ML17146B223
| ML17146B223 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 09/30/1999 |
| From: | Cowgill C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Byram R PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9910070064 | |
| Download: ML17146B223 (32) | |
Text
September 30, 1999 Mr. Robert Byram Senior Vice President - Nuclear PP8L, Inc.
2 North Ninth Street Allentown, Pennsylvania 18101
SUBJECT:
MID-CYCLEPLANT PERFORMANCE REVIEW (PPR) - SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION On September 13, 1999, the NRC staff completed the mid-cycle Plant Performance Review (PPR) ofthe Susquehanna Steam Electric Station. The staff conducted these reviews for all operating nuclear power plants to integrate performance information and to plan for inspection activities at your facilitythough March 2000. The focus of this performance review wa's to identify changes in performance over the past six months, and to allocate inspection resources accordingly.
Our mid-cycle review of the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station determined that the station's overall performance has remained consistent with the performance described in our April 9, 1999, letter which forwarded the results of the last full PPR.
Senior management was actively involved in station activities and operators continued to perform well in both routine and non-routine evolutions.
Equipment problems continued to challenge the station staff resulting in unplanned power reductions and plant shutdowns.
Also communication and coordination problems within your organization contributed to the automatic Unit 2 reactor shutdown caused by the failure of the Unit 2 main transformer, the manual Unit 2 shutdown caused by the crimped tube on the traverse in-core probe system, and the power reduction to,repair the tom rubber expansion boot on the isophase bus. We understand that you have recognized that changes are needed and have initiated actions, such as a station self-assessment and an equipment reliability review, to address and improve station performance.
During the next six months, we plan to conduct our core inspection program and to continue with the initiative inspections discussed in our April 9, 1999, PPR letter regarding work controls, engineering support to operations, predictive maintenance, and the maintenance rule.
In response to,the station's equipment problems that have occurred'since the full PPR, we plan to expand the scope of our work controls inspection to include a review of equipment performance.
As part of our continuing follow-up of your actions in response to the fire protection functional inspection, we plan to conduct an initiative inspection to determine ifchanges made in the fire protection program have effectively corrected prior problems.
Enclosure 1 contains a historical listing of plant issues, referred to as the Plant Issues Matrix (PIM), that were considered during this PPR process to arrive at an integrated review of licensee performance trends.
The PIM includes items summarized from inspection reports or other docketed correspondence between the NRC and PP8L'Inc. from September 1998 through July 1999. As noted above, greater emphasis was placed on those issues identified in the past six
'l '$
9910070064 9909'30 PDR ADGCK 05000387 8
Mr. Robert Byram months during this performance review. The NRC does not attempt to document all aspects of
'licensee programs and performance that may be functioning appropriately.
Rather, the NRC only documents issue's that the NRC believes warrant management attention or represent noteworthy aspects of performance.
In addition, the PPR may have also considered some pre-decisional and draft material that does not appear in the attached PIM, including observations from events and inspections that had occurred since the last NRC inspection report was issued, but had not yet received full review and consideration.
This material will be placed in the Public Document Room as part of normal issuance of NRC inspection reports and other correspondence.
This letter advises you of our plans for future inspection activities at your facilityso that you will have an opportunity to prepare for these inspections and to provide us with feedback on any planned inspections which may conflict with your plant activities. Enclosure 2 details our inspection plan through March 2000 to coincide with the scheduled implementation of the revised reactor oversight process in April2000. The rationale or basis for each inspection outside the core inspection program is discussed above so that you are aware of the reason for emphasis in these program areas.
Resident inspections are not listed due to their ongoing and continuous nature.
Ifcircumstances arise which cause us to change this inspection plan, we willcontact you to discuss the change as soon as possible.
Please contact me at (610) 337-5233 with any questions you may have.
Sincerely, Original Signed By:.
Curtis J. Cowgill, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-387, 50-388 License Nos. NPF-14, NPF-22
Enclosures:
- 1. Plant Issues Matrix
- 2. Inspection Plan
~ Mr.,Robert Byram cc w/encl:
R. F. Saunders, Vice President - Nuclear Site Operations G. T. Jones, Vice President - Nuclear Engineering and Support B. L. Shriver, General Manager - SSES T. J. Harpster, Manager, Nuclear Licensing G. D. Miller, General Manager - Nuclear Assurance R. R. Wehry, Nuclear Licensing - SSES M. M. Golden, Manager - Nuclear Security P. Nederostek, Nuclear Services Manager; General Electric W. H. Lowthert, Manager, Nuclear Plant Services A. M. Male, Manager, Quality Assurance H. D. Woodeshick, Special Assistant to the President G. DallaPalu, PP8L Nuclear Records R. W. Osborne, Vice President, Supply 8 Engineering Allegheny Electric Cooperative, Inc.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)
Distribution w/encl:
Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)
Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)
NRC Resident Inspector PUBLIC H. Miller, RA/J. Wiggins, DRA C. Cowgill, DRP D. Florek, DRP C. O'Daniell, DRP M. Oprendek, DRP DRS/DRP Division Directors DRS/DRP Deputy Division Directors DRS Branch Chiefs P. Kaufman, DRS J. McFadden, DRS W. Dean, NRR/DISP/IIPB G. Tracy, OEDO/ROPMS T. Boyce, NRR/DISP/IIPB D. Screnci, PAO Distribution w/encl:
ia E-Mail W. Travers, OEDO M. Tschiltz, Rl EDO Coordinator R. Borchardt, OE S. Collins, NRR E. Adensam, PDI, NRR S. Bajwa, NRR V. Nerses, Project Manager, NRR Inspection Program Branch, NRR (IPAS)
R. Correia, NRR DOCDESK DOCUMENT NAME: G:(BRANCH4>PPR(SUS(Sept 1999 PPR Letter for Susquehanna.wpd Toreceiveacopyofthisdocument, indicate inthe box: "C"=Cop withoutattachment/enciosure "E"=Cop withattachment/enclosure "N"=Nocopy OFFICE RI/DRP NAME CCowgill DATE 09/30/99 RI/DRP ABlough 0
99 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
ENCU)SURE 1 Page:
1 of 19 09/29/1999 09:44:06 IR Report 3 Region I
SUSQUEHANNA United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area / Issue Date Date Source Functional Area Template ID Type Codes Item Title Item Description 07/19/1999 1999006 Pri: OPS NRC NEG Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA2 Prl: 1B Sec: 5A Ter:
Executive Summary Following the Unit 1 automatic reactor shutdown on July 1, 1999, operators unnecessarily delayed placing the second division of suppression pool coolinq in service.
The operators placed the second division of suppression pool cooling in service approximately 40 minutes after the SSES emergency operating procedures directed suppression pool cooling to be maximized. (Section 05.1)
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA2 07/19/1999 1999006 Pri: OPS NRC NEG Prl: 5B Sec:
Sec: 1C Ter:
Executive Summary PP&L's post trip event reviews following the Unit 1 automatic reactor shutdown on July 1, 1999, were weak in that the reviews did not identify the unnecessary delay in placing the second division of suppression pool cooling in service.
(Section 05.1) 07/19/1999 199900641 Pri: OPS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 NRC NCV Prl: 1C Sec: 5A Ter.
Reportability Determinations On July 1, 1999, PP&L did not notify the NRC within the required time period that the Unit 1 high pressure coolant injection system injected water into the reactor coolant system.
On July 3, PP&L did not notify the NRC within the required time period that a main steam isolation valve had degraded to the extent that the valve's leakage rate exceeded the Technical Specification requirements.
The failure to make these notifications within the required time period is a violation of 10 CFR 50.72. This Severity Level IVviolation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is documented in PP&L's corrective action program as condition reports CR 187420 and CR 192457. (Section 04.1)
O6/O7/1999 1999OO5 Pri: OPS 'RC Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 NEG Pri: 2A Sec:
Ter:
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
PP&L operators delayed entry into a technical specification limiting condition for operation to perform troubleshooting after a Unit 1 main turbine bypass valve did not meet surveillance test requirements.
Whereas the delay to enter the technical specification limiting condition for operation was not consistent with operation's department procedures, no violation of technical specifications occurred since the corrective actions were completedt within the required time. (Section 04.2) 06/07/1999 1999005 Pri: OPS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 Self NEG Pri: 2A Sec:
Ter:
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
During this inspection period a number of notable equipment problems occurred which challenged the plant staff and the availability of plant systems important to safety. Specifically, the equipment problems were related to the Unit 1 electro-hydraulic control system fast acting solenoid valves, the Unit 2 isophase bus duct, the "C emergency diesel generator lube oil and air start systems, a containment atmosphere sample valve limitswitch, and loose fastener hardware on the "B"emergency diesel generator. (Section 02.1) 06/07/1999 199900541 Pri: OPS NRC NCV Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 Prl: 2A Sec:
Ter:
SV 15774A PRIMARYCONTAINMENTISOLATIONVALVEPOSITION INDICATION On May 28, 1999, operators did not satisfactorily implement an approved station procedure for containment atmosphere sample valve testing. The operators used an invalid control room indication to determine the position of valve SV 15774A when local valve position indication had failed.
This Severity Level IVviolation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation. This violation is documented in PP&L's corrective action program as condition report 96931.
(Section 04.1) ii
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Page:
2 of 19 09/29/1 999 09:44:06 IR Report 3 Region I
SUSQUEHANNA United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area/ Issue Date Date Source Functional Area Template ID Type Codes Item Title Item Description 04/26/1999 1999004 Pri: ppS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 04/26/1999 1999004 Prl: ppS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 NRC NEG NRC POS Pri: 5C Sec: 4C Ter:
Prl: 3A Sec: 2B Ter:
Executive Summary PP8L did not troubleshoot the unexpected slow pressurization ofthe residual heat removal system in a structured and methodical manner, which extended the time needed to identify the failed "1B" low pressure coolant injection valve. While troubleshooting was In progress, and unaware that the "1B"valve was failed, PP&L removed the "A" residual heat removal system from service for maintenance for 17 hours1.967593e-4 days <br />0.00472 hours <br />2.810847e-5 weeks <br />6.4685e-6 months <br />.
During this 17 hour1.967593e-4 days <br />0.00472 hours <br />2.810847e-5 weeks <br />6.4685e-6 months <br /> period, neither Unit 1 loop of residual heat removal was available for low pressure coolant injection. (Section E2.1)
Executive Summary During the Unit 2 refueling outage, the control, execution, and performance of major activities were good.
Management emphasized to the staff the importance of human performance, attention to detail, and personnel safety throughout the outage.
(Section 01.1 and 01.2) 04/26/1999 1999004 Prl: ppS Sec: ENG Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA2 NRC POS Pri: 5A Sec: 5B Tei-.
Executive Summary PP&L identified and resolved a potential common cause failure of all RHR injection valves prior to any need for the system to function. The operator's initial identification of the "1B" residual heat removal system slow pressurization refiected a good questioning attitude. The system engineer appropriately focused station priorities to complete troubleshooting and identify a failed low pressure coolant injection valve. (Section E2.1) 04/26/1999 199900443 Prl: ppS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 02/19/1999 1999002 Pri: ppS Sec: ENG Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA2 NRC NCV NRC NEG Pri: 1C Sec: 1A Ter:
Prl: 5C Sec: 5B Ter:
Failure to Make a One Hour Notification for the Unit1 Residual Heat Removal Injection Control Valve Failure On February 27, 1999, PP&L did not notify the NRC, within one hour of identification, that the Unit 1 RHR loop B was in a condition that was outside of the designbasis.
The failure to make the notification within one hour is a violation of 10 CFR 50.72. This Severity Level IVviolation is being treated as a Non<ited Violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is documented in PP&L's corrective action program as part of condition report 90981. (Section E2.1)
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
The condition report process is focused on accomplishing initial reviews, reportability and operability determinations, cause assessments, and establishment of proposed corrective actions to correct the condition and prevent recurrence.
However, process accountability is not readily apparent in the corrective action implementation portion of the process.
Corrective action implementation dates do not correlate with the assigned sigmfiicance level. Action due dates are controlled by the responsible manager who may change them during the course of implementation.
The only procedural requirement regarding corrective action implementation is refueling outage related with the shortest lead time being approximately 7-10 months, and the longest lead time being approximately 31-37 months.
The minimal administrative control over the corrective action implementation portion of the process contributes to a high process backlog. (Section E7.1)
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA2 02/19/1999 1999002 Prl: OPS NRC POS Prl: 5A Sec: ENG Sec: 5B Ter:
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
Annual assessments of the condition report process by NAS were thorough, critical, and well founded.
NAS assessments conducted in 1997 and 1998 identified most of the concerns identified by the inspectors.
(Section E7.1)
Page:
3 of 19 09/29/1999 09:44:06 IR Report 3 Region I
SUSQUEHANNA United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area/ Issue Date Date Source Functional Area Template ID Type Codes Item Title Item Description 02/19/1999 1999002 Prl: OPS Sec: ENG Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 NRC POS Pri: 5A Sec: 5B Ter: 5C EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
The condition report (CR) process is a high volume, low threshold corrective action system that is acceptable to meet the requirements of 10 CR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI. Adverse conditions are promptly identified and the process appears to be widely accepted for use, and is used by a broad cross section of the plant staff. There are no significant delays in the initial assessment, investigation, and completion of initial operability and reportability determinations.
Initial investigations and root cause assessments for issues of higher safety significance are thorough.
Investigations and causal analyses for CRs of lesser safety significance are generally thorough, but there are some instances where extent of conditions and/or generic implications may not be sufficiently explored.
(Section E7.1) 02/01/1999 1999001 Prl: ppS NRC ppS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 Pri: 2A Sec: 1A Ter: 3A Executive Summary A Unit 2 feedwater heater leak was promptly identified, repaired, and returned to service. Management highlighted the importance of reactivity control manipulations prior to the plant's return to fullpower and maintained a 1% per hour increase in reactor power.
01/04/1999 1998012 Pri: OpS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 01/04/1999 1998012 Pri: ppS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 NRC NEG NRC NEG Pri: 1A Sec: 1C Ter.
Prl: 1C Sec:
Ter:
Suppression Pool Bulk Water Temperature Monitoring During a planned plant process computer outage, PP&L removed one of the two methods being utilized to monitor suppression pool average water temperature and disabled the initial suppression pool water high temperature control room overhead annunciator.
PPSL did not recognize that Unit 2 had entered two limiting conditions for operations.
This resulted in a violation of minor significance because suppression pool bulk temperature did not exceed 90 degrees Fahrenheit.
(Section 04.1)
Technical Specification Operability Determinations In December 1998, PP&L incorrectly implemented a complex residual heat removal service water system Technical Specification Interpretation (TSI). Previous to this event in October, 1998, PP&L did not implement this TSI due to a lack of a reference to the TSI. In both instances PP&L returned the equipment to an operable status within the required time limitspecified in the TSI. PP&L corrective actions inchde planned revisions to the TSI and ultimately removal of all TSls. (Section 03.1) 01/04/1999 1998012 Pri: OPS NRC POS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 Prl:1B Sec: 2A Ter:
Unit Operations and Operator Activity The operator response to a Unit 1 loss of main condenser offgas system was excellent. Timely restoration of the offgas equipment by nuclear plant operators enabled plant control operators to stabilize the plant in a safe condition.
(Section 01.1)
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 01/04/1999 1998012 Pri: OpS NRC ppS Prl:,5A Sec: MAINT Sec: 5C Ter: 2A Outboard Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV)Repair Management's decision to stroke the Unit 1 outboard main steam isolation valve (MSIV)~ prior to the required surveillance test, was proactive and resolved a potential safety problem that could have resulted in a higher than expected pressure increase during a postulated MSIVclosure event.
(Section M1.1)
0
Page:
4 of 19 09/29/1 999 09:44:06 IR Report 3 Region I
SUSQUEHANNA United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area / issue Date Functional Date Source Area Template ID Type Codes Item Title Item Description 11/23/1998 1998011 Prl: OPS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 NRC NEG Pri: 1A Executive Summary Sections 01.1 &01.3 Sec: 1C Plant operator building rounds were thorough and properly maintained.
Communications between control room and field operators were good, operations personnel were knowledgeable of their responsibilities and control board awareness was good. However, the inspectors observed inconsistencies in the number of identified leaking safety relief vahres on multiple Plant Control Operator and Unit Supervisor turnover sheets during the week of October 19, 1998, and operations personnel were unsuccessful in starting the "A"Turbine Building Filter Exhaust Fan because they were unaware that a blocking permit was still in effect on the fan dampers'ir supply.
1 1/23/1998 199801 1 Prl: OPS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 NRC NEG Pri: 1C Sec:
Ter.
Executive Summary Section 03.1 PP8L identified several problems associated with the implementation ofTechnical Specifications (TS) ~ including a missed surveillance test (drywell floor drain sump level instrumentation), a PP8L determination that prior suiveillances for the source range monitors were not adequately performed, and an instance where a more conservative TS Interpretation was not recognized.
In each case, the inspectors conduded PP8L took prompt and effective initial corrective actions.
11/23/1998 1998011 Pri: OPS NRC POS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 Prl: 1A Sec: 2A Ter:
Executive Summary Section 02.1 The observed operator performance during the October 9, 1998, staitup was good. Changes made to plant procedures in response to a previous event were effective in minimizing operator distractions and resulted in improved control of core reactivity. However, operators were challenged by minor equipment problems and discrepancies between training and actual operation of nudear instrumentation.
11/23/1998 199801141 Prl: OPS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 Licensee NCV Prl: 1C Sec:
Ter.
FEEDWATER/MAINTURBINETRIP SURVEILLANCEINADEQUATE PP&L identified that four eighteen month logic system functional feedwater/main turbine trip system actuation instrumentation tests, required by TS, were missed.
PP8L's corrective actions, including procedure and programmatic actions, were good. This did not represent a repetitive condition because it resulted from a single failure to establish an adequate surveillance procedure.
Therefore, this non-repetitive, licensee identified violation is being treated as a nonmted violation, consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
11/23/1998 199801142 Prl: OPS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 Licensee NCV Pri: 1C Sec:
Ter:
SUPPRESSION POOL TEMPERATURE SURVEILLANCETESTING DID NOT MEET TS The failure to perform a monthly channel functional test on four SPOTMOS alarm relays was a violation of TS 4.6.2.1.c.2, functions 3a, b, c, and d surveillance requirements.
This licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
11/23/1998 199801143 Prl: OPS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 Licensee NCV Prl: 1C Sec:
Ter:
CONTINUOUS FIRE WATCH NOT ESTABLISHED WITHINTS TIME LIMIT The failure to establish a continuous fire watch within one hour of halon system inoperability was a violation ofTS 3.7.6.4 action "a" requirements.
This non-repetitive licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
nem Tune rPnrnnnenne i=n1Inunrn Athorl From 10/01/1998 To 09/30/1999
Page:
5 of 19 09/29/1999 09:44:06 IR Report 3 Region I
SUSQUEHANNA United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area / Issue Date Date Source Functional Area Template ID Type Codes Item Title Item Description Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA2 Ter:
11/23/1998 199801144 Pri: OPS Licensee NCV Pri: 1C Sec:
Sec:
CONTINUOUS FIRE WATCH NOT PER REQUIREMENTS OF TS PP&L identified, in a Licensee Event Report, that a one hour fire watch was established, instead of a continuous fire watch, as required by TS. PP&L's corrective actions, induding procedure and programmatic actions, were good.
This non-repetitive, hcensee identified and corrected violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section VII.B.1 ofthe NRC Enforcement Policy.
10/12/1998 1998010 Pfi: OPS NRC POS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 Pri: 1A Sec: 2A Ter:
Executive Summary Section 01.1 The licensee conducted plant operations in accordance with SSES procedures, and established effective equipment alignment and operability. The alignment of the Essential Service Water, Residual Heat Removal Service Water, Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Water, and Reactor Water Cleanup systems was determined to be adequate.
The material condition of these systems was adequate.
10/12/1998 1998010 Prl: OPS NRC Sec: MAINT Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA2 NEG Pri: 1B Sec: 2A Ter:
Executive Summary Section 01.2 Operators responded adequately to an unplanned Unit 1 scram on October 3, 1998. A corroded connection on a potential transformer resulted in a main generator protective relay actuation which, in turn, caused a generator trip and subsequent reactor scram.
PP&L's corrective actions were adequate.
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 10/12/1998 1998010 Prl: OPS NRC NEG Pri: 1B Sec: MAINT Sec: 2A Ter.
Executive Summary Section 01.3 Operators were challenged and responded appropriately to several equipment malfunctions and minor plant transients, including oil injection into Unit 1 reactor coolant due to a reactor water deanup system fault, a Unit 2 main generator transient during main turbine control valve testing, and a Unit 2 unexpected half-scram, due to a recirculation flowunit failure. Appropriate SSES procedures were adhered to and actions were adequately performed, communicated and documented.
10/12/1998 199801045 Prl: OPS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 Self NCV Pri: 4B Sec: 4C Ter:
ENTRY INTO TS 3.0.2, SECONDARY CONTAINMENTISOLATIONLOGIC DE-ENERGIZER PP&L identified in LER 50-387/98408 that a test procedure error resulted in inadvertently dewnergizing a portion of Secondary Containment Isolation Logic for about fourteen hours, a time in excess of that allowed by technical specifications.
The licensee's corrective actions were adequate.
This non-repetitive, licensee identified and corrected violation is being treated as a nonmted violation.
10/12/1998 199801046 Prl: OPS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000388 SUSQUEHANNA2 Licensee NCV Prl: 5A Sec:
Ter:
SECONDARY CONTAINMENTBOUNDARYSURVEILLANCEMISSED PP&L identified in LERs 50488/98401, 50-388/98403, and 5M88/98404 an inadequate surveillance that resulted from a word processing software conversion error. The licensee's corrective actions were adequate.
This non-repetitive, licensee identified and corrected violation is being treated as a nonmted violation.
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Page:
6 of 19 09/29/1999 09:44:06 IR Report 3 Region I
SUSQUEHANNA United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area/ Issue Date Date Source Functional Area Template ID Type Codes Item Title Item Description 07/19/1999 1999006 Prl: MAINT
. Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 Self NEG Prl: 2A Sec: 5C Ter:
Executive Summary A number of equipment problems occurred which challenged the plant staff and the availability of important plant systems.
Equipment problems caused two automatic plant shutdowns. A stem/disk separation on the Unit 1 "C" outboard mam steam isolation valve caused one shutdown and a failure on the Unit 2 "A"main transformer caused the second.
In addition, equipment problems caused two unplanned power reductions. A tube teak on the Unit 1 "3A"feedwater heater caused one power reduction and a motor failure on the Unit 1 "C" circulating water pump caused the second.
(Section 02.1)
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 06/07/1999 1999005 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Prl: 3A Sec:
Sec:
Ter:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 07/19/1999 1999006 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Prl: 2B Sec:
Sec: 2A Ter:
Executive Summary PP&L's physical secudty program testing and maintenance activities were conducted in a manner that protected public health and safety and met PP&L's commitments and NRC requirements.
(Section S1)
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
Maintenance activities were well controlled and well performed during installation of a new battery for the "E" emergence diesel generator.
Battery cell handling, physical and electrical installation, and post maintenance testing conformed to SSES procedures, industry practices, and regulatory requirements.
(Section M1.2) 06/07/1999 199900542 Pri: MAINT Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 NRC NCV Pri: 3A Sec:
Tel".
"B"EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR INOPERABLE DUE TO MISSING/LOOSE HARDWARE PP&L technicians did not properly implement a maintenance procedure and properly fasten the generator inspection screens to the "B"emergency diesel generator.
The improper fastening could have caused a failure of the emergency diesel generator.
The failure to properly implement a maintenance procedure for safety related equipment is considered a violation ofTechnical Specification section 5.4. This Severity Level IVviolation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation. This violation is documented in PP&L's corrective action program as condition report 95536. (Section M1.1) 04/26/1999 1999004 Prl: MAINT Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 Self NEG Prl: 3A Sec: 3C Tert Executive Summary During a Unit 2 under vessel maintenance activity on a local power range monitor (LPRM), technicians momentarily unseated the seal between the LPRM and reactor vessel, spraying about two quarts of contaminated. water on themselves.
The additional total radiation exposure (both internal and external) to the individuals, as a result of the contamination,"was non~nsequential.
PP&L initiated condition reports 92527 and 92528 to review this event.
PP&L's initial response and proposed actions were appropriate.
No violations of NRC requirements were identified.
(Section M1.1) 04/26/1999 1999004 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 Pri:.2B Sec: 3B Ter:
Executive Summary The inservice inspections had been performed acceptably and had included acceptable ASME program coverage, qualified personnel, approved procedures, proper implementation, appropriate examination documentation, and PP&L oversight. The inspections performed were thorough and of sufficient extent to determine the integrity of the components inspected.
Indications of nonconforming conditions were identified, explored, evaluated, documented and dispositioned in accordance with established requirements.
(Section M2.1)
Page:
7 of 19 09/29/1999 09:44:06 IR Report 3 Region I
SUSQUEHANNA United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area / issue Date Date Source Functional Area Template ID Type Codes Item Title Item Description 04/26/1999 199900441 Pri: MAINT Licensee NCV Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 Prl: 2A Sec: 5C Ter:
Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV)Seat Leakage In a Licensee Event Report, PP&L identified that two main steam isolation valves did not meet a seat leakage specification.
PP&L's corrective actions, including valve seat repair and re-test activities, were good. This Severity Level IVviolation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is documented in PP&L's corrective action program as condition report 92338. LER 50-388/99-001 is dosed.
(Section 08.1)
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 03/15/1999 1999003 Pri: MAINT Licensee POS Prl: 5A EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
Sec:
Sec: 5B The observation of ultrasonic testing of the residual heat removal injection valves determined that the technique applied was effective in identifying significant stem cracking. The ultrasonic testing minimized personnel radiation Ter:
'exposure and resulted in the timely identification ofan additional cracked valve stem. (Section M1.1) 02/19/1999 1999002 Prl: MAINT NRC POS Sec: ENG Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 Pri: 2B EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
Sec: 4B
~ The inspectors conduded that the surveillance testing procedures reviewed satisfactorily met the testing requirements outlined in NRC Generic Letter 96-01. The inspectors also determined that the minor discrepancies Ter:
noted In the procedures and drawings would not have affected the outcome of the testing.
(Section E2.1)
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 02/01/1999 1999001 Prl: MAINT NRC NEG Prl: 3A Sec:
Sec: 2B Tel" 2A Executive Summary During restoration of the "B"emergency diesel generator to service, following a 20 year overhaul, and removal of the maintenance spare "E" emergency diesel generator from service, the restoration of an operable emergency diesel ~enerator was unexpectedly delayed due to work coordination issues and continued problems with the diesels non-safety related control air system.
Nonetheless, the restoration of an operable diesel was completed within the allowed time.
02/01/1999 1999001 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 Pri: 3A Sec: 5A Ter. 5C Executive Summary Instrument and controls technicians identified that Technical Specification instruments had been contaminated with sodium hydroxide during planned surveillance tests.
Initial corrective actions included a detailed operability determination and a thorough review to determine the extent of the sodium hydroxide contamination.
Instruments were sampled, drained, flushed, and re-calibrated to restore equipment operability.
01/04/1999 1998012 Prl: MAINT NRC POS Pri: 3A Sec:
Sec:
Ter:
Dockets Discussed:
05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System Outage The Unit 2 high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system outage was well planned and executed.
The pump and turbine eijulpment areas were maintained as dean areas which resulted in an excellent work environment.
Excellent coordination of the HPCI post maintenance test minimized the heat addition to the suppression pool. (Section M1.1) li >>
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Page:
8 of 19 09/29/1999 09:44:06 IR Report 3 Region I
SUSQUEHANNA United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area / Issue Date Date Source Functional Area Template ID Type Codes Item Title Item Description 01/04/1999 1S98012 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Sec: OPS Dockets Discussed:
05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 Pri: 3A Sec: 5A Ter: 1C Standby Liquid Control (SLC) Storage Tank Foreign Material Removal Instrumentation and control technicians promptly reported an activity that led to the foreign material addition to the Unit 2 standby liquid control (SLC) tank. The techmcians, adions were representative of a good safety culture to report work activity problems. The shift supervisor's continuous operability assessment led to the appropriate SLC pump operability determination and the timely removal of all foreign material from the SLC tank. (Section M1.1) 01/04/1999 1998012-01 Pri: MAINT Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 Licensee NCV Pi'I: 2B Sec:
Ter:
LER 50-387,388/984I17, Incomplete Channel Functional Test of Source Range Monitor Channels PP&L identified that channel functional surveillance tests of the source range monitors did not include the indication portion of the channels as acceptance criteria, as required by Technical Specifications.
PP&L's proposed and completed corrective actions, including procedure and programmatic actions, were good. This non-repetitive, licensee identified and corrected violation is being treated as a nonmted violation, consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. LER 50-387/388/98417 is dosed.
(Section 08.1) 11/23l1998 1998011 Pri: MAINT Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 NRC NEG Pri: 2A Sec:
Ter:
Executive Summary Section M2.1 Operators and maintenance technicians responded properly to numerous equipment problems.
Previous analysis and completed corrective actions have not been fullyeffective at preventing recurrence of some equipment problems.
Examples included repetitive instances of Unit 2 containment instrument gas header pressure loss due to a stuck open check valve,."C" emergency diesel failure to start, and a repetitive steam leak on. reactor feedwater pump turbine steam supply valve HV-12710C requiring a second on-line leak seal repair.
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA2 Tel':
11/23/1998 1998011 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Pri: 2B Sec:
Sec:
~
Executive Summary Section M1.2 The inspectors concluded that the PP&L method to assess plant risk for on-line/emergent work, by reviewing the work in accordance with the current revision of the Susquehanna Team Manual and quality assurance procedures, meets the intent of the maintenance rule.
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 11/23/1998 1998011 Prl: MAINT NRC POS Prl: 5A Sec:
Sec:
Ter:
Executive Summary Section M2.1 PP&L Management's proactive response to the residual heat removal service water pump shaft failure aggressively resolved this potential common cause failure.
10/12/1S98 1998010 Prl: MAINT NRC NEG Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 Pri: 1B Sec: 2A Ter:
Executive Summary Section M1.2 Operators and maintenance technicians were challenged and responded well to several degraded material conditions, Including a minor steam leak on the Unit 1 feedwater check valve, a Unit 2 electro-hydraulic control system power supply failuie, and a minor steam leak on a Unit 2 pressure sensing line to a pressure switch for the Main Steam Low Pressure Isolation logic. Appropriate SSES procedures were adhered to and actions were adequately performed and documented.
Itarn Tuna Ir.nrnnlianna Fnltnwun Other). Fmm 10/01/1998 To 09/30/1999
Page:
9 of 19 09/29/1 999 09:44:06 IR Report 3 Region I
SUSQUEHANNA United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area / Issue Date Date Source Functional Area Template ID Type Codes Item Title Item Description 10/12/1998 199801042 Pri: MAINT Licensee NCV Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 10/12/1998 199801043 Pri: MAINT Licensee NCV Sec: ENG Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 Pri: 2A Sec: 5A Ter: 5C Prl: 4C Sec: 5A Ter:
LOSS OF CONTINUOUS VENTSAMPLING PP&L identified in LERs 50-387/98-001, 50 387/98-006, 50-388/98402, and 50 388/98406 that continuous vent sampling, as required by Technical SpeciTications, was not performed on four separate occasions, over a four month period, due to sample tubing separation from its connectors.
PP8L determined the cause to be age related loss of resilience of the tubing. The licensee's corrective actions were adequate.
These non-repetitive, licensee identified and corrected violations are being treated as a nonmted violation.
CONTAINMENTBOUNDARYNOT TESTED IN ACCORDANCE WiTHTS PP&L identified in LER 50-387/98402 pressure instruments that were not leak rate tested as required by Technical Specifications. A Notice of Enforcement Discretion, requested by the licensee, was approved by the NRC on February 3, 1998. The licensee completed testing with adequate results.
The licensee's corrective actions were adequate.
This non-repetitive, licensee identified and corrected violation is being treated as a non-cited violation.
10/12/1998 199801044 Prl: MAINT Licensee NCV Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 Pri: 4C Sec: 5A Ter:
INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM TEST FREQUENCY EXTENDED PP&L identified in LER 50 387/98405 that the test frequency for nine check valves exceeded the inservice testing-program test frequency. The appropriate tests were performed with adequate results.
The licensee's corrective actions, including procedure and programmatic corrective actions, were adequate.
This non-repetitive, licensee identified and corrected violation is being treated as a nonwted violation.
10/12/1998 199801047 Pri: MAINT Sec:
Dockets Discussed:,
05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 Licensee NCV Pri: 2A Sec: 5A Ter: 5C LOSS OF CONTINUOUS VENTSAMPLING - UNIT2 REACTOR BUILDING;AND FLOW RATE ESTIMATES NOT PP&L identified continuous vent sampling, as required by Technical Specification (TS), was not performed on three separate occasions, over a four day period; during this same period, sample flowrate estimates were not completed within the TS time limiton one occasion.
These events involved the mechanical failure of a sample pump, inadequate temporary installation and operation of a backup sampling system, and inadequate attention to detail by non-licensed techniaans.
The licensee's corrective actions were adequate.
These non-repetitive, licensee identified and corrected violations are being treated as a nonwted violation.
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA2 07/19/1999 1999006 Pri: ENG Licensee NEG Pri: 5B Sec:
Sec: 5C Ter:
Executive Summary A failed main transformer bushing resulted in the June 8, 1999, Unit 2 automatic reactor shutdown. The PP&L root cause analysis team conduded that PP&L had failed to take correct action on a vendor's 1 990 recall notice which identified a manufacturing defect which eventually led to this failure.
(Section M1.1) 07/19/1999 1999006 Prl: ENG Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 NRC POS Prl: 4B Sec: 5B Ter:
Executive Summary On July 1, 1999, the Unit 1 "C" outboard main steam isolation valve (MSIV)stem separated from the valve poppet, resulting in an automatic reactor shutdown.
PP&L determined that the stop plate had not been properly installed in the valve poppet during valve maintenance performed in 1990. PP&L reviewed the maintenance history on all Unit 1 and Unit 2 MSIVs, inspected three additional Unit 1 MSIVs, and found no additional problems. The inspectors conduded that PP&L had performed a thorough root cause analysis and a comprehensive extent of condition review. (Section E2.1)
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Page:
10 of 19 09/29/1999 09:44:06 IR Report 3 Region I
SUSQUEHANNA United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area / Issue Date Functional Date
~ Source Area 06/07/1999 1 999005 Pri: ENG Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 Template ID Type Codes Self NEG Pri: 2A Sec:
Ter:
Item Title Item Description EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
Continued problems with the emergency diesel generator non-safety related control air system components have resulted in mcreased emergency diesel generator unavailability time, additional fast starts, and increased operator, maintenance and scheduling burden.
(Section M1.1) 06/07/1999 199900543 Pri: ENG Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 04/26/1999 1999004 Prl: ENG Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 Licensee NCV Prl: 4B Sec:
Ter.
NRC NEG Pri: 4B Sec: 4C Ter.
SAFETY RELIEF VALVEACOUSTIC MONITOR ENVIRONMENTALQUALIFICATIONAND INSTALLATION PP&L determined that all Unit 1 and Unit 2 safety relief valve acoustic monitors were not installed in an
,environmentally qualified configuration, as a result of a failure to apply RTVsealant during modification activities.
PP&L failed to adequately translate vendor environmental qualification and design requirements into appropriate specifications and instructions. This is a severity level IVviolation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control and is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation. This violation is documented in PP&L's corrective action program as condition report 97121. (Section E1.1)
Executive Summary Although PP&L identified problems with roles and responsibilities during troubleshooting, they did not identify a change management issue.
Specifically, the station staff was not fullyaware that the system engineering interface with operations and maintenance during troubleshooting had been changed.
(Section E2.1) 04/26/1999 1999004 Prl: ENG Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA2 NRC NEG Pri: 5A Sec: 5B Ter:
Executive Summary The PP&L independent safety engineering group review of the slow pressurization of the residual heat removal system event was limited and missed opportunities to reveal additional insights related to the station staff response to the failed valve. (Section E2.1) 04/26/1999 1999004 Prl: ENG NRC POS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 Pri: 5B Sec: 5C Ter:
Executive Summary Engineering personnel performed a comprehensive failure analysis and a thorough root cause determination of the Unit 1 and 2 low pressure coolant injection valve stem failures. Corrective actions, including the replacement of internal parts with an improved design and material, were acceptable.
(Section E1.1) 04/26/1 999 1 99900442 Prl: EN G Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 NRC NCV Prl: 4B Sec: 4A Ter.
Residual Heat Removal System Injection Control Valve Stem Failure - Old Design Issue Design control deficiencies in the mid-1980's led to the use of material in the stem of the low pressure coolant injection valves that was susceptible to stress corrosion cracking. These deficiencies constituted a violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion III,"Design Control," In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy,Section VII.B.3,Violations Involving Old Design Issues, the NRC exercised enforcement discretion and did not cite this violation. (Section E1.1)
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Page:
11of19 09/29/1999 09:44:06 IR Report 3 Region I
SUSQUEHANNA United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area / Issue Date Date Source Functional Area Template Type Codes Item Title Item Description Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 03/15/1999 1999003 Prl: ENG Licensee POS Pri: 3A Sec:
Sec: 4A Ter:
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
The planning and construction of the Susquehanna Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility (ISFSF) were being accomplished well. Quality Assurance involvement has been evident throughout the ISFSF project. (Section E2.2) 03/15/1999 1999003-01 Pri: ENG Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 Licensee NCV Pri: 5B Sec:
- Ter:
CORE SPRAY QUARTERLYFLOW SURVEILLANCEDID NOT MEET ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA In a Licensee Event Report, PP&L identified that on two occasions, the Unit 2 core spray quarterly flowsurveillance test did not meet the Technical Specification (TS) acceptance criteria due to a procedure error. PP& L's proposed and completed corrective actions,.including procedure and programmatic actions, were good. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRG Enforcement Policy. This violation is in PP&L's corrective action program as condition report 98-3070.
LER 50-388/98411 is dosed.
(Section 08.1) 03/15/1999 199900342 Prl: ENG Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000388 SUSQUEHANNA2 NRC NCV Pri: 4A RESIDUALHEAT REMOVALSERVICE WATER (RHRSW) RADIATIONMONITOR Sec: 4B The residual heat removal service water (RHRSW) radiation monitors do not meet requirements of General Design Criteria 64. Specifically, the radiation monitors would not be functioning following a postulated design basis Ter:
=accident, since the monitors can not be manually started locally in the high post accident area radiation levels.
In addition, the location of a backup grab sample would not provide a representative sample as delineated in Regulatory Guide 1.21. This is a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III,"Design Control," which requires, in part, selection of suitable equipment that are essential to the safety related function of the system.
This Severity Level IVviolation is being treated as a Nonunited Violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is documented in PP&L's corrective action program as condition report 91031.
(Section E2.1) 02/19/1999 1999002 Prl: ENG Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 Licensee NEG Prl: 5C Sec: 5B Ter:
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
Internal reviews of the condition report system by Operating Experience Services (OES) and external reviews by Nuclear Assurance Services (NAS)~ the Cooperative Management Audit Program, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, and the Susquehanna Review Committee are continuing to find incomplete or inadequate corrective action dosure. A recent process change requiring OES to review competed actions to ensure that the actions satisfies the one prescribed, is reducing the amount of items identified. However, problems persist in this area.
(Section E7.1) 02/19/1999 1999002 Prl: ENG Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 NRC POS Prl: 4A Sec: 4B Ter.
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
The inspector concluded that PP&L's response to Generic Letter 96-01 adequately addressed the issues identified in the GL, and that there was an adequate basis for the positions taken in the response.
(Section E1.1) 02/19/1999 1999002 Pri: ENG Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 NRC POS Prl: 4C Sec: 4A Ter:
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
The inspector determined that the procedures for control of modifications to the facilityprovided appropriate controls for ensuring that modifications were properly carried over into the technical specifications and surveillance tests.
(Section E3.1)
Page:
12 of 19 09/29/1 999 09:44:06 IR Report 3 Region I
SUSQUEHANNA United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area / Issue Date Date Source Fu nctiona I Area Template ID Type Codes Item Title Item Description 02/01/1999 1999001 Prl: ENG Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 NRC POS Prl: 4C Sec: 4B Ter.
Exec'utive S ummary Two Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) meetings, related to a Unit 1 "C" reactor feedwater drain valve leak seal repair and a generic main generator synchronization issue, demonstrated that PORC conducted In<epth reviews of safety issues.
The PORC recommendations for both meetings were sound and supported by a conservative decision making process.
01/04/1 999 1 99801 2 Pri: ENG Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 NRC POS Pri: 3A Sec:
Ter:
High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System Outage System and maintenance engineers provided good outage support at the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) jobsite. Also, the HPCI system engineer monitored the post maintenance surveillance test and provided timely feedback to the operator performing the test. (Section M1.1) 01/04/1999 199801242 Prl: ENG Sec: MAINT Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 NRC VIOIV Prl: 4C Emergency Diesel Generatoi inoperable due to Heavy Rains Sec: 5C PP&L failed to adequately translate the system design, from a modification, into appropriate specifications, drawings, and procedures, and on two separate occasions substituted gasket material without a review for suitability Ter: 2A.
of materials. The inspectors 'determined this was an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion III~
" Design Control. PP&L's initial corrective actions were good. However, the proposed final corrective actions, which appeared reasonable to correct the original condition, were not performed in a timely manner.
In addition, PP8 L failed to recognize that SSES design control requirements had not been followed, when a different type gasket was installed in the plant. URI 50-387,388/984643 is dosed. (Section E8.2) 1 1/23/1998 199801 1 Pri: ENG NRC NEG Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 Pri: 4A Sec:
Te I Executive Summary Section E8.1 The inspectors conduded that the lack of an adequate feedwater loop seal existed since initial plant startup.
Once the lack of an adequate loop seal and other related issues were documented in condition reports, PP&L performed thorough operability determinations.
PP&L's completed and planned corrective actions were well planned and thorough.
1 1/23/1 998 1 99801 145 Prl: ENG Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 Licensee NCV Prl: 4A Sec: 4C Ter LEAKRATE TEST FOR FW 7A/B CONTAINMENTISOLATIONVALVES PP&L identified inconsistencies within the FSAR and TS for the feedwater containment boundary penetration s.
These inconsistencies resulted in PP&L not requesting an exemption from 1 0 CFR 50 Appendix J testing.
PP&L's completed corrective actions and scheduled corrective actions were thorough and complete. This non-repetitive, PP&L identified and corrected violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
1 0/02/1 998 1 998005 Pri'NG Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 NRC NEG Pri: 4B Sec: 4C Ter. 5A Executive S umma ry Section E7.3 PP&L Nuclear Department Administrative Procedures provide adequate guidance to determine ifa 10 CFR 50.59 unreviewed safety question exists. These documents dearly delineate the responsibilities for various processes within the 1 0 CFR 50.59 program and provide adequate controls for record retention and reporting the results of the evaluations.
The team noted several instances in which the required 1 0 CFR 50.59 documentation was not completed for condition reports dispositioned "use-as-is," as required by program procedures.
However, technical evaluations provided bases for no unreviewed safety question.
The failure to implement the administrative procedure for 1 0 CFR 50.59 evaluations is considered a minor violation of procedural adherence, and is not being cited for formal enforcement action.
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13 of 19 09/29/1999 09:44:06 IR Report 3 Region I
SUSQUEHANNA United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area / Issue Date Date Source Functional Area Template ID Type Codes Item Title Item Description 10/02/1998 1998005 Pri: ENG Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 NRC POS Pri: 4B Sec: 4C Ter:
Executive Summary Section E2.2 The core spray system was found to be installed and operated in a manner consistent with the design requirements for electrical power supplies as described in the update final safety analysis report and design basis documents.
Calculations reviewed were adequate to assure that the components and control circuits associated with the operation of the core spray system had sufficient direct current voltage to perform the intended design function.
Refueling testing and emergency diesel load calculations demonstrated the adequacy of the electrical power supply to the core spray system components.
10/02/1998 1998005 Prl: ENG NRC POS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 Prl: 4B Sec: 4C Ter:
Executive Summary Section E2.3 The inservice testing program for the core spray system was sound.
Program documents were found to be well organized, with appropriate records of relief requests, test deferral justifications and supporting technical information..
Test failures identified during relief valve testing were appropriately dispositioned.
The industry experience review program appropriately considered industry information.
10/02/1998 1998005 Prl: ENG Sec: OPS Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 NRC NEG Prl: 1C Sec: 4B Ter. 5A Executive Summary Section E 7.1 PP&L's program and process controls for the identification of conditions adverse to quality were adequate.
The team's review of sixty condition reports indicated that the initiation threshold was sufficiently low. However, two conditions, which were not documented, reflected inconsistency in the initiation of condition reports. A pressurization of a portion of Unit 1 core spray discharge piping was not documented in a condition report, although a similar problem with the residual heat removal system was documented.
An unexpected power increase was not document in a condition report; this event was also documented in NRC inspection report 50-387,388/98-07.
10/02/1998 1998005-01 Prl: ENG Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 NRC VIOIV Pri: 4B Sec: 5A Ter 5C FAILURETO MEET DESIGN CONTROL REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX B TO 10 CFR 50 (3 EXAMPLES)
Discrepancies identified in surveillance test procedures indicated weak engineering support in assuring acceptance cnteria bases were sound. The acceptance cntena for Unit 1 core spray test pressure did not take into account system configuration differences between Units 1 and 2, even though these differences were identified in design calculations.
The Unit 2 core spray quarterly flowsurveillance test inappropriately induded a non-conservative correction factor for which no basis could be identified. Although the consequence of these discrepancies did not result in system inoperability, the above failures to incorporate the requirements and acceptance limits contained in applicable design documents are two examples of a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III.
The resolution of core spray flowconcerns reflected a lack of questioning attitude. PP&L missed opportunities to identify that the loss of coolant accident (LOCA) analysis did not reflect the correct core spray flowin the facility's design.
The failure to ensure that the design basis is correctly translated into the LOCA analysis is a third example of a violation of the design control requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Section III.
10/12/1998 199801041 Pri: ENG Licensee NCV Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 Prl: 5A Sec: 5B Ter. 5C ISOLATIONVALVESFOR CONTAINMENTPURGE NOT SINGLE FAILUREPROOF PP&L identified in Licensee Event Report 50-387/97%24 a single failure mechanism that could enable drywell and suppression chamber atmospheres to communicate through a bypass line, following a postulated loss of coolant accident.
The licensee's interim corrective actions and planned modifications were adequate to resolve this issue.
In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy,Section VII.B.3,Violations Involving Old Design Issues, the NRC is exercising enforcement discretion and not citing this violation.
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Page:
14 of 19 09/29/1 999 09:44:06 IR Report 3 Region I
SUSQUEHANNA Date Source Functional Area United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT IS S UE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area/ Issue Date Template Item Title ID Type Codes Item Description Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 07/19/1999 1999006 Prl: PLTSUP NRC POS Pri: 3B Executive Summary Sec:
Sec: 3C The SSES security force members adequately demonstrated that they had the required knowledge to effectively implement the duties and responsibilities associated with their position. (Section S2)
Ter:
04/26/1999 1999004 Pri: PLTSUP Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 NRC POS Pri: 3C Executive Summary Sec:
Access controls to radiologically controlled areas were effective, and appropriate occupational exposure monitoring devices were provided and used.
Personnel occupational exposure was maintained within applicable regulatory
". Ter:
limits and as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). The AtARAefforts and results for 1998 were good, including the management of radiologically significant outage work. The annual and Unit 2 refueling and inspection outage collective dose goals for 1999 were aggressive and challenging.
(Sections R1.1 and R1.3) 04/26/1999.
1999004 Prl: PLTSUP NRC Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA2 POS Prl: 3C Executive Summary Sec: 2B Radiological housekeeping conditions were noted to be good.
In particular, the equipment and personnel work activity control and coordination for the Unit 2 refuel floor, suppression pool, and drywell were excellent. The number and type of personnel contaminations were tracked, trended, and evaluated for cause and corrective actions.
(Section R1.2) 04/26/1999 1999004 Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 Pri: PLTSUP Sec:
NRC POS Pri: 5A Sec: 5C Ter:
Executive Summary PP&L's self-identification and corrective action processes in the area of radiation protection were effective. Nuclear Assessment Services surveillance reports, HP self-assessments, and the corrective action program continued to be effective in identifying, at a low threshold, deficiencies and improvement opportunities.
Effective corrective actions were implemented for findings. (Section R7) 02/01/1999 1999001 Prl: PLTSUP NRC NEG Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 01/04/1999 1998012 Prl: PLTSUP NRC POS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 Pri: 4C Sec: 5A Ter: 3A Pri: 3A Sec:
Ter:
Executive Summary The NRC identified that two accessible fire zones were not inspected by hourly firewatches since 1992. PP&L incorrectly treated the areas as inaccessible when in fact they were accessible.
Once recognized, PP&L took immediate and effective corrective actions.
Security Computer Replacement Modification The security computer replacement, in the Security Control Center, was well controlled and completed with minimal interruptions to the normal plant access areas.
Asignificant improvement was noted for the plant accountability capabilities.
(Section S2) e n.-, nsi.i c.
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15 of 19 09/29/1 999 09:44:06 IR Report 3 Region I
SUSQUEHANNA Date Source Functional Area United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area / Issue Date Template Item Title ID Type Codes Item Description 1 1/23/1 998 199801 1 Prl: PLTSUP NRC POS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 1 1/23/1 998 1 99801 1 Prl: PLTSUP NRC POS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA2 Pri: 3A Sec: 3B Ter.
Pri: 3A Sec: 3B Ter.
Executive Summary Section R1.2 PP&L implemented overall effective surveys, monitoring, and control of radioactive materials and contamination.
The surveys, monitoring, and controls were performed with calibrated and properly used devices.
Personnel and area contamination rates were properly tracked and trended.
Executive Summary Section R.7 PP&L's self-identification and corrective action processes in the area of radiation protection were effective. Quality Assurance surveillances
~ corporate assessments, and self-assessments continued to be effective in identifying, at a Iow threshold, deficiencies and impiovement opportunities.
Corrective actions were implemented for findings.
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 1 1/23/1998 199801 1 Prl: PLTSUP NRC STR Pri: 3A Sec:
Sec: 3B Ter:
Executive Summary Section R1.1 PP& L implemented effective radiological controls at SSES.
Access controls to radiologically controlled areas were effective, appropriate occupational exposure monitoring devices were provided and used, personnel occupational exposure was maintained within applicable regulatory limits and As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable (AtARA),and the radiation work permit program was implemented properly for control of radiological work.
10/12/1998 1998010 Prli PLTSUP NRC POS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
0500038? SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA2 Pri: 2A Executive Summary Section S2
.Sec: 2B SSES security facilities and equipment in the areas of protected area assessment aids, protected area detection aids, and personnel search equipment were determined to be well maintained and reliable and met PP&L's Tei". 3A commitments and NRC requirements.
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 10/12/1998 1998010 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Pri: 2B Executive Summary Section R1.1 Sec:
Sec: 3A The licensee effectively maintained and implemented a radiological environmental monitoring program in accordance with regulatory requirements.
Ter.
1 0/1 2/1 998 1 99801 0 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 Pri: 2B Sec: 3A Ter.
Executive Summary Section R1.2 Generally, the licensee effectively maintained system operability and performed channel calibrations and channel functional tests for the meteorological instrumentation. A NRC identified concern with the adequacy of the channel calibration methodology involving the wind speed channel was entered into PP&L's corrective action system for resolution.
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16 of 19 09/29/1999 09:44:06 IR Report 3 Region I
SUSQUEHANNA United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area/ Issue Date Functional Template Item Title Date
'Source Area ID Type Codes Item Description 10/12/1998 1998010 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Pri: 2B Executive Summary Section R1.3 Sec:
Sec: 3A The licensee maintained effective radioactive liquid and gaseous effluent control programs.
The Offsite Dose Calculation Manual contained sufficient specification and instruction to acceptably implement and maintain the radioactive liquid and gaseous effluent control programs.
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 Prl: 2B Executive Summary Section R2.1 Sec: 3A The licensee established, implemented, and maintained an effective radiation monitoring system program with respect to electronic and radiological calibrations. As a result of self-assessment initiatives, the licensee Ter:
implemented efforts to improve radiation monitoring system reliability. Licensee tracking and trending efforts provided suflicient information to assess radiation monitoring system performance.
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA2 t
10/12/1998 1998010 Prl: PLTSUP NRC POS Sec:
10/12/1998 1998010 Prl: PLTSUP NRC POS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 10/12/1998 1998010 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 10/12/1998 1998010 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA2 Pri: 2B Sec: 3A Ter:
Pri: 2B Sec: 3A Ter:
Pri: 2B Sec: 3A Ter:
Executive Summary Section R2.2 The licensee established, implemented, and maintained an effective ventilation system surveillance program with respect to charcoal adsorption surveillance tests, high efficiency particulate mechanical efficiency tests, and air flow rate tests.
Executive Summary Section R7.3 The licensee established, implemented, and maintained an effective quality assurance program for the radioactive effluent control program with respect to audit scope and depth, audit team experience, and response to audit findings. The licensee also implemented an effective quality control program to validate measurement results for radioactive effiuent samples.
Executive Summary Section S1 PP8L conducted security and safeguards activities in a manner that protected public health and safety in the areas of alarm stations, communications, and protected area access control of personnel, packages, and vehicles. This portion ofthe program, as implemented, met PPSL's commitments and NRC requirements.
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA2 1998010 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Prl: 2B Executive Summary Section S3 Sec:
Sec: 3A Security and safeguards procedures and documentation were properly implemented.
Event logs were properly maintained and effectively used to analyze, track, and resolve safeguards events.
Ter:
Page:
17of19 09/29/1999 09:44:06 IR Report 3 Region I
SUSQUEHANNA Date Source Functional Area United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area/ Issue Date Template Item Title ID Type Codes Item Description Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 10/12/1998 1998010 Prl: PLTSUP NRC POS Prl: 2B Executive Summary Section S5 Sec:
Sec: 3A Security training was conducted in accordance with the training and qualification plan and, based upon interviews and inspector observations, was considered effective.
Ter.
10/12/1998 1998010 Prl: PLTSUP NRC Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA2 POS Prl: 2B Executive Summary Section S6 Sec: 3A The level of management support was adequate to ensure effective implementation of the security program, as evidenced by adequate staffing levels and allocations of resources to support programmatic needs.
Ter.
10/12/1998 1998010 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 Prl: 2B Sec: 3A Ter.
Executive Summary Section S7 The review of Pp&L's audit of the security program indicated that the audit was comprehensive in scope and depth, the audit findings were reported to the appropnate level of management, and the program was being properly administered.
In addition, a review ofthe documentation applicable to the self-assessment program, indicated that the program as being effectively implemented to identify and resolve potential weaknesses.
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 10/12/1998 1998010 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Prl: 2B Executive Summary Section R7.1 Sec:
Sec: 3A The audits and self-assessments were of sufficient depth to assess the implementation of the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program and the Meteorological Monitoring Program.
Ter. 5A
-10/12/1998 1998010 Prl: PLTSUP NRC POS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 Pri: 2B Sec: 5A Ter:
Executive Summary Section R7.2 The environmental laboratory continued to implement effective Quality Assurance and Quality Control programs for the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program samples, and continued to provide effective validation of analytical results.
10/12/1998 1998010 Prl: pLTSUP NRC Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 pOS Pri: 3A Sec:.
Ter:
Executive Summary Section S4 Security force members adequately demonstrated they had the requisite knowledge necessary to effectively implement the duties and responsibilities associated with their position.
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18 of 19 09/29/1999 09:44:06 IR Report 3 Region I
SUSQUEHANNA Date Source Functional Area United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area/ issue Date Template Item Title ID
'fype Codes Item Description 10/1 9/1 998 01014 Prl: PLTSUP NRC Sec: ENG Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 10/19/1998 02014 Prl: PLTSUP NRC Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA2 VIOIV Pri: 4A FAILURETO MEET THE SAFE SHUTDOWN PERFORMANCE GOAL OF MAINTAININGREACTOR VESSEL LEV Sec: 4C PP&L failed to provide a shutdown methodology that would have maintained the indicated reactor vessel water level above the top ofthe active fuel during a postulated fire, as required by SSES Fire Protection Review Report (FPRR),
Ter:
Section 3.0. This was a violation of Operating License Conditions to implement and maintain provisions of the approved fire protection program, as described in the SSES FPRR.
VIOIV Pi'I: 4A FAILURETO PROPERLY IMPLEMENTTHE REQUIREMENTS OF NFPA 13 IN THE DESIGN AND INSTALLATIO~
Sec:
PP8L failed to properly implement the requirements of National Fire Protection Association Standards 13, 15, 72D, and 72E in the design and installation of the SSES fire detection and suppression systems, as required by SSES Fire Protection Review Report (FPRR), Sections 4.1.2, 4.3, and Table 5.0-1, sections E.1 ~ and E.3.c. This was a violation of Operating License Conditions to implement and maintain provisions of the approved fire protection program, as described in the SSES FPRR.
10/1 9/1 998 Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA2 03014 Pri: PLTSUP NRC VIOIV Prl: 4A Sec:
Sec: 1C Ter:
FAILURETO PROVIDE 8-HOUR BATTERY POWERED EMERGENCY LIGHTINGUNITS IN ALLAREAS REQUIR PP&P failed to provide 8-hour battery powered emergency lighting in all areas of the plant requiring manual actions for safe shutdown, as required by SSES Fire Protection Review Report (FPRR), Section 3.3.2 and Table 5.0-1, section D.5.a. This was a violation of Operating License Conditions to implement and maintain provisions of the approved fire protection program, as described in the SSES FPRR.
10/19/1 998 Dockets Discussed:
05000387 SUSQUEHANNA 1 05000388 SUSQUEHANNA 2 05014 Prl: PLTSUP NRC Sec:
VioIV Pd:4A Sec: 4C Ter:
FAILURETO PROVIDE TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT NECESSARY TO MAKETHE CONNECTION FROM THE FIRE PP&L failed to provide tools and equipment necessary to make connection from the fire water system to the condensate transfer system to assure availability of the keepfiil system, which is necessary to prevent water hammer in the High Pressure Coolant Injection, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling, Core Spray, and Residual Heat Removal system discharge piping, as required by SSES Fire Protection Review Report (FPRR) ~ Section 3.3.1.1. This was a violation of Operating License Conditions to implement and maintain provisions of the approved fire protection program, as descnbed in the SSES FPRR.
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19 of 19 09/29/1 999 09:44:06 IR Report 3 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area I Issue Date Legend Type Codes:
BU Bulletin CDR Construction DEV Deviation EEI Escalated Enforcement Item IFI Inspector follow-up item LER Licensee Event Report LIC Ucensing Issue MISC Miscellaneous MV MinorViolation NCV NonCited Violation NEG Negative NOED Notice of Enforcement Discretion NON Notice of Non-Conformance OTHR Other P21 Pait21 POS Positive SGI Safeguard Event Report STR Strength URI Unresolved item VIO Violation WK Weakness Template Codes:
1A Normal Operations-1 B Operations During Transients 1C Programs and Processes 2A Equipment Condition 2B Programs and Processes 3A Work Performance 3B KSA 3C Work Environment 4A Design 4B Engineering Support 4C Programs and Processes 5A Identification 5B Analysis 5C Resolution ID Codes NRC NRC Self Self-Revealed Licensee Licensee Functional Areas:
OPS Operations MAINT Maintenance ENG Engineering PLTSUP Plant Support OTHER Other EEls are apparent violations of NRC Requirements that are being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action"(Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. However, the NRC has not reached its final enforcement decision on the issues identified by the EEls and the PIM entries may be modified when the final decisions are made.
URls are unresolved items about which more information is required to determine whether the issue in question is an acceptable item, a deviation, a nonconformance, or a violation. A URI may also be a potential violation that is not likelyto be considered for escalated enforcement action. However, the NRC has not reached its final condusions on the issues, and the PIM entries may be modified when the final conclusions are made.
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ENClOSURE 2 Page 1 of 1 09/29/1 999 1 1:35:20
~n~its nspection cttvity i e SUSQUEHANNA Inspection / ActivityPlan 1 0/01 /1 999 - 03/31 /2000 um oro Inspectors / Individuals anne a es Start End nspec ion Type 1 ~ 2 1 ~ 2 1 ~ 2 1 ~ 2 1 ~ 2 1 ~ 2 1 ~ 2 1 ~ 2 1 ~ 2 1,2 1 ~ 2 1 ~ 2 1 ~ 2 IP 37001 IP 37550 IP 84750 IP 40500
!P 86750 IP 81700 IP 83750 IP 40500 IP 64150 IP 71001 IP 62700 IP 62702 IP 37550 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation Program Engineering Radioactive Waste Treatment, And ENuent And Environmental Monitoring Effectiveness Of Licensee Process to Identify, Resolve, And Prevent Problems Solid Radioactive Waste Management And Transportation Of Radioactive Mater Physical Security Program For Power Reactors Occupational Radiation Exposure Effectiveness Of Ucensee Process to Identify, Resolve, And Prevent Problems Triennial Postfire Safe Shutdown Capability Reverification Licensed Operator Requalification Program'Evaluation Maintenance Program Implementation Maintenance Program Engineering 2
3 1
1 1
1 1
5 1
2 1
1 1
09/27/1 999
. 09/27/1 999 1 0/04/1 999 1 1 /1 5/1 999 1 1 /1 5/1 999 1 1/29/1 999 1 2/06/1 999 1 2/1 3/1 999 01/1 0/2000 0 1/24/2000 0 1/3 1/2000 0 1/3 1/2000 02/28/2000 1 0/01/1 999 1 0/01/1 999 1 0/08/1 999 1 1/19/1999 1 1 /1 9/1 999 1 2/03/1 999 1 2/1 0/1 999 1 2/1 7/1 999 0 1 /1 4/2000 0 1/28/2000 02/04/2000 02/04/2000 03/03/2000 Core Core Core Core Core Core Core Core Regional Initiative Core Regional Initiative Regional Initiative Regional Initiative is repo oes no m
u e 8 an ac Ivl les.
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