ML17266A535

Comments on Des for Facility

ML17266A535
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	12/14/1981
From:	Doherty J AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
To:	NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY)
References
NUDOCS 8112230372
Download: ML17266A535 (156)

Text

AOCE'SSION NBR: 8112230372 DOC ~ DATE: 81/12/irl NOTARIZED:

NO FACIL:50-389 St. Lucie Plantr Uniit 2E Fl or ida Power 8 Light Co.

AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION DOHERTYPJ ~ F ~

Affiliation Unknown REIC IP ~ NAME RECIPIENT AFF II IATIQN Docketin 8, Services Branch g

SUBJECT:

Comments on DES for facility'I'STRIBUTION CODE: "COOEB "COPIES iRECEIVED:LTR g ENCL ND SIZE:

TITTLE: Environ.

Comments

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NOTES:

DOCKET 05000389 ACTION:

RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME LIC BR N3 BC 06

NERSESPV, 01 COPIES LTTR ENCL REC IP IENT ID CODE/NAME NL COPIES LTTR ENCL INTERNAL: ELD NRR/DE/AFAB NRR/DE/HGEB NRR/DS I/AEB NRR/DS I/RAB 20 21 19 17 1

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1 1

IE 13 NRR/DE/EEB 16 NRR/DE/SAB 18 N

'SB 15 E

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1 1

1 EXTERNAL: ACRS NATL LAB NSIC 21 05 1

1 LPDR NRC PDR NTIS 03 02

,TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:

LiTTR SO ENCL

~ 'OCKETEn December 14, 198':NRC

'8f OEC 2f A8 '36 4527 Alconbury Lane 4<'I"ICE OFHogyfgg; Tx. 77021

<<O( KETlNGI SERYICE BRANCH Docketing Ec Service Branch U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission I'washington D. C. 20555 Docket No. 50-589, Florida Power and. Light Company Re:

CO<IIIENT ON. DKQ'T ENVIRONNENTAL STATEIIENT, RELATED TO THE OPERATION 0 <'l. L CXE PLAM.,

N T 0.

f To whom 'it may concern:

John P. Doherty, Z. D., of Houston,

Texas, comments as below on the DES which was. recently received from the NRC:

Dohert Comment 1

In Appendix I, the following statement (p. I-6) occurs:

"To illustrate:

A single-model 1000-IIÃe LUR operating

't an 80$ capacity factor for 50 years would. be predicted.

to induce between 5.5 and. 5.7 cancer fatalities in 100

years, 5.7 and. 17 in 500 years, and. 56 and 60 in 1,000 years as a result of releases of ration 222-." To this fuel

~c. cle impact description, the following detail should be d.etermined.

and added.:

a) The range of number of cancer fatalities for the 850-IINe St. Lucie Plant at its projected capacity factor and, la.censing period under consideration,! from fuel cycle radon-222.

b) The range of number of cancer injuries induced by

':.fuel cycle radon-222,'or the 850-IdÃe St. Lucie Plant at its projected. capacity factor and licensing period.

under consideration; c) The range of number of fatal birth defects induced. by fuel::cycle radon222 for the 850-NNe St. Lucie Plant at its projected. capaicty factor and lzcensxng period.;

d.) The range of number of non-fatal birth defects induced.

by fuel cycle radon-222 for the 850-Nt1e St. Lucie Plant at its projected. capacity factor and licensing period.

8ii2230372 8ii2iI4 PDR ADQCK 05000389 0

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Dohert Comment 2

In section 2.2 of the Draft it is unclear how the con-clusion PP&L's 1989 system capacity will still be about 50K oil fired, without understanding if the utility is us".ng the ne~r capacity to preferentially replace natural gas or oil..- Hence, the Draft should shower if natural gas is being replaced, and FPE~ continuing to use oil, the only fuel that supplies transportation energy of the three fossil fuels.

Thank you very much for the opportunity to comment on this DES.

I look forward to the final,statement.

S ncerely, John P. Doherty, J'.

D

1 M ~

h'

HUHEG-0842 Doc<et Ho.

5G->89. Florida Power and

Company, Orlando Utilities Commission City of Orlando, Florida of the Final Environmental Statement.

Related to the Operation'f St.

Lucie Plant, Unit Ho.

2 L'ight (U. S. ) Huclear Regulatory Commissxon Washing ton, DC Apr 82 Lq k

05. Ihpartrnent of Cornrnerce National Technical Information Service 6~i.~

>8/MMa9XZ

NOTICE Availabilityof Reference Materials Cited in NRG Publications Most documents cited in NRC publications willbe available from one of the followingsources:

1.

The NRC Public Document Room. 1717 H Street, NAV.

washington, D C 20555 2.

Thc NRC/GPO Sales Program, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, washington, DC 20555 3.

The National Technical lnformzition Service, Springfield, VA22161 Although thc listing that follows represents the majority of documents cited in NRC publications, it is not intended to be exhaustive.

Referenced documents available for inspection and copying for a fee from the NRC Public Docu.

ment I oom include NRC correspondence and internal NRC memoranda; NRC Office of inspection and Enforccnient bulletins, circulars, information riotices inspection and investigation notices; Licensee Event Reports; vendor reports and correspondence; Commission papers; and applicant and licensee documents and correspondence.

The following documents in the NUREG seiies are available fc purchase from the NRC/GPO Sale:

Program: formal NRC staff and.ontractor repor's, NRC.sponsored conference proceedings, and NRC booklets and brochur~e. A'iso available are Regulatory Guides. NRC regulations in the Code of Federal Regulations, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission Jssuances.

Documents available from th. National Teclinical Information Scrvicc include NUREG series reports ar d technical reports prepared by other federal agencies and reports prepared by the Atomic Energy Commission, forerunner agency to the Nuclear Regu'latory Commission.

W Documents available from public and special technical libraries include all npeii literature items, such 3$ books, journal aiid periodical articles, and transactions. Federal Register notices, federal and state legislation, and congressional reports can usually be obtained from these libraries.

Documents siich as theses, dissertations, foreign reports and translations, and non NRC conference proceedings are available for purchase from the organization spon oring thc publication cited.

Single copies of NRC draft reports are available free upon written request to the Division of Tech.

nical Information and Document Contre i, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 'LVashington, DC 20555.

Copies of industry codes and standards used in a substantive manner in the NRC regulatory process are maintained at the NRC Library. 7920 Norfolk Avenue. Bctnesda.

Maryland, and are available there for reference usc bv the public. Codes and standards are usually copyrighted and may be purchased from thc origmating organization or, if they are American National Standards, from the American National Standards Institute, 1430 Broadway, New York, NY 10018.

GPO Pnme'.spy price,

NUREG4842 Ftrtal Erttrirortmert&ll

~tenens'elated to the operation of

't. Lucie Plant, Unit No. 2 Docket No. 50-389 1

. Florida Power and Light Company OrlarIIdo Utilities Commission of the City of Orlando, Florida U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation April 1982

NRC loou 335

~ I )ll U.S. NUCLEAR AECULATORYCOMMISSION BIBLIOGRAPHICOATA SHEET I. REFORT IIUMbfA 4d.Iced OV OOCI

?IJREC-08II2 I. TITLE ANO SUBTITLE 4dd VO4rrrc Ido,rlrddrodncnl I Final ~&virot2trental State=nt Related to the I Cperation of St. Lucie Plaatl Unit?IO. 2 I AUTHORISI

1. /I toro oldell X AEC)tIENT'S ACCESSION NO.

$. OAtf REtOAT COMFLETEO 9 tEAFORMING ORGANIZATIONNAME *NO MAILIIIGAOOAESS Dnc4do Zdl Codll U,S

??uclear Regulatory Cccr&ssion Office of huclear Reactor Regulation Vashingtonl DiC.

20555 MOrc TH A ril O*tf AEtOAT ISSVEO MONTH

$ ada'cocol

~

ILOOrd OCOIII YEARl 82 vIAll IT SFONrSOA:NG ORGANIZA'tloI IIAVE ANO MAILINGADORE$$ Doc4dt Zdr Codol Satse as 9. above IQ tAOXCTITASKhYOAKVIIII No.

II. <<ONTRACT No.

- IT tvtf OF AEFORT Final Envirorrental Statement I

I I> SVttLEMENTARYNOtES Pertains to Docket Ro. 50-389 If ARStAACT 000 <<Ordh Or ICCCI tblIIOO COVl AEO DAC4Crrd dllrll I~ ICOOrt O'OIll The Final Em@,ror~cntal Statesent related to the operation of the St. Lucia PLmt IMt No, 2 by Florida Power and Light Cccpany and Orlando Utilities Cccnission of the City of O."lando, Florida (Docket?IO. 50-389)T located in St. Iucie County,

'lorida has been prepared by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regutation of the U,So Ihclear Regulatory Cccz'ssion.

The statement reports on the staff's review of the i~et of operation of the plant.

Also included are coments of state atcd federal govcrtfbent agercies and tbeabers of the public on the Draft Ernrirottsental Statement for this pro)cct and staff responses to these c~nts.

The?IRC staff has concluded, based on a weighing of envirotbsenteit tec?Meal and other factors, that an operatirg license could be granted.

I I KEY CY'JROS ANO OOCVMEclt ANALYSIS Ita. OESCRIt to4$

lie IOENTITIERS otEN.ENCEO TEAYlS IS AVAILASILItY$ TAtEMEIIT Ib SECURITY CLASS Itn I ~OOrd 2I leo Ol tACES

,<<C I OAV 2)$ I I Ill 20 Spugtvcgpfct<<cootcl ll t4icf

SUMMARY

AHO CONCLUSIONS This Final Environmental Statement-OL (FES, related to the operating

phase, was prepared by the U.S. Nuclear, Regulatory Cotteission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (the staff).-

Sections related to the aquatic environment were pre-pared in cooperation with the U. S.

Environmental Protection

Agency, Region IV.

1.

This action is administrative.

2.

The proposed action is the issuance of an operating license to the Florida Power and Light Company (the applicant) for the startup and operation of the St.

Lucie Plant Unit Ho.

2 (St.

Lucie 2), Oocket No. 50-389, located on Hutchinson Island which is a barrier island on the east coast of Florida approximately, midway between the cities of Fort Pierce and Stuart..

St. Lucie 2 will employ a pressurized-water reactor to produce 25GO mega-watts thermal (Sit).

A steam turbine-generator will use this heat to pro-vide 850 megawatts electric (HWe) gross.

The maximum design thermal output is 2700 NMt.

The exhaust steam will be condensed by a once"through flow of water taken from.and returned to the Atlantic Ocean.

3.

The evaluation in this statement represents the second assessment of the environmental impact, associated with St.

Lucie 2, pursuant to the guide-lines of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (HEPA) and 10 CFR, Part 51 of the Commission's Regulations.

After receipt of an application in 1973 to construct St.

Lucie 2, the staff carried out a review of'mpact, that would 'occur during its construction and operation.

This evaluatior was issued as a Final Environmental Statement, related to the construction

phase, in May 1974.

After this environmental

review, a safety review, an evaluation by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, and public hearings in Stuart, Florida, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, issued Permit No.

CPPR-144 in May 1977 for the constr: ction of St.

Lucie 2.

As of Oecember '1981 the construction of St.

Lucie 2 was about 84K complete.

Mith a proposed fuel-!oading date of October

1982, the applicant has applied for a license to operate St.

Lucie 2 and has submitted (March 1980) the required safety (FSAR)'nd environmental (ER-OI.)2 'reports in support of the application.

he staff has reviewed the activities associated with the proposed opera-tion of-St. Lucie 2 and the potential environmental impacts from operation, both beneficial and adve> se are summarized as follows:

a.

St.

Lucie 2 is being constructed south of, and on-the the same site as, St.

Lucie 1, an operating nuclear power plant of equivalent design.

The site consists of 1132 acres which are owned by Florida Power and Light Company.

The environmental impact on the site occurred with 'the construction of St.

Lucie 1.

There were no offsite transmission lines

• built specifically for St.

Lucie 2.

(Sec.

4.2.8)

St.

Lucie 2 FES

b.

C.

Controlled and treated releases of heat, tary wastes into the Atlantic Ocean 4111 adverse impacts on water use and aquatic negli,gible.

(Secs.

5.3 and 5.6)

It No measurable radiological impact on man result from routine operation.

The risk radiation is very low.

(Sec.

5. 10) chemical wastes, and sani" be rapidly assimilated; thus biota will be absent or or biota is expected to associated with accidental d.'.

No adverse impacts on the terrestrial environment of the project area will occur due to St.

Lucie 2 operation.

(Sec.

5.5)

Heated water will slightly increase he water temperature of the Atlantic Ocean in the vicinity of the discharge, but the effects on marine biota will be minimal.

(Secs 4.2.4 and 5.6.4)

Chemical releases to the Atlantic Ocqan are not expected to exceed water-quality criteria levels, and will not adversely impact marine biota.

(Sec.

5. 6. 5) 4.

5.

g.

The design of the discharge structure has been modified since the CP review.

The redesign results in lesser impact to marine biota.

(Secs.

4.2.4 and 5. 6) ll h.

A reassessment of the socioeconomic impacts of the operation of St.

Lucie 7 indicates that no significant change from the impacts already experienced from the operation of St.

Lucie 1 and the construction of St.

Lucie 2 will occur.

(Sec.

5.9) i.

The staff has reassessed the need fort the facility and concluded that operation of St.

Lucie 2 is warranted.

(Sec.

2)

The Draft Environmental Statement-OL (DES) was made available to the agencies specified in Chapter 8 and to the public.

On the basis of the analysis and evaluation set forth in this statement, and after weighing the environmental, economic, technical, and other benefits against the environmental and economic costs, and after consider-ing available alternatives at the operating license stage, it is concluded that the action called fo. under NEPA and 10 CFR Part Sl is the issuance of an operating license for St.

Lucie Plant, Unit No. 2, in accordance with the Environmental Protection Plan and subject to the following conditions for the protect>on of the environment:

a.

Before engaging in additional construction or operational activities that may result in a significant adverse environmental impact that was not evaluated or that is significantly greater than that evaluated in this statement, the applicant shall provide written notification to, and obtain prior written approval from, the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

b.

The applicant shall carry out the environmental (thermal, meteoro-'ogical, chemical, radiological, and ecological) aonitorlng programs outlined in this statement as modified and approved by the staff and St. Lucie 2 FES

implemented in the environmental protection plan incorporated in the operating license for the St.

Lucie Plant, Unit No. 2.

(Sec.

5) c.

If harmful effects or evidence of irreversible damage are detected during the operating life of the plant, the applicant shall immedi-ately provide the staff with an analysis nf the problem and a proposed course of action to alleviate it.

I Re fererces for Sugar and Conclusions l.

Florida Po~er and Light Company, St.

Lucie Plant, Unit No. 2, Final Safety Analysis Report, Oocket No. 50-389, 1980.

2.

Florida Power and Light Company, St.

Lucie Plant, Unit No. 2, Environmental'eport, Operating License Stage, Oocket No. 50-389, 1980.

St.

Lucie 2 FES

CONTENTS SUHHARY At(0 CONCLUSIONS......................

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Pa~re 1xiii 2.

INTRODUCTION.

l. 1 Resume 1.2 Administrative History...

1.3 Permits and Licenses......

5 PURPOSE OF AND NEED FOR ACTION..

2. 1 Resume

'.2 Production Costs.

2.3 Diversity of Supply 2.4 Reliability Analysis 2.5 Conclusions'.6References..............

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I 1"1 1-1 l-l,.

1-1 2-1 2-1 2-1 2-3 2"3 2-4 2-4 3.

ALTERNATIVES TO THE PROPOSEO ACTION.

3. 1 Resume....

3. 2 Alternatives.

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3-1 3-1 3-1 4.

AFFE 4.1

4. 2 4.3

4. 4 CTED ENVIROtNENT..'..............,.....,..

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Faci 1 ity Description.

4.2.1 External Appearance, Plant Layout, and Land Use...

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4.2.2 Plant Water Use.

4.2.3 Intake System.

4.2.4 Discharge System...

4.2.5 Radioactive Waste Treatment System (NPOES 004).....

4.2.6 Cooling.Water 0'.scharge (NPDES 001 and 008)........

4.2.7 Non-Radioactive Waste Discharge Systems (NPDES 001,

002, 003, 005, 006, 007, and 008).

4.2.8 Power Transmission System.

Project Related Environnental Descriptions...............'.

4. 3. 1 Community Characteristics.

4.3.2 Mater qua!ity.

4.3.3 Surface Water Hydrology.

4.3.4'round Water Hydroloqy...

4. 3. 5 Water Use.

4. 3. 6 Heteorology and Air guality

4. 3. 7 Terrestrial Ecology 4.3.8.

Aquatic Ecology.................

4. 3. 9 Threatened and Endangered Species.

4.3. 10 Historical and Archeological. Sites.

References.

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~ 4-1 4-1 4-1 4-1 4-1 4-1 4-9 4-11 4-12 4-13 4-14 4-14 4" 14 4-18 4-18 4"19 4-20 4-20 4-21 4-21 4-24 4-25 4"25 St.

Lucie 2 FES Preceding page btaaJt t

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CONTENTS (Continue()

TIONS0 0

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5.(

ENVIRONHENTAL CONSEQUENCES AND HITIGATING AC 5. 1 Resume.'

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'5.3 Water Use and Hydrological Impacts...

I 5.3. 1 Surface Water Use.

5.3.2 Ground Water Use 5.3;3 Floodplain Aspects of the Site 5.4 Air:qua)ity Impacts................:..

5.5 Terrestrial Ecology Impacts..

5.5)l Transmission. Lines.......;..

5.5.'2 Terrestrial Honitoring.......

5.6 Aquatic Ecology Impacts........-

II, j

5.6. 1 Entrapment....................

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.6. 2 Impingement...............

5 5.6.3 Entrainment.......

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5.6.4

- Environmental Effects of Dischargo" of Cooling Wa 5.6.5 Effects of Chemical Discharges..............';.

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Threatened and Endangered Species....;"...;..".....

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Historical and Archeological Sit'e Impacts.........

'.'ocioeconomic Impacts...........;.....I,'...I..

Rad>olog)cal 5.10. 1 Regulatory Requirements......',

5. 1002 Operational Overview.........I!...

5.10.3 Radiological Impacts from Rout'ine Operations...

5. 10.4 Environmental Impact of PostuIated Accidents..;

Impacts from the Uranium fuel Cycle..".................

Decommissioning.

Emergency Plann>ng. ;.......;

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5:7

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5.9

5. 10

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5. 11

5. 12

5. 13

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6. a 6.2 6.3 Unavoidable Adverse Impacts.....

Irreversible and Irretrievable Commitments of Resources Relationship Between Short-Term Uses and Long-Term Productivity.'

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Benefit-Cost Summary.

6 ~ 4 0 1 StL%ry

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6.4.3 Economic Costs 6.4.4.

Socioeconomic Costs 6.4.5 Environmental Costs..

6.4. 6 Conclusions.t

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.Impact from Siren Alert System...............

5.13.2'mergency Operations Facility."...'

5.14 References...

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k 6., EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED ACTION........"........'........

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5-1

,5 1

5 5-1

'-1 5-2 5"2

, 5-2 5-2 5-4 5"4 5-4 5-5 5-6 5-7 5"8 5-11 5-12 5"12 5-14 5-14 5-15 5-15 5-16 5-19, 5-32 5-6q 5-71 5-71 5-71 5-71 5-72 6-1 6-1 6-1 6-1

'-kl 6-1' 6-1

,6-1 6-5 6-5 6-,5 0

, 7',

LIST OF, CONTRIBUTORS....

7-1 St." Lucie 2 FES

.Yi

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0 I

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COt(TENTS (Continued) 8.

AGEnCIES A((D ORGANIZATIONS TO WHICH COPIES OF THIS DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL STATEHEHT MERE SENT 9.

STAFF, RESPONSES TO COFAEHTS ON THE DRAF'T EHVIRO((HENTAL STATEMENT..

APPENDICES A

Comoents on.he Draft Environmental Statement...

B Permits and Licenses.

C Historical and Archeological Sites.

D HEPA Population Dose Assessment.

E

- Examples of Site-Specific Dose Assessment Calculations....

F Rebaseiining of the Reactor Safety Study Results for PWRs.

G Consequ nce Hodeling Con iderations.

H Impact of. the Uranium Fuel Cycle........,.

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8-1 9-1 A-1 8"1 C-1 0-1 E-1

'-1 G-1 H-1 St.

Lucie 2 FES, vii

LIST OF FIGURES I

4. 1 General Plant Layout.............

4. 2 Offshore Ve 1 oc ity Caps.

4. 3 Section Through Ye)ocity Cap.

4. 4 Typical Cross Section Subaqueous Pipe.

4.5 Ocean Intake Pipeline

4. 6 Discharge Pipeline Oiffuser Section.

5. I Floodplain.

5. 2 Potentially Heaningful Exposure Pathways to Persons........ -..

5.3 Schematic Outline of Consequence Hodel 5.4 Probability'istributions of Individual Dose Impacts.....-.....

5.5 Probability Distributions of Population Exposures.............

S. 6 Probability Distrib jtions of Acute Fatalities 5.7 Probability Distributions of Cancer Fatalities.

5.8 Probat ility Distributions of Hitigation Heasures Cost.........

5.9

.Individual Risk of Dose as a Function of Distance.............

5. IO Isopleths of Risk of Acute Fatality per Reactor Year to an Individual....................................................

5. 11 Isopleths of Risk of Laten". Cancer Fatality per Reactor Year to an Individual.

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4-4 4-5 4-6

'-7 4"10 5-3 5-18 5>>ig 5-51 5;52

'"53 5"54 5-57 5-64 5-65 5-66 St.

Lucie 2 FES P."eceding page blank

1.1 2.1

=4.1 4.2 4.3 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9

5. 10

5. 11 6.1 LIST OF TABlES.,

Permits an J Licenses J

FP5L's Projections of Summer Peak Loads, Capacity, and Reserves, 1983-1988.

Flow Velocities in Ft/Sec at Various Locatic in the Intake Pipelines Under Clean and Fouled Conditions.

Hew Developments within 8 km (5 mi) of St.'ucie 2 Between 1978-1981 (as of Hay 1981).

Future Developments within 5 miles of St.

Lucie 2, 1981 to Future

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Typical Plume Characteristics for Unit 2 as Predicted by FP8L Hodel Studies..

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Incidence of Job-Related Fatalities.

Summary Table 5-4 Operational Environmental Radiological Surveillance Program......

Approximate Doses from Selected Design Basis Accidents...........

Summary of Atmospheric Releases in Hypothetical Accident Sequences in a PWR (Rebaselined).

Activity of Radionuclides in the St.

Lucie Unit 2 Core at 2754 MWt Summary of Environmental Impacts and Probabilities Comparison of St.

Lucie and LPGS Land Based Ocean Site Liquid Pathway Consequences Average Values of Environmental Pisks Due to Accidents, per Reactor-Year Table S Table of Uranium Fuel Cycle Environmental Data.......

Benefit-Cost Summary.

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1-3 2-3 4-8 4-16 4-17 5-9 5-21 5-24 5-29 5-42 5-43 5-46 5-55 5-60 5-62 5-70 6"2 St. Lucie 2 FES Precedhng page blank

FOREWORD This final environmental statement was prepared by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (the staff) in accordance with the Commission's Regulations, set forth in IO CFR Part 51, which implement the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).

Sec-tions related to the aquatic environment were prepared in cooperation with the U. S.

Environmental Protection Agency, Region IV.

This statement reviews the impact of operation of the St.

Lucie Plant, Unit 2.

Assessments that are found in this statement supplement those described in the Final Environmental State-ment (FES-CP) that was issued in Hay 1974 in support of issuance of a construc-tion ermit for the unit.

P The information to be found in the various sections of this statement updates the FES"CP in four ways:

(I) by evaluating changes to facility design and operation that will result in different environmental effects of operation

-(including those which would enhance as well as degrade the environment) than those projected during the preconstruction review; (2) by reporting the results of relevant new information that has become available subsequent to the issuance of the FES-CP; (3) by fartoring into the statement new environmental policies and statutes that have a bearing on the licensing action; and (4) by identifying unresolved environmental issues or surveillance needs which are to be resolved by means of license conditions.

(No uniesolved environmental issues have been identified.

A surveillance need has been identified and requirements for addi-tional surveillance are being developed as a result of our review on turtle entrapments.

Refer to Sections 5.6.1 and 5.7.)

Introductory r4sumhs in appropriate sections of this statement will summarize both the extent of "updating" and the degree to which the staff considers the subject to be"adequately reviewed.

Copies of this statement are available for inspection at the Commission's Public Document

Room, 1717 H Street, NW, Washington, DC

20555, and at the Indian River Community College Library, 3209 Virginia Avenue, Ft. Pierce, Florida.

Single copies of this Statement may be obtained by writing to the:

Division of Technical Information, Document Control Office U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, OC 20555 Victor /verses is the NRC Licensing Project Manager for St.

Lucie Plant Unit 2.

He may be reached at the address for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission shown above or by telephone (30I) 492-7000.

St.

Lucie 2 FES preceding page blank

1 IHTRODUCTIOH 1.1 Resurge The proposed action is the issuance of an operating license to the Florida Power and Light Company (FP&L or the applicant) for the startup and operation of St.

Lucie Plant, Unit Ho.

2 (St.

Lucie 2), Docket Ho.

STN 50-389.

St.

Lucie 2 is located on a 1132 acre site on Hutchinson Island, St.

Lucie County, approxi-mately midway between the cities of Fort Pierch and Stuart on the east coast..of Florida. It,is approximately 120 mi north of Miami and 225 mi south of Jackson" ville.

St.

Lucie 2 will employ a pressur>zed water reactor manufactured by Combustion-Engineering and will have a gross e)ectrical capacity of approxi-mately 850 MWe and a licensed thermal power ra ing of 2560 lÃt.

St.

Lucie 2 is being constructed south of, and on the same site as, St.

Lucie 1 which is an operating nuclear power plant.

St.

Lucie 2 shares certain facili-ties, including intake and discharge cooling canals and transmission lines, with St.

Lucie 1.

Condenser cooling will be accomplished through a once-through cool-ing system using water from the Atlantic Ocean.

1.2 Administrative Histor This operating license review is the second assessment of the environmental impact associated with St.

Lucie 2.

After receiving an application, in April 1973, to construct St.

Lucie 2, the staff reviewed the environmental impacts that would occur during its construction and operation.

This evaluation was issued as a Final Environmental Statement (FES"CP) in May 1974.

As a result of that environmental

review, a safety review, an evaluation by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), and public hearing before an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) in Stuart, Florida, the NRC issued a permit in May 2, 1977 for the construction of St.

Lucie 2 (CPPR-144).

In March 24, 1980 the applicant submitted an application, including a Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and an Environmental Report (ER-OL), requesting an operating license for St.

Lucie 2.

These documents were docketed on February 17, 1981 and the operational safety and environmental reviews were initiated by the staff.

As of the end of December 1981, construction of St.

Lucie 2 was approximately 84K complete with the reactor expected to be ready for fuel loading,in October 1982.

1.3 Permits and Licenses The status of permits and licenses which are required for the operation of St.

Lucie 2.is provided in Table l.l.

The staff has reviewed tt ; listing and is not aware of any potential non-NRC licensing difficulties that would delay

~

or preclude the proposed operation of St.

Lucie 2.

The Clean Water Act 401 certification by the State of Florida and the National Po'.lutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Permit (required by Sectiori 402 of the Clean Water St.

Lucie 2 FES

Act) issued by the the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) are prerequisites for the issuance of an operating license by the HRC.

After publication of the OES the applicant advised HRC that an additional intake structure would b necessary.

FP8L obtained the necessary permits for this action.

These included:

further modification of the Certification of Site Suitability, a

new Oredge and Fill Permit from the Corps of Engineers, a

new Beach Crossing Easement from the State of Florida Trustees of the Internal Improvement

Fund, and a Certification from EPA under Section 316(b) of The Clean Water Act that the new intake also meets best available technology.

EPA, Region IV issued a Public Notice of proposed issuance of a NPOES Permit and Consideration of State certification of the HPOES Permit on or about October 15, 1901.

The final HPOES Permit and monitoring programs are reproduced in Appendix B of this statement.

In addition, the applicant has obtained State approval of the facility in the form of a site certification.

A petition was filed by the applicant on -September 1,

1981 to amend the current State site certification for St.

Lucie 2.

St.

Lucie 2 FES 1-2

CA I

Table 1.1

Licenses, Permits, and Other Approvals Required for St.

Lucie 2 o agency

~ U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

~ Commission m

Authority Required Impact Limited work authorization Air, Land, Water Status or Authority Status 68 Stat.

919; 10 CFR 50 LMA received - 3/75

- U.S. Environmental Pr otection-Agency U.S.

Army Crops of Engineers UiS. Coast Guard Advisory Couricil on Historic Preservation Construction permit Operating License Special Nuclear Hat'

~ Source Nuclear Hat'1 License By-product Nuclear Hat'1 License National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Approval of State Certification of Compli-ance with Effluent Limitations Permit for Dredge - Fill for Discharge Pipeline Permit to Establish Pri" vate Aid to Havigation Determination that Site does not Infringe on Federal Landmarks Determination that Site is not Archeologically Significant Air, Land, Mater 68 Stat.

919; 10CFR70 Air, Land, Water 68 Stat.

919; 10CFR40 Air, Land, Water 68 Stat.

919; 10CFR30 Mater P

L 92-500 Section 402 Mater P

L 92-500 Section 401 Mater Mater River and Harbors Act Section 10 33CFR209 14 USC 81:33CFR66 Land Histor ic Preservation Act of 1966, Land Archeological Conserva-tion Act of 1974 Air, Land, Mater 68 Stat..919; 10CFR50 Air, Land, Water 68 Stat.

919; 10CFR50 Permit received - 5/77 Application submitted-3/80 Application to be submitted " 2/82 Application to be submitted - 2/82 Application to be submitted - 2/82 Application submitted-

'/81.

NPOES Permit included in Appendix B of this docunent.

The final NPOES Permit will be subnitted by EPA to the State for certification.

Permit obtained.- 1/81 Permit obtained - 5/81 See Section 2.6 of this Document See Section 2.6 of this Document

Table 1.1 (Continued)

Agency I

n

-; National Harine o'isheries Service/

Fish 8 Wildlife Service m

Florida Dept of Natural Resources Florida State Planning Board State of Florida Trustees of the Internal Improve-ment Fund Beaches and Shores Biological Survey Land Water Certification of Site Suitability

Water, Land, Air, Construction of Discharge Line Water Authority Required Impact Collection of Threatened Water and Endangered Species of Sea Turtles Status or Authority Endangered Species Act of 1973 Chapter 161 Florida Statutes Chapter 253 Florida Statutes Power Plant Siting Act of 1972; Sections 403.501 et.

seq.

Chapter 253 Florida Statues Status Permit obtained - 6/79, Not. required Not required Certification obtained 5/76, modified - 4/80.

FP8L filed a petition for amendment on September 1, 1981.

Permit obtained - 1/81 Florida Dept of.

Environmental Regulation Federal Aviation Agency Variance from State Water guality Standards State Certification that Discharge Complies with Sections 301, 302, 306, and 307 of PL 92-500 Certification to Con-struct and Operate=Pol-lution Control Device Air Navigation Approval Water Water Land, Water Air Ch 17-3, Florida Admin-istrative Code PL 92-500 Sect.

401 Power Plant Siting Act of 1972 80 Stat.

932; 14CFR77 Being developed under Power Plant Siting Act Certification w>ll be developed following State review of the final NPDES Permit.

Certification obtained 5/76 Permit obtained 12/79 So'ur<<e:

FSAR,

. Tab 1 e 12. 0-1

2 PURPOSE OF AND NEED FOR ACTION

2. 1 Resume Mhen the Final Environmental Statement-Construction Permit (FES-CP) was issued in Hay, 1974, the staff concluded that St.

Lucie 2 should be allowed to operate to ensure the reliability of service on the FP8L system.

At that time, St.

Lucie 2 was scheduled to begin commercial operation in December 1979.

This online date was predicated on an expected growth rate in summer peak load demand in the FP8L service area of about 11.4X a year from 1973 to 1980.

However, the actual growth rate from 1973 to 1980 was only about 4.9X a year.

14is decline in the expected growth rate of electricity demand is not unique to the FP8L service area; rather, it is representative of a national trend,

'ttributable in part, to higher prices for electricity, conservation, and an overall slowdown in economic growth.

One response by utilities ha been to adjust. the projected expansion of capacity by delaying planned additions to their systems.

It is in this context that the applicant has delayed the commercial availability of St.

Lucie 2.

Current scheduling calls for St.

Lucie 2 to begin commercial operation in Hay 1983.

In this statement the staff cvaluates the purpose and need for St.

Lucie 2 in the context of (1) overall system production costs for generating electricity; (2) availability of alternative fuels; and (3) reliability of the power supply for the FP&L System.

The conclusions drawn from this review will be factored into the staff's decision regarding the issuance of an operating license to St.

Lucie 2.

2.2 'r'oduction Costs St.

Lucie 2 was constructed to provide an economical source of baseload energy.

Because substantial capital as well as environmental costs associated with construction have already been incurred, the only economic factors that are relevant for consideration now are fuel costs and operation and maintenance (ON) costs, because these expenses will be affected by whether the unit operates or not.

A comparison of system production costs with and without St.

Lucie 2 available to the system shows strong economic justification for operation of,the facility.

The FP8L system is currently heavily dependent on fossil fuels for generating electricity for its customers.

In 1979 and 1980, slightly more than 50K of FP&L's electrical energy was generated by oil.

Other major energy sources relied upon by FP8L in 1979 and 1980 include nuclear ("25K), natural gas

("20K), and outside purchases

( SX).

The system's dependence on oil is even more pr'onounced when viewed in the context of FP8L's system capacity.

For

example, in 1980 slightly more than 60K of FP&L's capacity was oil fired and although significant additions to capacity are planned th; nughout the 1980's, FP8L's 1989 system capacity will still be about 5(C oil fired.2 Because of FP&L's current and future strong dependence on oil-fired capacity, the staff has concluded that the replacement for any energy not produced by St.

Lucie 2 would have to come predominantly from oil-~ired generation.

This conclusion is St.

Lucie 2 FES 2"1

consistent with the applicant's own assessment of the. source of replacement energy should St.

Lucie 2 not be allowed,to operate.

St.

Lucie 2 is an 802 HMe (net) unit which according to the applicant is expected to operate at an annual capacity factor.of 72 percent.

On an annual

basis, the unit would thus produce about 5 billion-kMh.

The applicant has estimated that if St.

Lucie 2 were not permitted to operate, all of this energy would have to be provided by oil-fired capacity.

FML also estimates an average plant heat rate for its oil-fired capacity of 10,000 BTU per kMh and 8 percent per year escalation

.on the price of oil.

This escalation rate is applied to a 1981 base price of $36.00 per barrel.

These parameters result in a fuel cost for replacement energy of about

$363 million during the proposed initial year of full operation of St.

Lucie 2 (1984).s The staff has evaluated the replacement energy cost of St.

Lucie 2 and concludes that 'substantial dollar savings will be realized with its operation, despite the fact that the staff views the dollar savings reported by the applicant as being on the high side.

First, production cost savings are computed by taking.-

the difference in operating cost between the source of replacement energy and the nuclear unit.

The applicant's analysis estimates the cost of replacement fuel but fails to deduct the savings in nuclear fuel resulting from that incr. ased reliance on oil.

Assuming a 1984 nuclear fuel cost of 10 mills/kwh the dollar savings hould be about

$ 50 million less than that estimated by the applicant.

Second, given the operating experience w'th nuclear plants in

general, the staff believes that the applicant's rapacity factor assumption for St.

Lucie 2 during its initial years of operation is optimistically high.

If a lower capacity factor were assumed, on the order of 50K to 55K, the applicant's estimate would be reduced by about 25K to 30K.

Taking both factors into consideration, the staff estimates fuel cost savings, during the initial year of operation of St.

Lucie 2, on the order of $225 million.

A production-cost analysis should also include the differential in variable 088 costs between St.

Lucie 2 and the units which would provide the replacement energy.

However, these cost items are quite small in relation to the fi.el-cost differential and would not alter the ultimate cost differential to any neaningful degree.

In addition, a decision to operate St.

Lucie 2 will necessitate a decommissioning expense once the unit is retired from service.

In 'ction 8.5 of the FES-CP, the staff discusses the different decommissioning me'tnods avai lable.

For a

large PMR unit (such as St.

Lucie 2) the decommissioning cost is estimated to range from $ 21 million to $43 million (in 1978 dollars).>>

In conclusion, savings associated with the operation of St.

Lucie 2 are substan-tial although less than that estimated by the appl;cant.

The results would not be significantly altered if the demand for electricity grows at a lower rate than assumed, because FPAL's marginal energy source would continue to be oil.

Savings were only estimated for the initial year of operation; in actuality, fuel-cost savings would continue as long as St.

Lucie 2 is capable of operating and the r argi>>a1 cost of replacement energy exceeds that of St., Lucie 2.

'he operation of St.

Lucie

? also will result in environmental impacts and risk.

These have been evaluated by the staff, and the findings are presented St.

Lucie 2 FES 2-2

in Sections 4 and 5 of.his report.

These impacts are viewed as negligible to acceptable.

I 2.3 Divei sit of Su 1

It is to the advantage of a public utility to have )!verse sources of power available.

Any number of problems could arise regatding the availability of fuel to generate electricity.

If imported oil ware,not available, if further limits were placed on the use of natural gas as a boiler fuel, or if shortages of enrichment facilities were to develop, too much reliance on one or two fuels, especially for baseload operation, could necessitate cutbacks in power to the power-supply grid.

Currently, slightly more than 80 percent of FP8L's generating capacity comes from natural gas or oil.s With St.

Lucie 2 in operation, FPbL would be better p> epared to meet un xpected changes in the supply of these fossil fuels.

Th

~ fact that operat on of St.

Lucie 2 will improve the diversity of fuel supply for che servic area is further justifica-tion for operation of the facility.

2.4 Reliabilit Anal sis FP8L's current official projections for its system call for average annual rates of increase of about 4.3 percent for peak-load demand and 3.6 percent for net-energy-for-area load for the period 1978 to 1988.

Table 2. 1 shows FPSL's reserve margins with and with'out St.

Lucie 2 in operation for 1983 through 1988.

The peak-load-responsibility values reported here reflect FP8 L's official forecast for the summer system-maximum hourly load including interruptible loads.

System capacity reflects summer ratings for all'apacity owned by FP8L.

I,f Table 2.1 FPEL's Projections of Summer Peak

Loads, Capacity, and Reserves, 1983-1988" Peak load (MWe)

Capacity (HMe)

With St.

Lucie 2 Reserve margin (X)

Without

With,

=

Without St.

Lucie 2 St.

Lucie 2 St.

Lucie 2 1983 10,715 13294 12547

24. 1

17. 1 1984 11,105 13294 12547

19. T 13;0 1985 11,495 13994 13247

21. 7

15. 2 1986 11,885 13994 13247

17. 7 ll.5 1987 12,275 14994 14247 22 2,

16. 1 1988 12,670 14994 14247 18.3 12.4 "Assumes St.

Lucie 2 is available for operation by the summer of 1983.

Source:

ER-OL Table 1.1-9.

St.

Lucie 2 FES 2-3

For capacity expansion planning purposes, FP&L considers reserve margins of 20 to 25 percent an acceptable range to insure an adequate and reliable system for its customers.

7 This starsdard is consistent with the 15-to 25-percent reserve margin guideline of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

Thus, based on FP&L's current load forecast and capacity plans (as shown in Table 2. 1), if St.

Lucie 2 is not =added within the proposed time frame, FP&L's reserve margins will be inadequate.

il The staff concurs with FP&L's finding that St.

Lucie 2 will probably be needed to maintain minimum-reliability levels.

A state-level econometric forecastin~

model has been developed for HRC by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL).

This model suggests that the growth in kWh sales in the State of Florida between 1980 and 1990 will approximate 5 percent per year.

Assuming equivalency in the growth of electr ic energy sales and peak load growth (i. ere a con tant system load factor) the staff's analysis results in higher projections of peak load demand and lower reserves than those estimated by the applicant.

Thus, if a 20 to 25 oercent reserve margin is needed for reliability purposes, the staff's analjsip supports the need for this unit.

2.5 Cenclnsiens The results of the staff's assessment of purpose and need support a decision to issue the operating license for St.

Lucie 2 in the time frame proposed by the applicant.

The fact of overrid'.ng importance is that the timely addition of this unit on the FP&L's system is expected to result in significant savings in system production costs.

Furthermore, the operation of this unit will decrease FP&L's dependence on fuel supplies of uncertain availability and will increase system reliability.

The operation of this unit will result in environmental costs and limited risk.

However, these issues have been addressedan this statement, and the staff has found the costs and risk to range from negligible to acceptable.

Horeover, if St.

Lucie 2 does not operate, replacement energy will have to be generated.

This increased use of other power generation facilities would have their associated environmental costs and risks.

Finally, although decommissioning is identified as an incremental cost of operating St.

Lucie 2, it should be noted that this cost represents less than 25 percent of the projected production-cost savings resulting from St.

Lucie 2 operation-for a single year.

2.5 References 1.

Florida Power and Light Company, St.

Lucie Plant Unit Ho. 2, Environmental Report Operating License Stage, Docket Ho. 50-389,

1980, (ER-OL), Response to HRC question 4, Amendment 1, April 1981.

2.

Ibid., Table 1.1-4.

3.

Ibid., Response to NRC question 9, Amendment 1, April 1981.

4.

U.S. Huclear Regulatory Commission, "Draft Environmental Impact Statement on Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities," NUREG-0586, January 1981.

5.

Op.

Ci ts 5

ER-OL, Table l.'-4.

St.

Lucie 2 FES 2-4

6.

Ibid., Table 1.1-9.

7.

Ibid., Response to NRC question 3, Amendment 1, April 1981.

8.

U. S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "The ORNL State-Level Electricity Oemand Forecasting Model," NUREG/CR-1295, July 1980.

St.

Lucie 2 FES

. 2-5

fi 3

'ALTERNATIVES TO THE PROPOSED ACTION

3. 1 Resume I

During the Construction Permit (CP) stage of the lice analyzed alternative sites, alternative plant desi ns, sing process, the staff and alterne.tive sources g

of generation, including the alternative of not addir.

new production capacity.

The staff corcluded based on its analysis of these al ernatives, as well as on a cost benefit analysis, that additional capacity was needed,'hat nuclear would be an environm'entally acceptable means of provi ing the capacity, and the St.

Lucia 2, at the ppecified site, and of a specifiesI design, was acceptable from an environmental perspective.

Since that time the unit has been substan-ss tially constructed.

The economic and environmental costs associated with the construction of the unit that have been incurred must be viewed as "sunk costs" in any prospective assessment.

,,v v

3. 2 Alternatives Absent the discovery of a compelling safety or environmental concern which was not evident during the construction permit review, consideration of different

'sites, drama'c plant modifications, or the construction of new and different energy sources as alternatives to the existing nuclear facility is not warranted at the OL-.stage.

No such compelling consideration has emerged.

The environmental costs associated with any of these a)ternatives which were considered and foreclosed at the CP review stage would now be prohibitive when compared to the incremental costs of operating the completed St. Lucie 2.

These alternatives would require significant environmental and capital, commit-men',

in addition to thei,r..costs of operation.

Further, the delays caused by any proposed change in plans would necessitate an assessment of the cost of providing the energy that could have been produced by St.

Lucie 2 versus the

• cost of energy from replacement energy sources during the delay period.,

v Therefore, it is the staff s view that at. this time, the only alternative to operation of St.

Lucie 2 is to deny its operation.

Absent any significant environmental or safety obje 'tion, the decision is an economic one.

If opera-tion is denied, the most conservative assumption (i.eve least costly) is that existing capacity on.the applicant's system is available to replace the energy that could have been provided by St.

Lucie 2.

If, under this scenario, it can be demonstrated that significant production cost savings are available from operation vis-a-vis non-operation, then the operating alternative is preferable.

The staff has evaluated this cost differential in Section 2.2 of this statement and finds that savings on the order of $225 million would be realized during the'roposed initial year of operation of St.

Lucie 2...

Comparable savings would be expected for subsequent years.

s

Thus, the only feasible alternative to operation has been evaluated,

and, operation of St.,Lucie 2 has been determined to be the preferred alternative.

v i

~

v s

v ss v

s vSt.

Lucie 2 FES 3-1 v

4 AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT

4. 1 Resume e

The following sections provide a description of the facility and the related environment only with respect to those areas where additional information or

-changes have occurred since the FES-CP review.

4. 2 Facilit Descri tion 4.2. 1 External A

earance Plant La out and Land Use A general description of the external appearance, land use, and plant layout is provided in Chapters 2 and 3 of the FES-CP.

Since thse FES CP was written, some minor changes have occurred in these areas.

The terminal end of the discharge canal headwall has been extended. to the south to handle the altered design of the discharge line for St.

Lucie 2.'he discharge pipeline for Unit 2 has a

4.9-m (16-ft) inside diameter instead of the 3.7-m (12-ft) diameter pipeline described in the FES-CP.

The original headwall was constructed to accommodate the 3.7-m (12-ft) pipe.

A detailed description of the effects of these change may be found in Section 4.2.4, Discharge System.

In December 1981, after issu-ance of the St.

Lucie Unit 2 DES, the applicant formally notified the NRC that a third 16'iameter intake pipeline would be constructed and would result in modification of the NE corner of the intaxe canal headwall area.

The head-wall structure would be of similar design to the one recently built for the Unit 2 discharge pipeline.

.i short sheetpi le channel would be constructed from the headwall to the existing canal.

Also, an additional plant access r ad was constructed over 61 m (200 feet) north of the discharge canal access on State Road A1A.

A general plant layout is presented in Figure 4. 1.

4.2.2 Plant Mater Use The sources of water for Unit 2 usage remain as described in the FES-CP.

Potable water and water for other uses requiring low salinity is provided by the Fort Pierce Hunicipal Mater Supply System.

Cooling water is obtained from the Atlantic Ocean.

There is an intake on Big Hud Creek to be used only for safe shutdown of the plant under emergency conditions.

Estimates of water use rates within the psant have been revised out changes since the FES-CP review are small.

Estimated average usage from the Fort Pierce water system is now 10.1 k/sec (161 gpm),

reduced from 13.2 2/sec (210 gpm) at the FES-CP review, and usage of ocean water is now estimated to be about 32.5 m"/sec (520,000 gpm),

an increase from 27. 1 m~/sec (430,000 gpm) at the FES-CP review.

The two original circulating water ocean intake structures and associated piping and canal instalsed during the construction of St.

Lucio 1 have not been modified since the St.

Lucie 2 FES-CP review.

St.

Lucie 2 FES 4-1

unit 1 Oischorge Pipehne I

l I

I Unit 2 Discharge Pipeline I

A ~L< Al 7I'g EAg 1

ll I

II II I

Intotie PiPthne II Units 1 5 2 ill

'llOI HEAOlilALL Shoretine Oischarge Conol Unite 1 S 2 Slat ~ Road AIA s

s Btovdovn Bldg Seat Welt

<<Po6in Fuel Hondhng Bldg, Reactor Auxihary Bldg.

~f Reaclo Bldg. Unit 2 Ti~bine Ger crater Bldg.

Unit 2 Intote Strocturc l

I I

O Intoti~ Canal stnite 1 5 2 Emergency Coohng s

I I

Svitch ord s

s~x s

/

X

, Figure 4.

1 General Plant Layout 4-2

Sine=- issuance of the OES, the applicant has started construction of a third ocean intake structure and intake pipeline.

This pipeline will termi-nate at a headwall in the =existing intake canal.

The intake canal, with the exception of he construction of the headwall, will be unchanged, It has been determined that the existing two intake structures and pipelines would be unable to provide adequate flow for two-unit operation without frequent maintenance to maintain flow.

Flow reduction in the two existing pipelines is due to marine focal ing.

The third intake pipeline will begin at an offshore intake structure located approximately 366 m (1200 ft) from the shoreline.

The ocean intake structure will be of similar size and design as the existing two ocean intakes.

The top of. the intake will be situated approximately

2. 4 m (8 ft) below the water sur-face at mean low water.

A vertical section to prevent sanding and a velocity cap to minimize fish entrapment will be constructed for each pipe.

No screens or grates are planned.

Figures 4.2 and 4.3 provide plan section drawings of the velocity cap.

The inside diameter of the third pipeline wi 11 be 4. 9 m

(16 ft) (the existing two intake pipelines have an inside diameter of 3. 7 m

(12 ft). )

The pipeline would be buried for its entire length, both offshore and onshore (see Fig. 4.4}.'igure 4.5 depicts the relative position of the three pipe'lines.

The pipeline would enter the east end of the intake canal at a new headwall structure.

The headwall structure would be of similar design to the Unit 2 discharge pipeline.

A short sheetp',le channel would be constructed from the headwall to the existing canal.

The maximum flow velocities in cm/sec (ft/sec) through the velocity cap openings, the vertical section of the velocity caps, and the pipeline under clean and fouled condition-for both the 3. 7 m (12 ft) and 4.9 m (16 ft) diameter lines are summarized in Table 4. l.

Flow velocity in the canal would be essentially unchanged from that predicted during the CP revie~ at 21 cm/sec (0.7 ft/sec).

The emergency water intake structure, which the applicant has constructed, is different in design and operation from ".nat evaluated in the FES-CP.

The emer-gency water intake structure allows water. to flow from Big Mud Creek, an arm of the Indian River, into the cooling 'nba' canal.

In the event that insuffi-cient flow is available for the shutdo'-.:~ of the station, two 1.4 m (54 in) pipe/valve assemblies on the intake stru'ure are opened and water is allowed to flow from Big Mud Creek to the intake canai.

The flow rate into the intake canal is dependent on the head differential be.'ween the canal and the creek.z To assure that the emergency system rema'ns operational, the system is tested semi-annually.

The test consists of opening and closing each valve in each

. 1.4 m (54 in) diameter pipe for a perio;.:,

ess than one minute.

Oepending on the head differential between the canal and the creek, about 380 ma (100,000 gal} per valve per test woula flow fry i "g Hud Creek to the intake canal.

Yearly estimated flows due t" testin~ f -o;! 3i", Hud Creek to the intake canal are estimated to be less than '900 m-'50.',0"~."al).~

The FES-CP evaluated the watri flow from th~ creek to the canal through pneuma-tic control plugs rather than remotely operated valves.

Semi-arnual testing of the earlier design that used nine pneumatic o"::gs would have resulted in the flow of approximately 15,000 m~ (4 x 'l0 ga<) Ji water from the creek into the canal.

St.

Lucie 2 FES 4-3

60' NTS 3Is -9" 44'"

PLAN SHOWN WITHVELOCITY CAP PLAN SHOWN WITHOVTVEI.OCITY CAP ss sl Is

~I ss II s

ry.

)

Is

~I ss ss s

ss'I,

~

ss

%. NEW PIPELINE I

~.

~

LL~L<J

4. EXIST. PIPELINES PROPOSED VELOCITYCAP EXISTING VELOCITYCAPS F1g. 4 ~ 2 PLAN ~ OFFSHORE VELOCITYCAPS 10 0

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 FEET

4 P MEAN LOW WATER EL 0.00

'RXEE444 WWFEEWWW~

E EL 5.75 FLOW FLOW EL -16 OCEAN BOTTOM EL 160 +

F !.OW EL ~

34.00'LM+

Jg4, SHEET PILINC TR EMI E CONCRETE I

I PZ32 EJHEET PILING OR I

EQUAL TO EL ~ 70.0 Fi g. 4. 3'ECTION THROUGH VELOCITYCAP

LANDWARD SEAWARD VELOCITY CAP INTAKE CANAL HEADWALL 320' 1200' NTS

$00 <NTSI DIKE DUNES n

SURF ZONE h<LW EL 0.0 5' 0 COVER IMIN)

PIPELINE 12' COVER MIN.

ISURF ZONEI OCEAN BOTTOM PROFILE INTAKEPIPE 100 0

100 200 300 400 500 600 F E ET

'IPELINE SHEET PILING TO BE REMOVEO OCEAN BOT.

CLEAN SANO BACKFILL

/ ii/ //

MLW EL 0.00 12 FT. COVER SURF ZONE 5 FT. COVER BEYOND SURF ZONE

+1+~+t/it<

INTAKEPIPE SHEET PILING TO REMAIN OR TO BE REMOVED PIPE O.D.

0 SHEETI'ILING 3'

0 F$ g.

4 ~ 4 TYPICALCw<J& SEC TION SUBAQUEOUS PIPE 20 0

20 40 80 FEET

97' PROPOSED VELOCITYCAP N

TRUE NORTH

%. EXISTING VELOCITYCAP 20 PLANT NORTH L29o.41

~.SS~

I

~

y 0 EXISTING VELOCITYC4P I

~ ~

ATLANTICOCEAN

'10 PROPOSED INTAKEPIPELINE 192 I.D.

I I

DATUM MEAN LOWWATFR ATLANTICOCEAN ELEVATION 0.0 EXIST INTAKEPIPELINES 1c+

I D, PROPOSED NEY/ HEADYJALL I

ANDCHANNEL II ll I'

MHW I.IN E s,

DUNES I

MLWLINE EXISTING HEAD'WALL LIANGROVE

, SWAMP PfsOPOSED YADENINGOF CANAL 40'

1 Ih lA MANGROVE SWAMP EXISTING INTAKECANAI.

TOP OF DIKE ~ ELEV. +13 0

100 200 300 600 FEET Fig. 4.5 PLAN OCEAN INTAKEPIPELINE

Table 4.1 Flow velocity in ft/sec at various locations in the intake pipelines under clean and fouled conditions"""

12'iameter Pipeline 16'iameter Location Clean" Fouled""

Clean" Fouled"*

Velocity cap opening Vqrtical pipe secticn Pipeline

."368

1. 18

4. 16

.$ 11 1.0

.927 1.31 6.77 6.24 4.

2 6.77 6.24 s

Condstsons predicted as of 1983 when system is pot in service.

• "Conditions predicted as of 1988 when the system is at the end of a cycle and would require cleaning to remove marine fouling.

"""From FP8L response to request for additional information.s' S v' St.

Lucie 2 FES 4-8

The new design using the two 1.4 m (54 in) diameter pipes and remotely operated valves results in an approximately 8-fold reduction in the annual flow of water from the creek

+o the canal during reliability testing.

4.2.4, Dischar e

S stem The St.

Lucie discharge system is composed of a 671 m (2200 ft) long discharge canal that terminates at two headwall structures east of State Road A1A.

Each headwall structure is connected to an ocean discharge pipr line.

The discharge canal constructed prior. to the operation of St.

Lucie 1 has not been substan-tiv ly modified since the preparation of the St.

Lucie 2 FES-CP.

However, the second headwall structure and discharge pipeline which the applicant is con-structing for St.

Lucie 2 operation is different from that evaluated in the FES-CP.

The diameter has been increased, the spacing between adjacent ports has been increased, additional ports are provided, and the ports have been turned to discharge at an angle away from shore rather than parallel to shore.

n To accommodate the redesigned St.

Lucie 2 discharge pipeline a new pipeline headwall had to.be constructed off the discharge canal.

The headwall and associated enlargement of the discharge canal are located immediately to the south of the original and functioning pipeline (see Figure 4. 1).

At the time of the FES-CP review the discharge pipeline designed to handle the additional canal flow from St.

Lucie 2 operation was a 3.7 m (12 ft) diameter multiport diffuser line extending about 853 m (2800 ft) offshore with each of the 48 ports oriented to discharge horizontally.

The redesigned discharge pipeline, emanating from the newly constructed

headwall, extends from the headwall into the ocean about 1029 m (3375 ft). It has a 4.9 m (16 ft) inside diameter and is buried about 1.5 m (5 ft) below the ocean floor.

The last 432 m (1416 ft) of the buried pipeline is the diffuser section (see Figure 4. 6).

The multiport diffuser consists of 58 ports, each port located 7.3 m (24 ft) between centers, is 40.6 cm (16 in) in diameter.

Each port is mounted on a 4.3 m (14 ft) high riser with a 1.2 m (4 ft) inside diameter.

To minimize

, plume interference as well as reentrainment in the intake, the ports are oriented in an offshore direction at a horizontal angle alternating 25 degrees left and right from the ".long axis of the diffuser.

Therefore, ports discharg-ing water to the same side of the diffuser are

14. 6 m apart and direct the jet flow away from shore.

Jet velocity of the discharge water at each port will average about 4 m/sec (13 ft/sec).

The velocity of water inside the discharge pipeline will average about 1.7 m/sec (5.7 ft/sec).

To control fouling in the discharge pipeline the inside of each port riser is lined with an anti-fouling compound called bis-(n-tributyltin) oxide (TBTO) in a neoprene rubber base.

This lining is 1.3 cm (0.5 inch) thick with a 5X con-centration cf TBTO.=

The anti-fouling proper ty of this system is due to the continuous slow release of TBTO from the rubber.

Estimates of continuous release rates based on the total surface area of TBTO impregnated rubber.

The release rate ranges from an initial rate of 0.24 lbs/day to an ultimate rate of

0. 11 lbs/day.

At a discharge flow rate of 32. 5 ma/sec (515,000 gpm) this corresponds to 0.039 ppb the first year of operation and to an average of 0.018 ppb during the later years of operation.

TBTO is currently registered with the US/PA for use as an anti-foulant.

St.

Lucie 2 FES 4-9

68 PORTS 0 24'PACINGS ~

1388'-

-.0-~

RISER W/PORT (TYP.)

" PLAN (NO SCALE)

BOTTOM ELEVATION RISER PIPE ALTERNATIVE SHEETEO TRENCH OPEN TRENCH EXCAVATION

+ OISCH. PORT (ALT.SIDE)

EXCAVATION 30 (SYMMETRICALABOUT Q UNLESS NOTED)

EL. 0.0 (MLS EMOVABLECOVER 6'4 (MIN.)

CLEAN SANO.

BACKFILL 3'i'iCIN.

SHEET PILING 34(MIN.)

SECTION A-A Figure 4.o Discharge Pipeline Diffuser Section St. Lucie 2 FES 4-10

When either St.

Lucie 1 or 2 circulating water system ns out of service for exterded periods the Y-port diffuser is to be closed and all flow will be diverted through the multi-port diffuser exc=pt when this coincides with those infrequent occasions on which the mu?ti-port di iiuser itself must be c!osed for cleaning.

With both units in service the relative distribution of flow between the two outfalls will vary with the Plant flow and pert aps with tidal and ocean current conditions.

Nominally each discharge str cture is designed for 33 ms"Isec (1160 cfs) corresponding to the rated circulating plus intake cooling water flow of each unit.

4.2. 5 Radioactive Waste Treatment S stem NPDES 004")

10 CFR 50.3~a requires an applicant for a license to operate a nuclear power reactor to include aidescription of the design of equipment to be installed for keeping levels of radioactive material in effluents to unrestricted areas as low as is reasonablyIachievable (ALARA).

The term "as( low as is reasonably achievable" means as low as is reasonably achievag le taking into account the state of technology and the economics of improvement in relation to benefits to the public health and safety and other societal and socioeconomic considera" tions and in relation to the utilization of atomic energy in the public interest.

Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50 provides numerical guidance on design objectives for light-water-cooled nuclear power reactors to meet the require-ments that radioactive mater'.als in eff?uents released to unrestricted areas be kept as low as is reasonably achievable.

II To meet the requirements of 10 CFR 5r.34a, the applicant has provided final designs of radwaste systems and effluent control measures for keeping levels of radioactive materials in efflrents to unrestricted areas within the design objectives of Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50.

The applicant has performed a cost-benefit analysis as required by Section II.D of Appendix I for St.

Lucie 2, to show conformance with Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50.

The st~ff, however, elected to evaluate the final designs of radwaste systems and effluent control measures based on the requirements of the Annex to Appendix I, dated September '4,'975, since (1) the applicant previously elected, on June 1,I3.976, to show conform-ance with the Annex rather than a cost-benefit analysis for St.

Lucie 1, which

-has operated since 1976; ano (2) the evaluation of the~system's ability to meet the requirements of the Annex is more conservative than that of Section II.D of Appendix I.

In addition, the applicant has provided an estimate of the quantity of each principal radionuclide expected to be released annually to unrestricted areas in liquid and gaseous effluents produced during normal operation, includ-ing anticipated operational, occurrences.

The staff's detailed evacuation c

g the liquid and gaseous radwaste systems and tt e capability of these systems to meet the requirements of Appendix I was presented ir. "hapter 11 of the safety evaluation r port issued in October, 1981.

The quantities of radioactive material calculated by the staff to be released from the plant are presented in Section

5. 10 of this environmental statement, along with the calculated doses tn individuals and to the population that will result from these effluent quanteties.

The staff's evaluation concludes that the final designs of radwaste systems and effluent control measures are capable

~nPO 5 number refers to.'.,'e outfaii se iai number designated in the NPDES Permit included in Appendix B.

St.

Lucie 2 FES 4"ll

of meeting the design objectives of Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50, such that radioactive materials in effluents released to unrestricted areas can be kept as low as reasonably achievable.

At the time of issuance of the operating license, the applicant will be required to submit technical specifications that wi 11 establish release rates for radioactive material in liquid and gaseous effluents.

These specifications will also provide for the routine monitoring and measurement oi all principal release points to assure that the facility operation is in conformance with the requirements of Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50.

4.2.6 Coolin Mater Oischar e

NPOES 001 and 008 Because the design of the cooling system discharge structure has been changed

'ince, the FES-CP, the potential for environmental impact has been reconsidered.

Additionally, although the performance of the turbines and condensers have not necessarily

changed, a wider range of conditions has been considered in assessing impact.

This information provide's the basis for the new revi~l.

The Circulating Water System (CMS) which cools the condensers is desiqned for a calculated maximum heat rejection rate of 6.51 x 10'!h~ (6. 17 =x 10~ Btu/hr).

At this rate the maximum temperature rise of the circulating water through thr condenser is about 14'C (25oF) at a circulating water flow of 30.9 m3/sec (490,600 gpm).~

With one of the four St. Lucie 2 circulating water-pumps out of use for servicing, cooling water flow would be reduced to a nominal rate of 24.9 ma/sec (394,600 gpm) and the maximi~ condenser temperature rise would be about,l7.2'C (31 F).

Servicing will be scheduled to coincide with unit outage.

However, the higher temperature condition is examined t" determine impact during unplanned pump failure.

Mith both nuclear units operating at capacity, failure of a single circulatirg pump would leave seven pumps in service with a Plant "temperature rise of 15.6OC (28'F).

The Intake Cooling Mater System (ICWS) for St.

Lucie 2 uses ocean water at a

flow rate nf 1.8 m /sec (29,000 gpm), principally to cool equip:.ant, anu has an average temperature rise of about 10.6 C (19 F).

When combined with the full water flow of St.

Lucie 2 (that is the combined ICMS and CMS flow) the total heat rejection rate is about 6.8 x 10'2 J/hr (6.4 x 10'tu/hr) and the net temperature rise is 13.7 C (24.6 F) with all pumps operating.

Since the discharge canal r.ill carry the comoined St.

Lucie 1 and 2 flows as well as the discharges from the Intake Cooling Mate;

Systems, the temperature differential between the ocean intake and the ocean discharge will depend on the status of operation of both units.

To assure that impacts would be acceptable while operating with circu',atinq pump outages. and to assure compliance with State of Florida regulations govern-ning temperature in= the ocean near the power plant discharge during such condi-

tions, FP&L looked at hypothetical worst case conditions for temperature studies.

They examined tl. situations which would exist with all eight station CMS pumps operating with ter perature rises of 15. 6 C (28 F) and 17.8 C (32 F).

The app)ication to EPA in the HPOr'S P rmit and th~ petition to the State for Modification nf Certification requested approval of continuous operation with a St.

Lucie 2 FE$

4"12

temperature rise of 16. 7"C {30 F) and intermittent rises as high as

17. 8 C

(32 F).

4.2.7 Hon-Radioactive Wast,e Dischar e

S stems NPDES 001 002.

003 005 006

~~00 aad Olla Since the FES-CP review, sore changes have been made in plans for usage of chemicals.

FML has described" the on-site hypochlorite generation system and associated waste streams and has given additional detail on usage of chemicals for Corrosion Control Systems.s the hypochlorite generation system will produce the sod!um hypochlor ite for condenser

.defouling.

Although condenser defouling was discussed at the t.ime of t,he FES-CP review, on-site generation of hypo-chlorite was nnt.

Wastes from pe: iodic cleaning of hypochlorite generator assemblies will be disposed of offsite by a licensed contractor.

FPEL has applied to EPA for authorization to chlorinate the auxiliary cooling water systems continuously, in addition to their previous request for intermitten chlorination of the, condenser cooling systems which was assessed in the FES-CP review.

The HPDES Permit provides limitations for total residual oxidants (TRO), which includes total residual chlorine, under outfall serial numbers 001 and 008.

During periods when TRO is being discharged from condenser (and auxiliar. system) chlorination, a maximum instantaneous TRO limitation at the terminus of the discharge ca !aI of 0. lO mg/1 is applicable.

Ho~ever, during periods when TRO is being di charged only from the auxiliary systems, the limitation is 0.03 mg/l.

Discharges of water treatment plant waste (demineralizer regeneration

wastes, etc.) normally a! e directed to the neutralization basin for treatment before release to the intake canal.

However, on occasion, direct discharge to the

'ntake canal from the neutralization basin (HPDES 002) may occur.

~ immediately preceding St.

Lucie 2 operations ome of the compon

.nts (including piping and various. portions of the steam system) may be cleaned and/or flushed with alkaline detergents and/or acid cleaning solutions.

These 'metal cleaning" wastes will be discharged to the evaporat.ion/percolation ponds or to the plant discharge canal (HPDES 003) after treatment.

Prior to ompletion of construction, dewatering wastes continue to be discharged (NPDES 005) to the intake or discharge canals or the evaporation/percolation ponds.

Condensers are tubed with titanium,

.~ highly corrosion-resistant

metal, and have. tube sheets fabricated of a copper alloy.

Appearance of titanium in the cooling water will be almost non-existent and copper corrosion should produce a

concentratio~ of less than 0.02 ljg/l."

FP8L has installed an extended-ae, ation wastewater treatment plant to treat the sanitary wastes from both units.

Chlorinated effluent (NPDES 006) will enter the cooling water intake canal

~here it will be further diluted.

This is in lieu of the septic tank and tile field planned at the time of the FES-CP review.

he new system avoids the potential problem of clogging of leaching fields identified in Section 3.7 of the FES-CP and should preclude the need for later tying into municipal treatment facilities.

St.

Lucie 2 FES 4-13

Pchemical and biocide waste d States will occur from the additional data on planned chemical usage and o

discharges.7 No point source discharge to waters of the Unite evaporation/percolation ponds.

4.2.8 Power Transmission

.S stem Additions of hydrazine, ammonium hydroxide, and phosphates for corrosion con-trol will leave the system with steam generator blowdown (NPDES 007), which passes through filters and demineralizers prior to any discharge.

Releases will be infrequent and at low concentration.

Potassium chromate will be used in complecely closed cooling systems.

Only leakage from these closed systems

- will be directed to the evaporation/percolation onds.

The ER-DL includes During coristruction of St.

Lucie 1 the applican 240 kV transmipsion system which is capable of.ca St.

Lucie 1 and=2 with one circuit as a spare.

,di.fferences from the FES-CP.

installed a three-circuit, rrying the full output of

herefore, there are no s

IIr e

s 4 14 l

~

v macd...,

-ov.

vt a.

r v~e +am'd <<.%m s

4.3

~Pro 'ect eel>>ted Environmental Desert tions v

, 4.3.1 Communit Characteristics Il The general socioeconomic characteristics of the region, including demography

'nd land use, are described in Section

2. 2 of thh FES-CP.

As that source indicates, the plant is located on 1132 acres in, the middle of'Hutchinson Island and is roughly equidistant from the cities of Fort Pierce and Stuart.

The. island is in both St.

Lucie and Hartin Counties.

St.

Lucie County covers approximately the northern two-thirds of the island with Hartin County covering" the remainder.

The entire area is experiencing great population'rowth which is expected to continue until a limit is'met whether due to physical constraints such as traffic congestion and. the availability of potable water or due to zoning restrictions.

The projected growth has caused the Treasure Coast Planning

. Council to question the future availability of public facilities on the island.

I

'ith respect to zoning," Hartin County is more restrictive in limiting the height of buildings and the density of residential-units per acre than St.

Lucie County..

Hartin County's area plan for Hutchinson Island restricts height to four stories and allows for a maximum of up to" 12 units/a for planned unit developments.

Because of a limit on the total number of units on the island in Hartin County, the average density is about 7.5 units/a.

St.

Lucie County has no height

~strictions, allows up to 18 uriits/a but has primarily 5 and ll unit/a density

.~ones. ~

s e

., Traffic congestion presents another possible constraint to population growth on the island.

There are presently three bridges from the mainland to Hutchinson Island.

One.is in Fort Pierce while the Jensen Beach Bridge and Stuart Cause-

- way are in the Hartin County portion of the island.. Because of the rapid growth on the island, especially in St.

Lucie County and the:resulting traffic flow to"

-, the mainland in Hartin County, the Treasure Coast Planning Council is under-

'aking a traffic study of the three bridges and, State Road AlA..State Road AlA is the only highway running the length of the island.'

St.,Lucie 2

FES

1 The traffic study which is estimated to be completed by November, 1981 will be used to determine if a new development in St.

Lucie County will warrant a

Development Regional Impact Study.

One of the possib'.e results of the impact study could be a more restrictive density for that development.

Concern exists in the area possibly because of the traffic congestion caused by

.an evacuation which may result due to an accident at the plant.

Traffic con-gestion is also a major concern in the evacuation due to hurricanns.

The constraint to population growth due to the-limited supply of potable water is discussed in the FES-CP Section 2.2.

Since then, there have teen plans to expand the water supply on Hutchinson Island.

The Fort Pierce Utilities Authority (FPUA) plans to construct a 41 cm (16 in) water main to a point approximately 5.6 km (3.5 mi) south of St.

Lucie 2.

This water main is being installed to serve Island Dunes, a 572 unit high rise development which is scheduled for completion by 1988.

The FPUA water main serving Island Dunes is in addition to the 30.5 cm (12 in) FPUA main already serving Hutchinson Island between St..

Lucie 2 and the southern boundary of St.

Lucie County.

Other plans to expand the water supply on Hutchinson Island involve the construction of deep wells to the Floridan Aquifer.

These wells employ a desalinization process called "reverse osmosis".

They are being constructed by developers not served by public water supplies.

On Hutchinson Island, all planned developments, except for Island Dunes and those projects within the City of Fort Pierce, will be providing their own potable water with the reverse osmosis process.

As a result, desalinization by this process means potable water will be less of a constraint to the island's development than previously thought.

This desalinization process is encouraged by the South Florida Water Management District.'~

FPEL estimates the 1981 population within 8 km (5 mi) of the plant to be

'10,336.,'he resident population within 8 km (5 mi) of the Plant is estimated

o reach 94,180 in the year 2030.

This growth is reflected in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 which list new developments with-in 8 km (5 mi) of St.

Lucie 2 for the periods 1978 through Hay of 1981 and 1981 through -1990.

This area is growing at a rate greater than anticipated beyond the 8 kn (5 mi) radius.

The 80 km (50 mi) radius around the plant contained 573,048 people in 1981.

The estimated populations for 2000 and 2030 are 1,006,452 and 1,710,139 respectively.

The entire area i.s a popular one for tourists and seasonal visitors.

The applicant has estimated the number of tourists and seasonal visitors to the area using data from the State of Florida Division of Tourism.

The applicant made projections through 1985 using a year's growth rate of N based upon a

1977 to 1978 comparison.

The State had done the same.

The applicant then used the annual growth rate from the year 1970-1978,

2. 1X, to project for 1985 to 2030.'"

The staff feels that a projected growth rate based upon more than one year's worth of data would have better served the purpose for the projections St.

Lucie 2 FES 4-15

TABLE 4.2 NBI DEVELOPMENTS MITHIH 8 km (5 mi) OF ST.

LUCIE 2 BETWEEN 1978-1981 (AS OF MAY, 1981)

Location by Total Number On Hutchinson Island:

Annular Sector of Units Completion Date Sand Dollar Yillas Ocean Towers Island Vi/lage Sheraton Condo (Former1y Sheraton Motel)

Oceana Mainland:

Golf Vi11age Midport,"

1 Il'E 1-2 SSE 1-2 SSE 4-5 SSE 4-5'SE 4-5 SSE 4-5 SW 3"4 4"5 SSM 4"5 SW 4-5 203

'58 32 84 286 617 375 1981 1981 1981 1978 1981 1980 1981 Source:

FR-OL, Response to NRC question 310.8.

St. Lucie 2

TABLE 4.3 FUTURE DEVELOPHEHT WITKIN 8 km (5 mi) OF ST.

LUCIE 2, 1981 to FUTURE On Hutchinson Island:

Sand Dollar Villas Island Dunes Island Village Islandia Mainland:

Saddle Club The Grove Savannah Club Hidport (Part of Port St.

Lucie)

Location by.

Annular Sector SE 1-2 and SSE 1"2 SSE 3-4 SSE 4"5 SSE 4"5

~

MHM 4-5 HW 4-5 M 4-5 SM 2-3 SW 3"4 SW 4-5 MSM 2-3 MSM 3-4 MSM 4"5 SSW 3-4 SSW 4-5 SW 3-4 SM 4-5 Total Humber of Units 162 144 10&

540 102 388 184 700 (Hote:

only 413 units are estimated to be in the five mile area.)

576 2560 426 380 976 Completion Date 1983 1986 1982 1987 or 1988 1982 1983 1986 1985 Before 1990 Before 1990 End of 1981 1983 1990 Source:

EP.-OL, Response to HRC question 310.8 St.

Lucie 2 FFS 4-17

4'hrough 1985.

The State has since revised their projections through 1985 to about a 5X growth rate. ~s For the five mile area around the Plant, the applicant estimates a peak daily tourist and seasonal visitor total of 4412 for 1981 and a projection of 40,259 for the year 2030.The 48 km (30 mi) tot-ls are 54,680 and 196,758 for the same years.'~

The population growth in the area has greatly exceeded the projections of the FES-CP.

This growth does not show any signs of slackening until one of the previously mentioned constraints is met.

The FES-CP review was based on about two years of water quality studies in the immediate site vicinity.

FP8L has continued to collect water quality data in conjunction with St.

Lucie 1 operation.

These St.

Lucie i. studies provide additional data on temperature and nutrient content.

The basic understanding of coastal water quality remains as described at the FES-CP review.

Mith the longer period covered by the availability of local

data, the ranges of values of most parameters have been extended.

For example, at the time of the FES-CP review data showed the range of ocean surface temperature near the site to be 15 C to 30 C (59 F to 86 F).

The longer sampling interval shows the range to be 15 C to 32 C (59 F to 90 F)

Nutrient levels during the post FES-CP sampling period remained low and within the range expected.

The "seasonal" peak in phosphorous reported in the FES-CP review has not recurred.

The peak had been attributed to upwelling of the nutrie>>t,rich water from greater depths.

Temporal variations in the subsequent data have been attributed to tidal exchange with the richer Indian River estuary.

I'issolved oxygen levels continue to be low in mid summer although values in recent years did not drop for extended periods to the 1972 low discussed in Section 2. 5 of the FES-CP.

4 4.3.3 Surface Mater H drolo Th-surface water descriptions presented in Section 2.5 of the FES-CP are still valid.

Bathymetric and tidal data have been collected subsequent to the FES-CP.

In addition, Section 5.3.3 contains a discussion of the hydrologic effect of alterations in the floodplain as required by Executive Order 21988-Floodplain thnagement.

.he St.

Lucie site, located on Hutchinson Island, is bordered on the east by the Atlantic Ocean which will be used for waste heat dissipation.

The Atlantic Ocean will also receive treated liquid effluents during normal plant operation.

Hutchinson. Island is separated from the mainland by the Indian River, a shallow, tida11y influenced lagoon.

To the north of the site lies Big Hud

Creek, an inlet off the Indian River.

Big Mud Creek is not a flowing stream but does receive surface and subsurface runoff resulting from precipitation on Hutchinson Island.

Big Hud Creek serves as a source of emergency cooling water for both St.

Lucie 1 and 2.

Average annual pre ipitation at the site is St.

Lucie 2 FES 4-18

157 cms (62 in.).

Surface runoff, however, is~very small at the site because of high soil permeability and evapotranspiration.

There are no freshwater streams in the vicinity of the site.

I The nearshore bottom of the Atlantic Ocean off (the site slopes at a one, on 80 gradient to about -10.7 m (-35 'ft) MLW.

The ocean bottom maintains this depth for about 800 m (0.5 mi) before rising to Pierce Shoal at about -6.4 m

("21 ft) MLM.

A slight trough 8 km (5 mi) wide and approximately 15 m (50 ft) deep separates Pierce Shoal from the northward '.extension of St.

Lucie Shoal.

The ocean bottom then slopes at a gradient of approximately one in 600 for 19 km (12 mi) across the continental shelf, to )a depth of 36 m (120 ft).

The slope then increases, resulting in a depth of 83 m (600 ft) approximately 29 km (18 mi) east of the Plant. site.

I A tide monitoring program undertaken by the app, icant from May 1976 to May 1977 showed a mean(tidal range of 1 m (3.28 ft).

Thjs compares favorably with mean tidal ranges det'ermined from established tide gauges at Miami 0.76 m (2. 3 ft),

,'alm Beach 0.85 m (2.6 ft), and Yera Beach 1.04 m (3. 1 ft).

Currents in the nearshore region of the site are affected primarily by winds and tides.

The Florida Current, a part of the Gulf stream system, is found farther offshore, beyond the 91 m (300 ft) contour.

Ocean currents near the St.

Lucie 1 discharge were measured by Continental Shelf Associates (CSA),

Tequesta, Florida, from November 1973 through May 1975.

Average current speed was found to be 22.5 cm/s (0. 74 ft/sec) near the surface and 16.4 cm/s (0.54 ft/sec) near the bottom.

The prevailing surface current direction is alongshore toward the north and occurs about 49K of the time.

Flow toward the south occurs about 35K of the time.

Current speeds were found to range from near zero to 48.8 cm/s (1.6 ft/s).

Frequency distributions by month for surface and bottom current directions and speed are provided in the applicant's ER-OL ~s Sea water temperatures on the Atlantic Ocean offshore of the site were found to range from about 15'C (59'F) :o 32'C (90'F) between 1971 and 1978.

The mean temperature for all stations and depths monitored during the period was 25 C

(77'F).

The average salinity of the Atlantic Ocean off Hutchinson Island is about 35.5 parts per thousand (ppt).

A range of 33.0 ppt to 38.5 ppt has been reported with most values between 34.0 ppt and 36.0 ppt.

Salinity is generally lowest during fall and winter and increases to a maximum during the summer.

4.3.4 Ground Water Hydrology Underlying the one to two meters (3 to 6 ft) of surface organic material on Hutchinson Island is the Anastasia Formation.

The Anastasia Formation is an unconfined water table aquifer consisting of grey slightly silty fine to medium sand with varying amounts of fragmented shells.

The Anastasia Formation extends to a depth of about -41 m (-135 ft) MSL to -47 m (-155 ft) MSL.

Below the Anastasia Formation lies the Hawthorne formation.

The upper 30 meters of the Hawthorne 'formation at the site consists of a slightly clayey and silty

-very fine sand.

Below this zone and extending to about -122 m (-400 ft) MSL are sandy clayey si its which form an aquiclude for the underl ying Floridian artesian aquifer.

The Floridian aquifer, which lies about 210 m below the land surface in St.

Lucie County, underlies all of Florida and southern Georgia.

The Floridian aquifer is a highly porous limestone formation with an estimated St.

Lucie 2,FES 4"19

~W1

artesian head at the site of 10.7 m (35 ft) HSL.

The thickness of the Floridian aquifer at the site is unknown; however, ar tesian wells up tn about 370 m in depth have been drilled in St.

Lucie County.

The groundwater table at the site occurs near or at the natural ground surface and reflects tidal variations near the Atlantic shore.

Field and laboratory tests show the permeability of the near surface material to be between 10-~ to 10-s cm/s.

4.3.5 Water Use There are no potable water intakes in surface water bodies that potentially may be affected by the plant.

Recreational uses of the Atlantic Ocean within 80 km (50 mi) of the St.

Lucie Plant include beach activities, saltwater fishing, boating and surfing.

The present and projected future participation rates of recreational water use are provided in the applicant's ER-OL.

A well survey conducted by the applicant for issuance of the Construction Permit indicated that there were no potable water wells on Hutchin.on Island.

An October 1979 survey conducted by the applicant indicated that there are now two wells located approximately 9

km (5-1/2 mi) south of the plant on State Road AlA presently being used as a source of potable drinking water.

These wells are 863 and 876 feet deep.

The survey also determined that condominium developments were planned in an area extending from 1.5 to 6.5 km south of the site.

The applicant has indicated that these developments may drill deep wells and use a reverse osmosis system for water supply.

4.3.6 tleteorolo and Air ualit The discussion of tne general climatology of the site and vicinity contained in the FES-CP remains unchanged.

Climatological statistics for average tempera-

ture and precipitation in the area have changed only slightly since issuance of the FES-CP.

However, information about the frequencies of thunderstorms, tornadoes, waterspouts, and hurricanes has changed.

A recent study by the National Climatic Center'~

indicates that about 100 thunderstorms occur each year in the vicinity of the St.

Lucie site.

Tornadoes in Florida are most likely in sp~ing and summer.

The applicant has examined tornado occurrences in the area for several different periods of record and concluded that the number of reported tornadoes in Florida is highest for the period 1968-1980, almost double the average reported for the period 1955-1967.

Using the higher frequency of tornado occurrences.

the applicant has computed a recurrence interval of 275 years for a tornado at the Plant site.

Waterspouts are quite

- common along the east coast of Florida, with 196 waterspouts reported witnin 40 km (25 mi) of the shore along 332 km (200 mi) of the coast centered at St.

Lucie. in the period 1952-1980.

Tropical cyclones (classified as tropical depressions, tropical storms, and hurricanes) affect the Florida penninsula on the average of about once per year.

The applicant has determined that 95 tropical cyclones (16 tropical depressions, 40 tropical storms, and 39 hurricanes) have affected the Florida penninsula within 161 km (100 mi) of the St.

Lucie site in the period 1899-1980.

Tropical cyclones are most likely in August, September, and October.

Since issuance of the FES-CP, several additional year'f onsite meteorological data have been collected at the plant site.

However, the onsite meteorolcgical St.

Lucie 2 FE,S 4"20

k measurements program has also changed since issuance of the FES"CP.

The best available period of record for onsite meteorological data at this time is January 1977 - December 1978. Prevailing winds at St..-Lucie. are soutneasterly, with winds from the east-southeast, southeast, and south-southeast occurring between 25K and 3'f the time at the site;

however, from November through

February, northwesterly winds prevail.

The average wind speed at St.

Lucie is about 3. 1 m/s (7 mph).

Calm conditions occur about 0.5X of the time.

Hautral (Pasquill type "0") and slight>y stable (Pasquill type "E") conditions, as defined by vertical temperature

gradient, occur between two-thirds and three-quarters of the time.

Moderately stable (Pasquill type "F") and extremely stable (Pasquill type "G",'onditions occur relatively infrequently, totalling only about 5X for the period January 1977 - Oecemher 1978.

As indicated above, several changes have been made to the preoperational onsite meteorological measurements program described in Section

6. 1.3 of the FES-CP.

The current meteorological program consists of a 60.6m (199 ft) tower located about 730m ('2400 ft) north of the reactor complex, with the following measure-ments:

wind speed and wind direction at the 10m (32.8 ft) and 57.9m (190 ft)

'.evels; temperature, gradient between the 10m and 57.9m levels and between the 10m and 33. 5m (110 ft) levels; drybulb temperature at 10m, 33.5m, and 57. 9m; and dewpoint temperature at the 10m level.

Precipitation is measured by a tipping bucket rain gauge located near the tower.

The wind speed and direction sensors have been upgraded since issuance of the FES-CP to conform to the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.23 with respect to starting thre-holds.

The entire onsite meteorological measurement program now conforms to the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.23.

The operational phase of the onsite meteorological measurements program will he essentially the same as the current program.

4.3.7 Terrestrial Ecolo 4.3.7.1 Gener'al The only'change occurring since the FES-CP is the elimination of approximately three acres of vegetation, primarily red mangrove and less that one acre of saw palmetto and Australian pine at the eastern end of the discharge canal.

This action is necessary for the construction of a second headwall and second discharge pipeline which will form part of the St.

Lucie 2 once-through cooling system.

While this construction involves excavating through the dune appro-priate precautions will be taken to restrict activity to less than 30 m

(100 ft) in width.

Once the structures are in place the dune will be restored to its original contour and revegetated with native dune - stabilizing species.

Therefore, this activity will have limited effect for a short period of time on the terrestrial ecology of the site.

4. 3.7. 2 Prime A r icultural Land There is no prime or unique agricultural land onsite.

4.3.8. 1 Indian River and Bi Mud Creek Indian River is a shallow coastal lagoon lying to the west of Hutchinson Island.

It is approximately 2,4 km (1. 5 mi) wide in the vicinity of the St.

Lucie 2 FES 4-21

station.

Big Mud Creek was a shallow (less than 1

m (3 ft) deep) arm of the Indian River that extends nearly across Hutchinscn Island immediately north of the Plant and serves as the source of emergency cooling water.

The creek was dredged for barge access and fill material during station construction.

Between He'rman Bay Point and State Road AIA the creek was dredged to a depth of approximately minus 14 m (45 ft) MLW.~

A channel connecting Big Hud Creek 'and the Intracoastal Waterway in the Indian River was dredged to minus 3.7 m

(12 ft) HLW.

II The FES-CP briefly discusses the biological characteristics of the Indian River and Big Hud Creek.

Since issuance of the FES-CP additional information characterizing these two waterbodies has bee collected.

Gilmore 'rovided a qualitative analysis of the ichthyofauna of the southern portion of the Indian River Lagoon and descr bed it as exceptionally speciose and probably the most diverse estuarine fish fauna in North America with over 300 species identified.

During the Gilmore~

study conducted in 1974-75 over 1 million fish were D

4.3.8.2 Atlantic Ocean c ptured )n monthly s ine hauls at seven stat>ons

>n the Indian River Lagoon (a total of 16 collections):

Approximately 5N of all species of fish were captured from Big Hud Creek, one uf the seven stations.

About 46K of the fish were taken from Big Mud Creek were from species of commercial or recreational value.

The Big Hud Creek sampling station had a sea grass bed at the eastern end of Big Mud Creek near State Road AIA crossing.

The large fish populations encountered by Gilmore'robably;~as due to the scarcity o~ other sea grass beds in Big Mud Creek since the dredging of the waterbody during station construccion.

Chlorophyll, phytoplankton, and zooplanktor sampling ind:cated that this sampling station was not exceptionally productive even though there was a grea abundance of planktivorous fishes.

Gilmore'urmises that since more of Big Mud, Creek has been dredged to depths below 10 m (33 ft) only a single shallow sea-grass bed is presently available for schooling oianktivorous fishes to avoid predators during diurnal periods.

During nocturnal periods these fishes graze on zooplankters found in the deeper open waters of the creek.

Poolt commented on the diversity of crustaceans collected from the Indian River at Big Mud Creek.

A total of 24 species of decapod and 1 species of stomatopod crustaceans were collected during a 1972-74 survey.

The FES-CP describes the various communities inhabiting the Atlantic Ocean immediately offshore of the St.

Lucie Plant.

This description is based on data available prior to Sx.. Lucie 1 startup in 1976.

As part of the operating license for St.

Lucie 1 the applicant has conducted a biological monitoring

program, begun in December 1975, which included sampling offshore in the vicinity of the Plant.

The results of this monitoring program are summarized yearly and presented in the annual non-radiological environmental monitoring

reports, the most recent is for calendar year 1980.

In 1960 offshore sampling was conducted for aquatic macrophytes, zooplankton, phytoplankton, macroinver tebrates, fish, and shellfish.

St.

Lucie 2 FES 4-22

The occurrence cf benthic macrophytes in the vjcinity of the Plant is limited principally by the lack of suitable substrate for macrophyte attachment and the high-energy of the nearshore environment.

Benthic macrophytes are generally fragments or small specimens attached to shell and rock.

Algal diversity and abundance at six sampling stations increases in the summer and autumn.

This increase is primarily caused by drift algae although the number of attached species also increases.

Drift algae tends to accumulate at the discharge and control stations both with sand bottoms and inshore.

These two stations had the highest species diversity.

Attached algae were dominant at the furth'....

offshore stations where the shell and shell fragment bottom offered more surface area for algal attachment.

Ho effect,of St.

Lucie 1 operation to the benthic macrophyte community was observed.

Seasonal variation of phytoplankton density and chlorophyll a offshore of the Plant over the past five years was generally bimodal with peaks in the fall and early spring.

Generally densities in the intake and discharge canals and at the offshore discharge and control stations were generally higher than at the remaining four offshore stations.

The discharge and control stations are the most inshore of the six offshore stations'he only probable offshore impact of-- Plant operation is pnytoplankton enrichment at the discharge station;

however, high densities of organisms and chlorophyll a at the control station may indicate that a nearshore influence rather than plant operation may be responsible for the higher phytoplankton standing crop.

4.3.8.2.3

~Zoo lankt.on Peak zooplankton densities occurred generally during the summer months, with variable winter and spring production periods.

Densities between stations were highly variable.

A comparison of baseline and St.

Lucie 1 operational studies showed no discernible trends.

Mean zooplankton densities and biomass were generally higher at the discharge sampling station than-at other offshore stations.

This higher number of organisms is probably related to nearshore influences rather than Plant operation.

Ho effect of St.

Lucie 1 operation, other than possible zooplankton enrichment due to a higher phytoplankton standing crop was observed.

4.3.8.2.4 Benthic Macr oinvertebr'ates Benthic data have been collected from five to six permanent offshore stations during the preceeding 5 years.

Sediment composition at the discharge station has remained essentially unchanged since prior to St.

Lucie 1'tartup.

Benthic grab data typically show extensive seasonal variation.

Within the last two years both the discharg'e and the southern control station have experienced increases in molluscs and echinoderms.

Recently increases occurred in the number of taxa and number of individuals collected between 1979 and 1980.

These increases tended to counteract the decreases noted between 1978 and 1979.

All observed fluctuations are attributed to long-term variability of the community and are probably not attributable to St.

Lucie 1 operation.

St.

Lucie 2 FES 4-23

4.3.8.2.5 Fish and Shellfish In 1980 sampling of fish and shellfish was conducted using gill nets, trawling and beach seines.

Five years of gillnetting and trawling in the Atlantic

~

immediately offshore of the station established that greater numbers

(~65% of the total catch) of fish captured were from the discharge and control stations.

These two stations were the most inshore of the six stations sampled.

This difference was attributed to the highly motile schooling nature of several of the species and the inshore preference of forage species.

The bottom relief, warmer water and turbulence associated with the St.

Lucie 1 discharge may also attract forage fish and their predators.

Beach seining established that the largest percentage of the total catch was found north of the Plant.

Ichthyoplankton was generally abundant during the spring and summer of each year.

The most common larval fishes were herrings and anchovies.

Differences in ichthyoplankton densities between the various offshore stations was attributed to natural year-to-year and seasonal variations rather than Plant operation.

4.3.9 Threatened and Endan ered S ecies Five species of marine turtles, Federally listed as threatened or endangered are known to be at the site (see Section 5.7).

All five species have been taken from the intake canal (see Section 5.6. 1).

Three species have been taken from the intake.

Three species are known to nest on the beaches of Hutchinson Island.

Based on information presented by NHFS, Hutchinson Island may be one of the largest marine turtle rookeries in the U.S.23 Censusing marine turtle nesting os> the beaches of Hutchinson Island was conducted in 1971 ~, 1973

1975, 1977, and 1979 26 F 2>

t The total estimated number of loggerhead nests on Hutchinson Island ranged from 2872 in 1977 to 4813 in 1975.

Since 1973 there has been an overall increase in the ratio of unsuccessful to successful loggerhead nesting crawls in which eggs are deposited."-'ompared to loggerhead turtles, green turtle nesting is uncommon on Hutchsnson Island.

The number of nests observed in the beach nesting survey ranged from

.five in 1977 to 43 in 1975.27 Assuming a two to three year breeding interval of 8-15 female green turtles nesting on Hutchinson Island, this represents a

major portion of the Florida population of nesting adults.

Leatherback tur ties nest only incidently in Florida.

The Hutchinson Island surveys have 'identified no more than six nests per year.

The ER-DL confirms that the Brown pelican (Pelecanus occidentalis) is a

occasionally seen during the fall, winter and sprung on Hutch>neon Is)and.

Neither species was seen onsite during the staff's site visit February 17 and 18, 1981.

Brown pelicans were seen about 10 miles south of the site on Hutchinson Island.

The ER-OL stage also lists the Pergrine falcon (Falco

~er. rinusi as an occasions'I visitor during fall, winter and spring.uu St.

Lucie 2 FES 4"24

All five species hav~ been observed on Hutchinson Isl mangroves.

Florida also has a Preservation of Native Flora statu

'listed in this act, grow on the St.

Lucie Plant site.

concerned with removal of terrestrial plants.

te.

A number of species However, the Act is only 4.3s10 Historical and Archsalo ical Sites The Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission lists both the Brown pelican and Bald eagle as threatened and list the Peregrine falcon as endangered.

In

addition, they list the Mood stork (II cteria americana) as endangered and the follo44fng species as "species of specsa concern I

Little blue heron (Florida caerulea)

Snowy egret (i retta thula)

Reddish egret Dichromarassa rofescens)r and and they all nest in Ttsere has been no cnange in the description of the historic and archeological sites disc ssed in Section 2. 3 of the FES-CP.

hh 4.4 References l.

Op. Cit., ER-OL, Section 3.4.2.3.

la.

2.

Uhrig, R. E., 1981, letter to O.

G. Eisenhut, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, dated December 9, 1981.

Uhrig, Robert E. 198'etter to Oarrell G. Eisenhut, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, O. Ceo from Robert E. Uhrig, Florida Power and Light Company, Miami, FL, dated April 27, 1981.

3.

Uhrig, Robert E.

1981.

Letter to Darrell G. Eisenhut, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.Ce p from Robert E. Uhrig, Florida Power and Light Company, Miami, FL, August ll, 1981.

=

4.

Op. Cits e ER-OL, page 3.4-1.

5.

Ibid., page 3.6"l.

6.

Ibid., page 3.6-4.

7.

Ibid., Tables 3.6"2 and 5.6-1.

8.

Personal Covuunication, Hartin County Planning Department,

Stuart, Florida, February and Hay, 1981.

Note to files.*

9.

Personal Communication, St.

Lucie County Planning Department Board, Fort Piercc, Florida, february, 1981.

Note to files.*

10.

Personal Communication, Treasure Coast Planning Council, Stuart, Florida, Hay 1981.

Note to files.*

• val ao e or snspe".tio.>

and copying for a fee from the NRC Public Document

Room, 1717 H Street, Washington, OC 20555.

St.

Lucie 2 FES 4"25

11.

12.

13.

14, 15.

16.

Ibid., February 1981.

Op. Cit., ER"OL, Response to NRC guestjon 310,7.

Ibid., Response to HRC question 310.8.

Ibid., Response to NRC guestion 310.10.

State of Florida, 1979 Florida Tourist Study, Division of Tourism, Tallahassee,

Florida, 1980.

Op. Cit., ER-OL, Table 2.4.1 thru 2.4.4.

17.

- H. J.

Changery, "National Thunderstorm Frequencies for the Contiguous United States, " U.S.

Nu lear Re(<<latory Co(rmission, NUREG/CR-2252, November 1981.

18.

Gilmore, R. Grant, Jr.,

1981.

Letter to Hichael T. Hasnik, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, O.C., from R. Grant Gilmore, Harbor Branch Foundation, Inca e Fort Pierce, FL, dated February 26, l981.

19.

20.

21.

23.

24.

25.

26.

Jones, R. S.,

R.

G. Gilmore, Jr.,

G.

R. Kulczycki, W.

C. Magley, and B. Graunke, 1975.

Studies of the Fishes of the Indian River Coastal Zone.

Harbor Branch Foundation, Incra Fort Pierce, FL.

Poolt, Liberta S.

1981.

Letter to Michael T. Hasnik, U.S. Huclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, O.Ci a from Liberta S. Poo1t, Smithsonian Institution, Fort Pierce Bureau, Fort Pierce, FL, dated February 26, 1981.

Gilmore, R. Grant, Jre a 1977.

Fishes of the Indian River Lagoon and Adjacent Waters, Florida.

Bull. Florida State Mus., Bio.

Sci. 22(3):101-148.

Florida Power and Light Company.

1981.

Annual Non-Radiological Environ-mental Monitoring Report 1980.

Vol. 1-2, prepared by Applied Biology, Inc., Atlanta, GA.

National Marine Fisheries

Service, 1976, "Listing and protecting green sea turtle (Cheleeia

~e dae),

)eggerhead eea turtle (Caretta caretta),

Pacific Endangered Sp cies Act of 1973," FEIS, NMFS, Dept. of Commerce, Washington, O.C.,

114 pp.

Gallagher, Robert He e et ale e 1972, "Har ine turtle nesting on Hutchinson Island, Florida,

.n 1971," Fla.

Dept. of Hat. Res.,

Sp. Sci.

Rpt.

Ho. 37.

Worth, Dewey F. and Jonathan B. Smith, 1976, "Harine turtle nesting on Hutchinson Island, Florida, in 1973, Fla.

Dept. of Hat.

Re., Mar. Sci.

Labe a Fla. Har.

Res.

Pub.

No.

18.

Florida Power and Light Company, 1978, "Ecological Monitoring at the Florida Power and Light Company.,

St.

Lucie Plant - Annual Report 1977,.

Vol. 1, prepard by Applied Biology, Inc., Atlanta, GA.

-St. -Lucie 2 FES 4-26

27.

Florida Pow r and Light, Company.

1980.

"Arnual Non-Radiological Environ-mental Honitoring Repor t, 1979, Vol. 1-3," prepared by Applied Biology, Inc., Atlanta, GA.

28., Op. Cit., ER-OL.

29.

Ibid., ER-OL, Table 2.2-7.

30.

31.

Ibid., ER-OL, T"bl 2.2-6.

Uhrig, R. E., 1982, letter to D.

G. Eisenhut, U.S. Huclear Regulatory Commission, Wash:ngton, OC, dated January 28, 1982.

St.

Lucia 2 FES 4-27

5 EHVIROHHEHTAL COHSEQUEHCFS AHD HITIGATIHG ACTIOHS R. 1

Resume, The following sections discuss and evaluate the environmental consequences and mitigating actions for those areas where additionalIinformation or changes have occurred since the FES-CP review.

Mhere there is no new information or change, no discussion is p'rovided.

Operational monitoring programs are to be conducted in accordance with the Environmental Protection Plan (FPP) to be issued as a par t of the Operating License by the HRC.

The EPP will require the applicant, as licensee, to (1) notify the HRC if changes in station design or dperation occur or if tests or experiments affecting the environment are perforded, providing that such

changes, tests, or experiments involve an unreviewed environmental question;-

'(2) maintain specific environmentally related records; (3) report violations of, and reports arising from, the HPDES permit or State certification pursuant to Section 401 of the Clean Mater Act; and (4) report unusual or important

'.environmental events.

t

• I R

I Section

5. 1 of the FES-CP explains that these impacts

,installation and operation of St.

Lucie l.

There are impacts associated with the operation of St. Lucie 5.3 Mater Use and H drolo ical Im acts t

occurred with the no significant land-use 5.3.1 Surface Mater Use

't t

The average estimated water use by St.

Lucie 2 is 32.74 x 103 1/s (1158 cfs) and the maximum estimated water use is 33.33 x 103 1/s (1177 cfs).

Almost all of this water will be withdrawn from the Atlantic Ocean and will be used for the circulating water system and the intake cooling water system after which it will'be returned to the Atlantic Ocean through the discharge canal.

An average of 10.1 1/s (161 gpm) of fresh water will be supplied by the Fort Pierce Municipal Mater Supply System and will be used for the water treatment system,-

potable and sanitary water system, and other miscellaneous uses.

Host of this water will be ultimately discharged to the Atlantic Ocean after treatment.

In that the St.

Lucie 2 draws its major water requirement from the. Atlantic Ocean and discharges waste heat and treated effluents into the same water body, there are no potable water supplies that can be affected by the operation of St: Lucie 2.

The amount of water supplied by the For t Pierce Municipal Mater Supply System is.too small to have any significant impact on water availability in the site area throughout the operatinq life of the plant.

Use of ocean water at St.

Lucie 2:will not preempt, other water uses'y man.

St.

Lucie 2 FES 5-1 *,

R t

'C.i su

5.3.2 Ground Water Use There will be no ground water used by St.

Lucie 2 during operation or any discharge of effluents into the ground water environment.

5.3.3 Flood lain As ects of the Site Development of the St.

Lucie site was essentially completed before St.

Lucie 1 became operational in 1976.

Executive Order 11988, Floodplain Hanagement, was signed in Hay 1977.

It is, therefore, our conclusion that consideration of a'.ternative locations for those structures located on the preconstruction 100 year floodplain is neither required nor practicable.

Kutchinson Island, wh re the St.

Lucie plant is sited, is a coastal barrier island fronting the Atlantic Ocean between'tuart and Fort Pierce, Florida. It is separated from the Florida mainland by a tidal lagoon, the Indian River.

The 37 km (23 mi) long island is bounded to the north by Fort Pierce Inlet and to the south by St.

Lucie Inlet.

On the Atlantic side of the island the beach front is backed by a bar rier dune which extends between the two inlets.

The preconstruction elevation of the site area varied between elevatio,i 0.6 and 1.6 m (2 and 5 ft. ) HSL.

The 100-year preconstruction flood level established by the Fede'ral Insurance Administration (FIA) in a preliminary study is 2. 1 m (7 ft) HSL for both the Indian River and the Atlantic Ocean.

The seismic Category I landfill upon which the plant island is located is at least 4.9 m (16 ft) above mean sea level.

Plant grade for St.

Lucie 2 is established at about 5.2 m (17 ft) HSL which is above the level of the Probable Haximum Hurricane Surge.(a more extreme event than the 100-year flood).

The location of the plant relative to the 100-year floodplain is shown in Figure 5. 1.

The applicant estimated the impact on the 100-year flood level in the Indian River due to St.

Lucie 2 construction hy assuming that the rise in water level in the Indian River during the flood would be equal to the volume of the flood displaced by the construction landfill.

This rise was determined to be 3.7 cm (1.5 in).

The hydrological impact is, therefore, considered to be negligible.

As stated in Section 5.7 of the FES-CP, nonradioactive atmospheric pollutants (such as those indicated in Table 3. 6 of the FES-CP) produced by operation of the diesel generators for emergency power should not have a significant impact on air quality in the vicinity of the plant.

5.5 Terrestrial Ecolo Im acts Throughout the constructio>> of St.

Lucie 2 the architect engineer contractor has had an environmental engineer onsite.

This individual was on the resident construction engineer's staff and implemented the environmental protection program.

Kis daily log was inspected during the staff's site visit.

Once construction is completed and the disturbed areas not needed for operation (e.g.,

laydown, the area disturbed for the new discharge pipeline, etc. ) are landscaped there should be no significant impacts to the terrestrial environment.

St.

Lucie 2 FES 5-2

Figure 5.3 SAOSCNTT LAIC

/

CLOOO ~IIC SOVNDARY 47 SSEASS WAVER LfVEL OOEASC OOCSSOARY AT SCEASC Ef4 LEVEL SCASSOROVE ELOOO SLASSC ELEV E ET S SCARC IIOAD AIA AELASCVSO OOEASC Ssa SAID SAC CC

~M%VS AIVCA li CCCV SS SL SOCSYR fLOOO OOUCCDARY ELEVATSOSC 1 CT.

~fl&SCOUL SCE RSCASS SAY

~IS STASUTC SASS Floodplain St.

Lucre 2 FES 5-3

5.5.1 Transmission Lines The staff has reviewed sources of environmental impact which could be associated with the operation of transmission lines.

The staff has found no convincing or compelling argument to date to prohibit

,, the operation of 500 kV lines.

Therefore, St. Lucie's 240 kV lines should pose no problems.

The applicant does not use herbicides i i maintaining its t transmission corridor rights-of-way.

II 5.5.2 Terrestrial Honitorin No specific monitoring program associated wit,h the terrestrial biota is deemed necessary.

Monitoring of turtle nesting impacts are treated under the aquatic section.

er Reporting of unusual or important environmental ei=n's will be specified in the Environmental Protection Plan.

5.6 A uatic Ecolo Im acts Operation of St.

Lucie 2 will result in an approximate doublina of intake flow to 66 m /sec (2,320 ft /sec).

Organisms unable to resist this flow will be entrained into the offshore intake structures and pass through the intake pipes in to the intake canal.

Because of the high flow rates in the immediate vicinity of the velocity caps and through the intake pipes escape by aquatic organisms from the intake canal is impossible except during station shutdown.

Ultimately these organisms will be (1) imping d on either the block net at the State Road AIA bridge or the plant intake traveling screens, (2) entrained through the plant service or circulating water

systems, (3) die, (4) be removed, or (5) escape back through the intake pipe if both units stop pumping.

ll Semi-annual testing of the emergency water intake structure will result in the

'impingement and entrainment of some Indian River - Big Hud Creek organisms.

The effect of this loss on the fish and shellfish communities of Indian River and Big Hud Creek was evaluated and found acceptable in the FES-CP.

The emergency water intake structure has been significantly redesigned (see Section 4.2.3).

The'ew design results in an approximately 8-fold reduction in the water usage from the creek to the canal during reliability testing therefore no detectable impact to organisms inhabitating Big Hud Creek is anticipated.,

Construction of the third intake pipeline will result in significant shoreline activity eastward of the plant.

The applicant has notified the NRC that construction will begin in February 1982 and end by December 1982.

Construction will proceed on a three shift-per day basis.

Such activity will discourage nesting of sea turtles.

The staff has performed an assessment of construction impacts on sea turtle nesting and has. concluded that nesting may be temporarily disrupted in the vicinity of the shoreline activity but no long-term detrimental impact to the population is expected.

Based on previous studies conducted by the applicant, a 35K to 5N drop in loggerhead turtle nesting along a 0.5-mile stretch of beach is predicted for the 1982 nesting season.

No decrease in nesting activity for the green turtle or leatherback turtle is expected since neither regularly nest along this stretch of St.

Lucie 2 FES 5-4

shoreline.

The applicant will be required to check the shoreline in the vicinity o. construction daily during the nesting season and relocate any nests that are discovered.

,II 5.6.1

~Entre ment The potential impact on populations of marine organisms due to entrapment in the Plant canal system was evaluated in the FES-CP.

It was concluded that with an adequate velocity at the intake structure, the numbers of organisms entrained through the intake pipes were expected to be small and the effect of entrapment minor.

The FES-CP recommended a monitoring program to determine the actual numbers of organisms entrapped.

Monthly gill net collections were taken in the intake canal since St.

Lucie 1 began operation in 1976.

The 61 m x 3 m (200 ft x 10 f:) gill nets (76 mm (3 in.) stretch mesh) were as fished two consecutive 24-hour periods each month.

After each 24-hour period, organisms were removed from the nets and identified.

A wide variety of species are taken including lobsters,

crabs, sharks,

rays, drums, jacks, and grunts.

The most commonly collected organisms over the past 5 years were grunt, drum, snapper, jack, porgy, mullet, and searobin.

When the number of fish and shellfish taken in the intake canal is compared to the num-ber taken from offshore stations the number entrapped in the intake canal i low.

Very few sport and commercial migratory species of fish have been taken in the canal gill netting effort over the past 5 years.

Detailed results of these gill net collections are presented in the recent annual operating reports.

'i' three intake structures and pipelines the volume of water flowing through the two units is the same as was reviewed during the CP; however, the flow velocities of the two original ocean intake structures will be reduced.

Flow velocities at the intake structure of the third pipeline will be about the same as predicted for the existing two intake pipeline configurations.

The operation of a third intake pipeline is therefore not expected to significantly change the predicted rate of entrapment of fish and shellfish in the intake canal.

Since operation of St.

Lucie 1 commenced in March 1976 sea turtles have been observed in the intake canal.

A total of five different species, Chelonia

~m das, the green turtle, Caretta caretta, the loggerhead turtle, Dermoche~l s

inst>tuted a turtle recovery program in which sea turtles are denied access to the intake canal downstream of State Road AIA bridge through the use'of a block

net, are captured using a gill or tangle net and are identified, measured, condition recorded,

tagged, and, released alive tv the. Atlantic Ocean south of the intake structure.

Between 1976 and March of 19812 a total of 542 loggerheads, almost all juveniles, 48 green turtles, all 'uveniles, 6 leatherbacks, all adults, one Kemp's Atlantic ridley, and 1 hawksbill have been collected in the intake canal.

The mortality rates for the individuals recovered have been 9.2X for loggerheads, and 14.6~ for green turtles.

No mortality was observed in the captured leatherbacks, hawksbill, or ridley.

The staff has performed a review of the potential impact of two-unit operation with the three ocean intake structures on the different species of sea turtles St.

Lucie 2 FES 5"5 PP

and has concluded that operation of St.

Lucie 2 will not impact the habitat or continued existence of any species.

The details of this review are included in the revised endangered species biological assessment report (refer to Section

5. 7).

5.6.2

~Im in ement The intake canal block net located at State Road A1A bridge is designed to exclude marine turtles from the remainder of the canal and plant intake structure.

The block net is constructed of 1.3 cm (.5 in) x 15 cm (6 in) polyline square mesh and will only exclude larger organisms.

Organisms small enough to pass through the block net will u'ltimate:y be swept down the canal to the plant intake structure.

Oue to the flo4s invo",ved and the irregularity of the bottom some larger organisms occasionalIly avoid the block net and move downstream towards the plant.

Mortality associated 'with this net is probably almost non-existent due to the large mesh size and the low canal flow rates of 27 cm/sec'(.9 ft/sec) to 33.5 cm/sec (l. 1 ft/sec).

Because of the mesh size only large organisms would be expected to be impinged,

however, these organisms are generally strong swimmers and would be able to escape a current of this magnitude.

Impingement of organisms on the traveling intake screens was discussed in the FES-CP.

It was concluded that impingement losses were expected to'be of minor significance.

Since issuance of the FES-CP,, St.

Lucie 1 commenced operation.

As part of the St.

Lucie 1 operating license the utility was required to monitor impingement.

Between 1976 and 1978 24-hour impingement samples were taken at the St.

Lucie 1 intake screen during 226 days.

The mean numbers of finfish and shellfish collected per 24-hour period were 222 and 82 respectively.

The mean weights per 24-hour period were 1.7 kg (3.7 lbs) and

.5 kg (1.1 lbs).

Principal species impinged at the St.

Lucie 1 intake were anchovy, grunt, jack, croaker,

mojarra, shrimp, and blue crab.

The majority of organisms were small with over 80K of the impinged fish less than or 'equal to 8 cm (3 in) in length, and almost 100K of the impinged shrimp '4 cm (1.6 in) or less in length.

Assuming continuous St. Lucie 2 operation, the applicant has estimated that impingement rates (number per year) varied during the years of study from approximately 34,000 (1978) to 131 000 (1976) finfish and from 26,000 (1976) to 37,000 (1978) for shellfish.~

On January 24, 1979 the HRC issued an amendment to the St.

Lucie 1 Operating License4 that deleted the requirement for impingement monitoring.

The environ-mental impact appraisal which accompanied the amendment concluded that impinge-

. ment losses due to the operation of St.

Lucie 1 represent a very insignificant portion of the numbers of fishes in the site vicinity and a very small portion of the numbers of shrimp commercially caught off Florida's east coast.

Operation of the St.

Lucie 2 is expected to increase the station's impingement rate.

The magnitude of this increase is unknown.

The velocity at the opening to the existing two ocean intake structures during three intake operation is expected to be about 0.4 ft/sec and at the third intake 1 ft/sec.

The third intake will carry approximately 2/3 of the total flow into the intake canal.

Ouring the CP-review the same volume of water tnrough two ocean intake structures was found acceptable.

With three intake structures and pipelines e

St. Lucie 2 FES 5-6 m

the volume of water flowing through the two units is the same:

however, the flow velocity through the two original ocean intake structures will be reduced.

Since the volume with two-unit operation is expected to double, impingement is expected to increa e but probably will be less than twice the annual impingement estimate calculated from the 3 years of St. 'cie 1 data.

A doubling of the total weight of the mean annual impingement estimate for St.

Lucie 1 is less than 0.04K and 0.005K of the commercial fish and shellfish landed in either St.

Lucie or Hartin Counties.

I It is concluded that operation of St.

Lucie 2 with three intake pipelines will increase the impingement rate of fish and shellfish.

The rate of impingement is expected to be less than double the rate observed with one unit operation.

Mhen compared to the local commercial fishery landings even a five fold increase would be considered insignificant.

5.6.3 Entrainment The impact of entrainment on the phytoplankton, zooplankton, and ichthyoplankton into the plant circulating water system was evaluated in the FES-CP. it was concluded that there would be no measurable effect on the ecosystem of the adjacert oceanic waters.

Since issuance of the FES-CP the applicant has conducted monitoring programs to assess the losses to the phytoplankton, zooplankton, and ichthyoplankton communities due to the operation of St.

Lucie 1.

The results of this monitorirg program are summarized in Section

4. 3.8 and indicate ;lightly higher levels of zooplankton and phytoplankton in the vicinity of the discharge and that these elevated levels may be due to station operation, Based on the result of the monitoring programs for St.

Lucie 1 and the staff's experience in evaluating operating data at other coastal facilities it is concluded tha operation of St.

Lucie 2 will have no detrimental impact on the phytoplankton and zooplankton communities.'wo unit operation may increase further the local inshore populations of these two communities due to increases in the canal standing crop of certain taxa.

The applicant since 1976 has collected ichthyoplankton samples from 6 offshore stations and one station in both the intake and discharge canal as part of the monitoring requirements for St.

Lucie l.

Using the results of five years of sampling and a method of analysis presented in Goodyears the percent entrainment of eggs and larvae drifting past the stations has been estimated.

Assuming two unit operation and lOOX mortality due to plant passage it is estimated that between

.3X and.6X (x =.4X) of the eggs and larvae moving past the station would be entrained.

Under the most conservative conditions a

maximum of less than 4X of the eggs and larvae passing the site could, be entrained.

Based on above estimated percent loss no significant impact by entrainment to the local fisheries is expected due to operation of St.

Lucie 2.

The third intake draws water from virtually the same location and depth as the existing two intakes and the volume of water passing through the plant is irrespective of the number of intake pipelines.

Therefore, the operation of a third intake pipeline is not expected to alter the entrainment losses predicted.

for two intake pipeline operation.

St.

Lucie 2 FES 5-7

A 5.6.4 Environmental Effects of Oischar e of Coolin Water As a result of redesign of the cooling water discharge system provided to accommodate operation of St.

Lucie 2, the thermal plume will be different from that described in the FES-CP.

FPEL has employed both physical and mathematical models in the analysis of dispersion of the heated discharge.

FPEL has also made use of St.

Lucie 1 plume data in the updated modelling e'ffort.

The staff has evaluated the applicants approach and information and finds it generally reasonable.

The new analyses address two-unit operation as well as operation of the new discharge system alone.

Since the two units share the 671 m (2200 ft) long discharge

canal, the effluents from the two units are mixed and the flow through the "Unit 2 diffuser" need not be that originating from St.

Lucie 2.

The actual distribution of flow between the two discharge systems will be dependent on a number of hydraulic factorse with the fraction of.the station flow passing through either structure being less than or greater than half the total flow.

Over the range of flows studied, the ocean surface temperature rise becomes nigher with lower flow rate through the diffuser for a given station temperature rise~.

Thus, the maximum ocean temperature due to station discharge would occur with only one unit in service but both discharge pipelines in use.

The applicant did 'not specifically model this situation.

However, the State certification prohibits extended operation in this mode.

Except under he hypothetical stagnant ocean conaitions, the modelling of the discharges showed no interaction of the plumes from the two discharges.

Some interference at distances beyond modeiling limits is still conceivable but not significant due to the low temperatures involved.

For most ocean current and plant operating conditions, the plume area with both units in operation and both discharges in use was equal to the sum of the individual St.

Lucie 1 and 2

plume areas.

Thus, much of the interference of the plumes noted at the time of the FES-CP review was eliminated by the change in the design of the new discharge.

For stagnant ocean conditions which would exist only briefly during intertidal periods in the absence of wind driven currrents, the combined plume.

within the l. 1'C (2'F) isotherm could be as much as 25K larger than the sum of the individual plumes under the conservative assumptions of the modelling studies.

Actual maximum plume area is predicted by the applicant's models to occur with southward cur rent conditions and with reduced flew through the diffusers.

For.

example, with discharge flow reduc d to 23. 7 m~/s (836 cfs),

and with a Plant temperature rise of 17.8 C (32'F), the l. 1'C (2'F) isotherm encloses an area of 390 x 10~

m~ (963 acres).

Table 5.1 presents typical predicted St.

Lucie 2 plume characteristics for cooling system operation with the three current conditions.

The model results indicate that the northward current, which prevails, produces the smallest hea'ted plume.

The model

shows, as expected, that the highest surface temperature occurs under stagnant conditior s but surprisingly that the greatest area covered with warmed water would exist under the southward wind conditions.

Plume characteristics for other conditions of cooling system operation are provided in the ER-OL.

St.

Lucie 2 FES 5-8

Table 5.1 Typical Plume Characteristics for St.

Lucie 2 as Predicted by FP8L ltode) Studies Ocean Current Hax Surface Temp Rise oC (of)

Surface Area Within 2 F

Isotherm 10s me (Acres)

Plume Volume Within Isotherm 103 m3 10) ma (A-ft)

(Aqft)

Travel Time Through Plume to Isotherm 1 1 C (2 F) 2.8 C (5 F)

Sec Sec Northward Southward Stagnant 1.2 (2.1) 113 (28) 105 (85) 0.62 (0.5) 1.3 (2.3) 708 (175) 210 (170) 0,7 (0.6)

I 1.9 (3.5) 696 (172) 387 (314) 1.7 (1.4) 28 56 42 8

9 14 Source:

Section 5.1 of the fR-OL from Test t(o.5.

Flow = 1145 cfs and condenser temperature rise = 28oF.

St. Lucie 2 FES 5-9

I

, If

The regulations of the State of Florida Department of Environmental Regulation governing discharge of heated water as applicable to St.

Lucie 2 prescribe that heated water may be discharged with a temperature at the point of discharge up to 9.4 C (17 F) above ambient as long as the surface water temperature is not raised above

36. 1'C (97'F).

The rules further provide that the Department

may, upon application; establish a zone of mixing within the receiving waterbody beyond which the limits shall apply.-

FPEL has petitioned for a variance from the State specifying a mixing zone since the temperature rise exceeds 9.4 C

,'17 F).

The state has reviewed the FP8L petition and has tentatively defined the mixing zone limitation as follows:

"The heated water discharged from the multiport diffuser shall not exceed 9.4'C (17'F) above ambient outside of a thermal mixing zone of 13,000 ma (10.7 acre-ft).

The mixing zone shall be bounded by an area 422m (1385 ft) long extending seaward from the most landward discharge port, 6.4m (21.0 ft) to either side of the discharge pipe axis, and 2.4m (8. 0 ft) in height above the bottom of the discharge ports."

The proposed State requirements are included in Appendix B.

Based on St.

Lucie 2 modelling it would appear that a variance will not be needed for the 36. 1'C (97'F) limitation on surface temperature.

Maximum ambient surface temperature at the site is less than 32.2 C (90 F) and urface temperature rise of the discharge water from the new diffuser was generally less than 2.8 C (5 F) in the modelling results.

The State requirements for the variance will be documented in a modification to the site certification issued under the Florida Electrical Power Plant siting act and will be included in the State 401 Certification of the NPDES Permit.

The thermal plume from the St.

Lucie 2 discharge pipeline will rise rapidly' rom the discharge ports resulting in little, plume contact with, or. scouring of, the bottom.

The impact of the plume on benthos is expected to be insignificant even in the immediate vicinity of.he discharge pipeline.

Planktonic sPecies in the vicinity of the diffuser will be entrained in the plume.

" The high regeneration rates of phytoplankton and zooplankton will offset any significant losses due to plume entrainment.

Furthermore, the results of operational monitoring programs for St.

Lucie 1 indicate there has been, in the past, enrichment of phytoplankton and zooplankton in the vicinity of the St.

Lucie 1 discharge.

Ichthyoplankton entrained in the discharge plume will sustain some mortality.

Observed thermal tolerances of ichthyoplankton species known to occur off Hutchinson Island are quite variable.

Little is known on the effect of short-term thermal excursions typically encountered by eggs and larvae during plume entrainment.

Some ichthyoplankton mortality will occur as a result of plume entrainment.

This loss is expected to be significantly less than that due to Plant entrainment and probably would not be significant in relation to mortality from other causes.

Since under the most conservative conditions less than 4X of the eggs and larvae passing the site will be entrained (see Section 5.6.3) and since only a fraction of these will suffer plume entrainment related mortality, no detectable impact is predicted.

Adult fish are not expected to be adversely affected by the thermal plume.

Adult fish actively avoid areas where water temperatures reach lethal levels.

The peak period nf turtle nesting appears to be related to ocean temperature.

The results of, beach nesting censuses since commencement of St.

Lucie 1 opera-tio.i h<<e not provided evidence that higher temperatures due to the presence St.

Lucie 2 FES 5"10

offshore of the discharge plume have caused premature nesting in the vicinity of the site.

Due to the small size of the plume and the rapidity with which turtles could move through it, premature nesting of marine turtles due to simultaneous two unit operation is not predicted.

Furthermore, the beach nesting censuses also indicate that marine turtles do not avoid nesting on beaches bordering the plume.

In 1977 FP&L contracted a study'o determine the influence of water temperature on hatchling loggerhead turtles.

The LTso for loggerhead hatchlings was found to be 37.4'C (99'F) which is considerably higher than the maximum surface temperatures expected due to plant operation.

Temperatures of 33.3'C (91 F) produced a reduction in swimming speed and an impairment of orientation to 'brightness cues.

Temperatures of 304C were high enough to produce significantly reduced swirling speeds.

Temperatures below 30 C (86 F) seem to have a negligible effect on hatchling loggerhead turtles.

The response of green turtle hatchlings to elevated temperatures is thought to be similar to that of the loggerhead.

Since the maximum surface plume discharge temperature during the period of maximum hatchling emergence of July through September will only infrequently exeed 32'C (90'F) few hatchlings will be exposed to surface temperatures greater than 30~C (86'F).

t<ortality due to high water temperatures is not expected to occur.

Hortality to hatchlings due to disorientation and increased predation will be minor since (1) the normal plume direction is northerly which results in the smallest plume dimensions, (2) hatchlings that enter the plume and exhibit reduced swimming speeds will be entrained in the plume and be rapidly moved into cooler water and (3) access to the hottest portion of the plume, which is at the diffuser ports, will be denied due to the surface orientation of the hatchlings.

The potential for gas bubble disease killing a significant number of fish in the area of the discharge pipeline is minimal.

The use of the multiport jet diffuser promotes rapid mixing of the discharge and the high velocity of the existing water discourages fish from remaining in the plume for any significant period of time.

I

'he staff's assessment of the potential for cold shock to marine organisms, presented in the FES"CP remains valid and predicts no significant mortality.

5.6.5 Effects of Chemical Discharoes Usage of chemicals at this plant is updated in Section 4.2.7 and HPDES permit limitations are presented in Appendix B.

The FES-CP review expressed concern over the potential impact of residual chlorine.

Currently, FP&L is constrained by the NPDES Permit to a maximum total res>dual oxidant (TRO) concentration of

0. 1 mg/1 at the end of the discharge

canal, during intermittent condenser chlorination.

The basis for this constraint is provided in Item II.A.2.a, page B-29 of Appendix B. It is recognized that FP&L has applied to EPA for authorization to chlorinate the auxiliary cooling water systems continuously.

This has been discussed in Section 4. 2.7.

Experience with operation of St.

Lucie 1 under this constraint has been that actual TRO concentration is generally less than 0.05 mg/1 at the end of the discharge canal.hen St.

Lucie 2 begins operation, concentration will"be further reduced by dilution and chemical reaction.

Impact to organisms will be limited to partial loss o'St.

Lucie 2 FES 5-11

tho'se entrained and passed through the cooling system during chlorination.

This effect wi 11 be small.

The use of titanium condenser tubes in lieu of the copper alloy tubes evaluated at the FES-CP stage of licensing will avoid to a'reat extent the potential stress of the copper to organisms passed through'he condensers.

The organic tin compound which lines the new diffuser risers (See Section 4. 2.4) to prevent the growth of marine organisms within its ports is toxic by design.

FPhL has provided data whi=h show the compound to have toxic effects at con-centrations as low as 0.2 ppb for prolonged expo'sure.

It will leach from the surface ~t a lo~

> ate but the continual discharge of cooling water through the

=- diffuser will result in concentrations in the discharge much lower than those toxic levels.

,Extended periods without flow through the diffuser, if occurring during stagnant'" ocean current conditions, could allow accumulation of the sub-stance to toxic concentrations near the diffuser(with the potential of some damage to aquatic organisms.

However, the applicant will use the diffus~r rather than the Y port discharge during extended single unit outages except while the Unit 2 discharge line is being cleaned.

One unit operation would then require the use of the Y port discharge for that limited time peri". d.

Ouri~~ these periods, as well as extended periods with no flow through the Plant small, local impacts could occur.

It should be mentioned that the appli-cant's operating philosophy of the St.

Lucie Plants would make two unit outage at the same time unlikely.

Ouring the period of operation of St.

Lucie 1, sampling of aquatic biota has not revealed any damaged biota indicative of chemical stresses.

The discharges of liquid wastes are regulated through the NPOES Permit which is reproduced in Appendix B.

5.6.6 A uatic Honitorin ll The applicant's precperational monitoring program to measure

physical, chemical, and ecological parameters of surface waters is presenteJ in Section 6 of the FES-CP.

As a condition of the St.

Lucie I operating license the applicant has conducted a nonradiological environmental monitoring program.

The results of the program are summarized in Section 4.3.8.

Oe'.ailed accounts are presented in the more recent annual nonradiological environmental monitoring report" prepared by the applicant. '~'a Nonradiological aquatic monitoring programs required under the Clean Water A t for both St.

Lu~ie I and 2 will be conducted in accordance with the %PRIES.permit issued by USEPA Region IV and the certi fications issued by the State of Florida.

Harine turtle monitcrirg programs wi l be conducted in accordance with the Environmental Protection Plan issued by the HRC as part of the operating license.

5.7 Threatened and Endan ered S ecies Section 2.7. 2.2. 7 of the FES-CP discussed the probab-lity of any Federally recognized rare "r endangered species being found on the St.

Lucie site.'ince 1973, the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service has dropped the "rare" category and St.

Lucie 2 FES 5"12

now classifies species either "endangered" nr "threatened."

The FES-CP did not identify any significant impacts to th. populct'ions of the identified species.

In compliance with Section 7 of the 1978 amendments to the Endangered Species Act, the NRC requested from the U.S.

Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the U.S. National Marine Fisheries Service (HMFS) a list of those Federally recog-nized threatened and endangered

species, both list d and proposed to be listed,

. and designated critical habitats which might be affectaa by the licensing of-:

St.

Lucie 2.'

The FWS and NHFS responses'

'isted the West Indian manatee (Trichechus manatus),

brown pelican (Pelecanus occidentalis),

)>a).d, 9~

mississi lens>s loggerhead turtle (Caretta car tta),

green turtle (Chelonia

~mda-,

hawkshaw )1 turtle (fretmoche) s >mbnca~ta, Kemp's Atlantic rid)ay The FWS also requested under provision of the Endangered Spec>es Act, that the NRC perform a biological assessment for each of the listed species, The assessment has been performed and the resu]j;s wt,te transmitted to the FWS and NMFS for review on December 8 and 9, 1981.'t the time the assessment was performed, the applicant had not formally notified the NRC of their decision to install a third intake pipeline; there-fore, the assessment was based on two unit operation with the two oxi t'.ng intake pipelines.

Based principally on the results of the St.

Lucie 1 moni-toring program, the assessment concluded that no significant impact to the local populations of any of thes'pecies'is expected.

Some mortality tc sea turtles, specifically the loggerhead and green turtle is expected (see S( c-tion 5.6).

The staff considered this s,".vact to be acceptable and found that the continued efforts on the part of the applicant to monitor nestirsg on Hutchinson Island and to release turtles entrapped in the intake canal adequate to monit(~ the station imp=et on the populations

~

17c On December 21, 1981, HMFS in reference to the assessment requested additional information pertaining to mitigation on the part of the utility and the impact of the losses of sea turtles on the Florida and Caribgpqn populations.

In a January 13, 1982 letter to the HRC, the FWS requested'hat the assessment includ e the effects of thy cor, eduction and operation of the third intake pipeline.

Tne assessment'as updated to include impacts associated with the third intake pipeline and resubmitted to NMFS and FWS for review on March 24, 1982. 17f ~ >>g The HMFS and FWS respondeo cn March 26, 1982 and March 31, 1982, respectively. 17he l7

HRC, HMFS, and FWS concluded that based on the implemen-tation of the programs detailed in the Harch 24, 1982 biological assessmf nr report (and outlined below), it was unlikely that federally protected endan( ered nd/or threatened species would be detrime;stally affected.

The programs agreed upon by the

FWS, NMFS, and the NRC are outlined as follows:

w 1.

Conduct marine turtle nest relocation program during construction of the third intake pipelines.

2.

Perform field investigations into the use of light and sound to discourage marine turtle entry into the ocean intake structures.

If this does not achieve the goals specified in the assessment (item 2, p. iii) and the Environmental Protection Plan, install a test network of bars on -ne side St.

Lucie 2 FES 5-13

I

~

~

of one ocean intake structure to determine the feadibility of physically denying turtles access to the ocean intake pipelines.

3.

Continue the capture and release program with specific required changes includirg the performance of a gross necropsy on moribund turtles collected in the intake canal.

4, Conduct a study to determine alternative methods for the capture of marine turtles entrapped in the intake canal in an attempt to reduce mortality.

5.

Perform a yearly beach nesting study for all turtle species known to nest on Hutchiscn Island for a period of 5 years commencing with the completion of the third intake pipeline.

These programs will be included in the St.

Lucie Environmental Protection Plan and details will be finalized prior to the granting of the Unit 2 license.

3 5.8 Historic and Archeolo ical Site xm acts Operation of the Plant will not result in any significant impact on historic and archeological sites in the area.

The State Historic Preservation Officer has stated.'the proposed project will have no effect on any sites listed, or eligible for lis-ing, in the hational Re ister of Historic Places, or otherwise of National, State, or local s>gnsfscance.

ee Append>x C.

5.9 Socioeconomic Im acts Socioeconomic i~acts of station operation on the community are discussed in Sections 5.6 and 8.2 of the FES-CP.

The primary impacts are benefits from increased local tax revenues, employment, and local purchases.

Mhen St. Lucie 2 is placed in service, FP8L till be paying both real and personal property taxes on the unit.

Based upon projected taxable value and millage rates.

ard the current Florida laws, the estimated tax yield from St.

Lucie 2 for the first year in service will be 5. 5 million in 1981 dollars.

St.

Lucie 2 will be depreciated (straight-line) at a rate of approximately four percent per year for property tax purposes.

Hew additions will be added to the tax base as they are completed.

The additions, unless substantial, tend to offset depreciation to the extent that the 5.5 million annual projection can be

.forecast through 1988.

The actual am unt of taxes paid will be based on the millage rates as authorized by ',a~ during the years St, Lucie 2 is energized for commercial

use, and the valuation established following project completion.

For these

reasons, the actual taxes received by the county may be either less than or greater than the amount indicated above The authorized, 1&81 tax revenues for St.

Lucie County are

$27,885,000.

Based on thes~ values, the taxes collected attributable to St.

Lucie 2 amount to 19.7 percent of the taxes collected by St.

Lucie County.'t.

Lucie 2 FES 5-14

I

-,cussed In addition to the impact created by facility radioactive effluents above, within the HRC policy and procedures for environmental prote described in 10 CFR Part 51 there are generic treatments of envirom effects of all aspects of the Uranium Fuel Cycle.

These environmental data have been summarized in Table 5-3 of 10 CFR Part 51 reproduced herein as Table 5.11 and are discussed later in this Statement; in Section

5. 11.

In tha same manner the environmental impact of transportation of fuel and waste to and from an LWR is summarized in Table S-S of 10 CFR Part 51 reprodc"ed herein as Table 5.3 and presented in Section 5.10.3.1.2.

Recently an additional operational requirement for Uranium-Fuel-Cycle Facilities including nuclear power plants was established by the Environmental Protection Agency in 40 CFR Part 190.-~

This regulation limits annual doses (excludirg radon and its daughters) for members of the public to 25 mrems, total body; 75 mrems, thyroid; and 25 mrems, other organs from all fuel-cy'cle facility con-tributions that may impact a specific individual in the public.

5. 10.2 0 erational Overview Reactors to keep releases of radioactive materials to unrestricted areas during normal operations, including expected operational occurrences, as lnw as is reasonably achievable (ALARA).

Appendix I of 10 CFR Part 50 provides'numerical guidance on dose-design objectives for LWRs to meet this ALARA requirement.

Applicants for permits to construct and for licenses to operate an LWR shall provide reasonable assurance that-"the following calculated dose-design objec-tives will be met for all unrestricted areas:

3 mrems/yr to the total body or 10 mrems/yr to any organ from all pathways of exposure from liquid effluents; 10 mrads/yr gamma radiation or 20 mrads/yr beta radiation air dose from gaseous effluents near ground level--and/or 5 mrems/yr to the total body or 15 mrems/yr to the skin from gaseous effluents; and'5 mrems/yr to any organ from all path-ways of exposure from airborne effluents that include the radioiodines, carbon-14, tritium, and the particulates.

Experience with the design, construction andi operation of nuclear power reactors indicates that compliance with these design objectives will keep average annual releases of radioactive material in effluents at small percentages of the limits specified in 10 CFR Part 20, and in fact, wile result in doses generally below

.he dose-design objective values of Appendix I of 10 CFR 50.

At the same time, the licensee is permitted the flexibilityof operation, compatible with con-siderations of health and safety, to ensure that the public is provided a

dependable source of power even under unusual operating conditions which may temporarily result in releases higher than such small percentages b '

all well within the limits specified in 10 CFR Part 20.

Ouring normal operations of St.

Lucie 2, small quantities of radioactivity (fission and activation products) will be released to the environment.

As required by NEPA, the staff has determined the dose estimated to members of the public outside of the plant boundaries as a result of the radiation from these radioisotope releases and relative to natural background radiation dose levels.

These Plani-generated o.nvironmental dose levels are estjmated to be very small because of both the Plant design and the developmont of a program which will be St.

Lucie 2 FES 5-16

implemented at the Plant to contain and control all radioactive emissions and efflu~nts.

As mentioned above, highly "fficient radioactive-waste management systems are incorporated into the design and are specified in deta'il in the Technical Specifications for the Plant.

The effectiveness of these systems will be measured by process and effluent radiological monitoring systems that permanently record the amounts of radioactive constitutents remaining in the various airborne and waterborne process and effluent streams.

The amounts of radioactivity released through vents and discharge points to be further dispersed and diluted to points outside the Plant boundaries are to be recorded and published semiannually in the Radioactive Effluent Release Reports for the plant.

The small amounts of airborne effluents that are released w'.ll diffuse in the atmosphere in a fashion determined by the meteorological conditions existing at the time of release and are generally much dispersed and diluted by the time they reach unrestricted areas that are open to the public.

Similarly, the small amounts of waterborne effluents released will be diluted with Plant waste water and then further diluted as they mix with the Atlantic Gcean beyond the Plant boundaries.

Radioisotopes in the Plant's efflu~nts that enter unrestricted areas will produce doses through their radiations to members of the general public similar to the doses from background radiations (that is, cosmic,- terrestrial and internal radiations),

which also include radiation from nuclear weapons fallout.

These radiation doses can be calculated for the many potential radiological exposure pathways specific to the environment around the Plant, such as direct radiation doses from the gaseous plume or liquid effluent stream outs de of the Plant boundaries, or internal radiation dose commitments from radioactive contaminants that might have been deposited on vegetation, or in meat and fish products eaten by people, or that might be present in drinking water outsid~ the plant or incorporated into milk from cows at nearby farms.

These

doses, calculated for the "maximally exposed ".individual (that is, the hypothetical individual potentially subject to maximum exposure),

form the basis of the staff'.". evaluation of impacts.

Actually, these estimates are tor a fictitiou~ person hecause assumptions are made that tend to overestimate the dose that would accrue to members of the public outside the Plant boundaries.

For example, if this "maximally exposed" individual were to receive the total body dose calculated at the Plant boundary as a result of external exposure to the gaseous plume, he/she is assumed to be physically exposed to gamma radia-tion at that boundary for 70K of the year, an unlikely occurrence.

Site specific values for the various parameters involved in each dose pathway are used in the calculations.

These include calculated or observed values, for the amounts of radioisotopes released in the gaseous and liquid effluents, meteorological information (for example, wind speed and direction) specific to the site topography and effluent release

points, and hydrological information pertaining to dilution of the liquid effluents as they are discharged.

An annual land census will identify changes in the use of unrestricted areas to permit modifications in the programs for evaluatino doses to individuals from St.

Lucie 2 FES 5

GASEOUS EFFLUENT IOr4ted by Orrpertrcrrl OD ty rrl b

d O

tr

'P

~I 0

0n E

L'UCLEAR PO'L'(ER PLANT LIOUI 0 EFFLUENT IOrerrted by kbrrrne rrr Lrqurd StreennI 0 rect Inerbe tron a

e +r'+err/err r

'yrIerrgln I

I~~

r "~%&Acyl cQ~&cQ ln~t&

g r

FUEL TRANSPORT

~el~ gcreen Figure 5.2 Potentially Meaningful Exposure Pathways to Individuals St.

Lucie 2 FES

I+

principal pathways of exposure.

This census specification will be incorporated into the Radiological Technical Specification and satisfies the requ';rements of Section IV.B.3 of Appendix I to IO CFR Part 50.

As use of the land surrounding the site boundary change

, revised calculations will be made to ensure that the dose estimate for gaseous eifluent always represents the highest dose that might possibly occur for any individual member of the public for each applicable foodchain pathway.

The estimate considers, for example, where people live, where vegetable gardens are located, and where cows are pastured.

An extensive radiological environmental monitoring program',

designed specifically for the environs nf St.

Lucie, provides measurements of radiation and radioactive. contamination levels that exist outside of the facility boundaries both before and after operations begin.

For this program offsite radiation levels are continuously monitored with thermoluminescent detectors (TLOs).

In addition measurements are made on a number of types of samples from the surrounding area to determine the possible presence of radioactive'on" taminants which, for example, might be deposited on vegetation, be present in drinking water, utside the plant, or be incorporated into cow's milk from near-by farms.

lhe results for all radiological environmental samples measured during a calendar year of operation are recorded and published in the Annual Padiological Environmental Operating Report for the facility.

The specifics of the final operational monitoring program and the requirement for annual pub-lication of the monitoring results will be incorporated into the operating license Radiological Technical Specifications for the St.

Lucie facility.

5. 10.3 Radiolo ical Im acts from Routine 0 erations 5.10.3.1 Radiation Ex osure Pathwa s:

Dose Commitments The potential environmental pathways through which persons may be exposed to radiation originating in a nuclear power reactor are shown schematically in Figure 5.2.

" Mnen an individual is exposed through one of these

pathways, the dose is determined ir, part by the amount of time the person is in the vicinity of the source, or the amount of time tiNe radioactivi y inhaled or ingested is retained in.the body.

The actual effect of the radiation or radioactivity is determined by calculating the dose conmitment.

This duse commitment is calculated to be she total dose that would be received over a 50-yr period, following the intake of radioactivity for I yr under the conditions existing 15 yrs after th. Plant begins operation (calculation for the 15th year, or the mid-point of Plant operation represents an average exposure over the life of the plant).

However, with few excep ions, most of the internal dose commitment for each nuclide is given during the first few years after exposure because of the turnover of the nuclide by physiological processes and radioactive decay.

There are a number of possible exposure pathways to man th'at are appropriate to be studied to determine impact of the routine releases from the St.

Lucie site on members of the general public living and working outside of the site boundaries, and whether the releas.s projected at this point in the licensing process will in fact meet regulatory requirements.

A detailed listing of these possibilities would include external radiation exposure from the gaseous effluents, inhalation of iodines and particulate contaminants in the a',r, drinking ni 1k from a cow or eating meat from an animal that feeds on open P

E St.

Lucie 2 FES

pasture near the site on which iodines or particulates may have deposited, eating vegetables from a garden near the site that may be contaminated by similar deposits, and drinking water or eating fish caught near the point of discharge of liquid effluents.

Other less important pathways include:

external irradiation from radionuclides deoosited on the ground surface, eating animals and food crops raised near the site using irrigation water that may contain liquid effluents, shoreline, boating and swimming activities near the 'ocean, lakes or streams that may be contaminated by effluents, drinking poterjtially contaminated water and direct radiation from within the Plant itself.

,'Note that for.he St.

Lucie site there is no drinking water pathway of concern evince the liquid effluents are discharged into the Atlantic Ocean.

Calculations of the effects for most path ays are limited to a radius bf 80 km (50 mi).

This limitation is based on several facts.

Experience as demonstrated by calculation has shown that all individual dose commitments ()0. 1 mrems/yr) for radioactive effluents are accounted for within a radius of 80 km (50 mi) from the Plant.

Beyond this distarce the doses to individuals are smaller than O. 1 mrems/yr, which is far below natural-background

doses, and the doses are subject to substan ial uncertainty because of limitations of predictive mathe-matical models.

The staff has made a detailed st dy of all of the above important pathways and has evaluated the radiation-dose commitments both to the plant workers and the general public for these pathways resulting from routine operation of the Plant.

A discussion of these evaluations

follows,

5. 10.3. l. 1 Occu ational Radiation Ex os<<re ~or PWRs Host of the dose to nuclear plant workers results from external exposure to radiation from radioactive materials outside of the body rather han from internal exposure from inhaled or irgested radioactive materials.

Experience shows that the dose to nuclear plant workers varies from reactor to reactor and from year to year.

For environmental-impact purposes, it can be projected by using the experience to date with modern PWRs.

Recently licensed 1000-HWe PWRs are operated in accordance with the post-1975 regulatory requirements and guidance that place increased emphasis on maintaining occupational exposure at nuclear power plants ALARA.

These requirements and guidance are outlined primarily in 10 CFR Part 20,~'tandard Review Plan Chapter 12,

~ and Regulatory Guide 8.8.

The applicant's proposed implementation of these requirements and guidelines is reviewed by the staff during the licensing process, and the results of that review are reported in the staff's Safety Evaluation Reports.

The license is granted only after the review indicates that an ALARA program can be imple-mented.

In addition, regular reviews of operating plants are performed to determine whether the ALARA requirements are being met.

Average collective occupational dose information for 239 PWR reactor years of operation is available for those plants operating between 1974 and 1980.

(The year 1974 was chosen as a starting date because the dose data for years prior St. Lucie 2 FES 5-20

Table 5.2 Incidence of Job-Related Fatalities Nor tqljty Rates (premature deaths Occupational Group per 10s person-years)

Underground metal miners Uranium miners Smelter workers Hining Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries Contract construction b Transportation and public uti 1 ities Nuclear-plant worker Hanufacturing Wholesale and retail trade

Finance, insurance, and real estate Services Total private sector

%1300 420 190

'61 35 33 24 23 7

6 3

3 10 The President's Re ort on Occu ational Safet and Health, "Report on Occupat>ona afety and Hea th by the U.S.

Department o

Health, Education, and Welfare,"

E.

L. Richardson, Secretary, Hay 1972.

U.S.

Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Occupational Injuries and Illness in the United States by Industry, 1975," Bulletin 1981, 1978.

The nuclear-plant workers'isk is equal to the sum of the radiation" related risk and the noreadiaNon rHated risk.

The estimated occupational risk associated with the industry-wide average radia" tion dose of 0.8 rem is about ll potential premature deaths per 10 person-years due to cancer based on the risk estimators described in the text mentioned-below.

The average nonradiation-related risk for seven U,S. electrical utilities over the period 1970-1979 is about 12 actual premature deaths per 10s person-years as shown in Figure' of the paper by R. Wilson and E.

S. Koehl, "Occupational Risks of Ontario Hydro's Atomic Radiation Workers in Perspective,"

presented at Nuclear Radiation Risks, A Utility-Medical Dialogue, sponsored by the International Institute of Safety and Health in Washington, DC, September 22-23, 1980.

(Note that the estimate of ll radiation-related premature cancer deaths describes a potential risk rather than an observed statistic.).

St.

Lucie 2 FES 5-21

In estimating the health effects resulting from both onsite (see Section 5.10.3. 2) and occuoational radiation exposures as a result of normal operation

. of this facility, the staff used somatic (cancer) and genetic ri"k estimators that are based on widely accepted scientific information.

Speci, ically, the staff's estimates are based on information compiled by the National Academy of Science's Advisory Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR I).

The estimates of the risks to workers and the general public are based on conservative assumptions (that is, the estimates are probably higher than the actual number).

The following risk estimators were used to estimate health effects:

135 potential deaths from cancer per million person-rems and 258 potential cases of all forms of genetic disorders per million person-rems.

The cancer mo) tality risk estimates are based on the "absolute risk" model described in BEIR I.

Higher estimates can be developed by use of the "rela-tive risk" model along with the assumption that risk prevails for the duration of life.

Use of the "relative risk" model would produce risk values up to about four times greater than those used in this report.

The staff regards the use of the "relative risk" model values as a reasonable upper limit of the range of uncertainty.

The lower limit of the range would be zero because health effects have not been detected at doses in this dose-rate range.

The

, number of potential nonfatal cancers would be approximately 1.5 to 2 times the number of potential fatal cancers, according to the 1980 report to the National Academy of Science's Advisory Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR III).

Values for genetic risk estimators range from 60 to 1500 potential cases for all forms of genetic disorders per million person-rems (BEIR I).

The va'lue of 259 potential cases of all forms of genetic disorders is equal to the sum of the geometric means of the risk of specific genetic defects and the risk of defects with complex etiology.

However, the value of zero cannot be excluded because there is no direct evidence of human effects at doses in this dose rate range.

(BEIR III).

The preceding values for risk estimators are consistent with the recommendations of' number of recognized radiation protection organizations, such as the Inter-national Commission on Radiological Protection'(ICRP, 1977), the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurement (NCRP, 1975)., the National Academy of Sciences (BEIR III), and the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR, 1977).

The risk of potential fatal cancers in the exposed work force population at the St.

Lucie facility and the risk of potential genetic disorders in all future generations of this work force population, is estimated as follows:

multiply-ing the annual plant worker population dose (about 880 person-rems) by the risk

,estimators, the staff estimates that about 0.12 cance~

deaths may occur in the total exposed population and about 0.23 genetic disorders may occur in all future generations of the same exposed population.

The value of 0.12 cancer deaths means that the probability of one cancer death over the life time of the entire work force as, a result of 1 year of facility operation is about 12 chances in 100.

The value of 0.23 genetic disorders means that the probability of 1 genetic disorder in all future generations of the entire work force as a result of 1 year of facility operation is about 23 chances in 100.

St.

Lucie 2 FES 5'=&

1 5.10.3.1.2 Public Radiation Ex osure Transportation of Radioactive Haterials, The transportation of "cold" (unirradiated) nuclear fuel to the reactor, of spent irradiated fuel from the reactor to a fuel'eprocessing

plant, and of solid radioactive wastes from the reactor to waste burial grounds is considered in 10 CFR Part 51.

The contribution of the environmental effects of such transportation to the environmental costs of licensing the nuclear power reactor is set forth in Summary Table 5-4 from 10 CFR Part 51, reproduced herein as Table 5.3.

The-cumulative dose to the exposed population as summarized in Table 5.3 is very small when compa'red to the annual dose of about 61,000 person-rems to this same population or 26",000,000 person-rems to the U.S. population from background radiation.

lt

~

Direct Radiation for PWRs The principal sources contributing to radiation fields in nuclear plants are the reactor core, primary coolant, and radioactive effluent releases.

In a

PWR, the reactor core and the primary coolant, with its fission, corrosion, and activation products, are located in a heavily shielded reactor containment or other heavily shielded building.

Oecause these major radiation sources are contained in a heavily shielded area, dose rates in the vicinity of PWRs are generally undetectable (less than 5 mrems/yr ).

Low-level radioactivity storage containers outside the plant are estimated to make a dose contribution at t'-e site boundary of,'less than 1X of that due to the direct radiation from the plant.

)

ll Radioactive Effluent Releases:

Air and Water As pointed out in an earlier section, all effluents from the Plant will be subject to extensive decontamination, but small controlled quantities of radio-active effluents will be released to the atmosphere and to the hydrosphere during normal operations.

Estimates of site-specific radioisotope release values have been developed on the basis of estimates regarding fuel performance and the descriptions of operational and radwaste systems in the applicant's ER and FSAR and by using the calculational models and parameters developed by the staff.

These have been supplemented by extensive use of the applicant's site

" and environmental data in the ER and in subsequent answers to staff questions, and should be studied to obtain an understanding of airborne and waterborne releases from the Plant.

These radioactive effluents are then diluao.d by the air and water into which they are released before they reach areas a;cessible to the general public.

Radioactive effluents can. be divided into several groups.

Among the airborne effluents the radioisotopes of the noble gases--krypton,

xenon, and argon--do not deposit on the ground nor are they absorbed and accumulated within living organisms; therefore, the noble gas effluents act primarily as a source of direct external radiation emanating from the effluent plume.

Dose calculations are performed for the site boundary where the highest external-radiation doses to a member of the general public as a result of gaseous effluents have been St. Lucie 2 FES

Table 5.3 (5um(nary Table 5-4) Environmental Impact of Transportation of Fuel and Waste to and from One Light-Water-C""'. ~

Nuclear Power Reactor~

W I

Svvssknv Tsacc ~Mrvecrnrtrrtuhrfact or Tnsnsfontstvtnof Ftrtt sno wssts to aropnchr Grrc (Nhrt wsttm CO(had kkcccfrl POVVtn Asadton

~

trcmru Coreafrorra Of tnkrraecnt Erhetvvnwrtar fvtkfcf Heat (per ftad4ted tost cask n Irsns0....,.,

2$0000 Skrttf.

wacre (Qoverr>>d hf Fsd<<al or State rsoocsons) 72.000 4>>. per ovck; 100 tcr>> per cask pw rsl~.

Trsrto der>>cF Trvck =

(ate than 1 per dsy.

Less lhan 5 por month.

AanQe ot doses lo erpeeed ndvvkfds ~

(per re4clcr tear)

Ekfrvrhtrve dose lo

<<C>>eed~

(per rosette Tear)

'mntportalon workers..

Generat pulse'ecokkara 200 001 ls 000 <<ilfenk.

w 4 marvrenl 1,100 OOOOtotdmdfern...

Sn>>nrenk COCCI 0 0001 lo 0 Cd morom kCCIO(hf4 Si Tnkrrkvcht fnmsvwemhC r>>k

~ ehecta Smas 5 CorrvnCm(neve~ causes.....,

1 tetr( ckorf rt 100 reactor )nark 1 nonfatal <<oeT n 10 re

~clef searle 5c )5 properts carr>>oe psr reactor Tsar rOsts rppoosnQ svs tsbte are Orven W tr>>~'s Envfonn>>n& Serves ot Transpcftsson ol Sodcecove Matsnds 14 and tram tkrcteV Poww Plants.

WASH-12%, Dceenbes to72. and SIPP k N(IAEG-TSr025 apre 151$. Soth dtovn>>rm are everabre tor INtpecsnn rrvf co(hfnQ ot 0>> Convrrstice'4 Pvbkc )oovvr>>m Acorn, 1 2 1 1 H sk Nw washndron, 0 C, end reef bs cbtonsd oom Nsscvwt Techrvcat tntcrmsson Serves.~ Ya 22151 W~t225 rs svs(s(CO irom t(TIS sl a coal ol 5$ 4$ (mcrokche. 52 2$) and NVAEG TSr0$5 a evsrabre st 4 cost ot 5$ 2$ (rrvcrokche. 522$ )

'Ths Fed<<st Asdakon Covncl hss recornn>>nded that e>> rsdskon doses <<om as tCkfces of redeson otf>>r man nskfst

~ and n>>dcst erposvrss shovkt bo smted 10 sAoo rnrrfsm per Test 1st dvvkksss 41 4 retvh d ocov(>>sonst erpcv srfe and shcvrkf t>> snvted lo $00 rrvarem per tear lor Nkvvkrsh ev tr>> Qonerst popvtsscn. Tho dose to nndwrkrsh dve lo avsr ww nskfat bacs Qrckrnd Iada son>> shoot 120 msvem por tear,

~ktsnrsm rs an erprets>>n tcr tr>> tv<<mason ot whde bodf doses lo kvvkksts st ~ orrkrp Ttvra, d osch zone>>r ot a pc(hasten (ftkpd 1.000 peopkr were lo recwve ~ tk>>e d 0 001 rom (I mrvsm), or d 2 peopre were lo rocwvo 4 dole ol 0$

mm ($00 rnersrn) esctk ee knot rr>>nvem dote rn arch cato wove) bo 1 msrvrera,

~Akt>>vch tho etrvvoAvr>>ntst rnk ofr~ \\tracts st<<IvrvnQ horn osnsportsson soodsnts 4 clfran7/ mcapsb& of hemp~ tars not>>ck ths nlk remorse smss lQssrsesa ol whee>>r 4>> b<<nQ acpsed lo 4 sfk)rs reactor or 4~

sto F

St. Lucie 2 FES 5-24

<<C

estimated to occur; these include the total body and skin doses as well as the annual beta and gamma air doses from the plume at that boundary location.

Another group of airborne radioactive effluents--the radioiodines, carbon-l4, and tritium--are also gaseous but these tend to be deposited on the ground and/or inhaled into the body during breathing.

For this class of effluents, estimates of direct external-radiation doses from deposits on the ground, and of internal radiation doses to total body, thyroid, bone, and other organs from inhalation and from vegetable, milk, and meat consumption are made.

Concentrations of iodine in the thyroid and of carbon-14 in bone are of particular. significance here.

A third group of airborne effluents, consisting of pai ticulates that remain after filtration of airborne effluents in the plant prior to release, includes fission products such as cesium and barium and corrosion accivition products such as cobalt and chromium.

The calculational model determines the direct ex ernal radiation dose and the internal radiation doses for these contaminants through the same pathways as described above for the radioiodines, carbon-l4, and tritium.

Doses from the particulates are combined with those of the radio-

iodines, carbon"14, and tritium for comparison to the design objectives set forth in of Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50.

The waterborne radioactive effluent constituents could include fission products of such as nuclides of strontium and iodine; activation products such as nuclid sodium and manganese; and tritium as tritiated water.

Calculations estimate the internal doses (if any} from fish consumption, from water ingestion (as drinking water}, and from eating of meat or vegetables raised near t ~e site on in igation water, as well as any direct external radiation from recreational use of the water near the point of discharge.

The release values for each group of effluents, along with site-sy~cific meteorological and hydrological data, serve as input to computerized radiation" dose models that estimate the maximum radiation dose that would be received outside the facility via a number of. pathways for individual members of the public, and for the general public as a whole.

These models and the radiation dose calculations are discussed in Regulatory Guide 1. 109 and in Appendix 0 of this Statement.

Examples of site-specific dose assessment calculations and discussions of parameters involved are given in Appendix E.

Doses from all airborne effluents except the noble gases are calculated for the location (e.g., the site

boundary, garden, residence, milk cow, meat animal) where the highest radiation dose to a member of the public has been established from all applicable pathways (such as ground depositing, inhalation, vegetable consumption, cow milk consumption or meat consumption).

Only those pathways associated with airborne effluents that are known to exist at a single location are combined to calculate.the total maximum exposure to an exposed individual.

Pathway doses associated with liquid effluents are combined without regard to any single location, but they are assumed to be associated with maximum exposure of an individual through other than gaseous-effluent pathways.

y

=St.

Lucie 2 FES 5-25

5.10.3.2 Radiolo ical Im act on Humans Although the doses calculated in Appendix E are based on radioactive-waste treatment system capability and are well below the Appendix I to 10 CFR 50 design objective values, the actual radiological impact associated with the operation of the Plant will depend, in part, on the manner in which the radio" active waste treatment sy"tern is operated.

Based on its evaluation of the potential performance of the ventilation and r~dwaste treatment

systems, the staff has concluded that the systems as now proposed are capable of controlling effluent releases to meet the dose-design objectives of Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50 22 The Plant's operation will be governed by operating license Technical Specifica-tions that wil'l be based on the dose-design objectives of Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50.~~

Because these design-objective value's were chosen to permit flex-ibilityof operation while still ensuring that P~lant operations are ALARA, the actual radiolog;cal impact of Plant operation may result in doses close to the dose-design objectives.

Even if this situation exists, the individual doses for the member of the public subject to maximum exposure will still be very small

<<hen compared to natural background doses

(~100 mrems/yr) or the dose limits specified in 10 CFR Part 20 (500 mrems/yr " total body) as consistent with considerations of the health and safety of the public.

As a result, the staff concludes that there will be no measurable, radiological impact on any member of the public from routine operation of the Plant.

M Operating standards of 40 CFR Part 190, the Environmental Protection Agency's Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Nuclear Power Operations,~a specify that the annual dose equivalent must not exceed 25 mrems to the whole

body, 75 mrems to the thyroid, and g5 mrems to any ether organ of any member of the public as the result of exposures to planned discharges of radioactive mate-rials (radon and its daughters excepted) to the general environment from all uranium-fuel-cycle operations and radiation from these operations that can be expected to affect a given individual.

T'he staff concludes that under normal operations the St.

Lucie plant is capable of operating within these standards.

The radiological doses and dose commitments resulting from a nuclear power plant are wel'.

known and documented.

Accurate measurements of radiation and radioactive cnntaminants can be made with very high sensitivity so that much smaller amounts of radioisotopes can be recorded than can be associated with any possible observable ill effects.

Furthermore, the effects of radiation on living systems have for decades been subject to intensive investigation and consideration by individual scientists as well as by select committees that have occasionally been constituted to objectively and independently assess radiation dose effects.

Although, as in the case of chemical contaminants, there is debate about the exact extent of the effects of very low levels of radiation that result from nuclear power plant, effluents, upper bound limits of deleterious effects are well established and amenable to standard methods of risk analysis.,

Thus the risks to the maximally exposed member of the public outside of the site boundaries can be readily quantified.

Further, the impacts on, and risks to, the total population outside of the boundaries can also be readily calculated and recorded.

These risk estimate" for St.

Lucie 2 are presented below.

St.

Lucie 2 FES 5-'26

The risk to the maximally exposed individual is estimated oy multiplying the risk estimators presented in Section 5.10.3.l.l by the annual dose"design objectives for total body radiation in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I.

This calculation results in a risk of potential p:emature death from cancer to that individual from exposure to radioactive effluents (gaseous or liquid) from one year oi <<eactor operations of less than one chance in one million."

The risk of -,,otential premature death from cancer to the average individual within 80 km (50 mi) of the reactor from exposure to radioactive effluents from the reactors is much less than the risk to the maximally exposed individual.

These risks are very small in comparison to natural cancer

-.ncidence from causes unrelated to the operation of St.

Lucie 2.

Hultipl<Jing the annual U.S. general public population dose from exposure to radioactive effluents and transportation of fuel and waste from the operation of this Plant (that is, 91 person-rems) by the preceding risk estimators, the staff estimates that about 0.01 cancer deaths may occur in the exposed popula-tion cad about 0. 02 genetic disorders n<ay occui in all future generations of the exposed population.

The significance of theSe risk estimates can be deter" mined by comparing them to the natural incidence of cancer death and genetic aonormalities in the U.S. population.

Hultiplying the estimated U.S. popula-tion ".or +he year 2000 (~260 million persons) by the current incidence of actual cancer fatalities

(~20X) and the current incidence of actual genetic diseases

(~GX}, about 52 millicn cancer deaths and about 16 million genetic abnormalities are expected (BEIR I; American Cancer Society, 1978).

The risk to the general public from exposure to radioactive effluents and transportation of fuel and wastes from the annual operat'.on of St.

Lucie 2 is a very small fraction (less than one part in a billion) of the estimated normal incidence of cancer fatalities and genetic abnormalities in the year 2000 population.

On the basis of the preceding comparison (that is, comoaring the risk from exposure to radioactive effluents and transportation of fuel and waste from the annual operation of this Plant with the risk form the estimated incidence of cancer fatalities and genetic abnormalities in the year 2000 population) the staff concludes that the risk to the public health and safety from exposure to radioactive effluents and the transportation of fuel and wastes fror< normal operation of St.

Lucie 2 will be v"ry small.

5.10.3.3 Radiolo ical Im acts on Biota Other Than Humans Oepending on the pathway and radiation source, terrestrial and aquatic biota will receive doses that are approximately the same or somewhat higher than humans receive.

Although guidelines have riot been establisheu for acceptable limits for radiation exposure to species other than human, it is generally agreed that the limits established for L humans are sufficiently protective for other species.

Although the existence of extren.ely radiosensitive biota is possible and increased radiosensitivity in organism may result from environmental inter-actions with other stresses (for examole, heat or biocides},

no biota have yet been discovered that show a sensitivity (in terms of increased morbidity or The re st of potentiai premature death from cancer to the maximally exposed individual from exposure to radioiodines and particulates would be in the same range as the risk from exposure to the other types of effluerts.

St.

Lucie 2 FES 5-,27

mortality) to radiation exposures as low as those expected in the area surround-ing the Plant.'urthermore, at a11 nuclear plants for which radiation exposure to biota other than humans has been analyzed,s'here have been no cases of exposure that can be considered significant in terms of harm to the species, or that approach the limits for exposure to members of the public that are per" mitted by 10 CFR Part 20.

Inasmuch as the 1972 BEIR Report concluded that evidence to date indicated no other living organisms are very much more radio-sensitive than humans, no measurable radiological impact on populations of biota is expected as a result of the routine operation of this Plant.

5.10.3..4 Radiolo ical Monitorin Radiological environmental monitoring programs are established to provide data where there are measurable levels of radiation and radioactive materials in the site environs and to show that in many cases no detectable levels exist.

Such monitoring programs are conducted to verify the effectiveness of in-plant systems used to control the release of radioactive materials and to ensure that unanticipated buildups of radioactivity will not occur in the environment.

Secondarily, the environmental monitoring programs could identify the highly unlikely existence of releases of radioactivity from unanticipated release points that are not mentioned.

An annual surveillance (Land Census) program will be established to identify changes in the use of unrestricted areas to provide a basis for modifications of the monitoring programs or of the Technical Specifications conditions that relate to the control of doses to the individuals.

These programs are discussed in greater detail in HRC Regulatory Guide 4.1 Rev.

1, "Programs for Monitoring Radioactivity in the Environs of Nuclear Power Plants,"

and the Radiological Assessment Branch Technical Position, Rev. I, November 1979, "An Acceptable Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program."a~

The preoperakional phase of the monitoring program should provide for the measurement cf background levels of radioactivity and radiation and their var i-ations along the anticipated important pathways in the areas surrounding the Plant, the training of personnel and the evaluation of procedures, equipment and techniques.

The St. Lucie 2 preoperational program is the ongoing monitor-ing program for St.

Lucie 1.

The ongoing program is described in detail in the St. Lucie 1 Environmental Technical Specifications and summarized in Table 5.4.

The staff has reviewed the preoperational environmental monitoring plar, of the applicant.

and finds that it, is acceptable as presented.

H I

St. Lucie 2 FES I

5-28

I, re~~>>

~

J

'r>>>>>>'"~>>- >>'I+0+vKKlrf'OAAe~~>>>>rL>>r>>A~

r Table 5.'4 Operational Environmen.al Radiological Surveillance.

~

Program - St.

Lucie Plant Exposure Pathway and/or Sample Criteria and Sampling Locations Collection Type and.Frequency Frequency of Analysis 1

l.

AIR 1.1 Particulate and Iodine

~

1.2 Direct Radiation

~

~

~

~

2.

WATER 1>>

2.1 Surface Matet I

2.1.1 Discharge Canal

'r

~

-r 1

'2

~ 1.2 Ocean'.1.3 Estuarine Meekly.

Gross Beta Gamma spectral analysis of monthly composite Radioactive Iodine

. Determine direct radia" tion exposure by TLO readout (mean of 2.TLOs) 1 location, west of AIA:

2 locations:

(Control) 1 location:

Big Hud Creek:

r V

Honthly Gamma spectral analysis Tritium (Quarterly Sr"89 8 90 (Quartet ly Composite)

Honthly Gamma sectral analysis Tritium (Quarterly Composite)

=, Sr-89 8 90 (Quarterly Composite)

Gamma spectral analysis Tritium Quarterly 1

Comparison onsite versus offsite and reference locations:

3 locations onsite, noi th, east, and southwest of the plant:

5 locations offsite within a radius of 10 miles of plant:

and 1 control location Comparison of onsite versus offsite and Quarterly reference locations:

3 locations onsite,

~

north, east, and southeast of the plant:

5 locations offsite 'within a radius of 10 miles of plant:

and 1 control location:

I m

~AA>>>> A AA'~~

I>>.A>>AA>>rrrLA

~

II

Table 5.4 (Continued)

Exposure Pathway and/or Sample Criteria and Sampling Locations Col lection Frequency Type=and Frequency of Analysis 2.2 Ground Water (we 1 l) 1 location, Residence, 7609 Indian River Orive:

Semi-annual ly Gamma Spectral Analysis Gross Beta Tritium 2.3

= Potablr 'Hater (wellsj 1 location, City of Ft. Pierce, drinking water supply, 1 location, City o< Stuart, drinking water supply,

l. location, Port St. Lucie, drinking water supply guar terly Gamma spectral analysis Gross Beta

'ritfum

3. 2 Ocean

3. 3 Beach (sand) 3.4 Estuarine 1 location, beach west of dicharge structure:

1 location, offshore, 1 mile north of discharges:

1 location, offshore, 1 mile south of discharge:

1 location,

offshore, Vero Beach:

(Control) 1 location, east of Blind Creek, 1 mile north of discharge:

1 location, near

intake, 1 mile south of discharge:

1 location, Vero Beach:

(Control) 1 location, Big Mud Creek:

3.

BOTTOM SEDIMENT i-P. 1 Discharge Canal 1 location, west of AIA:

.Semi-annually Semi-annually Gamma spectral analysis Sr-90 Gamma spectral analysis Sr-90 Semi-annually Gamma spectral an'alysis Sr-90 Semi-annually Gamma spectral analysis 4.1 Crustacea (Lobster or crab or shrimp) 4.2 Fish 4.2. 1 Carnivores 1 location, vicirity of discharge structure:

1 location, Vero Beach:

(Control)

Semi-annually Gamma spectral analysis Sr-89 4 90 1 location, vicinity of discharge structure:

Semi-annually Gamma spectral analysis 1 location, Vero Beach:

(Control)

Table 5.4 (Continued)

'xposure Pathway and/or Sample 4.=".2 Herbivores Criteria and Sampling Locations I location, vicinity of discharge structure:

1 location, Vero Beach:

(Control)

Collection Frequency Semi-annually Type and Frequency of Analysis Gamma spectral analysis Sr -89 8 90 5.

TERRESTRIAL

5. 1 Milk 5.2 Biota 5.2.1 Food Crop

'cu (Citrus) 5;2.,2 Food Crop (edible leafy) vegetation) 5.3 Soil I location within 15 miles radius of plant and in the prevailing wind direction from

'he plant:

I location, 53.2 mi south of the 'plant, Palm Beach County (Control)

Dairy herd. census 6 locations, I location, Vero Beach:

(Control) 1 location as determined by garden census (Specification 3.2.d) 5 locations within a 25 mile radius of plant:

1 location, Vero Beach:

(Control)

Semi-monthly Gamma spectral analysis Sr-89 8 90 I-131 Monthly Semi-annually Gamma,spectra'1 analysis Sr-89 8 90 I-131 Harvest Time Harvest Time Harvest Time Gamma spectral analysis Sr-89 5 90 Gamma spectral analysis Sr-89 8 90 Gamma spectral analysis I-I3).

Once per 3-year Gamma spectral analysis period Sr-90

5.10.3.<.2 Operational The operational, o fsite radiolc ical-monitorina program is conducted to provide data on measurable levels of radiation and radioactive vaterials in the site envirors in accordance with 10 CFR Parts 20 and 50. It assists and provides backup support to the effluent-monitoring pro",ram recommended in NRC Regulatory Guide l.21, "Measuring, Evaluat)ng and Reporting Radioactivity in Solid Wastes

'and Releases of Radioac ive Materials in Liquid and Gaseous Effluents from Light-Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants."

The applicant stat s that the operational program will in essence be a con-tinuation of the preoperational program described above with some periodic adjustment of sampling frequencies

~n expected critical exposure pathways--such as increasing milk sampling frequency and deletion of fruit, vegetable, soil, and gamma radiation survey samples.

The proposed operational program will be reviewed prior tc Plant operation.

Modification will be based upon anomalies and/or exposure pathway variations observed during the preoperational program.

I The final operational-monitoring program proposed by the applicant will be reviewed in detail by the staff, and the specifics of the required monitoring program will be incorporated into the operating license Radiological Technical Specifications.

5.10.4 Environmental Im act of Postulated Accidents

5. 10.4. 1 Plant Accidents The staff has considered the potential radiological impacts on the environment of possible accidents at St.

Lucie 2 in accordance with a Statement of Interim Policy published by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on June 13, 1980.

The following discussion reflects these considerations and conclusions.

The first section deals with general characteristics of nuclear power plant accidents including a brief summary of safety measures to minimize the proba-bility of their occurrence and to mitigate their consequences if they should occur.

Also described are the important properties of radioactive materials and the pathways by which they could be transported to become environmental hazards.

Potential adverse health effects and impacts on society associated with actions to avoid such health effects are also identified.

Next, actual experience with nuclear power plant accidents and their observed health effects and other societal impacts are described.

This is followed by a summary review of -safety features of St.

Lucie 2 and of the site that act to mitigate the consequences of accidents.

The results of calculations of the potential consequences of accidents that have been postulated in the design basis are then given.

Also described are the results of calculations for the St.

Lucie 2 s>te using probabilistic methods to estimate the possible impacts and the risks associated with severe accident sequences of exceedingly low probability of occurrence.

St.. Lucie 2 FES-5-32

5.10.4.1. I General Characteristics of Accidents The term "accident,"

as used in this section, refers to any unintentional event not addressed in Section 5. 10.3 that results in a release of radioactive materials into the environment.

The predominant focus, therefore, is on events that can lead to releases substantially in excess of permissible limits for normal operation.

Such limits are specified in the Commission s Regulations in 10 CFR Part 20 'nd 10 CFR Part 50, Apoendix I.

There are several features which combine to reduce the risk associated with accidents at nuclear power plants.

Safety features in the design, construc-tion, and operation comprising the first line of defense are to a very large extent devoted to the prevention of the release of these radioactive materials from their normal places of confinement within the plant.

There are also a

number of additional lines of defenses that ar. designed co mitigate the conse-quences of failures in the first line.

Descriptions of these features for the Station may be found in the Final Safety Analysis Report,a~

and in the staff's Safety Evaluation. Report.

The most important mitigative features are described in Section 5.10.-4:1.3 below.

These safety features are designed taking into consideration the specific locations of radioactive materials within the Plant, their amounts, their nu"lear, physical, and chemical properties, and their relative tendency to be transported into, and for cr ating biological hazards in, the environment.

5.>0.4.1. 1. 1 Fission Product Characteristics By far the ?argest inventory of radioactive material in a nuclear power plant is produced by the uranium oxide f el fission process and is contained in the fuel rods.

During periodic refueling shutdowns, the assemblies containing these fuel rods=."re transferred to a spent fuel storage pool so that the second la: gest inventory of radioactive material is located in this storage pool.

Much small r inventories of radioactive materials are also normally present in the water that circulates in the reactor coolant system and ir, the systems used to process gaseous and liquid radioactive wastes in the plant.

These radioactive materials exist in a variety of physical and chemical forms.

Their potential "cr dispersion into the environment is dependent not only on mechanical forces that might physically trans[.~rt them, but also upon their inherent properties, part;cularly their volatility.

The majority of these materials exist as nonvolatile solids over a wide range of temperatures.

Some, he.:ever, are relative?y volatile solids and a f w are gaseous in nature.

These characteristics have a significant bea;ing upon the assessment of the environment 1 radiological impact of acc'dents.

The gaseous materials include radioactive forms of the chemically ine) t noble gases krypton

."..",d xenon.

These

'.iave the highest potential for release into the atmosphere.

Lf a reactor acciuent were to occur involving rupture or other failure of the fuel rod cladding, the releas of substantial quantities of these radioactive gases from the affected fuel rods is a virtual certainty.

Such accidents are considered to have very low frequency but are credible events (see Section

5. 10.4. 1.2). It is for this reason that each nuclear power plant is analyzed for a hypothetical design hasis accident that postulates the release of the entire contained inventory of radioactive noble gases from the St. i.ucie 2 FES

fuel into the containnent structure.

If releas'ed to the environment beyond the containment structure as a possible result, of failure of safety features, the'azard to individuals from these noble gases would ar ise predominantly through the external gamma radiation from the airborne plume.

The reactor containment structure is designed to minimize this type of release.

Radioactive forms of iodine are formed in substantial quantities in the fuel by the fission process and in some chemical forms may be quite volatile.

For these

reasons, they have traditionally been regarded as having a relatively high pote.tial for release from the fuel. If released to the envir nm o

ent, the principal radiolc.gical hazard associated with the radioiodines is ingestion into the human bcdy and subsequent concentratiop in the thyroid gland.

Because of this, its potential for release to the atmos here is reduced by the use of special systems designed to retain the iodine.

The chemical forms in which the fission product radioiodines are found are generally solid materials at room temperatures,

however, so that they have a

strong tendency to condense (or "plate out") upo'n cooler surfaces.

In addition most of the iod'.ne compounds are quite soluble in, or chemically reactive with, water.

Although these properties do not inhibit the release 'of radioiodines from degraded fuel, they do act to mitigate the release from containment struc-tures that have large internal surface areas and that contain large quantities of water as a result of an accident.

The same propei ties affect the behavior" of radioiodines that may "escape" into the atmosphere.

Thus, if rainfall occurs during a release, or if there is mcisture on exposed

surfaces, for example,

dew, the radioiodines will show a strong tendency to be absorbed by the moisture.

Other radioactive materials formed during the operation of a nuclea'r power plant have lower volatilities, and therefore, by, comparison with the noble gases and iodine, a much smaller tendency to escape from degraded fuel rods unless the temperature of the fuel becomes very high.

By the same token, such materials, if they escape, by volatili=ation from the fuel, tend to condense quite rapidly to solid form again when transported to a lower temperature region and/or dissolve in water when present.

The former mechanism can have the result of producing some solid particles of sufficiently small size to be carried some distance by a moving stream of gas or air. If such particulate materials are dispersed into the atmosphere as a result of failure of the con-tainment barrier, they will tend to be carried downwind and deposit on surface features by-gravitational settling or by precipitation (fallout), where they will become "contamination" hazards in the environment.

All radioactive isotopes exhibit the property of radioactive decay with characteristic half-lives ranging from fractions of-a second to many days or years.

Many of them decay through a sequence or chain of decay processes and all eventually become stable (nonradioactive) isotopes.

The radiation emitted during these decay processes is the reason that they are hazardous materials.

5.10.4.1.1.2 Ex osure Pathwa s

The radiation exposure (hazard) to individuals is determined by their proximity, to the radioactive material, the durat.on of exposure, and factors that act to shield the individual from the radiation.

Pathways for the transport of r adia-tion and radioactive materials that lead to radiation exposure hazards to humans St.

Lucie 2 FES 5-34

I I

are generally the same for accidental as for normal" releases.

These are depicted ir. Figure 5.2.

There are two additional possible pathways that could be significant for accident releases that are not shown in Figure 5.2.

One of these is the fallout onto open bodies of water of radioactivity initially carried in the air.

The second would be unique to an accident that

~ results in temperatures inside the reactor core sufficiently high to rause melting and subsequent penetration of the basemat underlying the reactor by the mo'iten core debris.

This creates the potential for the release of radioactive material into the hydrosphere through contact with groundwater.

These, pathways may lead to external exposure to radiation, and to internal exposures if radioactivity is inhaled, or ingested from contaminated food or water.

It is characteristic of these pathways that during the transport of radioactive material by wind or by water, the material tends to spread and disperse, like a plume of smoke from a smokestack, becoming less concentrated 4i larger volumes of air or water.

The result of these natural,'processes is to !essen the intensity of exposure to inaividuals downwind or downstream of the point of

release, but they also tend to increase the number who may be exposed.

For a release into the 'atmosphere, the degree to which dispersion reduces the concen-tration in the plume at any downwind point is governed by the turbulence characteristics of the atmosphere which vary considerably with time and from place to place.

This fact, ta}~en in conjunction with the variability of wind direction and the presence or absence of precipitation, means that accident consequences are very much dependent upon the weather corditions existing during the ac"ident.

r 5.10.4.1.1.3 Health Effects The cause and effect relationshi~s between radiation exposure and adverse health effects are quite complex. 'ut they.have been more exhaustively studied than for any other environmental contaminant.

(

Whole-body radiation exposure resulting in a dose greater than about 10 rem..for a few p~ 'sons and about 25 rem for nearly all people over a short period of

- time (hou: s) is necessary before any physiological effects to an individual are clinically detectable.

Doses of about 10 to 20 times larger than the latter

dose, also received over a relatively shor t period of time (hours tn a few days),

ca~ be expected to cause some fatalities.

At the severe, but extremely low probability end of the accident

spectrum, exposures of these riagnitudes are theoretically possible for pe~sons in tie close proximity of such accidents if

. measures are nnt or cannot be taken to provide protection, for example, by sheltering or evacuation.

~ ~

fi>>k R

Lower levels of exposures may also constitute a health risk, but the abi'lity to

-. define a direct cause-and-effect relationship between a

known exposure to radia-tion and any given health effect is difficult given the backdrop of the many other possible reasons why a particular effect is observed in a specific indi-vidual.

For this reason, it is necessary to assess such effects on a statisti-cal basis.

Such effects include randomly occurring cancer in the exposed population and genetic changes in future generations after exposure of a pro-spective parent.

Cancer in the exposed population may begin to develop only after a lapse of 2 to 15 years (latent period) from the time of exposure and then continue over a'>eriod of about 30 years (plateau period).

However, in the case of exposure of fetuses (in utero),

cancer may begin to develop at birth V

.St.

Lucie 2.FES 5-35

(no latent period) and end at age 10 (i.e., the plateau period is 10 years).

The health consequences model currently being used is based on the 1972 BEIR Report of the National Academy of Sciences.a~

Host authorities agree that a reasonable and probably conservative estimate of the randomly occurring health effects of low levels of radiation exposure to a large number of people is within the range of about 10 to 500 potential cancer deaths (although zero is not excluded by the data) per million person-rem.

The range comes from the-latest NAS BEIR III Report (1980)~

which also indicates a

probable value of about 150.

This value is virtually identical to the value of about 140 used in the current NRC health effects models.

In addition, approxi-mately'20 genetic changes per million person-rem would be projected by BEIR III over succeeding generations.

That also compares well with the value of about 260 per million person-rem currently used by the staff.

5.10.4.1. 1.4 Kealth Effects Avoidance Radiation hazards in the environment tend to disappear by the natural process of radioactive decay.

Where the decay process is a slow one,

however, and where the material becomes relatively fixed in its location as an environmental con-taminant (for example, in soil), the hazard can continue to exist for a rela-

'ively long period of timemonths, years, or even decades.

Thus, a possible consequential environmental societal impact of severe accidents is the avoidance of the health hazard rather than the health hazard itself, by restrictions on the use of the contaminated property or contaminated foodstuffs, milk, and drinking water.

The potential economic impacts that this can cause are discussed below.

5.10.4.1.2 Accident Ex erience and Observed Im acts The evidence of accident frequency and impacts in the past is a useful indicator or future probab!lities and impacts.

As of mid-1981, there were 73 commercial nuclear power reactor units licensed for operation in the United States at 5l sites with pcwe~ generating capacities ranging from 50 to 1130 HWe.

The combined experience with the 73 operating units represents approximately 500 reactor-years of operat'on over an elapsed time of about 20 years.

Accidents have occurred at several c

these facilit!es.~"~~

Some of these have resulted in releases of radioactive material to the environment, ranging from very small fractions of a curie to a few million curies.

None is known to have caused any radiation injury or fatality to any member of the public, nor any significant individual or collective public radiation exposure, nor any significant con-tamiaation of the environment.

<his experience base is not large enough to permit a reliable quantitative statistical inference.

It does,

however, sug-gest that significant environmental impacts due to accidents are very unlikely-to occur ove; time periods of a few decades.

Melting or severe degradation of reactor

.>el has occurred in only one of these 73 operating units, during the accident at Three Mile Island " Unit 2 (THI-2}

on March 28, l979.

In addition to the release of a few million curies of xenon, mostly xenon-133, it has been estimated that approximately 15 curies of radioiodine was also released to the environment at THI-2.~a This amount represents an extremely minute fraction of the total radioiodine inventory present in the reactor at the time of the accident.

Ho vtner radioactive fission products were released in measurable quantity.

St.

Luci'e 2 FES 5"36

It has been estimated that the maximum cumulative offsite radiation dose to an individual was less than 100 millirem.4s'~~

The total population exposure has been estimated to be in the range from about 1000 to 5000 person-rem.

This exposure could produce between none and one additional fatal cancer over the lifetime of the population.

The same population receives each year from natural background radiation about 240,000 person-'rem and approximately a

half-million cancers are expected to develop in this group over its lifetime,4s'~" primarily from causes other than radiation.

Trace quantities (barely above the limit of detectability) of radioiodine were found in a few samples of milk produced in the area.

No other food or water supplies were affected.

Accidents at commercial nuclear power plants have also caused occupational injuries and a few fatalities but none attributed to radiation exposure.

Indi-vidual worker exposures have ranged up to about 4 ~~rem as a direct consequence of reactor accidents (although there have been higher exposures to some workers as a result of other unusual occurrences).

However, the collective worker exposure levels (person-rem) are a small fraction of the exposures experienced during normal routine operations that average about 440 to 1300 person-rems in a

PWR and 740 to 1650 person-rems in a BWR per reactor-year.

Accidents have also occurred at other nuclear reactor facilities in the United States and in other countries.~'ecause of inherent differences in design, construction, operation, and purpose of most of these other facilities, their accident record has only indirect relevance to current nuclear power plants.

Helting of reactor fuel occurred in at least seven of these accidents, including the one in 1966 at the Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant Unit 1.

This was a sodium-cooled fast breeder demonstration reactor designed to generate 61 HWe.

The damages were repaired and the reactor"reached full power four years following the accident.

It operated successfully and completed its mission in 1973.

This accident did not release any radioactivity to the environment.

A reactor accident in 1957 at Windscale, England released a significant quantity of radioiodine, approximately 20,000 curies, to the environment.

This

reactor, which was not operated to generate electricity, used air rather than water to cool the uranium fuel.

During a special operation to heat the large amount of graphite in this reactor, the fuel overheated and radioiodine and noble gases were released directly to the atmosphere from a 123 m (405 ft) stack.

Milk produced in a 512-km (200-mi ) area around the facility was impounded for up to 44 days.

This kind of accident cannot occur in a reactor like St.

Lucie 2, how~ver, because of its water-co

'ted desig<..

5. 10.4.1.3 Miti ation of Accident Conse uences Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has conducted a safety evaluation of the application to operate St.

Lucie 2.

Although this evaluation. contains more detailed information on plant design, the principal design features that relate to safety are presented in the following section.

T

~

St. Lucie 2 FES 5-37

St.

Lucie 2 contains features designed to prevent accidental release of radioactive fission products from the fuel and to lessen the consequences should such a release occur.

Hany of the design and operating specifications of these features are derived from the analysis of postulated events known as design basis accidents.

These accident preventive and mitigative features are collectively referred to as engineered safety features (ESF).

The possibili-ties or probabilities of failure of these systems is incorporated in the assess-ments discussed in Section 5.10.4.1.4.

The Reactor Building, which is a dual containment design comprising a steel containment vessel surrounded by an annular space and enclosed by a reinforced concrete shield building, is a passive mitigation ystem which is designed to minimize accidental radioactivity releases to the environment.

Safety injec-tion systems are incorporated to provide cooling water to the reactor core

. during an accident to prevent or minimize fuel damage.

Cooling fans provide heat removal capability inside the containment following steam release in accidents and help to prevent containment failure due to overpressure.

Similarly, the containment spray system is designed to spray coo'l water into the containment atmosphere.

The spray water also contains an additive (hydra-zine) which will chemically react with any airborne radioiodine to remove it from the containment atmosphere and prevent its release to the environment.

All the mechanical systems mentioned above are supplied with emergency power from onsite diesel generators in the event that normal offsite station power is interrupted.

The fuel handling building also has accident mitigating provisions.

On.a high radiation signal in the fuel building, discharge from the fuel building ventilation system is automatically switched to the safety grade shield building ventilation filter system.

There are features of the plant that are necessary for its power generation function that can also play a role in mitigating certain accident consequences.

For example, the main condenser, although not classified as an ESF, can act to mitigate the consequences of accidents involving leakage from the primary to the secondary side of the steam generators (such as steam generator"tube

.ruptures)

If normal offsite power is maintained, the ability of the plant to send contaminated steam to the condenser instead of releasing it through the safety valves or atmospheric dump valves can signficantly reduce the amount of radioactivity released to the environment.

Huch more extensive discussions of the safety features and characteristics of St.

Lucre 2 may be found in the applicant's Final Safety Analysis Report.s~

The staff evaluation'f these features will be addressed in its Safety Evalua-tion Report.

In addition, the implementation of the lessons learned from the THI-2 accident, in the form of improvements in design, and procedures and operator training, will significantly reduce the likelihood of a degraded core accident whi h could result in large release of fission products to the contain-ment.

Specifically, the applicant will he required to meet those THI-related requirements specified in l'.UREG-0737.

As noted in Section 5. 10.4. 1.4, no credit has been taken for these actions and improvements in discussing the radiological risk of accidents.

St. 'uci e 2 FES.

5-38

5.10.4.1.3.2 Site Features The NRC's reactor site criteria, 10 CFR Part 100, require that the site for everypower reactor have certain characteristics that tend to reduce the risk and potential impact of accidents.

The discussion that follows briefly describes the St.

Lucie site characteristics and how they meet these requirements.

First, the site has an exclusion area, as required by 10 CFR Part 100.

The exclusion area, located within the 1132 acre site owned by the FP&L, is a

circular area with a 1554 meters (5100 ft. ) radius centered on the St.

Lucie 2 containment building.

There are no residents within the exclusion area.

The applicant owns all surface and mineral rights in the land portions of the exclusion area, and has the authority, required by 10 CFR Part 100, to deter-mine all activities in this area.

The exclusion ;rea extends eastward into thn Atlantic Ocean as well as westward into the Indian River, so that these waterways, as well as State Road AlA, traverse th'e exclusinn area.

Activities unrelated to P;ant operation that occur within the exclusion area in lude traffic on State Road A1A, and water re'ated activities on the Indian River and Atlantic Ocean.

In case of an emergency, formal.arrangements have been made with Federal,

State, and local officials, to control the traffic and other activity on the highway, waterways-,

and beach traversing the exclusion area.

Second, beyond and surrounding the exclusion area is a low population zone (LPZ), also required by 10 CFR Part 100.

The LPZ for St.

Lucie 2 'is a circular area with a 1.609 km (1 mi) radius, measured from the center of the St.

Lucie 2 containment building.

Mithin this zone, the applicant must ensure that there is a reasonable probability that appropriate protective measures could be taken

'on, behalf of the residents in the event of a serious accident. 'll land within the LPZ is owned by the applicant (this is not required by 10 CFR Part 100),

and only structures related to the operation of the Plant are within this area.

There are no other facilities, institutions or residences in the LPZ now, or planned. far the future.

Transients occasionally use the beach seaward of the mean highwater line.

The over-water portions of the LPZ are under the jurisdic tional control of'tate and local government agencies.

In case of a radiological emergency, the applicants have made arrangements to carry out protective actions, including evacuation of personnel in the vicinity of the Plant.

For further

details, see Section

5. 10.4. 1.3.3 on Emergency Preparedness.

Third, 10 CFR Part 100 also requires that the distance from the reactor to the nearest boundary of a densely populated area containing more than about 25,000 residents be at least one and one-third times the distance from the reactor to the outer bourdary of the LPZ.

Since accidents of greater potential hazards

=- than those commonly postulated as representing an upper limit are conceivable, although highly improbable, it was considered desirable to add the population center distance requirement in 10 CFR Part 100 to provide for protectior.

against excessive exposure doses to people in large centers.

However, because of its rapid rate of growth, Port St.

Lucie is expected to become the nearest population center by about 1990.

The population center distance is at least one and one-third times the LPZ outer radius.

The largest city within 80 km (50 mi) of the St.

Lucie site is Mest Palm Beach, Florida, located ap) roximately

'5 km (34 mi) south, with a 1970 population of 57,375.

Currert population

-densities within 30 miles of the site are about 90 persons per square mile, and are projected to reach about 1064 persons per square mile during the life of the plant.-

St.

Lucie 2 FES 5-39

't The safety evaluation of the St.

Lucie site has also inc uded a review of

-potential external hazards, i.e., 'activities offsite that might adversely a feet the operation of the Plant and cause an accident.

This review encompassed nearby industrial, transportation, and military facilities that might crea e explosive, missile, toxic gas or similar hazards.

The risk to the

t. Lucie facility from such hazards has been found to be negligibly small.

A more detailed discussion of the compliance with the Commission's siting criteria and the consideration of external hazards is given in the staff's Safety Evaluation Report.

'.10.4.1.3.3 Emer enc Pre aredness I

Emergency preparedness plans including protective

'and environs are in an advanced; but not yet full

.ance with the provisions of 10 CFR Part 50, effect operating license will be issued to a nuclear fac finding is made by the staff that the state of ons action measures for the Plant completed stage.

In accord-ive November 3, 1980, no lity applicant unless a

ite and offsite emer enc g

preparedness provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.

Among the "standards that must be met by. these plans are provisions for two Emergency Planning Zones (EPZ).

A plume hxposure pathway EPZ of about 16 km (10 mi) in radius and an ingestion exposure pathway EPZ of about 80 km (50 mi) in radius

,are required.

Other standards include appropriate ranges of protective actions-for each of'hese

zones, provisions for dissemination to the public of basic emergency planning information, provisions for rapid notification of the public during a serious reactor emergency, and methods,

systems, and equipmen'or assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences in.the EPZs

~ of a radiological emergency condition.

i(

NRC, and the Federal Emergency Hanagement Agency (FEHA) have.agreed. that FEHA will make a finding and determination as to the adequacy of State and local government Emergency

Response

P~ans.

NRC will determine the adequacy of ttu.

applicant's Emergency

Response

Plans with respect to the standards listed in Section 50.47(b) of 10 CFR Part 50, the requirements of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, and the guidance contained in NUREG-0654/FEHA-REP-l, Revision 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency

Response

Plans and Preparedness in Suppor t of Nuclear Power Plants,"

dated November 1980.

After the above determinations by NRC and FEHA, the NRC will make a finding in the licenring process as to the overall and integrated state of preparedness.

The NRC staff findings will be repo: ted in its Safety Evaluation Report (SER);

Although the presence of adequate and tested emergency plans, cannot prevent an. accident, it is the staff's judgment that such plans can and will sub-stantially mitigate the consequen=es to the pubic if an accident should occur..

5.10.4. 1.4 Accident Risk and Im act Assessa nt

5. 10,4. 1.4. 1 Desi n Basis Accidents As a means of ensuring that certain features of St.

Lucie 2 meet acceptable design and performance criteria, the applicant and the staff have analyzed the pote'ial consequences of a number of postulated accidents Some of these could lead to significant releases of radioactive materials to the environment, and calculations have been performed to estimate the potential radiological consequences to persons offsite.

For each postulated initiating event,

+he St.

Lucie 2 FES 5-40

5 4

v potential. radiological consequences cover a considerable range of values depending upon how the accident develops and the relevant conditions, including wind direction and weather, prevalent during the accident.

In the safety analysi's of St.

Lucie 2, three categories of accidents have been considered.

These categories are based upon their probability of occurrence and include (a) incidents of moderate frequency, i.e.,

events that can reason-ably be, expected to occur during any year of operation, (b) infrequent acci" dents,.i.e., events tha might occur once during the life.ime of the plant, and (c) limiting faults, i.e., accidents not expected to occur but, that have the potential for significant, releases of radioactivity.

The radiological conse-quences of incidents in the first category, also called anticipated operational occurrences, are similar to the consequences discussed in Section 5. 10.3.

Some of the initiating events postulated in the second and third categories for St. Lucie 2 are shown in Table 5.5.

These are designated design basis accidents because specific design and operating features, as described above in Section 5.10.4. 1.3.l, are provided to limit-their potential radiological conse-quences.

Approximate radiation doses that might be received by a person at the nearest site boundary (1550 meters (5100 ft) from the plant) are also shown in Table 5.5, along with a character ization of the time duration of the, releases.

The results shown in the Table reflect the expectation that ESF and other operating features designed to mitigate the consequences of the postulated accident would function as intended.

An important consequence of this expecta-tion is shat the radioactive releases considered are limited to noble gases and radioiodines and that any other radioa"tive materials, e.g., in particulate.

form, are not expected zo be released.

The results are also quasi;probabilistic in nature in the sense that the meteorological dispersion conditions are"taken to be neither the best nor the worst for tn site, but rather at an average value determined by actual site measurements.

In order to contrast the results of these calculations with those using mora pessimistic, or conservative, assump-tions described below, the doses shown in. Table 5.5 are sometimes referred to as "realistic" doses.

sI

~

\\

s' The staff has also carriers out calculations to estimate the'potential upper bounds for individual exposures from the same initiating accidents in Table 5.5 for the purpose of implementing the provisions of 10 CFR Part 100, "Reactor

'ite Criteria."

For these calculations, much more pessimistic (conservative or worst case) assumptions are made as to the course taken by the accidents and the prevailing conditions.

These assumptions include much larger amounts of radioactive material. released by the initiating events, additional single failures in equipment, of eration of E=F's in a degraded mode," and very poor meteorological dispersio..'onditions.

The results of these conservative calculations snow that, for these events, the:

limiting whole"body exposures are not expected to exceed 2.5 rem to any individual at the site boundary.

They also show that radioiodine releases have the potential for offsite exposures ranging up to about 65 rem to the thyroid.

For such an exposure to occur, an individual would have to be located at a point on the site boundary where the radioiodine concentration in the plume has its highest value and inhale at a bre thing rate characteristic of a person

~he containment system, however, is assumed to prevent leakage in excess of that which can be'emonstrated by testing, as provided in 10 CFR 100.11(a).

P

,, s St.

Lucia 2 FES '": -.,

5-41 I

v vm Amm 3~

m v '

j g'c a

F Tab'le 5.5 Approximate Doses from Selected Design Basis Accidents U

I Duration of Release""

2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> doses at 1550 meters*

Mhole Bod rem r

~Infre cent accidents:

Release of liquid waste storage Steam generatort tube rupture Fuel. handling 'accident r

(2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> (2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> (2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> F

.0. 001

0. Ol

0. 025 Hain steam 'line break Control rod ejection

.. Large-break LOCA

'(2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> hours-days hours-days (0.0005 (0.0015 0.014 "The nearest site (or exclusion area) boundary.

"*( means "less than".

Source:

FES-CP; UIt UU F

t V

U St.

Lucie 2 FES

Table 5. 6 Summary of. Atmospheric Releases in Hypothetic'al Accident Sequences in a PWR (Rebaselined)

Accident Sequence Seque~~~

or

- Probability per reactor-yr Event V 0.64 0.82 0.41 0.1.'.04 0.31 0.39

~ 0.15 0.044 0.018

'0.2 0.2 0.3 0.02 0.03 2 x 10-1 x 10-

2. x 10-1 x 10-e 1 x 10-THLB'WR 3

2 x 10-N r

'I

. ~

"4r' r

4 4

~

N 4

44 I

. C/l 4

"g N

NI ~

cn Fraction of Core Inventory Released' Xe-Kr I

Cs-Rb Te-Sb Ba-Sr=.Ru La c

20xlOe 10

0. 006 30x10e 10 0.002 3.0 x 10-e 0.8 0.003 PWR ?

4.0 x 10-s

'6 x 10-3 7

'\\

14 Background

on the isotope groups and,release mechanisms is oresented in Appendix VII, u

'ASH-1400 (Ref. -45)..

See Appendix F fur description of the accident sequences and release categories.

Includes Ru, Rh, Co, Ho, Tc.

Includes Y, La, Zr, Nb,- Ce, Pr, Nd, Np, Pu, Am, Cm.

(d)

NOTE:

Please refer to Section 5.10.4. 1.4.7 for a discussion of uncertainties in risk estimates.

N II

,1 I

4

~,

~

~

4 Nf

~

~ 4

~N&r\\rW "rr.w r

4V 4rr ~

N MAt %4A4 w.

N 44N~

44 wM 4 4@. Mr.

~~4

I r

r jogging, for a period of two hours., The health risk to an individual receiving such a thyroid exposure is the potential aopearance of benign or malignant thyroid nodules in about 2 out of 100 cases, and the development of a fatal cancer in about 1 out of 1000 cases.

tt None of the calculations of the impacts of design basis accidents described in this section takes into,".onsideration possible reductions in individual or pcpulation exposures as a result of taking any protective actions.

5.10.4.1.4.2 Probabilistic Assessment of Severe Accidents In this and the following three sections, there is a discussion of the probabilities and consequences of accidents of greater severity than the design basis accidents identi; ied above in Section 5.10.4.1.4.1.

As a class, they are considered less likely to occur, but their consequences could be more severe both f>r the plant itself and for the environment.

These more severe accidents, frequently called Class 9 accidents, are different from design basis accidents in two primary'espects:

they in"vive substantial physical deterioration of

.the fuel in the reactor core, including overheating to the point of mel ing, and they involve deterioration of the capability of the containment structure to perform its intended function of limiting the release of radioactive mate-

., rials to the environment.

The assessment methodology 'employed is that described in the Reactor Safety

.Study (RSS) which was published.in 1975.~s"

'In 1980, the sets of accident "sequences that were found in the RSS to be the dominant contreibutors to'he

., risk in the prototype PMR (Surry Unit 1) were lupdated~6 ("rebaselined").

The rebaselining was done largely to incorporate peer group comments~7 and better

- data and analytical techniques resulting from research and development after the publication of the RSS.

Entailed in the rebaselining effort was the

, =evaluation of individual dom.nant accident sequences as they are understood to evolve.

The earlier technique of grouping a number of accident sequences into the encompassing Release Categories as was done in the RSS has been largely

= eliminated.

I

'I St. Lucio 2 is a Combustion Eng',neering-designed pressur'zed water reactor having similar'design and operating characteristics to the RSS prototype PMR.

Therefore, the present assessment for-St. Lucie 2 has used as its starting point'he rebaselined accident sequences and sequence groups referred to above, and more fully described in Appendix F.

Characteristics of the sequences (and re'ease,categories) used (all of which involve partial to complete melting of=

the reactor core) are shown in Table 5.6.

Sequences initiated by natural phenomena such as tornadoes, floods, or seismic events and those that could be'nitiated by deliberate acts of sabotage are not included in tbese event sequences.

The radiological consequences of such events would not be different, in kind from those which have been treated.

s4oreover, it is the staff's judg-

ment, based on design requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix A, relating to effects of natural phenomena, and 'safeguards requirements of 10 CFR Part 73, that these events do not contribute significantly to risk.

8

~

.Because this report has been the subject o, considerable controversy, a discus-sion of the uncertainties surrounding it is provided in Section 5.10.4.1.4.7.

,ap

't. Lucie 2 FES

' '-44 a

a r

~

S 'I h

r r

~ *

'r I

r

~

N T

p 9

uf c-ev re

-ac Thttof

/

Calculated probability per reactor year associated with'each accident sequence (or release category) used is shown -in the second column in Table 5.6.

As.in

- the RSS there are substantial uncertainties in these probabilities..

This is due; in part, to difficulties associated with the quantification of human error and to inadequacies in the data b'ase on failure rates of individual plant components that were used to calculate the probabilities.~7 (See Section 5-10.4.1.4.7 below.) 'he probabilities of accident sequences from Surry Unit 1 (the prototype PMR) were used to give a perspective of the societal risk of St.

Lucie 2 because, although the probabilities of particular accident sequences may be substantially different for St. Lucie 2, the overall effect of all sequences taken together is likely to be within the uncertainties (see Section 5.10.4. 1.4.7 for discussion of uncertainties in risk estimates)."

The magnitudes (curies) of radioactivity releases

/or ea~,'> accident sequence or release category are obtained by multiplying the release frart'ons shown in Table 5.6 by the amounts that would b< present in the core a;, '.he time of the hypothetical accident.

These are shown in Table 5.7 fo'r St.

L.ucie 2 at a.core thermal power level of 2754 megawatts.

.The potential radiological consequences of these releases have'been calculated by the consequence model used in the RSS~S and adapted to apply to a specific site.

The essential elements are shown -in 'schematic form in Figure 5. 3.

Environmental parameters specific to the St; Lucie site have been used and

'-,include the following:

~

Heteorological data for the'ite representing a-full year of consecutive hourly measurements and seasonal variations.

~

'Projected population for. the year 2000 extending throughout regions of 80 and 560 km (50 and 350 mi) radius from the site, including estimates of" the populat',on of off-shore islands such as

Cuba, Grand Bahama island, and many others,.

~

The habitable land fraction within the 560 km'(350 mi) radius.

/

Land use statistics, cn a state-wide basis, including farm land values, farm product values including dairy production, and growing season infor-mation, for the State of Florida ard each surrounding State within the 560 km (350 mi) region.

1he off-shore islands were assumed to have land ipse statistics comparable to Florida.

o obtain a probabili y 'distribution of consequences the calculations are er.ormed assuming the occurrence of each acciden release sequence at each.f 1 different "sta".,t" times ct>roughcut a one-year period.

Fach calculaticn tilizes the site specific hourly metecrological data and -seasonal infnrma

.icn'r the time period following each "start" time.

The consequence model also contains provision for incorporating the consequence reduction benefits of, actuation, relocate.ion and other protective actions.

Early evacuation and location of people would consiaerably reduce the exposure from the radin-tive cloud and from the contamin ted ground in the wake of +he cloud passage.

e evacuation model used (see App ndix G)'as be~n revised-from that used in

!e RSS for better site-specific application.'he quantity 'ive characteristics the evacuation model used for.'he St Lucie ite are estiiiates made by <<he St.- Lucie

. F ES 5-45

Table 5.7 Activity of Radionuclides in the St.

Lucie 2 Core at 2754 HWt Group/Radi onuc 1 ide Radioactive Inventory (millions of curies)

Hal f-1ife (days)

A.

B.

C.

NOBLE GASES Reeypeon-B Krypton-85m

!rypton-87 Krypton-88 Xenc n-133 Xenon-135 IODINES iodine-131 Iodine-732 Iodine-133 Iodine-134 Iodine-135 ALKAL1 NETALS Rub>d)uu-86 Cesium-134 Cesium-136 Ces ium"137

0. 48 21 40 59 150 29 73 100 150 160 130

0. 022 6.5 2.6 4.0 3950

0. 183 0.0528 0.117 5.23 0.384

8. 05 0.0958

0. 875 0.0366'".

280

18. 7 750 13.0 11,000 De TELLURIUM-ANTIMONY E.

F.

e lur>um-12 Te 1 1 unium-127m Tel 1 urium-129

~

Tel 1 urium-129m Tel 1 urium-131m Tel 1 urium"132 Antimony-127 Antimony-129 AKALINE EARTHS S tronts um-89 Strontium-90 Strontium-91 Barium-140 COBALT ANO NORBL kl¹ALS Cobalt-60 Molybdenum-99 Technetium-99m Ruthenium-103 Ruthenium-105 Ruthenium-106 Rhodium-105 5.1 0 95 27 4.6ll

,100 5.3 28 81 3.2 95 140

0. 67 0.25 140 120 95 62 22 42

0. 391 109 0.048 34.0

1. 25

3. 25

3. 88

0. 179

52. 1 11,030 0.403 12.8

71. 0 1920 2.8

0. 25

39. 5

0. 185 366

1. 50 St.

Lucie 2 FES, 5-46

Table 5.7 Activity of Radionuclides in the St.

Lucie 2 Core at 2754 lMt Group/Radionuclide G.

RARE EARTHS REFRACTORY OXIO AND TRANSURANICS Radioactive Inventory (millions of curies)

Half-life (days)

Vttnusrgd Yttrium-91 Zirconium-95 iirconium-97 Niobium-95 Lanthanum-140 Cerium-141 Cerium-143 Cerium-144 Praseodymsium-143 Neodymium-147 Neptunium-239 Plutonium"238 Plutonium-239 Plutonium-240 P Iutonium-241 Americium-241 Curium-242 Cu>'ium-244 3.4 100 130 130 130 140 130 110 73 110 52 1400

0. 049

0. 018

0. 018 2.9

0. 0015

0. 43

0. 020

2. 67

59. 0

65. 2

0. 71

, 35;0

1. 67

32. 3

1. 38 284 13.7 ll.1

. 2.35 32,500 8.9 x 10e 2.4 x 106 5350 1.5 x 10s 163 6630-ll(0 the abOVa gruup>ng Of rad>enuCisirde COrreSpOndS tO that

>n Table 5.6.

St.

Lucie 2 FES "5-47

I j

II I

Figure 5. 3 weather Oata Release. Categories Atnospheric Oispersion Oosieetry Health Effects Cloud Oepletion Cround Cortauination Populal;ion I

Property Oaaage

'I J

'I Evacuation Schematic Outline of Consequence Hodel.

I'I I

St. Lucie-2 FES 5"4S J. t I

I J2

staff and are partly based upon evacuation time estimates prepared by the applicant.

There may be some people near a site who will not be notified or who will choose not to evacuate (howevers there will be planning for essentially complete notification, even for those with impaired hearing or in remote living situations).

Also,'here normally would be special facilities near a plant

~

such. as schools or hospitals, where special equipment or personnel-cay be required to effect evacuation.

Such facilities near the St. Lucie site include (among others) the Lawnwood Hedical Center, the Easter Hanor'are Nursing Home, and the County Courthouse and Jail, all in Fort Pierce.

For the above reasons, actual evacuation effectiveness could be greater or less than that characterized but would not be expected to be much less.

4 The other protective actions include:

(a) either complete denial of use (inter-diction), or permitting use only at a sufficiently later time after appropriate decontamination of food stuffs such as crops and milk, (b) decontamination of severely contaminated environment (land and property) when it is considered to be economically feasible to lower the levels of contamination to protective action guide (PAG) levels, and (c) denial of use (interdiction) of severely contaminated land and property for varying periods of time until the contamina-tion levels reduce to such values by radioactive decay and weathering so that land and property can be economically decontaminated as in (b) above.

These actions would reduce the radiological exposure to the people from immediate and/or subsequent use of or living in the contaminated environment.

Early evacuation in the plume exposure pathway EPZ and the other protective actions mentioned above are considered appropriate sequels to serious nuclear reactor accidents at this site involving significant release of radioactivity to the atmosphere.

Therefore, the dose consequence results shown for these more severe accidents at St.

Lucie 2 include the benefits of these protective actions.

There are also uncertainties in the estimates of consequences, and the error bounds may be as large as they are for the probabilities.

It is the judgment of the staff, however, that it is more likely that the calculated results are overestimates of consequences rather than underestimates.

The results of the calculations using this consequence model are radiological doses to individuals and to populations, health effects that. might result from these exposures, costs of implementing protective actions, and costs associated with property damage by radioactive contamination.

5. 10.4. 1.4.3 Dose and Health Im acts of Atmos heric Releases The results of the calculations of dose and health impacts performed for the St.Lucie 2 facility and site are presented in the form of probability distri-butions in Figures 5.4 through 5. 7 and are included in the impact Summary Table 5.8. All'fthe accident sequences shown in Table 5.5 contribute to the results.

The consequences from each sequence or group of sequences is weighted by its associated probability.

. ~arly exposure to an individual inciudes external doses from the radioactive cloud and the contaminated

ground, and the dose from internally deposited radionuclides from inhalation of contaminated air during the cloud passage.

Other pathways of exposure are excluded.

St.

Lucie 2 FES 5-49

Figure 5.4 shows probability distribution curves for the number of per"ons who might receive whole body doses equal to or greater than 200 rems and 25 rems, and thyroid doses equal to or greater than 300 rems from early exposure," all on a per-reactor-year basis.

A 200-rem whole body dose corresponds approximately to a threshold value for which hospitalization would be indicated fur the treatment of radiation injury.

A 25-rem whole body dose (which has been identified earlier as the lower limit for clinically observable physiological effects in nearly all people) and 300-rem thyroid dose are guideline values applied to reactor siting in 10 CFR Part 100.

Figure '5.4 shows that there are less than 5 chances in 1,000,000 per year (a 5 x 10-o probability) that one or more persons,may receive doses equal to or greater than any of these doses specified.

The fact that the three curves initially run almost parallel in horizontal lines shows that if one person were to receive such doses, the chances are about the same that ten to hundreds would be so exposed.

The chances of larger numbers of persons being exposed at those levels are seen to be considerably smaller.

For

example, the chances are less'han 1 in 100,000,000 (a 10-a probability) that 10,000 or more people might receive whole-body doses of 200 rem or greater.

It should be noted that a very low probability, such as 10-per reactor year, is associated with a large release of radioactive material at a time when there are very infrequent w ather conditions that tend to maximize total exposure.

A majority-of the exposures reflected in this figure would be expected to occur to persons within a 64 km (40 mi) radius of the plagt.

Virtually all exposures would occur within a 113 km (70 mi) radius.

I Figure 5.5 shows the probability distribution for the total population exposure in person-rems, that is, probability per reactor-year that the total population exposure will equal or exceed the values given.

Huch of the population exposure, up to about one million person-rems, would occur within 80 km (50 mi) but the more severe releases as in the first two accident sequences in Table 5.6 would result in exposure to persons beyond the 80 km (50 mi) range as shown.'or perspective, population doses shown in Figure 5.5 may be compared with the annual average dose to the popu!ation within 80 km (50 mi) of the St.

Lucie site due to natural barkground radiation of 83,000 person-rem, and to the anticipated annual population dose per reactor to the general public (the entire U.S.) from normal plant operation of 50 person-rem (excluding plant workers).

Figure 5.6 shows the probability distribution for acute fatalities, representing radiation injuries that would produce fatalities within about one year after exposure.

Virtually all of the acute fatalities would be expected to occur within a 20 km (12. 5 mi) radius.

The results of the calculations shown in

'this figure and in Table 5.9 reflect the effect of evacuation within the 16 km (10 mi) plume exposure pathway EP2 only.

For the very low probability accidents having the potential for causing radiation exposure above the threshold for acute fatality beyond 16 km (10 mi), it would be realistic to expect that-authorities would evacuate persons at all distances at which such exposures might occur.

Therefore, the number of people exposed to doses that might cause acute fatalities could reasonably be expected to be lower than calculated.

However, for this site the upper end of the dose consequences versus probability spectrum indica es that for some very small probabilities, the number of people with doses of such severity to warrant,-supportive medical treatment may exceed St.

Lucie 2 FES 5-50

PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS OF INDIVIDUALDOSE IMPACTS

~ 1(f 10

1(f 10 -'0 10

=

1($

C7 A

S4 g'o 4l

~P O

~A'o LHGHND a =%HOLE BODY DOSE ~ 25 RHM 0 = WHOLH BOD'Y DOSE ~ 200 MM

~ = THYROID DOSH ~ 300 REM IN r~0 p

OO.

1 X=NUMBEtl OP AI"I.'HCTHD PHHSONS 0

10 10 Figure 5.4 Note'Please see Section 5.10.4.1.4.7 for discussion of uncertainties in risk estimates.

10

PHQBABIL1TY DISTRIBUTIONS OF POPULATION EXPOSUBj"8 yi0'.0 10' 16 f(f 10 15o I EGHND

> = ENTIRE EXPOSED POPULATION o=POPULATION WITIIIN 50 MILES o

<'o 10 10 10 10 X'=TOTAL PERSON REM whole body Figure 5.5 llote:

Please see Section 5.10.4.1.4.7 for discussion of uncertainties in risk estimates

'o 18

PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION OP ACUTE PATALITIHS e 1d lt '6 1&

LEGEND G=HVAC. TO 10 MILES M

C pg r

O O

10 1(f

=

10 X=ACUTE I'ATALITI&

Figure 5.6 Note:

Please see Section 5.1Q.4.1.4,? for discussion of uncertainties in risk estimates.

e'O 10'

Vl IVl

)O A

C O

U+O R

PP Q'O M

~.O C

BGBA/31LITY DISTHIBUTiO.NS Ol'ANCER PATALITiL'8, t6'0'U l&

LHGHND

'N'I'IBH HXPOSHD POP ULA'I'ION--HXCL.'I'IIYHOID o:= HN'I'IBH HXPOSHD POPUI,A'I'ION - -'I'ilYBOID ONLY

~=WIVtllN ~O MILHS--EXCLUDING VIIYBOID l

WITillÃ50 MILi',S--TilYBOI9ONLY 0O

'O

<'0 10 10 Xl=LATiÃTCANCHR "ATALITIr'S Figure 5.7

~

Note:

Please see Section 5.10.4.1.4.7 for discussion-of uncertainties in risk estimates LQ

E Table 5.8 Summary of Environmental Impacts and Probabilities I

I IC' eJo EO Probability of Impact Per Reactor"Year Persons Persons

'Exposed Exposed over 200 rem over 25 rem

.Population Exposure Millions of

'cute person-rem Fatalities 50 mi/Total r

Latent*

Cancers Cost of Offsite 50 mi/

t/itigating Actions Total

'Hillions of Dollars

]0-~

r=='o-s 5 x lo-e

]Qa6

]Qa7 F

~ *',, ~

]Qua Related figure 0

0 0

35 4000 8500 -

5.3 0

0 0

24,000 85,000 190,000 5.3 0

0 0

0

,200 850 5.'5 0/0 0.007/0.009 0.3/2 6/21 13/58'20/100 5.4 0/0 0/0 50/]60 700/1700 1700/4000 2400/6000

'.6 22 140 900

• 2000 4000 5.7 "Includes cancers. of all organs.

Genetic effects might be approximately twice the number of latent cancers HQTE:

Please refer to Section 5.10.4.1.4.7 for. a di cussion of uncertainties in risk estimates.

4 d

the nation's capacity for providing the best sepportive medical care.

The effect of this on the number of acute fatalities is discussed in Appendix G.

Figure 5.7 represents the relationship between population exposure and the induction of >atal latent cancers--that is, those cancers that might appear over a period of many years following exposure.

The impacts on the total population and the population within 80 km (50 mi) are shown separately.

The fatal latent cancers have been subdivided, into those attrihutable to exposures of the thyroid and to those attributable to exposures of all other organs.

As noted in Section

5. 10.4.1. 1, the various measures for avoidance of adverse health effects including those due to residual radioactive contamination in the environment are possible consequential impacts of severe accidents.

'Calculations of the probabilities and magnitude= of such impacts for St.

Lucie 2 and environs have also been made.

Unlike the radiation exposure and adverse health effect impacts discussed

above, impacts associated with adverse health effects avoidance are more readily transformed into economic impacts.

The results are shown'as the probability distribution for costs of offsite mitigating actions in Figure 5.8 and are included in the impact Summary Table 5.8.

The factor contributing to these estimated c.osts=include the fo 1 1 owing:

Evacuation costs Yalue of crops contaminated and condemned Value of milk contaminated and condemned Costs of decontamination of property where practical, I

Indirect costs due to loss of use of property and incomes derived therefrom.

1'he last named costs would derive from the necessity for interdiction to prevent the use of property until it is either free of contamination or can be economically decontaminated.

F>gure 5.8 shows that at the extreme end of the accident spectrum these costs could exceed billions of dollars but that the probability that this would occur is exceedingly small, less than one chance in one million pei year.

Additional economic impacts that can be monetized include costs of decontamina-tion of the facility it elf and the costs of replacement power.

Probability distributions for these impacts have not been calculated, but they are included in the discussion of risk considerations in Section

5. 10.4. 1.4.6 below.

5. 10.4. 1.4.5 Releases to Groundwater A pathway for public radiation exposure and environmental contamination that would be unique for-severe reactor acciderts war identified in Section 5.10.4. l. 1 St.

Lucie 2 FES 5"56

4x 4

PR013h.BILi ~Y DISg'RI13UTION Dil MITIGATION MEASURES

.".10 l0 l0 l0 l0' 10 10 10'

~

~MAid!!I C.OS'i'G-:

Art~

'N, O

'O OO 0

-Qi

'O 1

OO n

O 0

10

~'PTTTAI 10 10

= Hf 10 kd LO X=-TOTAL COFl'N DOLLARS 1980 F/gure 5.8 Note:

P1ease see Sect'.on 6.10.4.i.4.7 for discussion of uncerta$ nt$ es

$ n risk estimates O

i,0'g 5

I above.

Consideration has been given to the potential, environmental impact of this pathway for the St.

Lucie Plant.

The pnincipal contributors to the risk are the core melt accidents associated with the PWR-1 through 7 release cate-gories.

The penetration of the basemat of the containment building can release molten core debris to the geologic st'rata beneath the Plant.

Soluble radio-nuclides in this debris can be leached and transported with groundwater to down-gradient domestic wells used for drinking*or to surface water bodies used for aquatic food and recreation.

In pressurized water reactors, such as the St.

Lucie P'lant, there is an additional opportunity for groundwater contamina-tion due to the release of contaminated sump water to the ground through a

breach in the containment.

An analysis of the potential consequences of a liquid pathway release of radioactivity for generic sites was presented in the "Liquid Pathway Generic Study" (LPGS).~

The LPGS comp'red the risk of accidents involving the liquid pathway (drinking water, irrigation, aquatic food, swimming and shoreline usage) for four conventional, generic land-based nuclear plants and a floating nuclear plant, for which the nuclear reactors would be mounted on a barge and moored in a water body.

Parameters for the land-based sites were chosen to represent averages for a wide range of real sites and are thus "typical," but represented no real site in pa'rticular.

The discussion in this section is an analysis to determine whether or not the St.

Lucie site liquid pathway consequences would be uniquely severe when com-pared to land-based sites considered in the LPGS.

The method consists of a direct scaling of the LPGS population doses based on the relative values of key parameters characterizing the LPGS "ocean" site and the St.

Lucie site.

The parameters which were evaluated included amounts of radioactive materials enter-ing the ground, groundwater travel time, sorption on geologic media, surface water transport, aquatic food consumption, and shoreline usage.

Ooses to individuals and populations were calculated in the LPGS without con-sideration of interdiction methods such as isolating the contaminated ground-water or denying use of the water.

In the event of surface water contamination, commercial and sports fishing, as well as many other water-related activities, would be restricted.

The consequences

'ould therefore be largely economic or

social, rather than radiological.

In any event, the individual and population doses for,'the liquid pathway range from fractions to very small fractions of those that can arise from the airborne.pathways.

The St.

Lucie site is located on Hutchinson Island, which is a typical east coast barrier island in southern Florida.

The site is bordered by the Indian River (an estuarine bay) on the southwest, the Atlantic Ocean on the northeast and Big Hud Creek (a backwater off the Indian River) on the northwest.

Ground-water flows in several layers under the site, but the only flows which concern

~ the liquid pathway analysis are in the unconsolidated sand and silt water table aquifer of the Anastasia formation.

The Anastasia format. on is roughly 50 meters (150 feet) thick at the site.

Groundwater flows in this formation are generally toward the Atlantic Ochan, caused by recharge from precipitation on the mainland.

The Indian River comes between Hutchinson Island and the mainland, but is too shallow to intercept the major portion of groundwater flow toward the ocean.

Piezometers located on

. Hutchinson Island generally show a slight gradient of 0.00016 toward the ocean.~7 St.

Lucie 2 FES 5-58 1

a

1 Using the applicant's site parameters Shown in Table 5.9, the staff calculated, a groundwate travel time of 1180 years to the Atlantic Ocean.

This compares to a ground'..ater travel time of 0.61 years used in the LPGS ocean-based case,~e which would clearly demonstrate the superiority of the St. Lucie site for the liquid pathway contribution tp risk if it could be determined that this is the only pathway for contaminants released to groundwater to reach the surface water.,

There exists,

however, the possibility of an alternative pathway for contamina" tion of surface water via groundwater travel to Big Mud Creek.

The placement of piezometers on Hutchinson Island is not adequate to show the existence of a gradient toward Big Hud Creek, which is the closest body of surface water.

A phenomenon on many islands is the presence of a fjesh water lens in the, water table which floats over salt water.

The lens is supported by the infiltration of fresh water from precipitation.'t is thickest in the middle of the island and thinnest at the coasts.

It'is the possibility of a gradient in the fresh water lens towards Big Mud Creek. that is of concer'n here.

The staff analyzed the transport of radioactively contaminated water released to the postulated fresh water lens using an analytical method based on the Ghyben-Hertzberg approximation for fresh water lenses.s Thc: estimated minimum travel time for groundwater'o reach Big Hud Creek is 29 years.,

For groundwater 'ravel times on the order of years, the staff has shown~e that the only significant radionuclide contributors to.the liquid pathway population dose from an assumed core melt accident would be Sr90 and Csl37.

These two nuclides interact chemically with most geologic media and thus travel more slowly than the groundwater.

Conservative values of the retardation factors,.

which reflect the effects of sorption of -the radionuclides on geologic mate-

- rials, were estimated by the applicant to be 9.5 for Sr and 86 for Cs.

The staff considers these values to be conservative, and consistent with ranges of retardation factors displayed by geologic materials similar to those found under the site. 'sing these values the staff estimates that the mean ground-water transport time from the reactor buildings to Big Hud Creek would be 278 years for Sr-90 and 2520.years for Cs-137.

Groundwater travel times to the Atlantic Ocean would be much longer, about 11,000 years for Sr-90 and l00,000 years for Cs-137.

When these travel times are compared to the 5.7 years. for Sr"90 and 51 years for Cs-137 used in the LPGS land-based ocean site case, the relatively larger travel t mes for the St.

Lucie site would allow a much smaller fraction of the released radioactivity to escape to the surface water.

This reduction would be about a factor of 775 for Sr;90 in the pathway to Big Hud Creek.

Yirtually all of the Cs-137 would have decayed before reaching surface water. via either path-way as would the Sr-90 for the pathway to the Atlantic Ocean.

Contaminated water reaching Big Mud Creek would subsequently be transported into the Indian River and then carried to.the Atlantic Ocean.

The two poten-tial liquid exposure pathways for the site are aquatic food consumption and

'direct shoreline exposure.

The applicant estimated the commercial and recreational finfish and shellfish harvests within 80 km (50 mi) of the St.

Lucie site to be abou.

2.6 X 30~ Kg/yr (2.9 x 10~ tons/yr). s This value includes all brackish inland waterways.

The staff considers these values for,the amount of affected seafood harvest to be

'I r

St.

Lucie 2 FES 5"59 Lk

Table 5.9 Comparison of St.

Lucie and LPGS Land Based Ocean Site Liquid Pathway Consequences Parameter LPGS St.

Lucie Groundwater Flow to Atlantic Ocean St.

Lucie Groundwater Flow to Big Hud Creek Groundwater Yelocity Qistance to Surface Mater Effective Porosity Permeability 2188 (700 ft) 0.2 H/A 0.4 5 x 10-s 'cm/sec (5173 ft/yr) 1180 0.4 5 x 10-a cm/sec

0. 61 Groundwater Travel Time (years)

Retardation Sr Coefficients Cs Radionuclide Sr Travel Time Cs (years)

Fraction Sr -90 Reaching Cs-137 surface water Total finfish

1. 9 8 shellfish (2. 1 annual harvest within 80 km Population dose relative to LPGS-aquatic food shore 1 ine 29 9.2 83 9.5 86 11,000 100,000 9.5 86 278 2520 5.7 51

0. 87

0. 31

~0

~0 0.0013 6.3 x 10-~a x 10s Kg x 10'ons) 2.6 x 10~

Kg 2.6 x 10~

Kg (2.9' 10~ tons) 1.0 1.0 wO w0 0.0078 w0 2m/day 0.00173 m/day H/A (6.7 ft/day)

(0.00568 ft/day) 460m (1500 ft) 745m (2444 ft)

St. Lucie 2 FES 5-60

conservative for the reason that much of these waters would be"unaffected by the assumed releases from the Plant.

The LPGS evaluation considered only the recreational and commercial fishing offshore, which is taken to be about 1.9 x 10 Kg/yr (2100 tons/yr).

Therefore, the St.

Lucie catch is taken to be a factor of about'4 times greater than the LPGS catch.

Approximately 62 percent of the population dose from aquatic food consumption calculated in the LPGS was due to Cs-137 and approximately 38 percent was due to Sr-90.

The only significant radionuclide which could enter the ocean from the liquid pathway in the St.

Lucie case is Sr-90 via the Big Mud Creek path" way.

The staff has conservatively estimated, therefore, that the population dose without interdiction in the St.

Lucie case would be at least a factor of 930 smaller than the LPGS case for seafood consumption.

Nearly all of the direct shoreline exposure in the LPGS case was determined to be caused by Cs-137.

Since virtually all of the Cs-137 should decay before reaching the ocean, the direct exposure pathway can be eliminated from further consideration.

Results of these analyses are summarized in Table 5.9.

The St.

Lucie liquid pathway contribution to population dose has, therefore, been demonstrated to be smaller than that pre8icted for the LPGS land based ocean site, which repr esents a "typical" ocean site.

Thus the St. Lucie site is not unique in its liquid pathway Cohtribution to risk.

There are measures which could be awaken to minimize the impact of the liquid pathway.

The staff estimated that the minimum groundwater travel time from the St.

Lucie site to Big Mud Creek would be at least 29 years.

In addition, the holdup of important radionuclides would provide additional time to utilize engineering measures such as slurry walls and well point dewatering to isolate the radioactive contaminants at the source.

5. 10.4.1.4.6 Risk Considerations The foregoing discussions have dealt separately with the probabilities and consequences of accidents.

These two factors are combined to obtain average measures of environmental risk of accidents.

Such averages can be particularly instructive as an aid to the comparison of radiological risks associated with accident releases and with normal operational releases.

A common way in which this combination of factors is used to estimate risk is to multiply the probabilities by the consequences.

The estimate is then expressed numerically as consequences expected per unit of time.

By use of such a quantification of risk the staff does not mean to assert that there is universal agreement that people's attitudes about risk, or what constitutes an acceptable risk, should be governed solely by such a measure.

Nevertheless, we believe that. it can be a contributing, but not necessarily

decisive, factor in making a risk judgment.

Table 5. 10 shows average annual values of risk for the St.

Lucie 2 reactor, associated with population dose, acute fatalities, latent fatalities, and costs for evacuation, other protective actions, and decontamination.

These average values are obtained by multiplying the probabilities by the consequences, and summing these products over the entire range of consequence distribution.

Since the probabilities are on a per reactor-year

basis, the average risks shown are also on a per reactor-year basis.

St. Lucie 2 FES 5"61

1 Table 5.10 Average Values of Environmental Risks Due to Accidents, per Reactor Year Population exposure person-rem within 80 km (50 mi) person-rem total Acute fatalities

,Latent cancer fatalities all organs excluding thyroid thyroid only IlCost of protect&re actions and de 20 78 0.00007 0.005 0.0014 ontamination

$4,250 NOTE:

See Section 5. 10.4.1.4.7 foIr discussions of uncertainties in risk estimates.

St.

Lucie 2 FES 5-62

I

The population exposure may be compared with those for normal operation releases shoQn in Appendix E, Table E.7.

The population exposure risk within 80 km (50 mi) due to accidents is about 20 person-rem, higher than the average annual dose of 4 person-rem due to normal operations.

The two figures are roughly comparable, however, considering the uncertainties involved.

There are no acute fatality or economic risks associated with protective actions,and decontamination for normal releases; therefore, these risks are unique for accidents.

For perspective and understanding of the meaning of the acute fatality accident risk estimate of 0. 00007 per year, the staff notes tha'he population at risk is most'ly within about 16 km (10 mi) of the plant (about 163,000 persons in the year 2000).

The risk of accidental fatalities per year for a population of this size, based upon overa)l averages for the United

States, are approximately 36 for motor vehicle accidents, 13 from falls, 5 from

drowning, 5 from burns, and 2 from firearms.s~

The economic risk associated with protective actions and decontamination'could be compared with property damage costs associated with alternative energy

.. generation technologies.

The use of fossil fuels, coal or oil, for example, would emit substantial quantities of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides into the atmosphere,

and, among other things, lead to environmental and ecological damage through the phenomenon of acid rain.ss This effect has not, however, been sufficiently quantified to draw a useful comparison at this time.

Figure 5.9 shows the calculated risk expressed as whole"body dose to an individual from early exposure as w function of the distance from the Plant-within the plume exposure pathway EPZ.

The values are on a per reactor-year basis and all accident sequences and sequence groups in Table 5.6 contributed to the dose, weighted by their associated probabilities.

Evacuation and other protective actions reduce the risks to an individual of acute and latent cancer fatalities.

Figures 5.10 and 5.11 show curves of constant risk, as a function of distance, per reactor year, to an individual living in the St.

Lucie 2 plume exposure pathway EPZ, of acute death and death from lztent cancer, respectively, due to potential accidents in the reactor.

Directional variation of thes curves reflect the variation in the average

'raction of the year the wind would be blowing into different directions from the Plant.

For comparison the following risks of fatality per year to an individual living in the U.S.

may be noted;s~

automobile accident 2.2 x 10-~,

falls 7.7 X 10-

, drowning 3. 1 x 10-

, burning 2.9 x 10-

, and firearms

= 1.2 x 10-s.

There are other economic impacts and risks that can be assigned a monetary value that are not included in the cost calculations discussed in Section

'. 10.4. 1.4.4.

These are accident impacts on the facility itself that result in added costs to the public, i.e., ratepayers, taxpayers and/or shareholders.

These costs would be associated with decontamination, repair or replacement of the facility, and for replacement power.

No detailed methvdology has been developed for estimat ng the contributions of an accident to the economic risks to the licensee for decontamination and restoration of the plant.

Experience with such costs is currently being accumulated as a result of the Three fille Island accident.

If an accident occurred during the first year of St.

Lucie 2 (1984) operation, the economic e

St. Lucie 2 FES 5-63

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penalty associated with the initial year of the unit's operation is estimated at $ 1.0 billion for decontamination and

$ 60Q million for restoration, including replacement of ihe damaged nuclear fuel.

The staff considers the estimate as conservative (high) in that the total costs are assumed to occur during the first year of the accide it, whei eas in reality the costs would be spread over several years thereafter.

Although insurance would cover

$ 300 million of the

$ 1600 million, the insurance is not credited against the

$ 16QO million because the

$300 million times the risk probability should theoretically balance the insurance premium.

In addition, the staff estimates additional fuel costs of

$ 225 million (1984 dollars) for replacement power during each year the unit is being restored.

This estimate assumes that the energy that would have been forthcoming from St.

Lucie 2 (assuming 60K capacity factor} will be replaced primarily by oil"fired generation.

Assuming

$225 million per year for replace-ment power costs and inoperation of St.

Lucie 2 for 8 years, the total addi-tional replacement power costs in 1984.dollars ~ould be approximately

$1.8 billion.

If the probability of sustaining a total loss of the original unit is taken as the sum of the occurrence of a core melt accident (the sum of the probabilities for the categories in Table 5 6), then the probability of a disabling accident happening during each year of the units service life is 4.8 x 10"s.

Hulti-plying the previously estimated cost of $3.4 bi llion for'n accident to St.

Lucie 2 during the initial year of its operation by the above 4.8 x 10-s probability results in an economic risk of approximately

$165,000 applicable to St.

Lucie 2 during its first year of operation.

This is also approximately the economic risk during the second and each.subseouent year of its operation.

Although nuclear units depreciate in value and may operate at, reduced capacity factors such that the economic consequences due to an accident become less as the units becoi.e older, this is offset, by higher costs of decontamination and restoration of the unit in the later years due to inflation.

I

5. 10.4. 1. 4 ~ 7 Uncertainties The foregoing prcbabilistic and risk assessment discussion has been based upon the methodology presented in the Reactor Safety Study (RSS) which was published in 1975.

In July 1977, the 1(RC organized an Independent Risk As~=-.sment Review Group to (1) clarify the achievements and limitations of the React 'afety Study Group, (2) assess the peer comments thereon and the responses i'~ ihe comments, (3) study the current state of such risk assessment methodology, and (4) recommend to the Commission how and whether such methodology can be used in the regulatory and licensing process.

The results of this study were issued September 1978."~

This report, called the Le~is Report, contains several findings and recommenda-tions concerning the RSS.

So"e of tNe more significant findings are summar,'.zed below.

A number of sources of both conserv<< '.isn and nonconservatism in the probability calculations in RSS were found, wliich were very difficult to balance.

The Review Group was unable to determine whether the overall probability of a core melt given in the RSS was high or low, but they did conclude that the error bands were understated.

'St.

Lucie 2 FES 5-67

4

)

The methodology, which was an important advance over earlier methodologies that had been applied to reactor risk, was sound.

It is very difficult to follow the detailed thread of calculations thro'ugh the RSS.

In particular, the Executive Summary is a poor'escription of the contents of the report, should not be used as such, and has lent

'tself to misuse in the discussion of reactor risk.

RSS and the Review Group Report.

The Commission ac Review Group.

On January'.18,

1979, the Commissisn issued a statement of policy concerning the cepted the findings of the The accident at Three Hile Island occurred in Mare accumulated experience record was about 400 reacto to note that this was within the range of frequenc an accident of this severity.

It should also be Island accident has'esulted in a very comprehensi 1979 at a time when the

-years.

It is of interest es estimated by the RSS for noted that the Three Mile e evaluation of reactor accidents like that one, by a significant number of investigative groups both within HRC and outside of it.

Actions to improve the safety of nuclear power plants have come out of these investigations, including those from the Presi-dent's Commission on, the Accident at Three Mile Island, and staff investiga-tions and task forces.

A comprehensive "NRC Action Plan Developed as a Result of the THI-2 Accident," HUREG-0660, Vol. I, Hay 1980 collects the various

,recoenendations of these groups and describes themlunder the subject areas of:

Operational Safety; Siting and Design; Emergency Preparedness and Radiation Effects; Practices and Procedures; and tiRC Policy, Organization and Hanagement.

Th;. action plan presents a sequence of actions, some already taken, that will

'esult in a gradually increasing improvement in safety as individual actions are completed.

St.

Lucie 2 is receiving and will receive the benefit of these actions.

The impfovement in safety from these actions has not been. quantified,

however, and the radiological risk of accidents discussed in this chapter does not reflect these improvements.

Subsequent to the preparation of this section for t)e Draft Environmental State-ment by the staff, the applicant had submitted revised estimates of population, based on 1980 census

data, and revised estimates os population growth within 50 miles of the St. Lucie site over the projected life span of the plant.

These prrjections reflect a larger growth rate of population, particularly within 10 miles of the plant, than those used in the consequence calculations

. that appeared in the OES.

The increased population projection was one of

'everal changes to input for the consequence calcu.ations between the OES and FES Others included a shorter delay time prior to evacuation, but a slower

'effective evacuation

speed, and a shorter time before relocation for residents between 16 and 40 km (10 and 25 mi) away from the site.-

The effect of these

changes, necessitated by new information and a refinement of the modeling proc-

ess, has been to predict fewer acute fatalities and more latent cancer fatali-ties, with other consequences increasing moderately for the most part; The evacuation and relocation changes are discussed further in Appendix G.r 5.10.4.2 Conc.lusions The foregoing sec'tions consider the potential environmental impacts from acci-dents at St.

Lucie 2.

These have, covered a broad spectrum of possible acci-dental re1eases of radioactive materials into the environment by atmospheric

.'. St. Lucie 2 FES 5-68 g

1 h

U

h El N

and groundwater pathways.

Included in the considerations are postulated design basis accidents and more severe accident sequences that lead to a severely damaged reactor core or core melt.

h The 'environmental impacts that have been considered include potential radiation exposures to individuals and to the population as a whole, the risk of near-and long-term adverse health effects that such exposures could entail, and the potential economic and societal consequences of accidental contamination of the

" environment.

These impacts could be severe, but the likelihood of their occurrence is judged to be small.

This conclusion is based on (a) the fact that considerable experience has been gained with the operation of similar facilities without significant degradation of the environment; and (b) a, pi obabilistic assessment of the risk based upon the methodology developed in the Reactor Safety Study.

The overall assessment, of environmental risk of accidents, assuming protective action, shows that it is higher, but roughly comparable to, the risk for normal operational

releases, although accidents have a potential for acute fatalities and economic costs that cannot arise

,from normal operations.

The risk of acute fatalities from potential accidents at the site are small in comparison with the risk of acute fatalities from other human activities in a comparably sized population.

I I

~

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The 'staff has concluded that there are no special or unique features'bout the

, St.

Lucie 2 site and environs that would warrant additional mitigation features for St.

Lucie 2.

5. 11 Impacts'from the Uranium Fuel C cle The Uranium Fuel Cycle rule, 10 CFR Part 51 (44 FR 45362), reflects the latest information relative to the reprocessing of spent fuel and to radioactive waste

'management as discussed in HVREG-0116, Environmental Survey of the Reprocessing'nd Waste Hanagement Portions of the LMR Fuel Cycle, and HUREG-0216, which presents staff responses to comments on HUREG-0116.

The rule also considers other environmental factors of the uranium fuel cycle, including aspects of mining and milling, isotopic enrichment, fuel fabrication, and management of low-and high-level wastes.

These are described in the AEC report MASH-1248, Environmental Survey of the Uranium Fuel Cycle.

The staff was-also directed to develop an explanatory narrative that would convey in understandable terms the significance of releases in the table.

The narrative was also to address such important fuel cycle impacts as environmental dose commitments and hea'1th

effects, socioeconomic impacts and cumulative impacts,

~here these are appro-priate for generic treatment.

This explanatory narrative was published in the Statement contains a number of sections that address those impacts of the LMR supporting fuel cycle that reasonably appear to have significance.,for indivi-dual reactor licensing sufficient to warrant attention for HEPA purposes.

Table 5-3 of the final rule is reproduced in its entirety as Table 5. 11. herein.

Specific categories of natural resource use included in the Table relate to land.use, water consumption and thermal effluents, radioactive releases, burial of ti ansuranic and high" and low;level wastes, and radiation doses from trans-portation and occupational exposures.

The contributions in the taule for

'eprocessing, waste management, and transportation of ~astes are maximized for either of the two fuel cycles (uranium only and no recycle); that is, the cycle that results in the greater impact is used.

h

.St. Lucie 2 FES

'- 5"69

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"ES 5-7a

.1 Appendix H of this FES contains a description of the enviornmental impact assessment I

of the uranium fuel cycle as related to the operation of the St. Lucie P'.ant.

The environmental impacts are based on the values given in Table S"3 (Table ~.ll),

and on an analysis"'of the radiological impact from redo~-222 and technet;um-99 releases.

The staff has determined that the environdenta) impact of the Plant on the U.S. population from radioactive gaseous and liquid releases (including radon and technetium) due to the uranium fuel cycle i,s insignificant when com-pared with the impact of natural background radiation.

In addition, the non-radiological impacts of the uranium fuel cycle have b'een found to be acceptable.

5.12 Decommissionin Decommissioning of a nuclear po~er reactor does not u mental impacts whick are unique to a specific project decommissioning nuclear facilities is we)1 in hand,

'a improvements in decommissioning techniques are to be I

ual ly involve environ-The technology for d, while techhical xpected, at the present ommission, January 1981.

5.13 Emer enc Plannin im'acts t>me decomm>ssioning can be performed sa ely and at r asonable cost.

Radiation doses to the public as a result of decommissioning activities should be very small and would primarily come from the transportation of decommisdioning waste

, to waste burial grounds.

Radiation doses to decommissioning workers should be

~ a small fraction of the'orker exposure over the operating )ifetime of the facility; these doses usually wi)1 be well within the. occupational exposure

'imits imposed by regulatory requirements.

Decommiss>oning costs for reactors

're a small fraction of the present worth commissioning costs.

A full analysis

'of decommissioning is available in HUREG-0586, "Draft Generic Environmental Impact Statement nn Decommissioning of, Huc)ear Facilities," U.S. Huclear Regulatory C

5.13.1 Im act from Siren Alert 5 stem I

FP8L is currently developing its Emergency Plan for the Plant in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, as well as the recommended criteria contained in HURFG-0654.

The staff believes the only noteworthy potential source of.impact on the pub" c from emergency planning would be associated with a siren alert system.

A com-plete cycle test will be required annually.

The test requirements and al-rm noise )evels are corsistent with those used for existing alert systems; there-fore, the staff concludes that the noise impacts associated with a siren alert system will be infrequent and insignificant.

5.13.2 'Emer enc 0 erations Facilit An Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) will be constructed to conform to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, as amended to meet the recommended criteria contained in HUREG-0696.

The ~toff believes that this car. be done in a manner that will not significantly disturb the area and without imposing an unaccept-ab)e environmental impact on the affected area.

- St.,t.ucie 2 FES

- ~

4'

)

'-71

5.

1a.

References Florida Power and Light Company.

1980.

Annual Hon-Radiological Environmental Honitoring Report 1979.

Vol. 1-3, prepared by Applied Biology Inc., Atlanta, GA.

Florida Power and Light Company.

198la.

Annual Hon-Radiological Environmental Honitoring Report 1980.

Vol. 1-2, prepared by Applied Biol~gy Inc, Atlanta, GA.

2..Uhrig, Robert E. 198la.

Letter to Darrel G. Eisenhut, U.

S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C., from Robert E. Uhrig, Florida Power and Light Company, Hiami, FL, dated April 27, 1981.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

12.

13.

14.

15.

Florida Power and Light Company.

1981b.

Environmental Report - Operating

License, Hiami, FL, dated February 13, 1981.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

l979.

License Amendment Ho.

29 to Appendix 8 to Operating License No.

DPR-67 for the St.

Lucie Plant, dated January 24, 1979.

Goodyear, C.

P.

1977.

Mathematical methods to evaluate entrainment of aquatic organisms by power plants.

FWS/OBS-76/20.3.

U.S. Dept. of the Interior Fish and Wildlife Service.

Topical Briefs:

Fish and Wildlife Res.

and Electrical Power Generation, No. 3.

17 pp.

Op. Cit.,

FP&L, 198lb.

Op. Cit., FP&L, 198lb.

Op. Cit., FP&L, 1981b.

FP&L Co.,

1977.

ABI 1978.

Ecological monitoring at the Florida Power and Light Co. St.

Lucie Plant Annual Report 1977, Vol. 1.

Prepared for the Florida Power and Light Co., Hiami FL.

Op. Cit., FP&L, 1980.

,Op. Cit., FP&L, 198la.

Op. Cit., FP&L, 1980.

Op. Cit., FP&L, 1981a.

Youngbl'ood, Billy J.

1981.

Letter to Donald J.

Hankla, U.S.

Fish and Wildlife Service, Jacksonville, FL, from Billy J.

Youngblood, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., dated February 12, 1981.

Ydungblood, Billy J.

1981.

Letter to Harold B. Allen, U.S. National Harine Fisheries

Service, St.

Petersburg, FL, from Billy-J. Youngblood, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., dated February 12, 1981.

St.

Lucie 2 FES 5-72

16.

17.

17a.

'7b.

17c.

17d.

17e.

17f.

17g.

17h.

17i.

I Allen, Harold B.

1981.

Letter to Billy J. Youngblood, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., from Karold B. Allen, U.'.

National Marine Fisheries

Service, St.

Petersburg, FL, dated March 16,,

1981.

Hankla, Donald J.

1981, Letter to Billy J. (oungblood, U.

S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.

C. from Donald J.

Hankla, U.

S. Fish and'Wildlife Service, Jacksonville, FL, dated February 24, 1981.

I h

Hlraglsa,,F. J.,

1981 letter to D. J.

Hankla, U.S.

Dept. of Inter>or, F15 and Wildlife Service, Jacksonville, FL, dated December 8, 1981.

Miraglia, F. J.,

1981 letter to H.

B. Allen U.S.

Dept. of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atomspheric Admin.

National Marine Fisheries Service, St. Petersburg, FL, dated C cember 9, 1981.

Ekberg, D. R., 1981 letter to F. J. Miraglia, U.S. Nuclear Regulatcry Commission, Washington, D.C., dated December 21, 1981.

Hankla, D. J.,

1982 letter to F. J. Miraglia, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., dated January 13, 1982.

Bellmund, S.,

H. T. Hasnik, and G.

LaRoche.

", 1982.

Assessment of the impacts of the St.

Lucie Nuclear Plant on threatened or endangered species.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

Hiragl.ia, F. J.

1982.

Letter to D. J.

Hankla, U.S.

Department of Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service, Jacksonville, FL, dated Harch 24, 1982.

Hiraglia, F. J.

1982.

Letter to D.

R. Ekberg, U.S.

Department of Con.merce, National Harine Fisheries

Service, St. Petersburg, FL, dated March 24, 2982.

Ekberg, D. R.

1982.

Letter to F. J. Miraglia, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., dated Harch 26, 1982.

Hankla, D.J.

1982.

Letter to F. J. Hiraglia, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C., dated Harch 31, 1982.

18.

Op. Cit., ER-OL, Response to NRC question 310.13.

19.

Ibid., Response to KRC question 310.11.

20.

Ibid., Response to NRC question 310.12.

21.

22.

Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 20, "Standards for Protection Against Radiation," January 1981.

Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," January 1981.

St. Lucie 2 FES 5-73

23.

Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations Part 190, "Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Nuclear Power Operations,"

January 1981.

24.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Standard Review Plan:

Chapter 12-Radiation Protection,"

HUREG-75/087, Hovember 1975.

(now published as NUREG-0800)

I I

25.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulatory Guide 8.8, "Information Relevant to Ensuring that Occupational Radiation Exposures at Nuclear Power Stations Mill Be as Low as Is Reasonably Achievable;" Revision 3, June 1978.

. 26.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Occupational Radiation Exposure at Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors, 1979,"

HUREG-0713, Vol. 2, March 1931.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

33 ~

34.

35.

U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Final Environmental Statement Related to Steam Generator Repair of Sur ry Power Station, Unit No. 1," NUREG-0692,

=

July 1980.

Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 51, "Licensing and Regulatory Policy and Procedures for Environmental Protection," January

1981, par.

51.20.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Calculation of Releases of Radioactive Haterials in Gaseous and Liquid Effluents from Pressurized

'ater Reactors,"

NUREG-0017, April 1976.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulatory Guide 1.109, "Calculation of Annual Ooses to Man from Routine Releases of Reactor Effluents for the Purpose of Evaluating Compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I,"

Revision 1, October 1977.

B.

G. Blaylock and J.

P. Mitherspoon, "Radiation Ooses and Effects Estimated for Aquatic Biota Exposed to Radioactive Releases from LWR National Academy of Science, "The Effects on Populations of Exposures to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation" (BEIR Report),

1972.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulatory Guide 4.1, "Programs for Honitoring Radioactivity in the Environs of Nuclear Power Plants,"

Revision 1, April 1975.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Radiological Assessment Branch Technical Position, "An Acceptable Radiological Environmental Honitoring Program," Revision 1, November 1979.

U. S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulatory Guide 1.21, "Measuring, Evaluating, and Reporting Radioactivity in Solid Mastes and Release of

, Radioactivity in Liquid and Gaseous Effluents from Light-Mater-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 1, June 1974.

St. Lucie 2-FES 5-74

36.

37.,

38.

39.

40.

41.

42.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Nuclear Power Plant Accident Considerations Under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,"

Statement. of Interim Policy, 45 FR 40101-40104, June 13, 1980.

Florida Power and Light Company, Final Safety Analysis Report, St.

Lucie Plant Unit No. 2, as

amended, July 1981.

National Research Council, "Energy in Transition 1985-2010."

Final Report of the Committee on Nuclear and Alternative Energy Systems (CONAES), 1979.

C.

E: Land, Science 209:1197, 12 September 1980.

Academy of Sciences/Hational Research Council, "The Effects on Populations of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation,"

Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiations (BEIR), July 1980.

"Descriptions of Selected Accidents'that Have Occurred at Nuclear Reactor Facilit}es."

H.

W. Bertini et al., Nuclear Safety Information Center, Oak Ridge Na'tional Laboratory, ORNL/NSIC"176, April 1980.

L. B. Marsh, "Evaluation of Steam Generator Tube Rupture Accidents," U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG"0651, March 1980.

43.

44.

45.

46.

47.

48.

"Three Mile Island - A report to the Commissioners and the, Public."

Vol. I, Summary Section 9, Mitchell,.Regovin, Director, Nuclear Regulatory

. Commission Special Inquiry Group, January

1980, NUREG/CR-1250, Vol. l.

".Report of the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island."

Commission Findings B, Health Effects, October 1979.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Reactor Safety Study," MASH-1400, NUREG-75/014, October 1975.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Task Force Report on Interim Operation of Indian Point."

NUREG-0715, August 1980..

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Risk Assessment Review Group Report, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission."

NUREG/CR-0400, September 1978.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commiss'ion, "Overview of the Reactor Safety Study Consequences Model."

HUREG"0340, October 1977.

" 49.'-

. 50.

53..

52.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Liquid Pathway Generic Study."

HUREG-0440, February 1978.

Bear,'J.,

H draulics of Groundwater, McGraw Hill, Inc. 1979, p 379-433.

I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Geosciences Data Base Handbook for Modeling a Nuclear Maste Repository," Vol. 1, NUREG/CR-0912, January 1981.

Op. 'Ct.,

ER"OL, Response to question E240.3.

lt r

.-, 't.'ucie 2 FES 5-75 4

I Ir ~

Ir

'I fr I r r

x -,I', I[ 'l, rI r,lrr g

I I~ rrr+

1 I AAJI54r1rrr lt r

I r

r

53.

I Y

Harris, V., Yang, J.,

and Warkensteen J., "Accident Mitigation-Slurry Mall Barriers," Draft report to staff of Hydrologic Engineering Section,

HGEB, DE, NRR, from Argonne National Laboratories, 1981.

54.

'I 55.

l 56.

56a.

57.

Op. Cit.~,

CONAES Report, pp.

577.

Ibid., pp 559-560.

Ibid., p 553.

Uhrig, Robert E., 1981 Letter to D.

G.

Commission, Washington, D.C. from Robe Co.,~tiiami, FL, dated August 27, 1981.

II U.S. jNuclear Regulatory Commission, "E

sing and Waste Hanagement Portions of NUREG"0116 (Supplement 1 to WASH-1248)

Eisenhut, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory t E. Uhrig, Florida Power and Light I

r

~

~

vironmental Survey of the Reproces" he LMR Fuel Cycle," Report

," Mashington, D.C., October 1976.

58.

59.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Public Comments and Task Force,"

Responses Regarding the Environmental Survey of the Reprocessing and Maste Hanagement Portions of t~e LWR Fuel Cycle," Report KUREG-0216 (Supplement 2 to MASH-1248), Washington, D.C., Harch 1977.

U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, "Environmental Survey of the Uranium Fuel Cycle," Report WASH-1258, Washington, D.C., April 1974.

St.

Lucie 2 FES I

5-76

'I C

lt

'kp

(

6 EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED ACTION

(

6.1, Unavoidable Adverse Im acts The'staff has reassessed the physical, social, biological, and economic impacts that can be attributed to the operation of St.

Lucie 2.

For the most part, these impacts are as stated in Chapter 5 of the FES-CP.

Actions taken by the applicant since the FES-CP stage have resulted in adequately mitigating the operating impacts.

6.2 Irreversible and Irretrievable Commitments of Resources

(

All of the significant resource commitments were identified at the time of the CP review and are discussed in Chapter 8 of the FES-CP.

The staff's assess-ment has not changed except that the continuing escalation of costs has increased the dollar values of the materials used for constructing and fueling St. Lucie 2.

6.3 Relationshi Between Short-Term Uses and Lon -Term Productivit There have been no significant changes in the staff's evaluation for the Plant since the CP review as discussed in Chapter 8 of the FES-CP.

6.4 Benefit-Cost Summar 6.4. 1 '((umma(

Sections below summarize the economic, environmental, and socioeconomic benefits and costs which are associated with the operation of St.

Lucie 2.

The benefits and costs are shown in Table 6.1.

6.4.2 Benefits The direct benefits to be derived from the operation of St.

Lucie 2 include approximately 4.2 billion kWh of electrical energy which the unit will. be able to produce annually (this projection assumes that St.

Lucie 2 will operate at an average 60 percent capacity factor).

The benefits also include improved reliability due to the addition of 802 l%e of generating capacity, as well as the saving of approximately

$225 million in production costs per gear.

FP8 L's

'lan to sell 168 HWe of St.

Lucie 2 will reduce these direct benefits to i(ie FPEL system by about 20 percent but the total benefits will be retained within a regional context.

6.4.3 Economic Cost's

(

The economic costs associated with St.. Lucie 2 operation include fuel and opera" tion and maintenance costs.

For the first year of operation, fuel and ONi are estimated at 10 mills/kWh and 4 mills/kWh, respectively.

The cost of decommis-sioning is a small additional cost of operation.

The staff's estimate for decommissioning St.

Lucie 2 ranges from about

$21 million to $43 million in 1978.'ollars.

r St.

Lucie 2 FES

=

6"1 I

(( J l4

~

(

A 1

Table 6.1 Benefit-Cost summary Primary Impact and Effect on Population or Resources'agnitude or Reference2 Staff Assesment of Benefit or Costa Direct benefits Energy (2.2 and 6.4.2)

Capacity (2.4)

Reduced generating costs (2.2)

Improved diversity of supply (2.3)

Improved system reliability (2.4)

Indirect Benefits Local Taxes ~Ad Va1orem) (9.9)

Annual employment (5.9)

Annual payroll (5.9)

Annual local purchases (5.9)

Economic costs of o eratin Fuel (2. 2 and 6.4. 3) 0 81 H (6.4I 3)

Decommissioning (2.2 and 5.11)

Environmental Costs 4,200 kMh/yr x 106 802 kW x 103 225 million 0/yr 5.5 million 0/yr 280 persons 7.8 million 0/yr

$750,000/yr 10 mills/kMh (initial year of operation) 4 mills/kWh (initial year of operation) 21"43 million 1978 $

Large Small

. Small Large Small Hoderate Small Small Small Small 1.

Resources Committed a.

Land (FES-CP 2. 1) b.

Water (5.3.1) 2.

Damages Suffered by Other Water Users Because of a.

Surface Water Consumption (5. 3. 1) b.

Surface Mater Contamination (5.3:1) c.

Ground Water Consumption (5'.2) ed.

Ground Water Contamination (5.3. 2) 458 ha 9.6 2/s rma None None None None None St. Lucie 2 FES 6-.2 e

1 cop lee aeeear&ee\\eeea ~

Table 6. 1 (continued)

Primary Impact and Effect on Population or Resources'.

Damage to Aquatic Biota Oue to a.

Intake Losses (5.6) b.

Surface Mater Discharges-Heat (5.6.4) c.

Surface Mater Discharges-Chemical (5.6.5) 4.

Damage to Terrestrial Resources (5.5) 5.

Human Health Effects (Non-radiological)

Oue to Air equality Changes (5.4) 6.

Human Health Effects (Radiological)

Oue to a.

Etfects of Reactor Opera-tion on General Population (5.10) b.

Effects of Reactor Opera-tion on Morkers at Site (5. 10. 3. 1. I) c.

Effects of Balance of Fuel Cycle (5.10.3.1.2) d.

Accident Risk (5.l0.4) 7.

Societal Costs in Terms of a.

Historic and Archeological Resources (5.8) b.

Visual Intrusion (5.9) c.

Increased Traffic (5.9) d.

Increased demands on Public Facilities and Services (5.9) e.

Increased demands on Private Facilities and Services (5.9)

Magnitude or

~~

Reference~

6.5 x $0>> J/ hr Staff Assesment of Benefit or Costs Sma1 1 Small None None None Small Small Small Small Small Smal 1

'mall Small "The impact of an accident could possibly be large, while the risk of an accident is small.

St.

Lucie 2 FES 6-3

Notes:

Table 6. 1 I(continued) 1.

References in parentheses indicate FES section where evaluation appears.

II 1

2.

For those factors which are not quantifiable, see text section.

3.

Subjective measure of costs and benefits are assigned, by reviewers, where quantification is not possible:

Small - impacts which, in the reviewers'udgement, are of such minor nature,- based on currently available information, that they do not warrant detailed investigations or considerations of mitigative actions; Hoderate - impacts which, in the r'eviewers'udgement, are

'likely to be clearly evident (Hitigation alternatives are usually considered for moderate impacts.);

Large - impacts which, in the reviewers'udgement, represent either,a severe

,penalty or a major benefit.

Acceptance requires that large negative impacts should be more than offset by othe'verriding project considerations.

h l!

h St.

Lucie 2 FES 6-4

6.4.4 Socioeconomic Costs Ho significant socioeconomic costs are expected from either the operat>on cf St..Lucie 2 or from the number of employees and their families living in the area.

6.4.5 Environmental Costs The environmental costs were previously evaluted in the FES-C7 and have not adversely changed.

If the results of the studies described in Section 5.7 indicate that additional mitigation measures are required for endangered species.

additional costs may be incurred for such protection.

An upper bound of such costs could perhaps be as high as 65 mi11ion dollars.

This assumes the need for installation of a network of bars to deny turtles access to the intake pipelires.

However, the need for additional measures and the nature of such measures will be determined on the basis of operating experien"e of the second unit and the results of the studies discussed above.

Ho significant environmental costs are expected from the operation of St.

Lucie 2, including consideracions of the uranium fuel cycle and accidents.

6.4. 6 Conclusions As a result of the analysis and review of potential environmental, technical,

economic, and social

impacts, the staff has prepared an updated forecast of the effects of the operation of St.

Lucie 2.

Ho new information has been obtained that alters the overa'll balancing of the benefits of operation versus the environmental costs.

The staff has determined that St.

Lucie 2 can be operated with minimal environmental impact.

jl St.

Lucie 2 FES 6-5

7 LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS This environmental statement was prepared by the following people:

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comaission Victor Herses, Project Hanager Brian Richter,, Environmental Review Coordinator/Regional Impact Analysis Donald Sells, Draft Environmental Statement Coordinator Sarbes Acharya, Accident Analysis Steven Baker, Design Features/Accident Analysis Alvin Brauner, Siting Analysis Richard Coriell, Hydrology/Accident Analysis Patnck Easley, Accident Analysis J. Eberle, Accident Analysis James Fairobent, Accident Analysis Sidney Feld, Purpose/Alternatives/Cost-Benefit James Hawxhurst, Accident Analysis R.

Wayne Houston, Accident Analysis Harry Krug, Design Basis Accidems Dr. Germain LaRoche, Terrestrial Ecology J.

Lee, Radioactive Waste Hanagement Dr. Hichael T. Hasnik, Aquatic Ecology Lynne Fairobent, Radiological Assessment Donald Perrotti, Emergency Planning Dr. Robert B. Samworth, Environmental Engineering Argil Toalston, Risk Considerations Rex Wescott, Hydrology/Accident Analysis St. Lucie 2 FES 7-3

NVIRONM NTAL S A EMENT N RE SEN 8

AGENCIES AND ORGANIZATIONS TO WHICH COPIES OF THIS DRA Copies of this document were sent to the following on initial l

)

U.S. 'Department of Agriculture U.S. ~Department of the Army, Corps of Engineers U.S. Department of Commerce U.S. Department of Energy U.S. Department of Health and Human Services U.S. Department of Housing and-Urban Development U.S. Department of the Interior U.S. Department of Transportation U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Advisory Council on Historic Preservation'ederal Emergency Management Agency EState of Florida, Bureau of Intergovernmental Relations State of r'1orida, Department of Environmental. Regulation State Historic Preservation Office Treasure Coast Regional Planning Council Hartin County Planning Department St. Lucie County, County Administrator distribution:

4 4

4 4 ~

h I

St.'Lucie 2 FES 4

h 4

8"1 HE 4!

9.

RESPONSES TO COYAEHTS OH THE DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT Pursuant to 10 CFR Part 51, the "Draft Environmental Statement Related to the Operation of St.

Lucie Plant, Unit Ho. 2" was transmitted, with a request for

comments,

.to the agencies and organizations listed in Section 8.

In addition, the HRC requested comments on the Draft Environmental Statement-OL (OES) from interested persons by a notice published in the Federal

~Re ister on October 30, 1981 (46 FR 53822).

In response ti- '."ese requests, comments were received from:

U.S.

Oeparment of Agriculture, Economics and Statistics

Service, October 27,

1981, Velmar M. Davis State of Florida, Office of the Governor, December 11, 1981, Malter 0.

Kolb U.S. Department of Transportation, U.S. Coast Guard, Rear Admiral M. E.

Caldwel'I Florida Power 8 Light, December 14,

1981, Robert E. Uhrig U.S. Environmental Protection

Agency, December 14, 1981, John E.

Hagan, III.

John F. Oo)erty, Houston, TX; December 14, 1981 U.S.

Department of the Interior, Office of the Secretary, December 15, 1981,i Bruce Blanchard U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration, Bureau of radiological Health, December 21, 1981, John C. Villforth U.'S. Department of Agriculture, Soil Conservation Service, January 12,

1982, James M. Hitchell.

m 1',.

These comment letters are reproduced in chronologica};orlop r in Appendix A of this Final Ervironmental Statement-OL (FES).

The comments received from the U.S.

Department of Agriculture (two letters) and the State of Florida, Office of the Governor, did not require NRC staff responses, either because they offered no comments or because their comments indicated agreement with the DES.

The remaining six comment letters did require responses and/or revisio. ". to the text of the OES that are incorporated into this FES.

The individual cotwents are numbered in the margins of each of the six letters

':n Appendix A except where the comments have already been numbered -in the documents submitted by the r

St. Lucie 2 FES 9-1

operation (Section 5.10.3) and postulated accidee Other general sugject areas of the comments were:

I Socioeconomics (Sec.

5.9)

Land use a'nd terrestrial, ecology (Sec.

5.5)

Hydrology, water quality,.and aquat'.c ecology fi Res onse to Corvnent From Rear Admiral W.

E.

Cal ts (Section 5. 10.4).

ell (see

p. A-4) parties concerned.

The responses to the comments are provided below for each letter in the order in which they appear in Appendix A.

JI The majority of coments concerned the radiological aspects of normal IIl.

Table 1.1 in the text has been corrected.

Res onse to Comments From Florida Power 8 Li ht (see pp. A-5 thru A-12) 1.

The st,f decided the 2.

Agreed.

The Table of 6.

7.

Agreed.

Agreed.

The text has

~ <<

The text has 8.

Agreed.

The text has 9.

Agreed.

The text. has 10, "Agreed.

The text has ll.

Agreed.

The text has 12.,

The proposed new rule published; therefore, 13.

Agreed.

The text has 3.: The staff, decided the 4.

Agreed.

The text has 5.

Agreed; The text has text should remain as is.

Contents has been revised text should remain as '.

been revised accordingly.

been revised accordingly.

been revised accordingly.

been revised accordingly.

I been revised accordingly.'ccordingly.

been revised accord>ngly.

been revised accordingly.

been revised accordingly.

will not have been adopted by the time this the text will remain as is.

been revised accordingly.

il r<<

FES is N

14.

Agreed.

The text has been revised to read "instead of".

15.

Agreed.

" The text has been revised accordingly.

" 16."

Agreed.

The text has been revised accordingly.

St. Lucie 2 FES 9-2 I

I

(

4, $

(A I<<I<<

I" ~,( &~4044(, ((4'y \\Q'i

<<k

((

. A J

$ Mal (( << i(l I.. I+.<<(>>..

I

.<<A((<<I<<<<<<~

(

IL

17.

Agreed.

The text has been revised.

18.

Agreed.

The text has been revised accordingly.

19.

Agre J.

The text has been revised accordingly.

20.

A reed.

The text has been revised accordin 1

g g y 21.

The text was revised in accordance with EPA comment IIl (see

p. A-14).

22.

Agreed.

The text has been revised.

23.

The statement in the text will remain as is because it refers to a tentative plan described at. the time of the CP review.

24.

Agreed.

The text has been revised accordingly.

25.

The staff disagrees with the comment that the statement contributes nothing to the environmental analysis.

Section 4.3.1 deals with community characteristics, not the impact of the plant's operation.

However, the text has been revised to make the statement clear.

26.-

Agreed.

The*text has been revised accordingly.

27.

Agreed.

The text has been revised accordingly.

28.

Agreed.

The 29.

Agreed.

The 30.

Agreed.

The 31.

Agreed.

The 32.

Agreed.

The text has been revised accordingly.

text has been revised accordingly.

text has been revised accordingly.

text has been revised accordingly.

text has been revised accordingly.

33.

Agreed.

'Th text has been revised accordingly.

34.

The staff decided the text should remain as is.

35.

Agreea.

The text has been revised.

36.

Agreed.

The text has been revised accordingly.

37.

Agreed.

The text has been revised accordingly.

38.

Agreed.

The text has been revised accordingly.

39.

Agreed.

The text has been revised accordingly.

~

'0.

Disagree.

An orchid was seen by the staff on th environmental site visit.

All orchids are on the State of Florida endangered species list.

41.

Agreed.

The text has been revised accordingly.

St.

Lucie 2 FES 9"3

42.

Agreed.

The text has been revised accordingly.

Il 43.

Agreed.

The text has been revised accordingly.

44.

Agreed.

The text has been revised accordingly.

45.

Agreed.

The text has been revised accordingly.

46.

Agreed.

The text has been revised accordingly.

I 47.

Agreed.

The text has been revised accordingly.

48.

Agreed in part.

The text has been rev sed.

49.

The staff decided the text should remain as is.

50.

The staff decided the text should rema n as is.

51.

Agreed.

The text has I

52.

Agreed.

The text ha-been revised accordingly.

been revised accordingly.

53.

Agreed.

The text has been revised 54.

Agreed.

The text has been revised 55.

Agreed.

The text has been revised 56.

Agreed.

The text has been revised 57.

Agreed.

The text has been ".evised accordingly.

accordingly.

accordingly.

accordingly.

accordingly.

58.

Agreed.

Table 5.1 in 59.

Agreed.

,The text has the text has been revised accordingly.

been revised accordingly.

60.

Agreed.

The text has been revised accordingly.

61.

Agreed.

The text has been revised accordingly.

62.

Agreed.

The text has been revised accordingly.

63.

The staff decided the text should remain as is.

64.

Agreed.

The text has 65.

Agreed.

The text has been revised accordingly.

been revised accordingly.

66.

Agreed.

The text has been revised accordingly.

67.

Agreed.

The text has been revised accordingly.

St.

Lucie 2 ff5 9-4

68.

The staff decided that a comparison of nuclear power plant workers to other industrial workers is appropriate and illustrates that the risk from working at a nucler power plant is on a par with the risks associated with other occupations.

The text remains as is.

69.

Agreed.

The text has been revised accordingly.

70.

Agreed.

The text has been revised accordingly.

71; Agreed.

The text has been revised according'ly.

72.

The staff has decided the sentence is correct as it is now.

The following sentence acknowledges the uncertainty in quantifying the effect of acid rain.

73.

The staff has decided that the information in this Section adequately covers what needs to be said about a narrative; therefore, the text will remain as is.

I 74, 75, 76, 77.

In a telecon discussion between EPA (C.

H. Kaplan) Region IV, Atlanta, Georgia and HRC (V. Nerses) on 2/10/82, EPA generally concurs with the FP&L comments and notes that these comments do not change the acceptability of meeting the 316(b) requirements.

Res onse to Comments From Hr. J.

E.

Ha an III (s'ee

p. A"14) l.,

Agreed.

The text has been revised accordingly.

2.

Agreed.

The text has been revised accordingly.

Res onse to Comments From Hr.

B. Blanchard (see p. A-15)

Ol.

Freshwater for plant operation will be supplied by the Fort Pierce Municipal Mater Supply System from the mainland.

Hence, there will not be any competitive water use between existing or plannea wells on Hutchinson Island and the power plant.

Also the two existing wells are 863 and 876 feet deep, far too deep to be contaminated by any accidental radioactive spills from the plant.

Section 4.3.5 has been revised to reflect the information on well depths.

82.

Sections 2.2 and 5.1 and Table 5.7 of the FES-CP describe the major recreational activities and areas in the vicinity of the plant and the effects of plant operation on them.

There have beeri no changes occurring since the publication of the document which would result in a significant impact to recreation due to plant operation.

As mentioned in the foreward to the DES, updated FES-CP information which will result in significant impacts due to plant operation are included in the OES.

St. Lucie 2 FES 9-5 At

Res onse to Comments From ter. J.

F. Dohert (see pp.

A-16 and A"17) 1-a) Section 5.10.3.2, entitled "Radiological Impact on Humans," of the St Lucie 2 FES discusses the risk to both the maximially exposed individual and to the general population from the routine operation of St Lucie 2.

1-b) The Advisory Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiations (BEIR III) in their report entitled "The Effects on Populations of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation" points out that )or some sites and types of cancers (e.g.,

lung) the incidence is fairly well approximated by mortality.

Therefore, you can use the values quoted in

. Appendix I of St.

Lucie DES on cancer deaths as an approximation for the number of incidents of lung cancer from radon-222.

1-c) The text in the FES has been revised to include these points.

1-d) The text in the FES has been revised to include these points.

2.

FPL's current expansion plan projects a total of 15,994 H'~( of capacity on-line by 1989.

This capacity is composed of 8015 HM of oil, 2,856 MM of nuclear, 2,423 NM of gas, and 2,700 MH of coal.

Although oil will still constitute approximately 50 percent of FPL's capacity in 1989, it is expected that its contribution towards meeting the electrical energy needs of the service area will be reduced.

Both the applicant and staff concluded in Section 2.2 of this statement that the availability of St.

Lucie 2 will permit the displacement of oil on the FPL system.

Res onse to Comments From Hr. J.

C. Yillforth (see pp. A-18 and A-19) 1.

No response required.

2.

No response required.

3.

5.

No response required.

In the OES or FES we do not ordinarily address the monitoring of accidents.

However, it is discussed in Section 13.3 of the SER.

The text has been changed to reflect this comment.

St. Lucie 2 FES 9-6

APPENDIX A COHXENTS ON THE DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT St.

Lucre 2 FES