ML16356A291
| ML16356A291 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 08/25/2016 |
| From: | Entergy Operations |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16256A115 | List:
|
| References | |
| W3F1-2016-0053 | |
| Download: ML16356A291 (27) | |
Text
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 8.1-1 Revision 14-A (03/06) 8.0 ELECTRIC POWER
8.1 INTRODUCTION
8.1.1 UTILITY GRID DESCRIPTION (DRN 05-1767, R14-A)The transmission grid of Entergy Louisiana, LLC, which consists of over 2,200 miles of line operating at voltages from 69 to 500 kV (shown on Figure 8.1-1) interchanges power with Waterford 3. (DRN E9900733)The Entergy Louisiana, LLC grid is a part of the Entergy Electric System and is directly interconnected with the grid of each of the other operating companies as shown on Figure 8.1-2. In addition, Entergy Louisiana, LLC's grid is interconnected with three other companies which are not part of the Entergy Electric System. These are: Central Louisiana Electric Company, Southwestern Electric Power
Company and Mississippi Power Company. Entergy Louisiana, LLC is also a member of the
Southeastern Electric Reliability Council. (DRN E9900733)Through these connections, Entergy Louisiana, LLC is interconnected with the other utility systems in the United States and operates in parallel with them. (DRN 05-1767, R14-A) 8.1.2 OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM Power is supplied from the main generator to t he Waterford 3 switching station through two main transformers which are in parallel. From the switching station, two overhead lines transmit power to the Waterford switchyard, which is the point of connection to the grid. The Plant Electric Power Distribution System receives power under normal operating conditions from the main generator through two unit auxiliary transformers.
For start-up and shutdown, when the main generator is unavailable, power is obtained through two start-up transformers from the grid through the switchyard transmission lines and the switching station. When Waterford 3 is not operating, an additional path of supply from the switching station to the Plant Electric Power Distribution System may be made available by opening links in the generator main leads and by using the main transformers and unit auxiliary transformers instead of the start-up transformers. A simplified one line diagram of the switchyard is given in Figure 8.1-4 and of the switching station in Figure 8.1-5. The Main One Line Diagram is shown in Drawings G285 and G286. The Offsite Power
System is discussed more fully in Section 8.2.
8.1.3 ONSITE POWER SYSTEM (DRN E9900733)
The Onsite Power System consists of three 4.16 kV ESF buses (3A3-S, 3B3-S, and 3AB3-S), two diesel generators (3A-S and 3B-S), several 480 V power centers (supplying motor loads directly and through motor control centers), three 125 V dc batteries, five 125 V dc buses (3A-DC-S, 3B-DC-S, 3AB-DC-S, 3A1-DC-S and 3B1-DC-S), and several 480 V and 208Y/120V power distribution panels. (DRN E9900733)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-38.1-2Revision 11 (05/01)The Main One Line Diagram, Figure 8.1-7, shows the Onsite Power System configuration.(DRN 99-0682)Power for safety related loads is normally supplied by the non-safety related 4.16 kV buses (3A2 and 3B2)of the Offsite Power System. Should offsite power from either of these buses be lost, the Onsite Power System will receive power automatically from the appropriate diesel generator. Non-safety related loads (excluding loads identified in Table 8.3-1) will be automatically disconnected from the safety Onsite Power System. Each ESF bus (3A3-S or 3B3-S) is redundant to the other; each can supply sufficient power to its safety related loads to enable safe shutdown, or to mitigate the consequences of a design basis accident.
The third bus, 3AB3-S, may be connected to either 3A3-S or 3B3-S, but never to both. Therefore 3AB3-S is not considered as a third, separate source of ESF power. (This bus serves to supply power to safety related loads which are standby to safety related loads on buses 3A3-S and 3B3-S.)(DRN 99-0682) (DRN 99-0733)The Plant Electric Power Distribution System Loads are given in Table 8.1-2. The ac safety loads areshown in Table 8.1-1. The dc safety loads are listed in Tables 8.3-3, 8.3-4 and 8.3-5. The 120 V ac and 125 V dc one line diagrams are shown in Drawing 287, Sheet 1.(DRN 99-0733)The third of a kind ESF electrical system shown on Figure 8.1-9 consists of:a)4.16 kV Switchgear 3AB3-S(power)b)480V Switchgear 3AB31-S(power) c)125V d-c System 3AB(control) d)120V a-c and 125V d-c(instrumentation)Item c contains battery 3AB-S and does not have interconnections with the SA or SB 125V d-c systems.Item d derives the low level power for instrumentation from items a and b through necessary step downtransformers and from item c.Control power for items a and b is obtained from item c.Items a and b receive power, either from system SA or system SB. The dead bus transfer is made fromthe main control room. To accomplish this and meet the single failure criterion, eight breakers have been provided. These breakers are: (Refer to Figure 8.1-9)Breaker No. 1 - Tie breaker from 4.16KV swgr 3A3-S to 3AB3-SBreaker No. 2 - Tie breaker from 4.16KV swgr 3AB3-S to 3A3-S Breaker No. 3 - Tie breaker from 4.16KV swgr 3B3-S to 3AB3-S Breaker No. 4 - Tie breaker from 4.16KV swgr 3AB3-S to 3B3-S Breaker No. 5 - Tie breaker from 480V swgr 3A31-S to 3AB31-S Breaker No. 6 - Tie breaker from 480V swgr 3AB31-S to 3A31-S Breaker No. 7 - Tie breaker from 480V swgr 3B31-S to 3AB31-S Breaker No. 8 - Tie breaker from 480V swgr 3AB31-S to 3B31-S WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 8.1-3 Revision 14-A (03/06)When the two position selector switch is in position A, breakers No. 1, No. 2, No. 5 andNo. 6 are closed (the rest are open), and when it is in position B, breakers No. 3, No. 4, No. 7 and No. 8
are closed (the rest are open).
Following is the sequence of events for a transfer from System SA to SB.
a) Trip breaker No. 1 and No. 5 from the main control room. These breakers are operated by one control switch. b) Move two position selector switch from position A to B. Breaker No. 2 and No. 6 will trip and breaker No. 4 and No., 8 will close, if breakers No. 1, No. 5, No. 3 and No. 7 are open. The latter condition is monitored and controlled by undervoltage relays 27 in the line side of breaker No. 2, No. 4, No. 6 and No. 8. 4.16KV breakers No. 2 and No. 4 are interlocked electrically and also, 480V breakers No. 6 and No. 8, so that both of a kind cannot be
closed at the same time. c) Close breakers No. 3 and No. 7 from the main control room. These breakers are operated by one control switch. The control switch of breakers No. 1 and No., 5 are key interlocked with the control switch of breakers No. 3 and No. 7. Keys may be removed only in the trip position. Transfer from system SB to SA involves the same eight breakers described above and it is accomplished in a similar manner with the same requirements imposed on transferring from system SA to SB. It should be noted that breaker No. 1 and No. 5 receive control power from 125V dc system SA, whereas breaker No. 3 and No. 7 from 125V dc system SB. The balance of the breakers, i.e., No. 2, No. 4, No. 6, and No. 8 receive control power from 125V dc system SAB. Therefore, there is no control device or instrumentation in system SAB requiring power from system SA or SB. (DRN E9900733)All power, control and instrumentation cabling are routed in separate raceway systems i.e., SA, SB, and SAB, which are color coded for identification. (DRN E9900733)8.1.4 DESIGN BASES 8.1.4.1 Offsite Power System The Offsite Power System is designed to:
a) Provide a reliable source of auxiliary power for start-up, operation and shutdown of the plant. (DRN 05-1767, R14-A)b) Provide for transmission of the station output to the Entergy Louisiana, LLC grid. (DRN 05-1767, R14-A)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-38.1-4Revision 11 (05/01) (DRN E9900733)c)Comply with NRC General Design Criterion 17 (Electric Power Systems) by providing twoelectrically and physically independent transmission circuits from the grid to the Plant Electric Power Distribution System; each circuit is designed to be available within a few seconds following a design basis accident to assure that vital safety functions are maintained. (DRN E9900733)d)Minimize the probability that loss of one line will cause loss of the other or of the Onsite PowerSystem. (DRN E9900733)Appendix 8.1A provides the results of a Station Blackout (SBO) Evaluation performed for Waterford 3 inaccordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.63. The evaluation demonstrates that equipment will be functional such that Waterford 3 can safely cope with an SBO for four hours. (DRN E9900733)8.1.4.2Onsite Power SystemThe Onsite Power System is designed to:a)Provide a reliable source of auxiliary power for safe shutdown of reactor, assuming loss of offsitepower and single failure in the Onsite Power System.b)Provide independent, redundant and testable power supplies, each with its own distributionsystem, so that the required safety function can be performed by either power supply, assuming a single failure in the other power supply or in its distribution system.c)Provide for testing the operability and functional performance of the components of each systemand of the systems themselves.d)Be capable of withstanding the effects of the design basis wind, tornado, flood and earthquakewithout loss of power to safety related components essential to safe shutdown or to maintenance in a safe condition.e)Minimize the probability that loss of one onsite power supply or of its distribution system will causeloss of the other onsite supply, of the other onsite distribution system or of the Offsite PowerSystem.Details of seismic design and testing are provided in Section 3.10.
8.1.4.3Criteria, Codes and StandardsThe electrical systems and equipment for the plant which are safety related are designed, manufactured,tested, installed and maintained to meet the requirements of the applicable NRC General Design Criteria, in accordance with the following IEEE Standards, as modified by the following NRC Regulatory Guides.Wherever alternative approaches are used to meet the intent of some specific recommendations of Regulatory Guides and IEEE Standards, the method of attaining an acceptable level of safety is found inthe full discussion of these documents in Subsection 8.3.1.2.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 8.1-5 Revision 308 (11/14) a)The applicable General Design Criteria, as listed in 10CFR50, Appendix A, are discussed in Section 3.1.b)NRC Regulatory Guides:1)1.6, Independence Between Redundant (Onsite) Power Sources and Between Their Distribution Syst ems (3/10/71) (DRN E9900733, LBDCR 14-010, R308) 2)1.9**, Selection of Diesel Generator Set Capacity for Standby Power Supplies (3/10/71 and 03/07) (DRN E9900733, LBDCR 14-010, R308) 3)1.22, Periodic Testing of Protection System Actuation Functions (2/17/72)4)1.29, Seismic Design Classification (8/73) 5)1.30, Quality Assurance Requirements for the Installation, Inspection, and Testing of Instrumentation and Electric Equipment (8/11/72) 6)1.32, Use of IEEE Std 308-1971, "Criteria fo r Class 1E Electric Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations (8/11/72) 7)1.40, Qualification Tests of Continuous-Duty Motors Installed Inside the Containment of Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants (3/16/73) 8)1.41, Preoperational Testing of Redundant On site Electric Power Systems to Verify Proper Load Group Assignments (3/16/73) 9)1.53, Application of the Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Plant Protection Systems (6/73) 10)1.62, Manual Initiation of Protective Actions (10/73) 11)1.63, Electric Penetration Assemblies in Containment Structures for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants (1/74) 12)1.73, Qualification Tests of Electric Valv e Operators Installed Inside the Containment of Nuclear Power Plants (1/74) 13)1.75*, Physical Independence of Electric Systems (1/75)*Indicates that Waterford 3 has taken exception to or interprets the Regulatory Guide. These alternate ways of meeting the intent of the Regulator y Guide are discussed in Subsection 8.3.1.2. (DRN E 9900733) ** See FSAR Section 9.5.4 and the applicable Technica l Specification and TS Bases for a discussion of Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer Systems. (DRN E 9900733)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 8.1-6 Revision 308 (11/14) 15)1.81, Shared Emergency and Shutdown Electric Systems for Multi-Unit Nuclear Power Plants (6/74) (not applicable to Waterford 3) 16)1.89, Qualification of Class 1E E quipment for Nuclear Power Plants (11/74) (DRN E 9900733) 17)1.93, Availability of Electric Power Sources (12/74) (DRN E 9900733) c)Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standards:
1)IEEE Standard 279-1971, Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, Criteria for 2)IEEE Standard 308-1971, Criteria for Class 1E Electric Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations. (DRN E 9900733) 3)IEEE Standard 317-1972, Electric Penetration A ssemblies in Containment Structures for Nuclear Power Generating Stations. (DRN E 9900733) 4)IEEE Standard 336-1971, Installation, In spection and Testing Requirements for Instrumentation and Electric Equipment Du ring The Construction of Nuclear Power Generating Stations.
5)IEEE Standard 338-1971, IEEE Standard Criteria for the Periodic Testing of Nuclear Power Generating Station Class 1E Power and Protections Systems.
6)IEEE Standard 344-1971, IEEE Recommended Prac tices for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.
7)IEEE Standard 384-1974, Criteria for Separat ion of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits. (LBDCR 14-010, R308) 8)IEEE Standard 387-1972 and 387-1995, Criteria fo r Diesel Generator Units Applied as Standby Power Supplies for Nuclear Power Stations. (LBDCR 14-010, R308) 9)IEEE Standard 415-1976, Guide for planning of Pre-Operational Testing Programs for Class 1E Power Systems for Nucl ear Power Generating Stations.10)IEEE Standard 450-1980, Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Generating Stations and Substations. (DRN 05-1767, R14-A) d)In addition to the above, all transmission lines and substations are des igned and constructed in accordance with applicable industry standards, incl uding those of the Entergy Louisiana, LLC. All electrical equipment, both onsite and offsite, is designed and manufactured to applicable ANSI, NEMA, IEEE and other industry standards. (DRN 05-1767, R14-A)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 8.1-1 (Sheet 1 of 6) Revision 302 (12/08) (DRN E 9900733) TYPICAL EQUIPMENT CONNECTED TO SAFETY RELATED POWER SOURCES (DRN E 9900733) UNID Description of Load Nameplate
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 8.1-1 (Sheet 2 of 6)Revision12-B (04/03) (DRN E9900733)
TYPICAL EQUIPMENT CONNECTED TO SAFETY R ELATED POWER SOURCES (DRN E9900733)
UNID Description of Load Nameplate WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 8.1-1 (Sheet 3 of 6)Revision12-B (04/03) (DRN E9900733, R11)
TYPICAL EQUIPMENT CONNECTED TO SAFETY RELATED POWER SOURCES (DRN E9900733, R11)
UNID Description of Load Nameplate WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 8.1-1 (Sheet 4 of 6)Revision12-B (04/03) (DRN E9900733, R11)TYPICAL EQUIPMENT CONNECTED TO SAFETY RELATED POWER SOURCES (DRN E9900733, R11)
UNID Description of Load Nameplate WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3TABLE 8.1-1 (Sheet 5 of 6)Revision12-B (04/03) (DRN E9900733, R11)
TYPICAL EQUIPMENT CONNECTED TO SAFETY RELATED POWER SOURCES (DRN E9900733, R11)
UNID Description of Load Nameplate WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 8.1-1 (Sheet 6 of 6) Revision 309 (06/16) (DRN E9900733, R11) TYPICAL EQUIPMENT CONNECTED TO SAFETY RELATED POWER SOURCES (DRN E9900733, R11)
UNID Description of Load Nameplate WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 8.1-2 (Sheet 1 of 4) Revision 304 (06/10) (DRN E9900733) TYPICAL AUXILIARY LOADING Item Rating of Division A Division B No. Quant.Description Each Load(3) Normal Load*Normal Load*(V) (hp)(hp)(3) (kVA)(hp)(3) (kVA) (DRN E9900733; EC-19206, R304)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 8.1-2 (Sheet 2 of 4) Revision 304 (06/10) Item Rating of Division A Division B No. Quant.Description Each Load(3) Normal Load*Normal Load*(DRN E9900733; EC-19206, R304)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 8.1-2 (Sheet 3 of 4) Revision 304 (06/10) (DRN E9900733) Item Rating of Division A Division B No. Quant.Description Each Load(3) Normal Load*Normal Load*(V) (hp)(hp)(3) (kVA)(hp)(3) (kVA)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 8.1-2 (Sheet 4 of 4) Revision 304 (06/10) Item Rating of Division A Division B No. Quant.Description Each Load(3) Normal Load*Normal Load*(V) (hp)(hp)(3) (kVA)(hp)(3) (kVA)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 8.1-3 (Sheet 1 of 7) FSAR CROSS-REFERENCE OF DISCUSSION OF SRP ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA FOR ELECTRIC POWER FSAR DISCUSSION ONSITE STANDBY ACESF AC POWE R ESF DC POWE R OFFSITE POWER POWER SUPPL Y DISTRIBUTI ON DISTRIBUTI ON CRITERIA SYSTEM (8.2) (DG SETS)
(8.3.1)SY STEM (8.3.1) SYSTEM (8.3.2) REMARKS I. REGULATORY GUIDES (2)a.RG 1.6-1971Independence Between N/A 8.3.1.2.3 8.3.1.2.3 8.3.2.2.1.3 Compliance is indi-Redundant Standby cated in FSAR Sub-(Onsite) Power Sourcessection 8.1.4.3.
and Between Their Distribution Sy stems (LBDCR 14-010, R308) b.RG 1.9-1971 Selection of Diesel N/A 8.3.1.2.4 N/A N/A Compliance is indi- RG 1.9 2007 Generator Set Capa-cated in FSAR Sub- city for Standbysection 8.1.4.3.
Power Supplies (LBDCR 14-010, R308) c.RG 1.22-1972 Periodic Testing of N/A (1) (1) (1) Compliance is indi-Protection Sy stem cated in FSAR Sub-Actuation Functionssection 8.1.4.3.
See SurveillanceRequirements in (Technical Specifications)d.RG 1.29-1973 Seismic Design N/A 8.3.1.2.6 8.3.1.2.6 (1) C l assificatione.RG 1.30-1972Quality Assurance N/A T 17.2-1 T 17.2-1 T 17.2-1 Compliance is indi-Requirements for the cated in FSAR Sub-Installation, Inspec-section 8.1.4.3 tion, and Testing of Instrumentation andElectric Equipmentf.RG 1.32-1972Criteria for Safety-(1)
(1) 8.3.1.2.8 8.3.2.2.1.4 Comp liance is indi-Related Electric Power cated in FSAR Sub-Systems for Nuclearsection 8.1.4.3 Power Plantsg.RG 1.40-1973 Qualification Test N/A N/A (1) N/A Compliance is indi- of Continuous Duty cated in FSAR Sub-Motor Installed In-section 8.1.4.3 Side the Containment of Wa ter-cooled Nuclear Power Plants WSESFSARUNIT3TABLE 8.1-3 (Sheet 2 of 7) Revision 9 (12/97)FSAR DISCUSSIONONSITE STANDBY ACESF AC POWER ESF DC POWEROFFSITE POWERPOWER SUPPLYDISTRIBUTIONDISTRIBUTION CRITERIA SYSTEM (8.2)(DG SETS) (8.3.1)SYSTEM (8.3.1) SYSTEM (8.3.2) REMARKS I. REGULATORY GUIDES (Cont'd)h. RG 1.41-1973Preoperational Testing N/A 8.3.1.2.10 8.3.1.2.10 8.3.1.2.10Compliance is indi-of Redundant Onsitecated in FSAR Sub-Electric Power Systemssection 8.1.4.3to Verify Proper LoadGroup Assignmentsi. Deletedj. RG 1.53-1973Application of the N/A 7.2.3.3.5 7.2.3.3.5 7.2.3.3.5Compliance is indi-Single-Failure Cri-cated in FSAR Sub-terion to Nuclearsection 8.1.4.3Power Plant Protec-tion Systemsk. RG 1.62-1973Manual Initiation N/A (1) (1) (1)Compliance is indi-of Protective Actionscated in FSAR Sub-section 8.1.4.3l. RG 1.63-1973Electric Penetration N/A N/A 8.3.1.1.4 8.3.1.1.4Compliance is indi-Assemblies in Con-cated in FSAR Sub-tainment Structuressection 8.1.4.3for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plantsm. RG 1.68-1978Preoperational and N/A 14.2.7.13 14.2.7.13 14.2.7.13Initial Startup Test Programs for Water-Cooled Power Reactorsn. RG 1.70-1975Standard Format and (1) (1) (1) (1)Compliance is indi-Content of Safetycated in FSAR Sub-Analysis Reports forsection 1.1Nuclear Power Plants, Rev. 2 WSESFSARUNIT3TABLE 8.1-3 (Sheet 3 of 7)FSAR DISCUSSIONONSITE STANDBY ACESF AC POWER ESF DC POWEROFFSITE POWERPOWER SUPPLYDISTRIBUTIONDISTRIBUTIONCRITERIA SYSTEM (8.2)(DG SETS) (8.3.1)SYSTEM (8.3.1) SYSTEM (8.3.2) REMARKS I. REGULATORY GUIDES (Cont'd)n.RG 1.73-1974Qualification Tests N/A N/A 3.9.3.2.2N/ACompliance is indi-of Electric Valvecated in FSAR Sub-Operators Installedsection 8.1.4.3Inside the Contain-ment of Nuclear Power Plantso.RG 1.75-1975Physical Independence N/A 8.3.1.2.13 8.3.1.2.13 8.3.1.2.13Compliance is indi-of Electric Systemcated in FSAR Sub-section 8.1.4.3p.RG 1.89-1974Qualification of N/A 3.10.2 3.10.2 3.10.2Compliance is indi-Class 1E Equipment and 3.11.2 and 3.11.2 and 3.11.2cated in FSAR Sub-for Nuclear Power section 8.1.4.3Plantsq.RG 1.93-1974Availability of 16.3/4.8 16.3/4.8 16.3/4.8 16.3/4.8Compliance is indi-Electric Powercated in FSAR Sub-Sourcessection 8.1.4.3II.I EEE STANDARDSa.IEEE Std 279-1971 Criteria for Pro-N/A N/A 8.3.1.2.14 8.3.1.2.14Compliance is indi-tection System forcated in FSAR Sub-Nuclear Power section 8.1.4.3Generating Stationsb.I EEE Std 308-1971 Criteria for Class 1E 8.3.1.2.15 8.3.1.2.15 8.3.1.2.15 8.3.2.1.15Compliance is indi-Electric Power Systems and 8.3.2.2.1.5 and 8.3.2.2.1.5 and 8.3.2.2.1.5 and 8.3.2.2.1.5cated in FSAR Sub-for Nuclear and Powersection 8.1.4.3Generating Stationsc.I EEE Std 317-1972 Electric Penetration N/A N/A 8.3.1.1.4 8.3.1.1.4Compliance is indi-Assemblies in Con-cated in FSAR Sub-tainment Structuressection 8.1.4.3for Nuclear Power Generating Stations WSESFSARUNIT3TABLE 8.1-3 (Sheet 4 of 7)FSAR DISCUSSIONONSITE STANDBY ACESF AC POWER ESF DC POWEROFFSITE POWERPOWER SUPPLYDISTRIBUTIONDISTRIBUTION CRITERIA SYSTEM (8.2)(DG SETS) (8.3.1)SYSTEM (8.3.1) SYSTEM (8.3.2) REMARKS II.IEEE STANDARDS (Cont'd)d.IEEE Std 323-1971 Standard General N/A 3.11.2 3.11.1 8.3.2.2Guide for Qualify-and 3.11.2ing Class 1E Elec-trical Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Sta-tionse.IEEE Std 334-1971 Type Test of N/A N/A 3.11.2 N/Atinuous-Duty Class 1E Motors for Nuclear Power Generating Stationsf.IEEE Std 336-1971 Installation, In-N/A 8.3.1.2.17 8.3.1.2.17 8.3.1.2.17Compliance is indi-spection and Test-cated in FSAR Sub-ing Requirementssection 8.1.4.3for Instrumentation and Electrical Equip-ment During the Con-
struction of Nuclear Power Generating Stationsg.IEEE Std 338-1971 Criteria for the N/A N/A 8.3.1.2.18 N/ACompliance is indi-Periodic Testing ofcated in FSAR Sub-Nuclear Power Gene-section 8.1.4.3rating Station Pro-tection Systemsh.IEEE Std 344-1971 Recommended Prac-N/A (1)(1)(1)Compliance is indi-tices for Seismiccated in FSAR Sub-Qualification ofsection 8.1.4.3Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 8.1-3 (Sheet 5 of 7)
FSAR DISCUSSION ONSITE STANDBY AC ESF AC POWER ESF DC POWER OFFSITE POWER POWER SUPPLY DISTRIBUTI ON DISTRIBUTI ON CRITERIA SYSTEM (8.2) (DG SETS) (8.3.1) SYSTEM (8.3.1) SYSTEM (8.3.2) REMARKS II.IEEE STANDARDS (Cont'd) i.IEEE Std 379-1972 Guide for he N/A 7.2.2.3.2 7.2.2.32 7.2.2.3.2 Application of the and 72.2.3.5 and 7.2.2.3.5 and 7.2.2.3.5 Single Failure Cri-terion to Nuclear Power Generating Station Pro-tection System sj.IEEE Std 384-1974 Criteria for Sepa-N/A 8.3.1.2.19 8.3.1.2.19 8.3.1.2.19 Comp liance is indi-ration of Class 1E cated in FSAR Sub-Equipment and Cir-section 8.1.4.3 cuits ( LBDCR 14-010, R308) k.IEEE Std 387-1972 Criteria for Diesel-N/A 8.3.1.220 N/A N/A Compliance is indi- IEEE Std 387-1995 Generator Units cated in FSAR Sub-Applied as Standbysection 8.1.4.3Power Supplies for Nuclear Power Stations ( LBDCR 14-010, R308) l.IEEE Std 415-1976 Guide for Planning of N/A 14.2.7 23 14.2.7.23 14.2.723 Compliance is indi-Pre-Operational Testing cated in FSAR Sub-Programs for Class 1Esection 8.1.4.3Power Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations m.IEEE Std 450-1980 Recommended Practice N/A N/A N/A 8.3.2.2.1.6 Compliance is indi-for Maintenance, Tes ing cated in FSAR Sub- and Replacement of Large section 8.1.4.3 Lead Storage Batteries for Generating Stations and Substations III. BRA NCH TECHNICAL POSITIONS a.BTP ICSB 2 (PSB)
Diesel-Generator N/A N/A N/A N/A The Waterford 3 ReliabilityDiesel Generators Qualification are of the same ty pe Testing (CES Model KSV-16-T)as those used at theSusquehana units.
Therefore, this BTP is not applicable to Waterford.
WSESFSARUNIT3TABLE 8.1-3 (Sheet 6 of 7)FSAR DISCUSSIONONSITE STANDBY ACESF AC POWER ESF DC POWEROFFSITE POWERPOWER SUPPLYDISTRIBUTIONDISTRIBUTION CRITERIA SYSTEM (8.2)(DG SETS) (8.3.1)SYSTEM (8.3.1) SYSTEM (8.3.2) REMARKS III. BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITIONS (Cont'd)b. BTP ICSB 6 (PSB) Capacity Test Require- N/A N/A N/A 8.3.2.1.8Battery tests willments of Station be performed as out-Batteries-Technicallined BTP ICSB 6 atSpecifications the intervals statedin the Technical Specificationsc. BTP ICSB 8 (PSB) Use of Diesel-N/A N/A N/A N/AWaterford does notGenerator Setsmake use of the for Peakingdiesel-generator sets for peaking.d. BTP ICSB 11 (PSB) Stability of N/A N/A N/A N/AThe Louisiana PowerOffsite Power& Light grid systemSystemshas interties withthat of Middle SouthServices. Discus-
sions of the grid system may be found in FSAR Section 8.1
and 8.2e. BTP ICSB 15 (PSB) Reactor Coolant N/A N/A N/A N/AReactor coolantPump Breakerpumps are discussedQualificationin FSAR Subsection
5.4.1f. BTP ICSB 17 (PSB) Diesel Generator N/A 8.3.1.1.2.11(c)
N/A N/AProtective Trip Circuit Bypassg. BTP ICSB 18 (PSB) Application of the N/A N/A N/A N/AManually-Controlled,Single Failure Cri-Electrically Oper-terion to Manually-ated Valves are dis-Controlled Electri-cussed FSAR Subsec-cally-Operated 16.3/4.5.2Valvesh. BTP ICSB 21Guidance for Appli- 7.5.1.8 and 7.5.1.8 and 7.5.1.8 and 7.5.1.8 andcation of RG 1.47 7.5.2.8 7.5.2.8 7.5.2.8 7.5.2.8 WSESFSARUNIT3TABLE 8.1-3 (Sheet 7 of 7)FSAR DISCUSSIONONSITE STANDBY ACESF AC POWER ESF DC POWEROFFSITE POWERPOWER SUPPLYDISTRIBUTIONDISTRIBUTION CRITERIA SYSTEM (8.2)(DG SETS) (8.3.1)SYSTEM (8.3.1) SYSTEM (8.3.2) REMARKS IV. 10 CFR PART 50a. 10 CFR 50.34Contents of Appli- N/A N/A N/A N/AWaterford is in com-cations: Technicalpliance with thisInformation partb. 10 CFR 50.36Technical Specifi-N/A N/A N/A N/AWaterford is in com-cationspliance with thispart. See FSAR Chapter 16 (Technical Specifications)c. 10 CFR 50.55aCodes and Standards N/A N/A N/A N/AWaterford is in com-pliance with this
partV. GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIAAll General Design Criteria are discussed in FSAR Section 3.1 Notes:(1) Criteria as applicable to this section is found in the other referenced sections.(2) Discussions of general compliance with Regulatory Guides is indexed in FSAR Section 1.8.
N/A - Not Applicable WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 8.1A-1 Revision 14-B (06/06)
APPENDIX 8.1A STATION BLACKOUT EVALUATION EVALUATIONLP&L performed an evaluation, EC-E89-016, for Waterford 3 for a Station Blackout (SBO) in accordance with 10CFR50.63 using the guidance in NUMARC 87-00 and Regulatory Guide 1.155. There were no hardware changes required for Waterford 3 to cope with an SBO for four hours. Procedural changes are implemented to enhance the ability of Waterford 3 to cope with an SBO. The plant specific evaluation for Waterford 3 demonstrates that equipment will be functional such that Waterford 3 can safely cope with an
SBO for four hours. (DRN E990733)The Nuclear Utility Group on Station Blackout (NUGSBO), Nuclear Utility Management Resource Council (NUMARC), the NRC, and various technical consulting firms endeavored for several years to resolve the technical issues for an SBO. The resolution addressed the margins of safety, potential malfunctions and accident types, probabilities of malfunctions and accidents, and consequences. The resolution for SBO was established and documented in 10CFR50.63, NUMARC 87-00, and Regulatory Guide 1.155. The plant specific evaluation for Waterford 3 was performed in accordance with the foregoing documents.
The Waterford 3 evaluation was independently verified by Entergy technical personnel and reviewed and
approved by cognizant personnel. (DRN E990733)The SBO industry resolution, Waterford 3 plant specific evaluation, and independent review and approval of the effort provide additional defense in depth that Waterford 3 will be able to cope with an SBO and
that an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
DISCUSSIONThe results of the evaluation are summarized below, (Applicable NUMARC 87-00 sections are shown in parenthesis).A. Proposed Station Blackout Duration(DRN E990733) NUMARC 87-00, Section 3, was used to determine a proposed SBO duration of four hours.
The following plant factors were identified in determining the proposed station blackout duration: (DRN E990733) 1. AC Power Design Characteristic Group is P2 based on: (DRN 06-339, R14-B)a. Expected frequency of grid-related Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) - does not exceed once per 20 years (Section 3.2.1, Part 1A); b. Estimated frequency LOOPs due to extremely severe weather, places the plant in ESW Group 4 (Section 3.2.1, Part 1B); (DRN 06-339, R14-B)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 8.1A-2 Revision 14-B (06/06)(DRN 06-339, R14-B)c. Estimated frequency of LOOPs due to severe weather places the plant in SW Group 2 (Section 3.2.1, Part 1C); d. The offsite power system is in the I3 group (Section 3.2.1, Part 1D); 2. The emergency AC power configuration groups is "C" based on: (Section 3.2.2., Part 2C);a. There are two (2) emergency AC power supplies not credited as alternate AC power sources (Section 3.2.2, Part 2A); b. One (1) emergency AC power supply is necessary to operate safe shutdown equipment following a loss of offsite power (Section 3.2.2, Part 2B); (DRN 06-339, R14-B) 3. The target EDG reliability is 0.975. a. A target EDG reliability of 0.975 was selected based on having a nuclear unit average EDG reliability for the last 50 demands greater than 0.94 consistent with
NUMARC 87-00, Section 3.2.4. B. SBO Procedure Description Plant procedures have been reviewed and modified to meet the guidelines in NUMARC 87-00, Section 4, in the following areas: 1. AC power restoration per NUMARC 87-00, Section 4.2.2; LP&L Emergency Procedures for Restoration of Offsite Power to Waterford 3. (DRN E9900733)2. Severe weather per NUMARC 87-00, Section 4.2.3; OP-901-S21 - Severe Weather and Flooding.(DRN E9900733) Plant procedures have been reviewed and changes necessary to meet NUMARC 87-00 implemented in accordance with 10CFR50.63 in the following area: 1. Station blackout response per NUMARC 87-00, Section 4.2.1; OP-902-005 - Degraded Electrical Distribution Recovery Procedure. C. Proposed Modifications and Schedule The ability of Waterford 3 to cope with a station blackout for four hours in accordance with NUMARC 87-00, Section 3.2.5, and as determined in "Section A," was assessed using NUMARC
87-00, Section 7, with the following results:
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 8.1A-3 Revision 14 (12/05)1. Condensate Inventory for Decay Heat Removal (Section 7.2.1)(DRN E9900733; 04-1680, R14)
It was determined (using Section 7.2.1 of NUMARC 87-00) that approximately 106,300 gallons of water are required for decay heat removal and primary system cooldown to 400F (emergency operating procedures address whether cooldown is necessary) for a four-hour station blackout coping period (NUMARC 87-00, Section 3.2.5). Since the minimum permissible condensate storage tank level required by Technical Specifications exceeds 106,300 gallons, adequate inventory is available. (DRN E9900733; 04-1680, R14) 2. Class 1E Battery(ies) Capacity (Section 7.2.2)A battery capacity calculation verified that the Class 1E batteries have sufficient capacity to meet station blackout for four hours. 3. Compressed Air (Section 7.2.3)Air-operated valves relied upon to cope with a station blackout for four hours can either be operated manually or have sufficient backup sources independent of the preferred and Class 1E power supply. Valves requiring manual operation or that need backup
sources for operation are identified in plant procedures. 4. Effects of Loss of Ventilation (Section 7.2.4) a. EFW Pump Room The calculated steady state ambient air temperature for the steam driven EFW pump room during a station blackout induced loss of ventilation is 90F. This temperature is below the threshold value of 120F for dominant areas of concern requiring equipment operability analysis. b. Control Room Complex for PWR The assumption in NUMARC 87-00, Section 2.7.1, that the control room will not exceed 120F during a station blackout has been assessed.
The control room at Waterford 3 does not exceed 120F during station blackout.Therefore, the control room is not a dominant area of concern. Reasonable assurance of the operability of station blackout equipment in the areas containing potential heat sources have been assessed using Appendix F
to NUMARC 87-00 or the Topical Report. No modifications or associated procedures are required to provide reasonable assurance for equipment
operability.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-38.1A-45.Containment Isolation (Section 7.2.5)The plant list of containment isolation valves was reviewed to verify that valves whichmust be capable of being closed or that must be operated (cycled) under station blackout conditions can be positioned (with indication) independent of the preferred and Class 1E power supplies. No plant modifications or additional procedure changes were required to ensure that appropriate containment integrity can be provided under SBO conditions.6.Reactor Coolant Inventory (Section 2.5)The ability to maintain adequate reactor coolant system inventory to ensure that the core is cooled was assessed for four hours. A plant-specific analysis was used for this assessment. The expected rates of reactor coolant inventory loss under SBO conditions do not result in core uncovery in a SBO of four hours. Therefore, makeup systems in addition to those currently available under SBO conditions are not required to maintain core cooling.The results of the SBO evaluation for Waterford 3 were provided to the NRC on April 14, 1989 viaReference 2.Section 8.1A References1 - Nuclear Management and Resources Council, "Guidelines and Technical Bases for NUMARCInitiatives Addressing Station Blackout at Light Water Reactors," NUMARC 87-00, November 1987.2.-Louisiana Power and Light letter W3P89-0510 to USNRC, dated April 14, 1989.