ML16043A261
| ML16043A261 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 02/12/2016 |
| From: | Alan Blamey Reactor Projects Region 2 Branch 6 |
| To: | James Shea Tennessee Valley Authority |
| References | |
| IR 2015004 | |
| Download: ML16043A261 (42) | |
See also: IR 05000327/2015004
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257
February 12, 2016
Mr. Joseph W. Shea
Vice President, Nuclear Licensing
Tennessee Valley Authority
Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801
SUBJECT: SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT
05000327/2015004 AND 05000328/2015004
Dear Mr. Shea:
On December 31, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an
inspection at your Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. On January 26, 2016, the NRC
inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Pratt and other members of your
staff. Inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report.
The NRC inspectors documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this
report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. The NRC is treating this violation
as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest this violation or its significance, you should provide a response within 30 days of
the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; with copies to the
Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Sequoyah
Nuclear Plant.
J.W. Shea 2
In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections,
Exemptions, Requests for Withholding, of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its
enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the
NRCs Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRCs
Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible
from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic
Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Alan Blamey, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 6
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos.: 50-327, 50-328
Enclosure: Inspection Report 050003272015004, 05000328/2015004
w/Attachment: Supplementary Information
cc: via ListServ distribution Via email
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DATE 2//2016 2/9/2016 2/11/2016 2/5/2016 2/5/2016
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E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
J.W. Shea 3
Letter to J.W. Shea from Alan Blamey dated February 12, 2016
SUBJECT: SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT
05000327/2015004 AND 05000328/2015004
Distribution w/encl:
D. Gamberoni, RII
S. Price, RII
L. Gibson, RII
OE Mail
RIDSNRRDIRS
PUBLIC
RidsNrrPMSequoyah Resource
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket Nos.: 50-327, 50-328
Report Nos.: 05000327/2015004, 05000328/2015004
Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)
Facility: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2
Location: Sequoyah Access Road
Soddy-Daisy, TN 37379
Dates: October 1 - December 31, 2015
Inspectors: G .Smith, Senior Resident Inspector
W. Deschaine, Resident Inspector
M. Coursey, Reactor Inspector
R. Baldwin, Senior Operations Engineer
S. Sanchez, Sr. Emergency Preparedness Inspector
C. Fontana, Emergency Preparedness Inspector
J. Hickman, Emergency Preparedness Inspector (In-training)
A. Nielsen, Senior Health Physicist
J. Panfel, Health Physicist
C. Kontz, Senior Project Engineer
Approved by: Alan Blamey, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 6
Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000327/2015004; 05000328/2015004; 10/1/2015 - 12/31/2015; Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,
Units 1 and 2; Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced
inspections by region-based inspectors. One non-cited violation was identified. The
significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using
Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP) dated April
29, 2015. Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310, Components Within the
Cross Cutting Areas dated December 4, 2014. All violations of NRC requirements are
dispositioned in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy dated February 4, 2015. The
NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is
described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 5.
A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
- Green: The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV Non-cited Violation (NCV) of
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50.54(q), for changes to the
licensees radiological emergency plan, effective December 18, 2014, that reduced
the effectiveness of the plan and therefore, should have received NRC approval prior
to making the change. Specifically, the effectiveness of TVAs Radiological
Emergency Plan (Generic Part), Revision 104, was reduced by the inadvertent
removal of the offsite telephone communications description for the Health Physics
Network and Emergency Notification System communication tools, as well as the
monthly testing of those devices. The licensees failure to recognize that Revision
104 reduced the effectiveness of the emergency plan was a performance deficiency.
The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program (CAP) as
Condition Report (CR) 1093684.
This finding is more than minor because it brings into question the thoroughness of
the licensees review process when making changes to the emergency plan and
adversely affects the procedure quality attribute of the emergency preparedness
cornerstone objective. This finding is a violation of NRC requirements and because
it has the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function,
traditional enforcement is applicable in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B. This
finding is determined to be a Severity Level IV violation in accordance with Section
6.6.d.1 of the Enforcement Policy because it involves the licensees ability to meet or
implement a regulatory requirement not related to assessment or notification such
that the effectiveness of the emergency plan is reduced (Section 1EP4).
B. Licensee-Identified Violations.
None
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status:
Unit 1 operated at or near 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP) until November 23, 2015,
when Unit 1 was manually tripped due to an erratically operating loop 3 main steam isolation
valve (MSIV) that was slowly drifting off its full open seat. Following repairs to the loop 3 MSIV
hand switch, the unit was restored to 100 percent RTP on November 25. Unit 1 continued to
operate at 100 percent RTP until December 18 when Unit 1 was reduced to 47 percent RTP
due to an observed reduction in the main generator hydrogen fan differential pressure. On
December 26, the main generator was taken off line to perform more extensive troubleshooting
of the main generator hydrogen cooling system. The unit remained off line and in Mode 3 for
the remainder of the period.
Unit 2 began the period at 95 percent RTP in order to address flow oscillations in the heater
drain system. The flow oscillations were subsequently corrected following calibration of the #3
heater drain tank level control system and the unit was returned to 100 percent RTP on October
6. The unit continued to operate at 100 percent RTP until October 17, 2015, when the unit
entered a power coast down period. On November 14, with the unit at 80 percent RTP, Unit 2
was shut down for a refueling outage, 2R20. Following the outage, Unit 2 returned to 74 percent
RTP on December 16, where it operated temporarily to address a problem with the heater drain
system. Following completion of repairs to the #3 heater drain tank 2A auxiliary oil pump on
December 21, the unit returned to 100 percent RTP where it operated for the remainder of the
period.
1. REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, and Emergency
Preparedness
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)
Evaluation of Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather (Cold Weather) Conditions
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed design features and licensee preparations for protection of the
essential raw cooling water (ERCW) intake structure, main steam valve vault enclosures,
both Unit 1 and 2 refueling water storage tanks (RWSTs), as well as other risk significant
areas susceptible to extreme cold and freezing conditions. The inspectors reviewed the
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and Technical Specifications (TS) in
order to gain insights regarding freeze protection. The inspectors performed a detailed
review of licensee procedures 0-PI-OPS-000-006.0, Freeze Protection, Revision 59
and 0-PI-MIN-000-706.0, Freeze Protection Insulation Inspection, Revision 9. The
licensee began implementing these procedures on October 1 in order to ensure freeze
protection equipment and strategies were implemented and executed prior to the onset
of extreme cold weather. The inspectors reviewed all freeze protection-related Condition
Reports (CRs) to ensure there were no significant deficiencies within the licensees
freeze protection program.
4
The inspectors also walked down portions of the affected systems to assess deficiencies
and system readiness for extreme cold weather, and discussed prioritization of
deficiencies and status of corrective actions with licensee personnel. Documents
reviewed are listed in the Attachment. This activity constitutes one inspection sample of
adverse weather protection.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)
.1 Partial System Walkdown
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following two systems to verify the
operability of redundant or diverse trains and components when safety equipment was
inoperable. The inspectors focused on identification of discrepancies that could impact
the function of the system and, therefore, potentially increase risk. The inspectors
reviewed applicable operating procedures, walked down control system components,
and determined whether selected breakers, valves, and support equipment were in the
correct position to support system operation. The inspectors also verified that the
licensee had properly identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could
cause initiating events or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers and
entered them into the Corrective Action Program (CAP). Documents reviewed are listed
in the Attachment. The inspectors completed two samples, as defined in Inspection
Procedure (IP) 71111.04.
- Battery buses I, II, IV while III battery charger was out-of-service (OOS)
- 1A Containment Spray (CS) train while 1B CS pump was OOS
.2 Complete System Walkdown
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a complete system walkdown of the Component Cooling
System (CCS) and support systems to verify proper equipment alignment, to identify any
discrepancies that could impact the function of the system and increase risk, and to
verify that the licensee properly identified and resolved equipment alignment problems
that could cause events or impact the functional capability of the system.
The inspectors reviewed the UFSAR, system procedures, system drawings, and system
design documents to determine the correct lineup and then examined CCS components
and their configuration to identify any discrepancies between the existing system
equipment lineup and the correct lineup. During the walkdown, the inspectors reviewed
the following:
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- Valves were correctly positioned and did not exhibit leakage that would impact the
functions of any given valve.
- Electrical power was available as required.
- Major system components were correctly labeled, lubricated, cooled, ventilated, etc.
- Hangers and supports were correctly installed and functional.
- Essential support systems were operational.
- Ancillary equipment or debris did not interfere with system performance.
- Tagging clearances were appropriate.
- Valves were locked as required by the locked valve program.
In addition, the inspectors reviewed outstanding maintenance work requests and design
issues on the system to determine whether any condition described in those work
requests could adversely impact current system operability. Documents reviewed are
listed in the Attachment to this report. This inspection activity constituted one sample, as
defined in IP 71111.04.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)
Fire Protection Tours (Quarterly)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted a tour of the four areas important to safety listed below to
assess the material condition and operational status of fire protection features. The
inspectors evaluated whether: combustibles and ignition sources were controlled in
accordance with the licensees administrative procedures; fire detection and suppression
equipment was available for use; passive fire barriers were maintained in good material
condition; and compensatory measures for out-of-service, degraded, or inoperable fire
protection equipment were implemented in accordance with the licensees fire plan.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors completed four
samples, as defined in IP 71111.05.
- Auxiliary Building Elevation 653
- Auxiliary Building Elevation 669
- Auxiliary Building Elevation 690
- Auxiliary Building Elevation 714
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
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1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed one internal flood protection measure sample associated with
the Auxiliary Building, elevation 653, internal flood design to verify that flood mitigation
plans were consistent with the design requirements and risk analysis assumptions and
that equipment essential for reactor shutdown was properly protected from a flood
caused by pipe breaks in the 653 elevation of the auxiliary building. Specifically, the
inspectors reviewed the licensees moderate energy line break flooding study to fully
understand the licensees flood mitigation strategy, reviewed licensee drawings and then
verified that the assumptions and results remained valid. The inspectors walked down
the 653 elevation of the auxiliary building and the associated pump rooms (Unit 1 and
Unit 2 CS and residual heat removal (RHR) to verify the assumed flooding sources,
adequacy of common area drainage, and flood detection instrumentation to ensure that
a flooding event would not impact reactor shutdown capabilities. This activity constitutes
one sample, as defined in IP 71111.06.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R08 In-service Inspection Activities (71111.08)
a. Inspection Scope
Non-Destructive Examination (NDE) Activities and Welding Activities
From November 23-27, 2015, the inspectors conducted an onsite review of the
implementation of the licensees inservice inspection (ISI) program for monitoring
degradation of the reactor coolant system (RCS) boundary, risk-significant piping and
component boundaries, and containment boundaries in Unit 2.
The inspectors reviewed the following non-destructive examinations (NDEs) mandated
by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel
Code (Code of Record: 2001 Edition with 2003 Addenda) to evaluate compliance with
the ASME Code,Section XI and Section V requirements, and if any indications or
defects were detected, to evaluate if they were dispositioned in accordance with the
ASME Code or an NRC-approved alternative requirement. The inspectors also
reviewed the qualifications of the NDE technicians performing the examinations to
determine whether they were current, and in compliance with the ASME Code
requirements.
- Visual (VT-3) Examination of the Reactor Vessel Internals and Core Support
Structure
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The inspectors reviewed the following welding activity, qualification records, and
associated documents in order to evaluate compliance with procedures and the ASME
Code,Section XI and Section IX requirements. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the
work order (WO), repair and replacement plan, weld data sheets, welding procedures,
procedure qualification records, welder performance qualification records, and NDE
reports.
- WO 115428320, Replace Reactor Coolant System (RCS) PRZR Pressurized-Water
Reactor (PWR) Relief Valve, Class 1
During non-destructive surface and volumetric examinations performed since the
previous refueling outage, the licensee did not identify any relevant indications that were
analytically evaluated and accepted for continued service; therefore, no NRC review was
completed for this Inspection Procedure (IP) attribute.
Pressurized Water Reactor Vessel Upper Head Penetration Inspection Activities
The inspectors verified that for the Unit 2 vessel head, a bare metal visual (BMV)
examination was required during this outage, in accordance with the requirements of
ASME Code Case N-729-1 and 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D). The inspectors reviewed
portions of the BMV examination of the reactor vessel upper head penetrations, and the
associated NDE reports to determine if the examinations were performed in accordance
with the requirements of ASME Code Case N-729-1, and 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D).
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the associated NDE documentation to determine
if the required examination coverage was achieved, and if limitations were recorded in
accordance with the licensee procedures.
The licensee did not identify any relevant indications that were accepted for continued
service. Additionally, the licensee did not perform any welding repairs to the vessel
head penetrations since the beginning of the last Unit 2 refueling outage; therefore, no
NRC review was completed for these IP attributes.
Boric Acid Corrosion Control Inspection Activities
The inspectors reviewed the licensees boric acid corrosion control (BACC) program
activities to determine if the activities were implemented in accordance with the
commitments made in response to NRC Generic Letter 88-05, Boric Acid Corrosion of
Carbon Steel Reactor Pressure Boundary Components in PWR Plants, and applicable
industry guidance documents. Specifically, the inspectors performed an onsite records
review of procedures, and the results of the licensees containment walkdown
inspections performed during the current refueling outage. The inspectors also
interviewed the BACC program owner, conducted an independent walkdown of
containment to evaluate compliance with the licensees BACC program requirements,
and verified that degraded or non-conforming conditions, such as boric acid leaks, were
properly identified and corrected in accordance with the licensees BACC and CAPs.
8
The inspectors reviewed the following engineering evaluations completed for evidence
of boric acid leakage to determine if the licensee properly applied applicable corrosion
rates to the affected components. The inspectors also evaluated whether the licensee
properly assessed the effects of corrosion induced wastage on structural or pressure
boundary integrity, in accordance with the licensee procedures.
- WO 114039093, Boric acid leakage from SQN-2-FCV-062-0059-B
- WO 112732423, Boric acid leakage from SQN-2-FCV-062-0073-A
- WO 115801465, Boric acid leakage from SQN-2-FCV-068-0303
- WO 114971023, Boric acid leakage from SQN-2-PMP-074-0010
- WO 117105469, Boric acid leakage from SQN-2-PMP-074-0010
The inspectors reviewed CRs and associated CAs related to evidence of boric acid
leakage, to evaluate if the corrective actions completed were consistent with the
requirements of the ASME Code and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI.
Steam Generator Tube Inspection Activities
The inspectors verified that for the Unit 2 steam generator tubes, no inspection activities
were required this refueling outage, in accordance with the requirements of the ASME
Code, the licensees Technical Specifications, and Nuclear Energy Institute 97-06,
Steam Generator Program Guidelines.
Identification and Resolution of Problems
The inspectors reviewed a sample of ISI-related issues entered into the CAP to
determine if the licensee had appropriately described the scope of the problem and
had initiated CAs. The review also included the licensees consideration and
assessment of operating experience events applicable to the plant. The inspectors
performed this review to ensure compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion
XVI, Corrective Action, requirements. These activities constitutes one samples of In-
service Inspection activities as defined in IP 71111.08.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11)
.1 Quarterly Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed one licensed operator requalification program review. The
inspectors observed a simulator session on October 6, 2015. The training scenario
involved a letdown temperature control valve failing to control in automatic followed by
the 1A component cooling water pump tripping off. Then the crew experienced a
9
complete loss of all alternating current (AC) with emergency diesel generator breaker
recovery. The inspectors observed crew performance in terms of: communications;
ability to take timely and proper actions; prioritizing, interpreting and verifying alarms;
correct use and implementation of procedures, including the alarm response procedures;
timely control board operation and manipulation, including high risk operator actions;
oversight and direction provided by shift manager, including the ability to identify and
implement appropriate TS action; and, group dynamics involved in crew performance.
The inspectors also observed the evaluators critique and reviewed simulator fidelity to
verify that it matched actual plant response. Documents reviewed are listed in the
Attachment. This activity constituted one inspection sample, as defined in IP 71111.11.
b. Findings
No findings were identified
.2 Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Performance
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed and assessed licensed operator performance in the main
control room during periods of heightened activity or risk. The inspectors reviewed
various licensee policies and procedures such as OPDP-1, Conduct of Operations,
NPG-SPP-10.0, Plant Operations, and 0-GO-5, Normal Power Operation. The
inspectors utilized activities such as post-maintenance testing, surveillance testing,
unplanned transients, infrequent plant evolutions, plant startups and shutdowns, reactor
power and turbine load changes, and refueling and other outage activities to focus on
the following conduct of operations as appropriate:
- operator compliance and use of procedures
- control board manipulations
- communication between crew members
- use and interpretation of plant instruments, indications and alarms
- use of human error prevention techniques
- documentation of activities, including initials and sign-offs in procedures
- supervision of activities, including risk and reactivity management
- pre-job briefs
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. This activity constituted one
inspection sample, as defined in IP 71111.11.
b. Findings
No findings were identified
10
.3 Annual Review of Licensee Requalification Examination Results
a. Inspection Scope
On October 29, 2015, the licensee completed the comprehensive biennial requalification
written examinations and the annual requalification operating examinations required to
be administered to all licensed operators in accordance with Title 10 of the CFR
55.59(a)(2), Requalification Requirements, of the NRCs Operators Licenses. The
inspectors performed an in-office review of the overall pass/fail results of the individual
operating examinations, written examinations, and the crew simulator operating
examinations in accordance with IP 71111.11, Licensed Operator Requalification
Program. These results were compared to the thresholds established in Section 3.02,
Requalification Examination Results, of IP 71111.11.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the maintenance activities, issues, and/or systems listed below
to verify the effectiveness of the licensees activities in terms of: appropriate work
practices; identifying and addressing common cause failures; scoping in accordance
with 10 CFR 50.65(b); characterizing reliability issues for performance; trending key
parameters for condition monitoring; charging unavailability for performance;
classification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2); appropriateness of
performance criteria for structure, system, or components (SSCs) and functions
classified as (a)(2); and appropriateness of goals and corrective actions for SSCs and
functions classified as (a)(1). Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The
inspectors completed two samples, as defined in IP 71111.12.
- Cause Determination Evaluation (CDE) 2827 - 125 volt Vital Battery Charger IV
failure
- CDE 2854 - 125 volt Vital Battery Charger II output fluctuations
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following activity to determine whether appropriate risk
11
assessments were performed prior to removing equipment from service for
maintenance. The inspectors evaluated whether risk assessments were performed as
required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), and were accurate and complete. When emergent
work was performed, the inspectors reviewed whether plant risk was promptly
reassessed and managed. The inspectors also assessed whether the licensees risk
assessment tool and risk categories were in accordance with Standard Programs and
Processes Procedure NPG-SPP-07.1, On-Line Work Management, Revision 16 and
Instruction 0-TI-DSM-000-007.1, Risk Assessment Guidelines, Revision 9. Documents
reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors completed one sample, as
defined in IP 71111.13.
- Emergent failure of Unit 2 pressurizer pressure master controller when transferring
from automatic control to manual
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments (71111.15)
a. Inspection Scope
For the six operability evaluations described in the CRs listed below, the inspectors
evaluated the technical adequacy of the evaluations to ensure that TS operability was
properly justified and the subject component or system remained available, such that no
unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability
evaluations to UFSAR descriptions to determine if the system or components intended
function(s) were adversely impacted. In addition, the inspectors reviewed compensatory
measures implemented to determine whether the compensatory measures worked as
stated and the measures were adequately controlled. The inspectors also reviewed a
sampling of CRs to assess whether the licensee was identifying and correcting any
deficiencies associated with operability evaluations. Documents reviewed are listed in
the Attachment. The inspectors completed six samples, as defined in IP 71111.15.
- CR 1090750, B annulus vacuum fan will not maintain -5 inches of water differential
pressure
- CR1084510, Prompt Operability Evaluation (POE) for water found in Unit 1 terry
turbine inboard bearing
- CR 1089604, Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) cooler fan belt issue
- CR 1083279, Tape over air valve vent port
- CR 1109937 - Operational Decision Making Instruction (ODMI) Unit 1 fuel leak
- Operator Work Around Sample: CR 1027155 Unit 1 Emergency boration flow
indicator reading lower than actual flow
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
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1R18 Plant Modifications (71111.18)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the temporary modifications listed below and the associated 10
CFR 50.59 screening, and compared it against the UFSAR and TS to verify whether the
modification affected operability or availability of the affected system.
- Temp Modification SQN-1-2015-068-001, Removal of Unit 1 Loop 3 Tcold RTD from
scan on Eagle 21
- DCN 23646, Abandon Instrument Guide Column, penetration #57, core location B3
Following installation and testing, the inspectors observed indications affected by the
modification, discussed them with operators, and verified that the modifications were
installed properly and their operation did not adversely affect safety system functions.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors completed two
samples, as defined in IP 71111.18.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the post-maintenance tests associated with the seven work
orders (WOs) listed below to assess whether procedures and test activities ensured
system operability and functional capability. The inspectors reviewed the licensees test
procedure to evaluate whether: the procedure adequately tested the safety function(s)
that may have been affected by the maintenance activity; the acceptance criteria in the
procedure were consistent with information in the applicable licensing basis and/or
design basis documents; and the procedure had been properly reviewed and approved.
The inspectors also witnessed the test or reviewed the test data to determine whether
test results adequately demonstrated restoration of the affected safety function(s).
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors completed seven
samples, as defined in IP 71111.19.
- WO 117303798, Failure to set injection relays
- WO 117063755, DCN23527 Stage 2 PMT Vital Battery Charger III
- WO 117406963 - 2A Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (AFW) pump
Reassembly
- WO 115901948, Unit 2 Lower Containment D Coolers Supply Isolation Valve
replacement
- WO 116398040, Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Governor valve
13
- WO 117352715, Unit 2 Penetration X-115 failed as found leakage testing
- WO 117173071, Unit 1 Swap inboard bearing housing on 1-PMP-3-142 with spare
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities (71111.20)
.1 Unit 2 Refueling Outage Cycle 20
a. Inspection Scope
For the Unit 2 refueling outage that began on November 14, 2015, the inspectors
evaluated licensee activities to verify that the licensee considered risk in developing
outage schedules, followed risk reduction methods developed to control plant
configuration, developed mitigation strategies for the loss of key safety functions, and
adhered to operating license and TS requirements that ensure defense-in-depth. The
inspectors also walked down portions of Unit 2 not normally accessible during at-power
operations to verify that safety-related and risk-significant SSCs were maintained in an
operable condition. Specifically, between November 14 and December 13, the
inspectors performed inspections and reviews of the following outage activities.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. This inspection satisfied one
inspection sample for Refueling Activities, as defined in IP 71111.20.
- Outage Plan. The inspectors reviewed the outage safety plan and contingency plans
to confirm that the licensee had appropriately considered risk, industry experience,
and previous site-specific problems in developing and implementing a plan that
assured maintenance of defense-in-depth.
- Reactor Shutdown. The inspectors observed portions of the shutdown in the control
room from the time the reactor was tripped until operators placed it on the RHR
system for decay heat removal to verify that TS cooldown restrictions were followed.
Subsequent to the reactor shutdown, the inspectors toured the lower containment to
observe the general condition of the RCS and emergency core cooling system
components and to look for indications of previously unidentified leakage inside the
polar crane wall.
- Licensee Control of Outage Activities. On a daily basis, the inspectors attended the
licensee outage turnover meeting, reviewed CRs, and reviewed the defense-in-depth
status sheets to verify that status control was commensurate with the outage safety
plan and in compliance with the applicable TS when taking equipment out of service.
The inspectors further toured the main control room and areas of the plant daily to
ensure that the following key safety functions were maintained in accordance with
the outage safety plan and TS: electrical power, decay heat removal, spent fuel
cooling, inventory control, reactivity control, and containment closure.
14
- The inspectors also observed the implementation and control of tag-out, 2-TO-2015-
0042, on the Unit 2 B CS pump to verify that the equipment was appropriately
configured to safely support the work and testing. To ensure that RCS level
instrumentation was properly installed and configured to give accurate information,
the inspectors reviewed the installation of the Mansell level monitoring system.
Specifically, the inspectors discussed the system with engineering, walked it down to
verify that it was installed in accordance with procedures and adequately protected
from inadvertent damage, verified that Mansell indication properly overlapped with
pressurizer level instruments during the draining of the pressurizer, verified that
operators properly set level alarms to procedurally required set-points, and verified
that the system consistently tracked RCS level while lowering to reduced inventory
conditions.
- Refueling Activities. The inspectors observed fuel movement at the spent fuel pool
and at the refueling cavity in order to verify compliance with TS and that each
assembly was properly tracked from core offload to core reload. In order to verify
proper licensee control of foreign material, the inspectors verified that personnel
were properly checked before entering any foreign material exclusion (FME) areas,
reviewed FME procedures, and verified that the licensee followed the procedures.
To ensure that fuel assemblies were loaded in the core locations specified by the
design, the inspectors independently reviewed the recording of the licensees final
core verification.
- Reduced Inventory. Prior to the outage, the inspectors reviewed the licensees
commitments to Generic Letter 88-17. Before entering reduced inventory conditions
the inspectors verified that these commitments were in place, that plant configuration
was in accordance with those commitments, and that distractions from unexpected
conditions or emergent work did not affect operator ability to maintain the required
reactor vessel level.
- Heatup and Startup Activities. The inspectors toured the containment prior to reactor
startup to verify that debris that could affect the performance of the containment
sump had not been left in the containment. The inspectors reviewed the licensees
mode-change checklists to verify that appropriate prerequisites were met prior to
changing TS modes. To verify RCS integrity and containment integrity, the
inspectors further reviewed the licensees RCS leakage calculations and
containment isolation valve lineups. In order to verify that core operating limit
parameters were consistent with core design, the inspectors also reviewed portions
of the low power physics testing, including reactor criticality.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
15
.2 Unit 1 Forced Outage
a. Inspection Scope
Following the manual reactor trip of Unit 1 on November 23, 2015 due to the loop 3
MSIV slowly drifting off its fully open seat, the licensee maintained Unit 2 in Mode 3 until
conditions to support restart were established on November 24. The inspectors
reviewed the licensee's mode change checklists to verify that appropriate prerequisites
were met prior to changing TS modes. The inspectors reviewed portions of the plant
startup including reactor criticality and power ascension. This inspection satisfied one
inspection sample for Outage Activities, as defined in IP 71111.20.
b. Findings
No findings were identified
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)
a. Inspection Scope
For the three surveillance tests identified below, the inspectors assessed whether the
SSCs involved in these tests satisfied the requirements described in the TS surveillance
requirements, the UFSAR, applicable licensee procedures, and whether the tests
demonstrated that the SSCs were capable of performing their intended safety functions.
This was accomplished by witnessing testing and/or reviewing the test data. Documents
reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors completed three samples, as
defined in IP 71111.22.
Routine Surveillance Tests:
- 0-SI-MIN-302-239.0, Unit 2 Testing of the Divider Barrier Seal, Revision 9
Ice Condenser Surveillance Test:
- 0-SI-MIN-061-107.0, Unit 2 Ice Condenser Floor Drains, Revision 3
Containment Isolation Valve (CIV) Surveillance Tests:
- 0-SI-SXV-070-266.0, ASME Code Valve Testing, Appendix O (FCV-70-140) and
Appendix P (FCV-70-141), Revision 23
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
16
1EP2 Alert and Notification System Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the licensees methods for testing and
maintaining the alert and notification system in accordance with NRC IP 71114,
Attachment 02, Alert and Notification System Evaluation. The applicable planning
standard, 10 CFR Part 50.47(b)(5) and its related 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section
IV.D requirements were used as reference criteria. The criteria contained in NUREG-
0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response
Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 1, were also
used as a reference.
The inspectors reviewed various documents which are listed in the Attachment,
interviewed personnel responsible for system performance, and observed aspects of
periodic siren maintenance and testing. This inspection activity satisfied one inspection
sample for the alert and notification system on a biennial basis.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1EP3 Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees Emergency Response Organization (ERO)
augmentation staffing requirements and process for notifying the ERO to ensure the
readiness of key staff for responding to an event and timely facility activation. The
qualification records of key position ERO personnel were reviewed to ensure all ERO
qualifications were current. A sample of problems identified from augmentation drills or
system tests performed since the last inspection was reviewed to assess the
effectiveness of corrective actions.
The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC IP 71114, Attachment 03,
Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System. The applicable
planning standard, 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2), and its related 10 CFR 50, Appendix E
requirements were used as reference criteria.
The inspectors reviewed various documents which are listed in the Attachment. This
inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for the ERO staffing and
augmentation system on a biennial basis.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
17
1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
a. Inspection Scope
Since the last NRC inspection of this program area, several changes were made to the
Radiological Emergency Plan, along with changes to several implementing procedures.
The licensee determined that, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q), the Plan continued
to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. The
inspectors reviewed these changes to evaluate for potential reductions in the
effectiveness of the Plan. However, this review was not documented in a Safety
Evaluation Report and does not constitute formal NRC approval of the changes.
Therefore, these changes remain subject to future NRC inspection in their entirety.
The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC IP 71114, Attachment 04,
Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes. The applicable planning
standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b), and its related requirements in 10 CFR 50, Appendix E,
were used as reference criteria.
The inspectors reviewed various documents that are listed in the Attachment to this
report. This inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for the emergency action
level and emergency plan changes on an annual basis.
b. Findings
Introduction. The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV NCV for the licensee having
reduced the effectiveness of their emergency plan without having obtained prior
approval from the NRC, as required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part
50.54(q). Specifically, the effectiveness of Tennessee Valley Authoritys Radiological
Emergency Plan (Generic Part), Revision 104, was reduced by the inadvertent removal
of a paragraph in the Offsite Telephone Communications section of the Plan. This
revision has been in effect since December 18, 2014.
Description. While performing a detailed review of a change to the generic (corporate)
radiological emergency plan (E-Plan), the inspectors identified a reduction in
effectiveness when a paragraph appeared to be missing from the Offsite Emergency
Communications section of the E-Plan. The paragraph that was missing included
information on the Health Physics Network and Emergency Notification System
telephones, where they are located, and the monthly testing of those telephones. The
inspectors verified that the telephones remained in place in each of the emergency
response facilities and that they were being tested satisfactorily within the specified
frequency. The change to the E-Plan included re-formatting of the document and
migration to a template format for ease when performing future changes.
Upon further questioning by the inspectors, the licensee determined that there was no
50.54(q) review paperwork and that the missing paragraph was an inadvertent omission
that was not caught during their review process. As part of an extent of condition
review, additional items were identified as missing from Revision 104 of the E-Plan.
These items included additional text that was inadvertently omitted and a reference to
18
the wrong section of the E-Plan. The inspectors determined that the licensee had
multiple prior opportunities to identify these omissions, for example the 50.54(q) change
review process, the annual Quality Assurance emergency preparedness (EP) audit, and
the EP self-assessment completed just prior to the inspection week. To restore
compliance the licensee will process another revision to the E-Plan that will replace the
items that were omitted. This revision was completed on October 30, 2015.
Analysis. A licensee making changes to its emergency plan that reduces the
effectiveness of the plan without prior NRC approval as required by 10 CFR 50.54, is
considered a performance deficiency within the licensees ability to foresee and correct.
This finding is more than minor because it brings into question the thoroughness of the
licensees review process when making changes to the emergency plan and adversely
affects the procedure quality attribute of the emergency preparedness cornerstone
objective. This finding is a violation of NRC requirements and because it has the
potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function, traditional
enforcement is applicable in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B. This finding is
determined to be a Severity Level IV violation in accordance with Section 6.6.d.1 of the
Enforcement Policy because it involves the licensees ability to meet or implement a
regulatory requirement not related to assessment or notification such that the
effectiveness of the emergency plan is reduced
Enforcement. Title 10 of the CFR, Part 50.54(q) states, in part, that a licensee may
make changes to emergency plans without NRC approval only if the changes do not
reduce the effectiveness of the plans and the plans, as changed, continue to meet the
standards of 50.47(b) and the requirements of Appendix E. Proposed changes that
reduce the effectiveness of the approved emergency plans may not be implemented
without application to and approval by the NRC. Contrary to the above, on December
18, 2014, the licensee implemented a change to their Radiological Emergency Plan
(Generic Part) which reduced the effectiveness of the plan. Specifically, the licensee
inadvertently and unknowingly omitted sections of the plan, and their extensive review
process failed to identify the omissions, all of which resulted in a change that reduced
the effectiveness of the approved emergency plan and was implemented without
application to and approval by the NRC. Because the violation was entered into the
licensees CAP as CR 1093684, it is being treated as a non-cited Severity Level IV
violation consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000327,05000328/2015004-01, Failure to Recognize and Submit for Approval a Reduction in
Effectiveness of the Emergency Plan.
1EP5 Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the Corrective Actions (CAs) identified through the EP program
to determine the significance of the issues, the completeness and effectiveness of CAs,
and to determine if issues were recurring. The licensees post-event after action reports,
self-assessments, and audits were reviewed to assess the licensees ability to be self-
critical, thus avoiding complacency and degradation of their EP program.
19
Inspectors reviewed the licensees 10 CFR 50.54(q) change process, personnel training,
and selected screenings and evaluations to assess adequacy. The inspectors toured
facilities and reviewed equipment and facility maintenance records to assess licensees
adequacy in maintaining them. The inspectors evaluated the capabilities of selected
radiation monitoring instrumentation to adequately support Emergency Action Level
(EAL) declarations.
The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC IP 71114, Attachment 05,
Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness. The applicable planning standards, related
10 CFR 50, Appendix E requirements, and 10 CFR 50.54(q) and (t) were used as
reference criteria.
The inspectors reviewed various documents which are listed in the Attachment. This
inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for the maintenance of emergency
preparedness on a biennial basis.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
2. RADIATION SAFETY (RS)
Cornerstones: Occupational Radiation Safety (OS) and Public Radiation Safety (PS)
2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (71124.01)
a. Inspection Scope
Hazard Assessment and Instructions to Workers: During facility tours, the inspectors
observed labeling of radioactive material and postings for radiation areas, high radiation
areas (HRA), locked HRAs (LHRA), very HRAs (VHRA), radioactive material storage
areas, and contaminated areas established within the radiologically controlled area
(RCA) of the Unit 1 (U1) and Unit 2 (U2) Auxiliary Buildings, U2 upper and lower
containment, and radioactive waste processing and storage locations. The inspectors
independently measured radiation dose rates or directly observed conduct of licensee
radiation surveys for selected RCA areas in the auxiliary buildings and U2 containment.
The inspectors reviewed survey records for several plant areas including surveys for
alpha emitters, airborne radioactivity, and pre-job surveys for selected U2 refueling
outage (U2R20) tasks. The inspectors also discussed changes to plant operations that
could contribute to changing radiological conditions since the last inspection. For
selected U2R20 outage jobs, the inspectors attended pre-job briefings and reviewed
radiation work permit (RWP) details to assess communication of radiological control
requirements and current radiological conditions to workers.
Hazard Control and Work Practices: The inspectors observed and evaluated access
barrier effectiveness for selected LHRA and VHRA locations to include the U1 and U2
Auxiliary Buildings and U2 containment. Changes to procedural guidance for LHRA and
VHRA controls were discussed with radiation protection (RP) supervisors. Controls and
20
their implementation for storage of irradiated material within the spent fuel pool were
reviewed and discussed in detail. Established radiological controls (including airborne
controls) were evaluated for selected tasks, including reactor disassembly, seal table
work, and reactor coolant pump motor replacement. In addition, licensee controls for
areas where dose rates could change significantly as a result of refueling operations
were reviewed, observed, and discussed during crud burst cleanup.
Occupational workers adherence to selected RWPs and RP technician proficiency in
providing job coverage were evaluated through direct observations and interviews with
cognizant licensee staff. Electronic dosimeter (ED) alarm set points and worker stay
times were evaluated against area radiation survey results. Worker response to select
ED dose rate alarms were evaluated. For selected U2R20 HRA and LHRA tasks
involving significant dose rate gradients, the use and placement of whole body and
extremity dosimetry to monitor worker exposure was discussed with cognizant licensee
staff.
Control of Radioactive Material: The inspectors observed surveys of material and
personnel being released from the RCA and U2 containment using portable radiation
survey instruments, hand and foot monitors, small article monitors, personnel
contamination monitors, and portal monitor instruments. The inspectors reviewed the
procedural requirements used to perform the radiation surveys for release. During plant
walkdowns, the inspectors evaluated radioactive material storage areas and containers
for material condition, proper posting/labeling, and proper control. In addition, the
inspectors also reviewed records of leak tests on selected sealed sources and discussed
nationally tracked source transactions with cognizant RP staff.
Problem Identification and Resolution: CR documents associated with radiological
hazard assessment and control were reviewed and assessed. The inspectors evaluated
the licensees ability to identify and resolve the issues. The inspectors also evaluated
the scope of the licensees internal audit program and reviewed recent assessment
results.
RP activities were evaluated against the requirements of Updated Final Safety Analysis
Report (UFSAR) Section 12; TS Section 6.12; 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)
Parts 19 and 20; and approved licensee procedures. Licensee programs for monitoring
materials and personnel released from the RCA were evaluated against 10 CFR Part 20
and IE Circular 81-07, Control of Radioactively Contaminated Material. Documents
reviewed are listed in the Attachment. This inspection satisfied one inspection sample
for Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls, as defined in IP 71124.01.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
21
2RS8 Radioactive Solid Waste Processing and Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, and
Transportation (71124.08)
a. Inspection Scope
Waste Processing and Characterization: During inspector walk-downs, accessible
sections of the liquid and solid radioactive waste processing systems were assessed for
material condition and conformance with system design diagrams. Inspected equipment
included storage tanks, transfer piping, resin dewatering and packaging components,
and abandoned radioactive waste processing equipment. The inspectors discussed
component function, processing system changes, and radioactive waste program
implementation with licensee staff.
The inspectors reviewed the 2014 Annual Radioactive Effluent Report and radionuclide
characterizations from 2013 - 2014 for selected waste streams. For primary resin and
Dry Active Waste, the inspectors evaluated analyses for hard-to-detect nuclides,
reviewed the use of scaling factors, and examined quality assurance comparison results
between licensee waste stream characterizations and outside laboratory data. Waste
stream mixing and concentration averaging methodology were evaluated and discussed
with radioactive waste staff. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees procedural
guidance for monitoring changes in waste stream isotopic mixtures.
Radioactive Material Storage: During walk-downs of indoor and outdoor radioactive
material storage areas, the inspectors observed the physical condition and labeling of
storage containers and the posting of Radioactive Material Areas. The inspectors also
reviewed licensee procedural guidance for storage and monitoring of radioactive
material.
Transportation: The inspectors evaluated shipping records for consistency with licensee
procedures and compliance with NRC and Department of Transportation (DOT)
regulations. The inspectors reviewed emergency response information, DOT shipping
package classification, waste classification, radiation survey results, and container
handling methodology. The inspectors also observed shipment preparations for a
Surface Contaminated Object package and evaluated technician performance and
knowledge of DOT requirements.
Problem Identification and Resolution: The inspectors reviewed condition reports in the
areas of shipping and radioactive waste processing. The inspectors evaluated the
licensees ability to identify and resolve the issues. The inspectors also reviewed recent
self-assessment results.
Radioactive waste processing, radioactive material handling, and transportation activities
were reviewed against the guidance and requirements contained in the licensees
Process Control Program, UFSAR Chapter 11, 10 CFR Part 20, 10 CFR Part 61, 10
CFR Part 71, the Branch Technical Position on Waste Classification (1983), and
NUREG-1608 Categorizing and Transporting Low Specific Activity Materials and
Surface Contaminated Objects. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in
the report Attachment. This inspection satisfied one inspection sample for Radioactive
22
Solid Waste Processing and Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, and Transportation
as defined in IP 71124.08.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency
Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and Security
4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals relative to the PIs listed below for the period
October 1, 2014, through June 30, 2015. To verify the accuracy of the PI data reported
during that period, PI definitions and guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory
Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, was used to confirm the
reporting basis for each data element.
Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone
- Drill/Exercise Performance
- ERO Readiness
- Alert and Notification System Reliability
For the specified review period, the inspectors examined data reported to the NRC,
procedural guidance for reporting PI information, and records used by the licensee to
identify potential PI occurrences. The inspectors verified the accuracy of the PI for ERO
drill and exercise performance through review of a sample of drill and event records.
The inspectors reviewed selected training records to verify the accuracy of the PI for
ERO drill participation for personnel assigned to key positions in the ERO. The
inspectors verified the accuracy of the PI for alert and notification system reliability
through review of a sample of the licensees records of periodic system tests. The
inspectors also interviewed the licensee personnel who were responsible for collecting
and evaluating the PI data. Licensee procedures, records, and other documents
reviewed within this inspection area are listed in the Attachment. This inspection
satisfied three inspection samples for PI verification on an annual basis.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
23
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152)
.1 Daily Review
a. Inspection Scope
As required by IP 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, and in order to help
identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up,
the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensees CAP.
This was accomplished by reviewing the description of each new CR and attending daily
management review committee meetings.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings were identified.
.2 Selected Issue Follow-up: CR 1086525, Unit 1 Post Trip Performance Review and CR
1087140 Operator Performance Deficiencies Following Sept 14 2015 Reactor
Trip
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed a sample of operator Performance issues entered into the CAP
to determine if the licensee had appropriately described the scope of the problem, and
had initiated CAs. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the licensees actions following a
reactor trip due to a loss of an electrical bus. The review also included the licensees
consideration and assessment of operating experience events applicable to the plant.
The inspectors performed this review to ensure compliance with 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, requirements. Documents reviewed are
listed in the attachment. The inspectors completed one sample, as defined in IP 71152.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings were identified. The inspector made the following observations associated
with weaknesses in the implementation of the corrective action program requirements:
The inspector identified a weakness in the disposition of issues as described in SPP-
22.303, section 3.2.12(F) CR Closure Review which required the condition identified in
the CR be corrected prior to closing the subject CR. CR 1087140 identified that a
potential RED path was indicated for heat sink during the event that was erroneous but
the inspector could not locate disposition of the issue as part of this CR or any of the
referenced closure CRs associated with CR 1087140.
The inspector identified a weakness in the closing of action as described in SPP-22.303,
section 3.2.6, Closing an Action to No Actions Taken. CR 1087140 Referenced CR
1084819, Post-trip S/G level control weakness, as one of the CRs addressing
performance deficiencies. Operations Critique also references this CR to address the
24
SG level control issues. CR 1084819 was closed with no actions taken and only
referenced a procedure change implemented for integrated technical specification (ITS)
conversion. This did not appear to adequately address the condition in the report details
or any crew performance issues with controlling SG levels and compliance with
emergency procedures.
The inspector identified a weakness in the closure of CRs as described in SPP-22.303,
section 3.2.13 (A), Closing one CR to another CR which identifies that a CR with a
higher significance level cannot be closed to a CR with lower significance level. CR
1084819 was coded as an E level CR. This represented a closure of an issue from a C
level per (1087140) associated with failure to comply with emergency operating
procedure to an E level CR.
.2 Semi-Annual Trend Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed issues entered in the licensees corrective action program and
associated documents to identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more
significant safety issue. The inspectors focused their review on root cause evaluations
that were completed by the licensee during 2015, but also considered the results of
inspector daily condition report screenings, licensee trending efforts, and licensee
human performance results. The review nominally considered the 12-month period of
January 1 through December 31, 2015. The inspectors compared their results with the
licensees analysis of trends. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the adequacy of
corrective actions associated with a sample of the issues identified in the licensees
trend reports. The inspectors also reviewed corrective action documents that were
processed by the licensee to identify potential adverse trends in the condition of
structures, systems, and/or components as evidenced by acceptance of long-standing
non-conforming or degraded conditions. Documents reviewed are listed in the
attachment.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings were identified. The inspector made the following observations associated
with implementation of the corrective action program:
In general, the licensee had identified trends and appropriately addressed them in their
CAP. The inspectors evaluated the licensee trending methodology and observed that
the licensee had performed a detailed trend review. The licensee routinely reviewed
cause codes, involved organizations, key words, and system links to identify potential
trends in their data. The inspectors compared the licensee process results with the
results of the inspectors daily screening.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee root cause evaluations (RCE) that were completed
during 2015. The inspectors observed that the licensee made revisions to each RCE, but
the revisions were mostly editorial.
25
4OA3 Event Follow-up
Unit 1 Manual Reactor Trip
a. Inspection Scope
On November 23, 2015, the inspectors responded to Unit 1 due to a manual reactor trip
as a result of a slowly closing loop # 3 main steam isolation valve. The inspectors
evaluated plant status, mitigating actions, and the licensees classification of the event,
to enable the NRC to determine an appropriate NRC response. The inspectors
discussed the trip with operations, engineering, and licensee management personnel to
gain an understanding of the event and assess follow-up actions. The inspectors
reviewed operator actions taken to determine whether they were in accordance with
licensee procedures and TS, and reviewed unit and system indications to verify whether
actions and system responses were as expected and designed. The inspectors found
that operators responded to the situation appropriately and in accordance with plant
procedures, and that plant systems responded to the trip as designed. The inspectors
also reviewed the initial licensee notifications to verify that they met the requirements
specified in NUREG-1022, Event Reporting Guidelines. The event was reported to the
NRC as event notification51559, and documented in the licensees CAP as CR
1107656.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA5 Other Activities
Review of the Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI)
(60855.1)
a. Inspection Scope
On December 30, the inspectors performed a walk-down of the ISFSI storage pad in
order to verify that operations were conducted in a safe manner in accordance with
approved procedures and without undue risk to the health and safety of the public. The
inspectors noted that there were 44 multi-purpose canisters (MPC) positioned on the
ISFSI pad. The inspectors verified the MPC vents were in good condition and free of
obstruction. The inspectors also verified that appropriate radiation surveys were being
performed in the vicinity of the MPCs. The inspectors verified that any ISFSI problems
were placed in the CAP. The inspectors also reviewed ISFSI document control practices
to verify that changes to the required ISFSI procedures and equipment were performed
in accordance with guidelines established in local procedures and 10CFR72.48.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
a. Findings
No findings were identified.
26
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
.1 Exit Meeting Summary
On January 26, 2016, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr.
Pratt and other members of his staff, who acknowledged the findings. The inspectors
asked the licensee whether any of the material examined during the inspection should
be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee personnel
J. Alfultis, Senior Manager Site Projects
G. Garner, Director Work Management
M. Giacini, Director Plant Support
M. Halter, Senior Manager Radiation Protection
M. Henderson, Manager Engineering Programs
A. Little, Senior Manager Nuclear Site Security
T. Marshall, Director Operations
W. Pierce, Director Engineering
P. Pratt, Plant Manager
M. Rasmussen, Director Maintenance
K. Smith, Director Training
H. Hill, Rad Waste Superintendent
J. Johnson, Program Manager Licensing
K. Loomis, Boric Acid Program Engineer
M. Lovitt, Chemistry Manager
M. McBrearty, Licensing Manager
S. Mohorn, Rad Waste Superintendent
C. Owens, Rad Waste HP
J. Rolph, Radiation Protection Technical Support Superintendent
C Schwarz, Site Vice President
J. Stamey, Rad Waste Health Physicist
J. Stewart, Chemist
NRC personnel
A. Hon, Project Manager, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened and Closed
05000327, 328/2015004-01 NCV Failure to Recognize and Submit for
Approval a Reduction in Effectiveness of the
Emergency Plan. (Section 1EP4)
Attachment
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Section R01: Adverse Weather Protection
Procedures
AOP-N.03, Flooding, Revision 55
NPG-SPP-09.22, External Flood Protection Program, Revision 1
0-PI-OPS-000-006.0, Freeze Protection, Revision 59
0-PI-MIN-000-706.0, Freeze Protection Insulation Inspection, Revision 9
Section R04: Equipment Alignment
Procedures
AOP-M.03, Loss of Component Cooling Water, Revision 17
FSAR (Amendment 24) Sections
9.2.1, Component Cooling System
6.2.2, Containment Heat Removal Systems
8.3.2, Direct Current (DC) Power System
Section R05: Fire Protection
Procedures
FPDP-1, Conduct of Fire Protection, Revision 4
0-PI-FPU-317-299.W, Att. 8, Shift Check List, Revision 40
NPG-SPP-18.4.7, Control of Transient Combustibles, Rev. 7
0-SI-FPU-410-703.0, Inspection of FPR Required Fire Doors, Rev. 6
SQN-FPR-Part-II, SQN Fire Protection Report Part II - Fire Protection Plan, Revision 33
Other documents
AUX-0-653-00, Fire Protection Pre-Fire Plans Auxiliary Building - El. 653, Revision 8
AUX-0-669-00, Fire Protection Pre-Fire Plans Auxiliary Building - El. 669, Revision 4
AUX-0-690-00, Fire Protection Pre-Fire Plans Auxiliary Building - El. 690, Revision 4
AUX-0-714-00, Fire Protection Pre-Fire Plans Auxiliary Building - El. 614, Revision 4
Section R06: Flood Protection Measures
Other documents
TVA letter to NRC dated May 4, 2007. TVA response to GL 2007-01
SQN Probabilistic Risk Assessment - Internal Flooding Analysis, Revision 3
Section R08: Inservice Inspection Activities
Procedures:
N-UT-64, Generic Procedure for the Ultrasonic Examination of Austenitic Pipe Welds, Rev. 16
N-UT-84, Procedure for the Phased Array Ultrasonic Examination of Austenitic and Ferritic Pipe
Welds, Rev. 4
N-UT-85, Manual Ultrasonic Examination for the Detection of Thermal Fatigue in Piping and
Components within the Material Reliability Programs, Rev.1
3
N-VT-1, Visual Examination Procedure for ASME Section XI Preservice and Inservice, Rev. 46
Calculations:
MDQ-002-068-2006-0169, Calculation for the Determination of Total Effective Degradation
Years (EDY) for the Sequoyah Unit 2 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Head, Rev. 2
Drawings:
CISI-1000-C-59, Steel Containment Penetration Details, Rev. 4
ISI-0298-C-04, Reactor Vessel Support Locations, Rev. 2
Work Orders/Work Requests:
WO 114039093, clean boron, replace gaskets, and bolting Section XI replacement
WO 115428320, RCS PRZR PWR Relief Valve
WO 115796111, Leaking valve 2-VLV-062-0661
Condition Reports:
Condition Report (CR) 627446, Dry white boron coming the two horizontal flanges of
2-FCV-62-59-B
CR 890230, SR to evaluate shortcomings in identification of leak conditions in containment
Problem Evaluation Report (PER) 1016839, U1C20 - Loose Parts Surveillance Specimen
Capsule Root Cause Analysis PER Report
PER 1099288, Leaking valve 2-VLV-72-510
Miscellaneous Documents:
0-MI-MIN-000-070.0 Cleanliness of Fluid Systems for Maintenance Activities, Rev. 11
0-MI-MVV-000-029.0 (ATT I.4), Maintenance of Target Rock Power Operated Relief Valve
(PORVs) [C.1], Rev. 7
0-SI-DXI-000-114.3, ASME Section XI ISI/NDE Program Unit 1 and Unit 2, Rev. 28
Certificate of Conformity: Visual Illumination Certificate No. I11030001
Certificate of Method Qualification Record for: D93LJVL1J, 3MNO6QGPV, RGVIVT3PI, and
D93LJVL1J
Design Change Request Form D23646
IHI Southwest Technologies, Inc. Certificate of Qualification for Examiner: DJM9431 and
WK7861
NETP-124, PWR Reactor Pressure Vessel Integrity, Rev. 0
Notice of Indication Report No. R-0018
Phased Array Ultrasonic Calibration Data Sheet Report No. R-0060
UT Calibration/Examination Report No. R-0022
Visual Acuity Examination Record for NDE/QC Personnel: D93LJVL1J, 3MNO6QGPV
Section R12: Maintenance Effectiveness
Procedures
TI-4, Maintenance Rule Performance Indicator Monitoring, Trending, and Reporting -
10CFR50.65, Revision 27
4
Section R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation
Procedures
NPG-SPP-07.3, Work Activity Risk Management Process, Revision 16
NPG-SPP-07.2.4, Forced Outage or Short Duration Planned Outage Management, Revision 5
NPG-SPP-07.2, Outage Management, Revision 5
GOI-6, Apparatus Operations, Revision 172
0-GO-16, System Operability Checklists, Revision 21
NPG-SPP-07.3.4, Protected Equipment, Revision 3
Section R15: Operability Evaluations
Procedures
NEDP-22, Operability Determinations and Functional Evaluations, Rev. 16
OPDP-8, Operability Determination Process/Limiting Conditions for Operation Tracking, Rev. 18
NPG-SPP-03.5, Regulatory Reporting Requirements, Revision 11
Section R18: Plant Modifications
Procedures
NPG-SPP-09.3, Plant Modifications and Engineering Change Control, Revision 20
NPG-SPP-09.4, 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments, Revision 9
NPG-SPP-09.5, Modifications Temporary Configuration Changes, Revision 9
Section R19: Post Maintenance Testing
Procedures
MMDP-1, Maintenance Management System, Revision 30
NPG-SPP-06.5, Foreign Material Control, Revision 8
NPG-SPP-06.1, Work Order Process Initiation, Revision 5
NPG-SPP-06.3, Pre-/Post-Maintenance Testing, Revision 1
NPG-SPP-06.9, Testing Programs, Revision 1
NPG-SPP-06.9.1, Conduct of Testing, Revision 9
NPG-SPP-06.9.3, Post-Modification Testing, Revision 6
Section R20: Refueling and Outage Activities
Procedures
FHI-3, Movement of Fuel, Revision 77
0-GO-15, Containment Closure Control, Revision 39
0-GO-13, Reactor Coolant System Drain and Fill Operations, Revision 86
NPG-SPP-08.1, Nuclear Fuel Management, Revision 10
0-PI-OPS-000-011.0, Containment Access Control During Modes 1-4, Revision 15
Section R22: Surveillance Testing
Procedures
NPG-SPP-06.9.1, Conduct of Testing, Revision 9
5
0-SI-SXV-072-266.0, ASME Code Valve Testing, Revision 14
0-SI-OPS-068-137.0, Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory, Revision 34
Section 1EP2: Alert and Notification System Evaluation
Procedures and Reports
NP-REP, Appendix B, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Radiological Emergency Plan, Rev. 103
Sequoyah FEMA REP-10 Report, Volumes 1 and 2, September 2014
EPFS-1, Administration Control and Distribution of EP Field Support Procedures, Rev. 9
EPFS-2, Control Room Notification, Rev. 6
EPFS-3, Servicing the Meteorological equipment at Environmental Data Stations, Rev. 15
EPFS-7, Radio and Meteorological Tower Station, Rev. 4
EPFS-9, Inspection, Service, and Maintenance of the Prompt Notification System (PNS) at
Browns Ferry, Sequoyah, and Watts Bar Nuclear Plants, Rev. 8
EPFS-12, Repair and Preventative Maintenance Procedures for Radiological Environmental
Monitoring Air Sampling System, Rev. 2
EPIP-14, Radiological Control Response, Rev.23
Records and Data
Weekly Silent Tests, October 2014 - June 2015
Monthly Siren Tests, October 2014 - June 2015
Corrective Action Documents
CR 0798124, Failure of SQN siren 103 during 10/23/13 silent test
CR 0833362, Outage of TEMA SQN siren activation circuits
CR 0837856, Report of SQN ANS siren sounding by member of public
CR 0940668, SQN siren testing should have been entitled Site Assembly and Accountability
CR 0944560, ANS Siren 58 failed to report during silent test
CR 1081534, ANS siren SQN-0-PNS-901-043 timer failure
CR 1087782, ANS siren SQN-0-PNS-901-049 failed communication poll
Section 1EP3: Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System
Procedures
TRN-30, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Training, Rev. 31
EPDP-2, Emergency Duty Officer, EP Staff and Operations Duty Specialist Notification
Procedures, Rev. 6
EPDP-3, Emergency Plan Exercises and Preparedness Drills, Rev. 13
EPDP-5, Emergency Public Information, Rev.1
EPDP-7, Review of Agreement letters and Contracts, Rev. 4
EPDP-8, Emergency Preparedness Quality Assurance, Rev. 3
EPIP-1, Emergency Plan Classification Matrix, Rev. 51
EPIP-7, Activation and Operation of the Operations Support Center, Rev. 31
EPIP-11, Emergency Preparedness Performance Indicators, Rev. 7
EPIP-13, Dose Assessment, Rev. 17
EPDP-17, Emergency Plan Effectiveness Review [10 CFR50.54 (q)], Rev. 5
6
Records and Data
EPDP-10, Facilitation of ANS and Notification Tests, Rev. 6 and Attachment 1 for 9/8/15 and
10/9/15
SSD 1-R-90-255, Set-point and Scaling document, 3/22/10
TEENS pager tests, 5/6/14 and 7/1/14
QA-SQ-15-015, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) - Quality Assurance (QA) - Emergency
Preparedness NRC Baseline Inspection Readiness Assessment
SQN-EP-SSA-15-003, Snapshot Self-Assessment Report, 2015
Evacuation Time Estimates for SQN Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ, November 2012
ARCADIS letter to Walt Lee, Annual Population Update for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, 10-mile
Emergency Planning Zone, December 2014
Select ERO Augmentation test results for 2014 and 2015
Results of periodic ERO notification tests
Corrective Action Documents
CR 0789203, QA recommendation for REP muster roll call
CR 0961364, Four individuals were not present at the REP muster
CR 0961365, REP muster on November 25, 2014 responders not present
CR 0966602, Loss of TVA paging system
CR 0967365, 12/8/14 TEENS test electronics issue with phone
CR 0970562, 12/15/14 TEENS test issue
CR 0976169, REP pagers not receiving page in secondary chemistry laboratory
CR 0979694, EP REP duty team assignment changed without proper notification to Engineer
CR 1004967, Three members of the C REP Team late to muster
Section 1EP4: Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
Procedures
EPDP-17, NPG Emergency Plan Effectiveness Review [10 CFR 50.54(q)], Rev. 5
EPIP-1, Emergency Plan Classification Matrix, Rev. 50 and 51
EPIP-4, Site Area Emergency, Rev. 37 and 38
EPIP-6, Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center, Rev. 49 and 50
EPIP-8, Personnel Accountability and Evacuation, Rev. 20 and 21
EPIP-14, Radiation Control Response, Rev. 22 and 23
NP-REP Radiological Emergency Plan, Rev. 103 and 104
NP-REP Radiological Emergency Plan, Appendix B, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Rev. 103
Change Packages
CECC 2014-030, Screening Evaluation Form for REP, App. A, Rev. 104, dated 7/11/14
CECC 2014-030, Effectiveness Evaluation Form for REP, App. A, Rev. 104, dated 7/11/14
CECC 2014-031, Screening Evaluation Form for REP, App. A, Rev. 104, dated 7/11/14
CECC 2014-031, Effectiveness Evaluation Form for REP, App. A, Rev. 104, dated 7/11/14
CECC 2014-032, Screening Evaluation Form for REP, App. A, Rev. 104, dated 7/11/14
CECC 2014-032, Effectiveness Evaluation Form for REP, App. A, Rev. 104, dated 7/11/14
CECC 2014-036, Screening Evaluation Form, dated 8/15/14
CECC 2014-036, Effectiveness Evaluation Form, dated 8/15/14
SQN 2014-007, Screening Evaluation Form for EPIP-1 Rev. 51, dated 4/23/14
SQN 2014-007, Effectiveness Evaluation Form for EPIP-1 Rev. 51, dated 4/23/14
7
SQN 2014-008, Screening Evaluation Form for EPIP-14 Rev. 23, dated 5/19/14
SQN 2014-008, Effectiveness Evaluation Form for EPIP-14 Rev. 23, dated 5/19/14
SQN 2014-022, Screening Evaluation Form for EPIP-4 Rev. 38, dated 11/13/14
SQN 2014-022, Effectiveness Evaluation Form for EPIP-4 Rev. 38, dated 5/8/15
SQN 2015-003, Screening Evaluation Form for EPIP-8 Rev. 21, dated 1/30/15
Section 1EP5: Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness
Procedures
CECC EPIP-1, Central Emergency Control Center, Rev. 60
CECC EPIP-9, Emergency Environmental Radiological Monitoring Procedures, Rev. 53
CECC EPIP-23, Radioactive Material Transportation Incidents, Rev. 24
EPDP-17, NPG Emergency Plan Effectiveness Review [10 CFR 50.54(q)], Rev. 5
EPIP-5, General Emergency, Rev. 47
EPIP-7, Activation and Operation of the Operations Support Center, Rev. 31
EPIP-8, Personnel Accountability and Evacuation, Rev. 21
EPIP-10, Medical Emergency Response, Rev. 29
EPIP-11, Security and Access Control, Rev. 9
EPIP-13, Dose Assessment, Rev. 17
NPG-SPP-7.1, On-Line Work Management, Rev. 10
NPG-SPP-18.3.5, Designated Emergency Response Equipment (DERE), Rev. 0
NPG-SPP-22.300, Corrective Action Program, Rev. 1
Records and Data
Drill and exercise reports 2014-2015
TVA Quality Assurance Audit Report SSA 1402, dated 3/3/14
TVA Quality Assurance Audit Report SSA 1501, dated 3/24/15
Self-Assessment QA-SQ-15-015, NRC Inspection Readiness, dated 10/2/15
Sequoyah Drill Report, Dated 3/25/15
Sequoyah Drill Report, Dated 7/8/15
Sequoyah Drill Report, Dated 7/29/15
Corrective Action Documents
CR 0959227, NRC identified that a DEP opportunity was not counted in 8/13 DEP PI data
CR 0964927, REP EAL 1.3.2.P Clarification for Containment Spray Operation
CR 1013399, Not Declaring 50.54 X and Y in SAMG REP Drill
CR 1051208, In the SQN Red Team REP Drill Objective 1.2 not met
CR 1093289, REP van #2 has loose door seal
CR 1093297, Response check due dates for survey meters in REP van #3 were out of date
CR 1093684, NP-REP omitted information - NRC identified
CR 1093694, NP-REP revision log does not match NP-REP Generic - NRC identified
Section 2RS1: Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls
Procedures, Guidance Documents, and Manuals
NPG-SPP-05.1, Radiological Controls, Revision (Rev.) 005
NPG-SPP-05.1.1, Alpha Radiation Monitoring Program, Rev. 005
NPG-SPP-05.6, Controlling Byproduct and Source Material, Rev. 003
8
NPG-SPP-22.300, Corrective Action Program, Rev. 003
NPG-SPP-22.302, Corrective Action Program Screening, Rev. 007
O-SI-RCI-000-056.0, Byproduct Material Inventory and Sealed Source Leak Test Rev. 017
RCI-14, Radiation Work Permit (RWP) Program, Rev. 059
RCI-15, Radiological Postings Rev. 030
RCI-17, Control of Byproduct and Source Material, Rev. 021
RCI-21, Control of Radioactive Materials, Rev. 021
RCI-22, Contamination Control Rev. 025
RCI-24, Control of Very High Radiation Areas Rev. 014
RCI-28, Control of Locked High Radiation Areas Rev. 015
RCI-29, Control of Radiation Protection Keys, Rev. 016
RCI-200, Documenting Radiological Surveys, Rev. 003
RCI-201, Radiation and Contamination Surveys, Rev. 019
RCI-202, Airborne Radioactivity Surveys, Rev. 009
RCI-204, Radiological Surveys of Equipment and Materials Leaving the RCA, Rev. 010
RCI-208, Hot Particle Controls, Rev. 004
RCI-209, Radiological Surveys of Personnel Leaving the RCA or Protected Area, Rev. 004
RCI-300, Hot Spot Program, Rev. 001
RCI-404, Radiation Protection Requirements for Remote Job Coverage, Rev. 001
RCI-412, Radiation Protection Surveys during Initial Spent Fuel Assembly Movement, Rev. 002
RCI-417, Radiological Monitoring of the Hydrogen Peroxide Injection Crud Burst, Rev. 001
Records and Data
0-SE-RCI-000-056.0 Byproduct Material Inventory and Sealed Source Leak Test, 06/18/2015
0-TI-NUC-000-002.0, Storing Material in Spent Fuel Pool or New Fuel Vault, Rev. 0026,
Attachment-1, Inventory of Materials in Spent Fuel Pool, Cask Loading Area, and New Fuel
Vault, dated 07/09/2015
Airborne Radiation Survey (ARS) Number (No.) 111915004, U2 Lower Containment IPCW,
11/19/2015
ARS No. 111915003, U2 Lower Containment Raceway, 11/19/2015
ARS No. 111715007, U2 Lower Containment - Seal Table, 11/17/2015
Annual Inventory Reconciliation Confirmation for License #DRP-77, dated 01/20/2015
RWP No. 15241601, U2 Equipment Zone/Upper Containment: Engineering Inservice
Inspections (ISI)
RWP No. 15223703, U2 Lower Containment & Seal Table Locked High Rad Areas
RWP No. 15241301, U2 Upper/734 Equipment Zone/SFP - Ops Inspections
RWP No. 15243702, U2 Upper Containment/SFP Area/734 Equipment Zone: Thimble Tube
Replacement
RWP No. 15241123, U2 Reactor Cavity - LHRA -Rx Head Set
RWP No. 15241603, U2 Upper Containment - Engineering ISI
Site Audit Report No. SSA1506, Radiation Protection, 07/28/15
Survey No. SQN-M-20151118-6, R202 U2 Seal Table, 11/18/2015
Survey No. SQN-M-20151117-5, R202 U2 Seal Table, 11/17/2015
Survey No. SQN-M-20151114-17, R203 U2 Raceway, 11/14/2015
Survey No. SQN-M-20151118-5, U-2 Raceway, 11/18/2015
Survey No. SQN-M-20151114-12, R241 U2 Inside Polar Crane Wall, 11/14/2015
Survey No. SQN-M-20140512-16, R241 U2 Inside Polar Crane Wall, 05/12/2014
Survey No. SQN-M-20121029-12, R241 U2 Inside Polar Crane Wall, 10/29/2012
9
Survey No. SQN-M-20151115-16, R261 U2 Reactor Cavity, 11/15/2015
Survey No. SQN-M-20140513-3, R261 U2 Reactor Cavity, 05/13/2014
Survey No. SQN-M-20121016-12, R261 U2 Reactor Cavity, 10/16/2014
TVA NPG Snapshot Self-Assessment Report No. SQN-RP-SSA-15-003, Radiological Hazard
Assessment and Exposure Controls, 02/13/15
U2R20 Daily Report, dated 11/17/2015
Corrective Action Program (CAP) Documents
CR #928351
CR #945217
CR #965363
CR #965360
CR #993906
CR #1003154
CR #1018507
CR #1015742
CR #1055689
CR #1055891
CR #1058919
CR #1066240
CR #1094755
CR #1094254
CR #1094253
2RS8: Radioactive Material Processing and Transportation
Procedures, Manuals, and Guides
RHSI-6, Bead Resin/Activated Carbon Dewatering Procedure for Energy Solutions14-215 or
Smaller Liners, Rev. 8
RCI-21, Control of Radioactive Materials, Rev. 21
RWTP-101, 10 CFR 61 Waste Characterization, Rev. 2
PCP, Process Control Program, Rev. 5
NPG-SPP-05.9.1, Radioactive Material/Waste Shipments, Rev. 1
NPG-SPP-22.302, Corrective Action Program Screening, Rev. 7
Shipping Records and Radioactive waste Data
2014 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report
Shipping Logs, 1/1/14 - 9/29/15
Shipment 15-0201, LSA, Resin
Shipment 15-0501, SCO, Contaminated Equipment
Shipment 15-0802, LSA, Filters
Shipment 14-0802, Type B, Resin
Qualification Matrix Report, Rad Material Shipping Receipt
2013 Spent Resin Storage Tank Transfers, 10 CFR 61 Analysis
Package USA/9168/B(U)-96, Certificate of Compliance, Rev. 20
10
CAP Documents
SQN-RP-SSA-15-001, Radiological Hazard and Transportation Self-Assessment
CR 949521
CR 924971
PER 1001710
Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator Verification
Procedures
EPDP-11, Emergency Preparedness Performance Indicators, Rev. 7
NPG-SPP-22.300, Corrective Action Program, Rev. 1
TRN-30, Radiological Emergency Plan Training, Rev. 29
Records and Data
DEP opportunities documentation for 4th quarter 2014; 1st and 2nd quarters 2015
Siren test data for 4th quarter 2014; 1st and 2nd quarters 2015
Drill and exercise participation records of ERO personnel for 4th quarter 2014; 1st and 2nd
quarters 2015
Corrective Action Documents
CR 0959214, EPDP-11 participation concern
CR 0960182, HAB graded exercise visitation conflict
CR 0969414, Licensed Operator Requalification Drill and Exercise Failure
CR 0991809, Evaluate EPDP-11 wording on participation credit
AC alternating current
ADAMS Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers
BACC boric acid corrosion control
BMV bare metal visual
CA corrective actions
CAP corrective action report
CCS component cooling system
CDE cause determination evaluation
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CR condition report
DCN design change notice
DOT Department of Transportation
ECCS emergency core cooling system
ED electronic dosimeter
EN event notification
ERCW essential raw cooling water
ERO Emergency Response Organization
FME foreign material exclusion
FSAR final safety analysis report
IMC inspection manual chapter
IMC inspection manual chapter
IP inspection procedure
ISFSI Independent spent fuel storage installation
ISI in-service inspection
LHRA locked high radiation areas
MPC multi-purpose canisters
MSIV main stream isolation valve
NCV non-cited violation
NDE non-destructive examinations
NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ODMI operating decision making instruction
OOS out-of-service
POE prompt operability evaluation
PWR pressurized-water reactor
RCE Root cause evaluation
RCA radiologically controlled area
RCW raw cooling water
RP radiation protection
RTP rated thermal power
2
RWP radiation work permit
RWST refueling water storage tanks
SCC structure, system, or components
TS technical specifications
TVA Tennessee Valley Authority
U1 Unit 1
U2 Unit 2
UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
UT ultrasonic
VHRA very high radiation areas
WO work order