ML17040A011

Interim Staff Response to Reevaluated Flood Hazards Submitted in Response to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Information Request - Flood-Causing Mechanism Reevaluation

ML17040A011
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	02/22/2017
From:	Juan Uribe Japan Lessons-Learned Division
To:	Richey M FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co
Uribe J, NRR/JLD 415-3809
References
CAC MF3286, CAC MF3287
Download: ML17040A011 (4)

Text

Mr. Marty L. Richey Site Vice President UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 February 22, 2017 FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Beaver Valley Power Station Mail Stop A-BV-SEB1 P.O. Box 4, Route 168 Shippingport, PA 15077

SUBJECT:

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2-INTERIM STAFF RESPONSE TO REEVALUATED FLOOD HAZARDS SUBMITTED IN RESPONSE TO 10 CFR 50.54(f) INFORMATION REQUEST-FLOOD-CAUSING MECHANISM REEVALUATION (CAC NOS. MF3286 AND MF3287)

Dear Mr. Richey:

The purpose of this letter is to provide a summary of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff's assessment of the reevaluated flood-causing mechanisms described in the March 2, 2016, flood hazard reevaluation report (FHRR) submitted by FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC, the licensee) for Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2 (Beaver Valley) (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS)

Accession No. ML16063A288), as well as supplemental information resulting from audits.

By letter dated March 12, 2012, the NRC issued a request for information pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 50.54(f) (hereafter referred to as the 50.54{f) letter)

(ADAMS Accession No. ML12053A340). The request was issued as part of implementing lessons learned from the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant. Enclosure 2 to the 50.54(f) letter requested licensees to reevaluate flood-causing mechanisms using present-day methodologies and guidance. Concurrent with the reevaluation of flooding hazards, licensees were required to develop and implement mitigating strategies in accordance with NRC Order EA-12-049, "Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events" (ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A735). On March 30, 2015, the Commission provided staff requirements memorandum (SRM) (ADAMS Accession No. ML15089A236) to COMSECY-14-0037, "Integration of Mitigating Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events and the Reevaluation of Flooding Hazards," dated November 21, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14309A256), affirming that licensees need to address the reevaluated flooding hazards within their mitigating strategies for beyond-design-basis external events.

Revision 2 of Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) guidance document NEI 12-06, dated December 2015, includes a methodology for performing a mitigating strategies assessment (MSA) with respect to the reevaluated flood hazards. On February 29, 2016, the NRC staff published Japan Lessons-Learned Division (JLD) Interim Staff Guidance (ISG)

JLD-ISG-2012-01, Revision 1, "Compliance with Order EA-12-049, 'Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events'" (ADAMS Accession No. ML15357A142), in the Federal Register (81 FR 10283).

This ISG endorses Revision 2 of NEI 12-06 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16005A625). Based on the guidance provided in Revision 2 of NEI 12-06, any flood event duration parameters and applicable flood associated effects that were not provided in the FHRR should be considered as part of the Beaver Valley MSA. The NRC staff will evaluate the flood event duration parameters (including warning time and period of inundation) and flood-related associated effects developed by the licensee during the NRC staff's review of the MSA.

In addition to the MSA, in order to complete its response to the information requested by to the 50.54(f) letter, the licensee is expected to submit an integrated assessment or a focused evaluation, as appropriate, to address the reevaluated flood hazards that exceed the current design basis, as described in the NRC letter, "Coordination of Request for Information Regarding Flooding Hazard Reevaluation and Mitigating Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events" (ADAMS Accession No. ML15174A257). This letter describes the changes in the NRC's approach to the flood hazard reevaluations that were approved by the Commission in its SRM to COMSECY-15-0019, "Closure Plan for the Reevaluation of Flooding Hazards for Operating Nuclear Power Plants" (ADAMS Accession No. ML15209A682).

The NRC staff has reviewed the information submitted by the licensee in its FHRR and has summarized the results of the review in the tables provided as an enclosure to this letter.

Table 1 provides the current design-basis flood hazard mechanisms. Table 2 provides the reevaluated flood hazard mechanisms; however, the reevaluated flood hazard mechanisms bounded by the current design basis {Table 1) are not included.

The NRC staff performed a confirmatory analysis of the information provided in the FHRR to independently evaluate the sensitivity of the reevaluated hazards to input parameters. The confirmatory analysis indicated that the streams and rivers flood causing mechanism is sensitive to the input parameters and methodology used. The sensitivities identified have been discussed with the licensee. As a measure of conservatism, the licensee agreed to use the current design basis stillwater elevations for streams and rivers for the subsequent flood evaluations addressing flooding due to streams and rivers. The water elevations summarized in Table 2 reflect this commitment.

Based on the information provided by the licensee and the staff's confirmatory analysis, the NRC staff has concluded that the reevaluated flood hazard information, as summarized in Table 2 of the enclosure, is suitable for the assessment of mitigating strategies developed in response to Order EA 12 049 (i.e., defines the mitigating strategies flood hazard information described in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) guidance document NEI 12 06, "Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide") for Beaver Valley. Further, the NRC staff has concluded that the enclosed reevaluated flood hazard information is suitable input for other flooding assessments associated with the 50.54(f) letter. The NRC staff plans to issue a staff assessment documenting the basis for these conclusions at a later time.

If you have any questions, please contact me at (301) 415-3809 or e-mail at Juan. U ribe@nrc.gov.

Docket Nos. 50-334 and 50-412

Enclosure:

Summary of Results of Flooding Hazard Re-Evaluation Report cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv Juan ibe, Pro ct Manager Hazards Management Branch Japan Lessons-Learned Division Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 & 2 Table 1. Current Design Basis Flood Hazards for Use in the MSA Mechanism Local Intense Precipitation BVPS Unit 2: Safeguards Building BVPS Unit 1 BVPS Unit 2: Main Steam Valve Building Area BVPS Unit 2: Emergency Diesel Generator Building (1 Door)

BVPS Unit 2: Auxiliary Building (3 Doors)

BVPS Unit 2: Fuel and Decontamination Building (1 Door)

BVPS Unit 2: Control Building (3 Doors; South)

BVPS Unit 2: Control Building (1 Door; North)

BVPS Unit 2: Service Building (1 Door; SB30-8)

BVPS Unit 2: Reactor Containment (Equipment Hatch)

Stillwater Elevation 732.5 ft NGVD29 No Impact on the Site Identified 732.5 ft NGVD29 732.5 ft NGVD29 735.4 ft NGVD29 735.3 ft NGVD29 735.4 ft NGVD29 735.4 ft NGVD29 732.5 ft NGVD29 735.1 ft NGVD29 Waves/

Run up Minimal No Impact on the Site Identified Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal Design Basis Hazard Elevation 732.5 ft NGVD29 No Impact on the Site Identified 732.5 ft NGVD29 732.5 ft NGVD29 735.4 ft NGVD29 735.3 ft NGVD29 735.4 ft NGVD29 735.4 ft NGVD29 732.5 ft NGVD29 735.1 ft NGVD29 Reference FHRR Section 2.1.1 & UFSAR Table 2.4-6 FHRR Section 2.1.1 FHRR Section 2.1.1 & UFSAR Table 2.4-6 FHRR Section 2.1.1 & UFSAR Table 2.4-6 FHRR Section 2.1.1 & UFSAR Table 2.4-6 FHRR Section 2.1.1 & UFSAR Table 2.4-6 FHRR Section 2.1.1 & UFSAR Table 2.4-6 FHRR Section 2.1.1 & UFSAR Table 2.4-6 FHRR Section 2.1.1 & UFSAR Table 2.4-6 FHRR Section 2.1.1 & UFSAR Table 2.4-6

Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 & 2 Table 1. Current Design Basis Flood Hazards for Use in the MSA Mechanism BVPS Unit 2: Service Building (1 Door)

BVPS Unit 2 Fuel and Decontamination Building (3 Doors)

BVPS Unit 2: Emergency Diesel Generator Building (3 Doors)

Streams and Rivers Probable Maximum Flood Peggs Run - BVPS Unit 1 Peggs Run - BVPS Unit 2 Combined Event - Probable Maximum Flood with Wind Wave for Units 1 & 2 at the Intake Structure Failure of Dams and Onsite Water Control/Storage Structures Conemaugh Dam with Standard Project Flood - Units 1 & 2 Storm Surge BVPS Unit 1 BVPS Unit 2 Stillwater Elevation 732.5 ft NGVD29 735.3 ft NGVD29 732.4 ft NGVD29 730.0 ft NGVD29 Not included in DB No Impact on the Site Identified 730.0 ft NGVD29 725.2 ft NGVD29 Not included in DB No Impact on the Site Identified Waves/

Run up Minimal Minimal Minimal Not applicable Not included in DB No Impact on the Site Identified 6.7 ft Not applicable Not included in DB No Impact on the Site Identified Design Basis Hazard Elevation 732.5 ft NGVD29 735.3 ft NGVD29 732.4 ft NGVD29 730.0 ft NGVD29 Not included in DB No Impact on the Site Identified 736.7 ft NGVD29 725.2 ft NGVD29 Not included in DB No Impact on the Site Identified Reference FHRR Section 2.1.1 & UFSAR Table 2.4-6 FHRR Section 2.1.1 & UFSAR Table 2.4-6 FHRR Section 2.1.1 & UFSAR Table 2.4-6 FHRR Section 2.1.2 & Table 3 FHRR Section 2.1.2 & Table 3 FHRR Section 2.1.2 & Table 3 FHRR Section 2.1.8 & Table 3 FHRR Section 2.1.3 & Table 3 FHRR Section 2.1.4 & Table 3 FHRR Section 2.1.4 & Table 3

Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 & 2 Table 1. Current Design Basis Flood Hazards for Use in the MSA Mechanism Reference Elevation Run up Stillwater I

Waves/

l lDesign Basis Hazard

_ E!_~vation --~--------

Seiche BVPS Unit 1 BVPS Unit 2 Tsunami BVPS Unit 1 BVPS Unit 2 Ice-Induced Flooding Channel Migrations/Diversions BVPS Unit 1 BVPS Unit 2 included in DB No Impact on the Site Identified Not included in DB No Impact on the Site Identified No Impact on the Site Identified Not included in DB No Impact on the Site Identified Not included in DB No Impact on the Site Identified Not included in DB No Impact on the Site Identified No Impact on the Site Identified Not included in DB No Impact on the Site Identified 1

Not included in DB No Impact on the Site Identified Not included in DB No Impact on the Site Identified No Impact on the Site Identified Not included in DB No Impact on the Site Identified Note 1: Reported values are rounded to the nearest one-tenth of a foot.

FHRR Section 2.1.4 & Table 3 FHRR Section 2.1.4 & Table 3 FHRR Section 2.1.5 & Table 3 FHRR Section 2.1.5 & Table 3 FHRR Section 2.1.6 & Table 3 FHRR Section 2.1.7 & Table 3 FHRR Section 2.1.7 & Table 3

Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 & 2 Table 2. Reevaluated Flood Hazards for Flood-Causing Mechanisms for Use in the MSA Mechanism Stillwater Elevation Local Intense Precipitation BVPS Unit 1: Main Steam Cable 735.5 ft Vault (MS-35-1)

NGVD29 BVPS Unit 1: Diesel Generator 735.3 ft Building (G-35-2)

NGVD29 BVPS Unit 1: Diesel Generator 735.3 ft Building (G-35-3)

NGVD29 BVPS Unit 1: Diesel Generator 735.2 ft Building (Removable Shield E)

NGVD29 BVPS Unit 1: Diesel Generator 735.3 ft Building (Removable Shield W)

NGVD29 BVPS Unit 1: Coolant Recovery 735.6 ft Tanks (TA-35-1)

NGVD29 BVPS Unit 1: Coolant Recovery 735.6 ft Tanks (Removable Panel)

NGVD29 BVPS Unit 1: Safeguards (SG 735.4 ft

1)

NGVD29 BVPS Unit 1: Fuel Building (F 735.9 ft 1; F-35-3)

NGVD29 BVPS Unit 1: Fuel Building (F 735.6 ft

2)

NGVD29 BVPS Unit 1: Fuel Building (F 735.7 ft

4)

NGVD29 Waves/

Run up

_T ___

Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal Reevaluated Hazard Elevation 735.5 ft NGVD29 735.3 ft NGVD29 735.3 ft NGVD29 735.2 ft NGVD29 735.3 ft NGVD29 735.6 ft NGVD29 735.6 ft NGVD29 735.4 ft NGVD29 735.9 ft NGVD29 735.6 ft NGVD29 735.7 ft NGVD29 Reference Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3 FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3 FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3 FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3 FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3 FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3 FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3 FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3 FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3 FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3 FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3

Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 & 2 Table 2. Reevaluated Flood Hazards for Flood-Causing Mechanisms for Use in the MSA Mechanism BVPS Unit 1: Decontamination Building (D-35-1)

BVPS Unit 1: Decontamination Building (D-35-2)

BVPS Unit 1: Service Building (S-35-44)

BVPS Unit 1: Service Building (S-35-48)

BVPS Unit 1: Service Building (S-35-49)

BVPS Unit 1: Service Building (S-35-67)

BVPS Unit 1: Warehouse (W 1)

BVPS Unit 1: Waste Gas Storage Area (DT-27-1)

BVPS Unit 1: Containment (Equipment Hatch)

BVPS Unit 1: Control Building (0-35-1)

BVPS Unit 1: Control Building (S-35-71)

BVPS Unit 1: Control Building (S-35-72)

Stillwater Elevation 735.2 ft NGVD29 735.3 ft NGVD29 735.5 ft NGVD29 735.5 ft NGVD29 735.5 ft NGVD29 735.5 ft NGVD29 735.5 ft NGVD29 735.6 ft NGVD29 735.2 ft NGVD29 735.6 ft NGVD29 735.6 ft NGVD29 735.8 ft NGVD29 Waves/

Run up Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal Reevaluated Hazard Elevation 735.2 ft NGVD29 735.3 ft NGVD29 735.5 ft NGVD29 735.5 ft NGVD29 735.5 ft NGVD29 735.5 ft NGVD29 735.5 ft NGVD29 735.6 ft NGVD29 735.2 ft NGVD29 735.6 ft NGVD29 735.6 ft NGVD29 735.8 ft NGVD29 Reference FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3 FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3 FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3 FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3 FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3 FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3 FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3 FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3 FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3 FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3 FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3 FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3

Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 & 2 Table 2. Reevaluated Flood Hazards for Flood-Causing Mechanisms for Use in the MSA Mechanism Stillwater Elevation BVPS Unit 1: Control Building (S-735.6 ft 35-74)

NGVD29 BVPS Unit 2: Safeguards (SG 734.7 ft

4)

NGVD29 BVPS Unit 2: Diesel Generator 732.3 ft Building (DG-32-5)

NGVD29 BVPS Unit 2: Auxiliary Building 735.7 ft (A-35-1)

NGVD29 BVPS Unit 2: Auxiliary Building 735.6 ft (A-35-3)

NGVD29 BVPS Unit 2: Auxiliary Building 735.6 ft (A-35-5)

NGVD29 BVPS Unit 2: Fuel Building (F 735.5 ft

1)

NGVD29 BVPS Unit 2: Fuel Building (F 735.4 ft

2)

NGVD29 BVPS Unit 2: Containment 734.6 ft (Equipment Hatch)

NGVD29 BVPS Unit 2 Main Steam Cable 732.5 ft Vault (MS-35-3)

NGVD29 BVPS Unit 2 Safeguards (SG 732.5 ft

5)

NGVD29 BVPS Unit 2 Fuel Building (F 735.3 ft

3)

NGVD29 Waves/

Run up Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal Reevaluated Hazard Elevation 735.6 ft NGVD29 734.7 ft NGVD29 732.3 ft NGVD29 735.7 ft NGVD29 735.6 ft NGVD29 735.6 ft NGVD29 735.5 ft NGVD29 735.4 ft NGVD29 734.6 ft NGVD29 732.5 ft NGVD29 732.5 ft NGVD29 735.3 ft NGVD29 Reference FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3 FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 2 & 3 FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 2 & 3 FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 2 & 3 FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 2 & 3 FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 2 & 3 FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 2 & 3 FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 2 & 3 FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 2 & 3 FHRR Section 3.8.4 and Table 2 & 3 FHRR Section 3.8.4 and Table 2 & 3 FHRR Section 3.8.4 and Table 2 & 3

Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 & 2 Table 2. Reevaluated Flood Hazards for Flood-Causing Mechanisms for Use in the MSA Mechanism Stillwater Waves/

Reevaluated Reference Elevation Run up Hazard Elevation

--r Streams and Rivers 4

Combined Event - Probable 730.0 ft 2.8 ft 732.8 ft USAGE 2015 Evaluation of Upper Maximum Flood with Wind Wave NGVD29 NGVD29 Ohio River Basin for Unit 1 Turbine Building North FHRR Section 3.7 & Table 3 Wall 4

Combined Event - Probable 730.0 ft 4.0 ft 734.0 ft USAGE 2015 Evaluation of Upper Maximum Flood with Wind Wave NGVD29 NGVD29 Ohio River Basin for Unit 2 at Ground Slope FHRR Section 3.7 & Table 3 Approaching Reactor Building 4

Combined Event - Probable 730.0 ft 4.5 ft 734.5 ft USAGE 2015 Evaluation of Upper Maximum Flood with Wind Wave NGVD29 NGVD29 Ohio River Basin at Ground Slope Approaching FHRR Section 3.7 & Table 3 the Emergency Outfall Structure Note 1: The licensee is expected to develop flood event duration parameters and applicable flood associated effects to conduct the MSA. The staff will evaluate the flood event duration parameters (including warning time and period of inundation) and flood associated effects during its review of the MSA.

Note 2: Reevaluated hazard mechanisms bounded by the current design basis (see Table 1) are not included in this table Note 3: Reported values are rounded to the nearest one-tenth of a foot.

Note 4: Reported value is the Current Design Basis (COB).

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2-INTERIM STAFF RESPONSE TO REEVALUATED FLOOD HAZARDS SUBMITTED IN RESPONSE TO 10 CFR 50.54(f)

INFORMATION REQUEST-FLOOD-CAUSING MECHANISM REEVALUATION DATED February 22, 2017 DISTRIBUTION:

PUBLIC JUribe, NRR RidsNrrDorllpl1 Resource RidsRgn1 MailCenter Resource RidsOpaMail Resource ACampbell, NRO MWillingham, NRO MShams, NRR JLD R/F LQuinn-Willingham, NRO RidsNrrDorl Resource RidsNrrLASLent RidsAcrsAcnw_MailCtr Resource RRivera-Lugo, NRO KSee, NRO RidsNRRJLD Resource RidsNroDsea Resource RidsNrrPMBeaverValley Resource RidsOgcMailCenter Resource CCook, NRO LGibson, NRR BHarvey, NRO ADAMS Accession Nos.: Letter ML17040A011 ; Enclosure ML17039A550 *via email OFFICE NRR/JLD/JHMB/PM*

NRR/JLD/LA NRR/JLD/JHMB/BC(A)

NRR/JLD/JHMB/PM NAME JUribe Slent LGibson JUribe DATE 2/8/2017 2/10/2017 2/22/2017 2/22/2017 OFFICIAL AGENCY RECORD