ML16356A291
| ML16356A291 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 08/25/2016 |
| From: | Entergy Operations |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16256A115 | List:
|
| References | |
| W3F1-2016-0053 | |
| Download: ML16356A291 (27) | |
Text
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 8.1-1 Revision 14-A (03/06) 8.0 ELECTRIC POWER
8.1 INTRODUCTION
8.1.1 UTILITY GRID DESCRIPTION
(DRN 05-1767, R14-A)
The transmission grid of Entergy Louisiana, LLC, which consists of over 2,200 miles of line operating at voltages from 69 to 500 kV (shown on Figure 8.1-1) interchanges power with Waterford 3.
(DRN E9900733)
The Entergy Louisiana, LLC grid is a part of the Entergy Electric System and is directly interconnected with the grid of each of the other operating companies as shown on Figure 8.1-2. In addition, Entergy Louisiana, LLCs grid is interconnected with three other companies which are not part of the Entergy Electric System. These are: Central Louisiana Electric Company, Southwestern Electric Power Company and Mississippi Power Company. Entergy Louisiana, LLC is also a member of the Southeastern Electric Reliability Council.
(DRN E9900733)
Through these connections, Entergy Louisiana, LLC is interconnected with the other utility systems in the United States and operates in parallel with them.
(DRN 05-1767, R14-A) 8.1.2 OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM Power is supplied from the main generator to the Waterford 3 switching station through two main transformers which are in parallel. From the switching station, two overhead lines transmit power to the Waterford switchyard, which is the point of connection to the grid.
The Plant Electric Power Distribution System receives power under normal operating conditions from the main generator through two unit auxiliary transformers.
For start-up and shutdown, when the main generator is unavailable, power is obtained through two start-up transformers from the grid through the switchyard transmission lines and the switching station.
When Waterford 3 is not operating, an additional path of supply from the switching station to the Plant Electric Power Distribution System may be made available by opening links in the generator main leads and by using the main transformers and unit auxiliary transformers instead of the start-up transformers.
A simplified one line diagram of the switchyard is given in Figure 8.1-4 and of the switching station in Figure 8.1-5. The Main One Line Diagram is shown in Drawings G285 and G286. The Offsite Power System is discussed more fully in Section 8.2.
8.1.3 ONSITE POWER SYSTEM
(DRN E9900733)
The Onsite Power System consists of three 4.16 kV ESF buses (3A3-S, 3B3-S, and 3AB3-S), two diesel generators (3A-S and 3B-S), several 480 V power centers (supplying motor loads directly and through motor control centers), three 125 V dc batteries, five 125 V dc buses (3A-DC-S, 3B-DC-S, 3AB-DC-S, 3A1-DC-S and 3B1-DC-S), and several 480 V and 208Y/120V power distribution panels.
(DRN E9900733)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 8.1-2 Revision 11 (05/01)
The Main One Line Diagram, Figure 8.1-7, shows the Onsite Power System configuration.
Power for safety related loads is normally supplied by the non-safety related 4.16 kV buses (3A2 and 3B2) of the Offsite Power System. Should offsite power from either of these buses be lost, the Onsite Power System will receive power automatically from the appropriate diesel generator. Non-safety related loads (excluding loads identified in Table 8.3-1) will be automatically disconnected from the safety Onsite Power System. Each ESF bus (3A3-S or 3B3-S) is redundant to the other; each can supply sufficient power to its safety related loads to enable safe shutdown, or to mitigate the consequences of a design basis accident.
The third bus, 3AB3-S, may be connected to either 3A3-S or 3B3-S, but never to both. Therefore 3AB3-S is not considered as a third, separate source of ESF power. (This bus serves to supply power to safety related loads which are standby to safety related loads on buses 3A3-S and 3B3-S.)
The Plant Electric Power Distribution System Loads are given in Table 8.1-2. The ac safety loads are shown in Table 8.1-1. The dc safety loads are listed in Tables 8.3-3, 8.3-4 and 8.3-5. The 120 V ac and 125 V dc one line diagrams are shown in Drawing 287, Sheet 1.
The third of a kind ESF electrical system shown on Figure 8.1-9 consists of:
a) 4.16 kV Switchgear 3AB3-S (power) b)
480V Switchgear 3AB31-S (power) c)
125V d-c System 3AB (control) d)
120V a-c and 125V d-c (instrumentation)
Item c contains battery 3AB-S and does not have interconnections with the SA or SB 125V d-c systems.
Item d derives the low level power for instrumentation from items a and b through necessary step down transformers and from item c.
Control power for items a and b is obtained from item c.
Items a and b receive power, either from system SA or system SB. The dead bus transfer is made from the main control room. To accomplish this and meet the single failure criterion, eight breakers have been provided. These breakers are: (Refer to Figure 8.1-9)
Breaker No. 1 - Tie breaker from 4.16KV swgr 3A3-S to 3AB3-S Breaker No. 2 - Tie breaker from 4.16KV swgr 3AB3-S to 3A3-S Breaker No. 3 - Tie breaker from 4.16KV swgr 3B3-S to 3AB3-S Breaker No. 4 - Tie breaker from 4.16KV swgr 3AB3-S to 3B3-S Breaker No. 5 - Tie breaker from 480V swgr 3A31-S to 3AB31-S Breaker No. 6 - Tie breaker from 480V swgr 3AB31-S to 3A31-S Breaker No. 7 - Tie breaker from 480V swgr 3B31-S to 3AB31-S Breaker No. 8 - Tie breaker from 480V swgr 3AB31-S to 3B31-S
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 8.1-3 Revision 14-A (03/06)
When the two position selector switch is in position A, breakers No. 1, No. 2, No. 5 and No. 6 are closed (the rest are open), and when it is in position B, breakers No. 3, No. 4, No. 7 and No. 8 are closed (the rest are open).
Following is the sequence of events for a transfer from System SA to SB.
a)
Trip breaker No. 1 and No. 5 from the main control room. These breakers are operated by one control switch.
b)
Move two position selector switch from position A to B. Breaker No. 2 and No. 6 will trip and breaker No. 4 and No., 8 will close, if breakers No. 1, No. 5, No. 3 and No. 7 are open. The latter condition is monitored and controlled by undervoltage relays 27 in the line side of breaker No. 2, No. 4, No. 6 and No. 8. 4.16KV breakers No. 2 and No. 4 are interlocked electrically and also, 480V breakers No. 6 and No. 8, so that both of a kind cannot be closed at the same time.
c)
Close breakers No. 3 and No. 7 from the main control room. These breakers are operated by one control switch.
The control switch of breakers No. 1 and No., 5 are key interlocked with the control switch of breakers No. 3 and No. 7. Keys may be removed only in the trip position.
Transfer from system SB to SA involves the same eight breakers described above and it is accomplished in a similar manner with the same requirements imposed on transferring from system SA to SB.
It should be noted that breaker No. 1 and No. 5 receive control power from 125V dc system SA, whereas breaker No. 3 and No. 7 from 125V dc system SB. The balance of the breakers, i.e., No. 2, No. 4, No. 6, and No. 8 receive control power from 125V dc system SAB. Therefore, there is no control device or instrumentation in system SAB requiring power from system SA or SB.
(DRN E9900733)
All power, control and instrumentation cabling are routed in separate raceway systems i.e., SA, SB, and SAB, which are color coded for identification.
(DRN E9900733) 8.1.4 DESIGN BASES 8.1.4.1 Offsite Power System The Offsite Power System is designed to:
a)
Provide a reliable source of auxiliary power for start-up, operation and shutdown of the plant.
(DRN 05-1767, R14-A) b)
Provide for transmission of the station output to the Entergy Louisiana, LLC grid.
(DRN 05-1767, R14-A)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 8.1-4 Revision 11 (05/01)
(DRN E9900733) c)
Comply with NRC General Design Criterion 17 (Electric Power Systems) by providing two electrically and physically independent transmission circuits from the grid to the Plant Electric Power Distribution System; each circuit is designed to be available within a few seconds following a design basis accident to assure that vital safety functions are maintained.
(DRN E9900733) d)
Minimize the probability that loss of one line will cause loss of the other or of the Onsite Power System.
(DRN E9900733)
Appendix 8.1A provides the results of a Station Blackout (SBO) Evaluation performed for Waterford 3 in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.63. The evaluation demonstrates that equipment will be functional such that Waterford 3 can safely cope with an SBO for four hours.
(DRN E9900733) 8.1.4.2 Onsite Power System The Onsite Power System is designed to:
a)
Provide a reliable source of auxiliary power for safe shutdown of reactor, assuming loss of offsite power and single failure in the Onsite Power System.
b)
Provide independent, redundant and testable power supplies, each with its own distribution system, so that the required safety function can be performed by either power supply, assuming a single failure in the other power supply or in its distribution system.
c)
Provide for testing the operability and functional performance of the components of each system and of the systems themselves.
d)
Be capable of withstanding the effects of the design basis wind, tornado, flood and earthquake without loss of power to safety related components essential to safe shutdown or to maintenance in a safe condition.
e)
Minimize the probability that loss of one onsite power supply or of its distribution system will cause loss of the other onsite supply, of the other onsite distribution system or of the Offsite Power System.
Details of seismic design and testing are provided in Section 3.10.
8.1.4.3 Criteria, Codes and Standards The electrical systems and equipment for the plant which are safety related are designed, manufactured, tested, installed and maintained to meet the requirements of the applicable NRC General Design Criteria, in accordance with the following IEEE Standards, as modified by the following NRC Regulatory Guides.
Wherever alternative approaches are used to meet the intent of some specific recommendations of Regulatory Guides and IEEE Standards, the method of attaining an acceptable level of safety is found in the full discussion of these documents in Subsection 8.3.1.2.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 8.1-5 Revision 308 (11/14) a)
The applicable General Design Criteria, as listed in 10CFR50, Appendix A, are discussed in Section 3.1.
b)
NRC Regulatory Guides:
1) 1.6, Independence Between Redundant (Onsite) Power Sources and Between Their Distribution Systems (3/10/71)
(DRN E9900733, LBDCR 14-010, R308) 2)
1.9**, Selection of Diesel Generator Set Capacity for Standby Power Supplies (3/10/71 and 03/07)
(DRN E9900733, LBDCR 14-010, R308) 3)
1.22, Periodic Testing of Protection System Actuation Functions (2/17/72) 4)
1.29, Seismic Design Classification (8/73) 5)
1.30, Quality Assurance Requirements for the Installation, Inspection, and Testing of Instrumentation and Electric Equipment (8/11/72) 6)
1.32, Use of IEEE Std 308-1971, "Criteria for Class 1E Electric Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations (8/11/72) 7)
1.40, Qualification Tests of Continuous-Duty Motors Installed Inside the Containment of Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants (3/16/73) 8)
1.41, Preoperational Testing of Redundant Onsite Electric Power Systems to Verify Proper Load Group Assignments (3/16/73) 9)
1.53, Application of the Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Plant Protection Systems (6/73) 10) 1.62, Manual Initiation of Protective Actions (10/73) 11) 1.63, Electric Penetration Assemblies in Containment Structures for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants (1/74) 12) 1.73, Qualification Tests of Electric Valve Operators Installed Inside the Containment of Nuclear Power Plants (1/74) 13) 1.75*, Physical Independence of Electric Systems (1/75)
- Indicates that Waterford 3 has taken exception to or interprets the Regulatory Guide. These alternate ways of meeting the intent of the Regulatory Guide are discussed in Subsection 8.3.1.2.
(DRN E9900733)
- See FSAR Section 9.5.4 and the applicable Technical Specification and TS Bases for a discussion of Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer Systems.
(DRN E9900733)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 8.1-6 Revision 308 (11/14) 15) 1.81, Shared Emergency and Shutdown Electric Systems for Multi-Unit Nuclear Power Plants (6/74) (not applicable to Waterford 3) 16) 1.89, Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants (11/74)
(DRN E9900733) 17) 1.93, Availability of Electric Power Sources (12/74)
(DRN E9900733) c)
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standards:
1)
IEEE Standard 279-1971, Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, Criteria for 2)
IEEE Standard 308-1971, Criteria for Class 1E Electric Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.
(DRN E9900733) 3)
IEEE Standard 317-1972, Electric Penetration Assemblies in Containment Structures for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.
(DRN E9900733) 4)
IEEE Standard 336-1971, Installation, Inspection and Testing Requirements for Instrumentation and Electric Equipment During The Construction of Nuclear Power Generating Stations.
5)
IEEE Standard 338-1971, IEEE Standard Criteria for the Periodic Testing of Nuclear Power Generating Station Class 1E Power and Protections Systems.
6)
IEEE Standard 344-1971, IEEE Recommended Practices for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.
7)
IEEE Standard 384-1974, Criteria for Separation of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits.
(LBDCR 14-010, R308) 8)
IEEE Standard 387-1972 and 387-1995, Criteria for Diesel Generator Units Applied as Standby Power Supplies for Nuclear Power Stations.
(LBDCR 14-010, R308) 9)
IEEE Standard 415-1976, Guide for planning of Pre-Operational Testing Programs for Class 1E Power Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.
10)
IEEE Standard 450-1980, Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Generating Stations and Substations.
(DRN 05-1767, R14-A) d)
In addition to the above, all transmission lines and substations are designed and constructed in accordance with applicable industry standards, including those of the Entergy Louisiana, LLC. All electrical equipment, both onsite and offsite, is designed and manufactured to applicable ANSI, NEMA, IEEE and other industry standards.
(DRN 05-1767, R14-A)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 8.1-1 (Sheet 1 of 6)
Revision 302 (12/08)
<<(DRN E9900733)
TYPICAL EQUIPMENT CONNECTED TO SAFETY RELATED POWER SOURCES
ø(DRN E9900733)
UNID Description of Load Nameplate Security-Related Information Table Withheld Under 10 CFR 2.390
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 8.1-1 (Sheet 2 of 6)
Revision 12-B (04/03)
¨ (DRN E9900733)
TYPICAL EQUIPMENT CONNECTED TO SAFETY RELATED POWER SOURCES (DRN E9900733)
UNID Description of Load Nameplate Security-Related Information Table Withheld Under 10 CFR 2.390
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 8.1-1 (Sheet 3 of 6)
Revision 12-B (04/03)
¨ (DRN E9900733, R11)
TYPICAL EQUIPMENT CONNECTED TO SAFETY RELATED POWER SOURCES (DRN E9900733, R11)
UNID Description of Load Nameplate Security-Related Information Table Withheld Under 10 CFR 2.390
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 8.1-1 (Sheet 4 of 6)
Revision 12-B (04/03)
¨ (DRN E9900733, R11)
TYPICAL EQUIPMENT CONNECTED TO SAFETY RELATED POWER SOURCES (DRN E9900733, R11)
UNID Description of Load Nameplate Security-Related Information Table Withheld Under 10 CFR 2.390
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 8.1-1 (Sheet 5 of 6)
Revision 12-B (04/03)
¨ (DRN E9900733, R11)
TYPICAL EQUIPMENT CONNECTED TO SAFETY RELATED POWER SOURCES (DRN E9900733, R11)
UNID Description of Load Nameplate Security-Related Information Table Withheld Under 10 CFR 2.390
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 8.1-1 (Sheet 6 of 6)
Revision 309 (06/16)
(DRN E9900733, R11)
TYPICAL EQUIPMENT CONNECTED TO SAFETY RELATED POWER SOURCES (DRN E9900733, R11)
UNID Description of Load Nameplate Security-Related Information Table Withheld Under 10 CFR 2.390
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 8.1-2 (Sheet 1 of 4)
Revision 304 (06/10)
<< (DRN E9900733)
TYPICAL AUXILIARY LOADING Item Rating of Division A Division B No.
Quant.
Description Each Load(3)
Normal Load*
Normal Load*
(V) (hp)
(hp)(3)
(kVA)
(hp)(3) (kVA)
ø (DRN E9900733; EC-19206, R304)
Security-Related Information Table Withheld Under 10 CFR 2.390
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 8.1-2 (Sheet 2 of 4)
Revision 304 (06/10)
Item Rating of Division A Division B No.
Quant.
Description Each Load(3)
Normal Load*
Normal Load*
ø(DRN E9900733; EC-19206, R304)
Security-Related Information Table Withheld Under 10 CFR 2.390
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 8.1-2 (Sheet 3 of 4)
Revision 304 (06/10)
<<(DRN E9900733)
Item Rating of Division A Division B No.
Quant.
Description Each Load(3)
Normal Load*
Normal Load*
(V) (hp)
(hp)(3)
(kVA)
(hp)(3)
(kVA)
Security-Related Information Table Withheld Under 10 CFR 2.390
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 8.1-2 (Sheet 4 of 4)
Revision 304 (06/10)
Item Rating of Division A Division B No.
Quant.
Description Each Load(3)
Normal Load*
Normal Load*
(V) (hp)
(hp)(3) (kVA)
(hp)(3) (kVA)
Security-Related Information Table Withheld Under 10 CFR 2.390
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 8.1-3 (Sheet 1 of 7)
FSAR CROSS-REFERENCE OF DISCUSSION OF SRP ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA FOR ELECTRIC POWER FSAR DISCUSSION ONSITE STANDBY AC ESF AC POWER ESF DC POWER OFFSITE POWER POWER SUPPLY DISTRIBUTION DISTRIBUTION CRITERIA SYSTEM (8.2)
(DG SETS) (8.3.1)
SYSTEM (8.3.1)
SYSTEM (8.3.2)
REMARKS I. REGULATORY GUIDES(2)
- a. RG 1.6-1971 Independence Between N/A 8.3.1.2.3 8.3.1.2.3 8.3.2.2.1.3 Compliance is indi-Redundant Standby cated in FSAR Sub-(Onsite) Power Sources section 8.1.4.3.
and Between Their Distribution Systems (LBDCR 14-010, R308)
- b. RG 1.9-1971 Selection of Diesel N/A 8.3.1.2.4 N/A N/A Compliance is indi-RG 1.9 2007 Generator Set Capa-cated in FSAR Sub-city for Standby section 8.1.4.3.
Power Supplies (LBDCR 14-010, R308)
- c. RG 1.22-1972 Periodic Testing of N/A (1)
(1)
(1)
Compliance is indi-Protection System cated in FSAR Sub-Actuation Functions section 8.1.4.3.
See Surveillance Requirements in (Technical Specifications)
- d. RG 1.29-1973 Seismic Design N/A 8.3.1.2.6 8.3.1.2.6 (1)
Classification
- e. RG 1.30-1972 Quality Assurance N/A T 17.2-1 T 17.2-1 T 17.2-1 Compliance is indi-Requirements for the cated in FSAR Sub-Installation, Inspec-section 8.1.4.3 tion, and Testing of Instrumentation and Electric Equipment
- f. RG 1.32-1972 Criteria for Safety-(1)
(1) 8.3.1.2.8 8.3.2.2.1.4 Compliance is indi-Related Electric Power cated in FSAR Sub-Systems for Nuclear section 8.1.4.3 Power Plants
- g. RG 1.40-1973 Qualification Test N/A N/A (1)
N/A Compliance is indi-of Continuous Duty cated in FSAR Sub-Motor Installed In-section 8.1.4.3 Side the Containment of Water-cooled Nuclear Power Plants
WSES FSAR UNIT 3 TABLE 8.1-3 (Sheet 2 of 7) Revision 9 (12/97)
FSAR DISCUSSION ONSITE STANDBY AC ESF AC POWER ESF DC POWER OFFSITE POWER POWER SUPPLY DISTRIBUTION DISTRIBUTION CRITERIA SYSTEM (8.2)
(DG SETS) (8.3.1)
SYSTEM (8.3.1)
SYSTEM (8.3.2)
REMARKS I. REGULATORY GUIDES (Contd)
- h. RG 1.41-1973 Preoperational Testing N/A 8.3.1.2.10 8.3.1.2.10 8.3.1.2.10 Compliance is indi-of Redundant Onsite cated in FSAR Sub-Electric Power Systems section 8.1.4.3 to Verify Proper Load Group Assignments
i.
Deleted
- j. RG 1.53-1973 Application of the N/A 7.2.3.3.5 7.2.3.3.5 7.2.3.3.5 Compliance is indi-Single-Failure Cri-cated in FSAR Sub-terion to Nuclear section 8.1.4.3 Power Plant Protec-tion Systems
- k. RG 1.62-1973 Manual Initiation N/A (1)
(1)
(1)
Compliance is indi-of Protective Actions cated in FSAR Sub-section 8.1.4.3
- l. RG 1.63-1973 Electric Penetration N/A N/A 8.3.1.1.4 8.3.1.1.4 Compliance is indi-Assemblies in Con-cated in FSAR Sub-tainment Structures section 8.1.4.3 for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants
- m. RG 1.68-1978 Preoperational and N/A 14.2.7.13 14.2.7.13 14.2.7.13 Initial Startup Test Programs for Water-Cooled Power Reactors
- n. RG 1.70-1975 Standard Format and (1)
(1)
(1)
(1)
Compliance is indi-Content of Safety cated in FSAR Sub-Analysis Reports for section 1.1 Nuclear Power Plants, Rev. 2
WSES FSAR UNIT 3 TABLE 8.1-3 (Sheet 3 of 7)
FSAR DISCUSSION ONSITE STANDBY AC ESF AC POWER ESF DC POWER OFFSITE POWER POWER SUPPLY DISTRIBUTION DISTRIBUTION CRITERIA SYSTEM (8.2)
(DG SETS) (8.3.1)
SYSTEM (8.3.1)
SYSTEM (8.3.2)
REMARKS I. REGULATORY GUIDES (Contd)
- n. RG 1.73-1974 Qualification Tests N/A N/A 3.9.3.2.2 N/A Compliance is indi-of Electric Valve cated in FSAR Sub-Operators Installed section 8.1.4.3 Inside the Contain-ment of Nuclear Power Plants
- o. RG 1.75-1975 Physical Independence N/A 8.3.1.2.13 8.3.1.2.13 8.3.1.2.13 Compliance is indi-of Electric System cated in FSAR Sub-section 8.1.4.3
- p. RG 1.89-1974 Qualification of N/A 3.10.2 3.10.2 3.10.2 Compliance is indi-Class 1E Equipment and 3.11.2 and 3.11.2 and 3.11.2 cated in FSAR Sub-for Nuclear Power section 8.1.4.3 Plants
- q. RG 1.93-1974 Availability of 16.3/4.8 16.3/4.8 16.3/4.8 16.3/4.8 Compliance is indi-Electric Power cated in FSAR Sub-Sources section 8.1.4.3 II. IEEE STANDARDS
- a. IEEE Std 279-1971 Criteria for Pro-N/A N/A 8.3.1.2.14 8.3.1.2.14 Compliance is indi-tection System for cated in FSAR Sub-Nuclear Power section 8.1.4.3 Generating Stations
- b. IEEE Std 308-1971 Criteria for Class 1E 8.3.1.2.15 8.3.1.2.15 8.3.1.2.15 8.3.2.1.15 Compliance is indi-Electric Power Systems and 8.3.2.2.1.5 and 8.3.2.2.1.5 and 8.3.2.2.1.5 and 8.3.2.2.1.5 cated in FSAR Sub-for Nuclear and Power section 8.1.4.3 Generating Stations
- c. IEEE Std 317-1972 Electric Penetration N/A N/A 8.3.1.1.4 8.3.1.1.4 Compliance is indi-Assemblies in Con-cated in FSAR Sub-tainment Structures section 8.1.4.3 for Nuclear Power Generating Stations
WSES FSAR UNIT 3 TABLE 8.1-3 (Sheet 4 of 7)
FSAR DISCUSSION ONSITE STANDBY AC ESF AC POWER ESF DC POWER OFFSITE POWER POWER SUPPLY DISTRIBUTION DISTRIBUTION CRITERIA SYSTEM (8.2)
(DG SETS) (8.3.1)
SYSTEM (8.3.1)
SYSTEM (8.3.2)
REMARKS II. IEEE STANDARDS (Contd)
- d. IEEE Std 323-1971 Standard General N/A 3.11.2 3.11.1 8.3.2.2 Guide for Qualify-and 3.11.2 ing Class 1E Elec-trical Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Sta-tions
- e. IEEE Std 334-1971 Type Test of N/A N/A 3.11.2 N/A tinuous-Duty Class 1E Motors for Nuclear Power Generating Stations
- f. IEEE Std 336-1971 Installation, In-N/A 8.3.1.2.17 8.3.1.2.17 8.3.1.2.17 Compliance is indi-spection and Test-cated in FSAR Sub-ing Requirements section 8.1.4.3 for Instrumentation and Electrical Equip-ment During the Con-struction of Nuclear Power Generating Stations
- g. IEEE Std 338-1971 Criteria for the N/A N/A 8.3.1.2.18 N/A Compliance is indi-Periodic Testing of cated in FSAR Sub-Nuclear Power Gene-section 8.1.4.3 rating Station Pro-tection Systems
- h. IEEE Std 344-1971 Recommended Prac-N/A (1)
(1)
(1)
Compliance is indi-tices for Seismic cated in FSAR Sub-Qualification of section 8.1.4.3 Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 8.1-3 (Sheet 5 of 7)
FSAR DISCUSSION ONSITE STANDBY AC ESF AC POWER ESF DC POWER OFFSITE POWER POWER SUPPLY DISTRIBUTION DISTRIBUTION CRITERIA SYSTEM (8.2)
(DG SETS) (8.3.1)
SYSTEM (8.3.1)
SYSTEM (8.3.2)
REMARKS II. IEEE STANDARDS (Cont'd)
- i. IEEE Std 379-1972 Guide for he N/A 7.2.2.3.2 7.2.2.3 2 7.2.2.3.2 Application of the and 7 2.2.3.5 and 7.2.2.3.5 and 7.2.2.3.5 Single Failure Cri-terion to Nuclear Power Generating Station Pro-tection Systems
- j. IEEE Std 384-1974 Criteria for Sepa-N/A 8.3.1.2.19 8.3.1.2.19 8.3.1.2.19 Compliance is indi-ration of Class 1E cated in FSAR Sub-Equipment and Cir-section 8.1.4.3 cuits
( LBDCR 14-010, R308)
- k. IEEE Std 387-1972 Criteria for Diesel-N/A 8.3.1.2 20 N/A N/A Compliance is indi-IEEE Std 387-1995 Generator Units cated in FSAR Sub-Applied as Standby section 8.1.4.3 Power Supplies for Nuclear Power Stations
( LBDCR 14-010, R308)
- l. IEEE Std 415-1976 Guide for Planning of N/A 14.2.7 23 14.2.7.23 14.2.7 23 Compliance is indi-Pre-Operational Testing cated in FSAR Sub-Programs for Class 1E section 8.1.4.3 Power Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations
- m. IEEE Std 450-1980 Recommended Practice N/A N/A N/A 8.3.2.2.1.6 Compliance is indi-for Maintenance, Tes ing cated in FSAR Sub-and Replacement of Large section 8.1.4.3 Lead Storage Batteries for Generating Stations and Substations III. BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITIONS a.
BTP ICSB 2 (PSB) Diesel-Generator N/A N/A N/A N/A The Waterford 3 Reliability Diesel Generators Qualification are of the same type Testing (CES Model KSV-16-T) as those used at the Susquehana units.
Therefore, this BTP is not applicable to Waterford.
WSES FSAR UNIT 3 TABLE 8.1-3 (Sheet 6 of 7)
FSAR DISCUSSION ONSITE STANDBY AC ESF AC POWER ESF DC POWER OFFSITE POWER POWER SUPPLY DISTRIBUTION DISTRIBUTION CRITERIA SYSTEM (8.2)
(DG SETS) (8.3.1)
SYSTEM (8.3.1)
SYSTEM (8.3.2)
REMARKS III. BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITIONS (Contd)
- b. BTP ICSB 6 (PSB) Capacity Test Require-N/A N/A N/A 8.3.2.1.8 Battery tests will ments of Station be performed as out-Batteries-Technical lined BTP ICSB 6 at Specifications the intervals stated in the Technical Specifications
- c. BTP ICSB 8 (PSB) Use of Diesel-N/A N/A N/A N/A Waterford does not Generator Sets make use of the for Peaking diesel-generator sets for peaking.
& Light grid system Systems has interties with that of Middle South Services. Discus-sions of the grid system may be found in FSAR Section 8.1 and 8.2
- e. BTP ICSB 15 (PSB) Reactor Coolant N/A N/A N/A N/A Reactor coolant Pump Breaker pumps are discussed Qualification in FSAR Subsection 5.4.1
- f. BTP ICSB 17 (PSB) Diesel Generator N/A 8.3.1.1.2.11(c)
N/A N/A Protective Trip Circuit Bypass
- g. BTP ICSB 18 (PSB) Application of the N/A N/A N/A N/A Manually-Controlled, Single Failure Cri-Electrically Oper-terion to Manually-ated Valves are dis-Controlled Electri-cussed FSAR Subsec-cally-Operated 16.3/4.5.2 Valves
- h. BTP ICSB 21 Guidance for Appli-7.5.1.8 and 7.5.1.8 and 7.5.1.8 and 7.5.1.8 and cation of RG 1.47 7.5.2.8 7.5.2.8 7.5.2.8 7.5.2.8
WSES FSAR UNIT 3 TABLE 8.1-3 (Sheet 7 of 7)
FSAR DISCUSSION ONSITE STANDBY AC ESF AC POWER ESF DC POWER OFFSITE POWER POWER SUPPLY DISTRIBUTION DISTRIBUTION CRITERIA SYSTEM (8.2)
(DG SETS) (8.3.1)
SYSTEM (8.3.1)
SYSTEM (8.3.2)
REMARKS IV. 10 CFR PART 50
- a. 10 CFR 50.34 Contents of Appli-N/A N/A N/A N/A Waterford is in com-cations: Technical pliance with this Information part
- b. 10 CFR 50.36 Technical Specifi-N/A N/A N/A N/A Waterford is in com-cations pliance with this part. See FSAR Chapter 16 (Technical Specifications)
- c. 10 CFR 50.55a Codes and Standards N/A N/A N/A N/A Waterford is in com-pliance with this part V. GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIA All General Design Criteria are discussed in FSAR Section 3.1 Notes:
(1) Criteria as applicable to this section is found in the other referenced sections.
(2) Discussions of general compliance with Regulatory Guides is indexed in FSAR Section 1.8.
N/A - Not Applicable
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 8.1A-1 Revision 14-B (06/06)
APPENDIX 8.1A STATION BLACKOUT EVALUATION EVALUATION LP&L performed an evaluation, EC-E89-016, for Waterford 3 for a Station Blackout (SBO) in accordance with 10CFR50.63 using the guidance in NUMARC 87-00 and Regulatory Guide 1.155. There were no hardware changes required for Waterford 3 to cope with an SBO for four hours. Procedural changes are implemented to enhance the ability of Waterford 3 to cope with an SBO. The plant specific evaluation for Waterford 3 demonstrates that equipment will be functional such that Waterford 3 can safely cope with an SBO for four hours.
(DRN E990733)
The Nuclear Utility Group on Station Blackout (NUGSBO), Nuclear Utility Management Resource Council (NUMARC), the NRC, and various technical consulting firms endeavored for several years to resolve the technical issues for an SBO. The resolution addressed the margins of safety, potential malfunctions and accident types, probabilities of malfunctions and accidents, and consequences. The resolution for SBO was established and documented in 10CFR50.63, NUMARC 87-00, and Regulatory Guide 1.155. The plant specific evaluation for Waterford 3 was performed in accordance with the foregoing documents.
The Waterford 3 evaluation was independently verified by Entergy technical personnel and reviewed and approved by cognizant personnel.
(DRN E990733)
The SBO industry resolution, Waterford 3 plant specific evaluation, and independent review and approval of the effort provide additional defense in depth that Waterford 3 will be able to cope with an SBO and that an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
DISCUSSION The results of the evaluation are summarized below, (Applicable NUMARC 87-00 sections are shown in parenthesis).
A.
Proposed Station Blackout Duration
(DRN E990733)
NUMARC 87-00, Section 3, was used to determine a proposed SBO duration of four hours.
The following plant factors were identified in determining the proposed station blackout duration:
(DRN E990733)
- 1.
AC Power Design Characteristic Group is P2 based on:
(DRN 06-339, R14-B)
- a.
Expected frequency of grid-related Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) - does not exceed once per 20 years (Section 3.2.1, Part 1A);
- b.
Estimated frequency LOOPs due to extremely severe weather, places the plant in ESW Group 4 (Section 3.2.1, Part 1B);
(DRN 06-339, R14-B)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 8.1A-2 Revision 14-B (06/06)
(DRN 06-339, R14-B)
- c.
Estimated frequency of LOOPs due to severe weather places the plant in SW Group 2 (Section 3.2.1, Part 1C);
- d.
The offsite power system is in the I3 group (Section 3.2.1, Part 1D);
- 2.
The emergency AC power configuration groups is "C" based on: (Section 3.2.2., Part 2C);
- a.
There are two (2) emergency AC power supplies not credited as alternate AC power sources (Section 3.2.2, Part 2A);
- b.
One (1) emergency AC power supply is necessary to operate safe shutdown equipment following a loss of offsite power (Section 3.2.2, Part 2B);
(DRN 06-339, R14-B)
- 3.
The target EDG reliability is 0.975.
- a.
A target EDG reliability of 0.975 was selected based on having a nuclear unit average EDG reliability for the last 50 demands greater than 0.94 consistent with NUMARC 87-00, Section 3.2.4.
B.
SBO Procedure Description Plant procedures have been reviewed and modified to meet the guidelines in NUMARC 87-00, Section 4, in the following areas:
- 1.
AC power restoration per NUMARC 87-00, Section 4.2.2; LP&L Emergency Procedures for Restoration of Offsite Power to Waterford 3.
(DRN E9900733)
- 2.
Severe weather per NUMARC 87-00, Section 4.2.3; OP-901-S21 - Severe Weather and Flooding.
(DRN E9900733)
Plant procedures have been reviewed and changes necessary to meet NUMARC 87-00 implemented in accordance with 10CFR50.63 in the following area:
- 1.
Station blackout response per NUMARC 87-00, Section 4.2.1; OP-902-005 - Degraded Electrical Distribution Recovery Procedure.
C.
Proposed Modifications and Schedule The ability of Waterford 3 to cope with a station blackout for four hours in accordance with NUMARC 87-00, Section 3.2.5, and as determined in "Section A," was assessed using NUMARC 87-00, Section 7, with the following results:
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 8.1A-3 Revision 14 (12/05)
- 1.
Condensate Inventory for Decay Heat Removal (Section 7.2.1)
(DRN E9900733; 04-1680, R14)
It was determined (using Section 7.2.1 of NUMARC 87-00) that approximately 106,300 gallons of water are required for decay heat removal and primary system cooldown to 400F (emergency operating procedures address whether cooldown is necessary) for a four-hour station blackout coping period (NUMARC 87-00, Section 3.2.5). Since the minimum permissible condensate storage tank level required by Technical Specifications exceeds 106,300 gallons, adequate inventory is available.
(DRN E9900733; 04-1680, R14)
- 2.
Class 1E Battery(ies) Capacity (Section 7.2.2)
A battery capacity calculation verified that the Class 1E batteries have sufficient capacity to meet station blackout for four hours.
- 3.
Compressed Air (Section 7.2.3)
Air-operated valves relied upon to cope with a station blackout for four hours can either be operated manually or have sufficient backup sources independent of the preferred and Class 1E power supply. Valves requiring manual operation or that need backup sources for operation are identified in plant procedures.
- 4.
Effects of Loss of Ventilation (Section 7.2.4)
- a.
EFW Pump Room The calculated steady state ambient air temperature for the steam driven EFW pump room during a station blackout induced loss of ventilation is 90F. This temperature is below the threshold value of 120F for dominant areas of concern requiring equipment operability analysis.
- b.
Control Room Complex for PWR The assumption in NUMARC 87-00, Section 2.7.1, that the control room will not exceed 120F during a station blackout has been assessed.
The control room at Waterford 3 does not exceed 120F during station blackout.
Therefore, the control room is not a dominant area of concern.
Reasonable assurance of the operability of station blackout equipment in the areas containing potential heat sources have been assessed using Appendix F to NUMARC 87-00 or the Topical Report. No modifications or associated procedures are required to provide reasonable assurance for equipment operability.
WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 8.1A-4 5.
Containment Isolation (Section 7.2.5)
The plant list of containment isolation valves was reviewed to verify that valves which must be capable of being closed or that must be operated (cycled) under station blackout conditions can be positioned (with indication) independent of the preferred and Class 1E power supplies. No plant modifications or additional procedure changes were required to ensure that appropriate containment integrity can be provided under SBO conditions.
6.
Reactor Coolant Inventory (Section 2.5)
The ability to maintain adequate reactor coolant system inventory to ensure that the core is cooled was assessed for four hours. A plant-specific analysis was used for this assessment. The expected rates of reactor coolant inventory loss under SBO conditions do not result in core uncovery in a SBO of four hours. Therefore, makeup systems in addition to those currently available under SBO conditions are not required to maintain core cooling.
The results of the SBO evaluation for Waterford 3 were provided to the NRC on April 14, 1989 via Reference 2.
Section 8.1A References 1 -
Nuclear Management and Resources Council, "Guidelines and Technical Bases for NUMARC Initiatives Addressing Station Blackout at Light Water Reactors," NUMARC 87-00, November 1987.
- 2. -
Louisiana Power and Light letter W3P89-0510 to USNRC, dated April 14, 1989.