ML17040A011
| ML17040A011 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley  |
| Issue date: | 02/22/2017 |
| From: | Juan Uribe Japan Lessons-Learned Division |
| To: | Richey M FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co |
| Uribe J, NRR/JLD 415-3809 | |
| References | |
| CAC MF3286, CAC MF3287 | |
| Download: ML17040A011 (4) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 February 22, 2017 Mr. Marty L. Richey Site Vice President FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Beaver Valley Power Station Mail Stop A-BV-SEB1 P.O. Box 4, Route 168 Shippingport, PA 15077
SUBJECT:
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2- INTERIM STAFF RESPONSE TO REEVALUATED FLOOD HAZARDS SUBMITTED IN RESPONSE TO 10 CFR 50.54(f) INFORMATION REQUEST- FLOOD-CAUSING MECHANISM REEVALUATION (CAC NOS. MF3286 AND MF3287)
Dear Mr. Richey:
The purpose of this letter is to provide a summary of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff's assessment of the reevaluated flood-causing mechanisms described in the March 2, 2016, flood hazard reevaluation report (FHRR) submitted by FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC, the licensee) for Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2 (Beaver Valley) (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS)
Accession No. ML16063A288), as well as supplemental information resulting from audits.
By letter dated March 12, 2012, the NRC issued a request for information pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 50.54(f) (hereafter referred to as the 50.54{f) letter)
(ADAMS Accession No. ML12053A340). The request was issued as part of implementing lessons learned from the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant. Enclosure 2 to the 50.54(f) letter requested licensees to reevaluate flood-causing mechanisms using present-day methodologies and guidance. Concurrent with the reevaluation of flooding hazards, licensees were required to develop and implement mitigating strategies in accordance with NRC Order EA-12-049, "Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events" (ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A735). On March 30, 2015, the Commission provided staff requirements memorandum (SRM) (ADAMS Accession No. ML15089A236) to COMSECY-14-0037, "Integration of Mitigating Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events and the Reevaluation of Flooding Hazards," dated November 21, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14309A256), affirming that licensees need to address the reevaluated flooding hazards within their mitigating strategies for beyond-design-basis external events.
Revision 2 of Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) guidance document NEI 12-06, dated December 2015, includes a methodology for performing a mitigating strategies assessment (MSA) with respect to the reevaluated flood hazards. On February 29, 2016, the NRC staff published Japan Lessons-Learned Division (JLD) Interim Staff Guidance (ISG)
JLD-ISG-2012-01, Revision 1, "Compliance with Order EA-12-049, 'Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events'" (ADAMS Accession No. ML15357A142), in the Federal Register (81 FR 10283).
M. Richey This ISG endorses Revision 2 of NEI 12-06 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16005A625). Based on the guidance provided in Revision 2 of NEI 12-06, any flood event duration parameters and applicable flood associated effects that were not provided in the FHRR should be considered as part of the Beaver Valley MSA. The NRC staff will evaluate the flood event duration parameters (including warning time and period of inundation) and flood-related associated effects developed by the licensee during the NRC staff's review of the MSA.
In addition to the MSA, in order to complete its response to the information requested by Enclosure 2 to the 50.54(f) letter, the licensee is expected to submit an integrated assessment or a focused evaluation, as appropriate, to address the reevaluated flood hazards that exceed the current design basis, as described in the NRC letter, "Coordination of Request for Information Regarding Flooding Hazard Reevaluation and Mitigating Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events" (ADAMS Accession No. ML15174A257). This letter describes the changes in the NRC's approach to the flood hazard reevaluations that were approved by the Commission in its SRM to COMSECY-15-0019, "Closure Plan for the Reevaluation of Flooding Hazards for Operating Nuclear Power Plants" (ADAMS Accession No. ML15209A682).
The NRC staff has reviewed the information submitted by the licensee in its FHRR and has summarized the results of the review in the tables provided as an enclosure to this letter.
Table 1 provides the current design-basis flood hazard mechanisms. Table 2 provides the reevaluated flood hazard mechanisms; however, the reevaluated flood hazard mechanisms bounded by the current design basis {Table 1) are not included.
The NRC staff performed a confirmatory analysis of the information provided in the FHRR to independently evaluate the sensitivity of the reevaluated hazards to input parameters. The confirmatory analysis indicated that the streams and rivers flood causing mechanism is sensitive to the input parameters and methodology used. The sensitivities identified have been discussed with the licensee. As a measure of conservatism, the licensee agreed to use the current design basis stillwater elevations for streams and rivers for the subsequent flood evaluations addressing flooding due to streams and rivers. The water elevations summarized in Table 2 reflect this commitment.
Based on the information provided by the licensee and the staff's confirmatory analysis, the NRC staff has concluded that the reevaluated flood hazard information, as summarized in Table 2 of the enclosure, is suitable for the assessment of mitigating strategies developed in response to Order EA 12 049 (i.e., defines the mitigating strategies flood hazard information described in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) guidance document NEI 12 06, "Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide") for Beaver Valley. Further, the NRC staff has concluded that the enclosed reevaluated flood hazard information is suitable input for other flooding assessments associated with the 50.54(f) letter. The NRC staff plans to issue a staff assessment documenting the basis for these conclusions at a later time.
M. Richey If you have any questions, please contact me at (301) 415-3809 or e-mail at Juan. Uribe@nrc.gov.
Juan ibe, Pro ct Manager Hazards Management Branch Japan Lessons-Learned Division Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-334 and 50-412
Enclosure:
Summary of Results of Flooding Hazard Re-Evaluation Report cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv
Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 & 2 Table 1. Current Design Basis Flood Hazards for Use in the MSA Mechanism Stillwater Waves/ Design Basis Reference Elevation Run up Hazard Elevation - -------- ---
Local Intense Precipitation BVPS Unit 2: Safeguards Building 732.5 ft Minimal 732.5 ft FHRR Section 2.1.1 & UFSAR Table NGVD29 NGVD29 2.4-6 BVPS Unit 1 No Impact No Impact No Impact FHRR Section 2.1.1 on the Site on the Site on the Site Identified Identified Identified BVPS Unit 2: Main Steam Valve 732.5 ft Minimal 732.5 ft FHRR Section 2.1.1 & UFSAR Table Building Area NGVD29 NGVD29 2.4-6 BVPS Unit 2: Emergency Diesel 732.5 ft Minimal 732.5 ft FHRR Section 2.1.1 & UFSAR Table Generator Building (1 Door) NGVD29 NGVD29 2.4-6 BVPS Unit 2: Auxiliary Building 735.4 ft Minimal 735.4 ft FHRR Section 2.1.1 & UFSAR Table (3 Doors) NGVD29 NGVD29 2.4-6 BVPS Unit 2: Fuel and 735.3 ft Minimal 735.3 ft FHRR Section 2.1.1 & UFSAR Table Decontamination Building (1 NGVD29 NGVD29 2.4-6 Door)
BVPS Unit 2: Control Building (3 735.4 ft Minimal 735.4 ft FHRR Section 2.1.1 & UFSAR Table Doors; South) NGVD29 NGVD29 2.4-6 BVPS Unit 2: Control Building (1 735.4 ft Minimal 735.4 ft FHRR Section 2.1.1 & UFSAR Table Door; North) NGVD29 NGVD29 2.4-6 BVPS Unit 2: Service Building (1 732.5 ft Minimal 732.5 ft FHRR Section 2.1.1 & UFSAR Table Door; SB30-8) NGVD29 NGVD29 2.4-6 BVPS Unit 2: Reactor 735.1 ft Minimal 735.1 ft FHRR Section 2.1.1 & UFSAR Table Containment (Equipment Hatch) NGVD29 NGVD29 2.4-6
Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 & 2 Table 1. Current Design Basis Flood Hazards for Use in the MSA Mechanism Stillwater Waves/ Design Basis Reference Elevation Run up Hazard Elevation BVPS Unit 2: Service Building (1 732.5 ft Minimal 732.5 ft FHRR Section 2.1.1 & UFSAR Table Door) NGVD29 NGVD29 2.4-6 BVPS Unit 2 Fuel and 735.3 ft Minimal 735.3 ft FHRR Section 2.1.1 & UFSAR Table Decontamination Building (3 NGVD29 NGVD29 2.4-6 Doors)
BVPS Unit 2: Emergency Diesel 732.4 ft Minimal 732.4 ft FHRR Section 2.1.1 & UFSAR Table Generator Building (3 Doors) NGVD29 NGVD29 2.4-6 Streams and Rivers Probable Maximum Flood 730.0 ft Not 730.0 ft FHRR Section 2.1.2 & Table 3 NGVD29 applicable NGVD29 Peggs Run - BVPS Unit 1 Not included Not included Not included FHRR Section 2.1.2 & Table 3 in DB in DB in DB Peggs Run - BVPS Unit 2 No Impact No Impact No Impact FHRR Section 2.1.2 & Table 3 on the Site on the Site on the Site Identified Identified Identified Combined Event - Probable 730.0 ft 6.7 ft 736.7 ft FHRR Section 2.1.8 & Table 3 Maximum Flood with Wind Wave NGVD29 NGVD29 for Units 1 & 2 at the Intake Structure Failure of Dams and Onsite Water Control/Storage Structures Conemaugh Dam with Standard 725.2 ft Not 725.2 ft FHRR Section 2.1.3 & Table 3 Project Flood - Units 1 & 2 NGVD29 applicable NGVD29 Storm Surge BVPS Unit 1 Not included Not included Not included FHRR Section 2.1.4 & Table 3 in DB in DB in DB BVPS Unit 2 No Impact No Impact No Impact FHRR Section 2.1.4 & Table 3 on the Site on the Site on the Site Identified Identified Identified
Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 & 2 Table 1. Current Design Basis Flood Hazards for Use in the MSA Mechanism Stillwater I Waves/ lDesign Basis Reference Elevation Run up Hazard
--- ---- l
_ _E!_~vation --~--------
Seiche 1 BVPS Unit 1 included Not included Not included FHRR Section 2.1.4 & Table 3 in DB in DB in DB BVPS Unit 2 No Impact No Impact No Impact FHRR Section 2.1.4 & Table 3 on the Site on the Site on the Site Identified Identified Identified Tsunami BVPS Unit 1 Not included Not included Not included FHRR Section 2.1.5 & Table 3 in DB in DB in DB BVPS Unit 2 No Impact No Impact No Impact FHRR Section 2.1.5 & Table 3 on the Site on the Site on the Site Identified Identified Identified Ice-Induced Flooding No Impact No Impact No Impact FHRR Section 2.1.6 & Table 3 on the Site on the Site on the Site Identified Identified Identified Channel Migrations/Diversions BVPS Unit 1 Not included Not included Not included FHRR Section 2.1.7 & Table 3 in DB in DB in DB BVPS Unit 2 No Impact No Impact No Impact FHRR Section 2.1.7 & Table 3 on the Site on the Site on the Site Identified Identified Identified Note 1: Reported values are rounded to the nearest one-tenth of a foot.
Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 & 2 Table 2. Reevaluated Flood Hazards for Flood-Causing Mechanisms for Use in the MSA Mechanism Stillwater Waves/ Reevaluated Reference Elevation Run up Hazard
_T ___ Elevation Local Intense Precipitation BVPS Unit 1: Main Steam Cable 735.5 ft Minimal 735.5 ft Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3 Vault (MS-35-1) NGVD29 NGVD29 BVPS Unit 1: Diesel Generator 735.3 ft Minimal 735.3 ft FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3 Building (G-35-2) NGVD29 NGVD29 BVPS Unit 1: Diesel Generator 735.3 ft Minimal 735.3 ft FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3 Building (G-35-3) NGVD29 NGVD29 BVPS Unit 1: Diesel Generator 735.2 ft Minimal 735.2 ft FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3 Building (Removable Shield E) NGVD29 NGVD29 BVPS Unit 1: Diesel Generator 735.3 ft Minimal 735.3 ft FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3 Building (Removable Shield W) NGVD29 NGVD29 BVPS Unit 1: Coolant Recovery 735.6 ft Minimal 735.6 ft FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3 Tanks (TA-35-1) NGVD29 NGVD29 BVPS Unit 1: Coolant Recovery 735.6 ft Minimal 735.6 ft FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3 Tanks (Removable Panel) NGVD29 NGVD29 BVPS Unit 1: Safeguards (SG 735.4 ft Minimal 735.4 ft FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3
- 1) NGVD29 NGVD29 BVPS Unit 1: Fuel Building (F 735.9 ft Minimal 735.9 ft FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3 1; F-35-3) NGVD29 NGVD29 BVPS Unit 1: Fuel Building (F 735.6 ft Minimal 735.6 ft FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3
- 2) NGVD29 NGVD29 BVPS Unit 1: Fuel Building (F 735.7 ft Minimal 735.7 ft FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3
- 4) NGVD29 NGVD29
Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 & 2 Table 2. Reevaluated Flood Hazards for Flood-Causing Mechanisms for Use in the MSA Mechanism Stillwater Waves/ Reevaluated Reference Elevation Run up Hazard Elevation BVPS Unit 1: Decontamination 735.2 ft Minimal 735.2 ft FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3 Building (D-35-1) NGVD29 NGVD29 BVPS Unit 1: Decontamination 735.3 ft Minimal 735.3 ft FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3 Building (D-35-2) NGVD29 NGVD29 BVPS Unit 1: Service Building (S- 735.5 ft Minimal 735.5 ft FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3 35-44) NGVD29 NGVD29 BVPS Unit 1: Service Building (S- 735.5 ft Minimal 735.5 ft FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3 35-48) NGVD29 NGVD29 BVPS Unit 1: Service Building (S- 735.5 ft Minimal 735.5 ft FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3 35-49) NGVD29 NGVD29 BVPS Unit 1: Service Building (S- 735.5 ft Minimal 735.5 ft FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3 35-67) NGVD29 NGVD29 BVPS Unit 1: Warehouse (W 735.5 ft Minimal 735.5 ft FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3
- 1) NGVD29 NGVD29 BVPS Unit 1: Waste Gas 735.6 ft Minimal 735.6 ft FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3 Storage Area (DT-27-1) NGVD29 NGVD29 BVPS Unit 1: Containment 735.2 ft Minimal 735.2 ft FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3 (Equipment Hatch) NGVD29 NGVD29 BVPS Unit 1: Control Building (0- 735.6 ft Minimal 735.6 ft FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3 35-1) NGVD29 NGVD29 BVPS Unit 1: Control Building (S- 735.6 ft Minimal 735.6 ft FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3 35-71) NGVD29 NGVD29 BVPS Unit 1: Control Building (S- 735.8 ft Minimal 735.8 ft FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3 35-72) NGVD29 NGVD29
Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 & 2 Table 2. Reevaluated Flood Hazards for Flood-Causing Mechanisms for Use in the MSA Mechanism Stillwater Waves/ Reevaluated Reference Elevation Run up Hazard Elevation BVPS Unit 1: Control Building (S- 735.6 ft Minimal 735.6 ft FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 1 & 3 35-74) NGVD29 NGVD29 BVPS Unit 2: Safeguards (SG 734.7 ft Minimal 734.7 ft FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 2 & 3
- 4) NGVD29 NGVD29 BVPS Unit 2: Diesel Generator 732.3 ft Minimal 732.3 ft FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 2 & 3 Building (DG-32-5) NGVD29 NGVD29 BVPS Unit 2: Auxiliary Building 735.7 ft Minimal 735.7 ft FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 2 & 3 (A-35-1) NGVD29 NGVD29 BVPS Unit 2: Auxiliary Building 735.6 ft Minimal 735.6 ft FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 2 & 3 (A-35-3) NGVD29 NGVD29 BVPS Unit 2: Auxiliary Building 735.6 ft Minimal 735.6 ft FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 2 & 3 (A-35-5) NGVD29 NGVD29 BVPS Unit 2: Fuel Building (F 735.5 ft Minimal 735.5 ft FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 2 & 3
- 1) NGVD29 NGVD29 BVPS Unit 2: Fuel Building (F 735.4 ft Minimal 735.4 ft FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 2 & 3
- 2) NGVD29 NGVD29 BVPS Unit 2: Containment 734.6 ft Minimal 734.6 ft FHRR Section 3.8.4 & Tables 2 & 3 (Equipment Hatch) NGVD29 NGVD29 BVPS Unit 2 Main Steam Cable 732.5 ft Minimal 732.5 ft FHRR Section 3.8.4 and Table 2 & 3 Vault (MS-35-3) NGVD29 NGVD29 BVPS Unit 2 Safeguards (SG 732.5 ft Minimal 732.5 ft FHRR Section 3.8.4 and Table 2 & 3
- 5) NGVD29 NGVD29 BVPS Unit 2 Fuel Building (F 735.3 ft Minimal 735.3 ft FHRR Section 3.8.4 and Table 2 & 3
- 3) NGVD29 NGVD29
Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 & 2 Table 2. Reevaluated Flood Hazards for Flood-Causing Mechanisms for Use in the MSA Mechanism Stillwater Waves/ Reevaluated Reference Elevation Run up Hazard Streams and Rivers Elevation
--r 4
Combined Event - Probable 730.0 ft 2.8 ft 732.8 ft USAGE 2015 Evaluation of Upper Maximum Flood with Wind Wave NGVD29 NGVD29 Ohio River Basin for Unit 1 Turbine Building North FHRR Section 3.7 & Table 3 Wall 4
Combined Event - Probable 730.0 ft 4.0 ft 734.0 ft USAGE 2015 Evaluation of Upper Maximum Flood with Wind Wave NGVD29 NGVD29 Ohio River Basin for Unit 2 at Ground Slope FHRR Section 3.7 & Table 3 Approaching Reactor Building 4
Combined Event - Probable 730.0 ft 4.5 ft 734.5 ft USAGE 2015 Evaluation of Upper Maximum Flood with Wind Wave NGVD29 NGVD29 Ohio River Basin at Ground Slope Approaching FHRR Section 3.7 & Table 3 the Emergency Outfall Structure Note 1: The licensee is expected to develop flood event duration parameters and applicable flood associated effects to conduct the MSA. The staff will evaluate the flood event duration parameters (including warning time and period of inundation) and flood associated effects during its review of the MSA.
Note 2: Reevaluated hazard mechanisms bounded by the current design basis (see Table 1) are not included in this table Note 3: Reported values are rounded to the nearest one-tenth of a foot.
Note 4: Reported value is the Current Design Basis (COB).
M. Richey BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2- INTERIM STAFF RESPONSE TO REEVALUATED FLOOD HAZARDS SUBMITTED IN RESPONSE TO 10 CFR 50.54(f)
INFORMATION REQUEST- FLOOD-CAUSING MECHANISM REEVALUATION DATED February 22, 2017 DISTRIBUTION:
PUBLIC JLD R/F RidsNRRJLD Resource JUribe, NRR LQuinn-Willingham, NRO RidsNroDsea Resource RidsNrrDorllpl1 Resource RidsNrrDorl Resource RidsNrrPMBeaverValley Resource RidsRgn1 MailCenter Resource RidsNrrLASLent RidsOgcMailCenter Resource RidsOpaMail Resource RidsAcrsAcnw_MailCtr Resource CCook, NRO ACampbell, NRO RRivera-Lugo, NRO LGibson, NRR MWillingham, NRO KSee, NRO BHarvey, NRO MShams, NRR ADAMS Accession Nos.: Letter ML17040A011 ; Enclosure ML17039A550 *via email OFFICE NRR/JLD/JHMB/PM* NRR/JLD/LA NRR/JLD/JHMB/BC(A) NRR/JLD/JHMB/PM NAME JUribe Slent LGibson JUribe DATE 2/8/2017 2/10/2017 2/22/2017 2/22/2017 OFFICIAL AGENCY RECORD