ML17292B020

LER 97-S01-00:on 970718,failure to Take Compensatory Measure for Inoperative Microwave Security Zone Occurred. Caused by Personnel Error.Training Will Be Conducted W/ Appropriate Members of Security force.W/970815 Ltr

ML17292B020
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	08/15/1997
From:	Pfitzer B, Webring R WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
GO2-97-158, LER-97-S01, LER-97-S1, NUDOCS 9708250347
Download: ML17292B020 (6)

Text

~ CATEGORY P REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

=. ACCESSION NBR:9708250347 DOC.DATE: 97/08/15 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe 05000397 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION PFITZER,B. Washington Public Power Supply System .

WEBRING,R.L. Washington Public Power Supply System RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 97-SOl-00:on 970718,failure to take compensatory measure for inoperative microwave security zone occurred.

Caused by personnel error. Training will be conducted w/

appropriate, members of security force.W/970815 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE74T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:

TITLE: Safeguards Phys Sec Event Pt. 73.71 (Pu ic Available) E NOTES:

G RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL COLBURN,T 1 0 INTERNAL: AEOD/SPD/RRAB 1 1 1 1 NMSS/FCSS/FCOB 1 1 NUDOCS ABSTRACT 1 1 RGN4 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: NRC PDR 1 1 D

0 N

NOTE TO ALL "RZDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE. TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DZSTRIBUTZON LISTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD) ON EXTENSION 415-2083 FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 7 ENCL 6

WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM PO. Bov 968 ~ Richlanrl, t Vashingtoii 99352-0968 August 15, 1997 G02-97-158 Docket No. 50-397 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:

Subject:

NUCLF~ PLANT WNP-2, OPERATING LICENSE NPF-21, LICENSEE E&~221T REPORT NO. 97-S01-00 Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 97-S01-00 for WNP-2. This report is submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 73.71 and discusses the items of reportability, corrective action taken, and action to preclude recurrence.

Should you have any questions or desire additional information regarding this matter, please call me or Mr. Paul Inserra at (509) 377-4147.

Respectfully, RL Webring Vice President, Operations Support/PIO Mail Drop PE08 Enclosure cc: EW Merschoff, NRC RIV NRC Sr. Resident Inspector, MD927N (2)

KE Perkins, Jr., NRC RIV, WCFO INPO Records Center - Atlanta, GA TG Colburn, NRR DL Williams, BPA, MD399 PD Robinson, Winston & Strawn 9708250347 9708i5 PDR ADOCK 05000397 lllllllllllllllllllljllll)llllllilllll 8 PDR

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT LER fACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (3)

Washin ton Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 50-397 1 OF 3 TITLE (4) FAILURE TO TAKE COMPENSATORY MEASURE FOR INOPERATIVE MICROWAVE SECURITY ZONE EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (T) OTHER fACILITIES INVOLVED (6 )

DAY YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV. <<c<<<H DAY FAc<LITYNAME DOCKET NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER F AC<LIIYNAME DOCKET NUMBER 07 18 97 97 S01 00 08 15 97 N/A 05000 OPERATING HODB THIS REPORT IS SUBHITTED PURSUANT TO THE ILEQUIILEHENTS Of'0 CPR Sl (Check one or more) (ll) 20.402(h) 20.405(c) 50.73(a) (2) (iv) 73.71(b) 20.405(a)(1)Q 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.71(c) 20.405(a) (1) (ii) 50.36(c) (2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) OTHER 83%

20.405(a)(1)(iii) 50 73(a)(2)O< 50.73(a)(2)(viii) (A) 20AOS(a)(1}(iv) 50.73(a)(2}(ii3 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 20.405(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)

LICENSEE CONTACT fOR THIS LER (12)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

Bill Pfitzer, Licensing. Engineer 509-377-2419 COMPLETE ONE LINE fOR EACH COMPONENT PAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE COMPONENT M<<4<vAClV<<LR REPORTABLE CAUSE COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS TO NPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED MONTH DAY YES corn Iotod EXPECTED SUBMISSION DAT ABsTRAcT: On 18 July, 1997, with the plant operating at 83% power, an intrusion alarm was received in the Central Alarm Station (CAS) from a microwave unit monitoring a section of the isolation zone for the plant protected area. Both the CAS operator, and the operator of the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS), acknowledged the alarm and surveyed the associated security zone using closed circuit television (CCTV), but did not immediately recognize the need for a compensatory measure. Approximately 30 minutes later, as the CAS operator was reviewfng the alarm summary display, he saw the aAected microwave zone in constant alarm and realized it may indicate a Safeguards System failure requiring a compensatory measure within ten minutes. He dispatched a security patrol oQicer to the zone to conduct an operability test of the a6ected microwave unit. The test revealed the microwave unit was inoperative. The security patrol was then posted at the zone as a temporary compensatory measure. Upon arrival of the permanent compensatory oAicer, the security patrol conducted a walk-down of the affected isolation zone. No signs of intrusion were noted.

The root cause of this event is personnel error. Training will be conducted with appropriate members of the Security force, and disciplinary action will be taken with personnel involved in this event.

No intrusion occurred and compensatory measures were in place within approximately 30 minutes. Therefore, the safety consequences of this event are minimal.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONT(NUAT(ON FACILITY NAME (I ) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER )(UMBER (6) PAGE (3)

YEAR SEQUENTIAL RPIISIOI IluHBER NUHBRR Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 50-397 97 S01 2 OF 3 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

Even Descri i n On 18 July, 1997, with the plant operating at 83% power, an intrusion alarm was received in the CAS from a microwave unit monitoring a section of the isolation zone for the plant protected area. The CAS operator acknowledged/assessed the alarm and annotated it on the alarm summary as a "false alarm/CCTV shows zone and area clear." He did not notice that the microwave unit was in constant alarm and required compensatory posting, and consequently did not dispatch an off(cer to assume the required compensatory post within ten minutes per Security Plan Implementing Procedure (SPIP) 14.5.1, Contingency Events Response and Reporting.

Coincident with the actions of the CAS operator, the off)cer in the SAS heard the original alarm when it sounded, checked the alarm summary to confirm the alarm, and surveyed the associated area using the CCTV for any potential signs of intrusion into the associated isolation zone.

Approximately 30 minutes later, as the CAS operator was reviewing the alarm summary display, he saw the affected microwave zone in constant alarm and realized it may indicate a Safeguards System failure requiring a compensatory measure. He dispatched a security patrol officer to the zone to conduct an operability test of the affected microwave unit. The test revealed the microwave unit was inoperative. The security patrol officer was then posted at the zone as a temporary compensatory measure.

Upon arrival of the permanent compensatory off)cer, the security patrol officer conducted a walk-down of the isolation zone covered by the affected microwave unit. No signs of intrusion were noted.

Immedia e orr iv Action A Problem Evaluation Request (PER) was initiated to document the failure to post the required compensatory measure within ten minutes.

Further Evalu i n A work request was generated on 18 July, 1997, and the microwave unit was repaired, tested and placed back in service. The posting of a security off)cer as a compensatory measure was discontinued on 19 July, 1997.

Due to misinterpretation of the guidance in 10CFR73.71 by the security super visor at the time, the event was classified as meeting the criteria of 10CFR73.71, Appendix G (II) which requires the event be recorded in the safeguards event log within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and requires no NRC notification. Upon review of the event the Security Programs Manager reclassified the event, and on 23 July, 1997, telephone notification was made to the NRC Operations Center per 10CFR73.71, Appendix 6 (I) which requires NRC notification within one hour for events of this type.

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