ML17286A971

LER 91-016-00:on 910707,ESF Actuation Occurred.Caused by Blown Rupture Disk.Corrective Actions Taken to Replace Blown Rupture Disk & to Test Relief Valves for Proper Operating pressure.W/910802 Ltr

ML17286A971
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	08/02/1991
From:	John Baker, Fies C WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
GO2-91-145, LER-91-016, LER-91-16, NUDOCS 9108090134
Download: ML17286A971 (8)

Text

ACCELERATED D> TRIBUTION DEMONS ~TION SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM.(RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9108090134 DOC.DATE: 91/08/02 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe 05000397 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION FIES,C.L. Washington Public Power Supply System BAKER,J.W. Washington Public Power Supply System RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 91-016-00:on 910707,ESF actuation occurred. Caused by blown rupture disk. Corrective actions taken to replace'blown rupture disk & to test relief valves for proper operating D pressure.W/910802 ltr.

S DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR i ENCL / SIZE:

TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES: A ID RECIPIENT CODE/NAME COPIES 1'ECIPIENT LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME COPIES LTTR ENCL D

PD5 LA 1 1. PD5 PD 1. 1 D ENG,P.L. 1 INTERNAL: ACNW 2 2 ACRS 2 2 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 "1 AEOD/ROAB/DSP 2 2 NRR/DET/ECMB 9H 1 1 NRR/DET/EMEB 7E 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LHFB10 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 NRR/DREP/PRPBll NRR/DST/SICB8H3 2,

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NSIC POORER W 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 I

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NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE iVASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOiil PI-37 (EXT. 20079) TO LL)i!INATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUiiIENTS YOU DOiN'T NEED!

FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 33 ENCL 33

ti WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM F.O. Box 968 ~ 3000 George Washington Way ~ Richland, Washington 99352 Docket No. 50-397 August 2, 1991 G02-91-145 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO.91-016

Dear Sir:

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No.91-016 for the WNP-2 Plant.

This repori. is submitted in response to the report requirements of 10CFR50.73 and discusses the items of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.

Very truly yours, J.W. 'ker (N/0 927N)

WNP-2 Plant Nanager JWB:ac

Enclosure:

Licensee Event Report No.91-016 cc: Hr. John B. Hartin, NRC Region V Hr. C. Sorensen, NRC Resident Inspector (N/0 901A)

INPO Records Center Atlani.a, GA Hs. Dottie Sherman, ANI Hr. 0. L. Williams, BPA (N/0 399)

NRC Resident Inspector walk over copy

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (669) APPROVED OMB NO. 3(504)104 EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION CQLLE'CTION REQUEST: 50A) HAS. FORWARD LICENSEE EVENT REPORT tLER) COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (F630), U.S. NUCLEAR RE GULATO AY COMMISSION. WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3(600(04). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTANO BUDGET. WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (I I DOCKET NUMBER (2) PA E W h n ton N clear Plant - Un't 2 0 5 0 0 0 OF TITLE ( ~ I I

ESF Actuation Containment Instrument A i(

EVENT DATE (5) LFR NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (6)

MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR Nkg SEQUENTIAL err REVS~ MQNTH DAY YEAR FACILITYNAMES DOCKET NUMBER(S)

PX NUMSER yacc NVMSER 0 5 0 0 0 0 7 0 7 919 1 01 6 0 0 8 029 1

0. 5 0 0 0 OPERATINQ THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT T 0 THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR III ICneck one or more of tfte fouoIvinpl (11 MODE (9) 20.402(S) 20.405(cl 50,73(e I (2)(lr) 73.7)(II)

POWER 20.405( ~ )ll)(l) 50.36 (c) (1) 50.73(e) (2)(v) 73.71(cl LEYEL 0 0 0 20.40S(e) (I )(SI 60.36(c) (2) 60.73(e)(21(vB) QTH ER ISptcify in Aottrect Oefovrend In Tert HRC Form 20.406( ~ ) (1 l(ill( 50.73(e) (2) (ll 60.73(e) (2) (rlB) (Al 366A) jj4~kk<jg" 20A05(el(l ) (lv) 20.405(e) l1 ) (r) 60.73(eH2) (9) 50.73(e)(2) (lll) 50.73 60,73

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LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE COMPLETE ONE'INE FOR EACH COMPONEN'T FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13I CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC.

TUAER REPCRTABLE TO NPRDS gjj~gQQ8:. CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANVFAC TURER EPORTABLE TO NPADS

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At 1448 hours0.0168 days <br />0.402 hours <br />0.00239 weeks <br />5.50964e-4 months <br /> on July 7, 1991 an ESF actuation occurred when the safety related portion of the Containment Instrument Air (CIA) System was actuated. Valves CIA-V-39A and CIA-V-39B closed automatically on decreasing nitrogen pressure and Stepping Programmers (CIA-PROG-1A and CIA-PROG-1B) associated with the bottled nitrogen supply were initiated. The ESF actuation occurred, when a Rupture Disk (CN-RD-lB) on the normal nitrogen supply Storage Tank (CN-TK-1) blew resulting in a pressure decrease in the system.

At 1448 hours0.0168 days <br />0.402 hours <br />0.00239 weeks <br />5.50964e-4 months <br /> Plant Operators took immediate corrective action to line up the HAU Rupture Disk (CN-RD-1A) and Relief Valve (CN-RV-1A) which isolated the blowdown of the CN,system. Action was also taken to manually valve in one of the nitrogen bottles to maintain the ",AH header above 150 psig.

Corrective actions were also taken to replace the blown rupture disk and to test the relief valves for proper operating pressure. In addition an Engineering evaluation will be performed to identify methods of eliminating rupture disk failures.

The root cause of the event is indeterminate.

The event posed no threat to the health and safety of either the public or plant personnel.

NRC Form 366 (669)

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR AEGULATORYCOMMISSION (64)9) APPROVED OMB NO. 31500104 EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50A) HRS. FOAWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPOATS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P4)30), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATOAY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31504)(04), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCK ET NUMBE R (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

YEAR SEQUENTIAL .gg REVISION NUMBER ':~r NUM ER Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 o s o o o 3 979 1 016 0 0 0 2 oF0 6 TEXT /llmere SPece /4 rer)rr/red, Iree eddldane/ NRC Farm 366A'sl ((7)

Plant Conditions Power Level -0 X Plant Mode - 4

~D At 1448 hours0.0168 days <br />0.402 hours <br />0.00239 weeks <br />5.50964e-4 months <br /> on July 7, 1991 an ESF actuation occurred when the safety related

'portion of the Containment Instrument Air (CIA) System was actuated. Valves CIA-V-39A and CIA-V-39B closed automatically on decreasing nitrogen pressure "and Stepping Programmers (CIA-PROG-1A and CIA-PROG-1B) associated with the bottled nitrogen supply were initiated. The ESF actuation occurred when a Rupture Disk (CN-RD-1B) on the normal nitrogen supply Storage Tank (CN-TK-1) blew. The CIA low pressure alarm had activated at 1443 hours0.0167 days <br />0.401 hours <br />0.00239 weeks <br />5.490615e-4 months <br /> when the pressure was approximately 148 psig. Plant Operators took corrective action to line up the HA" Rupture Disk (CN-RD-lA) and Relief Valve (CN-RV-1A) which isolated the blowdown of the CN system.

At WNP-2 the normal nitrogen supply for the CIA system originates from a 11,000 gallon Storage Tank (CN-TK-1) with its associated vaporizers and a pressure/temperature control manifold. In-the normal mode of operation the CN system maintains a pressure of 150 psig in the CIA system using Pressure Control Valve (CN-PCV-10). Part of the overpressure protection on CN-TK-1 is a manifold consisting of two rupture disks (CN-RD-1A and CN-RD-1B) and two relief valves (CN-RV-lA and CN-RV-1B). This manifold is fed by a two way valve that allows selection of either the HA" or UB" relief valve and associated rupture disk.

The safety related part of the CIA provides a backup nitrogen supply to operate the seven Main Steam Safety Relief Valves (MSRVs) that are designated as Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) Valves. The ADS valves are required to be operational in modes 1, 2, and 3 with reactor pressure greater than 128 psig. Isolation of the safety related part of CIA takes place when valves CIA-V-39A and CIA-V-39B are automatically closed. This happens when the normal CIA pressure drops to 140 Psig (as measured by pressure switches CIA-PS-39A and CIA-PS-39B ) after a three minute time delay. A total of three signals in two channels (A and B) are used to initiate backup nitrogen. The signals for each channel are (1) CIA-PS-22A(B) 135 PSIG, (2)

CIA-PS-21A(B] 140 PSIG, and (3) CIA-V-39A(B) closed as described above. These signals feed a two-out-of-three logic circuit in each channel which initiates the stepping programmers for the nitrogen bottles. Programmer UA", CIA-PROG-lA, is initiated by the HAH logic and provides backup nitrogen to three ADS valves.

Programmer "B", CIA-PROG-1B, is initiated by the HBH logic and provides backup nitrogen to the four remaining ADS valves.

When the event occurred the backup nitrogen bottles were valved out of service since ADS is not requiPed in Modes 4 and 5. This is normally done during outages to conserve nitrogen. Under this condition if the stepping programmers initiate they are unable to automatically provide any backup nitrogen supply to the safety related header.-

I'RC Form 366A (64)9)

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (SJ)9) APPROVED OMB NO. 31500)06 EXPIRES: 4/30/92 STIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 508) HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENTBRANCH (PJ)30), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31504)04). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

KA~ SEQUENTIAL 'WA REVISION I~5. NVMSSR NVMSSR Washin ton Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 o s o o o 3 9 7 9 1 016 0 0 0 3 oF 6 TEXT //I moro e>>oo /I for/Ir/rod, oor odd/(/or>>/f/RC Forrrr 366A3/ (IT)

At the time of the event the Residual Heat Removal Loop UBH was inoperable and an alternate decay heat removal method was defined as required by Technical-Specification 3.4.9.2. The Abnormal Condition Procedure, PPM 4.4.2.1, Loss of RHR Shutdown Cooling Mode Loops, defines the options for alternate shutdown cooling.

The method chosen and noted in the shift managers log on July 7, 1991 was Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) apd Main Steam Safety Relief Valves (MSRVs). The two valves identified for Alternate Shutdown Cooling were MS-RV-4A and MS-RV-48 which are normally supplied with nitrogen from the CN system, or in case of the loss of the normal supply these two MSRVs can be supplied from the ADS backup nitrogen supply. The pressurized nitrogen is needed to open an MSRV in the relief mode.

This alternate method of cooling provides decay heat removal by using the LPCS Pump (LPCS-P-1) with flow to the suppression pool through two MSRVs.

Plant Operators were aware of the condition of the backup nitrogen bottles and the requirement to maintain alternate decay heat removal using the MSRVs. At 1630 hours0.0189 days <br />0.453 hours <br />0.0027 weeks <br />6.20215e-4 months <br /> the shift managers log noted that the non-safety related header and ADS HBH header pressure was approximately 125 psig. Plant abnormal condition procedure (PPM 4.820.81, Window 10-4) states that "IF ADS header pressure (CIA-PS-218) decays to 135 PSIG, ADS capability is impaired; REFER to Technical Specification 3.5. 1.H This was not a problem for this event since action was taken to manually valve in one of the nitrogen bottles to maintain the HA" header at approximately 150 psig.

At approximately 2000 hours0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br /> the two isolation valves CIA-V-39A and CIA-V-398 opened when the pressure in the CN System recovered to 143 psig. This placed the CIA and CN systems back in their normal operating configuration for mode 4 operation.

Immediate Corrective Action At 1448 hours0.0168 days <br />0.402 hours <br />0.00239 weeks <br />5.50964e-4 months <br /> Plant Operators took immediate corrective action to line up the HAH Rupture Disk (CN-RD-lA) and Relief Valve (CN-RV-lA) which isolated the blowdown of the CN system.

Action was also taken to manually control the HAH header at approximately 150 psig by valving in one of the nitrogen bottles.

Further Evaluation and Corrective Action A. Further Evaluation

1. This event is being reported per the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) as an "event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF).....".

2. Further evaluation of the Containment Nitrogen (CN) System shows the Relief Valves (CN-RV-lA and CN-RV-18) have a setpoint pressure of 245 psig. The Rupture Disks (CN-RD-lA and CN-RD-18) are purchased with a 310 psig rating. The pressure in the Storage Tank (CN-TK-1) is regulated at 210 psig by a Pressure Control Valve (CN-PCV-2).

NRC Form 366A (6J)9)

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (689) APPROVED OMB NO. 31600104 EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 600 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P430), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO 1HE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31600104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET. WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (11 DOCKET NUMBER (21 LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

YEAR a0.'EOIJENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 5 0 '0 0 3 7 1 6 oF0 6 TEXT illII>>ro Jl>>oo /J ror)IrlrtNL Irro oddldor>>/HRC %%drm 36643/ (17)

3. Evaluation of the Maintenance Work Request data base showed that thirteen rupture disks involving CN-RD-lA and lB have failed since plant startup.

4. Further evaluation showed two outstanding Maintenace Work Requests (MWRs)

(AR 3614 and AR 4666) associated with the HAH CIA .Subsystem. During the refueling outage the Pressure Control Valve (CIA-PCV-2A) was being modified in accordance with AR 3614. When the work was complete the Bypass Valve (CIA-V-733A) around CIA-PCV-2A was leaking and AR 4666 was written to correct this condition. The MWRs were still open at the time of the event and could effect the ability to automatically control pressure.

5. Transient Data Acquisition System (TDAS) and Process Computer (PC) data are normally used to evaluate the system behavior during the event.

However, the data available during this event had several problems which made it unreliable for analysis purposes.

6. The root cause of the rupture disk failure is indeterminite.at this time.

However, the root cause analysis is not complete. If further significant information is discovered it will be reported in a revision to this LER.

B. Further Corrective Action

1. The blown Rupture Disk (CN-RD-1B) was replaced.

2. To aid in the evaluation of the cause of rupture disk failure, the two relief, valves (CN-RV-lA and CN-RV-lB) associated with the rupture disks were tested to verify the proper setpoint pressure. CN-RV-lA lifted at 239 psig and CN-RV-1B lifted at 250 psig. Thus, both these valves were within the allowable pressure tolerance and should have actuated before the ruputure disc blew.

3. An Engineering evaluation of the system will be performed to determine actions necessary, including design changes, to eliminate frequent rupture disk failures.

4. A review of the CIA inputs to the Process Computer and TDAS will be performed to assure proper alignment.

NRC Form 366A (689)

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150010e (649)

EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50l) HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDINQ BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (F430), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, OC 20555, ANO TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3)600104). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (I) DOCKET NUMBER (2I LER NUMBER (5) PAGE (3)

SEQUENTIAL R 6 V IS 10 N YEAR NUMBER ':N NUMBER Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 s 0 0 o 3 79 1 016 0 0 0 5o" 0 6 TEXT /I/ moro <<Noe le rerXm'red, Iree odd/done/ NRC Form 35642/ ()7)

Safet Si nificance II There is no safety significance associated with this event. Since the plant was in mode 4 (Cold Shutdown) there are no conditions that require a fast automatic response of the CIA system; Thus in modes 4 and 5 the safety related part of CIA is valved out of service. With this plant configuration the normal source of nitrogen is available from the Containment Nitrogen (CN) system to operate the Main Steam Safety Relief Valves (MSRVs) if they are needed to support alternate shutdown cooling. If the CN system were to fail, each of the eighteen MSRVs has a 10 gallon accumulator and each of the seven ADS valves has a 10 gallon plus a 42 gallon accumulator. This stored nitrogen pressure is available to provide for initial operation of the selected valves. Over the long term the safety related portion of CIA can be placed in service manually. In addition, provision is made in the p'lant to allow the Control Air System (GAS ) and Service tern Air (SA) Systems to provide a backup to CIA so that all 18 MSRVs could be operated if necessary.

Similar Events There have been no similar events.

EI IS Information Text Reference EI IS Reference

~Se ~Com onent Containment Instrument Air (CIA) LD CIA Valves 39A and 8 LD (CIA-V-39A, 8)

CIA Programmers lA and 18 LD PMC (CIA-PROG-1A, 18)

Containment Nitrogen (CN) LK CN Rupture Disk 18 (CN-RD-18) LK RPD CN Storage Tank (CN-TK-1) LK TK CN Rupture Disk lA (CN-RD-lA) LK RPD CN Relief Valve lA (CN-RV-lA) LK RV CN Pressure Control Valve 10 LK PCV (CN-PCV-10)

Main Steam Safety Relief Valves RV (MSRVs)

Automatic Depressurization System BG (ADS)

CIA Pressure Switches 22A and 228 LD PS (CIA-PS-22A, 228)

CIA Pressure Switches 21A and 218 LD PS (CIA-PS-21A, 218)

NRC Form 366A (669)

NRC FORM 366A (669)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION t APPROVED OMB NO. 3)500104 ExplREs: e/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REOUEST: 50A) HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P630). U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO 1HE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (315001M). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET. WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME I'I) DOCKET NUMBER 12) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

YEAR SEOVENTIAL (7giy 4EvrsrON NVM ER .?49 NVM Err Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0 s 0 0 o 3 01 0 0 60F TEXT /I/ moro epeoo is smqrrr'red, rrse edd/None/ HRC Fomr 36SA'e/ (12)

EIIS Information Text Reference EIIS Reference

~Sstem ~Com onent Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System SO Low Pressure Core Spray System SM (LPCS)

Main Steam Relief Valve 4A and 4B SB RV (MS-RV-4A, 4B)

LPCS Pump 1 (LPCS-P-1) SM P CIA Pressure Control Valve LD PCV (CIA-PCV-2A)

CIA-PCV-2A Bypass Valve LD

'(CIA-V-733A)

Process Computer CPU Control Air System (CAS) LD Service Air (SA) System LF NRC Form 366A (669)