company's program for the dynamic qualification of safety related electrical and mechanical equipment for the Shearon Harris unit 1 nuclear power plant. Applicants are required to use,.

test or analysis or a combination of both to qualify equipment, such that its safety function will be ensured during and after the dynamic event, and provide documentation. The review, when completed, will indicate whether an appropriate qualification program has been defined and implemented for seismic category I mechanical and electrical equipment which will provide reasonable assurance that,'uch equipment will function properly during and, after the excitation due to vibratory forces of the dynamic event.

SUMMARY

A seismic qualification review team (SgRT) consisting of engineers the Equipment gualification Branch of the Nuclear Regulatory 'rom Commission and Idaho National Engineering Laboratory made a site visit to the Shearon Harris nuclear power plant 'of Carolina Power and Light Company located near Apex, North Carolina. They observed the field installation h

and reviewed the qualification reports for twenty-two selected pieces of seismic category I electrical and mechanical equip'ment and their supporting structures. Two generic and one equipment specific concerns were identified for which additional information is needed in order for the SORT to complete the review. These are referred .to as open items. The review indicated that the equipment was adequately qualified for the dynamic environment pending resolution of the open items.

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CONTENTS ABSTRACT ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

SUMMARY

1. INTRODUCTION .

.2. NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM (NSSS) EQUIPMENT ........... ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

2.1 Auxiliary Feedwater Controller-(NSSS 1) ..........

2.2 . 3-inch Diaphragm Valve (NSSS 2) 2.3 Four-Bay Two-Train Solid State Protection System T rain A (NSSS 3) 2.4 Process Control Cabinet (NSSS 4) ..

2.5 Component Cooling Water Pump (NSSS 5) ..........

2.6 Main Steam Relief Valve Controller (NSSS 7) 10 2.7 ASCO Solenoid Valve (NSSS 8) ..............................,

2.8 Residual Heat Removal Pumps and Motor (NSSS 10) ............ 12 2.9 14-inch Motor Operated Gate Valve (NSSS ll) ................ 13 2.10 7300 Printed Circuit Card'AL2 (NSSS 12) ... 17

3. BALANCE OF-PLANT (BOP) EQUIPMENT ..;.............................. 19 3.1 6900 V Switchgear (BOP 1) ..................,..... 19 3.2 Auxiliary Relay Cabinet (BOP 2) ............................ 21 3.3. Instrument Cabinet (BOP 3) .............................. 22 3.4 Containment Vacuum Relief Relay (BOP 4) .................... 23 3.5 Containment Cooling Flow. Switch (BOP 5) .................... 24 3.6 Centrifugal Fan and Motor (BOP 6) .......................... 25 3.7 1"1/2"inch Three-Way Valve (BOP 7) .. 26

3.'8 Main .Steam Power Operated Relief Valve (BOP 8) ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 27 3.9 Control Room Cabinet (BOP 9) 28

3. 10 Emergency Screen Mash Pump and Motor (BOP 10) ............... 30 3.11 30"inch Butterfly Valve (BOP 12) ........................... 31

3. 12 Hydra Motor Valve Op'erator (BOP 2A) ...;....... 31

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4. FINOINGS AND CONCLUSION ............................. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 33

4. 1 Generic Issues ............................................. 33 4.2 Equipment Specific Issues .................................. 33 4 .3 Conclusion o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ o 34 TABLE

1. List of Attendees .:....................-............. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 35

1. INTRODUCTION The Equipment gualification Branch (EQB) of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has the lead responsibility in reviewing,and evaluating the dynamic qualification of safety related mechanical and electrical equipment. This equipment may be subjected to vibration from earthquakes and/or hydrodynamic forces. Applicants are required to use test or analysis or a combination of both to qualify equipment essential to plant safety, such that its function will be ensured during and after the dynamic event. These pieces of equipment and how they meet the required criteria are described by the applicant in a Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).

On completion o'f the FSAR review, evaluation and approval, the applicant receives an Operating License (OL) for commercial plant operation.

A Seismic gualification Review Team (SgRT), consisting of engineers from the EgB of NRC and Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL), made a site visit to the Shearon Harris 1 nuclear power plant 'of Carolina Power and Light Company near Apex, North Carolina from December 3 through December 6, 1985. The purpose of the visit was to observe the field installation, review the equipment qualification methods, procedures (including modeling technique and adequacy), and documented results for a list of selected. seismic category I mechanical and electrical equipment and

.their supporting structures. This report, containing the review findings, indicates which of the items are qualified and require no additional documentation.. It also identified some equipment and certain general .

concerns for which additional information is needed in 'order for the SgRT to complete the review. These are referred to as open items. The applicant is to further investigate and provide additional documentation to resolve these issues.

Table 1 contains a list of personnel who attended the site visit.

Subsequent sections of this report give a brief overview and identify the concerns, followed by the findings, for the selected seismic category I equipment.

2. NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM (NSSS) EQUIPMENT

2. 1 Auxiliar Feedwater Controller NSSS-1 The auxiliary feedwater controller (MPL No. FK-2051A1) was supplied by Westinghouse with model No. 2445D69GOl. It is a 7300 series manual/automatic controller which provides a control function for,.the auxiliary feedwater system flow contr'ol valve 2051A. It is panel mounted to the main control board panel in the control room at elevation 305 ft using two mounting, bracket assemblies.

This controller was qualified by testing performed by Westinghouse documented by Westinghouse report WCAP-10802, dated March 1985. Testing consisted of testing several 7300 series manual/automatic controllers representative of the entire line of 7300 series controllers. They were mounted to a panel and tested simultaneously. They were all mounted using the two mounting bracket assemblies supplied with these controllers. The qualification tests consisted of low level (.2 g) resonance search from 1-50 hz and 5 operating basis earthquake (OBE) level and 4 safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) level pseudo triaxial sine beat tests. The SSE pseudo triaxial tests were run in four different orientations so the coherent test motion would be both in phase and out of phase. No natural frequencies were detected below 50 hz. The SSE test response spectra (TRS) enveloped the required response spectra (RRS) with a margin of at'east 2. The test zero period acceleration (ZPA) was 5.6 g. The required ZPA is .95 g. The 7300 series controllers tested, maintained their structural integrity, and did not change their state during any of the seismic tests, and were functionally operable following the earthquake simulations.

Westinghouse developed the required response spec>ra for the Shearon Harris main control board by performing a three dimensional time history analysis of the main control board. A generic device RRS was developed by enveloping the spectra for ten different model node locations. A response spectra analysis of the main control cabinet was performed to qualify the cabinet. The minimum safety margin for the cabinet was calculated to be 1.28. The main control board analysis is documented by WCAP 10469, dated January 1984.

Based'n our inspectioh of the field installation, review of the qualification documents, and the applicant's responses to questions, the auxiliary feedwater controller is adequately qualified for the prescribed loads.

2.2 3-inch Dia hra m Valve NSSS-2 The 3-in. diaphragm valve (MPL No. 2-WL-D650SB1) was supplied by ITT Grinnell with Serial No. 78-6225-15-1. This valve was purchased to specification G-678845. It is line mounted in the liquid waste process piping system just outside the containment in the auxiliary building at elevation 230 ft. The valve has a vertical pneumatic actuator supported only by its attachment to the valve. Loss of supply air to the valve actuator will result in the valve position remaining at or returning to its fail safe condition.

This valve was qualified by a combination of testing and analysis performed by ITT Grinnell, documented by report No. 1612 Rev. 2 dated August 14, 1985. The valve was analyzed in accordance with the requirements of ASME code 'section III for class 2 valves. This analysis included an evaluation of valve body stresses due to pressure and seismic nozzle loads. The specified seismic nozzle loads were expressed in terms I

of the attached piping yield strength. The specified axial stress was 2%

of yield strength and the bending stress was 205 of yield strength. The valve and actuator assembly were attached to a bookend test fixture for seismic testing which consisted of resonance search tests and static deflection tests. The assembly natural frequencies'were determined to be 12.9 Hz side-to-side, 16 Hz front-to-back, and rigid vertical. The static deflection tests consisted of putting a 9.0 g static force on the actuator center of gravity in each direction and operating the valve and actuator. Valve stroke times and leakage were monitored during the tests.

Operability of the valve and actuator was demonstrated with no observed failures or anomalies. The valve maximum accelerations for SSE loading were determined to be 1.0 g side-to-side (s/s), 2.3 g front-to-back (f/b),

and 0.7 g vertical (v) from the piping analysis. This piping analysis

(stress calc. 8250-1) was reviewed and the modeling of this flexible valve-actuator assembly was consistent with its mass and stiffness properties.

The applicant was asked to provide the maintenance procedures providing the valve nonmetallic diaphragm replacement requirements. Their response was that these valves are listed in the NSSS ME/ program as requiring routine maintenance; however, the maintenance procedures for these valves have not been prepared at this time.

Based on our inspection of the field installation, review of the qualification documents, and the applicant's responses to questions, the 3-in. diaphragm valve is adequately qualified fm the prescribed loads.

I 2.3 Four-Ba Two-Train Solid State Protection S stem Train"A NSSS-3 The four-bay two-train solid state protection system train A (DWG No. 1059E45G01, serial No. 0001) was supplied by Westinghouse according to purchase spec. No. 952591:. It was located in the reactor building at the 305-ft elevation. This four-bay unit is obtained by bolting together a standard three-bay and a non-standard one-bay unit on its sides. The resulting four-bay cabinet is in turn bolted to a common base with 16 bolts per bay making a. total of 64 bolts. This is an incre'ase, in number of bolts dictated by looseness during testing. The unit is then vertically mounted on the floor with 16 3/4"in. diameter bolts. There are four bolts (one on each corner) per bay. It is a part of the reactor protection system and provides reactor trip and safeguards actuation.

The unit is qualified based on a combination of tests and analysis.

Seismic loads are considered in the qualification. The details and results are documented in the reports: Seismic Testin of Electrical and Control E uf ment PGKE Plants; No. WCAP-8021, Rev.s 0, of Nay 1973 and ~Euf ment ualification b the Combi~ed Anal sis and Test A roved for the-Four-Ba Cabinet of the Two-Train Solid State Protection S stem, No. WCAP-8687 Supp.. 2-E16B, Rev. 2, of April 1982. These reports were prepared by 4

Westinghouse. The basic qualification consists of testing a standard three-bay cabinet and then extending the results, with analysis, to cover a four-bay configuration.

The tests performed on a standard three-bay were as follows. A three-bay cabinet was mounted on a single-axis table with 12 3/4-in.

bolts. In each of its principal axis direction, a resonance search with a 0..2 g input indicated the following frequencies between 1 to 35 Hz.

s/s f/b 9.8 Hz 10.8 Hz >33 Hz The corresponding frequencies by analysis for a four-bay configuration were:

s/s f/b 11.7 Hz 10.2 Hz >33 Hz Subsequently, a series of sine beat tests with 5 beats and 10 cycles per beat were performed at 1.25, 2.5, 3.5, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23; 25, 27, .29, 31, 33, and 35 Hz. These had adequate magnitude for the qualification against a generic Westinghouse requirement. It was compared to the requirement for the site. The input was more than required. The structural integrity and operability were verified. The following anomalies occurred but were satisfactorily resolved.

No mechanical problems occurred during the vertical axis tests. In the side-to-side axis tests at lower "g" levels, the two left end cabinet-to-base bolts repeatedly loosened and were deformed until it became necessary to replace these with more hardened bolts.. During subsequent testing at these "g" levels in the side-to-side axis, these bolts failed completely on the, last sine beat test although testing in this axis was completed. Before performing the front-to-back axis tests, twelve additional cabinet-to-base bolts were installed making a total of 24 bolts fastening the cabinet to its base. In the field, there are 16 bolts/bay making a total of 64. Also, during the front-to-back tests, several door

latches failed, thus allowing these doors to open. This had no effect on the proper operation of the system; therefore, no modification was considered necessary.

The functions .monitored by recorders were "UNDERVOLTAGE COIL", "TRAIN A TROUBLE (K524)", and "SAFETY INJECTION". Test switches were operated during the third seismic beat simulating a reactor trip and safeguards actuation, causing a change in amplitude of the "UNDERVOLTAGE COIL" and "SAFETY INJECTION" recorded signals.

At 5 Hz and 13 Hz in the front-to-back axis, the "SAFETY INJECTION" (SI) signal indicated several momentary trips (contact closures) before the test switches were operated. Also, at 7 Hz and 9.5 Hz, this signal indicated a momentary trip and then a permanent change of state (latch up) on the first sine beat of each test frequency. Investigation revealed that the momentary trips were caused by contact bounce on the output (slave) relays, and the permanent change of state was the result of the armature of the same relays bouncing closed, allowing their mechanical latch mechanism to operate. These malfunctions could have initiated safeguards actuation; however, they would not have negated a valid safeguards actuation, or reactor trip. Although SI was prematurely actuated, the undervoltage coil tripped as required when called upon to'o so, verifying that no.associated circuit damage resulted.

During tests at 7 Hz and 2 g in the side"to-side axis, two capacitors in one of the two dc Power Supply chassis came loose from their mounting and shorted its output voltage, thus causing that power supply to fail.

This failure was recorded on the "TRAIN A TROUBLE" signal. Since the output voltages from the two dc power supplies are auctioneered so that in case of failure of one supply the other continues to supply the dc voltage, the reactor trip and safeguai'ds actuation functions were not affected. The two capacitors were replaced in their holders and clamped. Subsequent testing in the front-to-back and vertical planes was completed with the capacitors remaining securely in place. There were no problems with the capacitors in the other dc power supply chassis. Considering the overall operation, including the above malfunctions, the system successfully met the criteria of the seismic tests.

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During the field inspection, it was discovered that cabinet hinge pins on the doors were falling out and the doors were not secure. These door-hing~ were repaired with welds and the applicant subsequently ascertained that it was an isolated occurrence.

The qualification review indicated that the life span of the nonmetallic parts, in general, has not been evaluated. It should be evaluated.

Also during the field observation of the four-bay, two-train solid state protection system train A (NSSS-3), it appeared that the'clearance between this unit and an adjacent one was not adequate. On inquiry, it was learned that this problem may be associated. with many cabinets. However, the applicant was aware of the problem and started a program to analyze and correct the situation where required.

Based on our observation of the field installation, review of the qualification document and applicant's responses to our questions, this unit is qualified for five years life.

2.4 Process Control Cabinet NSSS"4 The 7300 series process control cabinet (model No. 2447D63), supplied by Westinghouse, is located in the auxiliary building at the 30S-ft elevation. Although this cabinet was supplied by Westinghouse, it is being used to perform a BOP safety function, i.e., control the HVAC for safety related equipment areas.

The cabinet and printed circuit cards were qualified by separate testing. First, 0.2 g resonance search tests were performed on a fully loaded 3-bay cabinet, as reported in Westinghouse report WCAP-8687,.

supplement 2-E13A, Rev. 1, E ui ment uglification Test Re ort Process Protection'S stem Seismic Testin , dated July 1981. Natural frequencies of 10 Hz side-to-side and 7 Hz front-to-back were found. No vertical natural frequencies below 33 Hz were found. Multi-frequency pseudo triaxial qualification testing was then performed as reported in

Westinghouse report WCAP-8587, EQDP-ESE-13, Rev. 5, E ui ment Qualification Oata Packa e Process Protection S stem, dated June 1985. Five OBE tests and 4 SSE tests were run on the cabinet. Generic TRSs for each of these tests enveloped the Shearon Harris specific RRSs. The damping was 4 percent. The test mounting was the same as the actual in-plant mounting. No damage to the cabinet occurred during testing.

Accelerometers were mounted at the device locations in the full'y loaded cabinet tests described above. The output of these accelerometers was used to establish RRSs for testing of the printed circuit (PC) cards to be mounted in the cabinet. The testing of the PC cards is contained in Westinghouse report WCAP-8687, Supplement 2-E13D, Rev. 1, ~E ui ment ualification Test Re ort Process Protection S stem Su lemental Testin of Power Su lies and Circuit Breakers , dated April 1985. The in-cabinet generic RRS for the PC cards was developed by enveloping the response spectra generated from the accelerometer output from the cabinet testing.

Five OBE tests and 2 SSE tests were performed on each card. The TRSs enveloped the RRSs for all tests. Operability of the PC cards was monitored during the testing.

Several PC cards showed voltage inaccuracies greater than those specified in the original test plan. A list of the PC cards installed in

- the process control cabinet at Shear'on.Harris was reviewed. Four cards (NC03, NCH1, NSC7, and NSC3) showing inaccuracies were installed in the cabinet. Westinghouse qualified these cards by test (see Westinghouse letter CQL-8801, Carolina Power and Li ht Co. Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant 7300 Series PC cards Re uirin Anal sis) and found them to be acceptable for their purposes. However, since these cards are being used for a BOP function, EBASCO is required to make a similar evaluation. This issue was raised during the audit. EBASCO is currently working on this evaluation and is about 70 percent complete. Shearon Harris plant personnel agreed to inform the auditor when this task is complete.

Thermal aging of the PC cards was also performed as reported in Westinghouse report WCAP-8687, Supplement 2, Appendix 1, Short Term A A 2( h )~1A The qualified life of each PC card is 5 years.

Based on the observation of the field installation, review of the qualification documents, and the applicant's response to questions, the process control cabinet and associated PC cards are adequately qualified for the prescribed loads.

2.5 Com onent Coolin Water Pum NSSS-5 The component cooling water pump supplied by Pacific Pump (model No. 'DSK 16 x 18 in.) is located in the auxiliary building at the 236-ft elevation. The motor was supplied by the Westinghouse Large Motor Division. The. safety function of the pump is to supply cooling 'water to various NSSS safety related heat exchangers.

The pump was qualified using a combination of test and analysis.

Natural frequency testing of the pump was performed and reported in Pacific Pump Shop Order D-49273, Natural Fre uenc Test, dated August 12, 1977.

The test was performed on a pump motor assembly using a shaker. The shaker applied a 200, lb force over a frequency range of 10 to 220 Hz. The pump and motor were mounted on' common base plate. No piping was attached to the pump flanges. The base plate was clamped down through the grout holes rather than being grouted. These differences were considered to have no appreciable effect on the resulting natural frequencies. No major response was seen below 35 Hz.

Calculations demonstrating the structural integrity of the pump are contained in Pacific Pump Shop Order No. 5D-49273, repo'rt No. K"387, Rev. 1, Nuclear Service Pum Desi n Anal sis Re ort Class 3, dated July 29, 1976. The seismic load used in the calculations was 3 g horizontal and 2 g vertical. Shaft deflection calculations showed that the deflections were less than .the clearances available between the rotating and stationary parts. Holddown bolt calculations showed that bolt stresses were below allowable values. Pressure boundary calculations showed that structural integrity was maintained under worst case design condition loadings.

The motor was qualified by a combination of test and analysis.

Thermal aging, radiation aging, and qualification testing were performed qs reported in Westinghouse report No. WCAP-8687, Supp. 2-A02A, Rev. 2, E ui ment ualification Test Re ort Westin house LMD Motor Insulation, dated March 1983. Resonance search tests were performed from 1 to 70 Hz.

The lowest natural frequency was 52 Hz. Five OBE tests and 4 SSE tests were performed for various horizontal mountings on the test table.

Multi-frequency pseudo triaxial input was applied to the table. In all cases the TRSs enveloped the RRSs. The damping was 5 percent. No test anomalies or structural damage occurred.

Operability was not monitored during the testing. Therefore, further analysis was performed to show that the motor shaft deflections were less than available clearances. A summary of this analysis is contained in Westinghouse report seismic shop order 74F31249, Seismic Anal sis of Com onent Coolin Pum Motor for C L, dated December 23, 1976. A conjugate beam analysis of the pump shaft was performed. The loads considered were gravity, operational 1'oads, internal forces, external thrust, and impeller mass effects. The analysis showed that 'the rotor did not rub the stator, radial ahd thrust bearing loads were within allowable limits, and all stresses were below allowable values.

The minimum qualified life of the motor was reported as 5.68 years in Westinghouse Gale. No. f040301, S.0.206, Minumum uglified Life of 5 ears for W LMD Su lied Class 1E Motors, dated July 29, 1982.

Based on the observation of the field installation, review of the qualification document, and the applicant's response to questions, the component cooling water pump and motor are adequately qualified for the prescribed loads.

2.6 Main Steam Relief Valve Controller. NSSS-7 The main steam relief valve controller (MPL No. PK-30B1) was supplied by Westinghouse with model No. 2445D69G05. It is a 7300 series manual/automatic controller used to control one of the main steam relief

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valves. It is mounted in the main control board panel in the control room at elevation 305 ft. It is panel mounted using two mounting bracket assemblies furnished with the controller.

Dynamic qualification of this'tem was performed by testing performed by Westinghouse. This item was qualified identically to NSSS-1. See NSSS-1 for a description of the qualification testing.

Based on our inspection o'f the fi'eld installation, review of the qualification documents, and the applicant's responses to questions, the main steam relief valve controller is adequately qualified for the prescribed loads.

2.7 ASCO Solenoid Valve NSSS-8 The solenoid. valve (MPL No. 2RC-0525S-B-I) was supplied by" Automatic Switch Company (ASCO) with model No. FT-831654. This solenoid valve provides supply air to a pneumatic actuated valve identical to NSSS-2. It is located at elevation 246 ft of the auxiliary building. It is bolted to a horizontal channel with four 1/4 in. diameter bolts.

This .valve was qualified by testing performed by ASCO, documented by report No. 103, dated August 27, 1975. Testing consisted of a resonance test and two pseudo biaxial sine sweep tests. No natural frequencies were detected below 40 Hz. The pseudo biaxial tests had a double amplitude of 0.148 in. with test frequencies from 9 to 40 Hz.'. The corresponding range of peak acceleration levels was 0.6 to 12 g in the axis of test motion.

The plant generic input level is 2. 1 g in each direction. The test acceleration values are well in excess of the required test levels. The valves were tested in both an energized and deenergized state. No valve was observed during or after the tests. Operability of the valve 'eakage was demonstrated with no observed failures or anomalies.

Based on our inspection of the field installation, review of the qualification documents, and the applicant's responses,to questions, the ASCO solenoid valve is adequately qualified for the prescribed loads.

2.8 Residual Heat Removal Pum and Motor NSSS-10 The residual heat removal pump, supplied by Ingersoll-Rand (model No. 8 x 20 WDF) is located in the aver>

satisfactory completion of that program should be confirmed.

2. The field inspection revealed the generic question of inadequate clearance with respect to several cabinets. However, there is an ongoing program.to analyze and correct the situation. A satisfactory completion of this program is to be confirmed.

3. The generic question of evaluation of life-span for nonmetallic parts should be resolved.

3.10 Emer enc Screen Wash Pum s and Motor BOP 10 The two emergency screens wash pumps (MPL No. 1A-SA and SB) were supplied by Crane Deming Pump Co. with model No. 3065. They were purchased to specification No. CAR-SH-Mii Rev. 5. They are .270 gpm capacity horizontal pumps driven by Reliance 15 hp electric motors. 'he pump and motor assemblies are skid mounted and located at elevation 261 ft of the emergency service water intake structure. The skids are bolted down with four 1 inch diameter embedment bolts. These pumps provide wash water for the intake structure screens.

I The pumps and motors were qualified by analysis. The motor support bolts, pump, and support frame were analyzed by McDonald Engineering Analysis Co. and documented by report No. ME-626, dated November 1, 1984.

A. three dimensional computer model of the pump assembly was used for the analysis using the computer code ICES-STRUDL. The natural frequencies of 30

the pump assembly were determined to be in the rigid range. The lowest natural frequency was 36.9 Hz side-to-side. A static analysis was performed with a SSE acceleration of 1.0 g in each direction with nozzle loading. The highest stressed component was determined to be the frame adaptor bolts with a calculated stress of 23,734 psi compared to an allowable stress of 30,800'psi. The relative displacement between the pump impeller and casing was calculated to be .00342 inches compared to a clearance of .015 inches.

A qualification analysis of the pump motor was performed by Reliance Electric Motor Co. documented by report No. 796-A-85, dated September 28, 1979. This analysis wa's performed using static methods and an in house computer code No. 706. The relative deflection between the pump stator and rotor was calculated to be .0005 inches compared to a clearance of

.0052 inches. The loading used in the calculation was based on preliminary spectra ZPA which was approximately half of the final value. Therefore using the proper loading the relative deflection would be approximately

.001 inches still only one fifth the allowable value.

Based on our inspection of the field installation, review of the qualification documents, and the applicant's responses to questions, the emergency screen wash pumps are adequately qualified for the prescribed

loads,

3. 11 30-inch Butterfl Valve BOP 12 The 30-inch butterfly valve (ID No. 3SW-B106SB-1-09519, Model No. 30-150-8229 MT MOD: B) was only briefly looked into due to lack of time. The review established that a complete qualification documentation package was in place but did not establish,the merit of the qualification of the unit.

3. 12 H dramotor Valve 0 erator BOP-2A The hydramotor valve operator, supplied by ITT General Controls (model No, NH-91-Reverse) is located in the auxiliary building at the 305 ft 31

elevation. The safety function of the valve is to modulate flow for cooling of the service air handling unit.

The hydramotor valve operator was qualified by test in Myle'-.Laboratory report 58072, Seismic Testin of Milliam H dramotor Actuator Part No.

NH-91 Reverse Serial No. 7545B 135481-01-001 for ITT General Controls, dated June 8, 1976. The operator was mounted vertically in the tests. The operator was bolted to the test table. A threaded rod was welded to the

. table and was connected to the operator coupling 'to simulate connection to the valve stem. Biaxial testing (one horizontal axis and the vertical axis) was performed in two different horizontal orientations 90 degrees apart., Operability of the specimen was monitored during the testing.

Independent random motion from 1.25 to 35 Hz was applied to the specimen.

Each axis had a 3 g zero period acceleration for SSE. The Shearon Harris required accelerations for line mounted equipment is 3 g horizontal and 2 g vertical. The TRS exceeded 3 g at all frequencies above 1.5 Hz. Therefore the TRS enveloped the RRS. One SSE test and 5 OBE tests were performed.

The OBE tests were run at one-half of the SSE test level; i.e., 1.5 g zero period acceleration. No anomalies occurred during testing.

Other testing of the operator was performed with the operator mounted horizontally as described in ITT General Controls report 721.77.095, Addendum 5, Summar of NH90 Series Actuator Su lemental Generic ualification Testin to Class 1E Re uirements Outside Containment. No test anomalies were reported during testing.

Thermal aging was performed and a 20,000 hour0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> qualified life was identified in ITT General Controls report 721.77.095 Addendum 2, Certification of NH90 Actuators for 50 C 122 F Ambient Tem erature and 20 000 Hours Usa e at 6N'ated Load, dated May 16, 1978.

Based on the observation of the field installation, review of the qualification document; and the applicant's response to questions, the hydra motor valve operator is adequately qualified for the prescribed loads.

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4. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION The review of the Shearon Harris, Unit+ will be completed when the following open items are closed.

4.1 Generic Issues 4.1.1 During the field observation of the four-bay two-train solid state protection system train A (NSSS-3) it appeared that the clearance between this unit and an adjacent one was not adequate. On inquiry, it was further learned that this problem may be associated with many cabinets. However, the applicant indicated that he was already aware of the situation and a program was already in motion to analyze and correct the situation where

'required. The NRC should be informed when the program is completed.

4.1.2 The evaluation of the life-span of the nonmetallic parts has not been performed. They should be performed and'RC informed of the completion.

4.2 E ui ment S ecific Issues 4.2.1 The qualification review of the control room cabinet (BOP-9) indicates that only the cabinet is qualified. as of now. However, the structural adequacy as well as operability of the internals have not been established.

The qualification of the internal should be completed and NRC informed of the satisfactory completion.

33

4.3 Conclusion Based upon our review, we conclude that, pending resolution of all open items, an appropriate qualification program has been, defined and implemented for the seismic category I mechanical and electrical equipment which will provide reasonable assurance that such equipment will function properly during and after the excitation due to vibratory forces imposed by safe shutdown earthquake in combination with operating loads.

34

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LIST OF ATTENDEES J. Adams. W Nuclear Safety J. T. Adams HPES Stress K. D. Bedford CP&L HPES Goutam Bagchi USNRC Brad Bond Westinghouse Pete Brady CP&L HPES T. L. Bridges EG&G Idaho, Inc.

Guy Campbell CP8L Maint.

Don Casado CP&L Lee, Cerra Ebasco D. M. Crews ~

CP&L HPES Jan Dudiak Westinghouse Randall Fair CP&L T. S.

K. M. Fitzgerald CP&L HPES J. B. Gore T&B EDR D. 0. Greenwood F. Guerin E. Gurun W

CP&L HPES Nuclear Safety Ebasco EM B. LE Harris EG&G Idaho, Inc.

K. G. Hate'. CP&L QA Heffner CP8L Maint.

C. S. Hinnat CP&L Startup P..Howard CP&L Mark Komenic Westinghouse Clarke Kido EG&G Idaho, Inc.

J. Klein Ebasco"HVAC Tony Lenty CP&L HPOS Charles Leute Ebasco Civil L. I. Lof1 in

'im Lombardo CP&L HPES USNRC H. L. Magleby EG4G Idaho, Inc.

George F. Maxwell USNRC SRI David C. McCarthy CP&L NELD Mark McDaniel CP&L HPES John J. McInerney W Nuclear Safety C. L. McKenzie CP&L QA/QC (OPS)

J. F. Nevill CP&L HPES Dragos A. Nute Ebasco Civil/SAG Jim Ojala CP&L Bill Pahash Ebasco'SC James Parello Westinghouse

'Bob Pounty CP&L HPES Joe Ruggiero Ebasco Proj. Eng.

Don Ryan CP&L HPES Pedro Salas CP8L Licensing Z. T. Shi Ebasco Civil/SAG Jag N. Singh EG8G Idaho, Inc.

Di'ck Stephens CP&L RAT 35

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Matt Sterrett CP&L HPES Howard M. Stromberg EG&G Idaho, Inc.

Max F. Thompson, Jr. CP&L HPEMS J. N. Underwood CP&L HPES R. Brian Van Metre CP&L T.S.

E. J. Wagner CP&L HPES H. L. Williamf CP&L HPES Peter Yando CP&L HPES Ron Zola CP&L TS, 36

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