ML17128A170
| ML17128A170 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 09/01/2016 |
| From: | Chuck Zoia Exelon Generation Co |
| To: | NRC/RGN-III/DRS/OLB |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16257A680 | List: |
| References | |
| Download: ML17128A170 (89) | |
Text
Dresden Generating Station ILT-N-1 SWAP AUX POWER INSERT CONTROL RODS TO LOWER POWER APRM FAILS UPSCALE (RPS FAILURE)
GENERATOR FAILS TO TRIP ON REVERSE POWER TBCCW PUMP TRIP 2A RECIRCULATION FLOW CONTROLLER FAILS UPSCALE LOCA IN DW - MANUAL SCRAM LOSS OF RFPS - USE HPCI TO RESTORE LEVEL Rev. 00 02/16 Developed By:
Exam Author Date Approved By:
Facility Representative Date
SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 2 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Scenario Outline Facility: Dresden Generating Station Scenario No.: ILT-N-1 Op-Test No.: 15-1 (2016-301)
Examiners: ___________________________ Operators:
Initial Conditions: Unit 2 is operating at 170 MWe. Shutdown in progress per DGP 02-01. No LCO actions are in effect. 2/3 RBCCW pump and Reactor Feed Pump Standby Selector Switch are OOS.
Turnover: Transfer Buses 21 and 23 to TR-22. Continue shutdown via control rod insertion per DGP 02-01. Insert control rods until 130 MWe and remove turbine from service.
Event No.
Malf. No.
Event Type*
Event Description 1
NONE N (BOP)
Transfer Aux Power 2
NONE R (ATC)
Insert Control Rods to lower power 3
LP32117BU B12 I/T (ATC)(T/S)
APRM Fails upscale-RPS failure 4
T45 C (BOP)
Generator fails to trip on reverse power 5
Q11 C (BOP)
TBCCW - Pump Trip 6
ILT-N-1 Recir.cae I/T (ATC) (T/S)
RECIRC - 2A Recirculation Flow Controller Fails Upscale 7
F41 M (ALL)
Manual Scram - LOCA in drywell 8
H32 H33 H34 HP2A1F1 HP2B1F1 M (ALL)
Loss of RFPs - Use HPCI to restore level HPCI - Auto-start failure (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 3 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Scenario Objective Evaluate the Teams ability to operate the plant with a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) and a subsequent loss of Reactor Feed System.
Scenario Summary
- 1. Unit is at ~25%.
- 2. The following equipment is OOS:
- a. 2/3 RBCCW Pump
- b. Reactor Feed Pump Standby Selector Switch
- 3. LCOs:
- a. None Scenario Sequence After completing shift turnover, the BOP operator will transfer aux power from TR-21 to TR-22.
Following the transfer of TR-21 loads to TR-22, the ATC will insert control rods to allow removing the Main Generator from Service.
During the power reduction, APRM Channel 5 will fail upscale. RPS will fail to actuate. The team will respond by manually inserting a B channel RPS half scram. The Unit Supervisor will reference Tech Specs and declare Technical Specification3.3.1.1 Condition A applies.
After power is reduced to 100 MWe, the BOP will reduce load on the Main Generator in preparation for tripping the Main Turbine.
When Main Generator load has been reduced to approximately 10 MWe, the BOP will attempt to trip the Main Turbine. The turbine will fail to trip and the BOP will be required to open GCB 1-2 and 1-7 from the 923-2 panel.
The 2A TBCCW pump will trip on overcurrent. The BOP will respond and start the 2B TBCCW pump per DOA 3800-01. The BOP will execute DOP 6700-20 to address the 480V breaker trip.
The 2A Reactor Recirculation Pump speed will increase due to a Recirc Run-up. The ATC operator will place the 2A Reactor Recirculation Pump in speed hold and perform actions per DOA 0202-03. The Unit Supervisor will declare Technical Specification 3.4.1 Condition B not met.
After the actions of DOA 0202-03 and Technical Specifications have been addressed, a small leak from the Recirc System will develop. The team will respond to indications and enter DOA 0040-01k, Slow leak and take actions in preparation for a reactor scram per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram. The team will insert a manual scram when RPS actuation thresholds are challenged.
After the team has stabilized the plant following the scram a loss of Reactor Feed pumps will occur. The team will transition to the middle leg of DEOP 100, RPV Control and restore RPV level with High Pressure Coolant Injection.
Completion criteria: When the RPV level is restored to level band directed by the Unit Supervisor and at the discretion of the Lead Examiner, Place the simulator in FREEZE.
SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 4 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event One - Transfer Aux Power The BOP will transfer power supplies for Buses 21 and 23 from TR-21 to TR-22 in preparation for Unit Shutdown.
Malfunctions required: 0 (None)
Success Path:
Transfers Bus 21 feed from TR-21 to TR-22 IAW DOP 6500-01, Transfer of 4160 Volt Bus Power Supply Transfers Bus 23 feed from TR-21 to TR-22 IAW DOP 6500-01, Transfer of 4160 Volt Bus Power Supply Event Two - Insert Control Rods to Lower Reactor Power The ATC operator will insert control rods per DGP 02-1, Reactor Shutdown.
Malfunctions required: 0 (None)
Success Path:
Inserts to control rods per DGP 02-1, Reactor Shutdown until Generator Output is 130 MWe.
Performs DGP 03-04, Control Rod Movements Performs DOP 0400-01, Reactor Manual Control System Operation Event Three - APRM fails upscale (RPS fails to actuate)
APRM 5 fails upscale without a half scram due to an APRM Trip Unit problem.
Malfunctions required: 2 (APRM fails upscale)
(Failure of RPS)
Success Path:
Inserts a half scram per DOP 0500-07, Insertion-Reset of Manual Half Scram.
Determines Technical Specifications requirements.
Bypasses the APRM and resets the half scram per DOP 0500-07, Insertion-Reset of Manual Half Scram.
Event Four - Main Generator Fails to trip on reverse power Generator Field Breaker fails to open.
Malfunctions required: 1 (Reverse Power Trip Failure)
Success Path:
Opens GCB 1-2 and 1-7 from the 923-2 panel.
SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 5 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event Five - TBCCW Pump Trip The running (2A) TBCCW pump trips on overcurrent and TBCCW temperatures begin to rise.
Malfunctions required: 1 (2A TBCCW Pump Trip )
Success Path:
Performs DOA 3800-01, TBCCW System Failure.
Starts standby (2B) TBCCW pump and executes DOP 6800-20 for 480V Breaker Failure.
Event Six - 2A Recirculation Flow Controller Fails Upscale The 2A Recirculation Flow Controller fails upscale.
Malfunctions required: 1 (CAEP)
(2A Recirculation Flow Controller fails upscale)
Success Path:
DOA 0202-03, Reactor Recirculation System Flow Control Failure.
Event Seven - Manual Scram / LOCA in Drywell A LOCA in the Drywell occurs, causing DW pressure to rise, and requiring a manual scram.
Malfunctions required: 1 (Recirc loop leak)
Success Path:
Performs DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram.
Performs DEOP 0100, RPV Control Performs DEOP 0200-01, Primary Containment Control.
Event Eight - Loss of RFPs / Restore RPV level with HPCI A loss of RFPs results in RPV level dropping.
Malfunctions required: 4 (Loss of RFPs)
(HPCI failure to Autostart)
Success Path:
Performs DOA 2300-02, HPCI Fast Startup.
SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 6 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
PRE-SCENARIO ACTIVITIES 1
If applicable, conduct pre-scenario activities in accordance with TQ-JA-155-04, SIMULATOR EXAMINATION BRIEFING.
- a. Direct the Team to perform their briefs prior to entering the simulator.
- b. Provide the Team the following procedures:
- 1) Marked up copy of DGP 02-01, Reactor Shutdown
- 2) Control Rod Sequence Package
- 3) REMA
- 4) 2 clean copies of DOP 6500-01, Transfer of 4160 Volt Bus Power Supply
- 5) Clean copy of DGP 03-04, Control Rod Movements.
- 6) Clean copy of DOP 0400-01, Reactor Manual Control System Operation.
2 Simulator Setup (the following steps can be done in any logical order)
- b. Place Reactor Feed Pump Standby Selector Switch to OFF
- f.
Place Protected Pathway donuts on 2A, 2B, 3A, and 3B RBCCW pumps.
- h. Verify CRD F-02 is inserted
- i.
Verify RWCU flowrate is 600 gpm 3
Verify the following simulator conditions:
- a. Verify one Service Air Compressor supplying both Units and SA crosstie open.
- b. Verify 2A TBCCW pump is running and 2B is in standby
- c. Verify 2B RFP is running.
- d. Verify A and B Recirc Loop flows are not matched, with A Recirc loop approximately 5% higher than B NOTE: Do NOT run the initial setup CAEP file until the above setup is completed.
4 Run the initial setup CAEP file: 15-1 ILT-N-1.cae 5
Open but do NOT RUN YET CAEP file: ILT-N-1 Recirc.cae 6
Complete the Simulator Setup Checklist.
Symbols are used throughout the text to identify specific items as indicated below:
Critical Tasks 6
Time Critical / Sensitive Actions (Includes PRA Actions) n Required Actions q Optional Actions
SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 7 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event One - Transfer Loads from TR-21 to TR-22 Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior 1
SIMULATOR OPERATOR / ROLE PLAY:
If requested to set gains to 1, (wait 3 min) activate trigger 1, then report: gains set to 1.
(This trigger can be toggled OFF, then back ON to adjust the gains more than once).
FLOOR INSTRUCTOR CUE: When the BOP reaches the step to verify Transformer Load Tap Changer for TR-86 (supplies TR 22) set in accordance with DOP 6400-14, TR-86 LOAD TAP CHANGER OPERATION, inform the BOP you are an extra NSO assigned to monitor TR-86 Transformer Load Tap Changer and it is set correctly.
NOTE: The Team may transfer the loads in any order.
CRS q Directs transferring loads from TR-21 to TR-22 per DOP 6500-01, Transfer of 4160 Volt Bus Power Supply.
BOP Performs DOP 6500-01, Transfer of 4160 Volt Bus Power Supply, to transfer Bus 21 to TR-22 as follows:
n Positions TR-22 TO BUS 21 ACB SYNCHROSCOPE selector switch to ON.
q Verifies incoming and running voltages on INCOMING VOLTS and RUNNING VOLTS meters approximately equal.
q Verifies SYNCHRONIZING meter at "12 o'clock" and NOT rotating.
q Verifies SYNCHRONIZING meter lights NOT glowing.
n Positions TR-22 TO BUS 21 ACB breaker control switch to CLOSE.
q Verifies:
o SYNCHRONIZING meter at "12 o'clock".
o Appropriate breaker indicates CLOSED.
o Alarm 902-8 D-1, Bus 21 MAIN & RES ACB IN PARALLEL, sounds.
n Positions TR-21 TO BUS 21 ACB control switch to TRIP.
q Verifies:
o Breaker indicates OPEN.
o Alarm 902-8 D-1, Bus 21 MAIN & RES ACB IN PARALLEL, clears.
n Positions TR-22 TO BUS 21 ACB SYNCHROSCOPE selector switch to OFF.
q Verifies Transformer Load Tap Changer for TR-86 (supplies TR 22) set in accordance with DOP 6400-14, TR-86 LOAD TAP CHANGER OPERATION.
q Verifies appropriate Bus 21 ammeter and voltmeter indications normal.
SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 8 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event One - Transfer Loads from TR-21 to TR-22 Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior BOP Performs DOP 6500-01, Transfer of 4160 Volt Bus Power Supply, to transfer Bus 23 to TR-22 as follows::
n Positions TR-22 TO BUS 23 ACB SYNCHROSCOPE selector switch to ON.
q Verifies incoming and running voltages on INCOMING VOLTS and RUNNING VOLTS meters approximately equal.
q Verifies SYNCHRONIZING meter at "12 o'clock" and NOT rotating.
q Verifies SYNCHRONIZING meter lights NOT glowing.
n Positions TR-22 TO BUS 23 ACB breaker control switch to CLOSE.
q Verifies:
o SYNCHRONIZING meter at "12 o'clock".
o Appropriate breaker indicates CLOSED.
o Alarm 902-8 C-3, Bus 23 MAIN & RES ACB IN PARALLEL, sounds.
n Positions TR-21 TO BUS 23 ACB control switch to TRIP.
q Verifies:
o Breaker indicates OPEN.
o Alarm 902-8 C-3, Bus 23 MAIN & RES ACB IN PARALLEL, clears.
n Positions TR-22 TO BUS 23 ACB SYNCHROSCOPE selector switch to OFF.
q Verifies Transformer Load Tap Changer for TR 86 (supplies TR 22) set in accordance with DOP 6400-14, TR-86 LOAD TAP CHANGER OPERATION.
q Verifies appropriate Bus 23 ammeter and voltmeter indications normal.
ATC Assists as directed.
Event 1 Completion Criteria:
Bus 21 and Bus 23 transferred to TR-22, AND / OR, At the discretion of the Lead Evaluator.
SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 9 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event Two - Insert Control Rods to Lower Power Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior CRS Directs inserting control rods:
q Reviews REMA.
q Designates second verifier.
q Directs ATC to insert rods.
ATC Performs the following actions per DOP 0400-01, Reactor Manual Control System Operation, and DGP 03-04, Control Rod Movements, as directed Verifies the following prior to moving any control rod:
n Control rod selected on the select matrix is correct rod.
n Second Verification requirements satisfied.
n Rod Out Permit light is illuminated.
Inserts rods as follows:
n Moves the Rod Movement Control switch to ROD IN.
n Verifies ON light and proper Control Rod Timer operation.
n Releases switch before target position is reached.
n Verifies rod settles to target position and proper response of nuclear instrumentation.
BOP Performs second verification checks.
For first rod in a step:
n Verifies correct control rod pattern n
Verifies correct step and array.
n Verifies RWM rod blocks enabled For all rods moved:
n Verifies correct control rod selected.
n Verifies planned control rod motion is correct.
n Verifies control rod at target position.
ATC q
Informs the Unit Supervisor when Generator Load is 130 MWe.
Event 2 Completion Criteria:
Generator Load is approximately 130 MWe, AND / OR, At the discretion of the Lead Examiner.
SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 10 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event Three - APRM Fails Upscale (RPS Failure)
Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior 2
3 4
SIMULATOR OPERATOR:
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, activate trigger 2, which fails APRM channel 5 upscale and defeats the half scram.
Verify the following Triggers automatically activate:
o Trigger 3 - Deletes RPS system fail to scram malfunction when B channel scram pushbutton is depressed.
o Trigger 4 - Restores alarm 902-5 D-13 to NORMAL when APRM is taken to bypass.
ROLE PLAY:
IMD to troubleshoot APRM 5: Wait a few minutes and report that the APRM 5s scram trip unit failed. The problem is isolated to only APRM 5.
ATC q
Announces the following alarms:
o 902-5 A-6, APRM HI o
902-5 B-4, OPRM TOUBLE/INOP o
902-5 B-11, CHANNEL A/B NEUTRON MONITOR o
902-5 C-3, ROD OUT BLOCK o
902-5 D-13, Channel 4-6 APRM Hi-Hi/INOP q
Verifies APRM 5 readings against other APRMs on 902-5 panel.
n Performs DOP 0500-07, Insertion-Reset of Manual Half Scram, as follows:
o Verifies both RPS Channels are reset AND the attendant annunciators are reset.
Depresses the Manual Scram CH B pushbutton.
o Verifies RED backlighting under Manual Scram pushbutton illuminates.
o Verifies ALL (four) Scram Solenoid Group lights extinguish for the appropriate RPS Channel.
o Verifies Annunciator 902-5, A-15, (Channel B Manual Trip) alarms as appropriate.
q Verifies NO Control Rod movement has occurred.
n Bypasses APRM 5 after T.S. compliance verified by CRS.
n Resets RPS channel B per DOP 0500-07 (the team may opt to utilize DAN 902-5 D-13 or DOA 0500-02), Insertion/Reset of Manual Half Scram, as follows:
o Verifies half scram no longer required Turns the Scram Reset switch in each direction and verifies all eight white group solenoid lights are lit.
o Verifies alarm 902-5 A-10, Channel A Manual Trip, resets.
CRS n
Directs a Channel B half scram be inserted per DOP 0500-07, Insertion-Reset of Manual Half Scram.
SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 11 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event Three - APRM Fails Upscale (RPS Failure)
Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior Examiner Note:
If the candidate verifies reading on 902-37 panel, inform them the Hi and Hi-Hi light are lit for APRM 5.
BOP Performs the following actions per DAN 902-5 A-6:
q Verifies APRM 5 readings against other APRMs on 902-37 panel.
q Verifies APRM 5 function switch in operate.
CRS n
References TS 3.3.1.1, Condition A, and determines that sufficient channels are available.
n References TS 3.3.1.1, Condition C, and determines that restoration of RPS trip capability is required within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
n References TRM 3.3.a, Condition A, and determines that sufficient channels are available.
q Directs team to continue inserting control rods once Technical Specifications have been addressed.
Event 3 Completion Criteria:
APRM 5 bypassed, Half scram reset, AND Tech Spec determination complete.
AND / OR At the direction of the Lead Examiner.
SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 12 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event Four - Reduce Generator Load / Reverse Power Trip Failure Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior 10 11 ROLE PLAY:
If contacted to reset the Main Generator Lockout Relay (86 device), wait 3 minutes and insert Trigger 10, which resets the Main Generator Lockout Relay.
If contacted to set the Turbine Lube Oil TCV to 90°F, wait 3 minutes, insert Trigger 11, and report completion.
CRS When Generator output is < 130 MWe, directs team to prepare for and separate the Main Generator from the grid q May contact the TSO to inform them of intent to separate from the grid BOP n
Starts the following pumps on the 902-7 panel per DGP 02-01:
MSP (motor suction pump)
TGOP (turning gear oil pp) n Adjusts Main Generator VARs to zero n
Reduces Generator Load via:
o May utilize Auto Ramping or Manual Ramping function OR Generator GOVERNOR control switch o
When Generator Load Set is slightly above the value when the turbine/speed control module will control the Turbine Control Valves utilizes generator GOVERNOR control switch to lower generator load to 10 MWe.
n Verifies control valves closing and Main Turbine Bypass Valves opening ATC q Monitors RPV pressure, power, and Generator Output.
BOP Informs the US when Generator load has been lowered to 10 MWe.
CRS Directs the BOP to trip the Main Turbine using TURBINE TRIP buttons on 902-7 panel.
BOP n
Determines/announces the Main Generator failed to trip on Reverse Power ATC q Verifies Main Generator Output is < 0 MWe.
CRS q
Directs opening GCB 1-2 and GCB 1-7 from the 923-2 Panel after 90 seconds.
BOP n
Opens GCB 1-2 and 1-7 from the 923-2 Panel after waiting 90 seconds.
CRS q May direct IR to be generated and failure to trip recorded in log.
ATC q Directs EO to AEER to reset the generator lockout relay.
CRS q Contacts TSO for switching orders to reclose the 345 KV ring bus.
SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 13 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event Four - Reduce Generator Load / Reverse Power Trip Failure Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior Event 4 Completion Criteria:
GCB 1-2 and 1-7 are opened from the 923-2 panel AND / OR At the discretion of the Lead Examiner
SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 14 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event Five - TBCCW Pump Trip Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior 5
Floor Instructor / Simulator Operator / Role Play:
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, activate trigger 5, which will cause the 2A TBCCW Pump to trip.
EO to investigate: wait 2 min, then report that the 2B TBCCW pump is operating normally and the 2A TBCCW pump motor is very hot.
EO to check 2A TBCCW pump breaker: wait 2 min. and report the breaker appears is tripped open on overload.
BOP q
Announces trip of 2A TBCCW pump.
n Per DOA 3800-01, Loss of Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water, DAN 923-1 C-2, U2 or U3 TBCCW PP Trip, and DAN 923-1 D-2, U2 or U3 TBCCW Press Lo, starts 2B TBCCW pump.
q Monitors TBCCW temperature and pressure.
q Performs DOP 6700-20, 480V Circuit Breaker Trip.
q Sends operator to investigate.
ATC n
Monitors panels, provide assistance as directed.
CRS q
Directs operator actions and makes appropriate notifications.
TEAM May contact any/all of the following to inform of situation or request assistance:
q Shift Manager q
WEC Supervisor q
Operations Manager q
Shift Operating Supervisor q
Duty Maintenance Supervisor q
Duty Engineering Manager q
Work Week Manager Event 5 Completion Criteria:
2B TBCCW Pump has been started AND, TBCCW parameters have stabilized AND, DOP 6700-20 actions are complete, And / OR, At the discretion of the Floor Instructor / Lead Evaluator.
SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 15 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event Six - Master Recirculation Flow Controller Fails Upscale Trigger Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CAEP: ILT N-1 Recirc.cae SIMULATOR OPERATOR:
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, run CAEP: ILT N-1 Recirc.cae, which will cause 2A Recirc Flow Controller to fail upscale. If CAEP runs to completion and the crew has not recognized failure, with the concurrence of the chief examiner, re-open and re-run CAEP: ILT-N-1 Recirc.cae ROLE PLAY:
QNE to check core parameters: Wait 5 min, and then report all core parameters are within limits.
If sent to ASD trailer, wait 3 minutes and report: I see nothing abnormal in the ASD trailer.
ATC n
Determines and announces Recirculation Flow transient occurring by observing any of the following:
o Increase in Recirc Loop Flow as indicated on FR 2-260-7.
o Increase in Rx Power indicated on WI 2-6040-59.
o Increase in Core Flow and DP on DPR/FR 2-263-110.
o Increase in Total Stm Flow on UR 2-640-27.
o Increase in Rx Pressure on P/FR 2-640-28.
o Increase in Total Feedwater Flow on UR 2-640-26.
o Increase in Power Level on RR 2-750-10A/D, & RR 2-750-10B/C.
CRS n
Enters and directs actions of DOA 0202-03, Reactor Recirc System Flow Control Failure.
q Enters DGA-07, Unpredicted Reactivity Addition.
ATC Performs the following actions per DOA 0202-03, Reactor Recirc System Flow Control Failure:
n Momentarily places 2A ASD SPEED HOLD switch 2-202-60-302A to HOLD at Panel 902-4.
q Verifies Core thermal power <2957 MWt.
q Verifies NOT operating in the unstable region of the Power / Flow Map.
ATC Completes actions of DOP 0202-16, Reactor Recirculation System Manual Hold and Local Manual Operation. (None required)
BOP q Assists NSO as directed.
CRS n
Enters TS 3.4.1 Condition B.1, Recirculation loop flow mismatch not within limits.
n Declares B Recirc loop not in operation and must restore mismatch within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 16 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event Six - Master Recirculation Flow Controller Fails Upscale Trigger Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Event 6 Completion Criteria:
Both Recirc pumps in Speed Hold; AND / OR, At the direction of the Lead Examiner.
SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 17 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event Seven - Manual Scram / LOCA In DW Trigger Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 6
SIMULATOR OPERATOR:
At the discretion of the Lead examiner, activate trigger 6, which causes a small Recirc Loop leak to develop in the Drywell.
Role Play:
U-3 NSO to report Drywell pressure status: Report U-3 Drywell pressure is 1.2 psig and steady.
TEAM n
Recognizes and announces that Drywell pressure is slowly rising.
q May direct an operator to check the Unit 2 Drywell CAM.
q May direct operators to search for leaks.
Role Play:
EO to check Drywell CAM: (wait 2 min.)
Report, The Drywell CAM is trending up.
EO to search for leak Report, I am on my way out to check for leaks.
EO to check Cribhouse inlet temperature: (wait 5 min.)
Report, Cribhouse inlet temp is 70oF.
CRS n
Enters and directs performance of DOA 0040-01, Slow Leak.
q Set Scram contingency of 1.5 psig DW pressure. (Since DW pressure starts much lower than normal, may set a lower pressure Scram contingency q May enter DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram, and direct taking scram preparatory actions.
n Prior to reaching the Drywell Pressure scram setpoint, directs a manual reactor scram per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram.
ATC Performs the following actions per DOA 0040-01, Slow Leak, as directed:
q Maintain Level with FWLCS (immediate action).
q Monitors leakage rate, reactor water level, and Drywell pressure.
n Inserts manual reactor scram prior to 1.5 psig DW pressure
SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 18 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event Seven - Manual Scram / LOCA In DW Trigger Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Performs the following actions per DOA 0040-01 Slow Leak, as directed:
q Notifies Shift Supervisor and Rad Protection.
q Monitors for EP conditions.
q Directs search for leak.
q Shutdown H2 Addition.
q Makes PA announcement.
q Verify Crib House inlet temperature is <95oF.
q Initiates Torus cooling per Hard Card.
o Places 316A/B and 318A/B keylock switches in MANUAL OVERRD.
o Verifies the third circ water pump is secured prior to starting the first CCSW pump.
o IF starting torus cooling during a LOCA, THEN verifies RWCU recirc pump is tripped PRIOR to starting the first CCSW pump.
o Starts one CCSW pump in each loop and verifies 3A/B valves open.
o Starts at least one LPCI pump in each loop. (Starts additional LPCI pumps as required.)
o Adjusts CCSW flow controller to approximately 3500 gpm for one pump;
> 5000 gpm two pumps. [Maintain LPCI/CCSW dP 7 psid (1 LPCI Pump/loop) OR 20 psid (two LPCI Pumps/loop)]
o Momentarily places 11A/B valve control switches to close. (IF 11A/B remain open or re-opened due to LPCI logic, then close valves as soon as possible.)
o IF required, obtains Unit Supervisor permission, THEN places 317 keylock switches to MANUAL OVERRD.
o Opens 21A/B and 20A/B valves in desired loop.
o Throttles open 38A/B valves until > 5000 gpm per LPCI pump is established (maintains LPCI pump discharge pressure > 125 psig).
o Starts additional CCSW pumps if desired:
v IF TR 86(32) LTC in MANUAL, THEN PRIOR to starting 3rd OR 4th CCSW PP, verifies voltage on applicable ECCS bus > 4000 volts, preferred target 4160V.
v (Unit 2 Only) If 2/3 EDG is loaded, then refers to DOP 1500-02 prior to starting additional pumps.
o Adjusts CCSW flow controller to > 5000 gpm for two CCSW pumps [Maintain LPCI/CCSW dP 7 psid (1 LPCI Pump/loop) OR 20 psid (two LPCI Pumps/loop)].
ATC /
BOP Performs scram preparatory actions per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram, as directed.
q Starts MSP and TGOP.
q Trips H2 addition.
SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 19 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event Seven - Manual Scram / LOCA In DW Trigger Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Performs the following actions per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram, as directed:
n Presses scram pushbuttons n
Places mode switch in shutdown q Check rods inserted.
q Verifies Recirc Pumps run back.
q Maintains RPV/L between +25 and +35 inches or as directed by Unit Supervisor.
q Inserts SRM/IRMs.
TEAM Verifies the following as time allows:
q Group Isolations q Automatic start of ECCS systems q Automatic start of EDGs.
Event 7 Completion Criteria:
Team has performed a reactor scram, AND / OR At the discretion of the Lead Examiner.
SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 20 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event Eight - Loss Of RFPs - Use HPCI To Restore Level Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior 7
8 SIMULATOR OPERATOR:
After the Team has stabilized the plant and at the discretion of the Lead Evaluator, activate trigger 7, which causes the following:
v Increases the size of the recirc leak.
v After 1 min, trigger 8 trips the running 2B RFP and prevents the available RFP from starting.
ROLE PLAY:
EO sent to check EDG operation: wait 3 min, then report: Both EDGs are operating normally.
ROLE PLAY:
Acknowledge other requests; delay as necessary.
TEAM n
Determines/announces Drywell pressure rapidly rising.
CRS Enters DEOP 100, RPV Control, q Directs actions of DEOP 100.
q Verification of all isolations, ECCS and EDG starts.
q Holding RPV/L +8 to +48 inches.
q Maintaining RPV/P <1060 psig using Turbine Bypass valves.
CRS Enters DEOP 0200-01, Primary Containment Control, when PC/P reaches 2 psig and performs/directs:
q Monitoring of PC/P.
q Initiation of torus sprays before PC/P of 9 psig.
n When PC/P is above 9 psig or before DW/T reaches 281°F:
Verification of DSIL.
Tripping of recirc pumps.
Tripping of DW coolers.
Initiation of DW sprays.
q Monitoring of DW/T. (D/W sprays may be initiated for temp control) n Monitoring of SP/T and initiation of torus cooling.
q Monitors SP/L.
q Verifies initiation of drywell and torus H2/O2 monitors.
SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 21 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event Eight - Loss Of RFPs - Use HPCI To Restore Level Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior BOP Performs DEOP 0200-01, Primary Containment Control, actions as directed:
q Monitors PC/P and initiates torus sprays as directed:
v Opens the 19A/B valve in desired loop.
v Opens the 18A/B valve in desired loop.
q Initiates drywell sprays per Hard Card LPCI/CCSW OPERATION, as directed:
v Opens the 27A/B and 28A/B valves in desired loop.
v Adjusts sprays to maintain < 9 psig, but high enough to ensure ECCS NPSH by any combination of the following:
o Open or close 27A/B AND 28A/B valves in the desired containment spray loop.
o Throttling 21A/B OR 38A/B valves in the desired containment spray loop. (Maintain LPCI pump discharge pressure > 125 psig.)
q Monitors DW/T.
q Monitors SP/T and initiates torus cooling per Hard Card LPCI/CCSW OPERATION as directed. (May already be initiated for previous Event) q Monitors SP/L.
q Verifies initiation of drywell and torus H2/O2 monitors.
ATC q Determines/announces RFP trip.
q Attempts to start the available RFPs.
q Announces loss of all RFPs.
CRS n
Directs starting HPCI to restore and maintain RPV Level at the DEOP directed level band (+8 to +48).
q May direct inhibiting ADS (this is appropriate if RPV level approaches -59 inches BOP n
Determines HPCI did not start on initiation signal q Inhibits ADS initiation (If directed) n Starts HPCI as directed and restores level to the DEOP directed level band (+8 to
+48):
v Depresses AND holds the HPCI AUTO-START Pushbutton.
v Adjusts flow in Auto OR Manual Mode.
v Starts HPCI Room Cooler.
Event 8 / Scenario Completion Criteria:
Drywell Sprays have been initiated; AND, HPCI has been started to restore RPV level to DEOP directed level band.
AND / OR, At the direction of the Lead Examiner.
SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 22 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Critical Tasks (PC-1.1)
While executing DEOP 200-1, Primary Containment Control, when drywell pressure exceeds 9 psig and only if operating within the safe region of the drywell spray initiation limit (DSIL), initiate drywell sprays.
(PC-1.2)
After initiating drywell sprays per the primary containment pressure or temperature legs of DEOP 200-1, Primary Containment Control, terminate drywell sprays before drywell pressure drops to < 0 psig. (This may not apply based on scenario run time)
SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 23 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
REFERENCES PROCEDURE TITLE DAN 902-5 A-6 APRM HI DAN 902-5 A-10 CHANNEL A MANUAL TRIP DAN 902-5 A-15 CHANNEL B MANUAL TRIP DAN 902-5 B-4 OPRM TROUBLE/INOP DAN 902-5 B-11 CHANNEL A-B NEUTRON MONITOR DAN 902-5 C-3 ROD OUT BLOCK DAN 902-5 D-13 CHANNEL 4-6 APRM HI-HI INOP DAN 902-8 C-3 BUS 23 MAIN & RES BRK IN PARALLEL BUS 33 MAIN & RES BRK IN PARALLEL DAN 902-8 D-1 BUS 21 MAIN & RES BRK IN PARALLEL BUS 31 MAIN & RES BRK IN PARALLEL DAN 923-1 C-2 U2 OR U3 TBCCW PP TRIP DAN 923-1 D-2 U2 OR U3 TBCCW PRESS LO DGA-07 UNEXPECTED REACTIVITY CHANGE DGP 02-03 REACTOR SCRAM DGP 03-04 CONTROL ROD MOVEMENTS DOA 0040-01 SLOW LEAK DOA 0202-03 REACTOR RECIRCULATION SYSTEM FLOW CONTROL FAILURE DOA 0500-02 PARTIAL HALF OR FULL SCRAM ACTUATION DOA 2300-02 HPCI FAST STARTUP DOA 3800-01 LOSS OF TURBINE BUILDING CLOSED COOLING WATER DOP 0202-16 REACTOR RECIRCULATION SYSTEM MANUAL HOLD AND LOCAL MANUAL OPERATION DOP 0400-01 REACTOR MANUAL CONTROL SYSTEM OPERATION DOP 0500-07 INSERTION / RESET OF MANUAL HALF-SCRAM DOP 6400-08 345 KV VOLTAGE CONTROL DOP 6400-14 TR 86 LOAD TAP CHANGER OPERATION DOP 6500-01 TRANSFER OF 4160 VOLT BUS POWER SUPPLY DOP 6700-20 480V CIRCUIT BREAKER TRIP DEOP 100 RPV CONTROL DEOP 200-1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL TS 3.3.1.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) INSTRUMENTATION TS 3.4.1 RECIRCULATION LOOPS OPERATING TRM 3.3.a CONTROL ROD BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION
SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 24 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Simulator Scenario Review Checklist ILT-N-1 Quantitative Attributes 6
Total malfunctions (5 to 8) 2 Malfunctions after EOP entry (1 to 2) 4 Abnormal events (2 to 4) 2 Major transients (1 to 2) 1 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1 to 2) 1 EOPs contingency requiring substantive actions (0 to 2) 2 Crew critical tasks (2 to 3)
SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 25 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
CAEP Files
- ILT-N-1.cae
- Revision 00
- Written by WC
- 03/16
- Initial Conditions
- Inserts RPS Failure to Scram - Event 3 imf b12
- Inserts Generator Reverse Power Trip Failure - Event 4 imf t45
- Inserts the trips for 2A & 2C RFPs - Event 8 imf h31 imf h33l2 imf h34l2
- Prevents HPCI Autostart set hcipremaninfg = falsel2
- Event Trigger 1 sets gain for all 6 APRMs.
trgset 1 "0"l4 trg 1 "irf niagainf true"l4
- Event Trigger 2 APRM 5 drifts upscale. The half scram is defeated. - Event 3 Trgset 2 "0"l4 imf nia5pot (2) 125.0 1:00 21.0l4
trgset 3 "rpd301b"l6 trg 3 "dmf b12"l6
- Event Trigger 4 Auto activates when APRM 5 is bypassed. - Event 3
- Restores alarm 902-5 D-13 to NORMAL.
trgset 4 "nilapby(5)"l6 trg 4 "mmf ser1165 normal"l8
SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 26 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
- Event Trigger 5 trips the 2A TBCCW pump on overcurrent - Event 5 trgset 5 "0"l8 imf q11 (5)l8
- Event Trigger 6 Inserts a small recirc loop leak. - Major trgset 6 "0"l10 imf f41 (6) 0.01 2:00l10
- Event Trigger 7 Increases the recirc loop leak. - Post Major
- After 1 min, trips 2B RFP trgset 7 "0"l10 trg 7 "mmf f41 0.5"l12
- Event Trigger 8 trips the 2B RFP 60 seconds after Trigger 7 is activated trgset 8 "et_array(7)"l12 imf h32 (8 60)l12
- Event Trigger 9 allows HPCI to be started manually trgset 9 "hpdinit"l12 trg 9 "set hcipremaninfg = true"l14
- Event Trigger 10 resets the Main Generator 86 device trgset 10 "0"l14 irf t21 (10) resetl14
- Event Trigger 11 sets the Turbine Lube Oil TVC to 90F trgset 11 "0"l16 irf sp1 (11) 90l16
- End
SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 27 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
- 2A Recirc Runup CAEP
- Written by WC
- 03/16 set rrdaraisehi = truel2 set rrdaraisehi = falsel3 set rrdaraisehi = truel4 set rrdaraisehi = falsel5 set rrdaraisehi = truel6 set rrdaraisehi = falsel7 set rrdaraisehi = truel8 set rrdaraisehi = falsel9 set rrdaraisehi = truel10 set rrdaraisehi = falsel11 set rrdaraisehi = truel12 set rrdaraisehi = falsel13 set rrdaraisehi = truel14 set rrdaraisehi = falsel15 set rrdaraisehi = truel16 set rrdaraisehi = falsel17 set rrdaraisehi = truel18 set rrdaraisehi = falsel19 set rrdaraisehi = truel20 set rrdaraisehi = falsel21 set rrdaraisehi = truel22 set rrdaraisehi = falsel23 set rrdaraisehi = truel24 set rrdaraisehi = falsel25 set rrdaraisehi = truel26 set rrdaraisehi = falsel27 set rrdaraisehi = truel28 set rrdaraisehi = falsel29 set rrdaraisehi = truel30 set rrdaraisehi = falsel31 set rrdaraisehi = truel32 set rrdaraisehi = falsel33 set rrdaraisehi = truel34 set rrdaraisehi = falsel35 set rrdaraisehi = truel36 set rrdaraisehi = falsel37
SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 28 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16) set rrdaraisehi = truel38 set rrdaraisehi = falsel39 set rrdaraisehi = truel40 set rrdaraisehi = falsel41 set rrdaraisehi = truel42 set rrdaraisehi = falsel43 set rrdaraisehi = truel44 set rrdaraisehi = falsel45 set rrdaraisehi = truel46 set rrdaraisehi = falsel47 set rrdaraisehi = truel48 set rrdaraisehi = falsel49 set rrdaraisehi = truel50 set rrdaraisehi = falsel51 set rrdaraisehi = truel52 set rrdaraisehi = falsel53 set rrdaraisehi = truel54 set rrdaraisehi = falsel55 set rrdaraisehi = truel56 set rrdaraisehi = falsel57 set rrdaraisehi = truel58 set rrdaraisehi = falsel59 set rrdaraisehi = truel60 set rrdaraisehi = falsel61 set rrdaraisehi = truel62 set rrdaraisehi = falsel63 set rrdaraisehi = truel64 set rrdaraisehi = falsel65 set rrdaraisehi = truel66 set rrdaraisehi = falsel67 set rrdaraisehi = truel68 set rrdaraisehi = falsel69
SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 29 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Unit 2 Risk: GREEN Unit 3 Risk: GREEN Unit 2 is 170 MWe Leading Thermal Limit: MAPRAT @ 0.818 Action limit: 0.980 Equipment Unavailable: 2/3 RBCCW Pp, RFP Standby Sw itch Protected Equipment: 2A and 2B RBCCW Pps Unit 3 is in Mode 1 at Full Pow er Leading Thermal Limit: MAPRAT @ 0.819 Action Limit: 0.980 Equipment Unavailable: 2/3 RBCCW Pp Protected Equipment: 3A and 3B RBCCW pps Current Action Statements None LCO Started:
LCO Expires:
TS Cause:
Unit 1 Plant Status Today U1 Diesel Oil Storage Tank Transfer House has grating removed. Currently roped off with pump installed to pump to U1 Oil Separator Pit as required. Outside operator monitor and pump as necessary.
Today Chem Cleaning ventilation status:
HV-1A/EF-1A are secured due to HV-1A inlet and outlet dampers being shut w ith fan on, IR# 913157, WO 1239746.
HV-1B/EF-1B are secured due to HV-1B throw ing its belts. WO 1156150.
HVAC -1 ON.
HV-2 running.
Switchyard Status Today TSO notified of pending Unit 2 shutdow n
SCENARIO ILT-N-1 Page 30 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Unit 2 Plant Status Today Unit 2 Activities
- Shift 1 Activities ****
- Shift 2 Activities ****
Immediately after assuming the shift, Transfer TR-21 loads per DOP 6500-01, Transfer of 4160 Volt Bus Pow er Supplies
Continue Unit Shutdow n per DGP 02-01, Unit Shutdow n.
- Shift 3 Activities ****
Today
- Unit 2 Procedures In-Progress **** Do Not Delete ****
DGP 02-01, Unit Shutdow n
DGP 03-04, Control Rod Movements
Dresden Generating Station ILT-N-2 RAISE POWER USING RECIRC FLOW PLACE 2C RFP IN SERVICE HPCI SPURIOUS ISOLATION - INCOMPLETE LOSS OF CONTROL ROD INDICATION RFP VENT FAN TRIP WITH FAILURE OF STANDBY TO AUTO-START RWCU PUMP TRIP - INCOMPLETE ISOLATION EARTHQUAKE / MANUAL SCRAM STEAM LEAK IN DRYWELL / EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZE DUE TO LOW TORUS LEVEL Rev. 00 02/16 Developed By:
Exam Author Date Approved By:
Facility Representative Date
SCENARIO ILT-N-2 Page 2 of 29 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Scenario Outline Facility: Dresden Generating Station Scenario No.: ILT-N-2 Op-Test No.: 15-1 (2016-301)
Examiners: ___________________________ Operators:
Initial Conditions: Unit 2 is operating at 680 MWe for maintenance on 2C RFP. 2C RFP returned to service late last shift.
Turnover: Raise Power with Recirc Flow to 750 MWe then place 2C RFP in service on Bus 21.
Event No.
Malf. No.
Event Type*
Event Description 1
None R (ATC)
Raise power with flow 2
None N (BOP)
Place 2C RFP in service 3
HPGP4RLY AT46 I/T (BOP)
(T/S)
HPCI spurious isolation - incomplete 4
RDFAILF5 I/T (ATC) (T/S)
CRD - RPIS, Loss of Control Rod Indication 5
FWSACBV C (ATC)
RFP vent fan trip with failure of standby to auto-start 6
U11 C (BOP)
RWCU pump trip on overcurrent with incomplete isolation 7
CSBRKSEV M (ALL)
Manual Scram - Earthquake Causes Plant Damage/Torus Leak 8
F41 M (ALL)
Small Steam Leak/Emergency Depressurize Due Low Torus Level (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
SCENARIO ILT-N-2 Page 3 of 29 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Scenario Objective Evaluate the Teams ability to operate the plant with a Torus leak that requires an Emergency Depressurization.
Scenario Summary
- 1. Unit is at ~70%.
- 2. The following equipment is OOS:
- a. None.
- 3. LCOs:
- a. None Scenario Sequence After completing shift turnover, the Team will raise power using Recirc Flow per DGP 03-01, Power Changes and DOP 0202-03, Reactor Recirculation Flow Control System Operation After completing the power change, the crew will place the 2C RFP in service per DOP 3200-03, Startup of Second or Third Reactor Feed Pump or Shifting to Alternate Reactor Feed Pump.
After the 2C RFP has been placed in service, a HPCI isolation signal is received, and the HPCI isolation valves fail to close. The BOP must take manual action to complete the isolation per DAN 902(3)-3 C-7, HPCI AUTO ISOL INITIATED.
After the HPCI system isolation is completed, the US will review TS and determine TS 3.5.1 Action F.1 and TS 3.3.6.1 Action A.1 are applicable.
After the HPCI failure and TS have been addressed, CRD F-05 RPIS indication fails. The operating team will take action per DOA 0300-06, RPIS FAILURE. The ATC operator will enter a substitute position for CRD F-05 an attempt to restore RPIS indication. Ultimately, the ATC operator will select and fully insert CDR F-05.
The US will review TS and determine TS 3.1.3 condition C.1 and C.2 apply and directs fully inserting and disarming CRD F-05.
After CRD F-05 has been taken out of service and Tech Specs have been addressed, the running Reactor Feed Pump Vent Fan trips and the Standby Fan fails to start. The ATC operator will take start the standby fan and perform actions per DOA 5750-01.
When the RFP vent fan has been started, the RWCU Recirc pump will trip. This will result in a pressure transient in the RWCU system. This pressure transient will cause an isolation signal to be generated, but the isolation will not occur. The team will take action to complete the RWCU system isolation.
After the RWCU isolation has been completed, an earthquake causes plant damage, including a torus leak, which will require the Team to implement DOA 0010-03, Earthquakes, and manually scram the reactor.
After the scram, a small steam leak occurs. Emergency Depressurization will ultimately be required due to torus level.
Completion criteria: When the RPV is depressurized and at the discretion of the Lead Examiner, Place the simulator in FREEZE.
SCENARIO ILT-N-2 Page 4 of 29 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event One - Raise Power Using Recirc Flow The Team will raise power by increasing Recirc Flow.
Malfunctions required: 0 (None)
Success Path:
Performs DGP 03-01, Power Changes.
Performs DOP 0202-03, Reactor Recirculation Flow Control System Operation Event Two - Place 2C RFP in service The BOP will start and place in service the 2C Reactor Feed Pump.
Malfunctions required: 0 (None)
Success Path:
Performs DOP 3200-03, Startup of Second or Third Reactor Feed Pump or Shifting to Alternate Reactor Feed Pump.
Event Three - Incomplete HPCI isolation 902-3 C-12, HPCI STM LINE FLOW HI is received and HPCI fails to isolate. The team will isolate HPCI per DAN 902(3)-3 C-7, HPCI AUTO ISOL INITIATED Malfunctions required: 2 (HPCI spurious isolation)
(PCIS Group IV relay failure)
Success Path:
Take actions of DAN 902(3)-3 C-7 and isolate HPCI.
Verifies Isolation Condenser administratively operable Determines Technical Specifications requirements.
Event Four - Loss of RPIS indication CRD F-05 loses RPIS indication.
Malfunctions required: 1 (CRD F-05 RPIS indication failure)
Success Path:
Performs DOA 0300-06, RPIS Failure. Full insertion of CRD F-05 is required.
SCENARIO ILT-N-2 Page 5 of 29 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event Five - RFP Vent Fan trip with failure of standby to auto-start Running RFP Vent Fan trips, standby fails to auto-start Malfunctions required: 1 (RFP Vent Fan Trip)
Success Path:
Performs actions of DOA 5750-01, Ventilation System Failure Starts standby RFP Vent Fan Event Six - RWCU pump trip on overcurrent with incomplete isolation RWCU pump trip Malfunctions required: 2 (Overcurrent trip of RWCU pump)
(RWCU Isolation Failure)
Success Path:
.Perform actions of DAN 902(3)-4 F-12, RWCU SYS AFTER NON-REGEN HX PRESS HI Event Seven - Earthquake Causes Plant Damage / Torus Leak / Manual Scram An earthquake causes plant damage, including a torus leak.
Malfunctions required: 1 (Earthquake Causing Torus Leak )
Success Path:
Performs DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram.
Performs DEOP 0100, RPV Control Performs DEOP 0200-01, Primary Containment Control.
Event Eight - Small Steam Leak / Emergency Depressurize Due Low Torus Level A small steam leak occurs. Emergency Depressurization will ultimately be required due to torus level Malfunctions required: 1 (Small Steam Leak)
Success Path:
Performs DEOP 0200-01, Primary Containment Control.
Performs DEOP 0400-02, Emergency Depressurization.
SCENARIO ILT-N-2 Page 6 of 29 Rev. 00 (02/16)
PRE-SCENARIO ACTIVITIES 1
If applicable, conduct pre-scenario activities in accordance with TQ-AA-155-J004, SIMULATOR EXAMINATION BRIEFING JOB AID.
- a. Direct the Team to perform their briefs prior to entering the simulator.
- b. Provide the Team a copy of DOP 3200-03, Startup of Second or Third Reactor Feed Pump or Shifting to Alternate Reactor Feed Pump.
- c. Provide the Team a copy of DGP 03-01, Power Changes, marked-up for plant conditions below.
- d. Provide the Team a copy of DOP 0202-03, Reactor Recirculation Flow Control System Operation.
- e. Provide the Team a copy of REMA.
2 Simulator Setup (the following steps can be done in any logical order)
- 1) Reactor power ~70%.
- 2) Adjust Core flow to 68-70 Mlbm/hr. (MWe ~680) 3 Verify the following simulator conditions:
- a. Verify 2C RFP is OFF and selected to STANDBY
- b. Verify CDR F-05 is NOT at 00
NOTE: Do NOT run the initial setup CAEP file until the above setup is completed.
4 Run the initial setup CAEP file: 15-1 ILT-N-2.cae 5
Insert the following EXPERT commands: (IV this setup item)
- a. IMF SER0160 (1) ON
- b. IOR HPDCL4 (1) CLOSE
- c. IMF SER0086 (1) ON
- d. TRGSET 2 "HWHPDCL4"
- e. TRG 2 "DMF HP4VLBN" 6
Verify Trigger 1 is loaded in summary screen for Event 1. (IV this setup item) 7 Place the following equipment out of service:
- a. None 8
Complete the Simulator Setup Checklist.
Symbols are used throughout the text to identify specific items as indicated below:
Critical Tasks 6
Time Critical / Sensitive Actions (Includes PRA Actions) n Required Actions q Optional Actions
SCENARIO ILT-N-2 Page 7 of 29 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event One - Raise Power Using Recirculation Flow Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: If requested, cut in condensate demins to maintain 26-55 psid.
Respond as support groups contacted.
NOTE: QNE is in the control room (per the REMA). These actions will be performed by the Floor Instructor. If asked for concurrence or recommendations: concur with the teams actions and delay if asked for recommendations.
CRS Directs raising power:
q Reviews REMA.
q Directs ATC operator to raise power with flow to target of 750 MWe.
ATC q
Reviews DGP 03-01, POWER CHANGES and REMA to verify conditions to raise power are met.
Performs the following actions per DOP 0202-03, REACTOR RECIRCULATION FLOW CONTROL SYSTEM OPERATION:
n Raises Recirc Pump speed as desired to achive power change using:
q Panel 902-5 Master Manual Control speed pushbuttons OR q
Panel 902-4 2A/2B Recirc ASD Individual Manual Control speed pushbuttons BOP n
Provides peer check and monitors plant parameters during power change.
q May dispatch operator to walkdown FW Heaters q
Requests WEC/FS to dispatch operator to operate condensate demins as required to maintain 26-55 psid.
Event 1 Completion Criteria:
Main Generator output is 750 MWe AND/OR At the direction of the Lead Examiner.
SCENARIO ILT-N-2 Page 8 of 29 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event Two - Place 2C RFP in Service Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior ROLE PLAY:
When asked, report the 2C RFP is operating normally Respond to all other communications as required.
CRS n
Directs ATC to start 2C RFP BOP Starts 2C RFP DOP 3200-03, Startup Of Second Or Third Reactor Feed Pump Or Shifting To Alternate Reactor Feed Pump.
q Places RFPs Standby Selector switch, STBY PP SELECT in OFF position.
q Closes MO 2-3201C, q Opens 2C RFP RECIRC VLV PCV 2-3201C by placing control switch in OPEN.
q Verifies reactor water level is stable.
q Verifies sufficient system pressures.
q If previously closed, places MO 2-3201C, 2C PP DISCH VLV control switch to OPEN position.
n Starts 2C RFP.
q Verifies reactor water level is stable.
n Verify RFP Auxiliary Oil Pump AUTO stops.
q WHEN MO 2-3201C, 2C PP DISCH VLV, is fully open (the RED valve position indicating light is extinguished), THEN places 2C RFP RECIRC VLV PCV 2-3201A control switch in AUTO.
q Directs EO to perform checks on 2C RFP.
ATC q
Monitors RPV level and FRV position for proper response q
Provides peer check as required.
Event 2 Completion Criteria:
2C RFP in running on Bus 21, AND/OR, At the discretion of the Lead Examiner.
SCENARIO ILT-N-2 Page 9 of 29 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event Three - SPURIOUS INCOMPLETE HPCI ISOLATION Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior 1
2 Simulator Operator:
At the discretion of the Lead examiner, activate TRIGGER 1, which causes a HPCI steam flow GP 4 isolation instrument failure resulting in an isolation signal. The HPCI steam valves fail to isolate.
TRIGGER 2 will auto actuate when the 2-2301-4 control switch is taken to close and will delete the binding that was part of the initial setup.
ROLE PLAY: (Assign someone on the floor to handout the alarm sheet)
Approximately 60 seconds after the HPCI initiation inform the team that the XL-3 is alarming and hand a team member the XL-3 alarm sheet provided with this scenario.
After about 3 minutes, call on the phone as the EO sent to the AEER. Report that there is a smell of smoke in the room. There is a small amount of smoke coming from the 902-39 cabinet. You have carefully opened the cabinet, and you can see some damaged components. THERE IS NO FIRE.
If contacted as IMD, inform the team that you will send someone to the AEER ASAP.
If dispatched to the HPCI Room, wait approximately 3 minutes, and then report that there appears to nothing wrong in the HPCI Room.
After 5 minutes, as the IM Foreman, inform the team that initial investigation of the problem has revealed extensive damage to many of the HPCI isolation logic relays. You cannot tell him at this time which ones are damaged. You estimate at least 2 days to repair the damage.
Respond as the appropriate person. If asked for assistance, respond that you will come to the control room shortly.
BOP n
Announces alarm 902-3 C-12, HPCI Stm Line Flow Hi.
TEAM n
Determines HPCI GP 4 isolation should have occurred.
CRS n
Directs BOP to close the HPCI GP 4 isolation valves.
BOP n
Isolates HPCI as directed:
v Closes MO 2-2301-4.
v Closes MO 2-2301-5.
TEAM q May enter DEOP 0300-01, Secondary Containment Control.
CRS q Notifies Shift Manager and IMD of Event.
ATC q Monitors panels and assists as directed.
Note: The Tech Spec LCOs apply once the Team learns the length of time to repair.
SCENARIO ILT-N-2 Page 10 of 29 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event Three - SPURIOUS INCOMPLETE HPCI ISOLATION Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior CRS n
References Technical Specifications and determines:
v TS 3.3.6.1 Action A.1, Place Channel in trip within 24 hrs.
v TS 3.3.6.1 Action B.1, Restore isolation capability in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> v
TS 3.5.1 Action G.1 and G.2, Verify Isolation Condenser is OPERABLE immediately AND restore HPCI System to OPERABLE status within 14 days.
o May reference TS 3.6.1.3 Condition A and B due to PCIV failure Event 3 Completion Criteria:
Actions taken to isolate HPCI steam line, And, Tech Specs addressed, AND/OR, At the direction of the Lead examiner.
SCENARIO ILT-N-2 Page 11 of 29 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event Four - LOSS OF CONTROL ROD INDICATION Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior 3
SIMULATOR OPERATOR:
At the direction of the Lead Examiner, activate Trigger 3, RPIS failure for control rod F-05.
ROLE PLAY:
Respond as Support Groups notified.
ATC Reports and responds to DANs 902-5 A-3 ROD DRIFT, and B-3 ROD WORTH MIN BLOCK.
n Views Full Core Display and identifies CRD with Rod Drift light.
n Selects Control Rod F-05 and reports no indication on Four Rod Display for Control Rod F-05.
ATC Recognizes loss of control rod F-05 position indication on Full Core Display, Four Rod Display, RWM, and/or Process Computer.
CRS n
Enters DOA 0300-06, RPIS Failure, and directs its actions.
q May direct entry into DGA-07, Unexpected Reactivity Change ATC Performs subsequent actions of DOA 0300-06, RPIS Failure:
n Stops any power change or control rod motion in progress.
q May insert Rod F-05 to 00 prior to entering DOA 0300-06.
q Enters substitute position of 48 for F-05.
q Inserts control rod F-05 one notch.
q Determines no control rod position indication at alternate position.
n Drives rod F-05 to fully inserted position.
q Calls WEC to electrically or hydraulically isolate the control rod F-05 HCU.
q May enter a substitute position and take OOS on the RWM per DOP 0400-02, Rod Worth Minimizer.
CRS References appropriate plant licensing documents and determines:
n TS 3.1.3, condition C, required actions:
v C.1 Fully insert inoperable control rod within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />; AND, v
C.2. Disarm the associated CRD within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
q Directs electrically or hydraulically isolating control rod F-05 HCU.
ROLE PLAY As QNE acknowledge reports. If concurrence is requested for any action, report I concur with (insert requested action here)
BOP q
Monitors panel, provides assistance as directed.
SCENARIO ILT-N-2 Page 12 of 29 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event Four - LOSS OF CONTROL ROD INDICATION Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior TEAM q
May enter DOA 0300-12, Mispositioned Control Rod.
q Notifies the Shift Manager, QNE, Work Week Manager, Fin team, IMD, OR EMD.
ROLE PLAY:
When EO directed to disarm control rod F-05, report: Ill disarm F-05 after I receive a pre-job brief (it is not intended for this to be completed).
ATC q
Records failed RPIS indication per DOS 0300-06, CRD Abnormality Record.
Event 4 Completion Criteria:
DOA 0300-06 actions have been taken, Technical Specifications have been referenced, AND/OR, At the direction of the Lead Examiner.
SCENARIO ILT-N-2 Page 13 of 29 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event Five - RFP Vent Fan Trip with Failure of the Standby Fan to Autostart Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior NOTE: Ensure the ATC operator performs this Event 4
Simulator Operator:
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, activate Trigger 4, which causes 2A RFP vent fan to trip. The initial setup prevents 2B RFP vent fan from auto starting.
Role Play:
EO to check operation of 2B RFP vent fan: Wait 2 min, and then report that 2B RFP vent fan is operating normally.
EO to check 2A RFP vent fan breaker: Wait 2 min, and then report 2A RFP vent fan breaker tripped on over current.
Note: Per DOP 5750-06, Reactor Feed Pump Motor Ventilation System, fan control switches should be held in CLOSE for 45 seconds to allow airflow to develop. If the Team does not successfully start 2B RFP Vent fan due to not holding the control switch long enough and to avoid RFP high stator temperature computer alarms, provide the following Role Play:
Role Play:
Cue as the Shift Manager to the CRS: I recommend holding the 2B RFP Vent fan control switch to CLOSE for 45 sec.
ATC Acknowledges and announces alarm 902-6 F-8, RFP Vent Fan Trip:
n Determines 2B RFP Vent Fan did not auto start as expected and manually starts it.
q Sends operator to check status of the 2A RFP vent fan breaker at Bus 25.
q Sends operator to check operation of the 2B RFP vent fan.
q Performs DOP 6700-20, 480V Circuit Breaker Trip.
q May place Control Switch for 2A RFP Vent Fan in PTL CRS n
Directs starting 2B RFP vent fan.
q Enters DOP 6700-20, 480V Circuit Breaker Trip.
BOP q Assists as directed.
TEAM q May reference DOP 5750-06, Reactor Feed Pump Motor Ventilation System.
q May reference DOA 5750-01, Ventilation System Failure.
Event 5 Completion Criteria:
2B RFP vent fan is started, AND / OR; At the direction of the Lead Examiner.
SCENARIO ILT-N-2 Page 14 of 29 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event Six - RWCU Recirc Pump Trip with Incomplete Isolation Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior 5
Simulator Operator:
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, activate Trigger 5, which causes 2A RWCU RR Pump to trip and fails the system isolation logic.
If contacted as the QNE, acknowledge the report. If a core evaluation is requested, wait 3 minutes and report, no core limits have been violated.
If QNE presence in the control room is requested, inform them you are on the way and will be in the control room in 30 minutes.
If dispatched to Bus 23-1 to investigate 2A RWCU Recirc Pump Bkr, wait 3 minutes and report: the breaker for 2A RWCU Recirc Pump is open with an overcurrent target up.
BOP Acknowledges and announces alarm 902-4 A-10, RWCU Recirc PP Trip:
n Determines 2A RWCU Recirc Pump tripped.
n References DAN 902(3)-4 F-12, RWCU Sys After Non-Regen HX Press Hi n
Determines RWCU system should have isolated and did not.
n Takes manual action to close the following valves:
MO 2-1201-1, RX OUTLET ISOL MO 2-1201-2, INLET ISOL q
Verifies the following valves are closed:
o MO 2-1201-1A, RX OUTLET BYP o
MO 2-1201-3, AUX PP SUCT q Informs US of failure and that isolation is complete q Performs DOA 6500-10, 4KV Circuit Breaker Trip q Places Control Switch for 2A RWCU Recirc Pump in PTL (with Unit Supervisor concurrence)
US q Acknowledges report q Directs BOP to take action per DAN 902(3)-4 F-12, RWCU Sys After Non-Regen HX Press Hi q Contacts QNE q Directs entry into DGA-07, Unexpected Reactivity Change q Directs actions of DOA 6500-10, 4KV Circuit Breaker Trip q Directs placing Control Switch for 2A RWCU Recirc Pump in PTL per DOA 6500-10.
ATC q Performs DGA-07 actions as directed q Provides team with 902-5 panel update q Assists as directed
SCENARIO ILT-N-2 Page 15 of 29 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event Six - RWCU Recirc Pump Trip with Incomplete Isolation Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior Event 6 Completion Criteria:
DOA 6500-10 actions and completed RWCU system is isolated AND/OR At the discretion of the chief examiner
SCENARIO ILT-N-2 Page 16 of 29 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event Seven - Earthquake Causes Plant Damage / Torus Leak / Manual Scram Trigger Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 6
Role Play:
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, call the Control Room, as Security and report there has been a confirmed earthquake felt throughout the plant.
SIMULATOR OPERATOR:
After the above report, activate Trigger 6, which starts an ECCS suction line break in the torus basement.
Note:
It takes about 20 minutes for torus level to reach 11 feet. At the discretion of the lead examiner, use the cues in this event to jump ahead in time to expedite level drop if desired.
BOP n
Reports the following alarms:
923-4 A-3 (B-2), U2 E(W) RBFD SUMP LVL HI-HI 902-4 C-23, Torus Narrow Range Wtr Lvl Lo n
Checks the torus narrow range level indicator. Reports level dropping.
q Directs EO to perform DOS 1600-02, Torus Level Verification Using Local Sight Glass.
n Directs EO to investigate leakage to torus basement.
n Verifies proper operation of the RBFD Sump pumps. (Will require resetting the Group 2 isolation at both the 902-5 panel and the 923-4 panel for the sump pumps to operate if a Group 2 Isolation occurs).
ROLE PLAY:
As the EO sent to verify Torus level locally using sight glass (wait 4 min), then report:
Local Torus level is (use value from variable ppc232, unless it is <20, then report it is below the sightglass).
As the EO sent to investigate leakage (wait 2 min) or if not sent, then as the EO on his round, report: there is a large rupture from a pipe attached between the Torus shell and the Torus suction ring header near the East LPCI Corner room. The Torus basement floor is covered with water. There is no valve on the line.
As the EO sent to report LPCI corner status (wait 2 min), then report: there is no water in either LPCI corner room.
As Maintenance sent to determine if the leak could be stopped (wait 3 min), then report:
Maintenance cannot stop the leak.
As the EO sent to check the seismic monitor, report: the seismic monitor has been activated (red light lit).
If contacted as any outside agencies, regarding the earthquake, confirm there has been an earthquake in the area but there is no more information at this time.
CRS q
May enter DOA 0040-02, Localized Flooding in Plant.
q May reference DOA 0010-03, Earthquakes.
SCENARIO ILT-N-2 Page 17 of 29 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event Seven - Earthquake Causes Plant Damage / Torus Leak / Manual Scram Trigger Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Performs the following actions per DOA 0040-02, Localized Flooding in Plant, as directed:
n Makes PA announcement.
n Directs EO to investigate leakage to torus basement.
q Notifies Radiation Protection and Security as time permits.
CUE (if desired for time compression):
When torus level is < 14.5 feet and/or at the discretion of the lead examiner, cue the crew that we are taking a time jump and that both torus wide range level meters indicate 12.5 feet and are dropping at about 6 inches every 5 minutes.
CRS Enters and directs performance of DEOP 0200-01, Primary Containment Control:
q May attempt to add water to the Torus per DOP 1600-02.
q May direct scram preparatory actions per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram.
q May conservatively direct the Team to perform a manual reactor scram while determining if leak can be isolated.
ATC /
BOP q Performs scram preparatory actions per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram, as directed.
o IF FCL > 93%, THEN reduce FCL to < 93% by inserting CRAM rods per DGP 03-04 OR in sequence rods per DGP 03-04.
o Start the motor suction pump AND turning gear oil pump.
o Trip hydrogen addition.
ATC /
BOP n
Performs manual scram per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram, as directed.
Depresses BOTH Scram buttons.
Places RX MODE SW in SHUTDOWN.
o Verifies Recirc pumps run back to minimum.
o Controls reactor water level +25 to +35 inches or as directed by the Unit Supervisor.
o Verifies turbine tripped.
o Verifies generator tripped.
o Verifies aux power transfers.
BOP Performs the following actions per DEOP 200-01, Primary Containment Control, as directed:
q May attempt to add water to the torus by opening MO-2-2301-14, MIN FLOW BYPASS.
q Monitors/Reports DEOP 0200-01 entry parameters.
SCENARIO ILT-N-2 Page 18 of 29 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event Seven - Earthquake Causes Plant Damage / Torus Leak / Manual Scram Trigger Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS q
May decide to anticipate RPV Blowdown:
q Directs opening turbine bypass valves.
BOP q
Opens turbine bypass valves. (If directed to anticipating Blowdown)
CRS Enters DEOP 0300-01, Secondary Containment Control, and directs:
q If Reactor Building Ventilation isolates when unit is scrammed, directs restarting Reactor Building Ventilation.
BOP Performs DEOP 0300-01, Secondary Control, as directed:
q Time permitting, restarts Reactor Building Ventilation (if it isolates when the reactor is scrammed).
Event 7 Completion Criteria:
Team has performed a reactor scram, AND/OR At the discretion of the Lead Examiner.
SCENARIO ILT-N-2 Page 19 of 29 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event Eight - Small Steam Leak / Emergency Depressurize Due Low Torus Level Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior 7
SIMULATOR OPERATOR:
After the Team has stabilized the plant and at the discretion of the Lead Evaluator, activate Trigger 7, which causes a small steam leak.
ROLE PLAY:
EO sent to check EDG operation: wait 3 min, then report: Both EDGs are operating normally.
ROLE PLAY:
Acknowledge other requests; delay as necessary.
TEAM n
Determines/announces Drywell pressure rapidly rising.
CRS Re-enters DEOP 0200-01, Primary Containment Control, when PC/P reaches 2 psig and performs/directs:
q Monitoring of PC/P.
q Initiation of torus sprays before PC/P of 9 psig.
n When PC/P is above 9 psig or before DW/T reaches 281°F:
Verification of DSIL.
Tripping of recirc pumps.
Tripping of DW coolers.
Initiation of DW sprays. (PC-1.1) n Directs terminating drywell sprays before drywell pressure drops to < 0 psig. (PC-1.2) (This may not apply based on scenario run time)
BOP n
Initiates Torus sprays and Drywell sprays as directed. (PC-1.1)
BOP n
Secures torus sprays and Drywell sprays before 0.0 psig. (PC-1.2) (This may not apply based on scenario run time) n Re-enters DEOP 0200-01, Primary Containment Control, when torus bulk temperature reaches 95°F and performs/directs:
6 Initiation of Torus Cooling. (TCA13, 10 min.) (May already be running) n 6 Initiates Torus Cooling per the Hardcard. (TCA13, 10 min.) (May already be running)
Note:
Once the Team determines the Torus leak cannot be stopped, they may anticipate blowdown by using the Isolation Condenser and the Turbine Bypass valves.
Performance of these actions meets critical task (RPV-2.1) of blowdown if RPV is within 66 psid of the drywell before ERVs are required to be opened.
SCENARIO ILT-N-2 Page 20 of 29 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event Eight - Small Steam Leak / Emergency Depressurize Due Low Torus Level Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior CRS q
May anticipate blowdown and directs:
o Initiating the Isolation Condenser.
o Opening the Turbine Bypass valves.
BOP Anticipates blowdown as directed:
q Initiates Isolation Condenser to full flow.
q Opens the Turbine Bypass valves.
CUE (if desired for time compression):
10 minutes after the initial time compression cue was given and/or at the discretion of the lead examiner, cue the crew that both the Torus wide range level meters indicate 11.5 feet and are dropping at a rate of about 1 foot per 10 minutes.
CRS When suppression pool water level cannot be held above 11 feet, manually scrams and then performs an emergency depressurization. Enters DEOP 0400-02, Emergency Depressurization, and directs: (PC-4.4)
Enters DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram, and directs a manual scram. (May be already done)
Enters DEOP 0400-02, Emergency Depressurization, and directs:
q Initiation of Isolation Condenser to maximum flow.
n Verification that SP/L >6 feet.
n Opening all ADS valves. (RPV-2.1) n Verification relief valves are open.
BOP Performs DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram. (May be already done, see actions earlier in previous Event) (PC-4.4)
Performs DEOP 0400-02, Emergency Depressurization, actions as directed: (PC-4.4) n Initiates Isolation Condenser to maximum flow q
Verifies that SP/L >6 feet.
n Opens ADS valves. (RPV-2.1)
BOP n
Opens turbine bypass valves. (May already be open due to anticipating Blowdown)
Event 8 / Scenario Completion Criteria:
Containment parameters stabilized, AND, RPV depressurization in progress, AND / OR, At the direction of the Lead Examiner.
SCENARIO ILT-N-2 Page 21 of 29 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Critical Tasks (PC-4.4)
When executing DEOP 200-1, Primary Containment Control, when suppression pool water level cannot be held above 11 feet, manually scram and then perform an emergency depressurization of the reactor.
(RPV-2.1)
When conditions are met per DEOP 400-2, Emergency Depressurization, the minimum number of available SRVs required for emergency depressurization (MNSRED) are opened.
(PC-1.1)
While executing DEOP 200-1, Primary Containment Control, when drywell pressure exceeds 9 psig and only if operating within the safe region of the drywell spray initiation limit (DSIL), initiate drywell sprays.
(PC-1.2)
After initiating drywell sprays per the primary containment pressure or temperature legs of DEOP 200-1, Primary Containment Control, terminate drywell sprays before drywell pressure drops to < 0 psig. (This may not apply based on scenario run time)
SCENARIO ILT-N-2 Page 22 of 29 Rev. 00 (02/16)
REFERENCES PROCEDURE TITLE DAN 902-4 C-23 TORUS NARROW RANGE WTR LVL LO DAN 902(3)-4 A-10 RWCU RECIRC PP TRIP DAN 902(3)-4 B-11 RWCU DEMIN INLET FLOW LO DAN 902(3)-4 C-12 RWCU RECIRC PP DISCH PRESS LO DAN 902(3)-4 C-23 TORUS NARROW RANGE WTR LVL LO DAN 902(3)-4 F-12 RWCU SYS AFTER NON-REGEN HX PRESS HI DAN 902-5 A-3 ROD DRIFT DAN 902-5 B-3 ROD WORTH MIN BLOCK DAN 902(3)-3 C-12 HPCI STM LINE FLOW HI DAN 902(3)-3 C-7 HPCI AUTO ISOL INITIATED DAN 902(3)-6 F-8 RFP VENT FAN TRIP DAN 902(3)-6 G-9 RFP RECIRC VLV OPEN DAN 923-4 A-3 (B-
- 2)
U2 E(W) RBFD SUMP LVL HI-HI DEOP 0100 RPV CONTROL DEOP 0200-01 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL DEOP 0300-01 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL DEOP 0400-02 EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION DGA-07 UNPREDICTED REACTIVITY ADDITION DGP 03-01 POWER CHANGES DGP 02-03 REACTOR SCRAM DGP 03-04 CONTROL ROD MOVEMENTS DOA 0010-03 EARTHQUAKES DOA 0010-10 FIRE-EXPLOSION DOA 0040-02 LOCALIZED FLOODING IN PLANT DOA 0300-01 CONTROL ROD DRIVE SYSTEM FAILURE DOA 0300-05 INOPERABLE OR FAILED CONTROL ROD DRIVES DOA 0300-06 RPIS FAILURE DOA 0300-12 MISPOSITIONED CONTROL ROD DOA 6500-10 4KV CIRCUIT BREAKER TRIP DOP 0202-03 REACTOR RECIRCULATION FLOW CONTROL SYSTEM OPERATION DOP 0400-02 ROD WORTH MINIMIZER DOP 0600-06 FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVE (FWRV) OPERATION DOP 1200-03 RWCU SYSTEM OPERATION WITH THE REACTOR AT PRESSURE DOP 1600-02 TORUS WATER LEVEL CONTROL
SCENARIO ILT-N-2 Page 23 of 29 Rev. 00 (02/16)
PROCEDURE TITLE DOP 3200-03 STARTUP OF SECOND OR THIRD REACTOR FEED PUMP OR SHIFTING TO ALTERNATE REACTOR FEED PUMP DOP 5750-01 TURBINE BUILDING VENTILATION DOP 5750-06 REACTOR FEED PUMP MOTOR VENTILATION DOP 6700-20 480V CIRCUIT BREAKER TRIP DOS 0300-06 CONTROL ROD ABNORMAILTY RECORD DOS 1600-02 TORUS LEVEL VERIFICATION USING LOCAL SIGHT GLASS TS 3.1.3 CONTROL ROD OPERABILITY TS 3.3.6.1 PRMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION TS 3.5.1 ECCS - OPERATING
SCENARIO ILT-N-2 Page 24 of 29 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Simulator Scenario Review Checklist ILT-N-2 Quantitative Attributes 8
Total malfunctions (5 to 8) 1 Malfunctions after EOP entry (1 to 2) 4 Abnormal events (2 to 4) 2 Major transients (1 to 2) 2 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1 to 2) 1 EOPs contingency requiring substantive actions (0 to 2) 4 Crew critical tasks (2 to 3)
SCENARIO ILT-N-2 Page 25 of 29 Rev. 00 (02/16)
CAEP Files
- 15-1 ILT-N-2.cae
- For ILT Class 15-1 NRC Exam
- Written by DSS
- Rev 00
- Date 5/16
- INITIAL CONDITIONS
- Sets APRM Master Gain pot to 1.0 irf niagain 1.0
- Binds the 2-2301-4 valve 50% open imf hp4vlbn 50.0
- Prevents auto start of 2B RFP Vent Fan imf x13
- Prevents RWCU from isolating imf cirwcuapl2 imf cirwcubpl2
- EVENT TRIGGERS
- Event Trigger 1 causes indications of a spurious HPCI isolation trgset 1 "0"l2 imf ser0160 (1) onl2 ior hpdcl4 (1) closel4
- Event Trigger 2 will auto delete the 2-2301-4 valve binding trgset 2 "hwhpdcl4"l4 trg 2 "dmf hp4vlbn"l4
- Event Trigger 3 Fails all control rod F-05 RPIS indications trgset 3 "0"l6l6 imf rdfailf5 (3)l6 imf rpis_pos_cr043s (3) badl6
SCENARIO ILT-N-2 Page 26 of 29 Rev. 00 (02/16)
- Event Trigger 4 trips the 2A RFP Vent Fan trgset 4 "0"l8 Imf x10 (4)l8
- Event Trigger 5 trips the 2A RWCU Recirc Pump trgset 5 "0"l8 imf u11 (5)l8
- Event Trigger 6 Inserts an ECCS suction line break trgset 6 "0"l10 trg 6 "ramp wamwlps 200.0 201.0 1:00:00"l10 imf csbrksev (6) 100.0l10 imf csppbbrk (6 4:00) 100.0l10
- Event Trigger 7 Starts a small steam leak in the DW over a 3 minute ramp trgset 7 "0"l14 imf i21 (7) 0.4 3:00l14
- Event Trigger 28 sets gain for all 6 APRMs trgset 28 "0"l14 trg 28 "irf niagainf true"l14
- END
SCENARIO ILT-N-2 Page 27 of 29 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Unit 2 Risk: GREEN Unit 3 Risk: GREEN Unit 2 is 680 MWe Leading Thermal Limit: MAPRAT @ 0.818 Action limit: 0.980 Equipment Unavailable: None Protected Equipment: None Unit 3 is in Mode 1 at Full Pow er Leading Thermal Limit: MAPRAT @ 0.819 Action Limit: 0.980 Equipment Unavailable: None Protected Equipment: None Current Action Statements None LCO Started:
LCO Expires:
TS Cause:
Unit 1 Plant Status Today U1 Diesel Oil Storage Tank Transfer House has grating removed. Currently roped off with pump installed to pump to U1 Oil Separator Pit as required. Outside operator monitor and pump as necessary.
Today Chem Cleaning ventilation status:
HV-1A/EF-1A are secured due to HV-1A inlet and outlet dampers being shut w ith fan on, IR# 913157, WO 1239746.
HV-1B/EF-1B are secured due to HV-1B throw ing its belts. WO 1156150.
HVAC -1 ON.
HV-2 running.
Switchyard Status Today TSO notified of oil leaks on 345 Kv BT 2-3 CB (IR 810135) ComEd WO 6396128 Today 138 KV Bus 1 Feed To TR 22 Combi Units has low oil in the 'C' phase, ComEd WO #276162 Today HVO: Exercise CAUTION w hile in the 345 kV Yard due to excavation being performed in the area.
Marv Evans reports holes being dug near manual sw itch disconnects 345kV Blue Bus. Plyw ood w ill be installed over the holes if access is needed, but be aw are there are holes under the plyw ood.
SSC called from the 345Kv yard reporting that the cable trough covers are removed to prep for upcoming w ork. Be careful.
SCENARIO ILT-N-2 Page 28 of 29 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Unit 2 Plant Status Today Unit 2 Activities
- Shift 1 Activities ****
- Shift 2 Activities ****
Immediately after assuming the shift, raise pow er with Rector Recirculation Flow to 750 MWe
When Generator Output is 750 MWe, place the 2C Reactor Feed Pump in service on Bus 21.
- Shift 3 Activities ****
Today
- Unit 2 Procedures In-Progress **** Do Not Delete ****
DGP 03-01, Pow er Changes
SCENARIO ILT-N-2 Page 29 of 29 Rev. 00 (02/16)
XL3 Alarm DEVICE 81-12 IN ALARM AEER ABOVE 902-39
Dresden Generating Station ILT-N-3 CIRC WATER FLOW REVERSAL LOSS OF FW HEATER ISOLATION CONDENSER TUBE LEAK LOSS OF TURBINE SEAL OIL PUMP CIRCULATING WATER PUMP TRIP RPS MG SET TRIP LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR / MANUAL SCRAM HYDRAULIC ATWS - REPEATED SCRAM/RESETS Rev. 00 02/16 Developed By:
Exam Author Date Approved By:
Facility Representative Date
SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 2 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Scenario Outline Facility: Dresden Generating Station Scenario No.: ILT-N-3 Op-Test No.: ILT 15-1 (2016-301)
Examiners: ___________________________ Operators:
Initial Conditions: Unit 2 is operating at 980 MWe. No equipment OOS and no LCO actions in effect.
Turnover: Perform DOP 4400-08. EO and field supervisor have been briefed and are in the field awaiting direction. Following performance of DOP 4400-08, secure the 2B Circulating Water Pump per DOP 4400-02 for maintenance next shift. Maintain load per TSO direction.
Event No.
Malf. No.
Event Type*
Event Description 1
None N (BOP)
Circ Water Flow Reversal 2
FW3502AU FWHDRO18 C (ATC)
Loss of a Feedwater Heater 3
ICTUBLK C/T (BOP)
(T/S)
Isolation Condenser Tube Leak 4
K50 C (BOP)
Loss of all turbine seal oil - ESOP failure to auto-start 5
HP5 C (BOP)
B02 C/T (ATC)
(T/S)
RPS - MG Set, Trips / Re-energize from reserve power 7
NP2 M (ALL)
Manual Scram - Loss of Instrument Air - Unisolable 8
RDHLVFPA RDHLDEGA RDHLVFPB RDHLDEGB SCPMPOCA SCPMPOCB M (ALL)
ATWS - Hydraulic - Repeated Scram/Resets (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 3 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Scenario Objective Evaluate the Teams ability to operate the plant with a loss of Instrument Air and a Failure to Scram.
Scenario Summary
- 1. Unit is at ~100%.
- 2. The following equipment is OOS:
- a. None.
- 3. LCOs:
- a. None Scenario Sequence After completing shift turnover, the team will perform DOP 4400-08, Circulating Water System Flow Reversal.
Upon completion of Circulating Water Flow Reversal, the team will secure the 2B Circ Water Pump per DOP 4400-02.
When Circulating Water System Flow Reversal is complete, 2B1 HTR Normal Drain unlatches due to mechanical failure of the latch. 2B1 HTR level rises and the Emergency drain opens. However level continues to slowly rise until a 2B1 HTR trip occurs. The operator places the 2B1 HTR Extraction valve in PTS to prevent it from closing or re-opens it after it closes. This results in the 2B1 HTR level dropping with the Emergency drain controlling.
The Isolation Condenser develops a tube leak and must be isolated.
The Main Hydrogen Seal Oil pump trips with a failure of the Emergency Hydrogen Seal Oil pump to start. The team starts the Emergency Hydrogen Seal Oil pump and verifies the generator load does not exceed the capacity limit curves for possibly reduced generator hydrogen pressure.
Circulating water pump 2A then trips on overload and the BOP manually starts circulating water pump 2B to maintain condenser vacuum.
The Team receives a report that the Engineering department determined that EPAs 2B-1 and 2B-2 are inoperable. The CRS determines Tech Spec requirements and then a trip of RPS EPA 2B-1 causes a loss of RPS Bus A. The Team will reenergize RPS Bus A from reserve power and begin restoration of affected systems to a normal condition.
When Power restoration is in progress, a large leak develops in the Instrument Air system. The Team will scram the reactor prior to the MSIVs failing closed.
A hydraulic ATWS occurs when the Reactor scrams. The SBLC system fails to inject when started. The Team inserts control rods by manually driving them in and performing repeated scrams.
Completion criteria: When the RPV is depressurized and at the discretion of the Lead Examiner, Place the simulator in FREEZE.
SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 4 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event One - Circulating Water System Flow Reversal The BOP will reverse Circulating Water System Flow Malfunctions required: 0 (None)
Success Path:
Performs DOP 4400-08, Circulating Water System Flow Reversal Event Two - High Level in FW Heater 2B1 HTR Normal Drain unlatches due to mechanical failure of the latch. 2B1 HTR level rises and the Emergency drain opens. However level continues to slowly rise until a 2B1 HTR trip occurs.
Malfunctions required: 1 (2B1 HTR trip)
Success Path:
Places the 2B1 HTR Extraction valve in PTS to prevent it from closing or re-opens it after it closes.
Event Three - Isolation Condenser Tube Leak Isolation condenser develops a tube leak.
Malfunctions required: 1 (Isolation Condenser Tube Leak)
Success Path:
Team isolates the Isolation Condenser References Tech Specs Event Four - Main Seal Oil Pump Trip / Failure of Emergency Seal Oil Pump to Auto Start The Main Hydrogen Seal Oil pump trips with a failure of the Emergency Hydrogen Seal Oil pump to start Malfunctions required: 1 (Stator Cooling Water Pump Trip / Failure of Standby pump to auto start)
Success Path:
Team starts the Emergency Hydrogen Seal Oil Pump
SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 5 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event Five - Circulating Water Pump Trip The team will recognize and respond to a trip of the 2A Circulating Water Pump Malfunctions required: 1 (Circulating Water Pump Trip)
Success Path:
Start 2B Circulating Water Pump Event Six - RPS MG Set Trip / Re-energize from Reserve power The Team receives a report that the Engineering department determined that EPAs 2B-1 and 2B-2 are inoperable. Then a trip of RPS EPA 2B-1 causes a loss of RPS Bus A.
Malfunctions required: 1 (RPS EPA 2B-1 trips)
Success Path:
The CRS determines Tech Spec requirements.
Re-energize RPS Bus A from Reserve Power.
Event Seven - Loss of Instrument Air / Manual Scram A large leak develops in the Instrument Air System Malfunctions required: 1 (Instrument Air Leak)
Success Path:
Performs manual reactor scram.
Event Eight - Hydraulic ATWS/ARI Unsuccessful A Hydraulic ATWS occurs when the reactor is scrammed. ARI is unsuccessful Malfunctions required: 2 (Hydraulic ATWS)
(SBLC Failure to inject)
Success Path:
Team inserts control rods by manually driving control rods and performing repeated scrams.
SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 6 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
PRE-SCENARIO ACTIVITIES 1
If applicable, conduct pre-scenario activities in accordance with TQ-JA-155-04, SIMULATOR EXAMINATION BRIEFING.
- a. Direct the Team to perform their briefs prior to entering the simulator.
- b. Provide the Team a copy of DOP 4400-08, Circulating Water System Flow Reversal
- c. Provide the Team a copy of DOP 4400-02, Circulating Water System Startup and Shutdown.
2 Simulator Setup (the following steps can be done in any logical order)
- a. Initialize simulator in an IC with the following:
- 1) Reactor power ~100%. (Old Training Load IC 84 used for validation.
- 2) Adjust Core flow to 97-98 Mlbm/hr. (MWe ~980) 3 Verify the following simulator conditions:
- a. Verify 2A, 2B and 2C Circ Water Pumps are running
- b. Verify one Service Air Compressor supplying both Units.
- c. Verify Unit 2/Unit 3 Service Air Cross-tie valve is open NOTE: Do NOT run the initial setup CAEP file until the above setup is completed.
4 Run the initial setup CAEP file: 15-1 ILT-N-3.cae 5
Place the following equipment out of service:
- a. None 6
Complete the Simulator Setup Checklist.
Symbols are used throughout the text to identify specific items as indicated below:
Critical Tasks 6
Time Critical / Sensitive Actions (Includes PRA Actions) n Required Actions q Optional Actions
SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 7 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event One - Reverse Circulating Water Flow Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator/Communicator: Turnover included Field Supervisor and Extra EO briefed and in the field for execution of DOP 4400-08.
When contacted respond as appropriate. Use communications below:
Standing by MCC 25-2 All circ water flow reversal valves have power CRS n
Directs BOP to perform DOP 4400-08, CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM FLOW REVERSAL BOP Reverses Circulating Water Flow.
q Verifies LOCAL-REMOTE switch on 2252-71 panel is in the REMOTE position.
q Verifies all circ water flow reversal valves have power q Verifies operator stationed (with communications established) at MCC 25-2.
n Places CIRC WTR FLOW SELECT switch from WEST to EAST q Verifies:
q First half circ water flow reversal valves reposition in 30 seconds q
CONDR OFF GAS SUCTION VLVS reposition q
2nd half circ water flow reversal valves reposition in 30 seconds q
CONDR SEAL TROUGH LVL fill and drain valves change over q
N BRCH DP and SBRCH DP indications reverse q Changes light bulb lenses to maintain green board operations ATC q
Monitors panels q
Provides peer check as required.
CRS q
Directs securing 2B Circ Water Pump per DOP 4400-02 BOP q
Places Control Switch for 2B Circulating Water Pump in Trip.
q Verifies Discharge valve MO 2-4401B is closed Event 1 Completion Criteria:
Circ Water system flow is aligned to EAST Light Bulb Lenses have been swapped AND/OR, At the discretion of the Lead Examiner.
SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 8 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event Two - Loss of a Feedwater Heater Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior NOTE: THIS EVENT IS INTENDED TO BE PERFORMED BY THE ATC OPERATOR. THE BOP OPERATOR MAY NEED TO BE REMOVED FROM THE AREA PRIOR TO INSERTING TRIGGER 1.
1 FLOOR INSTRUCTOR / SIMULATOR OPERATOR / ROLE PLAY:
If the team announces that they will adjust gains, inform them an extra NSO will perform the adjustment. Then:
v Tell the team you are time compressing.
v Direct the simulator operator to activate trigger 1 and verify gains within limits.
v Inform the team the gains are adjusted.
(Note: trigger 1 can be toggled OFF, then back ON as many times as necessary to adjust gains) 2 SIMULATOR OPERATOR:
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, activate trigger 2, which causes 2B1 HTR normal drain to unlatch.
3-9 SIMULATOR OPERATOR:
Verify the following automatic triggers activate as expected:
Trigger 3:
Activates when 2B1 HTR Emergency Drain opens.
Holds 2B1 HTR Emergency Drain at 15% open.
Forces up alarm 902-6 E-04, 2B1 Heater Emerg Drain Vlv Open Trigger 4:
Activates when 902-6 E-01, 2B1 Heater Lvl Hi, alarms.
Holds 2B1 HTR Emerg Drain at 3.0% open.
Trigger 5:
Activates when Trigger 5 is active and 2B1 Htr Extr Vlv CLOSE light is ON.
After 30 sec, Holds 2B1 HTR Emerg Drain at 8.0% open.
Trigger 6:
Activates when alarm 902-6 E-01, 2B1 Heater Lvl Hi, clears.
Holds 2B1 HTR Emerg Drain at 0.0% open.
Trigger 7:
Activates when 2B1 Heater Extraction control switch is placed to PTS or OPEN.
Holds 2B1 HTR Emerg Drain at 12% open.
Trigger 8:
Activates when 2B1 Heater Level is below 14.0 inches and trigger 7 is active.
Removes hold on 2B1 HTR Emerg Drain.
Trigger 9:
Activates when trigger 8 is active.
Returns alarm 902-6 E-04, 2B1 Heater Emerg Drain Vlv Open, to NORMAL.
SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 9 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event Two - Loss of a Feedwater Heater Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior ROLE PLAY:
EO to check 2B1 level controllers: wait 2 min, then report the following for each component:
v SO 2-3502A, 2B1 FW HTR LCV 2-3502A SO VLV: report the SO 2-3502A is tripped due to its latch mechanically broken.
v LIC 2-3541-17A, B1 DRAIN TO A1 FLASH TANK, setpoint: report the LIC 2-3541-17A setpoint is 12 inches.
v LIC 2-3541-10A, B1 SPILL TO COND, setpoint: report the LIC 2-3541-10A setpoint is 14 inches.
v LIC 2-3541-10A, B1 SPILL TO COND, demand: report the LIC 2-3541-10A demand is 10 psig If asked: I see no obvious malfunction or instrument air leakage.
If asked: All heater level controller MODE switches are in AUTOMATIC.
If asked for local heater level indication, report the value displayed on Instructor station drawing 902-6-03 ATC q Announces alarms:
o 902-6 D-7, 2B1 Heater Normal Drain Vlv Closed.
o 902-6 E-4, 2B1 Heater Emerg Drain Vlv 33% Open.
q Sends an operator to check 2B1 Heater level controllers.
ATC q Announces alarm 902-6 E-1, 2B1 Heater Lvl Hi.
q Verifies automatic actions:
o MO 2-3101A, 2B1 FW HTR EXTR STM MOV, closes.
o FCV 2-3102A, 2B1 FW HTR EXTR STM BYP FCV, opens.
CRS n
Due to 2B1 Heater trip, enters DOA 3500-02, Loss of Feedwater Heaters.
ATC Performs DOA 3500-02, Loss of Feedwater Heaters, immediate actions:
q Monitors feedwater temperature and heater levels.
n Places 2B1 Heater extraction valve control switch in pull to stop (PTS).
OR n
Re-opens 2B1 Heater extraction valve when the 2B1 heater Hi level alarm resets.
BOP q Assists as directed.
Event 2 Completion Criteria:
2B1 Heater level controlling on its emergency drain valve, AND / OR, At the discretion of the Lead Examiner.
SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 10 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event Three - Isolation Condenser Tube Leak Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior 10 Simulator Operator:
At the discretion of the Floor Instructor/Evaluator, activate TRIGGER 10 which initiates a tube leak in the Isolation Condenser.
ROLE PLAY:
EO to IC Area: (wait 3 min.) Report, there is no evidence of steam leakage in the area but the IC is making noises. It sounds like metal parts expanding (creaking).
ROLE PLAY:
NOTE: (IC temps may be viewed on RNI display IC1, Isolation Condenser)
EO to check IC Vent outside: (WAIT 3 MIN.)
If IC shell temp is > 190°F, report some fog/steam exiting from the vent If IC shell temp is < 190°F, report NO steam exiting vent.
ROLE PLAY:
Chemistry to sample IC shell side: Report shell side sample results will take approximately 90 minutes.
ROLE PLAY:
Rad Protection to survey IC Vent outside: Report the radiological surveys will be initiated.
Security to control access to IC Vent outside: Report the area will be roped off.
BOP Announces alarms for the Isolation Condenser (IC) and refers to the following DANs:
q 902-3 B-3, IC Hi Rad q 902-3 C-4, IC Hi Temp q Monitors temperature and radiation levels for the Isolation Condenser CRS q
Directs/verifies Operators take action per DAN 902-3 C-4.
q After determining there is a leak in the IC, enters DOA 1300-01, Isolation Condenser Tube Leak.
q Declares the Isolation Condenser Inoperable.
q Requests Chemistry to sample Iso-Condenser shell side for change in activity.
BOP Performs DOA 1300-01, Isolation Condenser Tube Leak, as directed and monitors:
q IC vent rad levels.
q IC shell side water level.
q IC temperatures from TR 1340-1.
q IC area temperatures from 902-21 panel.
q IC area rad levels from 902-2 panel BOP q
Reports IC vent rad above 3 mr/hr and IC shell side level and temperatures rising.
SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 11 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event Three - Isolation Condenser Tube Leak Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior BOP Isolates the IC by closing the following valves per DAN 902-3 B-3 or DOA 1300-01.
n MO 2-1301-1 n
MO 2-1301-2 q
MO 2-1301-3 (May place control switch in Pull To Lock) n MO 2-1301-4 n
AO 2-1301-17 n
AO 2-1301-20 q
MO-2-1301-10 q
MO 2-4399-74 BOP q
May dispatch an EO to the Isolation Condenser area.
q May bypass the IC area hi rad input to the Rx Bldg Hi Rad alarm.
TEAM q
Dispatches personnel outside to investigate discharge from the vent.
TEAM q
Calls Chemistry and requests a sample of the shell side water to analyze for a change in activity.
TEAM q
Directs Rad Protection to conduct radiological surveys.
TEAM q
Directs Security to limit access underneath the IC vent.
CRS q
References Tech Specs and determines:
n LCO 3.5.3.A.1: Verify HPCI is OPERABLE immediately.
n LCO 3.5.3.A.2: Restore IC System to OPERABLE status within 14 days.
Event 3 Completion Criteria:
DOA 1300-01 is addressed, The IC is isolated, Tech Spec requirements are determined, AND / OR, At the discretion of the Lead Examiner.
SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 12 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event Four - Main Seal Oil Pump Trip / Failure Of Emergency Seal Oil Pump To Auto Start Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior 11 Simulator Operator:
At the direction of the Lead Evaluator, insert TRIGGER 11 to trip the Main Hydrogen Seal Oil Pump (MSOP).
12 Simulator Operator / Role Play:
EO directed to investigate local panel trouble alarm, wait 1 min., activate TRIGGER 12, and then report that The local alarm is Differential seal oil pressure low. If the ESOP is running, add to the report and it reset.
EO to report local Generator H2 pressure: Wait 1 min, and then report the local Generator H2 pressure indicates (use value from Monitor program) psig.
Role Play:
EO sent to check the MSOP breaker: Wait 3 min. then report, The MSOP breaker is tripped in the tripped free position.
If directed to check the MSOP, report, I cant find anything wrong with the MSOP.
EO to align Seal Oil and H2 valves: Wait 2 min, then report the (Insert nomenclature of requested valves) are (insert position requested).
Note: The simulator does not model the Seal Oil and H2 valves.
BOP Announces:
q 902-7 A-11, H2 Seal Oil Sys Oil Pp/Vac Pp Trip, alarm.
q MSOP tripped.
q Generator machine gas pressure dropping.
BOP q Determines ESOP did NOT automatically start as expected.
n Starts the ESOP.
TEAM q Makes PA announcement warning of H2 and /or oil vapor around the main generator.
CRS q Directs starting ESOP.
q Enters DOP 6700-20, 480V Circuit Breaker Trip.
q Verifies generator is operating within the operability curves of DOP 6400-08 q May direct execution of load drop to maintain generator within limits (This is not an exam requirement nor the intent of the event)
BOP q Announces 902-7 E-11, H2 Seal Oil & Alterrex Pnl Trouble, alarm q Dispatches EO to investigate local panel trouble alarm.
BOP Performs DOP 6700-20, 480V Circuit Breaker Trip, as directed:
q Dispatches EO to MCC 28-2 to investigate the MSOP trip.
q May place MSOP in PTL.
SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 13 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event Four - Main Seal Oil Pump Trip / Failure Of Emergency Seal Oil Pump To Auto Start Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior BOP Performs DAN 902-7 A-11, H2 Seal Oil Sys Oil Pp/Vac Pp Trip, additional actions:
q Directs EO to close:
o H-09, U2 H2 SEAL OIL VACUUM TK INLET SPRYA SV.
o H-13, U2 MAIN SEAL OIL PMP DISCH STOP CHC VLV.
q Stops the Seal Oil Vacuum Pump.
q Monitors 250 VDC electrical system (DOP 6900-01).
q Periodically monitors seal oil bearing pressure, hydrogen purity, and hydrogen differential pressure.
q Enters DOP 5320-11, Filling and Venting the Generator with Hydrogen to Raise Purity and/or Pressure during Normal Operation, if necessary.
q Directs an Operator to check for hydrogen at Generator shaft seal in Alterrex housing.
ATC q Assists as directed.
q Performs load reduction per DGP 03-01 (If directed)
Event 4 Completion Criteria:
ESOP started, AND/OR, At the discretion of the Floor Instructor
SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 14 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event Five - Circ Water Pump Trip Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior 13 Floor Instructor / Simulator Operator / Role Play:
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, activate TRIGGER 13, which trips 2A Circulating Water pump.
As the EO sent to 2A Circulating Water pump breaker (wait 3 min), then report: 2A Circulating Water pump breaker has an overcurrent target up.
As the EO sent to 2A Circulating Water pump (wait 3 min), then report: 2A Circulating Water pump motor is hot to the touch.
As the EO sent to check 2B Circulating Water pump operation (wait 2 min), then report:
2B Circulating Water pump is operating normally.
As the EO sent to check Cribhouse bar racks and traveling screens (wait 3 min), then report: the Cribhouse bar racks and traveling screens are clear.
BOP Performs the following actions per DAN 902-7 A-15, Circ Wtr PP Trip, DOA 4400-01, Circulating Water System Failure, and DOA 6500-10, 4KV Circuit Breaker Trip, as directed:
n Starts 2B Circulating Water pump. (immediate action) q Verifies condenser vacuum returning to normal.
q Verifies 2A Circulating Water pump discharge valve closes.
q Sends EO to check 2A Circulating Water pump breaker and operation of 2B Circulating Water pump.
q Places 2A Circulating Water pump control switch in PTL.
q Verifies Circulating Water Flow reversal valves lined up normally.
q May send EO to check Cribhouse bar racks and traveling screens.
CRS n
Enters and directs performance of DOA 4400-01, Circulating Water System Failure, and DOA 6500-10, 4KV Circuit Breaker Trip.
q May set contingency for DOA 4400-07, Reactor Operation with Only One Circulating Water Pump Available.
q Notifies the Shift Manager and EMD.
ATC q
Monitors panels and assists as directed.
Event 5 Completion Criteria:
2B Circ Water Pump has been started AND, DOA 4400-01 and DOA 6500-01 actions are addressed, OR, At the discretion of the Floor Instructor / Lead Evaluator.
SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 15 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event Six - RPS MG Set Trips / Re-energize from Reserve Power Trigger Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE: Ensure the ATC operator performs this Event ROLE PLAY:
At the discretion of the Floor Instructor/Evaluator, call as the Shift Manager and report:
Engineering has determined the following equipment inoperable due to Quad Cities Part 21 issue:
2-500-2B-1, 2B RPS MG SET 2B-1 EPA BKR 2-500-2B-2, 2B RPS MG SET 2B-2 EPA BKR ALL other EPA breakers are operable.
14 SIMULATOR OPERATOR ACTIONS:
After The Team has determined the Tech Spec requirements or at the discretion of the Floor Instructor/Evaluator, activate TRIGGER 14, which inserts a 2B RPS MG Set overcurrent trip to simulate trip of 2B RPS MG SET 2B-1 EPA BKR.
NOTE: Communications from the AEER should be over the phone (not the radio)
ROLE PLAY:
EO to check 2B RPS MG set: wait 2 min. and call on the phone and report:
v The 2B RPS MG Set motor is running with normal output of 120 volts.
v The 2A RPS Bus voltage is 0.0.
v The 2B RPS MG SET 2B-1 EPA BKR has tripped but ONLY has the POWER IN, MOTOR GEN red indicating light lit. (All other lights are NOT lit) v The 2B RPS MG SET 2B-2 EPA BKR has NO indicating lights lit.
15 NOTE: When the team begins to re-power 2A RPS bus, report: Another NSO has completed the steps for bypassing OPRMs.
EO to power the 2A RPS bus from the Reserve source: wait five minutes, call the U2 NSO on the phone and report I am at step G.3.l.(1) of DOP 0500-03, for supplying power to RPS 2A bus. The next several steps are yours.
When notified by the NSO to resume at step G.3.L.(6) then after ~ 1 min, activate TRIGGER 15. Call on the phone and report I have completed DOP 0500-03 thru step G.3.L.9. RPS Bus 2A has been reenergized from the reserve power supply. If asked:
CRS q References Technical Specifications and determines:
§ TS 3.3.8.2 (RPS Electric Power Monitoring) Condition A: Remove associated in-service power supply(s) from service within 72 hr.
§ TS 3.3.8.2 (RPS Electric Power Monitoring) Condition B: Remove associated in-service power supply(s) from service within 1 hr.
q May direct WEC to brief an operator to swap RPS Bus A to the alternate power supply per DOP 0500-03, RPS Power Supply Operation.
SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 16 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event Six - RPS MG Set Trips / Re-energize from Reserve Power Trigger Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC q Announces loss of 2A RPS Bus.
q Perform actions of DOA 0500-05, Loss of RPS.
q Bypasses APRM 6.
CRS q Enters DOA 0500-05, Loss of Reactor Protection System Bus, and directs actions.
n Directs swapping 2A RPS Bus to Reserve Power per DOP 0500-03, RPS Power Supply Operation.
n Directs entry into DGA-7, Unexpected Reactivity Change due to isolation of RWCU system.
ATC q Coordinates with an EO to restore power to the 2A RPS Bus per DOP 0500-03, RPS Power Supply Operation.
q Bypasses APRM 6. (May already done per DOA actions) n Resets the RPS CH A half scram per DOP 0500-07, Insertion/Reset of Manual Half Scram.
BOP q Performs DGA-07 actions as directed.
CRS q References Technical Specifications and determines:
§ TS 3.3.7.1 (Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) System Instrumentation) v Condition A2: Restore CREV instrumentation to operable within 6 hrs.
NOTE: After restoring the RPS Bus, the Team should begin to identify and plan for system restoration back to their normal lineups.
CRS q Coordinates restoration of affected plant systems.
q May direct shutdown of 2B RPS MG Set.
TEAM q Resets the Division 2 Refuel Floor Rad Monitor and Reactor Building Vent Rad Monitor.
q Restores Reactor Building Ventilation IAW DOP 5750-02, Reactor Building Ventilation and secures SBGT IAW DOP 7500-01, SBGT Operation.
q Resets ACAD/CAM system per DOP 2400-01 to reclose the 2-2499-3B and 4B valves.
q Restarts RWCU per DOP 1200-03, RWCU System Operation with the Reactor at Pressure.
Event 6 Completion Criteria:
RPS Bus 2A reenergized and plans for restoration of affected plant systems in progress, AND / OR; At the direction of the Lead Examiner.
SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 17 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event Seven - Instrument Air Leak / Reactor Scram Trigger Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 16 SIMULATOR OPERATOR:
At the direction of the Lead Examiner, activate TRIGGER 16 to initiate a large Instrument Air leak.
ROLE PLAY:
EO sent to check air compressor and air dryer operation, wait 3 min. then report, The air compressors are all running loaded and there are no problems at the air dryers.
Personnel sent to inspect IA system for rupture, acknowledge the order.
If asked, U1 air system is not is service BOP q Announces alarm 923-1 F-4, U2 INST AIR PRESS LOW.
q Verifies U2 SA to IA Auto Crosstie Valve opens at 85 psig CRS n
Announces entry into DOA 4700-01, Instrument Air System Failure, and directs team actions.
n Briefs team to be prepared to manually scram the reactor and close the outboard MSIVs IF Instrument Air pressure drops to 55 psig.
q Announces entry into DOA 0600-01, Transient Level Control, and directs concurrent performance with DOA 4700-01, IA System Failure.
BOP q Directs EO(s) to check air compressors and air dryers for proper operation q Directs in-plant personnel to inspect U2 IA system for proper lineup and leaks.
q May direct EO to cross-connect U2 to U3 IA Systems per DOP 4700-03, U2/3 IA Cross-Connect Operation.
q May dispatch EO to prepare Unit 3 SAC for start CRS q May direct scram preparations per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram.
ATC q Performs scram preparations per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram, as directed:
o Reduces power with Recirc flow to 56 Mlbm/hr core flow o
Starts the turbine motor suction pump AND turning gear oil pump.
o Trips H2 addition.
CRS When IA pressure drops to 55 psig, directs team to:
n Scram the reactor per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram.
n Control Outboard MSIVs per DOA 4700-01.
SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 18 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event Seven - Instrument Air Leak / Reactor Scram Trigger Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Performs the following actions per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram, and DEOP 100, RPV Control, as directed:
n Places Mode Switch to Shutdown and depresses the Scram pushbuttons.
n Determines rods did not insert.
q Initiates ARI.
n Provides an Update.
Rods did NOT go in.
ARI actuated.
Hydraulic ATWS Reports reactor level, Rx Press, DW Press, AND power.
BOP q Performs Reactor Scram actions per Hardcard.
Event 7 Completion Criteria:
Team has performed a reactor scram, AND/OR At the discretion of the Lead Examiner.
SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 19 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event Eight - Hydraulic ATWS Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior 17 18 19 Simulator Operator / Role Play:
When requested: Wait several min, activate the appropriate trigger and report completed.
TRIGGER 17: bypasses MSL GP 1 RPV/L and Offgas High Rad.
TRIGGER 18: installs scram jumpers.
TRIGGER 19: pulls ARI fuses.
ATC Per DGP 02-03, Reactor scram Hardcard:
n Runs back Recirc Pumps.
n If RX power >6%:
Trips recirc pumps.
Initiates 1 train of SBLC.
n Maintains RPV/L between +8 and +48 inches or as directed by Unit Supervisor.
CRS q Enters DEOP 100, RPV Control, and directs actions.
Due to report of ATWS condition, exits DEOP 100 AND enters DEOP 0400-05, Failure to Scram, and directs/performs actions:
q Placing ADS to inhibit. (Not expected to be a Critical Task for this scenario) q Placing Core Spray pumps in PTL.
n Inserting control rods using Alternate Rod Insertion.
Directs driving control rods.
Directs performing Scram/Reset/Scram.
q Verifying required auto actions.
q Installing of the jumpers for the MSIV low level isolations and the Off Gas high Rad isolations.
IF DEOP 400-5 level override criteria is met:
n If RX power >6%, terminating and preventing all injection except boron and CRD until RPV level -35 inches.
n Holding RPV level between -191 inches and the level lowered to.
n Stabilizing RPV pressure below 1060 psig.
ATC n
Terminates and prevents all injection except boron and CRD at the 902-5 panel in automatic as follows: (May not apply)
Using the RX LOW FLOW CONTROL STATION, 2(3)-640-20, lowers FWLC SETPOINT to -40 inches.
n Drives control rods Maximizes CRD pressure and inserts control rods to lower reactor power
SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 20 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event Eight - Hydraulic ATWS Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior BOP n
Terminates and prevents all injection except boron and CRD at the 902-3 panel as follows: (May not apply)
PLACES HPCI 4 and 14 valves in Pull-to-Close.
PLACES LPCI 22 valves in Pull-to-Close.
BOP n
Controls RPV pressure using the following as directed:
Turbine Generator / Bypass valves.
ADSVs.
ATC /
BOP n
Performs Scram/Reset/Scram per DEOP 0500-05, Alternate Insertion Of Control Rods, as follows: (RPV-6.1)
Directs ARI fuses pulled if RPV level is lowered below - 59 in.
Directs scram jumpers installed.
Places SDV Hi Water Bypass in the BYPASS position.
Closes the SDV vent and drain valves.
Resets the scram.
Opens SDV Vent and Drain valves.
Manually scrams the reactor when the SDV is drained.
Repeats as necessary.
NOTE: Two repeated scrams are expected to insert ALL the control rods. This is only possible if IA header pressure is sufficient to reseat the scram valves. The ability to perform repeated scrams successfully will be determined by the time at which the scram is inserted. If the team waits until IA header pressure reaches 55 psig, it is unlikely scram resets will be successful based on IA header pressure. If the scram will not reset, the success path is manual insertion of control rods.
ATC /
BOP n
Re-establishes injection using available injection systems to MAINTAIN RPV water level above -191 (in band directed by Unit Supervisor).
CRS q
Based on report that all control rods are inserted (if applicable),
q Exits DEOP 0400-05 and enters DEOP 0100 (if ALL rods are fully inserted).
Restoring RPV level to +8 to +48 in.
ATC n
Performs as directed:
Restores RPV level to +8 to +48 in.
SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 21 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Event Eight - Hydraulic ATWS Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior CRS May contact any/all of the following people to inform them of situation or request assistance:
q Operations Manager q Shift Operating Supervisor q Duty Maintenance Supervisor q Duty Engineering Manager q
Work Week Manager Event 8 / Scenario Completion Criteria:
Reactor Power is less than 6% with control rod insertion in progress.
AND/OR, At the discretion of the Lead Examiner.
SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 22 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Critical Tasks RPV-5.1 With a reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, take action per DEOP 400-5, Failure to Scram, to reduce power by inserting control rods.
RPV-5.3 With a reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, take action per DEOP 400-5, Failure to Scram, to reduce power by injecting boron before torus temperature reaches the Boron Injection Initiation Temperature (BIIT @ < 110°F RPV-5.4 Per DEOP 400-5, Failure to Scram, with a reactor scram required, the reactor not shutdown, and the automatic ADS timer initiated, inhibit ADS before an automatic actuation occurs.
RPV-5.5 Once DEOP 400-5, Failure to Scram power/level control leg, is entered with reactor power is > 6% -AND-RPV level is greater than -35 inches, terminate and prevent injection (with exception of boron and CRD) into the RPV.
RPV-5.7 Per DEOP 400-5, Failure to Scram, after terminate and prevent conditions are no longer required once any of the level control overrides have cleared, RPV injection is re-commenced and RPV level is maintained > the Minimum Steam Cooling RPV Water Level.
RPV-5.12 When executing DEOP 400-5, Failure to Scram, reactor pressure is controlled as necessary to prevent an uncontrolled positive reactivity excursion of > 5% power.
SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 23 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
REFERENCES PROCEDURE TITLE DAN 902-3 B-3 ISOL CONDR VENT RAD HI DAN 902-3 C-4 ISOL CONDR TEMP HI DAN 902-6 D-7 2B1 HEATER NORMAL DRAIN VLV CLOSED DAN 902-6 E-1 2B1 HEATER LEVEL HI DAN 902-6 E-4 2B1 HEATER EMERG DRAIN VLV 33 PERCENT OPEN DAN 902-7 A-11 H2 SEAL OIL SYS OIL PPVAC PP TRIP DAN 902-7 A-15 CIRC WTR PP TRIP DAN 902-7 E-11 H2 SEAL OIL AND ALTERREX PNL TROUBLE DAN 923-1 F-4 U2 INST AIR PRESS LO DEOP 100 RPV CONTROL DEOP 400-5 FAILURE TO SCRAM DEOP 500-5 ALTERNATE INSERTION OF CONTROL RODS DGP 02-03 REACTOR SCRAM DOA 0500-05 LOSS OF REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM BUS DOA 0600-01 TRANSIENT LEVEL CONTROL DOA 1300-01 ISOLATION CONDENSER TUBE LEAK DOA 3500-02 LOSS OF FEEDWATER HEATERS DOA 4700-01 INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM FAILURE DOA 4400-01 CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM FAILURE DOA 4400-07 REACTOR OPERATION WITH ONLY ONE CIRCULATING WATER PUMP AVAILABLE DOA 6500-10 4KV CIRCUIT BREAKER TRIP DOP 0500-03 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM POWER SUPPLY OPERATION DOP 1200-03 RWCU SYSTEM OPERATION WITH THE REACTOR AT PRESSURE DOP 2400-01 CAM SYSTEM H2 AND O2 DETECTION SUBSYSTEM OPERATION DOP 4400-08 CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM FLOW REVERSAL DOP 4700-03 UNIT 2-3 INSTRUMENT AIR CROSS-CONNECT OPERATION DOP 5320-11 FILLING AND VENTING THE GENERATOR WITH HYDROGEN TO RAISE PURITY AND OR PRESSURE DURING NORMAL OPERATION DOP 5750-02 REACTOR BUILDING VENTILATION DOP 6400-08 345KV VOLTAGE CONTROL DOP 6700-20 480V CIRCUIT BREAKER TRIP DOP 6900-01 250VDC ELECTRICAL SYSTEM DOP 7500-01 STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM OPERATION TS 3.3.6.2 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION TS 3.3.7.1 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION (CREV) SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION
SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 24 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
PROCEDURE TITLE TS 3.3.8.2 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) ELECTRIC POWER MONITORING TS 3.5.3 IC SYSTEM
SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 25 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Simulator Scenario Review Checklist ILT-N-3 Quantitative Attributes 8
Total malfunctions (5 to 8) 2 Malfunctions after EOP entry (1 to 2) 5 Abnormal events (2 to 4) 2 Major transients (1 to 2) 2 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1 to 2) 1 EOPs contingency requiring substantive actions (0 to 2) 5 Crew critical tasks (2 to 3)
SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 26 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
- 15-1 ILT-N-3.cae
- For ILT Class 15-1 NRC Exam
- Written by DSS
- Rev 00
- Date 5/16
- INITIAL CONDITIONS ####
- Sets APRM Master Gain pot to 1.0 irf niagain 1.0
- Sets scram discharge volume hydraulic blockage and degradation to 94%.
imf rdhlvfpa 94.0 imf rdhlvfpb 94.0 imf rdhldega 94.0 imf rdhldegb 94.0
- Inserts failure of ESOP to auto start.
imf t53
- EVENT TRIGGERS
- Event Trigger 1 sets gain for all 6 APRMs.
trgset 1 "0"l2 trg 1 "irf niagainf true"l2
- Event Trigger 2 Unlatches 2B1 HTR Normal Drain.
trgset 2 "0"l2 irf fw3502au (2) unlatchl2
- Event Trigger 3 Activates when 2B1 HTR Emerg Drain opens.
- Holds 2B1 HTR Emerg Drain at 17% open.
- Forces up alarm 902-6 E-04, 2B1 Heater Emerg Drain Vlv Open.
trgset 3 "hdvdrain(1,2).gt. 0.05"l4 irf fwhdro1b (3) 17.0l4 irf fwhdrc1b (3) truel4 imf ser1243 (3) onl4
SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 27 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
- Event Trigger 4 Activates when 902-6 E-01, 2B1 Heater Lvl Hi, alarms.
- Holds 2B1 HTR Emerg Drain at 0.0% open.
trgset 4 "sezpoint(1231)"l6 trg 4 "irf fwhdro1b 0.0"l6
- Event Trigger 5 Activates when Trigger 4 is active and 2B1 Htr Extr Vlv CLOSE light is ON.
- After 30 sec, Holds 2B1 HTR Emerg Drain at 8.0% open.
trgset 5 "et_array(4).and. hdl3101c(1)"l6 trg 5 "irf fwhdro1b (0 30) 8.0"l6
- Event Trigger 6 Activates when alarm 902-6 E-01, 2B1 Heater Lvl Hi, clears.
- and 2B1 Htr Extr Vlv OPEN light is OFF.
- Holds 2B1 HTR Emerg Drain at 0.0% open.
trgset 6 "(.not. sezpoint(1231)).and. (.not. hdl3101o(1))"l8 trg 6 "irf fwhdro1b 0.0"l8
- Event Trigger 7 Activates when 2B1 Heater Extraction control switch is placed to PTS or OPEN.
- Holds 2B1 HTR Emerg Drain at 12% open.
trgset 7 "hdd3101s(1).or. hdd3101o(1)"l8 trg 7 "irf fwhdro1b 12.0"l8
- Event Trigger 8 Activates when 2B1 Heater Level is below 14.0 inches and trigger 7 is active.
- Removes hold on 2B1 HTR Emerg Drain.
trgset 8 "(hdlinst(1,2).lt. 14.0).and. et_array(7)"l10 trg 8 "irf fwhdrc1b false"l10
- Event Trigger 9 Activates when trigger 8 is active.
- Returns alarm 902-6 E-04, 2B1 Heater Emerg Drain Vlv Open, to NORMAL.
trgset 9 "et_array(8)"l10 trg 9 "imf ser1243 normal"l10
- Event Trigger 10 inserts an IC tube to shell leak at 1% severity trgset 10 "0"l12 imf ictublk (10) 1.0l12
- Event Trigger 11 Trips Generator MSOP.
trgset 11 "0"l12 imf k50 (11)l12
- Event Trigger 12 acknowledges stator cooling water & H2 Seal Oil/Alterrex Pnl trouble alarms.
SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 28 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16) trgset 12 "0" l14 irf t81 (12) truel14 irf t22 (12) acknowledgel14
- Event Trigger 13 trips the 2A Circ Water pump on overcurrent trgset 13 "0"l16 imf hp6 (13)l16
- Event Trigger 14 causes 2B RPS MG Set to trip simulating trip of 2B RPS MG SET 2B-1 EPA Bkr trgset 14 "0"l16 imf b02 (14)l16
- Event Trigger 15 places 2A RPS Bus on reserve power trgset 15 "0"l18 irf b03 (15) truel18
trgset 16 "0"l18 imf np2 (16) 90.0 10:00 5.0l18
- Event Trigger 17 installs MSL Grp 1 RPV level and Offgas High Radiation bypass jumpers trgset 17 "0"l20 irf ci59jp in (17)l20 irf ogogjp in (17)l20
- Event Trigger 18 installs scram jumpers trgset 18 "0"l22 irf rpjumpas on (18)l22
- Event Trigger 19 pulls ARI fuses trgset 19 "0"l22 irf aw4 pulled (19)l22
- END ####
SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 29 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Unit 2 Risk: GREEN Unit 3 Risk: GREEN Unit 2 is 980 MWe Leading Thermal Limit: MAPRAT @ 0.818 Action limit: 0.980 Equipment Unavailable: None Protected Equipment: None Unit 3 is in Mode 1 at Full Pow er Leading Thermal Limit: MAPRAT @ 0.819 Action Limit: 0.980 Equipment Unavailable: None Protected Equipment: None Current Action Statements None LCO Started:
LCO Expires:
TS Cause:
Unit 1 Plant Status Today U1 Diesel Oil Storage Tank Transfer House has grating removed. Currently roped off with pump installed to pump to U1 Oil Separator Pit as required. Outside operator monitor and pump as necessary.
Today Chem Cleaning ventilation status:
HV-1A/EF-1A are secured due to HV-1A inlet and outlet dampers being shut w ith fan on, IR# 913157, WO 1239746.
HV-1B/EF-1B are secured due to HV-1B throw ing its belts. WO 1156150.
HVAC -1 ON.
HV-2 running.
Switchyard Status Today TSO notified of oil leaks on 345 Kv BT 2-3 CB (IR 810135) ComEd WO 6396128 Today 138 KV Bus 1 Feed To TR 22 Combi Units has low oil in the 'C' phase, ComEd WO #276162 Today HVO: Exercise CAUTION w hile in the 345 kV Yard due to excavation being performed in the area.
Marv Evans reports holes being dug near manual sw itch disconnects 345kV Blue Bus. Plyw ood w ill be installed over the holes if access is needed, but be aw are there are holes under the plyw ood.
SSC called from the 345Kv yard reporting that the cable trough covers are removed to prep for upcoming w ork. Be careful.
SCENARIO ILT-N-3 Page 30 of 30 Rev. 00 (02/16)
Unit 2 Plant Status Today Unit 2 Activities
- Shift 1 Activities ****
- Shift 2 Activities ****
Perform DOP 4400-08 Circulating Water Flow Reversal. When Circulating Water Flow Reversal is complete, secure 2B Circulating Water Pump for maintenance next shift.
- Shift 3 Activities ****
Today