ML17212B783

Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants,St Lucie Plant Unit 2,FL Power & Light Co, Draft Technical Evaluation Rept

ML17212B783
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	05/31/1982
From:	Shaber C EG&G, INC.
To:	NRC
Shared Package
ML17212B782	List: ML17212B783
References
REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SY, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR NUDOCS 8208040109
Download: ML17212B783 (37)

Text

CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 2, FLORIDA POWER 5 LIGHT CO.

Docket No. 50-389 Author C. R. Shaber Principal Techical Investigator T. H. Stickley EGSG Idaho, Inc.

May 1982 8208040i09 820720 PDR ADOCK 05000389 A PDR

ABSTRACT The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has requested that all nuclear plants either operating or under construction submit a response of compliancy with NUREG-0612, "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." EGSG Idaho, Inc. has contracted with the NRC to evaluate the responses of those plants presently under construction. This report contains EGSG's evaluation and recommendations for St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2.

EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2 does not totally comply with the guidelines of NUREG-0612. In general, compliance is insufficient in the following areas:

o of information supplied being adequate to evaluate effectively that action taken meets the NUREG requirements o physical marking of safe load paths in the plant area o up grading of plant unit 1 procedures for application at plant unit 2 o operator qualification o identification and quality of special lifting devices o regular lifting devices o crane and hoist inspection and testing.

The main report contains recommendations which will aid in bringing the above items into compliance with the appropriate guidelines.

CONTENTS Section Title Page ABSTRACT ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ e ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

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EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

.................................................... ii 1 . INTRODUCTION ............. -...................... -..... ".... " .. 1 1 .1 Purpose of Review ................. - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~" ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ " ""~ ~ 1 1..2 Generi c Background .................. ".............. " ".. 1 1.3 Plant-Specific Background ................................. 3

2. EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ........." .."................... 4 2 .1 Overview ..................................................

2.2 Heavy Load Overhead Handling Systems ...................... 4 2.3 General Guidelines ........................................ 6 2.4 Interim Protection Measures ............................... 17

3. CONCLUDING

SUMMARY

....................-...'......-.............. 21 3.1 Applicable Load Handling Systems .......................... 21 3.2 Guideline Recommendations ................................. 21 3..3 Interim Protection ................" ..-"""............. 24 4 REFERENCES ............. " .....................--................ 25

TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT FOR ST. LUCIE PLANT, UNIT 2

1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 Pur ose of Review This technical evaluation report documents the EGSG Idaho Inc. review of general load handling policy and procedures at Florida Power and Light Co., St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2. This evaluation was performed with the objective of assessing conformance to the general load handling guidelines of NUREG-0612, "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants" [1], Section 5.1.1.

1.2 Generic Back round Generic Technical Activity Task A-36 was established by the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff to systematically examine staff licensing criteria and the adequacy of measures in effect at operating nuclear power plants to assure. the safe handling of heavy loads and to reconmend necessary changes to these measures. This activity was initiated by a letter issued by the NRC staff on May 17, 1978 f23 to all power reactor licensees, requesting information concerning the control of heavy loads near spent fuel.

The results of Task A-36 were reported in NUREG-0612, "Control of ,

Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." The staff's conclusion from this evaluation was that existing measures to control the handling of heavy loads at operating plants, although providing protection from certain potential problems, do not cover adequately the major causes of load handling accidents and should be upgraded.

In order to upgrade measures for the control of heavy loads, the staff developed a series of guidelines designed to achieve a two-phase objective using an accepted approach or protection philosophy. The

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first portion of the objective, achieved through a set of general guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1, is to ensure that all load handling systems at nuclear power plants are designed and operated such that their probability of failure is uniformly small and appropriate for the critical tasks in which they are employed. The second portion of the staff's objective, achieved through guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Articles 5.1.2 through 5.1.5 is to ensure that, for load handling systems in areas where their failure might result in significant consequences, either (1) features are provided, in addition to those required for all load handling systems, to ensure that the potential for a load drop is extremely small (e.g., a single-failure-proof crane) or (2) conservative evaluations of load handling accidents indicate that the potential consequences of any load drop are acceptably small. Acceptability of accident consequences is quantified in HUREG-0612 into four accident analysis evaluation criteria.

The approach used to develop the staff guidelines for minimizing the potential for a load drop was based on defense in depth and 'is summarized as follows:

o provide sufficient operator training, handling system design, load handling instructions, and equipment inspection to assure reliable operation of the handling system.

o define safe load travel paths through procedures and operator training so that, to the extent practical, heavy loads are not carried over or near irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment o provide mechanical stops or electrical interlocks to prevent movement'of heavy loads over irradiated fuel or in proxi'mity to equipment associated with redundant 'shutdown paths.

Staff guidelines resulting from the foregoing are tabulated in Section 5 of NUREG-0612.

1.3 Plant-Specific Background In December 22, 1980, the NRC issued a letter [3] to Florida Power 8 Light Co., the Licensee for St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2 requesting that the Licensee review provisions for handling and control of heavy loads at St. Lucie Plant Unit 2, evaluate these provisions with respect to the guidelines of NUREG-0612, and provide certain additional information to be used for an independent determination of conformance to these guidelines. On August 6, 1981, Florida Power and Light Co.

provided the initial response [43 to this request.

2. EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2.1 Overview The following sections summarize Florida Power 5 Light Company's review of heavy load handling at St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2 accompanied by EG&G's evaluation, conclusions and recommendations to the licensee for bringing the facilities more completely into compliance with the intent of NUREG-0612. Florida Power 5 Light Co. review of the facilities does not differentiate between the two units so it is assumed that both units are of identical design. The licensee has indicated the weight of a heavy load for this facility (as defined in NUREG-0612, Article 1.2) as approximately 1380 pounds.

2.2 Heavy Load Overhead Handling Systems This section reviews the licensee's list of overhead handling systems which are subject to the criteria of NUREG-0612 and a review of the justification for excluding overhead handling systems from the above mentioned list.

2.2.1 Scope "Report the results of your review of plant arrangements to identify all overhead handling systems from which a load drop may result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal (taking no credit for any interlocks, technical specifications, operating procedures, or detailed structural analysis) and justify the exclusion of any overhead handling system from your list by verifying that there is sufficient physical separation from any load-impact point and any safety-related component to permit a determination by inspection that no heavy load drop can result in damage to any system or component required for plant shutdown or'ecay heat removal."

A. Summar of Licensee Statements The Licensee's review of overhead handling systems identified the cranes and hoists in a Table and coded as Group I those which handle heavy loads in the vicinity of irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment.

The Licensee has a'iso,identified twelve cranes by a Group II classification that has been excluded from satisifying the criteria of the general guidelines of NUREG-0612.

B. EG&G Evaluation The Licensee did not state what type of criteria they used in their inspection but did establish what they consider as sufficient physical separation between any load impact point and any safety related equipment or any irradiated fuel. The lack of specific criteria or other information such as drawings showing

~ the relationship between crane coverage and location of safety equipment prevents a detailed evaluation of the Licensee's statements.

C. EGKG Conclusions and Recommendations Based on the information provided, EGEG concludes that the Licensee has included all app'licable hoists and cranes in their Group I list of handling systems which must comply with the requirements of the general guidelines of NUREG-0612.

2.3 General Guidelines This section addresses the extent to which the applicable handling systems comply with the general guidelines of NUREG-0612 Article 5.1.1. EGSG's conclusions and recommendations are provided in summaries for each guideline.

The NRC has established seven general guidelines which must be met in order to provide the defense-in-depth approach for the handling of heavy loads. These guidelines consist of the following criteria from Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612:

A. Guideline 1 Safe Load Paths B. Guideline 2 Load Handling Procedures C. Guideline 3 Crane Operator Training D. Gui del ine 4 Special Lifting Devices E. Guideline 5 Lifting Devices (not specially designed)

F. Guideline 6 Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance)

G. Guideline 7 Crane Design.

These seven guidelines should be satisfied for all overhead handling systems and programs in order to handle heavy loads in the vicinity of the reactor vessel, near spent fuel in the spent fuel pool, or in other areas where a load drop may damage safe shutdown systems. The succe'eding paragraphs address the guidelines individually.

2.3.1 Safe Load Paths [Guideline 1, NUREG-0612 Article 5.1.1(1)3 "Safe load paths should be defined for the movement of heavy loads to minimize the potential for heavy"loads, if dropped, to impact irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel and in the spent fuel pool, or to impact safe shutdown equipment. The path should follow, to the extent practical, structural floor members, such that if the load is dropped, the structure is more likely to withstand the impact. These load paths should be beams,'tc.,

defined in procedures, sh'own on equipment layout drawings, and clearly marked on the floor in the area where the load is to be

handled. Deviations from defined load paths should require written alternative procedures approved by the plant safety review caanittee."

A. Summary of Licensee Statements The basis statement given is, "Safe load paths have been defined as requested and are shown on six sketches provided as Appendix B." Seven Group I heavy load handling systems are identified and removed from evaluation. Three because the loads are less than a defined heavy load; two because loads must follow the one path of a monorail; two groups because they involve monorails, 3 for charging pumps, and 8 for diesel engine overhaul where loads cannot involve other safety related equipment.

An administrative procedure for unit No. 1 plant is to be revised to include unit No. 2 as it becomes operational.

The procedure is reported to describe measures taken to ensure that heavy load operations follow safe load paths.

Facility Review Group approval is required for deviation.

B. EGSG Evaluation The actions indicated are good, but fail to provide information that can be evaluated to determine the extent of compliance to the Safe Load Path guideline 1 of NUREG quoted above; C. EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations (1) The actions taken on defining paths, their marking on drawings, and plans for extending administrative procedure controls indicate progress, but is less than Guideline 1 requires.

~ 0 (2) Records should be available for any subsequent audit, and should include data verifying that:

o heavy loads paths follow structural floor members, beams etc. and the capability of potential drop areas to withstand the impact load of a heavy load drop o physical markings of load path areas will be applied in the plant when making a special 1 i ft o adaptation of the administrative procedure for Unit No. 1 to Unit No. 2 is complete and assures that the deviation approval system involves written change and approvals.

2.3.2 Load Handlin Procedures (Guideline 2, NUREG-0612, Article "Procedures should be developed to cover load handling operations for heavy loads that are or could be handled over or in proximity to irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment. At a minimum procedures should cover handling of .those loads listed in Table 3.1-1 of NUREG-0612. These procedures should include: identification of required euipment; inspections and acceptance criteria required before movement of load; the steps and proper sequence to be followed in handling the load; defining the safe path; and other special precautions."

A. Summar of Licensee Statements Section 2. 1.3 (c) of Enclosure 3 of the NRC generic letter requests that'heavy loads listed in Table 3. 1- 1 of NUREG 0612 be tabulated along with the load weight, designated lifting device and special handling procedure.

These are significant heavy loads which are periodically

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handled in the vicinity of irradiated fuel in the reactor core or spent fuel pool.

Table 2 in Appendix A of the St. Lucie repor t provides this tabulation and lists the special procedures developed for Unit No. 1 which follow the guidelines of NUREG 0612 Section 5.1.1 (2) for these loads. Special procedures for the handling of the refueling canal bulkhead pressurizer missile shield and In-Service-Inspection tool are being developed for Unit No. 1. All of these procedures will be revised to include Unit No. 2 when that plant becomes operational. A special procedure for the handling of the cask storage pool bulkhead will be developed for Unit No. 2 and implemented when required. All of these above mentioned procedures will be available at the plant for review.

EGSG Evaluation The licensee response includes a Table 2 which lists thirteen heavy loads and the status of procedures for Plant Unit 1. Nine loads have procedures developed, three are being prepared and one is to be prepared. No information is given on; inspection and acceptance criteria before moving a load, the sequencial steps, or special precautions. It should be noted that this action all relates to Plant Unit No. 1 with plans to incorporate, by revision, Plant Unit 2, when the plant becomes operational.

C. EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations (1) The requirement seems to be identified and the developmental work is progressing for Plant Unit 1:;

with plans for them to be readily adaptible to .Plant Unit 2.

(2) The licensee should be prepared to show in the event of an audit that all procedures for heavy load handling have been written and approved for handling in Plant Unit 2. Also, the procedures in addition to defining safe paths, must:

o identify equipment o provide inspection and acceptance criteria before moving a load o include steps and proper sequence o include any special precaution necessary.

2.3.3 Crane Operator Training [Guideline 3, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(3)]

"Crane operators should be trained, qualified and conduct themselves in accordance with Chapter 2-3 of ANSI B30.2-1976,

'Overhead and Gantry Cranes'5]."

A. Summary of Licensee Statements.

Nothing submitted on the subject of crane operator training. However, material obtained in a subsequent transmittal includes St. Lucie Plant Unit No. 1 procedure No. 0010438 Revision 1. This document outlines the Crane Operator Training and gualification Program.

B. EGSG Evaluation The licensee, upon extension of the procedure for Plant Unit No. 1 to Wo. 2 can show that Chapter 2-3 of ANSI B30.2 has 10

been used to guide the training and qualification of crane operators.

C. EG&G Conclusion and Recommendations (1) The guideline 3 requirement must be recognized and action taken to meet training requirements. The quality of operators, reflected by their training in safe load handling is as important as any other phase of the requirements for control of heavy loads.

(2) Extend procedure No. 0010438 for Plant Unit No. 1 to Plant Unit No. 2 operators. The program should be documented so it may be audited.

2.3.4 Special Lifting Devices [Guideline 4, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(4)]

"Special lifting devices should satisfy the guidelines of ANSI N14.6-1978, 'Standard for Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers 1leighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials'63. This standard should apply to all special lifting devices which carry heavy loads in areas as defined above. For operating plants certain inspections and load tests may be accepted in lieu of certain material requirements in the standard. In addition, the stress design factor stated in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 should be based on the combined maximum static and dynamic loads that could be imparted on the handling device based on characteristics of the crane which will be used. This is in lieu of the guideline in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 which bases the stress design factor on only the

'eight (static load) or the load and of the intervening components of the special handling device."

A. Summary of Licensee Statements Section 2.1.3 (d) of Enclosure 3 of the NRC generic letter requests that lifting devices comply with ANSI 830.9-1971 or ANSI N14.6-1978 as applicable.

1 The current St'. Lucie Unit No. 1 plant administrative procedure AP0010438 is being revised to require that lifting devices for all load handling systems in Group I meet the requirements of these ANSI standards. This revision will be completed and in effect pr ior to Unit No. 2 operation. This procedure will include Unit No. 2 in its scope when that unit becomes operational.

B. EGSG Evaluation The licensee seems to have missed the import of what constitutes a special lifting device. (See the scope of ANSI N14.6.) Their report lists five heavy loads, periodically handled that probably require careful evaluation. The response statement given addresses only administrative procedure whereas the code principally relates to requirements concerning design, fabrication, acceptance testing and maintenance. These code requirements cannot be deferred until Plant Unit 2 is ready for operations.

C. EG&G Conclusions and Reconmendations (1) Action is required now, to assure that special lifting devices have been specified and built to the ANSI'N14.6 requirements and additional requirements given in Guideline ¹4 of NUREG 0612 Article 5.1.1(4).

(2) Assure that each special lifting device is built to Guideline ¹4 and ANSI N14.6 requirements. tIaintain adequate records that document this compliance to I

satisfy an audit.

2.3.5 Liftin Devices (Not Specially Designed) [Guideline 5, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(5)]

"Lifting devices that are not specially designed should be installed and used in accordance with the guidelines of ANSI 830.9-1971, 'Slings'7j. However, in selecting the proper sling, the load used should be the sum of the static and maximum dynamic load. The rating identified on the sling should be in terms of the 'static load'hich produces the maximum static and dynamic load. i<here this restricts slings to use on only certain cranes, the slings should be clearly marked as to the cranes with which they may be used."

A. Summary of Licensee Statements The applicable licensee statement is given in its entirety in 2.3.4 A above.

B. EGSG Evaluation The licensee statement and data given in their tables provides no information suitable to evaluate.

Administrative Procedure No. 0010438 for plant unit No. 1 assigns responsibilities that if acted upon adequately can meet the requirements of Guideline 5.

C. EG8G Conclusions and Recommendations (1) It is concluded that insufficient reporting or attention has been given to the selection of, "not specially designed" lifting devices. The load weights listed do not specify if they are combined static and dynamic loading. No details on supplemental data such as called for in ANSI B30.9 are supplied.

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(2) The licensee should maintain auditable records that give:

o suitable data on slings, (not specifically designed) to show that they are adequate to meet the requirements of ANSI B30.9 and guideline 5 o information that assures suitable markings on any sling that is restricted to a specific crane or cranes (3) Each sling and its components should be properly tagged to show its safe working load (static plus dynamic).

2.3.6 Cranes (Inspection, Testin , and Maintenance) fGuideline 6, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(6)l "The crane should be inspected, tested, and maintained in accordance with Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976, 'Overhead and Gantry Cranes,'ith the exception that tests and inspections should be performed prior to use where it is not practical to meet the frequencies of ANSI B30.2 for periodic inspection and test, or where frequency of crane use is less than the specified inspection and test frequency (e.g., the polar crane inside a PWR containment may only be used every 12 to 18 months during refueling operations, and is generally not accessible during power operation. ANSI B30.2, however, calls for certain inspections to be performed daily or monthly. For such cranes having limited usage, the inspections, test, and maintenance should be performed prior to their use)."

A. Su+nary of Licensee Statements "Section 2.1.3 (e) of Enclosure"3 of the NRC generic letter requests verification that ANSI B30.2-1976 Chapter 2-2 has been invoked with respect to crane testing and maintenance. 'nspection, 14

The St. Lucie Unit No. 1 program for crane inspection, testing and maintenance will follow this ANSI standard at the time Unit No. 2 becomes operational and will include Unit No. 2 within its scope at that time and will be available at the plant for review."

B. EGSG Evaluation Compliance with Chapter 2-2 of ANSI 830.2 requires important inspections, tests, adjustments and measurements before operations. The licensee statement infers that a functional program for Plant Unit 1 will merely be extended to Plant Unit 2. Preparation of Plant Unit 2 for operational readiness appears to be insufficient.

C. EG8G Conclusions and Recommendations (1) It is concluded that actions for compliance with code requirements cannot be deferred until the plant is ready to operate and the equipment is needed.

(2) Prior to the "in operations" program the following preoperational actions must be taken.

o Establish and document the adequacy of each hoisting unit for all of the ANSI 830.2 specified preoperational requirements.

o Establish and record to what extent, if any, each hoist has been used during plant construction use.

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2.3.7 Crane Desi n [Guideline 7, NUREG-0612, Article 5.l.l(7)]

"The crane should be designed to meet the applicable criteria and guidelines of Chapter 2-1 of ANSI 830.2-1976, 'Overhead and Gantry Cranes,'nd of CMAA-70, 'Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes'8]. An alternative to a specification in ANSI 830.2 or CMAA-70 may be accepted in lieu of specific compliance if the intent of the specification is sati sf i ed. "

A. Summary of Licensee Statements "The design of load handling systems follow CtQA ¹70 or CHAA ¹74, "Specification for Top Running and Under Running Single Girder Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes" as applicable. The OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration) safety requirements, which include the ANSI requirements, are followed in the design."

B. EGEG Evaluation The term "follow" is general and has a variety of uses. If we assume that the intended meaning, as used, is "to accept as authority and obey" a major part of this guideline is met. The remaining NUREG 0612 requirement is Chapter 2-1 of ANSI 830.2. The OSHA requirements are excerpts from the ANSI standard but in 29 CFR 1910.179(b)(2) for New and Existing Equipment it states, ". . . . shall meet the design specifications of ANSI 830.2. . ." This evaluation indicates the requirements were complied with.

C. EGSG Conclusion and Recommendation (1) The basic guideline may be met. Those hoists using CNA ¹74 (ANSI 830.17) design criteria are acceptable 16

where they apply, in 'lieu of ANSI B30.2. What has been the design criteria should be clearly stated.

(2) Maintain adequate records on the crane design to verify upon audit that ANSI 830.2, CMAA 70 and CMAA 74 requirements as applicable were complied with.

2.4 Interim Protection Measures The NRC staff has established (NUREG-0612, Article 5.3) that six measures should be initiated to provide reasonable assurance that handling of heavy loads will be performed in a safe manner until final implementation of the general guidelines of NUREG-0612, Article 5.1 is complete. Four of these six interim measures consist of general Guideline 1, Safe Load paths; Guideline 2, Load Handling Procedures; Guideline 3, Crane Operator Training; and Guideline 6, Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance). The two remaining interim measures cover the following criteria:

o Heavy load technical specifications o Special review for heavy loads handled over the core.

Licensee implementation and evaluation of these interim protection measures is contained in the succeeding paragraphs of this section.

2.4.1 Interim Protection Measure 1 - Technical Specifications "Licenses for all operating reactors not having a single-fai'lure-proof overhead crane in the fuel storage pool area should be revised to include a specification comparable to Standard Technical Specification 3.9.7, 'Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Storage Pool Building,'or PWR's and Standard Technical Specification 3.9.6.2, 'Crane Travel,'or BWR's, to prohibit handling of heavy loads over fuel in the storage pool until 17

implementation of measures which satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1."

A. Summary of Licensee Statements No statement on this subject is made.

B. EGEG Evaluation This interim protection is required for operating reactor hoisting units, therefore it has no requirements that apply for St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2, prior to operations.

C. EGSG Conclusions and Recommendations If hoisting units for the fuel storage pool area have purchase and installation actions pending, it would be beneficial to require them to meet the "single failure proof" standards before installation. The licensee must have either single failure proof hoists or meet acceptable alternate standard technical specifications. This affects licenses to operate, so the ability to verify St. Lucie Plant Unit 2,capability for compliance should be 'established.

2.4.2 Interim Protection treasures 2, 3, 4, and 5 - Administrative Controls "Procedural or administrative measures [including safe load paths, load handling procedures, crane operator training, and crane inspectionj... can be accomplished in a short time period and need not be delayed for completion of"evaluations and modifications to satisfy the guidelines, of Section 5.1 of

[NUREG-06121."

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A. Summary of Licensee Statements Summaries of Licensee statements are contained in discussions of the respective general guidelines in Sections 2.3.1, 2.3.2, 2.3.3, and 2.3.6, respectively.

B. EGSG Evaluations, Conclusions, and Recommendations EGSG evaluations, conclusions, and recommendations are contained in discussions of the respective general guidelines in Sections 2.3.1, 2.3.2, 2.3.3, and 2.3.6.

2.4.3 Interim Protection Measure 6 Special Review for Heavy Loads Over the Core "Special attention should be given to procedures, equipment, and personnel for the handling of heavy loads over the core, such as vessel internals or vessel inspection tools. This special review should include the following for these loads: (1) review of procedures for installation of rigging or lifting devices and movement of the load to assure that sufficient detail is provided and that instructions are clear and concise; (2) visual inspections of load bearing components of cranes, slings, and special lifting devices to identify flaws or deficiencies that could lead to failure of the component; (3) appropriate repair and replacement of defective components; and (4) verify that the crane operators have been properly trained and are familiar with specific procedures used in handling these loads, e.g., hand signals, conduct of operations, and content of procedures."

A. Summary of Licensee Statements None B. EGSG Evaluation None 19

C. EGSG Conclusion The non-operational plant requires no interim measures.

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3. CONCLUDING

SUMMARY

3.1 Applicable Load Handlin Systems Based on the information provided, EGKG concludes that the list of cranes and hoists supplied by the Licensee as being subject to the provisions of NUREG-0612 is adequate (see Section 2.2.1).

3.2 Guideline Recommendations Compliance with the seven NRC guidelines for heavy load handling (Section 2.3) are partially satisfied at St. Lucie Plant Unit 2. This conclusion is represented in tabular form as Table 3.1. Specific recommedations to aid in compliance with the intent of these guidelines are provided as follows:

Guideline Recommendation

l. (Section 2.3.1)

a. Maintain auditable data to show that safe load paths follow structural floor members and beams and that potential load drop areas will withstand the impact of a heavy load.

b. Maintain information to show how St. Lucie Plant No. 2 will physically mark safe load paths in the plant areas when making a ~

special lift..

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Guideline Recommendation

c. Adapt the administrative procedures of Plant Un>t 1 for Plant Unit 2 and assure the deviation approval system is written and auditable.

2. (Section 2.3.2)

a. Heavy load handling procedures must include o equipment identification o inspections and acceptance criteria before moving a load o proper steps and their sequence o special precautions.

3. (Section 2.3.3)

a. Operator training must be established.

b. The training must meet the requirements of At)SI B30.2 Chapter 2-3.

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Gui del ine Recommendation

4. (Section 2.3.4)

a. Identify special lifting devices and assure that each device has been specified and built to the standard requirements of ANSI N14.6 and Guideline 84.

5. (Section 2.3.5)

a. Assure that standard lifting devices are adequate for the combined static and dynamic load.

b. Maintain specification data on lifting devices to show that they comply with ANSI B30.9 and Guideline 85.

c. Assure proper labeling and identification information is affixed to slings.

6. (Section 2.3.6)

a. Take action to complete preoperational requirements:

o Compliance with ANSI B30.2 preoperational requirements 23

o Establishing the extent of use of each hoist during construction

7. (Section 2.3.7)

a. Assure adequacy of records to show that hoisting units meet the specified design requirements.

3.3 Interim Protection EGSG's evaluation of information provided by the Licensee indicates that the following actions are necessary to ensure that the six NRC staff measures for interim protection at St. Lucie Plant Unit 2 are met:

Interim Measure Recommendation None indicated Since the plant is not operational interim protection is not necessary. However if any hoists for fuel storage pool areas have not been purchased the purchase specificat'ions should require the hoist to meet single failure proof requirements.

4. REFERENCES

1. NUREG-0612 Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants NRC

2. V. Stello, Jr. (NRC)

Letter to all licensees.

Subject:

Request for Additional Information on Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel NRC, 17 May 1978

3. USNRC Letter to [Company1.

Subject:

NRC Request for Additional Information on Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel NRC, 22 December 1980

4. Robert E.Uhrig, (FPL).

Letter to Mr. Darrell G. Eisenhut, US Nuclear Regulatory COmmission Washington, D.C.

Subject:

St. Lucie"Unit 2, Docket No. 50-389.

Control of Heavy Loads, August 6, 1981.

5. ANSI B30.2-1976 "Overhead and Gantry Cranes"

6. ANSI N14.6-1978 "Standard for Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or more for Nuclear Materials"

7. ANSI B30.9-1971 "Slings"

8. CMAA-70 "Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes" 25

TABLF. 3.1. ST. LUCIL PLANT UNIT 2, NUREG 0612 CONPLIANLE HATRIX Meight Guideline 1 Guideline 2 Guideline 3 Guideline 4 Guide 1 ine 5 Guidel ine 6 Guide 1 inc 7 or Crane Special Crane-Test Lquipment Heavy Loads Capacity Safe Load Operator Lifting and Desi nat,ion tons ~[tons Paths Procedures ~Tratntn ttevtces ~httn s ~tns ectton ~crane tlest n Pump room monorails (2)

Charging pump A, B, t C {3)

Turbine gantry Crane 200/35 I

{2)

Reactor polar crane 191.4 200/50 I I 4 proced. I 2 being prep.

Auxiliary teles-coping jib (future)

Refueling machine I procedure I Refueling machine I I hoist Fuel transfer 1 I I procedure I machine Spent fuel handling I procedure I machine Refueling canal 1.25 I -being bulkhead monorail prepared Cask storage pool 1.25 To be bulkhead monorail prepare Fuel cask bridge 150/15 I I tm crane procedures Obese) generator monoraf ls (S)

TABLE 3.1. ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 2, NUREG 0612 COHPLIANCE HATRIX We I ght Guideline I Guidel lne 2 Oui de 1 lne 3 Guide 1 ine 4 Guide 1 ine 5 Guideline 6 Guideline 7 or Crane Special Crane-Test Equipment Oesi nation Heavy Loads Capacity Safe Load Operator Lifting and tons ~tons Paths Procedures ~lraanfn Devices . ~51tn s ~lns ectton ~Crane Oesl n Intake structure 45 I I trash rake mono-rail Component cooling water pump mono-rail lwelve heavy load handing systems excIuded Because load drop will not cause damage to system or components required for shut-down or decay heat removal.

C ~ Licensee action compiles with NUREG-0612 Guideline.

NC ~ Licensee action does not comply with NUREG-0612 Guideline R ~ Licensee has proposed revisions/modifications designed to comply with NUREG-0612 Guideline.

I' Insufficient Information provided hy the Licensee.