ML15351A284

Official Exhibit - SHN-028-MA-CM01 - Shine Presentation Slides: Safety Panel 2

ML15351A284
Person / Time
Site:	SHINE Medical Technologies
Issue date:	12/15/2015
From:	SHINE Medical Technologies
To:	NRC/OCM
SECY RAS
References
Mandatory Hearing 2, RAS 28628, 50-608-CP
Download: ML15351A284 (5)

Text

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Official Hearing Exhibit In the Matter of: SHINE MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES, INC.

(Medical Radioisotope Production Facility)

Commission Mandatory Hearing Docket #: 05000608 Exhibit #: SHN-028-MA-CM01 Identified: 12/15/2015 Admitted: 12/15/2015 Withdrawn:

Rejected: Stricken:

Other: Exhibit SHN-028 Commission Mandatory Hearing SHINE Construction Permit Application S f Safety - Panel P l2 Accident Analysis December 15,, 2015

Accident Initiating Events and Scenarios Bases for identification of accidents:

Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOPS)

Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)

List of events from NUREG NUREG-15371537 and the Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) augmenting NUREG-1537 Experience of the hazards analysis team Current preliminary design information Qualitative evaluations within categories Quantitative evaluations to determine consequences Postulated P t l t d an irradiation i di ti ffacility ilit (IF) and d radioisotope di i t production d ti facility (RPF) Maximum Hypothetical Accident (MHA)

Establishes an outer limit consequence, bounds other accidents Most limiting MHA was in the RPF (Facility MHA) 2

IF Postulated Maximum Hypothetical Accident Target solution vessel (TSV) and subcritical b iti l assembly bl supportt structure (SASS) integrity lost, Subcritical Assembly target solution spills into Support Structure irradiation unit (IU) cell (SASS)

Maximum inventories assumed in TSV TSV (Internal to Pool presence ignored SASS)

High radiation detected detected, initiates alarms and confinement High efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters and charcoal adsorbers d b credited dit d Dose consequences Worker TEDE: 3.1 rem TSV Dump Tank Public (site boundary) TEDE:

0.017 rem 3

RPF Maximum Hypothetical Accident (Facility MHA)

The five noble g gas TSV Off Gas storage tanks rupture Purge simultaneously NGRS Compressors With the maximum inventory y Contents are instantly Noble Gas released Storage Tanks Al RAD Al RAD Al RAD Al RAD Al RAD g radiation levels initiate High alarm and cell isolation Redundant isolation dampers close Condensate Al RAD 10% of the activity bypasses Knock Out Tank Process Vessel Vent System the isolation dampers 10% of the activity leaks Radioactive through penetrations Liquid Waste 4

RPF Maximum Hypothetical Accident (Facility MHA)

Dose consequences Worker TEDE: 3.6 rem Public (site boundary) TEDE: 0.082 rem The MHA consequences are conservative Simultaneous, instantaneous rupture Entirety of noble gas is transferred and released The five tanks are filled to capacity Additional ventilation isolation dampers would close, but are not credited Actual doses would be lower Radiological consequences to workers and the public are within the limits of 10 CFR 20.1101, 20.1201,, and 20.1301 5

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Official Hearing Exhibit In the Matter of: SHINE MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES, INC.

(Medical Radioisotope Production Facility)

Commission Mandatory Hearing Docket #: 05000608 Exhibit #: SHN-028-MA-CM01 Identified: 12/15/2015 Admitted: 12/15/2015 Withdrawn:

Rejected: Stricken:

Other: Exhibit SHN-028 Commission Mandatory Hearing SHINE Construction Permit Application S f Safety - Panel P l2 Accident Analysis December 15,, 2015

Accident Initiating Events and Scenarios Bases for identification of accidents:

Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOPS)

Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)

List of events from NUREG NUREG-15371537 and the Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) augmenting NUREG-1537 Experience of the hazards analysis team Current preliminary design information Qualitative evaluations within categories Quantitative evaluations to determine consequences Postulated P t l t d an irradiation i di ti ffacility ilit (IF) and d radioisotope di i t production d ti facility (RPF) Maximum Hypothetical Accident (MHA)

Establishes an outer limit consequence, bounds other accidents Most limiting MHA was in the RPF (Facility MHA) 2

IF Postulated Maximum Hypothetical Accident Target solution vessel (TSV) and subcritical b iti l assembly bl supportt structure (SASS) integrity lost, Subcritical Assembly target solution spills into Support Structure irradiation unit (IU) cell (SASS)

Maximum inventories assumed in TSV TSV (Internal to Pool presence ignored SASS)

High radiation detected detected, initiates alarms and confinement High efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters and charcoal adsorbers d b credited dit d Dose consequences Worker TEDE: 3.1 rem TSV Dump Tank Public (site boundary) TEDE:

0.017 rem 3

RPF Maximum Hypothetical Accident (Facility MHA)

The five noble g gas TSV Off Gas storage tanks rupture Purge simultaneously NGRS Compressors With the maximum inventory y Contents are instantly Noble Gas released Storage Tanks Al RAD Al RAD Al RAD Al RAD Al RAD g radiation levels initiate High alarm and cell isolation Redundant isolation dampers close Condensate Al RAD 10% of the activity bypasses Knock Out Tank Process Vessel Vent System the isolation dampers 10% of the activity leaks Radioactive through penetrations Liquid Waste 4

RPF Maximum Hypothetical Accident (Facility MHA)

Dose consequences Worker TEDE: 3.6 rem Public (site boundary) TEDE: 0.082 rem The MHA consequences are conservative Simultaneous, instantaneous rupture Entirety of noble gas is transferred and released The five tanks are filled to capacity Additional ventilation isolation dampers would close, but are not credited Actual doses would be lower Radiological consequences to workers and the public are within the limits of 10 CFR 20.1101, 20.1201,, and 20.1301 5