ML17053A611
| ML17053A611 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 03/15/1979 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17053A610 | List: |
| References | |
| SER-790315-3, NUDOCS 7904190101 | |
| Download: ML17053A611 (84) | |
Text
NCLOSURE 3
DRAFT FIRE PROTECTION SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION U.S.
NUCI EAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IN THE MATTER OF NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER COMPANY NINE MILE POINT-UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-220
0 t
1,. 0 INTRODUCTION Following a fire at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Station in March,
.1975, the Nuclear Regulatory Comnission initiated an evaluation of the need for improving the fire protection programs at all licensed nuclear power plants.
As part of this continuing evaluation, the NRC, in February 1976, published a report by a special review group entitled, "Recommendations Related to Browns Ferry Fire," NUREG-0050.
This report recomnended that improvements in the areas of fire prevention and fire control be made in most existing facilities and that consideration be given to design features that would increase the ability of nuclear facilities to withstand fires without the loss of important functions.
To implement the report's recommendations, the NRC initiai;ed a program for reevaluation of the fire protection programs at all licensed nuclear power stations and for a comprehensive review of all new license applications.
The NRC issued new guidelines for fire protection programs in nuclear power plants which effect the recommendations in NUREG-0050.
These guidelines are contained in the following documents:
"Standard Review Plan f'r the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuc1ear Power Plant," NUREG-75/087, Section 9.5.1, "Fire Protection,"
May 1976, which includes "Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants" (BTP APCSB 9. 5-1),
May 1, 1976.
b.
"Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants" (Appendix A to BTP APCB 9.5-1), August 23, 1976.
c.
"Supplementary Guidance on Information Heeded for Fire Protection Pro-gram Evaluation," October 21, 1976.
d.
e.
"Sample Technical Specifications,"
May 12, 1977.
"Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities, Adminis-trative Controls arid guality Assurance,"
June 14, 1977.
f.
"Manpower Requirements for Operating Reactors,"
memo from E.
G.
Case to R.
Boyd, V. Stello, and R. Mattson dated May ll, 1978.
All licensees were requested to:
(1) compare their fire protection programs with the new guidelines; and (2) analyze the consequences of a postulated fire in each plant area.
We have reviewed the licensee's analyses and have visited the plant to
'examine
%he relationship of safety-related components, systems and structures with both combustibles and the associated fire detection and suppression systems.
Our'eview has been limited to the aspects of fire protection w'ithin the NRC's jurisdiction, i.e., those aspects related to the protection of public health and safety.
We have not considered aspects of fire protection associated with life safety of onsite personnel and with property protection unless they impact the health and safety of the public due to potential release of radioactive material.
This report summarizes the status of our evaluation of the fire protection program at the Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation's Nine Mile Point Vnit 1 Nuclear Power Plant.
2.0 FIRE PROTECTION GVIDELINES 2.1 General Desi n Criterion 3 - "Fire Protection" The Conmission's basic criterion for fire protection is set 'forth in general Design Criterion 3, Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, which states:
"Structures, systems and components important to safety'hall be designed and located to minimize, consistent with other safety requirements, the probability and effect of fires and explosions."
"Noncombustibles and heat resistant materials shall be used wherever practical throughout the unit, particularly in locations such as the containment and the control room.".
"Fir e detection and protection systems of appropriate capac-ity and capability shall be provided and designed to mini-mize the adverse effects of fires on structures, systems and components important to safety."
"Fire fighting systems shall be designed to assure that their rupture or inadvertent operation does,not significantly impair the safety capability of these structures, systems and com-ponents."
2.2 Su lementar Guidance Guidance on the implementation of GDC-3 for existing nuclear power plants has been provided by the NRC sta'ff in "Appendix A" of Branch Technical Position 9.5-1, "Guidelines for Fir e Protection for Nucl'ear Power Plants."
Appendix A provides for a compr ehensive program assuring a substantial level of fire protection, beyond minimums that might be deemed to satisfy GDC-3.
The overall objectives of the fire protection program embodied in BTP 9.5-1 and Appendix A, are to:
(1) reduce the likelihood of occurrence of fires; (2) promptly detect and extinguish fires if they occur;
.('3),.maintain the..rapability to safely shut down 'the plant if fires
.o.ccur.; and
';('4')
prevent the release of a significant amount. of radioactive material
~f fires occur.
'Me,have.used the guidance of Appendix A as:appropriate in our review.
We have +valuated alternatives proposed by the licensee 4o various specific
-.:aspeMs;of -Appendix A using the overall objectives outlines;above to assure that-thesewbjectives are met for the actual relationship of combustibles, safety-related equipment and fire protection features of the facility.
1 3.0
SUMMARY
OF MODIFICATIONS The licensee plans to make certain plant modifications to improve the fire protection program as a result of both his and the staff's evaluations.
The proposed modifications are summarized below.
The implementation schedule for these modifications is in Table 3.1.
The licensee has agreed to this
=schedule.'he sections of this report, which discuss the modifications are noted in parentheses.
Certain items listed below are marked with an asterisk to indicate that the NRC staff will require additional information in the form of design details, test results, or acceptance criteria to assure that the design is acceptable prior to the actual implementation of these modifications.
The balance of the other modifications has been described in an acceptable level of detail.
Fire Detection S stems (4.2)
Fire detectors (early warning ionization type smoke detectors) will be provided over all trays carrying safety-related cable including the following areas:
4 (1)
Reactor Building (5.1), Elevations
- 198, 237, 261, 281,
- 298, 318 and 340 (2)
Control Building, Control Room (5.2.3)
(3)
Diesel Generator Building (5.3), Elevations 250 and 261 (4)
Turbine Building (5.4), Elevations
- 250, 261, 277, 291,
- 300, 320 and 333 (5)
Screen and Pump House (5. 5)
(6)
Waste Building (5.6)
(7)
Off-Gas Building (5.7) 3.1.2 S rinkler S stems Sprinkler systems will be provided for cable tray concentrations in excess of tqo deep, for all trays in the turbine building basement and where localized concentrations of vertical or horizontal cables occurred, including the following areas:
(1)
Reactor Building (5. 1), Elevations
- 237, 261 and 318 (2)
Control Building Control Room (5.2.3) and Cable Spreading Room (4.3.1.5 and 5.2.1.6)
C I
3.1. 3
\\
{3')
Diesel Generator Building (5.3.1), Elevation 250 (4)
Turbine Building (5.4), Elevation 250 (east and west basements),
26T. (where safety'related equipment is installed),,
277 and 300 (5)
Waste Building (5.6)
{'6)
Off-Gas Building {5.7)
(7)
Administration Building (5-8)
Five Sto s and Penetration Seals Suitable fire stops and/or penetration seals will be provided for el,ectrical cable runs in the following areas:
(1)'eactor Building (5.1), All Elevations (Z)
Control Building (5.2), Elevation 250
(,3.).
Diesel Generator Building (5.3), All Elevations
('4'),
Turbine Building Floor, Elevation 250 (5.4.1); floor, elevation 26T (5.4.4); elevation 277; and elevation 291 3
1'. 4'-
Fir.e; and. Heat. Barriers Fiire ar. heat barriers will be provided in the following. areas.-
(1:);
Reactor Building, Elevations 281 (5. 1A) and 298. (5.1.5)
('2)
DieseT Generator Building, Elevation 250:.
the area under. the diesels wiT1 be separated from cable runs (5.3.1)
(3.)
Turbine Bmlding (5.4), Elevation 250 and 261 (turbine. oil reservoi-r and turbine-oil storage room),
277',
291 and 300 (4)
Waste.'uilding (5.6.1), At elevation.
251
3.1.5 r
Fire Doors Upgraded fire doors wi.ll be provided in the following areas:
Elevation 250 261 261 261 261 277
,,Room Cable Room Auxiliary Control Room Waste Building Bailing Room Screen Pump House Control Room Hew Door Ratin Two "A" doors "A" door Two "8" doors "A" door "A" door Two "A" doors 3.1. 6 Additional R actor Buildin Modifications The following additional modifications will be provided in the Reactor Building:
(1)
At elevation
- 237, a fire hose standpipe (5.1.2)
Additional Control Buildin Modifications The following additional modifications will be provided in the Contl ol Building:
(1)
In the auxiliary control room the manual C02 system will be changed to automatic initiation by smoke detection Also, the HVAC system will be supplemented with a 100% fresh air and exhaust system (5.2. 2)
(2)
In the control room, portable 15, pound CO>.extinguishers
'have been mounted at each walk-in control panel.
ATso,.the false ceiling will-be modified to assure a flame spread rating of no greater than 25 (5.2.3)
'.1.8
. Additional Diesel Generator Buildin Modifications The following additional modifications will be provided in the Diesel Generator Building:
Ft (1)
At,elevation 250, the no.
103 d-g output cable will be rerouted.
Also, the cross-tie between redundant fuel lines will be removed and a
new one installed outside of the building (5.3.1)
(2)
In each d-g room, fire protection will be provided for exposed structural steel (5.3.2 and 5.3.3)
3 1,.9.
'AdditÃ:onal Turbine Buildin Mod.ifications The following additional modifications will be provided in the Turbine Building:
,'(1)
In the west basement, the offsite power cable far powerboard nd.
1'03 will be rerouted away from the powerboard no.
102 cables (5. 4. 2'.
(2)
At floor elevation
- 261, the chemical storage area has been relocat~
the floor cleaning machines removed, oil drains from the service air compressor have been "hard piped" and an "oil less." air com-pressor ordered (5.4.4}
(3)
En the turbine oil reservoir area the portable oil centrifuge was relocated and its hose penetration was closed (5.4.5)
(4)
At elevation 291, the cable reels stored here will be removed (5.4.:-
(5)
At elevation 300, 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated UL fire dampers will be installed in the oil storage tank room
',(.6)
Upgrade the south and west walls adjacent to the station trans-formers to assure protection from transformer fires (5.4.7, 5.9.61 3 '1..10dditional Waste Buildin Modifications The following additional modifications will be provided in the Waste
'Builxling:
(1.)'aste,oi1 storage drums will,be removed from elevation 261; they wil'1 instead 'be stored outside of the plant.
- Also, a fire cut-off
%rom 'the ',Waste Building -proper will be installed at the truck port (5.6..1) 3..I.TI Additional,General Hodifications Administrative Chan es The fol'lowing additional modifications and/or administrative changes are applicable to the plant, in general:
,'('1;)
,Riditiana1 traini,ng wi'll,be provided to fire brigade leaders
(2)
Pre-plans for fighting fires in safety-related/hazard areas will be completed (3)
Three 5200 CFN fire service type explosion-proof smoke ejectors and suitable ducting will be purchased (4)
Storage of clean-up rags in safety-related areas will be controlled (5)
Door frames which do not meet, the criteria of UL-63 will be replaced with frames that do meet criteria (6)
One hose house will be provided for every two hydrants containing equipment essentially duplicating that. at present hose houses (5.9.6)
(7}
Local alarms will be provided in areas having automatic detection systems (4.2) 3,1,12 Fire Fum (4.3.1.2)
(1)
Determine cause(s) for apparent anomaly in diesel pump performance and repair or replace equipment as necessary
t
Table 3.1 Im lementation Dates for Pro osed Modifications 3.1.1 3.1. 2 3.1.3 Modifications Fire Detection Systems Sprinkler Systems Fire Stops Penetration Seals Im lementation Date January 1,
1981 January 1,
1981 September 1,
1980 January 1,
1981 3.1.4 3.1.5 Fire Doors Fire and Heat Barriers January 1,
1981 January 1,
1981 3.1.6 Additional Reactor Building Modifications 3.1.7'dditional Control Building Modifications March 1, 1981 3.1.8 3.1.9 Additional D-G Building Modifications Additional Turbine Building Modifications 3.1.10 Additional Waste Building Modifications 3.1.11 Additional General Modifications/Administrative Changes 3.1.12 Diesel Fire Pump September 1,
1979
I I
4.0 EVALUATION OF PLANT FEATURES
- 4. 1 Safe Shutdown S stems There are several arrangements of safe shutdown systems which are capable of shutting down the reactor and cooling the core during and subsequent to a fire.
The exact arrangement available in a fire situation will depend upon the effects of the fire on such
- systems, their power supplies and control stations.
The licensee will install a safe shutdown panel, outside the control room, to effect safe shutdown considering a loss of the control room and"loss of offsite power.
Monitoring for emergency condenser and reactor pressure vessel level will be included.
During or subsequent to a fire, a safe shutdown could be achieved using safety-related equipment such as:
the reactor protection sys-tem, high pressure coolant injector system, depressurization
- system, emergency condenser
- system, shutdown cooling system, containment spray system, raw water system and core spray system.
Supporting systems and equipment such as the emergency diesel generators,:em-ergency batteries and a portion of the service water system would also be required.
4.2 Fire Detection and Si nalin S stems The plant has a protective signaling system which transmits various fire alarm and supervisory signals to the control room.
In addition to signals from heat or'moke detectors located in selected areas of the plant, the system also transmits alarm and supervisory signals-concerning operation or impairment of. the fire pumps, carbon, dioxide system, air foam system water spray, deluge and automatic.sprjgkler" systems and closing of'some valves in the fire protection water system.
The signaling system is provided with backup power in the event of a loss of-off-site power'y a connection to the emergency power supply system.
Ionization type smoke detectors or rate compensation type heat, detectors have been provided in selected areas of the plant.
The licensee will install additional smoke detectors so that detectors are provided over all trays containing safety-related cables.
The. five recirculating pump motor-generator sets on the 261 foot elevation of the turbine. building auxiliary equipment area each
.:contain.a considerable quantity of oil.
The nature and arrange-ment of heat detectors over these motor-generator
- sets, and the ventilating systems in the area will likely result in very slow detection of all but very large fires in this area.
Therefore, the licensee has proposed to install early warning smoke detectors.
The installed local application carbon dioxide extinguishing sys-tem at each motor-generator set may not, under such circumstances, provide prompt fire suppression.
In lieu of providing a curb around each motor-generator set to contain potential oil leaks and.spills as the staff 'requested, the licensee has proposed to install a level sensor in the fluid coupling of each motor-generator set, to alarm in the control room on. low oil level.
- For other areas of the plant, the licensee will conduct tests and/or perform studies to verify that, in areas of the plant containing or exposing safety-related equipment, detectors are located or will be installed to detect fires quickly enough to preserve the safe shut-down of the plant, given the anticipated manual or automatic response to the alarm.
Factors considered will include, but not be limited to, ceiling height, ventilation rate and air velocity, location and arrangement of combustibles, and obstructions to air flow..
,Alarm, supervisory, and trouble signals are annunciated in the control
.room visually, and audibly by a common alarm bell which is distinctive from other plant system alarms.
The licensee will install 1'ocal alarms in areas with automatic detection systems.
Me find that, subject to implementation of the above described modifi-
. cations, the fire detection and signaling system satisfies the ob-jectives identified in Section,2. 2 of this report and is, therefore, acceptable..
4.3. Fire Control S stems 4.3.1
~ll 3
The fire protection water supply for the plant is provided by Luke Ontario, which also serves as the ultimate heat sink.
Me find that the water supply satisfies the objectives identified in Section 2.2 of this report and is, therefore, acceptable.
The water supply is developed by two vertical shaft centrifugal fire pumps, each with a rated output of 2500 gpm at 125 psig.
The pumps, which take suction from a common sump (but through separate suction lines), are located in adjacent areas in the screen and pump house.
The electric motor driven pump is in an area with several safety-related pumps.
A diesel driven pump and its fuel tank and controller are located by themselves in a sprinklered room separated from the motor driven pump by 1-1/2 hour rated walls and a l-l/2 hour rated door.
The diesel fire pump room has a 1-1/2 hour rated separate ceiling whi.ch is lower than the roof of the screen and pump house.
The license has verified that the penetrations of the floor, ceiling, or walls of the room are sealed with materials in a design which has an established fire resistance rating of at least l-l/2 hours.
Yenti-lation duct penetrations have been provided with l-l/2 hour rated fire dampers.
Recent fire pump test reports appear to indicate that the diesel driven fire pump does not meet the performance requirements outline" in NFPA 20.
After correcting the variations in pump speed, the flow from this pump at discharge pressures near the rated head is approximately 10 percent below the typical pump characteristic curve, 15.percent below the manufacturer's certified curve, and 22 percent below the discharge of the electric driven pump.
As a
general rule of thumb, a maximum decrease of 10 percent in discharge capacity is tolerable over the life of a pump.
The licensee will determine the cause(s) for the apparent anomaly in diesel fire pump performance and repair or replace equipment as necessary by September 1979.
A UL listed automatic fire pump controller is co-located with the diesel fire pump.
No controller is provided for the 4160 volt electric motor driven pump, because none are manufactured for that voltage.
The diesel driven pump can be manually started from the.
control room or at its controller, but can be manually stopped only at the controller.
The motor driven pump can be manually started or stopped only at a circuit breaker adjacent to the pump.
Pump running, driver nonavailability, and pump driver trouble sig-nals are annunciated in the control room.
Additional annunciation is provided at the diesel fire pump controller.
The diesel fire
'ump controller is powered by the station batteries'he licensee will arrange the diesel engine to start automatically on loss of DC power to the controller.
Both pumps are arranged to start automatically if the pressure in the loop yard main falls below 100 psig.
A separate pres-sure switch to start each pump is provided.
The diesel engine has an air starter consisting of two receiver tanks and associ-ated equipment.
Each tank is capable of six starts at 30'F without refilling.
Power for the electric motor driven fire pump is supplied from the normal AC system.
Sufficient fuel to operate the diesel driven fire pump for eight hours is stored in a 275 gallon day tank next to the engine.
Two 30 gpm automatic electric driven centrifugal jockey pumps located in the same area as the motor driven fire pump, main-tain about 130 psig in the fire water system yard loop; These pumps also supply water to the seal water system.
We find that, subject to the implementation of the above described
- actions, the fire pumps satisfy the objectives identified in Section 2.2 of this report and are, therefore, acceptable.
4.3.1.3 Fire Water Pi in S stem Through a 12 inch overhead line, the separate 10 inch discharge line from each pump supplies the 8 and 10 inch fire service water loop main, part of which is run overhead through the turbine building.
Two connections to the Unit 2 fire service water sys-tem, with appropriate
- valves, provide the necessary alternative flow paths to assure availability of water to the Unit 1 fire service.water system in the event of a single failure in th'e Unit 1
piping.
All yard fire hydrants, automatic and manual water suppression
- systems, and interior hose stations are supplied by the loop main.
Exterior post indicator valves and interior'OSY valves subdivide the loop into a number of sections so that a single section could be isolated without impairing the entire system.
However, there are locations where the isolation of a single section could impair the availabili'ty of both automatic sprinklers and the backup hose stations in areas containing or exposing safety-related equipment.
The licensee has proposed to modify a portion of the system to pre-clude the loss of both automatic suppression systems and interior hose stations in areas so protected.
We will require the licensee to submit the details of such modifications prior to implementation.
C
Electrical subdivision is provided for the valve controlling the water supply to the wate'r spray and'oam water systems, as noted in Section 4.2 of this report.
Post indicator valves on the underground loop main; and fire pump discharge
- valves, sectionalizing valves inside the plant, and'alves controlling the flow of water to standpipes and sprinkler systems are locked open and checked monthly.
Yard fire hydrants have been provided at intervals of 200 to 300 feet around the exterior of the plant, except that protection on the east side is provided by two wall hydrants.
In addition to these two wall hydrants, exterior hydrants supplied by the Unit 2 fire service water main are now available.
The lateral to each hydrant is controlled by a key operated (curb) valve.
Two hose carts containing
- hose, nozzles, extinguishers, tools and other fire fighting equipment are provided in lieu of permanent hose houses.
One of these hose carts is outside, about 250 feet south of the south-west corner of the turbine building.
The other hose cart is inside the turbine building.
The licensee has p'roposed to provide one hose..
house for every two exterior hydrants, located as recommended in NFPA 24-1977, and essentially duplicating the contents of the present,.
hose carts.
Thread on hydrant outlets and'hose conriections throughout the plant are compatible with those of fire department's which. serve the plant.
We find that, subject to the implementation of 'the above described modifications, the fire water piping system satisfies: the. objectives
~ identified in Section 2.2 of this report and is, therefore, ac-ceptable.
Interior Hose Stations 1
Interior hose stations equipped:with'100 feet of l-l/2 inch diam-eter woven jacket-lined hose are provided in all areas of the plant except primary containment.
The licensee will provide hose stations.
inside primary:containment.
"Electrically safe" fire hose nozzles have been provided in a'reas containing electrical equipment.
The licensee will perform a hose stretch test to assure that all points in safety-related
- areas, and in other plant areas which contain major fire hazards, can be reached effectively by at least one hose stream with a maximum hos'e len'gth'f'00 'feet.
Additional hose stations will be provided where necessary.
The licensee has veri'fied that 100 gpm at a minimum residual-pressure of 65 psig is available at livery hose stations outlet in the plant.
We find, that, subject to implementation of the above described qodifications, the interior fire hose stations satisfy the objectives identified in Section 2.2 of this report and are, therefore, acceptabIe.
4.3.1...5 Water Su pression S. stems Wet pipe automatic sprinkler systems.
have been provided to protect the areas on elevations
- 250, 261 and 277 feet below the turbine generator and on elevations 250 and 261 feet west of the turbine generator; in the store room and shop area on elevation 261 feet of the administration building; the file area on elevation 250 feet of the administration building; the large and small equip-ment decontamination rooms and contaminated tool storage room on elevation 261 feet of the turb',ne building; the waste material boiler room and Iow level storage area on elevation 261 feet of the radwaste building; the diesel fire pump room on elevation 261 feet in the screen and pump house; and the oil storage room on.elevation 26T feet neat the stack.
A dry pipe automatic sprinkler system is provided in the reactor building track bay.
Automatic water spray systems have been pro-vi:ded to protect the oil-filled transformers located outside of thy. turbine building, the hydrogen storage rack',
and the turbine generator.
The. mai,n control valves for the turbine generator sprinkler and water spray systems are motor-operated with remote position indication andi operation in the control room and backup manual operators.
Valve motor, operators are powered from the stati'on batteries.
Control valves for," the remaining water spray systems are eIectrically supervised.
Control, valves for, other sprinkler systems are locked open and checked monthly,.
WateI-fj:ow in these systems is alarmed and annunciated in
'he'eontreI; room; The. I.icensee.
has generally proposed to install additional automatic sprinkler systems to protect stacks of more than two trays of safety-re1ated
- cables, in addition to all trays in the turbine bul:I,'ding where the effectiveness of manual fire fighting could be hampered.
by smoke.
Automatic sprinkler protection wiII also be, in-staTI'ed at'ocalized concentrations of el'ectrical cables.
Auto-matic. sprinkler protection of potential fire exposures to safety-r Hated~ trays wil:I also be provided.
Concentrations of safety-related cable over power boards will be sprayed with a flame retardant mate-rial'n lieu of installing automatic sprinklers to preclude water
,damage to the. power, 4oards.
A sprinkler system will be installed in
the cable spreading room as a backup to the existing COp sys-tem.
Additional sprinkler systems will also be provided as delineated in Section 5 of this report.
We will require the licensee to provide the design details of the proposed sprinkler protection for cable trays prior to implementation, including the design basis for water discharge density and sprinkler head spacing,
- location, and temperature rating.
We find that, subject to implementation of the above discussed modifications, the water suppression system satisfies the ob-jectives identified in Section 2.2 of this report and are, there-fore, acceptable.
4.3.1.6 Foam S stems Five foam water sprinkler systems are installed to protect the floor area beneath the turbine generator.
In addition, seven foam water standpipes supplying a total of twenty hose stations are provided on elevations 267 feet, 283 feet,. and 300 feeto'f the turbine building.
These hose stations are co-, located with
'plain water standpipes.
C.
Foam concentrate is stored in two redundant 600 gallon storage tanks in the foam room on el'evation 261 feet adjacent to'he turbine building.
Redundant, pumps supply foam concentrate from these tanks to the foam water sprinkler systems.
One pump is
'AC powered, the
,other is OC powered from the station batteries.
Opening of one of the motor operate) valves for these sprinkler systems actuates the pumps.
Automatic actuation of the motor operated valves.is provided by the installed detection systems in the areas protected.
Similar, but sma'lier, redundant pumps supply foam concentrate from the same tanks to the foam water standpipe
- system, which is auto-matically maintained at.140 to 160 psig by one of these pumps.
The systems have been designed to meet the requirements'of NFPA 16.
We find that the foam suppression system conforms to the objectives identified in Section 2.2 of this repor t and is,. therefore, ac-ceptable.
4.3.1.7 Effects of Su ression S stems on Safet S stems 4.g.2.
Fixed fire suppression systems have not been inswlled where their operation or failure could cause unacceptable damage to safety-related equipment.
In general, curbs, drains, and equip-ment pedestals limit the potential for flooding damage to equip-ment..
Open doorways will be used in certain areas without drains to remove water used for fire fighting.
There are no safety-related systems interlocked with fire fighting systems.
'1 Drip shielding has been provided for safety-related power boards as protection from water due to automatic sprinkler systens.
We find that the protection provided to protect safety systems from the effects of suppression system operation or fire water damage satisfies the objectives identified in Section 2.2 of this report and is, therefore, acceptable.
Gas Fire-Su ression S stems Total flooding carbon dioxide suppression systems are provided for the lube oil tank room, power board rooms
<101 and 103, generator exciter., turbine generator oil tank, diesel generators 102 and 103, cable spreading room and auxiliary control room.
Local application systems are provided for the motor-generator sets and turbine generator bearings.
Ionization type smoke de-tectors in the cable spreading room and auxiliary control
- room, and'ate compensation type heat detectors in each of the other protected areas alarm in the control room in case of fire.
Manual actuation onTy is provided for systems protecting the generator exciter, turbine. generator
- bearings, and turbine generator oil tank.
The auxiliary control room system is maintained in an "alarm only" status, and must be manually actuated.
The licensee will restore this system to fully automatic operation.
Carbon dioxide hose reels are provided at fourteen locations in the tur-bine building.
The amount of carbon. dioxide discharged into a particular area is generally controlled. by a timer.
No timer is provided for the manually actuated:
systems and discharge continues as long as the control switch is on.
A ten ton low pressure storage tank 'supplies
the fixed systems and the carbon dioxide hose reel stations in the turbine building.
The same tank also provides carbon dioxide via separate piping to purge the main generator hydrogen system.
A positive mechanical'nterlock in the tank prevents the level of carbon dioxide from being reduced below the minimum required for two complete discharges of carbon dio'xide into the 1'argest area protected by this supply.
The licensee intends to remove this interlock to make additional C02 available to extinguish a generator fire.
A low-level annunciator will be installed and administrative instructions issued to assure the minimum sup-ply required by the technical specifications for fire suppression is available.
Interlocks are provided to close dampers or doors, or shut down local ventilation systems, in areas protected by carbon dioxide suppression systems.
High and low pressure conditions in the carbon dioxide storage tank are alarmed and annunciated in the control room.
Oetectors in any area protected by carbon dioxide systems are'lso annun-ciated in the control
- room, as described in Section 4.2 of this report.
~ r In the event of'a total loss of OC control powe'r the master con-trol valves on the carbon dioxide system will fail "open".
Indi-vidual systems could. then be actuate'd by manually opening the appropriate selector valve.
We find that, subject to implemen'tation of the, above" described modifications, the design of gas fire-suppres'sion
=-systems satis-fies the objectives identified in Section 2.2 of this report and is, therefore, acceptable.
Portable Fire Extin uishers Hand-portable and wheeled.type extinguishers are provided thr ough-out the plant in accordance with the provisions of NFPA 10.
(Three types of extinguishers are provided depending on the intended fire fighting use.
Ory chemical extinguishers using "Purple K powder" are provided in 150-pound wheeled and 20-pound hand-portable sizes.
Carbon dioxide.extinguishers are provided in 5 and 15-pound hand-portable sizes.
Pressurized water extinguishers are provided in the 2-1/2 gallon size.)
10 We find that the type,and distribution of portable fire extin-gui.shers satisfies the objectives identified in Section 2.2 of this. report and is., therefore, acceptable; 4.4-Venti,lation.S stems and Breathi'n E ui ment 4.4..1 Smoke'emoval Ventilation systems are provided for all interior plant areas, but these systems are not designed specifically for smoke removal.
Nevertheless, the installed air handling systems. are capable of exhausting limited volumes of smoke, generally directed to the outside.
major exceptions include the turbine building basement from which air diffuses to the upper f'loors of the turbine building, cable spreading room which has no ventilation system, the main and auxiliary control rooms. which are provided with supply air only, the screen house and diesel generator rooms whicg have roof vents only, and the 8102 and 103 emergency switchgear rooms.
The. l.icensee.
has proposed various modifications to existing venti,l.ating systems, to handle smoke. removal and preclude smoke spread to safety-rel:ated areas.
The modifications will include:
(1) a fresh air input and exhaust system desioned to evacuate smoke during a. cpptral room or. auxiliary control room fire;
(,2) the. smoke. removal fag for.the control room system will also
.be capable of ejecting smoke from the cable spreading room; (3)
'oof.-mounted heat. and. smoke vents for-the turbine building; and,,
(4)'til.ization ot existing ductwork with some modifications for air* and smoke exhaust and additional ground-level intakes to suppl.ament supply air for the turbine bu~lding'asement.
In agdiCton:, tpree 5260; CFM'i,re:, servi.ce. type smoke ejectors with fTegi'bTe; ducti.ng; weal:1'., be provided for exiaent situations.
The licensee will verify that the failure or inadvertent operation of. these. systems will not'iolate the controlled area boundaries of'he plant.
'he licensee will arrange to monitor smoke and gases exhausted from areas containing radioactive materials, to determine if rel'ease to the environment is within the permissable limits of the. plant Technical Specifications.
11 '"
We find that, sybject, to implement=-:ion of the proposed modifi-
- cations, the smo'ke r'gmov'al sys'tems satisfy the objectives identi-fied in Section 2,2 ofthis'report 'nd are, therefore, acceptable.
t v
Filters Charcoal filters are installed in
-.e emergency ventilating sys-tems for the r'eactor building and;e control room.
The licensee will provide smoke detectors and a -.arual actuated dry pipe sprin-k'ler system to protect the charcoa1 filters in each system.
The charcoal columns in the offgas system in the turbine building are provided with temperature sense."s.
The licensee has indicated that a fire will be detected by these sensors and annunciated in the control room, following which t;e columns would be isolated to extinguish the fire.
The licensee will verify that a fire in these columns would not impair the =bi lity to isolate
- them, and that isolation of these columns wil', not result in 'an exc'essive release of radioactivity from some ".ther part of the plant.
We find that, subject to the impler=-ntation of the above modifi-
- cations, the protection for the fil:ers satisfies the objectives identified in Section 2.2 of this r port and is, therefore, ac-ceptable.
~ 5 Breathin E ui ment The plant has a total of thirty-eic.",t sets of breathing equipment with an additional fifty-two spare :ottled,'ea'ch rated at one half hour.
A new breathing air cor,"ressor will be instal led on elevation 261 feet of the administr=-tion building.extension by about August 1979.
At that time, t.;e'icensee wil.l hav'e the c'apa-bility to supply breathing air to t~n m'n for aeast"six hours at the rate of three.
{one half hour rated) bottles per man per hour.
We find that breathing equipment da-.isfies the objectives identified in Section 2.2 of this report and is, therefore, acceptable.
Batter Room Ventilation Continuous ventilation, at a rate,>-.>,excess of the rate of genera-tion of hydrogen, is necessary to i.event dangerous concentrations of hydrogen from accumulating in s~~ti on battery rooms.
Ventilation
air As supp,lizid through a louvered opening in the.door to each.,room,
-and exhausted through a xiuct connected Co the turbine *burl'ding exhaust system.
The l.imnsee wi'1'1 instal 1
>make.iietectars and an.iform Nor 'les's.of bakery venom venti-lati:on in each room.
We Wind that, subject to implementation of the 'above described modifications, protection against hydrogen accumulation in battery rooms satisfies the objectives identified in Section 2.2 of this report and is, therefore, acceptable.
>4.5 Floor Drains The licensee has performed an analysis of standing water damage to safety-related equipment.
The conclusion indicated that the com-
.bination of floor drains, floor sumps and ponding capability is suf-ficienf to prevent damage to safety-related equipment resulting from expected Tire suppression.
In one area, the diesel generator building,
,where Chere is a potential for fuel oil to spread:between
.the redundant
.diesel mnera4or rooms through the comon floor drain system, the lizensae ~ ~n the process of routing these drains.dir ectly to the
~outride af %he building.
<<Ma fled aha% the floor drains for Sire Vighting activities satisf~ the m53a&'iives ~xlentii'ied in Section 2.2 of this report and.are, therefore.,
~gtable 4.::6 J i. 'kti;n
- 5. zMms Zmer@erxcy ";liah&ag ~s sqppli:ed 4y Rhe "AC lipton.ng system basked
.up by idiesel @eneraMrs and.a'.taU.on >~erie.
Por&blj 'hand lights zr e 42m ~vail.ab.l e..
We A'nd Chai emergency lighting satisfies
%he abjecUvj s identMied in
'.Section
.'2 P. ef %tris.repart and is therefore,;acceptable.
4..7
.Gammer'izatian Z,stems
- A voice-;powered emergency
.comnuni:ca'ti.on -system is installed in the plant.
'..Ehe thread sets Wr the xylem have.been 'placed in the fire protection
,cabinet Co ~use Chein availabf']ity,.
Two~way radios.are also available Nor~ nf She W~e 'fi:ahri,ng teams,.
'Fixed.repeaters are -not presently installed ar needed according to She 'licensee..
13
We find that the communication systems satisfy the objectives identified in Section 2.2 of this report and are, therefore, acceptable.
H 4.8 Electrical Cables II 4'on-combustible materials are used for cable tray construction.
Auto-matic water sprinkler systems will be installed on safety-related cable trays which are stacked more than two trays deep.
Detection will be provided for all safety-related cable trays.
Interior fire hoses are provided in the vicinity of all cable trays.
Safety-related equipment in the vicinity of such cable trays have protection or will be provided protection if damage may occur from sprinkler operation..
The use of fire retardant materials are proposed for areas where safety-related cables pass over or near power boards.
Fire retardant materials will be also used to provide separation of cable runs and eliminate cable tray fire continuity.
Fire breaks have been proposed=
for certain cable runs to prevent the continuity of cable fires.
Originally installed cable construction does not comply with the re-quiremepts of the IEEE 383 flame test.
Therefore, detection will be provided.for all safety-related cable trays and sprinklers will be provided for heavy concentrations of, cable trays.
Cable, trays and conduit are used only for cables.
Cables in the control room, are kept to a minimum necessary for operation.
Cables entering the control room " '
terminaty there.
Cables are not. installed.in floor trenches or culverts.'e find that, subject to the implementation of the above discussed modifications, the electrical cables satisfy the objectives identified in Section-2.2 of this report and are, therefore, 'acceptable.
~~ ~
~
~
~
Fire barriers are penetrated by doorways,
- cables, conduit and'piping.
The means of sing a fire barrier through these various below.
~
~ \\
~
ventilation ducts, electi ical preventing a fire from cros-penetrations is discusse'd
1.4
~Doorwa s
I Fi:re Parriers separating vari'ous fire areas are penetrated by numerous doorways., mast of which have-a l-l/2 or 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rating.
The remai'ning doorways are provided. with nonraCed doors, some of which the licensee has proposed to replace with 3 or l-l/2 hour rated fire doors as appropriate, except for the battery rooms.
The licensee has evaluated the battery room doors and determined that the construction is equivalent to a 1-1/2 hour rated door.
During the site visit, the staff observed unlabelled fire door frames in certain doorways, and unlabelled transoms in the door-ways to the battery control rooms.
The licensee plans to replace these unlabelled frames with labelled fire door frames, or to demonstrate that the installed frames are designed, constructed and installed in accordance with the applicable provisions of Underwriters Laboratories Standard 63.
The unlabelled transoms wi'll be replaced with 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated transoms should their con-struction be found to be unacceptable.
During the site visit the staff also observed that nonlabelled ventilation. intake louver'ere installed in the doors to the adjacent station kattery. rooms:.
Fine door louvers. provided in the doors to the battery; ropms (or other areas containing or exposing safety-
':.related.'quipment)'ill-Pe appropriate'Iy rated,, labelled, fusible 1:ink. operated fire door l,ouvers.
.Fi'pe doors, to. safety-related and vital areas in the plant are l,acked. closed apd alarm in the control room when opened except iior, the three inner doors between the. diesel generator rooms
.and,'djacent.
power board rooms.
Ne will require these three doors;.to: he. el.ectncally supervised.
Doors in stairwells wi11, be arranged to be self-closing so that the door will close it-self after having been opened.
Me find that, subject. to implementation of the above described modificator'ons, protecti.on for door penetrations of fire barriers satfsjies-the objectives identified. in Section 2.2 of this re-port and. is, therefore, acceptable.
4.9.2 I
~ S S
~l~.
Ventilation Ouct Penetrations Fire dampers are installed in selected ventilation system pene-traions of the fire barriers in various, parts of the plant.
The major known exceptions are penetrations of the perimeters of the turbine building basement, the waste disposal building; and the control room.
The licensee will verify that labelled fire dampers are installed in all ventilating system penetrations of all fire barriers which separate safety-related areas from each other or from areas presenting a significant fire hazard.
In ventilation ducts that pass through rated fire barriers, the licensee will provide fire dampers with established fire ratings sufficient to deter fires with the combustible loading in the given area.
The fire dampers will be actuated by fusible links or smoke detectors.
All fire dampers will have ratings of three hours, unless the licensee justifies a rating of l-l/2 hours.
Ouring the site visit, the staff observed that the fire dampers installed in the auxiliary control room venti lation system ducts were inside the room.
Fire dampers are required to be installed at the point where the ducts in which they are provided pass through the fire barrier.
The licensee will insta11 fire dampers.in the ventilating system ducts for the auxiliary control room, and any other areas where fire dampers are required or provided, in the duct at the point where the duct passes through the fire barrier.,
.0..)
Me find that, subject to implementation of the, above described
~f
(,~~.~~ modifications, protection of ventilation duct penetrations satis-c - ~-
.L fies the objectives identified in Section 2.2 of this report and
('g 7 ga, therefore, acceptable
,~', ~~-'-4.9.3 Electrical Cable Penetrations P
~
Electrical cable penetrations in fire balriers are generally sealed with a variety of materials and designs, the fire resistance ratings of which have not been determined by any test method acceptab'ie to the staff.
The licensee will determine the ratings of existing designs in accordance with IEEE Standard 634-1978.
This. test method meets the staff requirements for tests of electrical cable penetra-tions, except that it does not provide a pressure differential across the barrier equivalent to the maximum expected in the plant.
There may be cable penetrations through fire barriers in. the plant, across which pressure differentials exist.
Me will require the fire resist-ance ratings of these penetrations to be determined, with such pres-sure differentials applied during the fire test.
I I
< ~
16 I
The licensee plans to provide three hour'ated seals on all
.cable.penetrations in the plant.
We find that, subject to implementation of the above described modifications, protection for elecirical cable penetrations of fire.barriers satisfies the objectives idqntH'ied in Section 2.2 of this report and is, therefore, acceptable.
-4.9.4 Pi in Penetrations Piping penetrations through fire barriers, except for those in the reactor building, are generally not sealed.
The licensee has not indicated the fire resistance rating of those penetrations which are sealed.
The licensee wil'1 test proposed piping penetrations in accordance with applicable sections of IEEE Standard 634-1978, "Cable Pene-tration Fire Stop gualification Test", although this test'ethod is not designed for piping penetrations.
The licensee will in-sta'il piping penetrations with fire resistance ratings equal to the barriers they penetrate.
The licensee plans to seal all piping penetrations between safety-related
- areas, and between safety-related and nonsafety-related areas.
Me f'izd that, subject to implementation of the above described
,modifications, protection for piping penetrations of fire barriers watisfies thy objectives identified jn Section.2.2 of this report
..and is, therefore, acceptable.
".4.;1'O'Se aration Criteria Separation criteria are not based upon Regulatory Guide 1.75.
- However, in. most instances cable separation meets or exceeds the guidelines.
of that 'document for %he T rbine and Reactor Buildings.
Separation of redundant circuits is achieved in the Turbine Bui1ding by routing cables on the East or West side of the building.
Further separation is. provided by locating trays above or below floor elevation 261 feet..
Any one of the following groups of Turbine Building cable trays ensures safe shutdown of the plant.
Cable Trays above Elevation 261 feet, or
,2.
Cable Trays below Elevation 261 feet, or 3.
Cable Trays above and below Elevation 261 f'eet on the East side, or 4.
'Cab1e Trays above and below Elevation 261 feet on the West side.
1 Separation of redundant circuits in the Reactor Building is achieved, by routing cables on the East or the West side of the building. If either the e~st cable tray or the west cable tray systems are opera-ble, the reactor can be safely shutdown.
The licensee will provide appropriate fire barriers and other protective measures to insure integrity of the cable tray separation system in the event of a fire, as described in paragraph 4.8.
We find that, subject to the implementation of the above described modifications, separation criteria satisfy the'objectives identified in Section 2.2 of this report and is, therefore, acceptable.
4.11 Fire Barriers Fire areas are enclosed by floors, walls, and ceilings which have three hour fire resistance ratings.
However, there are plant areas in which the failure of exposed structural steel suppor ting these fire barriers could impair the safe shutdown capability of the plant.
These areas include the turbine building, diesel'enerator
- rooms, and others.
The licensee will provide protection of the exposed structural steel in the diesel generator rooms and any other area where the failure of such steel could jeopardize the safe shutdown capability of the plant.
We find that, subject to implementation of the above described modifi-
- cation, the design of fire barriers satisfies the objectives identified in Section 2.2 of this report and is, therefore, acceptable.
4.12 Access and E ress Three stairwells will be enclosed to provide escape and access routes for fire fightinp activities.
The southeast stairwell in the Reactor Building and the northwest and southeast stairwells in the Turbine Building will be enclosed.
,Fire doors for each elevation will be provided.
The use of the remaining stairwells in other plant buildings will be established'y fire plan practice in drills.
We find that, subject to the implementation of the modifications de-scribed
- above, access and egress satisfies the objectives identified in Section 2.2 of this report and are, therefore, acceptable.
18 4.13 'Toxic and Corrosive Combustion Products T~.he,products of combustion of many polymers are toxic to humans and corrosive to metals.
Prompt fire detection and exti-nguishment are
,re1ied,upon fo reduce the quantity of=.such products..during a fire..
Means of smo'ke removal,
-as discussed in 'Section 4.4.1, are. provided
.as an aid in fire fighting access.
Members of the fire brigade.wi11 be provided with, and trained in the use of, emergency breathing apparatus for fighting fires involving such materials.
We find that, subject to implementation of the modifications described e1sewhere in this report, the precautions taken to reduce the effects
.of toxic and corrosive products satisfies the objectives identified in Sect'ion 2.2 of this report and are, therefore, acceptable.
4 14 'Nonsafet
-Related Areas We.have evaluated the separation by distance or by fire barriers of nonsafety-related areas to determine that, subject to implementation uf modifications described elsewhere in this report, fires in such
.areas will not adversely effect the ability to safe1y shutdown the
- p".lan't..
"Nonsafety-related areas which potentially pose a fire hazard to safe shutdown equipment arq addressed
'in Section 5.0 of this report.
- ".We ",have also evaluated Me -effects of fires in radwaste areas in terms ef raIdmacfive,releases, and,'have determined that fires in such areas
- vn l1.not result in unacceptable consequences.
5.0 EVALUATION OF SPECIFIC PLANT AREAS ll gt +
I The licensee has performed a fire hazard analysis of the facility to determine the fire 1 oading of vari ous plant areas, to identi fy the consequences of fires in safety-relate'd and adjqining nonsafety-related ar eas, and to evaluate the adequacy of existing an/ proposed fire protection systems.
We have evaluated the assumptions, methodology, and.conclusions of the fire hazard analysis in detail.
The results of the fire hazard analysis, other docketed information an) site visit observations were used in the staff's evaluation of specific plant areas to assure that the objectives stated in Section 2.2 were met.
'Fhe staff's evaluation of specific areas is discussed in the following subsections.
f
'I
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~
P
~ A lit
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5.1 Reactor Bui1 din The f'o'llowing evaluation is applicable to the Unit 1.Reactor Building.
5.1 I
Floor Elevation 198 Feet 9.1.1.1 Safet -Related E ui ment Redundant containment spray pumps and core spray pumps are located in this area, in separate rooms.
5.1.1. 2 Combustibl es E1ectrica1 insulation and oil for pump motors.
'5.1.1.3 Conse uences if No Fire Su ression Since the pump motors are widely separated an unmitigated fire at one motor would not affect the other motors.
5.3.1.4
+iie Protection S stem
":Fare suppression is provided by interior hose stations.
'5 l.l =5
.Ade uac of Fire Protection At yreqent, inadequate:
unsealed cable penetrations would
.permit heat and smoke to spread outside the fire area, and She cable itself might propagate the fire.
Also lack af automatic detection would allow the fire to continue unnecessarily.
Interior hose stations are satisfactory for suppression of fires i~ the pump cubica.ls.
5.1 1 5 Modifications The 1icensee will provide fire detection and will provide 5uiMble Tire stops l'or vertica'1 cable mns at floor,penetrations in the.reactor building.
We find that, subject to the implementation af fhe above-described modifications, the fire protection f'r *his area satisfies
%he objectives identified in Secion 2 2 Qf Chir report and is, therefore, a cceptab Ie.
5.1.2 Floor Elevation 237 Feet 5.1.2.1 Safet -Related E ui ment 5.1.2.2 Core spray topping pumps, control rod drive pumps, miscel-laneous valves and cable trays are located in this area.
Combustibles Electrical insulation and oil for pump motors, P.V.C. jacketing on cables in cable trays and some clothing in change room.
5.1.2.3 Conse uences if No Fire Su ression Overall fire load for the floor is low but an unmitigated fire could r esult in the loss of safety-related equipment and cables.
- 5. 1.2.4 Fire Protection S stem 5.1.2. 5 Fire suppression is provided by hose stations.
Ade uac of Fire Protection 5.1.2,6 At present, inadequate:
unsealed cable penetrations would permit heat and smoke to spread outside the fire area, and the cable itself might propagate the fire.
Also, lack of automatic detection would allow the fire to continue unnecessarily.
Modifications Detection for cable concentrations and safety-related motor installations will be provided.
'Sprinkler protection for heavy cable concentration areas at wall penetrations, will be provided.
Cable penetrations through the floor will be sealed.
Detection and a fire hose standpipe will be provided inside of the primary containment to be used during refueling.
'I We find that, subject to the implementation of the above-described modifications, the fire protection for this area satisfies the objective identified in Section 2.2 of this report and is, therefore, acceptable.
5'.5..3l F,Toor E.l'eva;ti'on 261, Feet 5'..lI. 3'.,lI 5.,1'.,3'..2!
Safet';Re.l'ated.'
ui ment-Powerboards. and'hutdown cooling pumps and: valves and cable trays are located, in this area.
C'ombu stibl'es 5I..li..3'.,3; Electrical insulation for motors, P.V.C. jacketing on cables, some. wood',, gas, (in tanks) and, plastic in; storage area,,
and.
resin in the precoat tank.
Conse uences. if No Fire Su ression 5..1I,.3';.4';
5'i..3'..5 Qvera:1,1 fire. load for, the floor is low,, but, an unmitigated fi're; could'result in the loss of redundant safety-related equipment and cables.
Fi:re Protection S stem I
Figure. protection is provided by hose. stations and..drys automatic.
spr,i'nkl.'er, pr,otection. (in the. trackbay, area),.
Ade uac of. Fire Protection 5:.1'.3. 6 At present, inadequate:
cables could propagate, fi're: in, power.-
boards
- and, a lack of automatic detecti'on,, could allow. a, fi;re-to contfnue unnecessarily.,
Modifications Detection for.cable concentrations and safety-related.
power-boards will be installed.,
A fire retardant material wi.ll be.
placed over all safety-related cable trays that pass over-or near powerboards.
Sprinklers wil.l be provided for.general tool storage and safety-related cable. concentrations.
Fire retardant material will also be placed on cables as a fire f
break in the cable trays to prevent the spread o fire.
Me fTnd that, subject to t'e implementation of the above-described modifications, the fire protection for this area satisfies the, objectives-=
$ denti+ied 5n Section 2. 2 of this report and is, therefore, acceptable.
5.1.4 Floor Elevation 281 Feet
- 5. 1.4.1 Safet -Related E ui ment Powerboards and filter pumps and panel are located in this area.
5.1.4.2 Combustibles 5.1.4.3 Safety-related cable trays with P.V.C. jacketed cables, power-board insulation on the north and west walls.
Localized fire loading within the area.
Conse uences if No Fire Su ression Overall fire load for the floor is low, but an unmitigated fire could result in the loss of redundant safety-related equipment and cables.
5.1.4.4 5.1.4.5 Fire Protection S stem Fire protection is provided by hose stations.
Ade uac of Fire Protection 5.1.4.6 At present, inadequate:
cables could propagate fires in powerboards, and a lack of automatic detection could allow a fire to continue unnecessarily.
Modifications Detection for cable concentrations and safety-related power-boards will be installed.
A fire retardant material will be placed over all safety-related cable trays that pass over or near powerboards.
A barrier will be used to separate powerboard 155 from powerboard 17 to assure that a fire in one board will not spread to the other.
Fire retardant materials will be used as a fire break in cable trays to prevent the spread of fire.
We find that, subject to the implementation of the above-described modifications, the fire protection for this area satisfies the objectives identified in Section 2.2 of this report, and is, therefore, acceptable.
'5..'l.5 Floor Elevation 298 Feet 5..1..5.
1 Safet -Related E ui ment Emergency cooling valves, and liquid-poison pumps and valves are located in this area.
5;1.5.2 Combustibles Electrical insulation ahd oil (small quantity:
approximately one gallon).
5.1.5.3 Conse uences if No Fire Su r ession Overall fire load for the floor is low, but an unmitigated fire could result in the loss of redundant liquid poison pumps.
'.5.,1.5.4
'Fire 'Protection S stem
'Fire, protection is provided by hose stations.
- 5..1,:5.'5
'Ade uac of 'Fire Protection At present, inadequate:
a fire involving one of the liqu'id
.poison pumps could affect the adjacent pump.
.5..'.l.'5.6 Modifications
'Detection near the safety-related equipment, will 'be '.provided.
.Also, a radiant heat barrier will be installed, between the liquid-poison.pumps to prevent fire damage to both pumps.
'We find that, subject to the implementation of the above-described modifications, the fire protection for th'is area:satisf'ies the objectives identified in Section 2.2 of this report and is,,therefore, acceptable.
5.1.6 Floor Elevation 318 Feet 5.1.6;1 Safet -Related E ui ment Containment spray valves are located in this area.
5.1.6.2 Combustibles Electrical insulation and oi'I (for motors) and some plastic and wood (transient outage storage).
5.1.6.3 Conse uences if No Fire Su ression Overall fire load for the floor is low, but an unmitigated fire could result in the loss of redundant safety-related equipment.
5.1,6.4 Fire Protection S stem Fire protection is provided by hose stations.
5.1.6.5 Ade uac of Fire Protection At present, inadequate for transient material storage
- area, since a fire in this material could affect safety-related, equipment and cables.
5.1.6,6 Modifications Detection near the safety-related equipment will be installed.
, Also, sprinklers will be provided for the transient outage equipment storage area.
We find that, subject to the implementation of the above-described modifications, the fire protection for this area satisfies the objectives identified in Section
- 2. 2 of this report and is, therefore, acceptable.
5.1.7 Floor Elevation 340 Feet
$.1.7.1 Safet -Related E ui ment There is no safety-related equipment which is used to shut down the reactor in this area.
5.1.7.2 Combustibles Fire hazards are present during refueling and generally represent a transient fire load of small consequence.
5.1.7.3 Conse uences if No Fire Su ression The consequences of no fire suppression in this ar ea would not result in the release of radioactive material to the environment in excess of 10 CFR 20 limits.
5.1..7A-Fire Protection S stem Fire protection is provided by hose stations.
5..T.,7.'..5 Ade uac of Fire Protection Generally satisfactory; however, detection sh'ould, be provided'o limit the spread of fire in the equipment storage area.
- 5. 1;..T.6!
Modifications Fire hazards will be handled by. administrative procedure.
Detection will be provided for the equipment storage area in the northeast corner of the building at elevation 340'.
Me find that, subject to the implementation of the above-described modifications, the fire protection for this area satisfies the.
objectives identified in Section 2.2 of this report and's, therefore, acceptable.
5.2 Control Buildin The following evaluation is applicable to the Unit 1 Control Building.
5.2.1 Cable Room Elevation 250 Feet 5.2.1.1 Safet -Related E ui ment Safety-related cable trays are located in this area.
5.2.1.2 Combustibles Electrical insulation (P.V. C. jackets) on cables in cable trays.
5.2.1.3 Conse uences if No Fire Su ression An unmiti,gated fire could result in the loss of redundant systems required for safe shutdown.
5.2.1.4 Fire Protection S stem The area has C02 automatic protection initiated by smoke detection in the room.
Manual hose stations are installed in the vicinity.
5.2.1.5 Ade uac of Fire Protection At present, inadequate:
the C02 system may not be capable of suppressing a fire in this area.
Ventilation is inadequate to remove smoke produced by burning cable insulation.
5.2.1. 6 Modifications A sprinkler system will be installed in the room as a backup to the C02 system.
All penetrations will be sealed.
Doors will be replaced with "A" label fire doors.
The HVAC system will be expanded to include smoke removal capability.
We find that, subject to the implementation of the above-described modifications, the fire protection for this area satisfies the objectives identified in Section 2.2 of this report and is, therefore, acceptable.
10 5..2..2 Auxil.iar Control Room and Com uter Room Elevation 250 Feet 5..2.,2.1 Safet -Related E ui ment The. auxiliary control room contains equipment necessary for station operation and for safe reactor shutdown.
5.2..2'.2 Combustibles El'ectrical cable insulation, electrical wiring within ihe control boards, and paper (in the computer room).
.5.2.2'..3'onse uences if No Fire Su ression An unmitigated fire in the auxiliary control room has the potential for damaging significant amounts of redundant safety-related equipment and cabling.
5:.'Z.;:2.4 Fire Protection S stems The area has a manually actuated COZ system and interior hose stations are installed in the vicinity of these rooms.
'5.Z'.2.'5'de uac of Fire Protection The present situation is unacceptable since a fire in thi.s.
area could prevent occupancy of the control room proper;.
destroy redundant cabling and seriously inhibit safe. shutdown of the. reactor.
5.2..2..6 Modifications The: manual COZ system will be changed to automatic ini.iation by smoke detection.
The. room will be sealed to provide enclosure for, the COZ and ventilation will be: tripped before COZ initiation.
The existing HVAC system will be enhanced with a 1005 fresh air input and exhaust
- system, including new supply and exhaust
- ducts, a
smoke exhaust fan, and additi-onal dampers.
(The. new system will be designed for emergency use to remove scoke.)
One fire door., presently "8" labeled,. will be replaced with one "A" labeled.
The licensee has also proposed to provide an emergency shutdown panel to be independent of this area (i.e.,
see
- 5. Z. 3).
We find that, subject to the implementa.ion of the above-described modifications, the fire'protection for his area satisfies the objectives identified in Section'.2 of'his report and is, therefore, acceptable.
5.2.3 Control Room Elevation 277 Feet 5.2.3.1 Safet -Related E ui ent The control room contains equipment necessary for station operation and for safe reactor shutdown, including operating indicators, controls and alarms.
5.2.3.2 Combustibles Electrical cable insulation, electrical wiring within the con-trol boards, floor covering, a false ceiling, and some paper (procedures ).
5.2.3.3 Conse uences if No Fire Su pression An unmitigated fire in the control room has the potential for damaging significant amounts of redundant safety-related equipment.
'.2.3.4 Fire Protection S stem Manual hose stations are provided in the vicinity.
5.2.3.5 Ade uac of Fire Protection At present, inadequate:
unmitigated fire could inhibit capability to shutdown the plant from the contro1 room.
Lack of detection could allow fire to propagate unne essarily in redundant cables in control cabinets.
5.2.3.6 Modifications Smoke detection will be installed in the control cabinets and above the ceiling.
12 An emergency shutdown panel will be provided outside the
'control room for principal control of equipment with sufficient moni'toning information, including emergency condensor and reactor pressure vessel fluid levels, to effect safe shutdown of the. reactor.
l~~
Three hour rated ("A" label) fire doors.wil-l-be provided at all entrances to the control room.
Por table 15 pound C02 extinguishers have been mounted on the wall at the entrance to each control room walk-in panel.
The false ceiling will be replaced with one having flame spread and smoke development ratings of no greater than 25.
Me find that,. subject to the implementation of the above-described modifications, the fire protection for this area satisfies the objectives identified in Section 2.2 of this report and is, therefore, acceptable.
5.3 Diesel Generator Buildin The following evaluation is applicab'Ie to the Unit I Diesel Generator
'Building.
'5'..3". I:
Floor Elevation 250 Feet'.
Under Powerboard Rooms and Diesel Generators
'5..".3..1 1'afet -Related Equi ment
.-Diesel generator output cables from both diesel generators are located in this area.
"5:;-3;;1."2.
<<Combus.t.i:,bl.es Cable insulation and diesel fuel oil, via an oil leak from diesel generators or the fuel supply.
5.3.1.3
.Conse uences if No Fire Su ression A single fire could damage the output cables from both emergency diesel generators.
13 5.3,1.4 Fire Protection S stem Manual hose stations are installed near the area.
5.3.1.5 Ade uac of Fire Protection At present, inadequate:
an unmitigated fire could damage output cab 1 es from both di es el g enera tors.
5.3.1. 6 Modificati ons The licensee has proposed to:
Provide 3-hour rated fire barrier below the diesel generator rooms to separate the redundant fuel oil lines and to contain fuel oil spills.
Provide curbs to contain oil spillage inside each room.
Relocate the output cables from diesel generator 103.
- Provide rated fi,re barriers and doors to separate the.
area directly below the diesel generator rooms and the power. board rooms from adjoining areas.
Remove the cross tie between the diesel generator fuel oil lines to prevent a fire in one area from disabling both diesels, and provide a new cross tie'utside the building.
Instal,l smoke detectors
.in the area below b'oth diesel generator rooms.
l Install automatic sprinklers in the areas below both diesel generator rooms.
We find that, subject to the implementation of the above-described modifications, the fire protection for this area satisfies the objectives identified in Section 2. 2 of this report and is, therefore, acceptable.
"~
14
'5..3.2 Diesel 'Generator Rooms Elevation '.261:Feet 5.:3.2,.;1 Safet -'Related E ui ment Diesel generators No.
102 and 103 are located in separate rooms in this area, as well as associated controls and auxiliary equipment and safety-related cables for other systems in the plant.
Electrical cables for diesel generator 102 fuel oil'system and several other safety systems are run through diesel generator room 'l03.
5.'3.2.'2
.Combusti bl es About 400 gallons of diese1 fuel oil in a day tank, about 350 ga'jlons of lube oil, and a considerable quantity of electrical cable insulation are in each of the two diesel generator l'toms
.'5..3.:2,.3
'.Conse uences If No Fire Su ression
'The diesel'enerator rooms are separated from each other and from other -areas of the plant by 3-hour rated fire barriers,
- except that electrical cable penetrations from these 'rooms to the.basement 'level are not sealed.
The basement area beneath these rooms is not subdivided, nor is it.separated from the rest of the basement level.
In addition, structural steel 'in the:Ciesel generator rooms is not,protected,against'Sire
'damage.
The electrical cables.in diesel generator room '103
- are.covered.with a flame
- retardant
- coating, and further enclosed in a 'missile shield as protection against:a diesel generator explosion.
,An unmitigated fire involving the diesel fuel:oil in one:of
'the diesel generator rooms would be like'ly to di,sable the particular diesel generator, and could damage the structural
,steel supports for the, walls and roof.
Some of the structural
- steel is common to the roofs of.both diesel generator rooms.
Therefore,
.a large fire in one diesel generator room could d'isable 'both diesel generators.
- Such:a fire in diesel generator room '103 'wou'ld a'iso ex'pose certain electrical cables serving diesel generator 102.
However, the flame retardant coating and the heavy steel missile shield may provide some protection.
In addition, a
fire or other high temperature condition originating in or near the redundant electrical cables in this room might affect both diesel generators.
The sills at the doorways of the diesel generator rooms are probably adequate to contain the total contents of one of the diesel generator day tanks, with or without the room drains functioning.
Fuel oil leaking through the unsealed floor pene-trations to the basement level or a pipe break in the the basement level below the diesel generators, could result in a fire involving cables and fuel oil piping from both diesel generators, and other cables in the turbine building basement.
There is also a potential for fuel oil to spread between the redundant diesel generator rooms through the common floor drain system.
The licensee has a satisfactory method of shutting off the supply of fuel oil to the day tank in each diesel generator room.
The arrangement of level sensors in the fuel oil day tanks will provide an alarm in the control room when about 175
'allons is left in either of the tanks.
Leaks of more than about 7
gpm while the diesel generator is running would eventual'ly draw the level of the day tank down far enough so that a low-low level alarm would be annunciated in the control room; smaller leaks would not draw the level down and would not, therefore, result in a signal.
5.3.2.4 Fire Protection S stems Pach diesel generator room is provided with. a total flooding carbon dioxide extinguishing
- system, automatically actuated by rate compensation type heat detectors.
Operation of the carbon dioxide system in either diesel generator room is arranged to automatically close the motor operated door to the
- exterior, and shut down the ceiling exhaust fans.
Portable fire extinguishers are located in each diesel genera-tor room, and nearby all of these areas.
Interior hose stations are located in each diesel generator room.
16
~ ii!
5.3.2.5 Ade uac of Fire Protection The fire protection is not adequate to prevent possible damage to redundant safety-related cables or equipment.
Unsealed cable penetrations would permit heat and smoke from a fire to spread outside the fire area, and the cable itself might propagate the fire directly.
These same penetrations could.
serve as pathways for diesel fuel oil spilled in the diesel generator rooms.
The floor drain system could allow combustible liquids to spread from one diesel generator'oom to the other.
The collapse of unprotected structural steel could damage both redundant diesel generators.
The automatic carbon dioxide extinguishing system should be effective in suppressing a fue1 oil fire.
However, if the exterior door did not close or if the ventilating system fans did. not stop, the carbon dioxide might be dissipated without extinguishing the fire.
In addition, operation of the ventilating system may.preclude timely fire detection in these rooms.
5.3.2.6 Modifications The licensee has proposed to:
Protect the exposed structural steel in each diesel generator room.
Provide electrical'cable penetration seals with fire resistance ratings required by the fire hazards analysis.
I Provide smoke detection.
Modify the floor drain system to eliminate this potential pathway for the spread of combustible liquids between redundant diesel generator rooms.
- addition, we will require. the licensee to:
Relocate redundant cables out of diesel generator room 103, or provide the results of an analysis which demonstrates that an unmitigated fire in this room would not degrade, the functioning of'hese cables.
17
~g 1
Electrically supervise the door between the diesel generator rooms and between the power board rooms so that an alarm sounds in a const'antly. attended location.when. one of the doors is open.
Provide the results of.- an analysis or test which demonstrates that the installed and proposed fire detection devices in the diesel generator rooms will be effective under all operating conditions which may exist in these rooms.
Mith the above modifications, we find that the fire protection of this area satisfies the objectives of Section
- 2. 2 of this report and is, therefore, acceptable.
5.3.3 Powerboard Rooms Elevation 261 Feet 5.3.3.1 Safet -Related E ui ment Powerboard Nos.102 and 103 are located in this area.
5.3.3.2 Combustibles Insulation on the wires inside the powerboard and on the cables within the room.
5.3.3.3 Conse uences if No Fire Su ression An unmitigated fire in a powerboard room could result in the loss of one onsite power source.
5.3.3.4 Fire Protection S stem Interior hose stations are installed adjacent to the area.
Fixed automatic C02 systems are installed in each room which are activated by heat detection in the rooms.
The cabling in the rooms has been coated with flame retardant material.
5.3.3.5 Ade uac of Fire Protection v
NIJ The lack of detection could allow a fire to propagate unneces-sar ily should the C02 systems be ineffective in extinguishing the fire.
18 5..3.3;6 Modifications
'Smoke detection will be provided.
Fire retardant materials
.wi-11;be employed Xo.cover safety-rel.ated cable trays in.the room.and 'floor penetrations.
'Adequate'ly rated and designed penetration seals will be provided between the powerboard and the 250 foot elevation.
'We find that, subject to the implementation of the above-described modifications, the fire protection for this area satisfies the objectives identified in Section
- 2. 2 of this report and is, therefore, acceptable.
19 5.4 Turbine Buildin
/
The following evaluation is applicable to the Unit 1 Turbine Building.
II 5.4.1" Floor 'levation 250 Feet Electrical cables for numerous safety-related systems are located in this area.
5.4.1.2 5.4.1.3 Combustibles
/
The combustibles in this area consist mainly of electrical cable insulation, miscellaneous ordinary combustibles, and several offgas system charcoal coIumns.
A rupture of the turbine oil sys-tem could release as much as 9,000 gallons of lube oil into this area.
Oil drained from the service air compressor on elevation 261 feet is carried to a metal drum on elevation 250 feet by flexi-ble tubing.
Conse uences If No Fire Su ression Three fire zones genera11y separated from each other by 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated fire barriers have been designated on this level by the licensee.
Zone Tl is the area generally west and south of the turbine generator, and Zone T2 the area east of the turbine genera-
- tor, and Zone T3 the area directly beneath the turbine generator.
Zones Tl and T2 are not physically separated from each other by fire barriers and doors.
Fire barriers separating these areas from adjacent areas of the plant are genera11y incomplete.
An unmitigated'fire in Zone T3 would not be expected to affect adjacent fire zones on this level.
An unmitigated fire in Zone Tl could involve electrical cables of redundant safety-related divisions in Zone T2, and vice versa.
An unmitigated fire in Zone T2 could also involve safety-related cables in the area beneath the emergency diesel generator building or the adjacent
,power board rooms.
Heat and smoke from fires in any part of this elevation could propagate to upper levels in the turbine building through numerous open stairs or ventilating system ducts.
A fire in the part of Zone T2 containing redundant offsite power feeds to the power board rooms couId cause the loss of all off-si te power.
20
/
5.4.1.,4'ire Protection S stems
'Re. storage area in Zone Tl at the west end, of. the turbine genera-tor, is protected by an automatic sprinkler system.
The floor be--
neath the turbine generator is protected by five automatic foam-water spr'inkier systems.
Portable extinguishers and interior hose stations are provided throughout this level.
5.4.1.5 Ade uac of Fire Protection The automatic suppression systems should be effective in control-ling fires which start in the protected ar eas.
Manual suppression of fires in other parts of this area should be adequate to limit
- damage, but the lack of automatic detection and complete fire barriers may permit redundant safety-related systems to be af-fected.
Damage to safety-related cables and equipment in'other areas may occur because of openings in existing fire barriers.
5'.4.1.6 Modifications The licensee has proposed to:
o 1'nstall automatic detection systems and automati.c suppression.
systems to protect safety-related cables in trays.
o Install an automatic sprinkler system to protect the nobl'e gas. equipment area.
Install fire barriers and fire doors. to complete, the: separation between Zones Tl and T2.
oi Enclose the stairs in Zones Tl andi T2: from thfs TeveT:
to~ the 261 foot elevation.
o.
Install fire doors in the fire barriers between Zone T2 and.
the area beneath the diesel generator and the. power, board:
rooms.
o Install fire detection systems in two parts. of Zone: T3..
o, Instal.l fire dampers in the ventil'ation system ducts'erving this area of the plant..
0 Reroute the offsite power cable for power board no.
3 from the area containing.power board no.
2 cables.
h.
Verify that safe shutdown can be achieved and maintained in event of a fire in any part of this area, assuming the simultaneous loss of off-site power.
5.4.2 With the above modifications, we find that the fire protection of this area satisfies the objectives of Section 2.2 of this report and is, therefore, acceptable.
Batter Board Rooms Elevation 261 Feet 5.4.2.1 Safet -Related E ui ment Power boards and associated cables are in each room.
5.4.2.2 Combustibles Power board and cable insulation are the principal combustible materials in these rooms.
6.4.2.3 5.4.2.4 Conse uences If No Fire Su ression An unmitigated fire jn either of these,,rooms would damage installed equipment and cables.
Non-rated cable penetrations from each room to battery rooms above and to the redundant adjacent battery room could provide a means for the spread of fire to 'adjacent areas.
The unlabelled transom above the door to each of these battery board rooms has not yet been shown to have adequate fire resist-ance go prevent a fire in the surrounding turbine. generator area from damaging the contents of both battery board rooms.
The licensee's fire hazard analysis has concluded that it will be possible to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in event of a fire in these rooms, using equipment and cables located elsewhere.
Fire Protection S stems Portable fire extinguishers and interior hose stations are available in nearby areas.
22 5 4'.Z'.5 A'de. uac of Fire Protection 5"..4".,2. 6 5 4l.S ManuaT. Are fighting, equipment should be: adequate; to control ar suppress, a Fire in ar,. near these rooms-but the lack of'utomatic.
detection would, permit a; fire to confinue: unneces:.-:
sari'Ty.
'J
) '.J o
Install automatic detection systems in these rooms.
The licensee will:
o Install 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated cable penetration seals.
We find that, subject to implementation of the above described modtR~tions, the. fire protectian for this area. satisfies the objectives identified in Section 2.;2 of this report and'is, therefore, acceptabTe;.
R'emai-rrder of'loor.
ETevatian 261; Feet-'n addition, the licensee will assure that the fire resistance
..~of the transoms over the doors to these rooms is adequate to prevent damage to cables or equipment in these rooms from a
,fire. in adjacent areas.
5! 4!.3~ '6 Fafet -Related E ui ment ETectricaT cables for various safety-related systems and equip-ment incTuding reactor feedwater and feedwater booster pumpr,-,
cT'osed.'water pumps, air compeessors,.
various. associated vaTves-,-,
and'ower.
boands.
Tl. and." 12 are: on this.: level'f'he. turbine:
buG'ding.
Most. of these items of. safety-relat'ed equi'pment. are Toe@ted'ithin. about 20 feet of-their redundant counterparts.
5..4'D':M Combustibl es E7ectricaT cable insuTation,. lubricating oiT mainly in five re-circulating pump motor generator sets, and various transient combustih1.es. ('i..e,. i'ncl'udes delivery trucks in track bay) are in; thix. area-.
Some. of the charcoal columns for the. offgas sys-tem sr~ Tacated i'; this-area..
A,chemicaT'torage.
area: an. this.
TeveT. is-'djacent to safety-reTated cabl'e= trays.
23
'.4.3.3
+II, ~
~
~
.Conse uences'f No Fire Su ressio g'wo principal fire.'zones generally separated':from each other by 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />;rated,.fire. barriers.have be=n.designated on this level.
Zone T3 is the area" cont'ain~ng the turbine generator,-and Zone T4 is the remainder of this level.
Several areas within Zone T4 are further enclosed by 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated barriers; A major fire involving the turbine generator would cause con-siderable damage to it and the are=- in which it is located, including the upper levels of the:."uilding.
Collapse of the exposed structural steel framed roof is possible.
The major fire in Zone T4, such as in the moor generator sets, cou'Id damage large amounts of safety-rel=-ted cables and equipment, including some redundant systems.
The licensee's fire hazards analysis concludes, that safe shutdown could be achieved and main-tained using equipment and cables
'ndependent of these areas in event of fire.
A fire in the o-,fgas system charcoal filters-is not expected to cause major damage or to release an excessive amount of radioactivity.
5.4.3.4
'Fire Protection S stems 5.4.3.5 Automatic sprinkler systems are pnvided in the decontamination
-,area, the oil storage room, and at the, wood storage area adjacent to the west end of the turbine generator area.;Automatic foam water sprinkler systems are provided to protect the turbine genera-tor area.
A m'anually'actuated car)on dioxide system is provided for the motor generator sets.
Alarm is provided by rate compensa-tion type heat detector s located a:ove these hazards.
Portabl e fire.extinguishers, carbon dioxide hose reels, interior hose
- stations, arid foam.w'ater hose 'stations are provided for manual fire fighting.
A high temperature alarm is proVided for the off-gas charcoal columns.
Presently, a single failure in the fire protection water system in this area could disable both fixed suppression systems and backup interior hose stations, in some loc tions.
Ade uac of Fire Protection I
The instaTled automatic and manual-suppression'ystems should be capable of controlling or extinguIshing postulated fires, except that automatic detection of a fire at the motor generator sets may be delayed as discussed in Sectior 4.2 of this report.
Subsequent C
24 carbon dioxide fire suppression efforts may not be. successful.
- Aq oil,l,eak from the motor generator sets, could spread a
considerable distance due to the lac'k.of cur'bs i'his area Manual fire fighting in other'reas should 'be adequate, a1-4hough lack of automatic detection will,permit Vires to con-tinue unnecessarily.
5.4.3.6 Modifications The licensee will:
Provide automatic sprinklers and detectors for safety-r elated cable penetrations and localized fire hazards including the truckway entrances, storage
- areas, and the laboratory areas.
Protect safety-related cables in trays over or near the power boards with flame retardant coatings.
o Seal floor penetrations on this elevation, and enclose s ta i.rway.
'o
'Seal wall penetrations at the turbine generator lube oil tank room.
<o
'Modify the 'fire protection water system.piping in,this area to,preclude loss of both fixed systems.and interior 'hose
.'protection in the same location by a.single failure in the
- piping system.
'"Hard,pipe" the oi1 drains from the service air compressor aiid i emove the Vl.qxible tubing.
(An "oil less" compressor is slated to be'nstall,ed in its Iplace.:)
Move the chemical storage area 6 feet to the south i:o elim-inate the hazard to the safety-related
- cables, and install
.a 'fire suppression system in the:new.area..
0 Install low level sensor s in the. mo'tor generator set Vluid couplings to alarm and annunciate in the control room.
a Provide a radiant heat shield between redundaiiC feedwater
- pulgps
25 5.4.4 5.4.4.1 We find that,. subject to implementation of the above described modifications, the fire protection for this area satisfies the objectives identified in Section 2.2 of this report and is, therefore, acceptab'le.
Turbine Oil Reservoir Elevation 261 Feet Safet -Related Equi ment There is safety-related cabling in corridors outside the turbine oil reservoir room.
5.4.4.2 Combustibles Up to 14,000 gallons of lubricating oil (in reservoir) and some residual oil in portable oil centrifuge.
5.4.4.3 Conse uences lf Ho Fire Su ression An unmitigated fire could result in the loss of safety-related cable in the general area.
5.4.4.4 Fire Protection S stem A manua'flv actuated C02 system is installed inside the reservoir and area foam water sprinklers are provided in the room, with manual foam hose stations and water hose stations in adjacent areas available as backup.
Fire detection is installed.
5.$.4.5 Ade uac of Fire Protection Fire protection provided for this area should preclude a fire
'nside the rooq from affecting the safety-related cabling in the outside corridor.
5.4.4.6 Modifications No modifications are required, We find that the fire protection for this area satisfies the objectives identified in Section 2.2 of this report and is, therefore, acceptable.
5:;p';K turtrine: Oil Stora e
Room Elevation 261'eet."
5:;4'..5=,T'af
-Re1ated.
E ui ment, There: is; no. safety-related equipment which is; used: ta. shutdown the-reactor in this area.
5....4..5..2.
Combustibl es Up to 1000 gallons of lubricating oil.
5'O'.R3.'onse uences If Ho Fire Su pression An unmitigated fire probably would not affect. any safety-related equipment.
5.4;5.=.4 Fire; Protection S stem A sprinkler system is provided.
able as backup.
5'..4'.S..F Ad uac of Fire Protection Interior hose stations are avail-Fire-protection is considered to be adequate. for this area-P 4'-'..5:,6.'>>
Mod.ificati ons.
5.4.'.6.
Na mode'fications are-required.
Me. find. that the fire protection for this area. sati'sfiez-the.
obj.ectTves identified in Section 2.2 of'his'eport and. is,-
therefore, acceptable.
Batter Room Elevation 277 Feet 5'..4";6.T S'afe
-Related E ui ment S'tati'om batteries and associated cab'1es are. located in these redundant. adjacent rooms.
27 5.4.6. 2 Combustibl es Electrical cable insulation is:the principal combustible in these rooms; hydrogen gas may be generated during battery charging.
5.4.6.3 Conse uences If No Fire Su ression A major fire in one of these rooms could damage installed equip-ment and cables, but not be expected to affect areas outside the room of fire origin.
5.4.6.4 Fire Protection S stem Portable fire extinguishers and interior hose stations are avail-able from nearby areas.
5.4.6.5 Ade uac of Fire Protection 5.4.6. 6 Manual fire fighting equipment should be adequate to control or suppress a fire in one of these
- rooms, but lack of detection would allow the fire to continue unnecessarily.
Modificatidns The licensee will install fire detectors and an alarm for loss of ventilation in each room.
In addition, the licensee will:
o Replace or verify that existing doors to these rooms are l-l/2 hour rated fire doors.
Verify that any louver installed in the doors to these rooms is a rated fire door louver.
Verify that rated fire dampers are installed in the room exhaust ducts at the point where the ducts pass through the ceiling of each battery room.
We find that, subject to implementation of the above described modifications, the fire protection for this area satisfies the objectives identified in Section 2.2 of this report and is,.
therefore, acceptable.
0 28 5.4. 7 R'emainder of F1oor Elevation 277 Feet 5.4.7 1
Safet -Related E ui ment Power board 101 and electrical cables are the major safety-related items in this area.
5.4.7.2 Combustibles Safety-related
.P.-;VW~acketed-cables in cable trays are spread along the west, east and south walls.
The power board is a.
localized fire hazard.
The station transformers are outside of the wes.
and south walls behind non-fire rated wal1s.
The hydrogen seal oil unit is located on the west side of the tur-bine generator.
5.4.7.3 Conse uences If No Fire Su ression 5.4.7.4 Two principal fire zones generally separated from each other by 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated fire barriers have been designated on this level.
Zona= T3 is-the-area.
containing. the turbine generator, and moisture separators
'and Zone T4 is the remainder= of this level..
(The bat-tery rooms/within Zone T4 have been previously discussed.)
l
~ t
$~mafor fire. in Zone-- Ta~could cause considerable damage to., the.- tur-bine-generator, and to'upper levels of the building.
Collapse of the. exposed structural steel framed-roof is possi'ble.,
A major fire ia. Zone T4 could cause damage to safety-related cables or equip-ment, including the redundant station battery rooms.
The outside walls. near the south and west corner-of the turbine generator building;: do: not have a fire resisiance rating., and may be, incapable of.- preventizg:,
a, major fire in the. outside transformers. from; causing damage in this area.
The licensee's fire hazard analysis concludes that safe shutdown could be achieved and maintained using equipment and cables independent of these areas.
Fir e Protection S stems
.Automat-ta sprinkler systems and foam water sprinkler systems have been instklled to protect the turbine generator and the immediate virinitp., including the-hydrogen seal oil unit.
Portable extin-guishers:,. carbon dioxide hose reels, and interior hose stations: are provided for"manual'ire fighting.
In addition;-. foam water hose stations.= are. also. provided around the turbine.- generator.and in the.
southwest portion of this level.
29 5.4.7.5 Ade uac of Fire Protection
~ The installed automatic suppression systems snould be capabl'e of controlling. or extinguishing postulated fires Manual fire fighting'n other areas should be adequate, although lack of auto'ma'tic detection will'ermit fires to ccntinue".unnecessarily.
t
'5.4.7.6 Modifications'he licensee will:
o Install an automatic sprinkler system and automatic; detection system to protect the welding area..
o Install automatic sprinklers and auto-.,atic detection to pro-tect heavy concentrations of safety-related cables.
o Upgra e
e west and south walls near the rans ormers to assure protection from transformer fires.
e Apply flame retardant materials in the safety-related cables in trays over or near power boards.
Enclose the hydrogen seal oil unit and associated piping in a
3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated fire barrier, or provice other suitable pro-tection.
'I
'n addition, the licensee will verify that the 'south and west walls near the transformers will have 3'our fire resistance ratings when modifications are complete.
5.4.8 5.4.8.1 Me find that, subject to implementation of the above described modifications, the fire protection for this arda i5tisfies,.the objectives identified in Section 2.2 of this repor't and is,'
therefore, acceptable.
r Floor Elevat'ioo 291 Feet Safet -Related E ui ment
./
Feedwater pump nos.
11 and 12~ HPCI valves, and D.
C. valve board no.
12 are located in this are'a, as well as some safe:y-r'elated cables.
5:4..8 '2 Combustibles 30 tg y /
~
< p~
,Major combustible materials on this level include ',lubricating oil, motor and cable insulation, w'iring in power boards',
miscellaneous transient combustibles inc'iud'ing arable reels, are also stored here.
Charcoal filters for the reactor building emergency ventilating system are located about 100 feet away in a separate section of the turbine building at about this elevation.
$.4.8.3 Conse uences If No Fire Su ression 5.4,.8.4 A major fire on this elevation would damage the safety-related cables and equipment located here.
The licensee's fire hazard analysis has concluded that it will be possible to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in event of a fire in this area, using equipment and cables in other plant areas.
I Fire Protection S stems Portable extinguishers, interior hose stations, a carbon
.dioxide hose reel, and a foam water hose station.are available on this elevation for manual fire fighting.
Ade uac of Fire Protection The 'installed manua'1 fire fighting equipment should 'be.capable of controlling or extinguishing a fire in this area, a.lthough the lack of automatic detection will allow the fire 'to.continue mnneccessarily.
'Modifications The licensee will:
o Install automatic detectors over power boards, heavy cable concentrations, and localized f'ire 'hazards o
Apply a flame retardant coating on cables in trays over or near power boards.
o Move cable reels now stored on this 1:evel to a new storage area on elevation 300 feet of the Curbine.'bui.l.ding.
f/
31 r,v' rf q.
Enclose a stairway, in the northwest corner of the area in
" a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> r'ated stair shaft.~
c>'~
o Provide sms'oke detect'ors and a manual sprinkler system for the charcoal filters.
fo Install a radiant heat shield to prevent postulated fires
~from spreading from one feedwater pump to the other.
We find that, subject to implementation of the above described modifications, the fire protection for this area satisfies the objectives identified in Section 2.2 of this report and is, therefore, acceptable.
5.4. 9 Floor Elevation 300 Feet 5.4.9.1 Safet -Related E ui ment There is no safety-related equipment which is used to shutdown the reactor in this area.
5.4.9.2 Combustibles Electrica1,insulation
{motors), hydrogen, charcoal filters {venti-lation equipment), clothing and wood (changing area),
and wire insglation (power board).
5.4.9.3 Conse uences If No Fire Su ression Overall floor fire loading is moderate, although collapse of the exposed structural steel framed roof is possible.'he licensee's fire hazard analysis conclude's that safe shutdown could be achieved and maintained using cables and hquipment independent of this area in case of fire'.
5.4.9.4 Fire Protection S stems Manually actuated 'water spray>a'nd foam water sprinkler systems are provided to protect the turbine generator area.
Rate compensation
. heat. detectors in the protected area alarm and annunciate in the contro]
room.
32 A. total flooding carbon dioxide extinguishing system pro'tects',
the; turbine generator exciter housing,,
and. a; 1'ocal'pplication, carbon diqxide extinguishing system protects: the turbi'ne; genera--
tor bearings and associated piping and equipment.
'Both systems.
are manually actuated, and rate compensation heat detectors, i;n the protected areas alarm and annunciate in the control room.
Ventilation duct dampers in the generator exciter housing shut automatically on discharge of the carbon dioxide system in that area.
Portable extinguishers, interior hose stations, foam water hose
- stations, and carbon dioxide hose reels are provided at various locations in this area.
5.4:..9.5 Ade uac of Fire Protection The installed suppression systems should be capable of controlling
'or extinguishing postulated fires in this area.
Manual fire fighting equipment should be capable of controlling or extinguishing, fires not protected by insgalled
- systems, although lack of auto-matic detection will permit these fires to, continue. unnecessari'ly..
5:.,$ 9: 6: 'odifi'cations The: l.icensee will:
onsta11 automatic detection, systems.
for, power boards.
and:
ventilation equipment..
o Create a general storage area in the. southwest corner," of elevation 300 feet, enclosed in
- a. rated.'ire barri'ee;.
Auto-matic detection and sprinkler systems'ill'e; i'nba'Tied'. here.
o Provide smoke detectors and manually actuated sprinkler systems for charcoal filters.
o:
Enclose seveVH stairways in rated shafts.,
o install roof vents over the turbine generator area.
I We;- find that, subject to implementation of the. above described:
modifications, the fire protection for this. area satisfies.
the.
obIectfves identified in Section 2.2 of, this report and, is there$ 'ore; acceptabl q.
wj
33 5.4.10 Lube Oil Room Ele ation 305 Feet 5.4.10.1 Safet -Related E ui ment There is no safety-related equipment which is used to shutdown the reactor in this area.
5.4.10.2 Combustibles Up to 30,000 gallons of lubricating oil.
5.4. 10.3 Conse uences If No Fire Su ression An unmitigated fire in this area should not affect safe shutdown equipment nor result in the release of radioactive material to the environment in excess of 10 CFR 20 limits.
5.4.10.4 Fire Protection S stem A total flooding C02 system is installed.
The walls of the lube oil room have fire resistance ratings of 2 or 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
The. floor has a l-l/2 hour rating.
5.4.10.5 Ade uac of Fire Protection The installed suppression systems should be capable of control-ling 'or, extinguishing postulated fires in this area.
5.4.10.6 Modifications 5.4. 11 The licensee will install 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated fire dampers ih the venti-lation duct penetrations of the lube oil room.
We find that, subject to implementation of the above described modificat'ions, the fire protection for this area satisfies the objectives identified in Section 2.2 of this report and is, therefore, acceptabl e.
g>> (
Floor Elevation 320 and 333 Feet
/
~
5.4.11.1 Safet -Related E ui ment I
There is no safety-related equipment whi ch is used to shutdown the reactor in this area.
34
'5.4.11.2 Combustibles Motor insulation (ventilation equipment) arid rome:clothing in a change area.
.5.4.11.3 Conse uences If Ho Fire Su ression Overall fire load is low, and an unmitigated fire in the area should not affect safe shutdown equipment nor result in the release of radioactive material to the environment in excess of 10 CFR 20 limits.
5;4.11.'4 Fire Protection S stem Interior hose stations and portable extinguishers are available.
5.-4.11.5 Ade uac of Fire Protection The existing fire protection equipment should be capable of controlling or extinguishing postulated fires in this area.
.:5.:.),.11 '6 Modifications Automatic detection will be provided 'for locali.zed,ha'zards;and the clothing change area.
':We find that, subject to implementation 'of"the.above describe'd modifications, the fire protection for this area'satisfies the objectives identified in Section Z.Z of this report.and is, therefore, acceptable.
5 5
.Screen and Pum House
'he following evaluation is applicable to the 'Unit 1 'Screen a'nd,'Pump House.
5.5.1 Floor Elevation 256 Feet 5.;5.1.1 Safet -Related E ui ment
.~Dies& jive-pump, emergency service water pumps, containment spray pumps, electr-ical fire-pump, and diesel generator '.,cooling water
- pumps.are.located in this area.
35 5.5.1. 2 5.5.1.3 Combustibles.
Fuel oil, electrical cable insulation, and plastic wire insulation (for power boards).
I 1
Conse uences If No Fire Su ression An unmitigated fire could result in the loss of redundant equipment required for safe shutdown.
5.5.1.4 Fire Protection S stem C~ Interior hose stations and portable
'n the area.
A sprinkler system is fire pump room.
5.5.1.5 Ade uac of Fire Protection
~ -~j, ~ c~-w>~<<:.
extingui shers a~ available provided for the diesel Lack of automatic detection could allow a fire to continue un-necessarily.
5.5.1.6 Modifications Detection will be provided for pump motors in constricted areas in the 'power board and cable tray area.
The door at the 261 foot elevation will be replaced with an "A" label door.
J ~
We find that, subject to the implementation of the-above described modifications, the fire protection for'this area
, satisfies 'the objectives identified in Section 2.2 of this report and is, therefore, acceptable.
I B.S
~Ih t8ildi, The'following,evaluation is app'iicable to the Unit-1 Waste Building.
5.6.1 Floors Elevations 225 247 261 and 281 Feet 5.6.1.1,. Safet -Related E ui ment There is no safety-related equipment which is used to shutdown the reactor'n this area.
36
.5..;6.1.. 2 Combustibl es
- Paper, wood, vehicles, electrical cable insulation, plastic,
,and oil (waste oil storage).
5;.6.1..3 Conse uences If No Fire Su ression An unmitigated fire could result in.low level contamination from loose contaminated solid waste.
(Solid waste stored here is periodically encapsulated in steel drums.)
No safety-related equipment would be lost and safe shutdown could be achieved.
5.6.1.4 Fire Protection S stem Interior hose stations are installed in the area.
A sprinkler system is installed for the bailing room area and low level storage area.
5.6.1.5 Ade uac of Fire Protection At present, inadequate:
lack of automatic detection could allow a fire to continue unnecessarily and lack of suppression could result in the release of low level contaminat'ion.
~Mdi'f'/
I,4
'Detection wil.l be'nstalled on every floor in areas o'f"possible fire outbreaks.
.Sprinklers will be installed for.the 'truck
'loadin'g area and a fire cutoff from the waste building proper will,be provided at -the.truck port.
.Haste oil storage drums will no longer be stored on elevat'ion
- 261
- .;,they will be stored outside of the plant area.
5uitable
- permanent.wall penetrations will be provided at elevation 251 in place of the temporary ones now in place.
The existing nonlabelled door at the 261 foot elevation will
-be replaced with a "B" label door.
The bailing room door -will be replaced with an "A" label door.
We find that, subject to the implementation of the above
- described modifications, the fire protection for this area satisfies the objectives identified in Section
-2.'2 of this
.report and is, therefore, acceptable.
37 5.7 Off-Gas Buildin The following evaluation is. applicable to. the Unit 1 Off-Gas Building.. [-
5.7.1 Floors Elevations 229 232 247 and 261 Feet There is no safety-related equipment which is used to shutdown the reactor in this area.
5.7.1.2 Combustibles 5.7.1.3 Acetylene (in welding area),
cab1e insulation, wire insulation and plastic.
Conse uences lf No Fire Su ression An unmitigated fire in this area would not result i.n the release of radioactive material to the environment in excess of 10 CFR 20 limits.
5.7.1.4 Fire Protection S stem Interior hose stations and portab1e extinguishers are avai1able in the area.
5.7.1.5 Ade uac of'Fir'e Protection.,
5.7.1.6 Fire protection for this area. is;satisfactory except lack of detection could allow a fire to continue unnece'ssari,ly..
Modifications The licensee plans to provide a sprinkler system-for-the welding area.
Generally, detection will, be provided on every f oor where
~fjre outbreaks-could-occur-.
ble find that,r's'ubject to,implementation of the above described modifications,-the fire protection'for this area satisifes-the objectives identified in Section 2.2 of this report and is, therefore, acceptable.
38 5.8 Administration Buildin The Tollowing evaluation is applicable to the Unit 1 Administration
- Building.
$.8..1 Floors Elevations
- 250, 261 and 277 Feet There is no safety-related equipment which is used to shutdown the reactor in this area.
5..8.I.2 Combustibles 5.B.l. 3
- Paper, cable insulation, wood, clothing and oil.
Conse uences If Ho Fire Su ression An unmitigated fire in this area could not affect safe shutdown equipment nor result in the release of radioactive material to the environment in excess of 10 CFR 20 limits.
5.8.14 Fire Protection S stem 5.8.1.5 A C02 system is installed for the record storage room.
Sprinkler systems are installed in shop, store area>
and the microfilm process area in the.basement.
Also detection i5.provided in the mict ofi1m process area and telephone room.
- Ade uac of Fire.Protection 5.8.'1. 6 Fire protection for this area is satisfactory.
Modifications The entire basement of the administration building will be.sprinkled to protect records.
Also, the administration building is presently being extended.
Construction is scheduled to be complete about 1980.
A sprinkler system will be installed to protect both %he extension and the present building as part.of the new construction.
Me find that, the fire protection for this area satisfies the objectives identified in Section 2.2 of this report and is, therefore, acceptabl e.
39 5.9
'Yard Area 5.9.1 Safet -Related E ui ment 5.9.2 There is no safety-related equipment in the yard area.
Combustibles
- 5. 9.3 The major combustible materials in the yard area include trans-former oil in the transformers outside the southwest corner of the turbine building, hydrogen in storage cylinders at the hydrogen rack outside the reactor building, and miscellaneous'rdinary combustibles.
Conse uences If No Fire Su ression 5.9.4 An unmitigated fire in the transformer area might cause damage on the 277 foot elevation of the turbine building; the outside wall in this area does not have a fire r esistance rating.
Fire Protection S stem 5.9.5 Automatic water spray systems are provided to protect the trans-formers and the hydrogen rack.
Pneumatic heat actuated gevices are installed to detect fires in these areas.
Yard hydrants, hose from two hose carts, and portable extinguishers are avail-able for manual fire fighting.
Ade uac of Fire Protection The installed automatic suppression systems should be adequate to control or extinguish a fire in the protected areas.
Pro-tection for the hydrogen rack is designed to prevent an exposure fire at the rack from causing over pressurization of the hydrogen storage cylinders.
Manual fire fighting equipment may not be capable of controlling fires involving the transformers.
In addition, lack of hose houses at regular intervals limits the amount of hose and other equipment available for fire fighting.
40 Modifications The. licensee; wil:1:.
o Upgrade the wal'1 a.t the 277 building in the vicinity of
-L' i:
~,
foot eTevation of'he, turbine the outside transformers.
o Provide one hose house for every two fire hydrants, es-'entially duplicating the equipment in the present hose carts.
We find that, subject to implementation of the above described modifications, the fire protection =or this area satisfies the objectives identified in Section 2.2 of this report and is, therefore, acceptable.
5 i
- 6. 0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS I
The administrative controls for fire protection consist of the fire protection orgagization, the qualifications and training for fire protection personnel, the controls to be exercised over combustib1es and ignition sources, plans and procedures for fighting fires in the various plant areas, and the quality assurance provisions for fire protection.
The licensee has provided a de-tailed description of proposed administrative controls.
Plans and procedures stipulating the management and staff organization and its qualifications; the fire brigade training program; controls over combustibles and ignition sources; and the prefire plans for fighting fires are being developed and impTemented.
The program and its implementing procedures as provided by letter from the licensee dated February 28,
- 1977, as supplemented by letter dated July 13, 1977; December 13, 1977; March 22, 1978; October 6, 1978; January 2, 1979; and January 31,
- 1979, are found acceptable by the staff using items. referenced in Sections 1.0(e) and 1.0{f).
We have evaluated the areas at Nine Mile Point Unit 1 to determine the minimum required fire brigade size to cope with fires that may occur, and have deter-mined that a five man brigade is required.
The licensee has agreed to a five man fire brigade to be available onsite during all shifts, and independent of demands placed on operating personnel and the security force in a fire situation.
This requirement is being incorporated into the Technical Specifi-cations with implementation 90 days after issuance of this report.
All five of the brigade members receivq the same instruction and practice, including familiarization with the content of the prefire plans with the ex-ception that two members will not r eceive fire fighting strategy training because they are under the direction of a trained brigade leader.
These two members do receive an acceptable level of training to perform their as-signed tasks.
Strategy training is on'1y required for brigade leaders and includes decision factors, direction of brigade, problem sessions and co-ordination of various pieces of equipment.
We find that, subject to'implementation of the above described programmatic
- changes, the fire protection program satisfies the objectives identified in Section 2.2 of this report and is, therefore, acceptable.
7.0 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS The Technical Specifications have previously been modified to incorporate interim Technical Specifications which include limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements for existing fire protection sys-'ems and administrative controls.
The licensee will propose a Technical
.Specification change to require that at least five indiv'iduals with fire protection training be onsite at all times.
This would be an increase in the size of the Fire Brigade.
Me find the change acceptable.
Following the implementation of the modifications of fire protection systems re-sulting from this review, the Technical Specifications will be similarly modified to incorporate the limiting conditions of operation and surveillance requirements for these modifications.
4
A
- 8. 0 CONCLUSIONS The licensee has performed fire hazards analysis and.has proposed certain modifications'o improve the fire protection program.
Additional modifi-cations have been.proposed by the licensee during the course of our review, which are based upon the fire hazards analysis and our onsite evaluation of the fire protection program.
In addition, we have concluded that the licensee should implement certain evaluations or improvements related 'to the fire protection program.
These are sumtarized in Section 3.0.
Signi-ficant steps are being taken to provide additiona1 assurance that safe shut-down can be accomplished "and the plant can be maintained in a safe condition during and following potential fire'ituations.
Additional evaluation of
.incorhplete items, discussed in the preceding sections, will be necessary before we can conclude that the overall fire protection at the Nine Mile Point Unit 1 facility wi'll satisfy the provisions of 3TP 9.5-1 and Appendix A thereto, which the staff has established for satisfactory long-term fire protection.
We find that the licensee's proposed modifications described herein are ac-ceptable both with respect to the improvements in the fire protectio'n program that they provide and with r espect to continued safe operation of the faci-lity, while the remaining items are completed..
In the report of the. Special Review Group on the Browns Ferry Fire (NUREG-0050) dated
- February, 1976, consideration of the safety of operation of.'all.opera-
'ing nuclear power plants pending the completion of our, detaile'd fire p'o-tection eyaluation was presented.
The following quotations from the report summarize the bpsis'or the Special Review. Group's conclusion that the opera-tion of the facility need not be restricted for public safety "A probability assessment of public safety or risk, in quantitative
'erms is give'n in the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400),.
As. the're-suIt of the calculation based on the Browns Ferry fire, the.'study-concludes that the potential for a significant release of radi'o-activity from such a fire is about 20K of that calculated from all other causes analyzed.
This indicates that predicted potential accident risks from all causes were not greatly affected by con-sideration of the Browns Ferry fire.
This is one of the-reasons that urgent action in regard to reducing risks due to potential fires is not required.
The study (WASH-1400) also points out that "rather straight forward measures, such ap may already exist at other nuclear plants, can significantly reduce the 'li.kelihood of'a potential core melt accident that might result from a large fire."
2
~
. ".Fires occur rather frequently; however, fires'nvolving eqiiipment.
unavailability comparable to the Browns Ferry fire are quite in-frequent;(see.,Secti:on, 3.,3 yf {NUREG-0050)):,'he Rpview Group beTieves. that steps already taken si'nce March 1975 (see Section 3.,3.2. of. (NUREG-0050),)'.have. reduced. this frequency sianificantly."
"Based on its review of th'e events transpiring before, during and'fter the Browns Ferry fire, the Review Group concludes that the probability of disruptive fires of, the magnitude of the Browns Ferry event is smal.l, and that there is no need to restrict opera-tion of nuclear power plants for public safety.
However, it is.
clear that much can and should be done to reduce even further the likelihood of disabling fires and to improve assurance of rapid, extinguishment of fires that occur.
Consideration should be given
'lso to features that would increase further the ability of nuclear faciliti'es to withstand large fires without 1oss of important'functions should such fires occur."
Me recpgnize that the "Risk Assessment Review Group Report to the U; S.,
Nuclear Regulatory Commission" NUREG/CR-0400 (The. Lewis Committee Report),
states that this Review Group is unconvinced of the correctness of the MASH-1400 conclusion that fires contribute negligibly to the..overall.risk.
of.'uclear plant operation.
- However, it, is our conclusion that the operation of the faciTity, pending.
reso10ti"on of the incomplete items and the implementation of al,l, facility modifi'cations, does pot present an undue risk to the health and safety.
of.
the.publ'i'c.Pased on, our..concurrence with the.Browns. Ferry Specia1.,Revi'ew,
- Group's fire concl'usions identified above, as well as 'the sign'ificant.
improvements in fire protection already made at the facility since. the.
.Browns Ferry..Fi,re..
These incl,ude establ,ishment, of, administrati,ve control's
'aver.
combustibl.'e material's'nd use of i,gnition.sources, train'i,ng and:staf.'-
fing. of a fire,brigade, and issuance of surveilTance requirements for,.fire pr'otection systems.
'e have determined that the license amendment does not authorize a change i,n effluent types or total amounts
- nor, an increase in power level and wil;1'not result in any'ignificant environmental'mpact..
Having mad'e this determination, we have further... concluded: that the. amendment; i.nvolves. an action, which is insignifi'cant *from the standpoint of environmental'mpact and, pursuant to 10 CFR Section 51.5(d)(4) that, an envi'ronmerrtal impact'ppraisal'eed.
not be prepared in connection with, the issuance: of thi's:
amendment..
We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the proba-bility or consequences of accidents previously considered and does not in-volye a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable as-surance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed
- manner, and (3) such activities will be con-ducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical go the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
1 ll
~
9.0 CONSULTANT'S REPORT Under Contract to Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Brookhaven National Laboratory has provided the'services of file protection consultants who participated in the evaluation of the licensee's fire protection program and in the preparation of the safety evaluation report (SER).
Their re-port "Fire Protection Evaluation - Nine Mile Point Unit 1", dated March
, 1979, discusses several matters which have been addressed in the SER.
The consultant's report contains recomendations which have, for the most part, been implemented during our evaluation.
The consultant's recommendations which we have not adopted, along with our basis, therefore, is as follows:
1.
Consultant's Comment:
Valve Supervision "Electrical supervision is provided for the valve controlling the water supply to the water spray and foam water systems, as noted in Section 4.2 of this report.
Post indicator valves on the under-ground loop main, and fire pump discharge valves, sectionalizing valves inside the plant, and valves controlling the flow of water to standpipes and.sprinkler systems are locked open and checked monthly.
Me will require the licensee to provide electrical super-vision for all valves in the fire water system."
~Rff R The guidelipes of. Appendix A to BTP 9.5-1 allow electrical super-vision, locking, or sealing with tamper-proof seals with periodic jnspection as a means of assuring that v'alves in the'fire 'protection water system are in the correct position.
Valves on other systems in the plant are present'ly under similar administrative control.
The plant Technical Specifications require a montly.check of all-valves in the flow path to fire suppression systems.:
A'eview by the staff of Licensee Event Reports for all.plants using such periodic checks indicates that valves being in the incorrect positiqg have not been a significant contributor to valve related failures.
Additionally, standing water as a resu1t of failure of suppression system piping will not damage=safety-related equipment due to curbs, drains, mounting of equipment above, floor level,,grating and doorways.
To date, the staff has not found any data that indicates that electrical valve supervision will significantly improve the availability of fire suppression systems in nuclear power plants.
K.
Consul tant.';- Corrments:-
Smoke-Removal r,
C 8
4 "The= licensee.
has. proposed various modifications= to: existing-ventilating systems-..
However-.
(we.)
h'ave=-no quantitative:
basis,,on;which to.j.udge.. the..'adequacy of either-existing:,,or proposed systems for.'th'ei'r"intended.'use=-as-.smoke:-
removal systems-.,
Me:-wil'1"require.-the=licensee=to.
provide the= results of=tests-or-,
. analyses-which demonstrate. that existing-;or-proposed.
methods of heat or. smoke venting are effective in preventing the-spread of heat. or smoke to areas not involved in the. fire and are: capable of-'exhausting the quantities of smoke and heat generated in-postulated fires.
We will require the licensee to verify that failure or inadvertent operation of these systems will not violate-the controlled area boundaries of the plant."
~fff R The. licensee has proposed certain modifications to exhaust smoke ih; crucial areas such as the control room and turbine building.
Additional information-and improved-equipment-would provide some benefit-in the design-and construction-of fixed. ventilation systems to,be used for smoke removal in future plants.
- However, a massive plant redesign of current plant ventilation systems is not warranted.
b'ecause portable; smoke; removal: equipment-can.
be. usedin those pl'ant areas..with inadequate-fixed-.smoke. removal. systems Portable. smoke.
removal units-have; been-used. i'n fire. service for" a sufficient length of'ime-so that the limits, on their. use.. is: well'nderstood;.
In=pl'ants where'moke=-removal is. dependent-.on such; equipment;,-,smok'ea removal.'s..'not general'ly, initiated until the:-.room-. atmosphere i'sscooled sufficiently;., by'fixed'sprinkltr-operation. or., manual,hose=fogging.-,to."
permit: entry by fire;-fighting:,personnel..
The-currently,'avai.lable:;
fire= service:- portableesmoke=-
removal units. have:-a..sufficiently;high;;
temper ature: capabi.lity'to:remove; smoke."-when-the.--hot'.gases=.are:-cool'ed'nough,~for'ire=-.Uri-gade entry.,
The=manual.fire.'-.fiqhting:consu1tants-..
have. made. their. evaluati'ons;. df. the-fire.- fightihg.- capabi.lii:ies-of=a-.
number. of. plants:and have=.recommended use..of=the-:portable; smoke.
exhaus.t systems.'..
'L Me= are: requiring the:- licensee= to'provide;- three 5200"CFN fire'. service=.
type-smok'e.-ejectors;(with-flexible=ducting) to;.suppl'ement the:-
proposed-modiWzati~ns.
discussed:;ih.paragraph-4'.4".1'.
We.'are:.also..
requiring; that;"
(1)'he= 1 icensee:. verify.;-that=the= failure-or.
i'inadvertent; operation of. these= systems=wil:1 not-vio3ate'he: con-tro11ed area boundaries: of the'lant',,and=(2).
the:- l.icensee,.develop prefire'-plans-:.which'..include the proper.-use:of'ventilation equipment=
in",each plant=areafof. concern-..
(This=wass addressed during our;;
Administrative.Conteojs=. review)..
3 Consequently, there will be adequate information available to continue to evaluate plant smoke removal capability.
The use of emergency breathing equipment, fire suppression equipment, fire barriers and other fire protection measures are evaluated based on the need for irmePiate access into an area and the limitations imposed by the currently available portable smoke removal units.
These concerns are evaluated on an area basis at each plant by the site review team with due consideration of the advice of the fire fighting consultant(s).
0
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4L A
I