ML17301A062

Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants,St Lucie Plant,Unit 2 (Phase Ii).

ML17301A062
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	10/31/1983
From:	Shaber C EG&G, INC.
To:	NRC
Shared Package
ML17214A569	List: ML17301A062
References
CON-FIN-A-6457, REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR NUDOCS 8310260311
Download: ML17301A062 (20)

Text

CON)ROL OF .".'BYY LOADS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS FLORIOA PG'iv'ER AND LI)-HT CG.

'T. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 2 (PHASE II)

Oocke- No. [iO-3893 A~v'.)cr

~ r Princ'pal Teci n-ical Inves:iaator T. H. S ickl ey

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Published October 1983 EC&G Idaho, Inc.

~canc ;a))s, cahc ~4 o Prepared for the U.S. NUc)ear Recula Iy Col".)1iss on Under GOE Con .rac-. No. OE-ACC7-75 DOIS70 FIN No. A5<."7

ABSTRACT The .nuclear eo latory io;,.m ssion (NRC) has req es.ec .ha-. alI ni clear

",lan-s, ei:her ocerat>na or under cors-ruc 'on, su'"mi- a response of consistency with NUREG-0612, "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." "BG :daho, 'Inc., has contracted with tne NRC to evaluate the resocnses ci t""sa "lan.s oresan .y under cons:ruc:ion. This repor.

contains =Mu s evaluation and recommendations for St. Lucie Plant Uni' for .he requirements of Sections 5.1.2, =. 1.3, 5. 1.5, ard 5. 1.6 of HUR~G"9612 (Phase > ). Sec.ion 5 1 i (Phase i) was covered in a separate report [13.

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'cie ."-lant Uni: 2 is no to;ally consis:ant with the guidelines of NUR""G-06'2. 'n general, i..consis-.enci es axis. in the followinc a eas:

0 The spen. fuel area has three minor situations needina i prov men to 5 cw>> s 5 ency wi h cuidel 'in cu remen 5 NUREG 06'2 Article c.l.2 The submit"al for the Reac.or."=uildino fa'.ls -o provide suitable information to show consistency wi .h any one of the three options soec i fi ed by NUREG 0612 Artie 1 e 5. . 3. ~

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hD s '"mit.al on the hoists in c.her areas, shows gereral

'.s:ency nowever :here are -'."."ee s'<-. ations whi"h recu',re

. acci-.ioral improvemen

'.he -ain reoor contains recommenda iors whicn will Hc in waking the above items cony'.stan,, wi .h .he aopropriate g'uicelines.

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CONTENTS ABSTRACT EXEC' 'E ~UP~/'PY INTRODlJCTYQN P" ~ 0 se 07 R-"v i ~w

] .2 Generic aackground ..............,.......

'.3 Plan--Specific Backoround EVAL'JAT~ON AND RECOi4IMENOATlONS

2. 1 Overview 2.2 Heavy L"ad Overhead Handling Sys.ems

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3.1 G idel ice Recommenda.ions 21 3.2 Acdi-. onal Recommenda:ions . 22 ~

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'Ce 4.3 ~

mn'ary ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t ~

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~ ~~ 22 R --8"RC-S 23 TABLES

2. Nonexemp- Heavy Load-Handling Sys:ems

C 'NT.""'."" H"'VY LQAOS .'T NUC'R PQ']cR PLANTS "LQR:DA .-""'r!=R ANO '=" CO. ST. 'C:= PLAN UNiT 2 (PLEAS= i:i

1. IN TROOUCT ION

?arose 0i Rev This technical evaluation repcrt documents the LG&G idaho, inc.,

review of genera! 1!cad-handling policy and procedvres a; S . Lucie Plant Unit 2 (St. Lucie 2). This evaluation was performed with the objec.ive of assessing co nformance to the general load-handling gu idel ines c f NURcG-0612, "Coritrol of Heavy Loads a Nuclea,r.Power

?lcn s LZ i Sections. c. '.2, ". l.3, 5. 1."", anc :6. This Ci c. WC OnaS2 =Velvet'.Cn.; hcSe 'SSeSScS ccnTQr..~nce t S '~a ioII \ I v '.=- ci NUB:G-O6'2 -arc was dcc men ec separa e r~pow Ger er~ c Beck6rovsci.,>~r i

~ ~ 't Gener ic Tecnnica! Activity Task n-36 was estab! shed by the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) s.aff to systematically examine staff licensing criteria and he adequacy of measvres in effect at opera.ing nuclear power plants o assure the safe handlinc of heavy loads and .c recommend necessary changes to these measures. This activity was ini .iated by a letter issved by the NRC staif on May 17, 978 [3], to ail power reac.or a plican.s, requesting infcrmation concerning .he ccritrol of heavy loads near soen- fuel.

T;-,e resu;:s c= ;ask A-36 were reoorted in VUR:-G-0612, "Control v 1 Heavy Loads a: Nuclear Power Plants." The staf-' conclus cn i om this evalua-icn was hat exis-ing measures tc control the handling of heavy loacs a- cper tine plan:s, al=hcugh providing pro-ection irom cer.ain Poten=ial ?rcbiems, 'c not adequa:ely ccver the major causes of load-ha.idling acciden"s and should be upgraded.

>n cider to uocrace mecsures fcr 'e control cf heavy.iocds, t,"e staff cevetoped c series'cf cuideiines designed to achieve a two-phase cbjective usina an ac"epted approach cr protection pniiosoohy. >p f rs por:ion of :he objective, achieved -hro 'gh a set of aenercl guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Article 5. 1. 1, is to ensure that ali load"handi >nc systems at nuclear power. pian .s are cesianed and cperatcd such tn>a: t.".e;r prcbabili y o>>a>lure '.'s un; fcrnly s>>>ail and apprcpriate for the critical tasks in which they are employed. The second portion o< the s aff's objective, achieved through guidelines iden.ified in NUREG-0612, Articles 5.1.2 throuah 5.1.5, is to ersure that, for locd Aandlina systems in areas wnere :heir failure miaht result in significan. consequences, ei her (a) fea ures are provided, in aCditicn to-.hose required for cll locd hcAdiina sys.ems,.to ensure e> ic 4

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p potential. f"r a.load crop is ext-. erne',y small (e.g., a sf( pa< I ~ lAeWt th&Vpbcw(g) COASe. Va 'V aVciuc >CAS CT ica~-n~~ciinc a"">=e,",.ts 'AC.cate ~hat the "ctent':al ccn>sequences cT a ~ ~ i 1 any ioac drop are ccceotably small. Acceptability cf acc>dent consequences is quantified in NUREG-0612 in"o four ac".icen. cnalysis evaluationw"i er a,as .follows: r 'r'

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0 Re<=a cs cc>cc ive m>a e 1al tata t m>cy resul: frcm damage to spent fuel based on calculations involving accidental dropping of a postulated heavy load produce doses that are well wi .hin 10 CFR Part 100 limits of 300 rem thyroid, 2" rem wnole body (analyses should show that doses are equal .0 or less than 1/4 of Part '00 limi .s);

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Ociilca> fuel and fuei storage racks based on calcula ior.s invo1 v nc > ac"icental droopina of a postulcted heavy lead sur <>

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-- is:arger nan 0.9:";

0 Da>>.age he reac or vessel cr the s"ent-fuel pool b- sed On CclCuia:ionS Of damaae fol 1OWing aCCidentai drOPPina Of a postula.ed heavy load is limited so as no..o result in

.wa:er ieakace -.ha- could uncover the f ei, ~ma<cup water cv~ided c cvercome i eakage shcui d be from a bor a-.ed source cf acecuate concentration if he water beina ics is bcl a:ed); ana 0 "Damage to equipmen. in reduncant cr dual safe shu.down "a:.,s, based on aiculaticns assum',ra .h accidental dropping of a pos.ulated heavy load, will be imited so as 1

no .o result in loss o required safe shu-.down functions."

The apprcach used tc deveico he staff guidelines =or minimi"ing the poten iai for a load drop was based'on defense in. depth. This plan includes proper ooerator training, equipment desian, and main enance cci r ]ad q-~4 s-~o ical 'pa.hs and crare in~erlcck "evi "es res-'.ric:irg"

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mcve.:ent over ciri areas Staf f au ide'I ines resui ting frcm .he foregoing are abula ed in Sec i on = of NURLG-'512.

Plant-Sc ci fic.Background ~ ~ e On December 22, 1980, he NRC issued a letter L4] o Florida Power and Light Company, he applican. for St. Lucie 2 requesting that the applicant review provisions for handlina and control of heavy loads at Lucie 2, evaiua-.e these provisions with respec= to -.he c ideiines of NUR G-0612, and provide cer.ain additional information to be used for an indepe. dent, determinatio'n of conformance to these guidelines.

Florida Power and Light Company provided responses tc this request on Aucust 6, 981 t':"1 ard Sep-ember 2 , '1982 [oj.

"Vn' ATION AIND RECOMtiENOAT"'O>>S 2.1 Overview Tne,followina sec.ions summarize Flcrida Power and Light Company'

,review cf heavy !Gad nandling at St. Luc'.e 2 accomoanied by a"-&GIs evai a-.:.cn, c"nc! s',on , and recommenca:ions :o .ne app','can ~ for making the facilities more consistent with the intent of NUREG-0612.

2.2 Heav Lead Overhead Hand!ina S stems Table 2.1 presen.s the applicant's list of overhead handling systems which are subject to the criteria of NUREG-0612. The aoplicant has

-.ha; -.he. we",aht o> a heavy loac for'the iacii!'s as "ounic5

~ r 2.3 Gu:de!ines

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The bas-ic,,~ide.l~;neq cf..NUREQ g6 g. =or Phase I evaluations are quo:ed C ~

below and followers with the 6pvlicant'5 sta emen;~s and the EG&G ev" 1ua icns w > ~ ec itlmenca ions. Sin'ce the guidei ine o> =.. 1.-'. i s specifically for Boiling Water Reactors it is not discussed. The intent of NRC is for St. Lucie 2 to show that they are consistent with one eac. of the appl icabl e oct ions of guidel ines i or ". l .2, or 5. 1. 3, or 5.1.5 and as aopropriiate 5.1.6.

2.3.1 Scen:-;" el Pool Area INUREG-0612. Ar.icle 5.1.2l.

(l) II;n6 cv erhead crane and asscciated lif:ina devices used for c heavv loads in t"e spen .-fuel poo area shc 'ld 5- c y o > i'lii 5 repcr=.

OR (2) "Each ci ~h>e i cl lc'wing i s provided:

(a) i4lechanical stops or elec rical in.erlocks should be provided hat prevent movement of the overhead crane load b'iock over or wi hin 15 feet hori=.ontal

(-"..5 meters) of ne spent"fuel cool. These mechanical

TA"L" 2." GY-"RHEAO,:ANGL'NG SYSTB.S SUB '"" 7 TG 5 UR":G 06 2 i!arne Ca" ac':

Sys-ems Gve. the Spent Fuel Pool F el Cask Bridge Crane i50 Ton Main Hook l5 Ton Auxiliary Hook, Refuelinc Canal Bulkhead i~:oncraif 3 ion Cask Storage Pool Bulkhead Monorail 3 fO!l Systems Gcerating in the Containment Polar Cr ane 200 Ton Main hook 50 Ton Auxiliary Hook Auxiliary Telescoping Jib Crane 1 Ton Re=veling Machine Hoist 1 Ton Systems Goera inc in Other Areas f".

mp,Room Monorai'fs fcn

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0 i esh f Gene a ol Monora l I s 1 Ton Component Cooling Ma:er Pump Monorail 3 Ion Turbine Gan:ry Cranes 200.Ton i4tg.in Hook 35 Ton Auxiliary Hook

<ntake. Strgg.prf, gripge Crane 45 To'n

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s ops o. e(ec . ical in-erlocks should no- be bypassed wnen the poo l on:ains "hot" spent fue 1, and should no. be bypassed without ap roval from he shif: supervisor (or o:her cesigna:ed plan: m n~g'em r,- oersonnei). Ti;e mechanical s-ops and

.e;e"=rica: interlocks snould be ver'f-ed to be in place and opera'ional pr',or .o plac',ng "ho." spen fuel in the pool.

(b) The mechanical stops or elec:ricai interlocks o S. 1.2(2)(a) above should also no. be bypassed urless an analysis i as demons .rated tha . damage due to'ostulated load drops would no: result in cri ticali:y or cause leakage that could uncover the fuel.

(c) To preclude roiling if dropped, the cask should no be carried at a height higher than necessary and in no case more than six (6) inches (1S cm) above the ooerating floor level of the refueling building or other components and s.ructures along the path of ravel.

(d) i~echanlcal s ops or elec r ical interlocks should be v',ced. -o. preclude crane trave'i fr"m areas where a

=os:ulated load Crop could came"e e.ui".men- -."m redundan.

V (e) Analyses should conform to the guidelines of Appencix A.

(34) 'nor(y d II h4,," 1 ow.i.hg are provided'('emote This alternative is t it 1

s Im I I'.,p~ (1) above',..~xcap allows movement of = heavy...

loao) such =s a cas<, n= -he pool wn ie i con".ains "hot" spent fuel if the pool is arge enough to maintain wide 1

separa-.ion between the 'load and the "hot" spent fuel.):

(a) "Hot" spent fuel should be concentrated in one location in

.he spent-fuel pool tha is separated as muci as p=ssi"le

-,r"m load pa-hs.

Hecl anical stops or electricai irterlocks should be provided to preven movement cf the overhead crane load block over or wi hin 25 fee- hor'zontal (7.S m) of ti;e "ho." spent fuel. To the ex'en . practiicaif io ds should De gloved over load pa:hs that avoid :ne spen.-;uel poo'.

and keo. at lees. 2S feet (7.S m) from th~ "hc-" spon- ~ 1 Tuel unless necessarv. chen i ~ s . ecessarv ioacs wi-.hin 25 rect of tne restric=ed region,:hese mechanical stops or elec r;cal interlocks should no: be bypassed unless ti;e spen. fuel has cecayed sufficien:ly as shown in Table 2.1-1

and 2.'-Z, or niess he :o:ai inven.ory of "ap activity for el within :he pro-ec-.ec area I would result in oI -si-.e coses less :han '.l< of '.0 CFR Pa ~ ~00 iif released, and such byoassing should require

he aporoval f. m .he shif. superv-isor (cr othe, designated plant managemen incividual). The mechanical stops or elect", ical inte. locks should be verified o be in place and opera ional prior to placing "hot" spen. fuel in he pool.

'f (c) Mechanic=-1 s ops or elec.".ical in.erlocks should be provided to restric- crane travel from areas where a postula.ed load drop cauld damage equipmer.: from redundan. or aiterna e safe shutdown pa.hs. Analyses have demonstrated that a pos.ulated ioaC crop in any location not res ricted by elec.rical interlocks or mechanical stops would not cause damage tha. could result in criticality, cause leakage that. could uncover the fuel, or cause loss of safe shu.down equipmen:.'d)

.o preclude roll ing, if dropped, :he cask should,.o- be gnt n'gher :nan necessary Iiav ~ v ~

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OPeravIno I IOOr iev'el of -he'efuel',ng bu iic':ng cr o her componen s anc structures aloro the I.n 07 travel.

.Arg]yses..shouio "r' conform to -.he guideiines Appendix A; I .~

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(4) "The effects of drops of heavy loads should be analyzed and shown .o satisfy the evaluation cri eria of Sec ion 5.1 of this report. These analyses should conform to the guidelines of Appendix A."

A. Summar of A.olicant s Statements The ruei cask bricae crane he~aviest load carried is :he 100 -.on Soen. F el Cask. Tnis crane i s no. s ngi e fa iI lure proof however, .he fo'.low'inc cp I 4 rIIrae I V ~ S demonstrate tt a no sincie failure will affec the spent storage pool.

o The cask is lifted through an L shaped opening in the Fuel Handling 8uiiding roof, and nor.h wall

hen lowero'd in-.o the fuel cask storage pool which is adjacen-. :o .he spen- fuel s.o,aoe pool, but is separa-.ed -,rcm ',t by a 5.5 foot thi k r oinfol cad concrete wali 0 Protec-.'on aga ns'ropping -.he cask in the spen-fuel pool is prov>ced by layou-. of the building e.g.: i is physically impossible to pass the cask over the spent fuel pool o Fully redundant limit swi tches are provided to confine the hook centerline wi .hin a 2 foot wide corridor tha-. is cen:ered over the cask storage pool c The cast ycka 'esicn ei.'ates:ne.possibii =y cf a double pendulum type of crop""e.g.: can fall in vertical droo only t ~ P' IP ~ y ~

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. a, walla of the cask s orace area slab are cesigned -or -.he 'mirac: loac or a drcpoed cask.

'he above features of the cask handling sys em demonstrate hat no single failure can result in a drop of the spent

uel cask ir,-o the spent fuel s.orage pool. For maximum prac ',cable, "defense-in-depth the general guidelines and in crim requiremen s for safe load handling of 'tUR G 0612 will be implemen

ed. Use of the '5 ton Aux;liary Hois or i .s safe y is rot disc ssec.

The Refueling Canal ""uikhead and Cask S orage Pool Buikheao 4ionorails are used o iif. these pool cate bulkheads o arc from heir normal loca:ion in :he pool walls and he desiona.ed s:orace locations. Although the weioht of .he bulkheads is below i.25 tons, monorail sys.ems with a 3 ton razed capacity have been provided. The following table

represents'e fac:crs cf safety fcr the various compcnen-'-

the mcrcrai l sys m '-asec upon a maximum lif:ed load cf

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Cateaor Safet Factor Condition

!.Cii 5 aniC t ~ C! l ey crt 5 10 U' i I!iic r c strenctn

,'-'.cis- rcpes 12 Ultima.e s-.rength i4!achinery 10 Ulti.ate s.renath Structural s eel 3 Yield strength Hocks 1P Ultimate s.rength Oue to the conservative cesign of these monorai ls, in cr "..c ion w.;l c e ops using specicl piece u es, a I I re :.".a: "".l" resu'.- in an uncon:r"lied cescer.-. ".-, rc I

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9. GEG valuat'ion ~ ~

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the-eo-ions of w ~

NUREG.06>2< Ar.icle "..1.2,

'=, =:ons , "r 4, were ".ot used 'or the Fuel Cask Br'dge crane. Usina op-ion 2 he presentation generally shows consistency with the intent of this guideline. However sub-items 2c and 2e are no addressed. There is no men ion if other lcacs are handled, or auxi!iary hois. use.

Rela:lve to the Refueling Caral Bulkhead and Cask Storage Peel Bulkhead monorai ls, there is no claim that they are s;:..a:e failure proof. 1n NUREG 0612, Art cle =. 1.2 here is

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Ca!! ror as5u.an c hiat e eVcluc ion C e. Ic 0 5. 1 ale

,e".. .n -. an ei-her"cr assurance is permi .-ed wi-h

( ) being to show that, ".he potential for a locd drop

',s ex.remely small." I. also calls fcr defense-in-depth and summar-izes itnis .o tnree guidelines with alternative I

r,easures to compensate for deficiencies of the numbers (2)

or (3) of he guide!ines. Arcng the al.erna: ves is,

"'ncreasei safety factors" reported by;lorica ?ower and Lich . ;n Phase < report;hey have shown consi s-.ency wi-h nulli ber ( ' and (2) al ternati ves, heref ore. the in;ert o; "=. 1 objective (1) is met.

C. "=MQ Conc I si ons and Reccmmendati ons The response for he Fuel Cask Bridge Crane usina cp.ion 2 has insufficierit information to show consistency with all of the auideiine. Provide, for 2(c), information .to show that the cask is handled at 6 inches or less above the operating floor level or other s ructures. Provide better informa..'on

.o show consis e rcy on .he analysis follcwing the Appendix A of BUR:-G 06 2. :ndica:e :f .he Fue Cask Sridce Crane or ac< 2ic cn< vvnc A f g

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A)t A ~ neavy Icacs, Ir st adcress their risk.

The EGEG analysis made frcm iNormation submit-.ed on the Refgeiiag.'Carai 'Buj.khead

~ ~ i and Cask'Storage Bulkhead mcrorails '.ncicate .ha -.. 1 cie 2 is ccr.sis.ent with gui de 1 inc 5. 1. 2 requi rements.

2.3. 2 Reactor Sui 1 ding t'NUREG-0612. Article S. 1. 31

( 1) "The crane and associated lif ing devices used for handling heavy loads in he containment building shculd satisfy the sinaie-failure-proof auidelines of Section 5. 1.6 of this report.

(2) Rac'i cc"Y.ainmen" soiation is pi"v,cec w!t."s p empt au=cma-.ic ac-ua iion on high rad'a:ion sc ha: po tuiated releases are within limits of evaluation Cri:ericn T of Section 5. 1 taking in"o account delay imes in detec.ion and ac ua ion; anc analyses have been performec to show .hat eva Iua ion c i aria ii, .'Ti, and iV of Sect on ". >

're sa isiied for pos-ula.ed load drops in this area. Tnese analyses should. conform to the guidelines o- Appendix A.

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Il (3) )he er;ec:s c; drops of neav n .c satisiy the evaluation cri"e. a Q Sec cn Loads anaiy"ed should ::nciuce th 1 reac. r vessel head; h a ; ' 'per . .

vessel in-~

internals; vesse'I ins ect on a=f ccoiar pump'~an~ io reoui rea Cfor continued de '=

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.d iona iy, the anaiysi-s should con, .

A di A" A. Summar of Applicant's Statements Table provides a 1 i st oT heavy load "hanciinc systems

=norina '.nteric"'<c I sV u 2.'hys ical iy ca ab le ( i . e. i ~

~..c . Ic,sc c ~ s:cps, o. okra ing procedures) 'of carrying neavy leads ever the reactor ves sel . ~ ~

The St. LucieHeavy-Load's-Limits" plan a . ~,

administ -"

nistcative .procedure AP 100438 ontroi'f t . u s covers neavy-'oad handling coera:icns f r. :hese cranes. A safe lo-d a " is efined which prohibits hook tra ravel over the reactor vessel without prior special aoproval. Howeverr, d ur i ng p 1 an maintenance t and refueling operations it i is sometimes necessary tc carry heavy leads over the reactor vessel e . S pecial procedures for

'4 nheavy

~4 - loads have been. prepared ~ icr th ose loads which are handled periodically over the reactor vessel.

identif ~see required ~uipment'nspe Tnese'rocedures

'cn n a c pt .. c, i~aria required before moveeement cr the loac the s .cps an prcce. secuence =oo ~be rciicwed in hard',ing he

oac; the load ,a.h pa i and any special precautions. Any load li s no. covered by special orocedure are controlled aaenericaliy by y :the p~lant~nt aimadmi..istrative procedure AP:06438 previously mentioned. This procedure requires that Facility Review Group approvai be ob ained prior o movement mov off hese loads over .he reac or vessel. T h e F acili y Review Group will assure ha. the proper controlss are present. presen 11

n acci ion z,o =hese procedures, wnich are avai',able at :he site for. review, safe operation of the cranes '.s assured by he crane inain-.enance and operator trainino and qualifica.ion progr ms which fo! low ANSi B30.2-'o76 guidelines.. Based uoon Florida Power and Ligh. Company's eview of he procedures, equipmen-. and personnel used in load handling operations over the core, we believe tha. the likelihood of :he load drop in the area is extremely smal'i and that no problem exis s.

B... EGEG Evaluation HUREG 0612 Article 5.1.3 calls for two assuranc'es that he criteria of Article 5.1 are met. 0ne is to sat'.wfy the cu.'de!'.nes of 5.1>>1 I'w',",ich were covered in,"i asa ), two is C>> 1 d I gI

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>> ~ ~ ~ v>> 4 ~ ~ 0 In Cl ~ >> ~ >> I >> ~ ~ >> IIR Ir are quoted above. The app'iican t's s:a.ament rei crates the information used to show consistency with Guideline 5.1. 1, bu., does not provide in=orma"i on for tne .reques ed as'su, any,a'".ihat'5 '1 i s met.

o There is no information to indicate that the cranes and associated lifting devices are single fai l ure proof 0 There is no discussion on radiation activa ed con:a-inment isola ion along the guides of Ar-icle 5. 1 i and suoplementary analyses or

5. 1  ! , 1:i, and 'V There is no load crop anaiysis as reques-.eo .i0 the guicelines of Ar:iicle 5. 1 and using he details g'iven in NUREG 0612 Appendix A.

12

==KG Conc Ius'cns and xecoI"..mencat-'.ons Insuf ci en: i nformati on i s prov i ded for a Ya1 ic evaluation i>

o= measures that show consis:=ncy wi-h 5.'.3. F'.orida Power and Light should select the most .appropriate of the three op:iors permitted by 5. l. and present .hose plant features

>a" sh>cw the pl ant is con s' tent w i -'h t>'Iat opt ons 1 requirement. Ihese comments apply equalIly o the four hoists in the Containmen iuilding.

2.3.3 Other Areas NUREQ-0612 Article 5. .51 "Tf sa e shutdown equipment are beneath or direc. ly. ad'acent o a Do ential traveI loac ca-.h of overhead hand) no systems, .(i.e ,.a patn not restr;c .ed by aveI ol by mechanical stoos cr =-Iectrical

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i'r mits 0 f crane I

locks) ore sa:; s-.y:ng:he genial Guide Iines .c> Sec.ion 5.1.

(a) Tne crane and associated lif ing devicqp. should conform

o the single-failure-proo;".guidelines of Section 5.1.6 of'I(thi s repor-;<< i<<v << ~

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OR (b j if the load crop could impair he ooeration of equipment or cabling associated with redundant or dual safe shu.down paths, mechanical stops or electrical interlocks should be provided to prevent movement of loads in proximity to these redundan. or dual safe shu.down equipeen.. (>n this case, credit should not be taken for intervening floors unless justified by analysis.)

(c) Tne eif ects 0 oac c roos have been analyzed and he

> I r sul.s 'ircicate tha= ca.>aae o safe shutcowr> equiipnent

~ovid not "re"1>uce o: ev '\ gI> O su >

~ gt + >

Cu pl<<<<

acn> ve sa> s>>utoown auicelines o- Appendi x A, as applicable.

(2) "Where" the sa>e shu.down eauipmen- has a cei lina separating from an overhead handling sys:em, an lterna-ive to Section 5.~.5(~) above would be to show by analysis tha the

-: ndiino syste'm wou!d

~ .".Ot penetrat o'e

'"e co il' a: IU e saf e shu down equi pmen

<<<<y Aoolicant Ummar

~

o, A <<1 '<<<<1 s Statements The oO her I area monorai ls and cranes which may cfIec n<<r Ui. ec ior sea OI AU . own, cora decay heat removal or spent fuel pool cooling are listed in Table 2. 1.

T;.e io Ilowing related information presents data relative to con.roi of the !isk.

The Pump Room, Char g in g Pump and Diesel Genera or monorai ls could po entially drop loads that could damage a safe sa e s.. tdown systenI. '.-'.cwever the s"s-' '.em wou!d be inoperative fo. -,c',r, encnce ";rposes. The monora'is a">> ~ ~c~ -,-.-

. cnc 3 !IJ co Plant Sere 5'lu CORA CVaOiIi Or' hea . removal couid no- be de-ea-ed "~y a- oadd crop on a 1 component which is being servicce d... ... I Nce monorails are:

~ ~ y o.. - .

)I I P t'v r' ~

\

physi ca 1 ly "nc>>pail e o- c"-r".ying heavy loads over ..

other ec ipment requi red ior p I ant safe shu:down o there is sufficient physical separation between redundant sys.ems to preclude damage -.o bo'a \ I ~

Technical specifica ions require one redundant system o be operative in order to remove -'e otI er irom service for ma'. n-enance.

'.he P'

o;..Ponen: Coolir.o Ma er I ocCS C ~

OP ""U!C c,c a c CC~ pump, hea . exchanger or piping. One ,edundan

II, A or i 5 rccui red worst a5e droo ~ ud shows iat, ne e su77'iCien- se amaoe cc-.h recurcar.-. sys ems.

Wl fne Uniit No. 1 and Uni- No o. 2 furbine Gantry Cranes can operate on the Unit No. furbine Building. potential load 2 Turbini crop risks exis forr St... Lucie ucie 2" from a- fcad drop , Ir fbi Ai from rrom Nc. > cver:,",e s.a= s.aam trestle and a dro crom o. 2 ovel buried intake cooling water i es.

0 prevent c ane travel overr " he steam

~

- ~:

tres:le because ause i-contains vital auxili iis oermitte~

p  :.

"'ii.

iliary reedwater pumps ar.d is pe.ational verification of t'ne interlocks are made prior to ini .iai use each shift. B-d ddu, ing co fd shu-down i 'i h paci I i lii.

y passiAg oi interlock and retuelinc an of y Revi ew Group aoorova1 1

i ~

modes, or on 5

1 ccrc. >>Ac>> QrI'a~ I V2 I i < ~ Cw ICII a

~ >>

Tne Uni " No. '2 t .. risk 'ieter T' 1 oad dro 'rop r to the two 30 inch.di 6 -'.

iCIff' pes e has been eo i given speciala 5. stUd y. One area"is at risk wi-,,y~~y. leavy leads.gnd,, spedi f i C.d . rop oriefltation Conceivabl'e"movefrent~ o

- ' o -ors 's res:r ctac by ar ~

area icentification and load oa path a to prevent such dro rops. s. Oeviations require Facilit i y Rev eview Group approval, and Engineering determinati o f precautions - t'ns rioging and load ppath. .. Also so, interim so "- "'

requiremen" s an ere.-

oerer-ere. cl guiidelines' oi NUREG ., 0612 have been adopted for operation of Turbine*Gan ry Cranes raAes ~

S.ruc.ure Building Crane ne 1 oa d s ir.. roduce risk .o

=..d C intake Cooling Ma'er o I

-,cr s--.e shs,u."cwA, " A 'r/or s" ase II acean'.,",="",=" -ii

' cm ova 1.

e ~ ~

s:udy c"mpared enero y oo-, of a maximum - load - drop too d esign miss.le ener"~ . y '-"

rom -crnado ri:i ssi Ie ro~.eciion s ructure which encloses t."Ie:C'rl pu"..p. pu."..p. stu the study The shows the structure will ~ ,t i oi tne .' pumps irom a load drop. En addid' ionn, t" ihe interim requirament s an d general

>>i J

!.,'g ',ie I

.o '~L'.-.== 6 2 wi:; be imp!emen=ed. This inciuces sa-e 1

!cad pa-.h ".

estric na crane opera .ion over i e iCM puiTip 5.

The Reactor Bui'.c-nc Polar Crane and Auxiliary .elescoping

')b cranes are'sed du~ nc c"ld shutdown and reiue!ing. The coolinc sys.am' "ing must remain functional and is at r-':sr.. !he ma'c."-ty o- :he piping is'nside the secondary shield wall below the 4 foo" thick opera.ing deck or inside an ' foo. deco pipe trench in base concrete. The piping is considered adequately pro. ected. in ihe piping penetration area on he sou:h side, the pipes exit the trench and

'secondary shielc wali confines and penetrate the s eel containment vessel. Protection exists by two levels of s'ucturzi stee .icor iraminc. However, ]cad hanc',inc ','s

~ <<C ~ ~ 0 ii~

~

~ ~

v <<VA

~

gefie. a I cu de l in=s and inde lm requi remen s have been aaopted.

~ p ~ << ~ ~ r

~ i

!he . ri;p ~oom Cna c nc Pumo and Oiesel Generator monorails

~

loads handled are over inopera ive equipment. Since the loads can't be handled over equipment required for shu down because =..ere iis adec a:e "hysical separa io. oi redu! dent systems o precl ce camace to bo.h the hazard elimination is consistent with =uidelines.

t he Component "="i',rg 'dater Pump Monorail worst case iced i% ~

d p s

v i c = es sri scient "hysiical sepa a ior to ~

<<<<At i << << 'c

~ ~

~

1v Ilw <<' .io)h

~

J ~

= -- -- ~ r sk.,Is s s "onsl stent wl n

. ~ > I guideline ".1.5:(c} requirements.

!he fl<<

'l 4n-'t No. ~ an" "ni: No. 2 Turb',ne Gartry Cranes have dual conisice aticns. Ine Uni . No. l has interlocks to preclude load passage over the auxiliary fe dwater pumps.

16