ML17313A525

Partially Deleted Response to 980320 Ltr Re Violations in Investigation Rept 4-97-022S.Corrective Actions:Sro License Terminated at APS Request.Author Demoted from Dept Leader to Section Leader & Completed Two Week Unpaid Leave

ML17313A525
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	04/15/1998
From:	Zell L ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
To:	Merschoff E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
Shared Package
ML17313A524	List: ML17313A523 ML17313A525
References
NUDOCS 9808110193
Download: ML17313A525 (12)

Text

Leo C. Zell Apnl 15, 1998 Ellis Merschoff Regional Administrator US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 Arlington, Texas 76011

Subject:

RESPONSE TO AN APPARENT VIOLATIONOF NRC REQUIREMENTS (NRC Investigation Report No. 4-97-022S)

Dear Mr. Merschoff:

Attached is my response to your letter to me dated March 20, 1998. A facsimile copy was sent to you under separate cover by William H. Briggs, Jr. This is the original.

Sincerely, Leo C. Zell 9808ii0193 980806 PDR ADOCK 05000M8 8 PDR

1 B4/15/1998 B7: 54 6B2-39 64 PAGE B2 1

DECLARATIONOF LEO CHAGRES ZELL IN RESPONSE TO MARCH 20, 1998 APPARENT VIOLATIONOF NRC REQUIREMENTS

1. This wHI respond to the March 20, 1898 fetter from Mr. EHls W. Merschoff, Regional Administrator, Region IV, Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC7 to me concerning an Apparent Violation of NRC Requirements (NRC investigation Report No.

4-97%22S) ('the March 20 Ietteg.

2. The March 20 lette'r asks me to address four different subjects -- (1) the reasons for the apparent violation; (2) the corrective steps that have been taken to address this Incident; (3) the corrective steps that have been taken to avoid future Instances of deliberate misconduct; and (4) the date when corrective action will be completed.

3. As you know, I have discussed these matters at length in my testimony before the CNice of lnvestfgatfons, ln my testimony and in wrNen statements I submitted to the NRC at the March N, 1898 Arhona Public Service Company ('AP~ p~nforcement conference, and fn statements that I gave to APS during its Investfgatfon of this matter. I ask that you refer ta these earlier statements and that you consider them ln fuff before you dedde the actfon that you wish to take in this matter. I have been complete and honest when I have tried to explain to Oi, to the NRG, to APS, and to my feHow employees and fnends the mistake I made, why lt happened, and the professional and personal toH that it has taken on me and my famHy.

4. With regard to the first subject that you have asked me to address, In my earlier statements I explained the reasons for the apparent vfoiatfon to the best of my abiHty..

Rather than repeat these statements here, Iet me simply reftemte what I have said repeatedly h my earHer statements - - I made a terrible mistake and in so doing I failed to fulNi my responsibilities as a licensed operator and a supenrfsor.

5. The remaining three subjects that you have asked me to address deal with conective steps that have been taken. The foHowfng Is a Est of the cormctive actions that have been or wlli be taken and the dates of their compfetfon:

~ My SRO license has been terminated at APS's request.

I wiH not be permitted to reapply for a NRG license or perform 10 CFR Part 55 duties for a period of at least one year. Completed, 2/19/98.

~ I have been demoted from department leader (manager) to section leader (supervisor). My base pay has been reduce Complefed, 2/ 0

~ I have completed a two week unpaid Decision-Making Leave. Completed, 2/2448, I have completed wilting a special edition of the Palo Verde News, along with the others involved ln this Incident. This artfde discusses the basics of the incident and focuses on the associated fssues and lessons learned. The title of the article Is Compromising Our Personal IntegCy and it was published

f B4/15/1998 B7: 54 6B2" 39 64 PAGE B3 and dlstributed to aH Palo Verde personnel. See attachment 01. Complefed, 8/2MS.

~ ln accordance with the direction of Dave Smith, Operations Director, I will provide a personal presentation and discussion regarding this Incident with Operations personnel either as a part of special meetings or as a part of Industry Operating Experience presented during operator training. This presentation wiH Include supervisory responsibHlties, license responsibilities, personal integrity and other issues and lessons teamed. To be completed by 7/31!98;

~ For a period of one year, wHI provide a personal presentation end discussion 1

regarding this Incident at the request of any APS officer er leader as a part of special meetings, Industry Operating Experience or alhhands meetIngs. This presentation wiH include supervisory responsibHities, license responsibilities, personal Integrity and other issues and lessons learned. To be completed by 2ffQ/99.

~ I will meetwith Dave Smith and Gregg Oveibeck, Vice President, Production, on a quarterfy basis to discuss performance and progress in this program. To be compteted by 2/10/99.

6. In addition, and equalfy as important, are the corrective actions I have taken upon myself. WNe those who know me say they believe In me and know and trust my character, I hold myself to a standard of perfection. One mistake ls one too many. I beHeve in high personal ethics, integrity and honesty. And yet I aHowed this to happen.

It Is difficultfor me to Internally wrestle with this dilemma. I will never again allow myself to lower my standamls or go agaInst something I believe in. And I will not aHow it to happen to someone else.

7. I ask that you consider the information submitted here and ln my earlier

'statements when maMng the final decision concerning this apparent violation of NRC requirements. Let me state again that I made a mistake when this Incident occurred and I did not follow NRC requirements, good supervisory practices or my own personal ethics. I am truly sony for vrhat I did and I give you my word lt has never'happened before or since, and I give you my word that it wHI never happen again. Additionally, I will ensure that the painful lessons I have learned are passed on to my coworkers so that they will not make a similar mistake.

I thank you for your consideration and this opportunity.

I declare under penalty of pe jury that the foregoing is true and correct.

o Charles Zeil Executed on the~day of April, 1988.

II l

I

P B4 15 .1998 87: 54 682-39 64 PVNGS EXEC OFF PAGE 84 Match 27. 1998 LATE-BREAKING NEWS Compromising Our Personal Integrity Recently, an HRC OJJtce ofInvestigation fnquiry revealed that fn March of1993 a Palo Verde operatfng cree failed in thefr ifcensedresponsfbflftfes and compromised their ethics by back&ming a time dependent surveillance test PT) ln order to prevent fncurrfng a Licensee Event Report g ER).

use individuals fnvolved have been subsequently removedPom Part $$ licensed duties and those with operating licenses have had their licenses expired Additional disciplinary action has been taken by APS.

2Rs bulletin presents the issues and lessons learnedPom the individuals involved to assist evey employee fn makfng the right chofce ~bile performing theirjob at Palo Verde.

Vfc make choices every day in pasonal matters and in our jobs. The process of making choices often involves consulting family members and peers as a selfwheck to ensure the decision you are about to make is appropriate and ethically sound.

Thousands of decisions are made every day at nuclear facilities across the country. As employees of APS, which holds the operating license for Palo Verde, we are entrusted with the responsibility for making choices in such a manner as to ensure the safe (more)

Palo Verde Nudear Generating Station e Strategic Communications PO.8ox S2034 Mail Station 7466 ~ Phoenix. Arizona 85072-2034 a 602393,1000

84/15/1998 87: 54 682-39 64 PVNGS EXEC OFF S PAGE 85 f) ~

and reliable operation ofthc facility. Nowhctc is tMs trust morc conspicuous than in thc case of licensed operators. They have been entzusted with the operational responsibilities ofthis facility based on their in4epth technical skill and sound decision-making abilities.

Their operational philosophy and ethical standards must bc unquestionable.

There aze important lessons to bc learned for alL As unfoztunatc as this event was for Palo Verde, on a pezsonal level, thc 1993 event was cvcn morc detrimenta to thc individuals involved. Allemployees at Palo Verde must reexamine their personal undersemding of the administrative and regulatozy requirements associated with their jobs. It is impoztant to understand how this incident happcncd and apply the lessons &om this event to czmurc similar incidents willncvcr again occur at Palo Verde.

Qood teamwozk and mutual zespect among peers can significantly inQuence thc decision-maliag process.%hen considering appropriate alternatives in rcsponsc to any situation, you are encouraged to seek advice f'rom somconc with an objective view of thc pzoblcm that wiD provide sound tcchnical and ethical advice.

In the 1993 incident, there was an identified failure to complctc a

'one-hour'urveillance documentation required by tcchnical specification. Thc individuals involved in this incident wcze expczicnccd Operations personnel who understood the requirements to submit a CRDR for missing thc timWcpcndcnt requirement. So why didn't they do what they knew they should'? How did they cross thc linc and make the wrong decision?

It becomes apparent this incident occurred because thc clemcnts of good decision mahzzg were compromised in a very subtle and seductive way.

Prior to removing the diesel genczator fzom service, the Operations personnel normally rcvicw plant conditions to ensure appropriate support for thc equipmcnt outage. In this event, the crevr clearly understood plant conditions met all surveillance requircmcnts prior to removing thc engine Rom service. Approximately four hours later thc engine was restored to service. No retest was required because the only wodc performed was a visual inspection.

~ Several hours later it was discovered that the documentation of plant conditions had been znissed.

(more)

84/15/1998 87: 54 682" 39 64 PAGE 86

~ ~e operators knew what plant conditions existed for thc duration ofthc diesel generator outage and believed as a practical matter they had performed the equivalent ofthe survcillancc requirements,

~ Rather than initiating a CRDR for the incident, the crew members back-timed documentation.

Rcgu1atory requirements, administrative control procedures and individual integrity dictated thc course ofaction to be taken. Instead, technical understanding of plant conditions, knowledge of systems status and determined lack of safety significance worked against Nuking the only correct choice to rcport thc surveillance as missed.

Crevr personnel decided to perform the surveillance test, as they should have, but they l~ Oh t,~l.Th also chose to back-time the completion to rcfiect meeting thc one+our surveillance, knowIcdgc, cxpcricncc levels, conditions

• / @II of the plant and thc perceived safety significance served to infiuencc their understanding of the significance of back-timing the documentation. Instead of exercising good decision making, the crew rationalized the situation and subvcrtcd onc of thc main reasons for having more than onc Hcensed person on shHt to make decisions. Not aH of the crew necessarily sponsored thc decision. Not all of them necessarily thought it was a good idea However, none of them refused to go along with it.

of this incident focus on subject The details p Mi'H,i' matter directly related to control room lly' f hU y a.~l* I V ~ I '*

Palo Verde to clearly understand thc potential liabilityand personal responsibilities to

~

ofthis incident and apply thc lessons learned to their own individual areas of MB responsibility.

Never allow your personal ethics or integrity to bc compromised by the willofthe group. %hen you are faced with diKcult decisions, remove thc emotional aspects that might taint your ability to remain objective. Ifyour supervision is promotmg domg something that in your mind is wrong, you need to challenge it. Ifyou witness or are a (more)

B4/15/1998 B7: 54 6B2-39 64 PVNGS EXEC OFF S PAGE B7

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part of a decision-making process you bclicve to be wrong, bc strong enough to stand firmlyon your objections. lfneeded, elevate your objections or concerns through thc management chain to obtain resolution.

As mcmbcxs of thc Palo Verde Team, wc must look out for thc interests of each other. Don't allow your fellow team members to make errors ofany type. Never assume that even ifyou were not the sponsor of a decision, but merely someone who went along with it and helped implement it, that you willesca resp'onsibifity. That is not only bad decision making, but an incorrect gauge of your personal responsibility. Each employee is responsible to the public, thc company and thc NRC, not only for safety of thc Rcility but also to assure compliance with NRC regulations and station procedures.

When incidents ofthis nature are made public, it can cause many to question the nrtegrity of our workforce and of others in thc nuclear industry.'1'afety of our employees as well as those who live and work around us, depends on the honesty and trustworthiness of every one ofour employees. This trust can never be compromised if we are to remain a viable power generation facility in thc years to come.

The responsibility entrusted to us is personal and it is individual. Personal integrity is all that stands between success and failure when faced with crossing thc linc in your decision mahng.

(end)