ML17301A062

Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants,St Lucie Plant,Unit 2 (Phase II)

ML17301A062
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	10/31/1983
From:	Shaber C EG&G, INC.
To:	NRC
Shared Package
ML17214A569	List: ML17301A062
References
CON-FIN-A-6457, REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR NUDOCS 8310260311
Download: ML17301A062 (20)

Text

CON)ROL OF.".'BYY LOADS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS FLORIOA PG'iv'ER AND LI)-HT CG.

'T.

LUCIE PLANT UNIT 2 (PHASE II)

Oocke-No.

[iO-3893 A~v'.)cr

~ r Princ'pal Teci n-ical Inves:iaator T.

H.

S ickley

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Published October 1983 EC&G Idaho, Inc.

~canc ;a))s, cahc

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Prepared for the U.S.

NUc)ear Recula Iy Col".)1iss on Under GOE Con.rac-.

No.

OE-ACC7-75 DOIS70 FIN No. A5<."7

ABSTRACT The.nuclear eo latory io;,.m ssion (NRC) has req es.ec

.ha-. alI ni clear

",lan-s, ei:her ocerat>na or under cors-ruc 'on, su'"mi-a response of consistency with NUREG-0612, "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants."

"BG :daho,

'Inc.,

has contracted with tne NRC to evaluate the resocnses ci t""sa "lan.s oresan

.y under cons:ruc:ion.

This repor.

contains

=Mu s evaluation and recommendations for St.

Lucie Plant Uni' for.he requirements of Sections 5.1.2,

=. 1.3,

5. 1.5, ard 5. 1.6 of HUR~G"9612 (Phase

> ).

Sec.ion 5

1 i (Phase i) was covered in a separate report [13.

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=V="UT:VE

'cie."-lant Uni: 2 is no to;ally consis:ant with the guidelines of NUR""G-06'2.

'n general, i..consis-.enci es axis. in the followinc a eas:

0 The spen.

fuel area has three minor situations needina i prov men to 5 cw>>

s 5 ency wi h cuidel 'in cu remen 5

NUREG 06'2 Article c.l.2 The submit"al for the Reac.or."=uildino fa'.ls -o provide suitable information to show consistency wi.h any one of the three options soec ifi ed by NUREG 0612 Artie 1 e 5. ~. 3.

) hD s '"mit.al on the hoists in c.her areas, shows gereral

'.s:ency nowever :here are

-'."."ee s'<-. ations whi"h recu',re

. acci-.ioral improvemen

'.he -ain reoor contains recommenda iors whicn will Hc in waking the above items cony'.stan,, wi.h.he aopropriate g'uicelines.

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CONTENTS ABSTRACT EXEC'

'E ~UP~/'PY INTRODlJCTYQN P" ~

0 se 07 R-"v i ~w

].2 Generic aackground..............,.......

'.3 Plan--Specific Backoround EVAL'JAT~ON AND RECOi4IMENOATlONS

2. 1 Overview 2.2 Heavy L"ad Overhead Handling Sys.ems

~

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(.I( ~ I 0 $ 1/

3.1 G idel ice Recommenda.ions 21 3.2 4.3 R --8"RC-S Acdi-. onal Recommenda:ions

'I e'

'Ce

~mn'ary

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22

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22 23 TABLES 2.

Nonexemp-Heavy Load-Handling Sys:ems

C 'NT.""'."" H"'VY LQAOS.'T NUC'R PQ']cR PLANTS "LQR:DA.-""'r!=R ANO '="

CO.

ST. 'C:= PLAN UNiT 2 (PLEAS= i:i 1.

IN TROOUCT ION

?arose 0 i Rev This technical evaluation repcrt documents the LG&G idaho, inc.,

review of genera!

1!cad-handling policy and procedvres a;

S

. Lucie Plant Unit 2 (St. Lucie 2).

This evaluation was performed with the objec.ive of assessing co gu idel ines cf NURcG-0612, nformance to the general load-handling "Coritrol of Heavy Loads a

Nuclea,r.Power

?lcn s

LZ i Sections. c. '.2, ". l.3,

5. 1."", anc

6.

This ccnTQr..~nce t S

Ci c.

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'~a ioII v WC OnaS2 =Velvet'.Cn.; hcSe

'SSeSScS

'.=- ci NUB:G-O6'2 -arc was dcc men ec separa e r~pow Ger er~ c Beck6rovsci.,>~r i

~

~ 't Gener ic Tecnnica! Activity Task n-36 was estab!

shed by the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) s.aff to systematically examine staff licensing criteria and he adequacy of measvres in effect at opera.ing nuclear power plants o assure the safe handlinc of heavy loads and.c recommend necessary changes to these measures.

This activity was ini.iated by a letter issved by the NRC staif on May 17, 978 [3], to ail power reac.or a plican.s, requesting infcrmation concerning

.he ccritrol of heavy loads near soen-fuel.

T;-,e resu;:s c= ;ask A-36 were reoorted in VUR:-G-0612, "Control v

1 The staf-'

conclus cn i

om Heavy Loads a: Nuclear Power Plants."

this evalua-icn was hat exis-ing measures tc control the handling of heavy loacs a-cper tine plan:s, al=hcugh providing pro-ection irom cer.ain Poten=ial

?rcbiems,

'c not adequa:ely ccver the major causes of load-ha.idling acciden"s and should be upgraded.

>n cider to uocrace mecsures fcr 'e control cf heavy.iocds, t,"e staff cevetoped c series'cf cuideiines designed to achieve a two-phase cbjective usina an ac"epted approach cr protection pniiosoohy.

>p f rs por:ion of :he objective, achieved

-hro 'gh a set of aenercl guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Article 5. 1. 1, is to ensure that ali load"handi

>nc systems at nuclear power.

pian.s are cesianed and cperatcd such tn>a: t.".e;r prcbabili y o>>a>lure

'.'s un; fcrnly s>>>ail and apprcpriate for the critical tasks in which they are employed.

The second portion o<

the s aff's objective, achieved through guidelines iden.ified in NUREG-0612, Articles 5.1.2 throuah 5.1.5, is to ersure that, for locd Aandlina systems in areas wnere :heir failure miaht result in significan. consequences, ei her (a) fea ures are provided, in aCditicn to-.hose required for cll locd hcAdiina sys.ems,.to ensure 4

e> ic p

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potential. f"r a.load crop is ext-. erne',y small (e.g.,

a sf(

I pa<

~ lAeWtth&Vpbcw(g) COASe. Va 'V aVciuc

>CAS CT a

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ica~-n~~ciinc a"">=e,",.ts

'AC.cate

~hat the "ctent':al ccn>sequences cT any ioac drop are ccceotably small.

Acceptability cf acc>dent consequences is quantified in NUREG-0612 in"o four ac".icen. cnalysis evaluationw"i er a,as.follows:

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0 Re<=a cs cc>cc ive m>a e 1al tata t m>cy resul:

frcm damage to spent fuel based on calculations involving accidental dropping of a postulated heavy load produce doses that are well wi.hin 10 CFR Part 100 limits of 300 rem thyroid, 2" rem wnole body (analyses should show that doses are equal

.0 or less than 1/4 of Part '00 limi.s);

0

<<n.

Ociilca>

invo1 v

> nc fuel and fuei storage racks based on calcula ior.s ac"icental droopina of a postulcted heavy lead sur <>

k -- is:arger nan 0.9:";

eTT 0

Da>>.age he reac or vessel cr the s"ent-fuel pool b-sed On CclCuia:ionS Of damaae fol 1OWing aCCidentai drOPPina Of a postula.ed heavy load is limited so as no..o result in

.wa:er ieakace

-.ha-could uncover the f ei,

~ma<cup water cv~ided c cvercome i eakage shcui d be from a bor a-.ed source cf acecuate concentration if he water beina ics is bcl a:ed);

ana 0

"Damage to equipmen.

in reduncant cr dual safe shu.down "a:.,s, based on aiculaticns assum',ra

.h accidental dropping of a pos.ulated heavy load, will be 1 imited so as no

.o result in loss o

required safe shu-.down functions."

The apprcach used tc deveico he staff guidelines

=or minimi"ing the poten iai for a load drop was based'on defense in. depth.

This plan includes proper ooerator training, equipment desian, and main enance cci ~ r ]ad q-~4 s-~o mcve.:ent over ciri ical 'pa.hs and crare in~erlcck "evi "es res-'.ric:irg" areas Staff au ide'I ines resui ting frcm.he Sec ion

= of NURLG-'512.

foregoing are abula ed in Plant-Sc ci fic.Background

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e On December 22,

1980, he NRC issued a letter L4]

o Florida Power and Light Company, he applican. for St.

Lucie 2 requesting that the applicant review provisions for handlina and control of heavy loads at Lucie 2, evaiua-.e these provisions with respec=

to -.he c ideiines of NUR G-0612, and provide cer.ain additional information to be used for an indepe. dent, determinatio'n of conformance to these guidelines.

Florida Power and Light Company provided responses tc this request on Aucust 6, 981 t':"1 ard Sep-ember 2

'1982 [oj.

"Vn' ATION AIND RECOMtiENOAT"'O>>S 2.1 Overview Tne,followina sec.ions summarize Flcrida Power and Light Company'

,review cf heavy

!Gad nandling at St.

Luc'.e 2 accomoanied by a"-&GIs evai a-.:.cn, c"nc!

s',on and recommenca:ions

o.ne app','can

~ for making the facilities more consistent with the intent of NUREG-0612.

2.2 Heav Lead Overhead Hand!ina S stems Table 2.1 which are presen.s the applicant's list of overhead handling systems subject to the criteria of NUREG-0612.

The aoplicant has

-.ha;

-.he. we",aht o>

a heavy loac for'the iacii!'s as "ounic5 2.3 Gu:de!ines

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The bas-ic,,~ide.l~;neq cf..NUREQ g6

g. =or Phase I evaluations are quo:ed C ~

below and followers with the 6pvlicant'5 sta emen;~s and the EG&G ev" 1ua icns w

~ ec itlmenca ions.

Sin'ce the guidei ine o>

=.. 1.-'. i s specifically for Boiling Water Reactors it is not discussed.

The intent of NRC is for St.

Lucie 2 to show that they are consistent with one eac.

of the appl icabl e oct ions of guidel ines i or ". l.2, or 5. 1. 3, or 5.1.5 and as aopropriiate 5.1.6.

2.3.1 Scen:-;" el Pool Area INUREG-0612. Ar.icle 5.1.2l.

(l)

II;n6 cv 5-c y o

i'lii 5 OR erhead crane and asscciated lif:ina c heavv loads in t"e spen.-fuel poo repcr=.

devices used for area shc 'ld (2)

"Each ci

~h>e i cl lc'wing i s provided:

(a) i4lechanical stops or elec rical in.erlocks should be provided hat prevent movement of the overhead crane load b'iock over or wi hin 15 feet hori=.ontal

(-"..5 meters) of ne spent"fuel cool.

These mechanical

TA"L" 2."

GY-"RHEAO,:ANGL'NG SYSTB.S SUB '"" 7 TG 5 UR":G 06 2

i!arne Ca" ac':

Sys-ems Gve.

the Spent Fuel Pool F el Cask Bridge Crane Refuelinc Canal Bulkhead i~:oncraif Cask Storage Pool Bulkhead Monorail i50 Ton Main Hook l5 Ton Auxiliary Hook, 3

ion 3

fO!l Systems Gcerating in the Containment Polar Cr ane Auxiliary Telescoping Jib Crane Re=veling Machine Hoist 200 Ton Main hook 50 Ton Auxiliary Hook 1 Ton 1 Ton Systems Goera inc in Other Areas f". mp,Room Monorai'fs v

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<ntake. Strgg.prf, gripge Crane

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w ~ I 0 i esh f Gene a ol Monora l I s Component Cooling Ma:er Pump Monorail Turbine Gan:ry Cranes fcnr

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1 Ton 3 Ion 200.Ton i4tg.in Hook 35 Ton Auxiliary Hook 45 To'n J

it

s ops o.

e(ec

. ical in-erlocks should no-be bypassed wnen the poo l on:ains "hot" spent fue 1, and should no. be bypassed without ap roval from he shif: supervisor (or o:her cesigna:ed plan:

m n~g'em r,- oersonnei).

Ti;e mechanical s-ops and

.e;e"=rica: interlocks snould be ver'f-ed to be in place and opera'ional pr',or.o plac',ng "ho." spen fuel in the pool.

(b)

The mechanical stops or elec:ricai interlocks o

S. 1.2(2)(a) above should also no. be bypassed urless an analysis i as demons.rated tha. damage due to'ostulated load drops would no: result in cri ticali:y or cause leakage that could uncover the fuel.

(c)

To preclude roiling if dropped, the cask should no be carried at a height higher than necessary and in no case more than six (6) inches (1S cm) above the ooerating floor level of the refueling building or other components and s.ructures along the path of ravel.

(d) i~echanlcal s ops or elec r

v',ced. -o. preclude crane

=os:ulated load Crop could ical interlocks should be trave'i fr"m areas where a

came"e e.ui".men- -."m redundan.

V (e)

Analyses should conform to the guidelines of Appencix A.

(34)

'nor(y d II s I m I I'.,p~

loao) such spent fuel separa-.ion h4,," 1 1 ow.i.hg are (1) above',..~xcap

=s a cas<,

n=

if the pool is 1

between the

'load provided'('emote This alternative is t it allows movement of

= heavy...

-he pool wn ie i con".ains "hot" arge enough to maintain wide and the "hot" spent fuel.):

(a)

"Hot" spent fuel should be concentrated in one location in

.he spent-fuel pool tha is separated as muci as p=ssi"le

-,r"m load pa-hs.

Hecl anical stops or electricai irterlocks should be provided to preven movement cf the overhead crane load block over or wi hin 25 fee-hor'zontal (7.S m) of ti;e "ho." spent fuel.

To the ex'en. practiicaif io ds should De gloved over load pa:hs that avoid :ne spen.-;uel poo'.

and keo. at lees.

2S feet (7.S m) from th~ "hc-" spon-

~ 1 Tuel unless necessarv.

chen i

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. ecessarv ioacs wi-.hin 25 rect of tne restric=ed region,:hese mechanical stops or elec r;cal interlocks should no:

be bypassed unless ti;e spen.

fuel has cecayed sufficien:ly as shown in Table 2.1-1

and 2.'-Z, or niess he :o:ai inven.ory of "ap activity for I el within :he pro-ec-.ec area would result in oI -si-.e coses less

han '.l< of '.0 CFR Pa

~

~00 iif released, and such byoassing should require

he aporoval f.

m.he shif. superv-isor (cr othe, designated plant managemen incividual).

The mechanical stops or elect", ical inte. locks should be verified o be in place and opera ional prior to placing "hot" spen.

fuel in he pool.

(c)

Mechanic=-1 s ops or elec.".ical in.erlocks should be provided to restric-crane travel from areas where a

postula.ed load drop cauld damage equipmer.:

from redundan.

or aiterna e safe shutdown pa.hs.

Analyses have demonstrated that a pos.ulated ioaC crop in any location not res ricted by elec.rical interlocks or mechanical stops would not cause damage tha. could result in criticality, cause leakage that. could uncover the fuel, or cause loss of safe shu.down equipmen:.'d)

.o preclude roll I

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OPeravIno I IOOr o her componen s

travel.

ing, if dropped,

he cask gnt n'gher

nan necessary

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iev'el of -he'efuel',ng bu anc structures aloro the should,.o-be V=

iic':ng cr I.n 07

.Arg]yses..shouio conform to -.he guideiines I

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~-"'R'f Appendix A; (4)

"The effects of drops of heavy loads should be analyzed and shown

.o satisfy the evaluation cri eria of Sec ion 5.1 of this report.

These analyses should conform to the guidelines of Appendix A."

A.

Summar of A.olicant s Statements The ruei cask bricae crane he~aviest load carried is :he 100

-.on Soen.

F el Cask.

Tnis proof however,

.he fo'.low'inc cp crane i s no.

s ngi e fa iI lure rIIrae I

4 I V ~

S demonstrate tt a no sincie failure will affec the spent storage pool.

o The cask is lifted through an L shaped opening in the Fuel Handling 8uiiding roof, and nor.h wall

hen lowero'd in-.o the fuel cask storage pool which is adjacen-.

o.he spen-fuel s.o,aoe pool, but is separa-.ed

-,rcm ',t by a 5.5 foot thi k

r oinfol cad concrete wali 0

Protec-.'on aga ns'ropping

-.he cask in the spen-fuel pool is prov>ced by layou-. of the buildinge.g.:

i is physically impossible to pass the cask over the spent fuel pool o

Fully redundant limit swi tches are provided to confine the hook centerline wi.hin corridor tha-. is cen:ered over the pool a

2 foot wide cask storage c

The cast ycka

'esicn ei.'ates:ne.possibii

=y cf a double pendulum type of crop""e.g.:

can fall in vertical droo only

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P' a, '- ihe walla of the cask s orace area slab are cesigned

-or -.he 'mirac: loac or a drcpoed cask.

'he above features of the cask handling sys em demonstrate hat no single failure can result in a drop of the spent

uel cask ir,-o the spent fuel s.orage pool.

For maximum prac ',cable, "defense-in-depth the general guidelines and in crim requiremen s for safe load handling of 'tUR G 0612 will be implemen:ed.

Use of the '5 ton Aux;liary Hois or i.s safe y is rot disc ssec.

The Refueling Canal

""uikhead and Cask S orage Pool Buikheao 4ionorails are used o iif. these pool cate bulkheads o arc from heir normal loca:ion in :he pool walls and he desiona.ed s:orace locations.

Although the weioht of.he bulkheads is below i.25 tons, monorail sys.ems with a 3 ton razed capacity have been provided.

The following table

represents'e fac:crs cf safety fcr the various compcnen-'-

the mcrcrai l sys m

'-asec upon a maximum lif:ed load cf illC

~ lails

~

Cateaor Safet Factor Condition

!.Cii 5 aniC t ~ C! l ey crt 5 10 U'

c i I!iicr strenctn

,'-'.cis-rcpes i4!achinery Structural s eel Hocks 12 10 1P 3

Ultima.e s-.rength Ulti.ate s.renath Yield strength Ultimate s.rength Oue cr I

I VV ~

to the conservative cesign of these monorai ls, in

"..c ion w.;l c e

"- ops using specicl piece u es, a

re :.".a: "".l" resu'.-

in an uncon:r"lied cescer.-.

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< a ic CS

". S eX me+ uii! i ke ly rc I

9.

GEG valuat'ion

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appeases-

.na the-eo-ions of NUREG.06>2< Ar.icle "..1.2,

'=, =:ons "r 4, were ".ot used 'or the Fuel Cask Br'dge crane.

Usina op-ion 2 he presentation generally shows consistency with the intent of this guideline.

However sub-items 2c and 2e are no addressed.

There is no men ion if other lcacs are handled, or auxi!iary hois. use.

Rela:lve to the Refueling Caral Bulkhead and Cask Storage Peel Bulkhead monorai ls, there is no claim that they are s;:..a:e failure proof.

1n NUREG 0612, Art cle =. 1.2 here is

=- Ca!! ror as5u.an c

hiat e eVcluc ion C

e. Ic 0

5. 1 ale

,e"..

.n -.

an ei-her"cr assurance is permi.-ed wi-h

( ) being to show that,

".he potential for a locd drop

',s ex.remely small." I. also calls fcr defense-in-depth and i

I summar-izes tnis

.o tnree guidelines with alternative r,easures to compensate for deficiencies of the numbers (2)

or (3) of he guide!ines.

Arcng the al.erna:

ves is,

"'ncreasei safety factors" reported by;lorica ?ower and Lich

n Phase

< report;hey have shown consi s-.ency wi-h nulli ber ( '

and (2) al ternati ves, heref ore. the in;ert o;

"=. 1 objective (1) is met.

C.

"=MQ Conc I si ons and Reccmmendati ons The response for he Fuel Cask Bridge Crane usina cp.ion 2

has insufficierit information to show consistency with all of the auideiine.

Provide, for 2(c), information.to show that the cask is handled at 6 inches or less above the operating floor level or other s ructures.

Provide better informa..'on

.o show consis e

of BUR:-G 06 2.

rcy on

.he analysis follcwing the Appendix A

ndica:e :f.he Fue Cask Sridce Crane or adcress their risk.

A f g A)t A

~ ac< 2ic cn< vvnc

~

neavy

Icacs, Ir st The EGEG analysis made frcm iNormation submit-.ed on the Refgeiiag.'Carai

'Buj.khead and Cask'Storage Bulkhead

~ ~ i mcrorails

'.ncicate

.ha 1 cie 2 is ccr.sis.ent with gui de 1 inc 5. 1. 2 requi rements.

2.3. 2 Reactor Sui 1 ding t'NUREG-0612. Article S. 1. 31

( 1)

"The crane and associated lif ing devices used for handling heavy loads in he containment building shculd satisfy the sinaie-failure-proof auidelines of Section

5. 1.6 of this report.

(2)

Rac'i cc"Y.ainmen" soiation is pi"v,cec w!t."s p empt au=cma-.ic ac-ua iion on high rad'a:ion sc ha:

po tuiated releases are within limits of evaluation Cri:ericn T of Section

5. 1 taking in"o account delay imes in detec.ion and ac ua ion; anc analyses have been performec to show.hat eva Iua ion c i aria ii,.'Ti, and iV of Sect

> on ".'re sa isiied for pos-ula.ed load drops in this area.

Tnese analyses should. conform to the guidelines o-Appendix A.

'0

(3)

Gi?

Il )he er;ec:s c; drops of neav n.c satisiy the evaluation cri"e.

a Q

Sec cn Loads anaiy"ed should

nciuce th 1

head; 'per vessel in-~

reac. r vessel h

a internals; vesse'I ins ect on a=f ccoiar pump'~an~

io C

reoui rea for continued de

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h ido"bli had d

.d 'i iona iy, the anaiysi-s should

con, A

di A" A.

Summar of Applicant's Statements Table 2.'hys ical iy

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~ c provides a

1 i st ca ab le

( i. e.

i s:cps,

o. okra oT heavy load "hanciinc systems

=norina '.nteric"'<c I ing procedures) 'of

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carrying neavy leads ever the reactor ves sel.

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The St.

Lucie plan administ -"

a. ~, nistcative

.procedure AP 100438 ontroi'f Heavy-Load's-Limits" t

. u s

covers neavy-'oad handling coera:icns f r f

hese cranes.

A safe lo-d a " is efined which prohibits hook traravel over the reactor vessel without prior special aoproval.

However d

i 1

t r,

ur ng p an maintenance and refueling operations it is i is sometimes necessary tc carry heavy leads over the reactor vessel S

e pecial procedures for

'4 heavy loads have been prepared th

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~

icr ose loads which are handled periodically over the reactor vessel.

Tnese'rocedures identif

~see required

~uipment'nspe

'cn n

a c pt c, i~aria required before moveement cr the loac the s

e

.cps an prcce.

secuence

=o

~

o be rciicwed in hard',ing he

oac; the load pa i

,a.h and any special precautions.

Any load li s no. covered by special orocedure are controlled aenericaliy by the ~lant aim a

y :

p ~nt admi..istrative procedure AP:06438 previously mentioned.

This procedure requires that Facility Review Group approvai be ob ained prior o mov f

movement of hese loads over.he reac or vessel.

h F

T e acili y Review Group will assure ha. the proper controls are presen s are present.

11

n acci ion z,o =hese procedures, wnich are avai',able at :he site for. review, safe operation of the cranes

'.s assured by he crane inain-.enance and operator trainino and qualifica.ion progr ms which fo!low ANSi B30.2-'o76 guidelines..

Based uoon Florida Power and Ligh. Company's

". eview of he procedures, equipmen-.

and personnel used in load handling operations over the core, we believe tha. the likelihood of :he load drop in the area is extremely smal'i and that no problem exis s.

B...

EGEG Evaluation HUREG 0612 Article 5.1.3 calls for two assuranc'es that he criteria of Article 5.1 are met.

0ne is to sat'.wfy the cu.'de!'.nes of 5.1>>1 I'w',",ich were

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1 d I g vol@>>I

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are quoted above.

The app'iican covered in,"i asa

),

two is 4 ~ ~ 0 In Cl ~

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IIR Ir t's s:a.ament rei crates the information used to show consistency with Guideline 5.1. 1, bu.,

does not provide in=orma"i as'su, any,a'".ihat'5

'1 i s met.

on for tne.reques ed o

There is no information to indicate that the cranes and associated lifting devices are single fai l ure proof 0

There is no discussion on radiation activa ed con:a-inment isola ion along the guides of Ar-icle 5. 1 i and suoplementary analyses or

5. 1 !

, 1:i, and 'V There is no load crop anaiysis as reques-.eo

.i0 the guicelines of Ar:iicle 5. 1 and using he details g'iven in NUREG 0612 Appendix A.

12

==KG Conc Ius'cns and xecoI"..mencat-'.ons Insuf i> ci en: i nformati on i s prov i ded for a Ya1 ic evaluation o= measures that show consis:=ncy wi-h 5.'.3.

F'.orida Power and Light should select the most.appropriate of the three op:iors permitted by 5. l.

and present

.hose plant features

>a" sh>cw the pl ant is con s' tent w i -'h t>'Iat opt 1 ons requirement.

hoists in the Ihese comments apply equalIly o the four Containmen iuilding.

2.3.3 Other Areas NUREQ-0612 Article 5.

.51 "Tf sa e shutdown equipment are beneath or direc.

o a

Do ential traveI loac ca-.h of overhead hand) systems,.(i.e,.a patn not restr;c.ed by 1 mits 0

aveI ol by mechanical stoos cr =-Iectrical i'r

~

> J I

+at

~ I I

~ J i

> 4

~ I sa:; s-.y:ng:he genial Guide Iines.c> Sec.ion 5.1.

ly. ad'acent no f crane locks) ore (a)

Tne crane and associated lif ing devicqp. should conform

o the single-failure-proo;".guidelines of Section 5.1.6 of thi s repor-;

~

~ 'I(

~

~ <<

i<<v

~

~

~ r' OR

~

~

(bj if the load crop could impair he ooeration of equipment or cabling associated with redundant or dual safe shu.down

paths, mechanical stops or electrical interlocks should be provided to prevent movement of loads in proximity to these redundan.

or dual safe shu.down equipeen..

(>n this case, credit should not be taken for intervening floors unless justified by analysis.)

(c)

Tne eifects 0

I oac c r sul.s 'ircicate tha=

~ovid not "re"1>uce o:

acn>

ve sa>

s>>utoown auicelines o-Appendi roos have been analyzed and he ca.>aae o safe shutcowr> equiipnent ev

'\\ gI>

O su

~ gt +

> Cu pl<<<<

x A, as applicable.

(2)

"Where" the sa>e shu.down eauipmen-has a cei lina separating from an overhead handling sys:em, an lterna-ive to Section 5.~.5(~)

above would be to show by analysis tha the

~.".Ot penetrat

'"e coil' ndiino syste'm wou!d a: IU e o'e saf e shu down equi pmen

~<<<<y A

<<1 '<<<<1 Ummar o, Aoolicant s Statements O

I The o her area monorai ls and cranes which may cfIec n<<r Ui. ec ior sea OI AU. own, cora decay heat removal or spent fuel pool cooling are listed in Table 2. 1.

T;.e io Ilowing related information presents data relative to con.roi of the !isk.

The Pump

Room, Char in g

g Pump and Diesel Genera or monorai ls could po entially drop loads that could damage a sa e

safe s.. tdown systenI.

'.-'.cwever the s"s-.em wou!d be inoperative fo.

-,c',r, encnce ";rposes.

The monora'is a">>

~ ~c~

. cnc 3 !IJ co Plant Sere 5'lu CORA CVaOiIi Or' hea. removal couid no-be de-ea-ed 1

d

~y a

oad crop on a

component which is being servic d...

Nc ce...

I e monorails are:

~

~

y

)I It'v P r'

~

o.. -. physi ca 1 ly "nc>>pail e other ec ipment requi

\\o-c"-r".ying heavy loads over..

red ior p I ant safe shu:down o

there is sufficient physical separation between redundant sys.ems to preclude damage

-.o bo'a

\\ I

~

Technical specifica ions require one redundant system o be operative in order to remove -'e otIer irom service for ma'. n-enance.

I ocCS C

~ OP ""U!C P'

'.he o;..Ponen:

Coolir.o Ma er c,c a

c CC~ pump, hea. exchanger or piping.

One

,edundan

A or i 5 rccui red

iat, ne e

su77'iCien-sys ems.

cc-.h recurcar.-.

II,worst a5e droo

~

ud shows se amaoe Wlfne Uniit No.

1 and Uni-Noo.

2 furbine Gantry Cranes can operate on the Unit No.

2 Turbini furbine Building.

potential load crop risks exis for St.

Lucie "

from r

ucie 2 from a

fcad drop rrom Nc.

> cver:,",e s.a=

Ir fbi Ai s.aam trestle and a dro crom o.

2 ovel buried intake cooling water i es.

0 prevent c ~ ane travel over "

~:

ause r

he steam tres:le because i-contains vital auxili iliary reedwater pumps ar.d is 1

pe.ational verification of t'ne interlocks are made prior to ini.iai use each shift.

B-lii.

y passiAg oi interlock is oermitte~ ""'ii.

i

~

5 i

p d du, ing co fd shu-down and of p

. d d an retuelinc

modes, or on i

'i h paci I i y Revi ew Group aoorova1 1 ccrc.

>>Ac>>

~ QrI'a I V2 I i

~

Cw ICII

~ >>

Tne Unit No. '2 1 oad dro r

iCIff' e

o a T'

'rop risk to the two 30 inch.di 6

'ieter pes has been given special stUd e

e i

a 5.

y.

One area"is at risk wi-,,y~~y. leavy leads.gnd,, spedi fi C.d f

. rop oriefltation Conceivabl'e"movefrent~

o

o -ors 's res:r ctac b

ar

~

y area icentification and load a

such dro s.

oa path to prevent i y eview Group rops.

Oeviations require Facilit Rev

approval, and Engineering determinati f

t'ns o

precautions rioging and load path.

Also oerer-so, interim requiremen" p..

so s

an ere. cl guiidelines oi NUREG 0612 ere.-

have been adopted for operation of Turbine*Gan ry Cranes raAes

~

S.ruc.ure Building Crane 1

d ne oa s

ir. roduce risk ne

.o

=..d C intake Cooling Ma'er o

-,cr s--.e sh."'>>

I

cwA, acean

",="

cm 1.

A e

s,u

'.,",="

~ -iiova

~

'r/or s" ase II s:udy c"mpared enero of y

o-,

a maximum load drop to d miss.le ener"~ '-"

o o

esign

. y rom -crnado ri:i ssi Ie ro~.eciion s ructure which encloses t."Ie:C'rl pu."..p.

The stu will pu"..p.

the study shows the structure

~,t i

oi tne pumps irom a load drop.

En addi ion t" d'

n, ihe interim requirament d

s an general i>> J

I!.,'g ',ie.o

'~L'.-.==

6 2 wi:; be imp!emen=ed.

This inciuces 1

sa-e

!cad pa-.h

". estric na crane opera.ion over i e iCM puiTip 5.

The Reactor Bui'.c-nc Polar

')b cranes are'sed du~ nc coolinc sys.am' "ing must Crane and Auxiliary.elescoping c"ld shutdown and reiue!ing.

The remain functional and is at r-':sr..

!he ma'c."-ty o- :he piping is'nside the secondary shield wall below the 4 foo" thick opera.ing deck or inside an '

foo. deco pipe trench in base concrete.

The piping is considered adequately pro. ected.

in ihe piping penetration area on he sou:h side, the pipes exit the trench and

'secondary shielc wali confines and penetrate the s eel containment vessel.

Protection exists by two levels of s'ucturzi stee

.icor iraminc.

However,

]cad hanc',inc

','s

~

<<C

~ ~ 0 i ~

~

A

~ i~ ~

v

<<V gefie. a I cu de l in=s and inde lm requi remen s have been aaopted.

~

p ~

~

~ i

~r

!he ri;p ~oom Cna

~ c nc Pumo and Oiesel Generator monorails loads handled are over inopera ive equipment.

Since the loads can't be handled over equipment required for shu down because

=..ere iis adec a:e "hysical separa io.

oi redu! dent systems o precl ce camace to bo.h the hazard elimination is consistent with =uidelines.

t i%

~

! he Component "="i',rg 'dater Pump Monorail worst case iced d

p s v i c

= es sri scient "hysiical sepa

~ a ior to

<<<<At

~ Il i ~ <<

~ << 'c 1v w

~ )h

.io J

~

= --

. ~ r

~ sk.,Is

> s I s "onsl stent wl n

guideline ".1.5:(c} requirements.

fl<< 'l

!he 4n-'t No.

~

an" "ni: No.

2 Turb',ne Gartry Cranes have dual conisice aticns.

Ine Uni. No. l has interlocks to preclude load passage over the auxiliary fe dwater pumps.

16