ML14181A982
| ML14181A982 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 02/06/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14181A980 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-261-98-03, 50-261-98-3, NUDOCS 9802170041 | |
| Download: ML14181A982 (53) | |
See also: IR 05000261/1998003
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Report No:
50-261/98-03
Licensee: Carolina Power & Light (CP&L)
Facility:
H. B. Robinson Unit 2
Location:
3581 West Entrance Road
Hartsville, SC 29550
'Dates:
January 5 - 9, 1998
Inspectors:
J. Lenahan, Reactor Inspector
M: Miller, Reactor Inspector
Approved by:
H.
Christensen. Chief. Engineering Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
Enclosure 2
9802170041 980206
PDR ADOCK 05000261
Q
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
H. B. Robinson Unit 2
NRC Inspection Report 50-261/98-03
This inspection was conducted to followup on the inspection findings from the
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) design inspection performed from
April 7 through May 23, 1997. The inspection findings, documented in NRC
Inspection Report (IR)
number 50-261/97-201, were classified as 15 Unresolved
Items and 12 Inspector Followup Items
Results:
During the current inspection, three Inspector Followup items and 14
Unresolved items were closed. Four violations and two apparent violations
were identified. These violations were as follows:
A violation for inadequate corrective action to resolve instrument
line slope deficiencies.
A violation for failure to report peak cladding temperatures
changes as required by 10 CFR 50.46.
A violation of 10 CFR 50.59 for increasing the motor operator
stroke times for two valves in excess of the times specified in
the UFSAR.
A violation of 10 CFR 50.9 for providing inaccurate information to
NRC regarding cable separation for the safety injection pumps.
The two apparent violations were identified as follows:
An apparent violation for deficiencies .in
NPSH resulting in the
safety injection pumps failing to meet the operability
requirements of the Technical Specifications and the design bases
for the pumps.
An apparent violation for inadequate design control.
Enclosure 2
REPORT DETAILS
III.
Engineering
El
Conduct of Engineering
An inspection was performed by the NRC from April 7 through
May 23, 1997, on design activities associated with the safety injection
(SI) and auxiliary feedwater (AFW) systems. The results of the design
inspection were documented in NRC Inspection Report (IR)
number 50
261/97-201 and transmitted to the licensee by NRC letter dated
August 14, 1997. The licensee replied to the Inspection Report in a
letter to NRC dated November 3, 1997, Subject: Reply to NRC Design
Inspection. In their reply, the licensee discussed their planned
corrective actions and commitments to address the issues identified
during the design inspection. The corrective actions, some of which
were previously addressed in the licensee's February 11, 1997, response
to the NRC October 9, 1996, 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter, included the
following;
Performance of a self assessment on control of calculations and
personnel performance of individuals completing or reviewing
calculations.
Review the use of uncertainties in instrument setpoint
calculations.
Provide additional training on licensing and design basis to
engineering and technical personnel.
Perform self-assessments (Safety System Functional type
inspections) on the effectiveness of design basis translation into
procedures and configuration maintenance.
Implement the Improved Technical Specifications.
Complete the review of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
(UFSAR).
Completion of validations of the design basis documents.
Resolve discrepancies identified as part of the design basis
review reconstitution program.
Enclosure 2
2
E7
Quality Assurance in Engineering Activities
E7.1 Licensee Self Assessments
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the self assessment the licensee performed
in the engineering support area during 1997 as a followup to
issues identified during the April - May, 1997 design control
inspection. The licensee committed to perform this self
assessment-in the November 3, 1997 letter referenced above.
b. Observation and Findings
The inspectors.reviewed Self Assessment RESS 97-34. Control of
Calculations, dated November 17, 1997. Six issues, three
weaknesses, and three recommendations (items for management
consideration) were identified during the self assessment.
The issues identified by the self assessment were as follows: two
issues regarding administrative controls (procedures): the need to
prepare or revise calculations for instrumentation setpoints, an
issue involving'calculation errors, and one issue which concerned
cross-referencing calculations. The inspectors verified condition
reports (CRs) were initiated to evaluate the issues in accordance
with the licensee's self assessment procedure. The weaknesses
identified concerned lack of consistency in calculations, failure
to have procedures in place which require cross discipline reviews
on calculations, and lack of a database to identify relationship
between various calculations. The inspectors verified that CRs
were initiated to evaluate the weaknesses. The recommendations
from the self assessment concerned improvements to Procedure MOD
002, Design Calculations, recommended additional training, and a
change to the document control database to identify the
relationship between various calculations and various other
calculations.
c. Conclusions
The self assessment resulted in identification of numerous issues
and weaknesses, which when resolved by the licensee, would improve
completed calculations. However some areas not addressed in the
self assessment included availability of the original design
records for use by engineers when completing calculations, and
compliance with corporate design control procedures (EGR-NGGC
series).
Enclosure 2
3
E.8
Miscellaneous Engineering Issues
E8.1 (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-261/97-201-02, Single Failure of CST Level
Instrumentation.
The NRC design team questioned whether the instrumentation for the
condensate storage tank (CST) complied with Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.97,
Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess
Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident. The questions
concerned whether the level instrumentation which did not provide true
redundant power supplies for the two level-circuits complied with RG
1.97. During a loss of off-site power concurrent with a failure of EDG
A, the CST level instrumentation would be lost after one hour. Both
circuits were powered from A train. Instrumentation Loop AFW-LT-1454A
was powered from Bus 1 and backed by EDG A. Instrumentation Loop AFW
LT-1454B was powered from Bus 2 and backed by Battery A. Battery A
would provide power for one hour.
Both circuits were original plant design. The licensee's RG 1.97
submittal, Revision 1, dated June, 1985, identified the CST level
instrumentation design configuration as described above. This was
accepted by the NRC staff and a safety evaluation report was
issued.
Operating Procedure OP-402, "Auxiliary Feedwater System" contained
a precaution that informs the operator that if CST level decreases
to 10% during operation, a backup water supply should be placed in
service. The backup water supply for the AFW system is service
water.
The inspectors concluded there was no safety concern regarding the CST
level instrumentation and it was in compliance with the licensee's RG
1.97 submittal to NRC.
E8.2 (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-261/97-201-03, Design Verification for
Calculations.
The NRC design team identified numerous potential deficiencies in
engineering calculations. The calculations and deficiencies were
discussed in NRC inspection report IR 50-261/97-201 in Sections
E1.3.2.2.b. E1.3.4.2.c,.E1.3.4.2.e. E1.3.5.2.a. and E1.5.2.2.
The
inspectors reviewed the following calculation deficiencies:
Enclosure 2
4
Calculation Number RNP-I/INST-1023, "Refueling Water Storage Tank
(RWST) Level Indication Accuracies". Revision 0. dated June 28.
1991, did not consider potential vortexing for the RWST above the
level setpoint of 9 percent that was used in the End Path
Procedure EPP-9, "Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation", Revision
20.
EPP-9 directed the operators to operate one safety injection
(SI) pump and, if required, one containment spray (CS) pump from
the RWST under accident conditions until the tank reached an
indicated level of 9 percent. The licensee initiated condition
report (CR) 97-00988 which was still being evaluated to address
.this concern. The vortexing effect was minor concerning -RWST
actual level. However, the vortexing affected the 9 percent level
setpoint for the net positive suction head (NPSH) for the SI
pumps. NPSH issues are discussed in Paragraph E8.7.
Calculation Number RNP-I/INST 1109, "Containment EOP Setpoint
Parameters", Revision 0, dated November 29, 1994, did not
determine the correct containment water level required for post
accident residual heat removal (RHR) pump recirculation operation
(EOP setpoint No. 20).
The EOP setpoint, No. 20, was calculated
to be 354 inches based on a required containment water level of 9
inches above the containment floor during normal operating
conditions. UFSAR Section 6.3.2.2.3 correctly stated that the RHR
NPSH analysis was based on a containment building water level of
1.5 feet above the containment floor. Calculation RNP-I/INST 1109
was updated using the correct containment water level to determine
level setpoint No. 20. This containment water level error was
applicable to Calculation RNP-I/INST-1058, discussed below. The
revised calculations did not effect the EOP setpoint of 354
inches.
Calculation Number RNP-I/INST-1058, "Containment Water Level
Instrument Uncertainty", Revision 0. dated April 4, 1994, used an
incorrect value for the containment water above the containment
floor. This error in the containment water level was similar as
discussed above for Calculation RNP-I/INST 1109. The licensee
revised Calculation RNP-I/INST-1058 using the correct containment
water level. The EOP setpoint was not effected.
Calculation Number RNP-I/INST.1040, "Main Steam Flow Accuracy and
Scaling Calculation", Revision 0. dated May 16, 1994, and
Calculation number RNP-I/INST-1043, "Main Steam Pressure Channel
Accuracy and Scaling Calculation", Revision 1, dated April 15,
1994, did not include seismic uncertainty factors. The design
requirements for the instruments covered by these calculations
required consideration of seismic uncertainty factors. Design
Enclosure 2
5
Guide DG-VIII.50. "Engineering Instrument Setpoints". Section 10,
Seismic Effects (SE), required that seismic effects be included in
the setpoint calculations for instrumentation which were required
to be operable during and after an earthquake. These calculations
were revised to include the seismic error uncertainty factors as
required by the design guide.
Calculation Number RNP-M/MECH-1620. "Evaluation of Effects of High
Energy Pipe Rupture on the CCWS", Revision 0, dated July 18. 1996,
did not document the break locations; the spatial relationship
between high energy line breaks (HELBs) and the componentcooling
water (CCW) piping; the possible jet impingement areas due to
cracks/breaks in CCW piping; and piping interactions due to the
HELB forces. Also, the calculation did not specifically address
the CCW piping between the containment penetrations and the
missile barrier. The licens6e determined that the design inputs
discussed above had not been included in the Calculation.
Calculation RNP-M/MECH-1620 was voided and ESR 97-00014 was
revised to include the information from the AE and NSSS vendors to
support that the CCW System inside containment is a closed system.
Calculation Number RNP-M/MECH-1362, "SW Screen Wash Piping Flow S
Analysis", Revision 1, dated September 5. 1991, was the
calculation (analysis) to demonstrate adequate performance of the
SW system with ruptures of non-seismic piping. The calculation did
not include rupture of the non-seismic piping that supply the
instrument and station air compressors. The licensee was in the
process of addressing the item.
Calculation Number RNP-E-6.020,"Load Profile and Battery Sizing
Calculation for Battery B", Revision 2, dated November 24, 1993,
incorrectly referenced a time period of "2 minutes to 59 minutes",
instead of "1 minute to 59 minutes. The calculation did not
consider some of the connected non-safety related loads and
referenced an incorrect battery cell type (MCT instead of MCX) in
Attachment U to the calculation. The licensee issued CR 97-00996
and CR 97-01082 to address these items. Evaluation of these items
was in progress.
Calculation Number RNP-E-6.23., "Minimum Inverter Voltage
Verification". Revision 2, dated December 1, 1993. did not
consider the increased inverter current at reduced battery
voltage. The licensee issued CR 97-01070. Corrective actions
included revision of the calculation to correct the above errors.
Enclosure 2
6
Calculation Number RNP-E-6.004, "DC Short Circuit Study", Revision
2, dated May 19, 1993, did not consider a small DC motor that was
connected to the system. The battery open circuit voltage used in
the calculation was less than voltage measured during testing.
This calculation along with calculation number RNP-E-018,
"Ampacity Evaluation of Safety Related 125VDC and 120VAC Power
Cables". Revision 4, dated March 16. 1994, analyzed cables rated
at 750C. whereas 600C rated cables were installed. The licensee
issued CR 97-01085 to have the calculation revised and corrected.
Calculation Number RNP-E-6.018, "DC Control Circuit Loop
Analysis". Revision 0, dated April 19, 1994, used incorrect
solenoid valve power values as a design input value. The licensee
issued CR 97-00996 to correct this item.
Calculation Number RNP-E-8.016, "Emergency Diesel Generator Static
and Dynamic Analysis", Revision 5, dated September 19, 1994, used
an incorrect reference and only modeled the "B"
SI pump motor.
The licensee issued CR-01074 to have the calculation corrected.
RNP-M/MECH-1460, "NPSH VS. CST Level for SDAFW Pump", Revision 0.
dated June 19. 1992, incorrectly assumed the CST water temperature
lto
be 1000F, instead of 115 0 F as in the Plant Parameter Document
for Cycle 18. The licensee was in the process of evaluating this
item.
RNP-M/MECH-1394, "AFW Pump Recirculation Flowrates for RNP-2",
Revision 2, dated August 21, 1995, used an incorrect specific
gravity for the CST water. The licensee was in the process of
evaluating this item.
The above examples of calculation errors were determined by the
inspectors to be (individually) minor discrepancies. The inspectors
concluded the safety significance of each individual calculation error
was minor and that none of the individual issues resulted in an
unreviewed safety question (USQ).
However, the large number of
calculation deficiencies identified a programmatic problem in the
licensee's design control program.
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III. Design Control, requires that
design control measures verify the adequacy of design, such as by design
review, alternate calculational methods, or a suitable testing program.
Section 3.4.3 of CP&L Corporate Quality Assurance Manual, states that
"sufficient design verification shall be performed by one or more
methods to substantiate that final design documents meet the
Enclosure 2
7
appropriate design." It further states that a design verification
should confirm that the design is technically adequate with respect to
the design bases.
The calculation errors discussed above were examples where the
design verification process did not verify either the adequacy of
the design with respect to the design basis, or that correct
design inputs were utilized in the calculations. Failure to
implement the design control measures of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.
Criterion III was identified to the licensee as apparent violation
item EEI 50-261/98-03-01, Inadequate Design Control.
The NRC design team identified an issue concerning Calculation
RNP-I/INST-1015, "Condensate Storage Tank Level Alarm Setpoints",
Revision 0. The issue concerned not referring to engineering
procedure, EGR-NGGC-0153, for scope and methodology of instrument
uncertainty and scaling. The inspectors verified that EGR-NGGC
0153, Revision 0 was not in effect at the time Revision 0 of
Calculation RNP-I/INST-1015 was completed. However, RNP-I/INST
1015 was in compliance with design guide DG-V111.50, "Instrument
Setpoints". which was in effect at that time.
Two additional issues were also identified by the NRC design team
as potential calculation errors in Section E1.5.2.2 of IR 50
261/97-201 which were reviewed and resolved by.the inspectors.
One concerned questions on Seimens calculati.on EMF-94-203(P). The
licensee issued ESR 9700487 to address the design team's
questions. The ESR concluded that the Seimens calculation was
correct. The other issue concerned calculation-number RNP-E-5.004
which will be addressed under IFI 50-261/97-201-22.
E8.3
(Closed) Unresolved Item 50-261/97-201-04, Instrument Sensing Line
Slope
During the design inspection, the NRC design team for identified
instrument lines for six instruments which had inadequate slope.
Inadequate slope permits trapping of air/gases in the instrument
lines which can result in erroneous instrument readings.
Previous
violations regarding inadequate instrument line slopes were
identified by NRC during the inspections documented in NRC
Inspection Report numbers 50-261/94-17 (VIO 94-17-02) and
50-261/95-30 (VIO 95-30-01). The licensee's actions to correct these
violations were documented in CP&L letters dated September 14, 1994, and
February 21, 1996,. Subject:.Reply to a Notice of Violation. The
licensee stated, in the violation responses, that other instrument
Enclosure 2
8
S
installations would be reviewed to identify any sensing lines that may
be improperly sloped and appropriate corrective actions would be
initiated. In response to the NRC design inspection, the licensee
determined that additional inspections of instrument sensing lines were
required. The instrument line inspections showed that additional
modifications were necessary to correct instrument line with inadequate
slope.
The failure to take adequate corrective actions to resolve the
instrument line slope deficiencies which-resulted in the previously
identified violations was identified to the licensee as Violation Item
50-261/98-03-02. Inadequate Corrective Actions to Resolve Instrument
Line Slope Deficiencies.
E8.4 (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-261/97-201-06, Notification of Changes
in Peak Cladding Temperature (PCT)
The NRC design team identified some examples where the licensee
may have failed to make annual reports of changes to the peak
cladding temperature required by 10 CFR 50.46. This URI is
discussed in paragraph E.8.5. below, in resolution of URI 50
261/97-201-07.
E8.5 (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-261/97-201-07, Reporting of
Significant Changes in PCT
The licensee initiated CR 97-01023 to document and evaluate
questions regarding notifications to NRC under 10 CFR 50.46 to
report changes in peak cladding temperatures. .The CR summarizes
the licensee's actions in reporting changes in PCT to NRC and
includes appropriate document references which submitted
information to NRC. From review of the submittal data, the
inspectors noted that on April 24, 1996, calculations showed the
PCT increased from 2006 0F to 20640F. On October 14, 1996,
calculations were completed which indicated the PCT increased from
2064oF to 21570F. Subsequently, the PCT was reduced to 2128oF
(based on calculations completed on October 25, 1996), which was
increased to 2163oF by a calculation completed on October 29.
1996. This value was reported to NRC on October 29. 1996.
10 CFR 50.46(a)(3)(ii) requires each significant change to or
error discovered in an acceptable evaluation model or in the
application of such a model that affect the peak cladding
temperature calculation, be reported to NRC within 30 days.
Significant change or error is defined in 10*CFR 50.46(a)(3)(I) as
one that results in a peak cladding temperature different by more
than 500F from the temperature calculated for the limiting tran
sient using the last acceptable model.
Enclosure 2
9
Review of the licensee's documentation showed that the licensee
failed to report the significant change to PCT (from 2006 0F to
20640F), as defined in 10 CFR 50.46, to.NRC from May 24, 1996, to
October 14, 1996. The failure to report the significant change in
PCT was identified to the licensee as violation item 50-261/98-03
03, Failure to Report PCT Changes.
The team also had additional questions on the licensee's reporting
of PCT changes for the cold leg switch over analysis. This will
be evaluated under IFI 50-261/97-201-08.
E8.6 (Open) Inspector Followup Item 50-261/97-201-08, Evaluation of
Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation
By letter dated August 26, 1997, NRC requested additional
information concerning the analysis of the emergency core cooling
system switch over from the injection to recirculation phase. The
licensee provided the information requested in a letter to NRC
dated October 14, 1997. The information is currently under review
by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
E8.7 (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-261-97-201-09. SI, RHR, and CS Pump
The NRC design team questioned the licensee on.the adequacy of th.e
available net positive suction head (NPSH) for operation of the
safety injection (SI), residual heat removal (RHR), and
containment spray (CS) pumps operating under accident conditions.
In responses to the team's questions, the licensee retained a
consulting engineering company to perform an analysis to
demonstrate that the pumps had adequate NPSH.
The inspectors reviewed the following calculations which were
prepared to address NPSH questions:
Calculation RNP-M/MECH-1637, Determination of Available NPSH for
ECCS SI Pumps A, B, & C in the Injection Mode of Operation,
Revision 0 (Altran Calculation 97159-C-01, Revision 0, dated
July 11, 1997)
Calculation RNP-M/MECH-1638, Determination of Available NPSH for
ECCS RHR Pumps A & B in the Recirculation Mode of Operation,
Revision 0 (Altran Calculation 97159-C-02. Revision 0. dated
November 6, 1997).
Enclosure 2
10
Review of the calculations showed that the NPSH available for the
RHR and CS pumps exceeded the NPSH required for various pump
running combinations in the recirculation mode of operation.
However, the analysis for the SI pumps showed that the NPSH
required exceeded the NPSH available for both the B and C SI pumps
when only one pump was running for the water levels in the RWST at
the EOP low level and low-low level setpoints. Upon discovery of
the NPSH deficiency for the SI pumps, the licensee evaluated the
effects by performing additional analyses and implemented
modifications to raise the RWST level. The modifications were
completed under ESR 9700307 and included adjustments to
instrumentation and relocation of the RWST overflow line. The
water level in the RWST was raised approximately 37 inches, which
corresponds to an increase of approximately 11 percent from the
original water level in the RWST. The licensee reported this
issue to the NRC Operations Center on June 27, 1997, and submitted
LER 97-008 on July 28. 1997.
The cause of the NPSH deficiency was determined by the licensee to
have occurred as a result of a modification implemented to the SI
system in 1988. The licensee concluded that the personnel
involved in the design change, Modification M-951, implemented on
March 24, 1988, failed to adequately assess the impact of the
changes on NPSH. The failure to verify the adequacy of design
changes was contrary to the requirements of 10.CFR 50, Appendix B,
Criterion III.
The inspectors concluded'that SI pumps B & C were'
inoperable due to insufficient NPSH in some plant configurations.
This is contrary to the requirements of Technical Specification 3.3.1.1.c which required two pumps to be operable during normal
plant operations. This was identified to the licensee as Apparent
Violation item EEI 50-261/98-03-04, SI Pumps Inoperable Due to
Inadequate NPSH.
The design team also identified inconsistencies in the UFSAR concerning
design and operation of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS). The
effect of these changes on NPSH were not discussed in the UFSAR.
Resolution of these issues will be included as part of violation item
EEI 50-261/98-03-04.
E8.8 (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-261/97-201-10, SI Valve Testing
During review of the Inservice Inspection (ISI) Program, the
Design team questioned an apparent inconsistency for lack of
inservice testing (IST) of accumulator fill valve numbers SI-851A,
B, and C. The team questioned whether these valves met the
definition of active valves and therefore should have been
Enclosure 2
included in the IST program. Active' valves are defined as valves
which are required to change position to perform their safety
function. A passive valve is not required to change position to
perform its safety .function. IST is not required to be performed
on valves defined as passive. Section 2.4.2 of NUREG-1482.
Guidelines for Inservice Testing at Nuclear Power Plants, states
"If a valve is routinely operated during plant operations, or has
an active safety function, it is an active valve. A valve need
not be considered active if it is only temporarily removed from
service for a short period of time."
The inspectors determined
that operation of valve numbers SI-851A. B, and C occurs
infrequently, and then for only short periods of time
(approximately 5 seconds) during power operations for make up to
the accumulators. The last time the valves were operated was on
October 20, 1997. They had not been operated for more than six
months prior to that date. The inspectors concluded that the
valves were properly classified as passive valves and were not
required to be included in the IST program. Therefore, the
licensee's IST program was in compliance with NRC requirements for
these valves. However, the licensee decided that a prudent and
conservative action would be to include these valves in their IST
program. The licensee revised procedure TMM-004, Inservice
Inspection Testing, to reclassify the valves as active and include
them in the IST program. The inspectors reviewed Revision 49 of
procedure' TMM-004, and verified the valves were now included in
the IST program in accordance with the response in the November 3.
1997 letter.
E8.9 (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 50-261/.97-201-11, Classification
of Valves in IST
During review of procedure TMM-004, the Design team questioned
whether valve numbers SI-864 A & B and SI-856 A & B were properly
classified in the procedure regarding inservice testing
requirements. The concern was an inconsistency in documentation
since the licensee had periodically leak tested the valves under
procedure EST-140. The licensee initiated CR 97-01981 to document
and evaluate this concern. The licensee revised procedure TMM-004
to reclassify the valves as Category A for testing requirements
and revised the IST data base to reflect the correct testing
category.
The Design team also questioned the classification of manual
operated valve numbers CC-927, CC-928, SW-75, and SW-77. These
valves were identified as passive valves in procedure TMM-004.
The licensee initiated CR 97-01129 on May 14, 1997, to document
Enclosure 2
12
and evaluate this issue. The licensee determined that numbers SW
75 and SW-77 stated in IR
50-261/97-201 were incorrect. The
correct numbers were SW-906 and SW-907. The normal position for
these valves is open to provide cooling to the RHR pumps. However
in the event of a pump seal failure, or a pipebreak, it would be
necessary to close the valves to prevent flooding of the RHR pump
room (pit). This issue was previously addressed in LER 89-008
which was reported to NRC on May 4, 1989. Corrective actions to
resolve the potential flooding problem included implementation of
a modification, number MOD-1017, to relocate the valves outside
the RHR room so the valves would be accessible for manual
isolation during long term recirculation operation when radiation
level may preclude entry to the RHR room. Therefore these valves
should have been classified as active and subject to IST. The
licensee determined that they had tested valve numbers CC-927 and
-928. but not the other two. The licensee initiated CR-01354 and
performed IST on valve numbers SW-906 and -907. The licensee
revised procedures to reclassify the valves as active and require
IST. The inspectors determined that when the design change
(modification) was implemented, licensee engineers failed to
revise the ASME Section XI program to incorporate the effect of
the design change on the IST program. The inspectors identified
the failure to update the IST program to the licensee as another
example of Apparent Violation EEI 50-261/98-03-01.
E8.10 (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-261/97-201-12, 10 CFR 50.59 Screening
Deficiency
In March, 1996, the licensee initiated ESR 9600012 to evaluate
replacement of motor pinions and the worm shaft gear on valve
numbers RHR-744 A & B. The evaluation in the ESR showed that the
valve stroke times would be increased from ten seconds to
approximately 16 seconds. A 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation screen
was performed.to determine if the proposed modification required a
detailed unreviewed safety question determination. In performance
of the safety evaluation screen, the.responsible engineers
concluded that the ESR would not result in a change to the
facility as described in the FSAR. The NRC design team identified
that Section 6.3.2.2.12 of the UFSAR stated that these valves were
supplied with 10-second operators...Therefore, increasing the
stroke time to 16 seconds did result in a change to the facility
as described in the FSAR.
10 CFR 50.59 requires the performance of an evaluation to
determine if changes to the facility (sys-tems, structures, or
components) or facility operating procedures described in the
Enclosure 2
13
Safety Analysis Report (SAR) involves an unreviewed safety
question. The 50.59 Safety Evaluation Screen performed on
March 7, 1996, to address replacement of motor pinions and worm shaft
clutch gears for valve numbers RHR-744 A & B under Engineering Service
Request 9600012, was inadequate. The activity resulted in increasing
the motor operator valve stroke times beyond the ten seconds specified
in UFSAR Section 6.3.2.2.12. This was identified to the licensee as
Violation item 50-261/98-03-05, Failure to Comply with 10 CFR 50.59 for
Modification to Two Valves Under ESR 9600012.
The modifications to the valves which increased the stroke times
beyond ten seconds were implemented in 1996. However, during
review of IST data, the licensee's IST engineer identified the
UFSAR discrepancy. CR 97-00589 was initiated on March 7, 1997 to
document and disposition the problem. Closeout of the CR included
performance of a new 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation screen which
identified the conflict with the UFSAR statement. The licensee's
evaluation showed that the revised 16 second stroke time was still
less than the 21 to 28 second allowable stoke.times permitted by
the accident analysis. A pending UFSAR change was initiated to
revise the statement in the UFSAR regarding the type operators (10
second) on the valves. The inspectors concluded that the original
error in the safety screen did not result in an unreviewed safety
question.and had only minor significance since the licensee had
already resolved the technical issues resulting from the screening
error.
E8.11 (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-261/97-201-14, SI Cable Separation
Discrepancy
The SI system consists of three pumps, designated A. B, and C,
with pumps A and C receiving electrical power from the A and B
trains, respectively. The B pump is powered from either train and
is maintained in a standby status. The B pump is powered from the
same electrical source as the pump being taken out of service. In
response to a request from the team that the licensee verify that
the electrical cables were adequately separated, the licensee
performed a review of cable routing for the safety injection
pumps. After reviewing the cable routing, the licensee determined
that the cables did not have adequate separation. The review
disclosed that safety injection pump C autostart cable C2239C and
manual cable C2239D were in the same cable tray as the SI pump A
autostart cable C2237D and the SI pump B (train A line up)
autostart cable C2891C.
Enclosure 2
14
When the licensee discovered the cable separation problem, they
declared SI pump C inoperable per Technical Specification 3.3.1.2
and placed pump B in service. The licensee initiated a condition
report (CR 97-01177) on May 20, 1997, and issued ESR 9700274 to
reroute cables C2239C and C2239D to obtain the required cable
separation. The modification was implemented on May 24-25, 1997.
UFSAR Section 8.3.1.3 stated that control cables are separated into two
basic channels (cable trays) as.required for redundant circuits. Cables
assigned to these channels for separation are required to be in their
respective channels from the beginning of the cable to the final
termination.
10 CFR 50.9 requires information provided to NRC by licensees to
be complete and accurate in all material respects. The fact that
the licensee provided inaccurate information in the UFSAR
regarding cable separation was identified to the licensee as
Violation 50-261/98-03-06, Failure to Provide Accurate
Information to NRC on Cable Separation for the SI Pumps.
E8.12 (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 50-261/97-201-16. Seismic
Qualification of 480 V AC Circuit Breakers
The NRC design team questioned licensee engineers regarding
seismic qualification of circuit breakers when the breakers were
in the disconnect (racked out) and removed (physically out of the.
cabinets and supported on rails) positions. The licensee had
previously identified an outlier concerning seismic qualification
of the breakers in these positions when performing the review
required to respond to Generic Letter 87-02, Verification of
Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment in
Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46. The
licensee determined that the breakers were seismically qualified
in the racked out;position in Calculation number RNP-C/EQ-1137.
The inspectors reviewed the calculation and verified that the
breakers were seismically qualified in this position. The
licensee also determined that the breakers were not qualified in
the removed position. However, the breakers are only in this
position when they are undergoing maintenance and are attended by
maintenance personnel. If maintenance personnel are not
physically present when the breakers are in the removed position,
that is,
physically out of the cabinets and supported on the
rails, the breakers are removed from the cabinets (rails) and
stored on the floor or moved to the electrical workshop for
performance of maintenance. Therefore, the breakers are not
Enclosure 2
15
required to be seismically qualified in the removed position for
possible seismic interactions with the cabinets.
E8.13 (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-261/97-201-17, SI Accumulator Pressure
Alarm Setpoint
The NRC design team identified a potential concern that the accumulator
relief valves would actuate before the control room would be alerted by
the accumulator high pressure alarm. The relief valve setpoints were
680 psig with a tolerance of -10 psig. The high pressure alarm setpoint
was 700 psig with a tolerance of +/-21 psig. Therefore, there was a 1
psig overlap (680 vs 679) and there was the possibility that the relief
valves could actuate before the control room operators would be alerted
by the high pressure alarm .
The inspectors did not identify any safety
concern in this area since the valves would automatically perform their
function and would reset as soon as the pressure dropped below the
relief valve setpoint value.
To correct this problem, the licensee changed the accumulator high
pressure alarm setpoint from 680 psig to 646 psig. The inspectors
concluded this concern was satisfactorily addressed by the licensee.
E8.14 (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-261/97-201-18, RWST Level Instrument
Uncertainty
The concern was that the seismic uncertainty factor was not used in
calculation RNP-I/INST-1023, "Refueling Water Storage Tank Level
Indication Accuracies", Revision 0 as required in Engineering procedure
EGR-NGGC-0153. The inspectors verified EGR-NGGC-0153 was not in effect
at the time RNP-I/INST-1023 was issued and therefore not applicable.
The procedure in effect was design guide DG-V111.50, "Instrument
Setpoints" and it did not require the "uncertainty" factor.
E8.15 (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-261/97-201-21, Translation of Design
Bases into Drawings. Procedures, and Installed Components
The NRC design team -identified examples where the installation
drawings did not reflect the design basis specified in the
calculations.
Examples were also identified by the NRC design
team where maintenance and surveillance test procedures did not
incorporate or verify the design basis specified in the design
calculations.
These examples, which were discussed in Sections
E1.3.5.2(a), E1.4.2.3. and E1.4.2.5 of IR 50-261/97-201, were as
follows:
Enclosure 2
16
The design basis for CCW thermal relief valve numbers CC-747 A and
B, CC-774, and CC-791G were incorrectly translated into the
installation drawings. Consequently, the valves were installed in
locations which resulted in the 10 psig back pressure values
specified in Westinghouse E-spec No. 676257 being exceeded by 5
psig.
The design basis for performance of testing on station batteries
(IEEE Standard 450-1980, Recommended Practice for Maintenance.
Testing, and Replacement of Large Storage Batteries for Generating
Stations and Substations) was incorrectly translated into MST-920,
Station Battery Performance Capacity Test, Revision 6, dated
September 28. 1995, and MST-921, Station Battery Service Test,
Revision 7, dated April 20, 1995. Step 7.5.10 of procedure MST
921 accepted voltages less than the minimum value of 1.0 volt DC
specified in IEEE Standard 450-1980. The duration of capacity
testing of station battery B specified in MST-920.was different
from that used by the battery manufacturer. The minimum
acceptance criteria of 107 volts specified in MST-921 for the
station battery load profile test was less than the value of 109.8
volts evaluated in Calculation RNP-E-6.018.
The designbasis for performance of maintenance on station
batteries was incorrectly translated'into procedures PM-410,
Installation of Battery Bank and Cell Connections, Revision 6,
dated November 2, 1995, and PM-411, Disassembly, Cleaning,
Assembly, and Testing of A and B Station Battery Cell Connections,
Revision 6, dated October 6, 1995. The procedures stated the
acceptance criteria for measured resistance was 50 microohms,
whereas the vendor calculations specified that the resistance of B
station battery may not exceed 50 microohms and the A station bat
tery resistance may not exceed 34 microohms. The requirements for
installation (torque) of intercell connections and mechanical
cable connections and the thickness of the intercell connectors
specified in PM-411 conflicted with requirements specified in
vendor technical manuals.
The NRC design team and the inspectors concluded that none of the
above examples resulted in inoperable equipment or constituted an
unreviewed safety question. The above examples of failure to
correctly translate the design basis into specifications,
drawings, procedures and instructions was identified to the
licensee as additional examples of Apparent Violation item EEI
50-261/98-03-01.
Enclosure 2
17
E8.16 (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 50-261/97-201-24. Station Battery
B Rating
The NRC design team questioned an inconsistency in the station battery
"B"
discharge rates used in calculation number RNP-E-6.020. The
question concerned whether values on the manufacturer's published data
sheets was correct, or whether actual test data should be used as was
used in calculation number RNP-E-6.021 for sizing Battery"A". The
inspectors reviewed a letter from the vendor dated December 15, 1997,
that stated the published information was correct and verified by
testing. Therefore, the rating specified in calculation RNP-E-6.020 was
correct. The inspectors concluded that battery "B"
was sized correctly.
E8.17 (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-261/97-201-25, Field Flash Battery
Testing
The licensee performed a self-assessment January 3 - 6. 1996. for the
Station Blackout Program which was documented in Self Assessment Report
No. 96-04. The report~stated that the battery capacity testing and duty
cycle testing were not being performed on either DSDG (dedicated
shutdown diesel generator) battery. It recommended that testing be
developed. A self assessment followup. RESS Report No.96-04f, dated
March 4, 1997, noted that.the battery testing had not been developed.
The licensee had issued condition report CR 96-00188. dated January 24,
1996, to track the resolution of station blackout requirements for
technical, implementation and improvement items (including the
batteries). The followup report No. 96-.4f-stated the design basis
calculation for the DSDG field flash battery was in progress.
The NRC inspection conducted from April 7 through May 23, 1997,
identified from the licensee's followup report No.96-04f that the DSDG
battery testing had not been initiated. The DSDG was the alternate AC
source for the "station blackout". At that time, the NRC inspection
team concluded that the licensee could not verify the availability or
operability of either the DSDG or the battery because it was not
incorporated into a testing program.
The inspectors verified that the licensee had completed calculations
RNP-E-6.028. "DS Battery Sizing Calculation" and RNP-E-6.029, "DSDG
Battery Sizing Calculation" that demonstrated the adequacy of the
battery. The licensee was also performing a monthly surveillance test
per operation procedure OST-910, Dedicated Shutdown Diesel Generator
(Monthly), Revision 19, dated December 23, 1997. to verify operability
of the DSDG. Two new testing procedures had been developed to verify
operability of the batteries, PM-449, "Dedicated Shutdown Field Flash
Battery Service Test" and PM-452, "Dedicated Shutdown UPS Battery
Enclosure 2
18
Service Test". The inspectors concluded the licensee had initiated
appropriate corrective action for this concern.
E8.18 (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-261/97-201-27, Control of Calculations
During review of design calculations, the NRC design team
identified examples where calculations that performed the same
analysis used different input data and/or reached different
conclusions. These examples, which were documented in Section
E1.5.2.1 of IR 50-261/98-03, were as follows:
Discrepancies were identified in calculation numbers RNP-I/INST
1015, Revision 0, dated December 22, 1990, and 84065-M-06-F.
Revision 3, dated January 14, 1991. for the condensate storage
tank level at which to change the AFW pump suction supply to the
service water system. Calculation RNP-I/INST-1015 shows a 10
percent level, whereas calculation 84065-M-06-F shows a 15 percent
level.
Calculation numbers 789M-M-02, Revision 0, dated December 15,
1989. 789M-M-05,.Revision 0, dated December 18, 1989, and RNP-E
6.002, Revision 0, dated December 1, 1987, were not identified as
voided or superseded when replaced by other calculations.
A calculation in ESR-00474, Revision 0. dated August 19, 1996.
which evaluated whether failure of a non-seismic pipe would affect
water supply to the safety injection pumps was not design
verified.
None of the above examples resulted in equipment being inoperable
or outside the design basis. The examples were minor errors which
did not result in a USQ. The above discrepancies were determined
to be additional examples of failure to comply with the
requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design
Control.
These were identified to the licensee as additional
examples of Apparent Violation item EEI 50-261/98-03-01.
V. MANAGEMENT MEETINGS
The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee
management at the conclusion of the inspection on January 9 and
January 30, 1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
The licensee did not identify any materials used during the inspection
as proprietary information.
Enclosure 2
19
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
J. Boska, Manager, Operations
H. Chernoff, Supervisor, Licensing/Regulatory Programs
T. Cleary, Manager, Maintenance
T. Clements, Superintendent, Design Control Unit, Nuclear
Engineering Department
R. Duncan, Manager, Robinson Engineering Support Section (RESS)
W. Farmer, Supervisor, ECCS, RESS
J. Fletcher, Superintendent, Mechanical Systems, RESS
J. Keenan, Vice-President, Robinson Plant
J. Moyer, Plant General Manager
J. Snelson, I&C Supervisor, RESS
T. Wilkerson, Manager, Regulatory Affairs
Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, and
administrative personnel.
NRC
J. Lenahan, Reactor Inspector
M. Miller, Reactor Inspector
B. Desai, Senior Resident Inspector
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP 37550:
Engineering
IP 92903:
Followup - Engineering
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
50-261/98-03-01
Inadequate Design Control (Paragraphs E8.2,
E8.9, E8.15 and E8.18)
50-261/98-03-02
Inadequate Corrective Actions to Resolve
Instrument Line Slope Deficiencies (Paragraph
E8.3)
50-261/98-03-03
Failure to Report PCT Changes (Paragraphs E8.5)
Enclosure 2
20
50-261/98-03-04
EEl
SI Pumps Inoperable Due to Inadequate NPSH
(Paragraphs E8.7)
50-261/98-03-05
Failure to Comply with 10 CFR 50.59 for
Modifications to Two Valves Under ESR 9600012
(Paragraph E8.10)
50-261/98-03-06
Failure to Provide Accurate Information NRC on
Cable Separation for SI Pumps (Paragraph E8.11)
Closed
50-261/97-201-02 URI
Single Failure of CST Level
Instrumentation (Paragraph E8.1)
50-261/97-201-03 URI
Design Verification for Calculations
(Paragraph E8.2)
50-261/97-201-04 URI
Instrument Sensing Line Slope.(Paragraph E8.3)
50-261/97-201-06 URI
Notification of Changes in PCI (Paragraph E8.4)
50-261/97-201-07 URI
Reporting of Significant Changes in PCT
0
(Paragraph E8.5)
50-261/97-201-09 URI
SI, RHR, and CS Pump NPSH (Paragraph E8.7
50-261/97-201-10 URI
SI Valve Testing (Paragraph E8.8)
50-261/97-201-11
IFI
Classification of Valves in IST (Paragraph E8.9)
50-261/97-201-12 URI
10 CFR 50.59 Screening Deficiency (Paragraph
E8. 10)
50-261/97-201-14 URI
SI Cable Separation Discrepancy (Paragraph
[8. 11)
50-261/97-201-16 IFI
Seismic Qualification of 480 V AC Circuit
Breakers (Paragraph E8.12)
20-261/97-201-17 URI
SI Accumulator Pressure Alarm Setpoint
(Paragraph E8.13)
50-261/97-201-18 URI
RWST Level Instrument Uncertainty (Paragraph
E8.14)
0lEnclosure
2
21
50-261/97-201-21 URI
Translation of Design Bases into
Drawings, Procedures, and Installed Components
(Paragraph E8.15)
50-261/97-201-24 IFI
Station Battery B Rating (Paragraph E8.16)
50-261/97-201-25 URI
Field Flash Battery Testing (Paragraph E8.17)
50-261/97-201-27 URI
Control of Calculations (Paragraph E8.18)
Discussed
50-261/97-201-08 IFI
Evaluation of Transfer to Cold Leg
Recirculation .(Paragraph E.8.6)
Enclosure 2
Enclosure 3
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Enforcement Policy Statement
This document compiles the "General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC
Enforcement Actions," (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600, published June 30, 1995, and
the various amendments to the Enforcement Policy approved by the Commission through
September 10, 1997. It is the staffs inteht to republish NUREG-1600 later this year. Pending
that republication, the Office of Enforcement is issuing this interim compilation of all
amendments to the Policy since it was last published. This document is also accessible on the
Internet at: www.nrc.gov/OE.
The amendments to the Policy were published in the Federal Register as follows:
Federal
Subittl
Register
Dat=
Adjustment of Civil Monetary Penalties
61FR53553
10/11/96
Departures from FSAR
61FR54461
10/18/96
Commission consultation, Open Enforcement
Conferences; risk; NCVs
61FR65088
12/10/96
Part 20, Exceedance of dose constraints
61FR65128
12/10/96
Correction as to exercise of discretion
61FR68070
12/26/96
Gaseous Diffusion Plants; NRC organizational
changes; Commission consultation
62FR06677
02/12/97
Participation in enforcement conferences
involving discrimination
62FR13906
03/24/97
Part 34, Radiography, examples of
62FR28974
05/28/97
potential violations
Corrections to Part 34 examples
62FR33447
06/19/97
Enforcement conference clarification
62FR52577
10/08/97
The Enforcement Policy is a general statement of policy explaining the NRC's policies and
procedures in initiating enforcement actions, and of the presiding officers and the Commission
in reviewing these actions. This policy statement is applicable to enforcement in matters
involving the radiological health and safety of the public, includin employees' health and
safety, the common defense and security, and the environment. This statement of general
policy and procedures is published to provide widespread. dissemination of the Commission's
Enforcement Policy. However, this is a policy statement and not a regulation. The
Commission may deviate from this statement of policy and procedure as appropriate under the
S
circumstances of a particular case.
Compilation of NRC Enforcement Policy as of September 10, 1997
WN ERAL STATEMENT OF POLICY
XI. REFERRALS TO THE DEPARTMENT
Consistent with the purpose of this
AND PROCEDURE FOR NRC
OF JUSTICE
program, prompt and vigorous
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
XII. PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF
enforcement action will be taken when
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
dealing with licensees, vendors,
Table of Contents
XI. REOPENING CLOSED
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
Preface
SUPPLEMENTS
do not achieve the necessary
meticulous attention to detail and the
I. INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE
PREFACE
high standard of compliance which the
II. STATUTORY AUTHORITY
NRC expects.'
Each enforcement
A. Statutory Authority
The following statement of general
action is dependent on'the
B. Procedural Framework
policy and procedure explains the
circumstances of the case and requires
M. RESPONSIBILITIES
enforcement policy and procedures of the
the exercise of discretion after
IV. SEVERITY OF VIOLATIONS
A. Aggregation of Violations
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
consideration of this enforcement
B. Repetitive Violations
(NRC or Commission) and the NRC staff
policy. In no case, however, will
C. Willful Violations
(staff) in initiating enforcement actions,
licensees who cannot achieve and
D. Violations of Reporting Requirements
and of the presiding officers and the
maintain adequate levels of protection
V. PI8DECISIONAL ENFORCEMENT
Commission in reviewing these actions.
be permitted to conduct licensed
CONFERENCES
C
VI. ENFORCEMENT
This statement is applicable to
activities.
A. Notice
ation
enforcement in matters involving the
B. Civileolti
radiological health and safety of the
Pa.
STATUTORY AUTHORITY AND
B. B Civil Penalty
I. Base Civil Penalty
public, including employees' health and
PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORK.
2. Civil Penalty Assessment
safety, the common defense and security,
A. Stuory Authonly
Initial Escalated Action
and the environment.' This statement of
Credit for Actions Related to
general policy and procedure will be
Identification
published as NUREG-1600to provide
The NRC's enforcement jurisdiction
c. Credit for Prompt and Comprehensive
widespread dissemination of the
drawn from the Atomic Energy Act
Corrective Action
Commission's Enforcement Policy,
of 1954, as amended, and the Energy
d. Exercise of Discretion
However, this is a policy statement and
Reorganization Act (ERA) of 1974, as
C. Orders
D. Related Administrative Actions
not a regulation. The Commission may
VII. EXERCISE OF DISCRETION
deviate from this statement of policy and
A. Escalation of Enforcement Sanctions
procedure as appropriate under the
I. Civil Penalties
circumstances of a particular case.
The term "vendor" as used in
2. Orders
2.
Odersthis
policy means a supplier of
3. Daily Civil Penalties
1. INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE
B. Mitigation of Enforcement Sanctions
1. Licensee-Identified Severity Level IV
The purpose of the'NRC enforcement
NRC-licensed faciity or activity.
Violations
2. Violations Identified During Extended
This policy primarily addresses
Shutdowns or Work Stoppages
safety mission in protecting the public and
the activities of NRC licensees and
3. Violations Involving Old Design Issues
the environment. Consistent with that
4. Violations Identified Due to Previous
purpose, enforcement action should be
apinfor
NRC
license
Escalated Enforcement Action
used:
used throughout the policy. However,
5. Violations Involving Discrimination
0 As a deterrent to emphasize the
6. Violations Involving Special
importance of compliance with
deteines hat t
r
Circumstances
requirements, and
C. Exercise of Discretion for an Operating
0 To encourage prompt identification and
take enforcement action against a
Facility
non-licensee or individual, the
VIII. ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
, comprehensive correction of
guidance in this policy will be used,
INVOLVING INDIVIDUALS
violations.
IfkNACCURATE AND INCOMPLETE
a
plcbe
pcfcgiac
NACCRATEAND NCOMLETEregarding
enforcement action against
FORMATION
FORCEMENT
individuals and non-licensees is
ACTIONIAGAINST.
Antitrust enforcement matters will
addressed in Sections VIII and X,
be dealt with on a case-by-case basis.
respectively.
Thi
satmet
s ppicbl t
Questions concerning the Enforcement Policy should be directed to the NRC's Office of
Enforcement at (301) 415-2741.
James Lieberman, Director
Office of Enforcement
Compilation of NRC Enforcement Policy as of September 10, 1997
ction 161 of the Atomic Energy Act
the Act and regulations or orders issued
order may request a hearing. The
thorizes the NRC to conduct
under sections 65, 161(b), .161(i). or 161(o)
NRC is authorized to make orders
inspections and investigations and to
of the Act. Section 223 provides that
immediately effective if required to
issue orders as may be necessary or
criminal penalties may be imposed on
protect the public health, safety, or
desirable to promote the common
certain individuals employed by firms
interest, or if the violation is willful.
defense and security or to protect health
constructing or supplying basic components
Section 2.204 sets out the procedures
or to minimize danger to life or
of any utilization facility if the individual
for issuing a Demand for Information
property. Section 186 authorizes the
knowingly and willfully violates NRC
(Demand) to a licensee or other person
NRC to revoke licenses under certain
requirements such that a basic component
subject to the Commission's
circumstances (e~g., for material false
could be significantly impaired. Section
jurisdiction for the purpose of
statements, in response to conditions
235 provides that criminal penalties may be
determining whether an order or other
that would have warranted refusal of a
imposed on persons who interfere with
enforcement action should be issued.
license on an original application, for a
inspectors. Section 236 provides that
The Demand does not provide hearing
licensee's failure to build or operate a
criminal penalties may be imposed on
rights, as only information is being
facility in accordance with the terms of
persons who attempt to or cause sabotage at
sought. A licensee must answer a
the permit or license, and for violation
a nuclear facility or to nuclear fuel.
Demand. An unlicensed person may
of an NRC regulation). Section 234
Alleged or suspected criminal violations of
answer a Demand by either providing
autholzes the NRC to impose civil
the Atomic Energy Act are referred to the
the requested information or explaining
penalties not to exceed $100,000 per
Department of Justice for appropriate
why the Demand should not have been
violation per day for the violation of
action.
issued.
certain specified licensing provisions of
the Act, rules, orders, and license terms
B. Procedural Framework
M. RESPONSEBIMUS
implementing these provisions, and for
violations for which licenses can be
Subpart B of 10 CFR Part 2 of NRC's
The Executive Director for
e
ked. In addition to the enumerated
regulations sets forth the procedures the
Operations (EDO) and the principal
isions in section 234, sections 84
NRC uses in exercising its enforcement
enforcement officer of the NRC, the
and 147 authorize the imposition of civil
authority. 10 CFR 2.201 sets forth the
Deputy Executive Director for
penalties for violations of regulations
procedures for issuing notices of violation.
Regulatory Effectiveness; hereafter
implementing those provisions. Section
The procedure to be used in assessing
referred to as the Deputy Executive
232 authorizes the NRC to seek
civil penalties is set forth in 10 CFR 2.205.
Director, has been delegated the
injunctive or other equitable relief for
This regulation provides that the civil
authority to approve or issue a
violation of regulatory requirements.
penalty process is initiated by issuing a
escalated enforcement actions. 4 The
Section 206 of the Energy
Notice of Violation and Proposed
Deputy Executive Director is
Reorganization Act authorizes the NRC
Imposition of a Civil Penalty. The licensee
responsible to the EDO for the NRC
to impose civil penalties for knowing
or other person is provided an opportunity
enforcement program. The Office of
and conscious failures to provide certain
to contest in writing the proposed
Enforcement (QE) exercises oversight
safety information to the NRC.
imposition of a civil penalty. After
of and implements the NRC
Notwithstanding the $100,000 limit
evaluation of the response, the civil penalty
enforcement program. The Director,
stated in the Atomic Energy Act, the
may be mitigated, remitted, or imposed.
OE, acts for the Deputy Executive
Commission may impose higher civil
An opportunity is provided for a hearing if
Director in enforcement matters in his
penalties as provided by the Debt
a civil penalty is imposed. If a civil penalty
absence or as delegated.
Collection Improvement Act of 1996.
is not paid following a hearing or if a
Subject to the oversight and direction
Under the Act, the Commission is'
hearing is not requested, the matter may be
of OE, and with the approval of the
required to modify civil monetary
referred to the U.S. Department of Justice
Deputy Executive Director, where
penalties to reflect inflation. The
to institute a civil action in District Court.
adjusted maximum civil penalty amount
The procedure for issuing an order to
is reflected in 10 CFR 2.205 and this
institute a proceeding to modify, suspend,
The term "escalated enforcement
Policy Statement.
or revoke'a license or to take other action
action' as used in this policy means a
Chapter 18 of the Atomic Energy Act
against a licensee or other personsubject to
des for varying levels of criminal
the jurisdiction of the Commission is set
ies (i.e., monetary fines andI,
II, or I
th
n
rviolation
(or problem) or any order
imprisonment) for willful violations of
any other person adversely affected by the
based upon a violation.
-2 -
Compilation of NRC Enforcement Policy as of September 10, 1997
necessary, the regional offices normally
provided notice the first time that discretion
In considering the significance of a
issue Notices of Violation and proposed
is exercised for a plant meeting the criteria
violation, the staff considers the
0
civil penalties. However, subject to the
of Section VII.B.2. In addition, the
technical significance, i.e., actual and
same oversight as the regional offices,
Commission will be consulted prior to
potential consequences, and the
the Office of Nuclear Reactor
taking action in the following situations
regulatory significance. In evaluating
Regulation (NRR) and the Office of
(unless the urgency of the situation dictates
the technical significance, risk is an
Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
immediate action):
appropriate consideration.
I
(NMSS) may also issue Notices of
(1) An action affecting a licensee's
Consequently, for purposes of formal
Violation and proposed civil penalties
operation that requires balancing the public
enforcement action, violations are
for certain activities. Enforcement
health and safety or common defense and
normally categorized in terms of four
orders are normally issued by the
security implications of not operating with
levels of severity to show their relative
Deputy Executive Director or the
the potential radiological or other hazards
importance within each of the
Director, OE. However, orders may
associated with continued operation;
following eight activity areas:
also be issued by the EDO, especially
(2) Proposals to impose a civil penalty
those involving the more significant
for a single violation or problem that is
I.
Reactor Operations;
matters. The Directors of NRR and
greater than 3 times the Severity Level 1
11.
Facility Construction;
NMSS have also been delegated
value shown in Table 1A for that class of
III.
Safeguards;
authofity to issue orders, but it is
licensee;
IV.
Health Physics;
expected that normal use of this
(3) Any proposed enforcement action that
V.
Transportation;
authority by NRR and NMSS will be
involves a Severity Level I violation;
VI.
Fuel Cycle and Materials
confined to actions not associated with
(4) Any action the EDO believes
Operations;
compliance issues. The Director, Office
warrants Commission involvement;
VII. Miscellaneous Matters; and
of the Controller, has been delegated the
(5) Any proposed enforcement case
VIII. Emergency Preparedness.
authority to issue orders where licensees
involving an Office of Investigations (01)
violate Commission regulations by
report where the NRC staff (other than the
Licensed activities will be placed in
nonpayment of license and inspection
01 staff) does not arrive at the same
the activity area most suitable n light
fees.
conclusions as those in the 01 report
of the particular violation involved
In recognition that the regulation of
concerning issues of intent if the Director
including activities not directly covered
nuclear activities in many cases does not
of 01 concludes that Commission
by one of the above listed areas, e.g.,
lend itself to a mechanistic treatment,
consultation is warranted; and
export license activities. Within each
judgment and discretion must be
jugetan
iceio
utb
(6) Any proposed enforcement action on.
activity area, Severity Level I has been
exercised in determining the severity
which the Commission asks to be
assigned to violations that are the most
levels of the violations and the
consulted.
significant and Severity Level IV
appropriate enforcement sanctions,
violations are the least significant.
including the decision to issue a Notice
IV. SEVERITY OF VIOLATIONS
Severity Level I and II violations are of
of Violation, or to propose or impose a
very significant regulatory concern. In
civil penalty and the amount of this
Regulatory requirements' have varying
general, violations that are included in
penalty, after considering the general
degrees of safety, safeguards, or
these severity categories involve actual
principles of this statement of policy and
environmental significance. Therefore, the
or high potential impact on the public.
the technical significance of the
relative importance of each violation,
Severity Level III violations are cause
violations and the surrounding
including both the technical significance
for significant regulatory concern.
circumstances.
and the regulatory significance, is evaluated
Severity Level IV violations are less
Unless Commission consultation or
as the first step in the enforcement process.
serious but are of more than minor
notification is required by this policy,
concern; i.e., if left uncorrected, they
the NRC staff may depart, where
could lead to a more serious concern.
warranted in the public's interest, from
The Commission recognizes that there
this policy as provided in Section VII,
are other violations of minor safety or
"Exercise of Enforcement Discretion.
The term "requirement' as used in
environmental concern which are
The Commission will be provided
this policy means a legally binding
below the level of significance of
written notification of all enforcement
Severity Level IV violations. These
actions involving civil penalties or
rieent
suchn
a se
regulation,
minor violations are not the subject of
orders. The Commission will also be
econ
l
p
io
o
formal enforcement action and are not
odeah a
seurtyimliaton
f otoprain3wt
Compilation of NRC Enforcement Policy as of September 10, 1997
ly described in inspection reports.
contributed to or were unavoidable
licensees and their contractors,
the extent such violations are
consequences of the underlying problem.
employees, and agents acting with
described, they are noted as Non-Cited
Normally, Severity Level 11 and III
integrity and communicating with
Violations.'
violations are not aggregated into a higher
candor. Willful violations cannot be
Comparisons of significance between
severity level.
tolerated by either the Commission or a
activity areas are inappropriate. For
The purpose of aggregating violations is to
licensee. Licensees are expected to
example, the immediacy of any hazard
focus the licensee's attention on the
take significant remedial action in
to the public associated with Severity
fundamental underlying causes for which
responding to willful violations
Level I violations in Reactor Operations
enforcement action appears warranted and
commensurate with the circumstances
is not directly comparable to that
to reflect the fact that several violations
such that it demonstrates the
associated with Severity Level I
with a common cause may be more
seriousness of the violation thereby
violations in Facility Construction.
significant collectively than individually and
creating a deterrent effect within the
Supplements I through VIII provide
may therefore, warrant a more substantial
licensee's organization. Athough
examples and serve as guidance in
enforcement action.
removal of the person is not necessarily
determining the appropriate severity
required, substantial disciplinary action
level for violations in each of the eight
B. Repetitive Violations
is expected.
activity areas. However, the examples
Therefore, the severity level of a
are neither exhaustive nor controlling.
The severity level of a Severity Level IV
violation may be increased if the
In addition, these examples do not
violation may be increased to Severity
circumstances surrounding the matter
create new requirements. Each is
Level III, if the violation can be considered
involve careless disregard of
designed to illustrate the significance
a repetitive violation.' The purpose of
requirements, deception, or other
that the NRC places on a particular type
escalating the severity level of a repetitive
indications of willfulness. The term
of violation of NRC requirements.
violation is to acknowledge the added
.willfulness" as used in this policy
Each of the examples in the supplements
significance of the situation based on the
embraces a spectrum of violations
Aft redicated on a violation of a
licensee's failure to implement effective
ranging from deliberate intent to
llatory requirement.
.corrective
action for the previous violation
violate or falsify to and including
The NRC reviews each case being
The decision to escalate the severity level
careless disregard for requirements.
considered for enforcement action on its
of a repetitive violation will depend on the
Willfulness does not include acts which
own merits to ensure that the severity of
circumstances, such as, but not limited to,
do not rise to the level of careless
a violation is characterized at the level
the number of times the violation has
disregard, e.g., inadvertent clerical
best suited to the significance of the
occurred, the similarity of the violations
eors in a document submitted to the
particular violation. In some cases,
and their root causes, the adequacy of
NRC. In determining the specific
special circumstances may warrant an
previous corrective actions, the period of
severity level of a violation involving
adjustment to the severity level
time between the violations, and the
willfulness, consideration will be given
categorization.
significance of the violations,
to such factors as the position and
responsibilities of the person involved
A. Aggregation of Violations
C. Willful Violatrions
in the violation (e.g., licensee official'
A group of Severity Level IV
Willful violations are by definition of
violations may be evaluated in the
particular concer
to the Commission
The term "licensee official as
aggregate and assigned a single,
because its regulatory program is based on
~sdi hsplc ttmn
en
increased severity level, thereby
first-line supervisor or above, a
resulting in a Severity Level III
licensed individual, a radiation safety
problem, if the Violations have the same
The term "repetitive violation" or
officer, or an authorized user of
fundamental undelyin case forgrwhichi
underlying
cause or programmaticnfsimilar violation" as used in this policy
licensed material whether or not listed
deficiencies, or the violations
statement means a violation that reasonably
on a license. Notwithstanding an
____________________
could have been prevented by a licensee's
individual's job title, severity level
corrective action for a previous violation
categorization for willful acts involving
AsNon-Cited Violation (NCV) is a
normally occurring (1) within the past 2
individuals who can be considered
ation that has not been formalized
years of the inspection at issue, or (2) the
licensee officials will consider several
o'a 10 CFR 2.201 Notice of
period within the last two inspections,
factors, including the position of the
Violation.
whichever is longer,
individual relative to the licensee's
-4-
Compilation of NRC Enforcement Policy as of September 10, 1997
or non-supervisory employee), the
Whenever the NRC has learned of the
the regional offices and are normally
significance of any underlying violation,
existence of a potential violation for.which
open to public observation.
the intent of the violator (i.e., careless
escalated enforcement action appears to be
Conferences will not normally be open
disregard or deliberateness), and the
.
warranted, or recurring nonconformance on
to the public if the enforcement action
economic or other advantage, if any,
the part of a vendor, the NRC may provide
being contemplated.
gained as a result of the violation. The
an opportunity for a predecisional
(I) Would be taken against an
relative weight given to each of these
enforcement conference with the licensee,
individual, or if the action, though not
factors in arriving at the appropriate
vendor, or other person'before taking
taken against an individual, turns on
severity level will be dependent on the
enforcement action. The purpose of the
whether an individual has committed
circumstances of the violation.
conference is to obtain information that will
wrongdoing;
However, if a licensee refuses to correct
assist the NRC in determining the
(2) Involves significant personnel
a minor violation within a reasonable
appropriate enforcement action, such as:
failures where the NRC has requested
time such that it willfully continues, the
(1) a common understanding of facts, root
that the individual(s) involved be
violation should be categorized at least
causes and missed opportunities associated
present at the conference;
at a Severity Level IV.
with the apparent violations, (2) a common
(3) Is based on the findings of an
understanding of corrective actions taken or
NRC Office of Investigations report
D. Violations of Reporting
planned, and (3) a common understanding
that has not been publicly disclosed; or
Requifements
of the significance of issues and the need
(4) Involves safeguards information,
for lasting comprehensive corrective action.
Privacy Act information, or
The NRC expects licensees to provide
If the NRC concludes that it has sufficient
information which could be considered
complete, accurate; and timely
information to make an informed
proprietary;
information and reports. Accordingly,
enforcement decision, a conference will not
In addition, conferences will not
unless otherwise categorized in the
normally be held unless the licensee
normally be open to the public if:
Supplements, the severity level of a
requests it. However, an opportunity for a
(5) The conference involves medical
violation involving the failure to make a
conference will normally be provided
misadministrations or overexposures
required report to the NRC will be
before issuing an order based on a violation
and the conference cannot be conductedO
based upon the significance of and the
of the rule on Deliberate Misconduct or a
without disclosing the exposed
circumstances surrounding the matter
civil penalty to an unlicensed person. If a
individual's name; or
that should have been reported.
conference is not held, the licensee will
(6) The conference will be conducted
However, the severity level of an
normally be requested to provide a written
by telephone or the conference will be
untimely report, in contrast to no report,
response to an inspection report, if issued,
conducted at a relatively small
may be reduced depending on the
as to the licensee's views on the apparent
licensee's facility.
circumstances surrounding the matter.
violations and their root causes and a
Notwithstanding meeting any of these
A licensee will not normally be cited for
description of planned or implemented
criteria, a conference may still be open
a failure to report a condition or event
corrective actions.
if the conference involves issues related
unless the licensee was actually aware of
During the predecisional enforcement
to an ongoing adjudicatory proceeding
the condition or event that it failed to
conference, the licensee, vendor, or other
with one or more intervenors or where
report. A licensee will, on the other
persons will be given an opportunity to
the evidentiary basis for the conference
hand, normally be cited for a failure to
provide information consistent with the
is a matter of public record, such as an
report a condition or event if the
purpose of the conference, including an
adjudicatory decision by the
licensee knew of the information to be
explanation to the NRC of the immediate
Department of Labor. In addition,
reported, but did not recognize that it
corrective actions (if any) that were taken
notwithstanding the above normal
was required to make a report.
following identification of the potential
criteria for opening or closing
violation or nonconformance and the long-
conferences,- with the approval of the
V. PREDECISIONAL ENFORCEMENT
term comprehensive actions that were taken
Executive Director for Operations,
CONFERENCES
or will be taken to prevent recurrence.
conferences may either be open or
Licensees, vendors, or other persons will
closed to the public after balancing the
be told when a meeting is a predecisional
benefit of the public's observation
organizational structure and the
enforcement conference.
against the potential impact on the
indvidal'
reponiblites elaiveto
A predecisional enforcement conference is
agency's decision-making process in a
individual's responsibilities relative to
a meeting between the NRC and the
particular case.
thermally
held in
The NRC will notify the licensee that
the use of licensed materiale
ofen
re n
an pprtniy ora reecsina
Compilation of NRC Enforcement Policy as of September 10, 1997
conference will be open to public
For a case in which an NRC Office of-
there is a full adjudicatory record
observation. Consistent with the
Investigations (01) report finds that
befote the Department of Labor. If a
agency's policy on open meetings,
discrimination as defied under 10 CFR
conference is held in such cases,
"Staff Meetings Open to Public,"
50.7 (or similar provisions in Parts 30, 40,
generally the conference will focus on
published September 20, 1994 (59 FR
60, 70, or 72) has occurred, the 01 report
the licensee's corrective action. As
48340), the NRC intends to announce
may be made public, subject to withholding
with discrimination cases based on 01
open conferences normally at least 10
certain information (i.e., after appropriate
investigations, the complainant may be
working days in advance of conferences
redaction), in which case the associated
allowed to participate.
through (1) notices posted in the Public
predecisional enforcement conference will
Members of the public attending open
Document Room, (2) a toll-free
normally be open to public observation. In
conferences will be reminded that (1)
telephone recording at 800-952-9674,
a conference where a particular individual
the apparent violations discussed at
(3) a toll-free electronic bulletin board
is being considered potentially responsible
predecisional enforcement conferences
at 800-952-9676, and on the Worlo
for the discrimination, the conference will
are subject to further review and may
Wide Web at the NRC Office of
remain closed. In either case (i.e., whether
be subject to change prior to any
Enforcement homepage
the conference is open or closed), the
resulting enforcement action and (2)
(www.nrc.gov/OE). In addition, the
employee or former employee who was the
the statements of views or expressions
NRC pill also issue a press release and
subject of the alleged discrimination
of opinion made by NRC employees at
notify appropriate State liaison officers
(hereafter referred to as "complainant")
predecisional enforcement conferences,
that a predecisional enforcement
will normally be provided an opportunity to
or the lack thereof, are not intended to
conference has been scheduled and that
participate in the predecisional enforcement
represent final determinations or
it is open to public observation.
conference with the licensee/employer,
beliefs.
The public attending open conferences
This participation will normally be in the
When needed to protect the public
may observe but may not participate in
form of a complainant statement and
health and safety or common defense
e confetence. It is noted that the
comment on the licensee's presentation,
and security, escalated enforcement
inpo se of conducting open conferences
followed in turn by an opportunity for the
action, such as the issuance of an
W
ot to maximize public attendance,
licensee to respond to the complainant's
immediately effective order, will be
but rather to provide the public with
presentation. In cases where the
taken before the conference. In these
opportunities to be informed of NRC
complainant is unable to attend in person,
cases, a conference maybe held after
activities consistent with the NRC's
arrangements will be made for the
the escalated enforcement action is
ability to exercise its regulatory and
complainant's participation by telephone or
taken.
safety responsibilities. Therefore,
an opportunity given for the complainant to
members of the public will be allowed
submit a written response to the licensee's
VI. ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
access to the NRC regional offices to
presentation. If the licensee chooses to
attend open enforcement conferences in
forego an enforcement conference and,
This section describes the
accordance with the "Standard
instead, responds to the NRC's findings in
enforcement sanctions available to the
Operating Procedures for Providing
writing, the complainant will be provided
NRC and specifies the conditions under
Security Support For NRC Hearings and
the opportunity to submit written comments
which each may be used. The basic
Meetings," published November 1, 1991
on the licensee's response. For cases
enforcement sanctions are Notices of
(56 FR 56251). These procedures
involving potential discrimination by a
Violation, civil penalties, and orders of
provide that visitors may be subject to
contractor or vendor to the licensee, any
various types. As discussed further i
personnel screening, that signs, banners,
associated predecisional enforcement
Section VID related administrative
posters, etc., not larger than 18" be
conference with the contractor or vendor
actions such as Notices of
permitted, and that disruptive persons
would be handled similarly. These
Nonconformance, Notices of
may be removed. The open conference
arrangements for complainant participation
Deviation, Confirmatory Action
will be terminated if disruption
in the predecisional enforcement conference
Letters, Letters of Reprimand, and
interferes with a successful conference.
are not to be conducted or viewed in any
Demands for Information are used to
NRC's Predecisional Enforcement
respect as an adjudicatory hearing. The
supplement the enforcement program.
Conferences (whether open or closed)
purpose of the complainant's participation
In selecting the enforcement sanctions
ally will be held at the NRC's
is to provide information to the NRC to
or administrative actions, the NRC will
onal offices or in NRC Headquarters
assist it in its enforcement deliberations,
consider enforcement actions taken by
ces and not'in the vicinity of the
A predecisional enforcement conference
other Federal or State regulatory
licensee's facility.
may not need to be held in cases where
bodies having concurrent jurisdiction,
.6-
Compilation of NRC Enforcement Policy as of September 10, 1997
such as in transportation matters.
violations resulting from matters not within
1. Base Civil Penalty
Usually, whenever a violation of NRC
their control, such as equipment failures
requirements of more than a minor
that were not avoidable by reasonable
The NRC imposes different levels of
concern is identified, enforcement action
licensee quality assurance measures or
penalties for different severity level
is taken. The nature and extent of the
management controls. Generally, however,
violations and different classes of
enforcement action is intended to reflect
licensees are held responsible for the acts of
licensees, vendors, and other persons.
the seriousness of the violation involved.
their employees. Accordingly, this policy
Tables IA and lB show the base civil
For the vast majority of violations, a
should not be construed to excuse personnel
penalties for various reactor, fuel
Notice of Violation or a Notice of
errors.
cycle, materials, and vendor programs.
Nonconformance is the normal action.
(Civil penalties issued to individuals
B. Civil Penalty
are determined on a case-by-case
basis.) The structure of these tables
A civil penalty is a monetary penalty that
generally takes into account the gravity
A Notice of Violation is a written
may be imposed for violation of (I) certain
of the violation as a primary
notice setting forth one or more
specified licensing provisions of the Atomic
consideration and the ability to pay as a
violations of a legally binding
Energy Act or supplementary NRC rules or
secondary consideration. Generally,
requirement. The Notice of Violation
orders; (2) any requirement for which a
operations involving greate r nuclear
nornlly requires the recipient to
license may be revoked; or (3) reporting
material inventories and greater
provide a written statement describing
requirements under section 206 of the
potential consequences to the public
(1) the reasons for the violation or, if
Energy Reorganization Act. Civil penalties
and licensee employees receive higher
contested, the basis for disputing the
are designed to deter future violations both
civil penalties. Regarding the
violation; (2) corrective steps that have
by the involved licensee as well as by other
secondary factor of ability of various
been taken and the results achieved;
licensees conducting similar activities and
classes of licensees to pay the civil
(3) corrective steps that will be taken to
to emphasize the need for licensees to
penalties, it is not the NRCs intention
prevent recurrence; and (4) the date
identify violations and take prompt
that the economic impact of a civil
when full compliance will be achieved.
comprehensive corrective action.
penalty be so severe that it puts a
The NRC may waive all or portions of a
Civil penalties are considered for Severity
licensee out of business (orders, rather
written response to the extent relevant
Level III violations. In addition, civil
than civil penalties, are used when the
information has already been provided
penalties will normally be assessed for
intent is to suspend or terminate
to the NRC in writing or documented in
Severity Level I and 11 violations and
licensed activities) or adversely affects
an NRC inspection report.
The NRC
knowing and conscious violations of the
a licensee's ability to safely conduct
may require responses to Notices of
reporting requirements of section 206 of the
licensed activities. The deterrent effect
Violation to be under oath. Normally,
Energy Reorganization Act.
of civil penalties is best served when
responses under oath will be required
Civil penalties are used to encourage
the amounts of the penalties take into
only in connection with Severity Level
prompt identification and prompt and
account a licensee's ability to pay. In
I, II, or III violations or orders.
comprehensive correction of violations, to
determining the amount of civil
The NRC uses the Notice of Violation
emphasize compliance in a manner that
penalties for licensees for whom the
as the usual method for formalizing the
deters future violations, and to serve to
tables do not reflect the ability to pay
existence of a violation. Issuance of a
focus licensees' attention on violations of
or the gravity of the violation, the NRC
Notice of Violation is normally the only
significant regulatory concem.
will consider as necessary an increase
enforcement action taken, except in
Although management involvement, direct
or decrease on a case-by-case basis.
cases where the criteria for issuance of
or indirect, in a violation may lead to an
Normally, if a licensee can
civil penalties and orders, as set forth in
increase in the civil penalty, the lack of
demonstrate financial hardship, the
Sections VI.B and VI.C, respectively,
management involvement may not be used
NRC will consider payments over
are met. However, special
to mitigate a civil penalty. Allowing
time, including interest, rather than
circumstances regarding the violation
mitigation in the latter case could encourage
reducing the amount of the civil
findings may warrant discretion being
the lack of management involvement in
penalty. However, where a licensee
exercised such that the NRC refrains
licensed activities and a decrease in
claims financial hardship, the licensee
from issuing a Notice of Violation. (See
protection of the public health and safety.
will normally be required to address
Section VII.B, "Mitigation of
why it has sufficient resources to safely
Enforcement Sanctions.") In addition,
conduct licensed activities and pay
licensees'are not ordinarily cited for
license and inspection fees.
-7-
Compilation of NRC Enforcement Policy as of September 10, 1997
The civil penalty assessment process
associated considerations for any given
- Wcivil Penalty Assessment
considers four decisional points: (a)
case, the outcome of the assessment
whether the licensee has had any Previous
process for each violation or problem,
In an effort to (1) emphasize the
escalated enforcement action (regardless of
absent the exercise of discretion, is
importance of adherence to requirements
the activity area) during the past 2 years or
limited to one of the following three
and (2) reinforce prompt self-
past 2 inspections, whichever is longer;
results: no civil penalty, a base civil
identification of problems and root
(b) whether the licensee should be given
penalty, or a base civil penalty
causes and prompt and comprehensive
credit for actions related to identification;
escalated by 100%. The flow chart
correction of violations, the NRC
(c) whether the licensee's corrective actions
presented below is a graphic
reviews each proposed civil penalty on
are prompt and comprehensive; and (d)
representation of the civil penalty
its own merits and, after considering all
whether, in view of all the circumstances,
assessment process.
relevant circumstances, may adjust the
the matter in question requires the exercise
base civil penalties shown in Table 1A
of discretion. Although each of these
and lB for Severity Level I, II, and Ill
decisional points may have several
violations as described below.
- Stiouwhether thelcensee
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Compilation of NRC Enforcement Policy as of September 10, 1997
a. Initial Escalated Action.
consider the factor of identification in
those opportunities;
addition to corrective action (see the
(iii) Whether the problem was
W
When the NRC determines that a non-
discussion under Section VI.B.2.c, below).
revealed as the result of a licensee self
willful Severity Level III violation or
As to identification, the NRC should
monitoring effort, such as conducting
problem has occurred, and the licensee
consider whether the licensee should be
an audit, a test, a surveillance, a design
has not had my previous escalated
given credit for actions related to
review, or troubleshooting;
actions (regardless of the activity area)
identification.
(iv) For a problem revealed through
during the past 2 years or 2 inspections,
In each case, the decision should be
an event, the ease of discovery, and the
whichever is longer, the NRC will
focused on identification of the problem
degree of licensee initiative in
consider whether the licensee's
requiring corrective action. In other
identifying the root cause of the
corrective action for the present
words, although giving credit for
problem and any associated violations;
violation or problem is reasonably
Identfication and Corrective Action should
(v) For NRC-identified issues,
prompt and comprehensive (see the
be separate decisions, the concept of
whether the licensee would likely have
discussion under Section VI.B.2.c,
Identfication presumes that the identifier
identified the issue in the same time
below). Using 2 years as the basis for
recognizes the existence of a problem, and
period if the NRC had not been
assessment is expected to cover most
understands that corrective action is
involved;
situations, but considering a slightly
needed. The decision on Identification
(vi), For NRC-identified issues,
long&i or shorter period might be
requires considering all the circumstances
whether the licensee should have
warranted based on the circumstances of
of identification including:
identified the issue (and taken action)
a particular case. The starting point of
(i) Whether the problem requiring
earlier; and
this period should be considered the date
corrective action was NRC-identified,
(vii) For cases in which the NRC
when the licensee was put on notice of
licensee-identified, or revealed through an
identifies the overall problem requiring
the need to take corrective action. For a
event9;
corrective action (e.g., a programmatic
licensee-identified violation or an event,
(ii) Whether prior opportunities existed to
issue), the degree of licensee initiative
this would be when the licensee is aware
identify the problem requiring corrective
or lack of initiative in identifying the
that a problem or violation exists
action, and if so, the age and number of
problem or problems requiring
requiring corrective action. For an
corrective action.
NRC-identified violation, the starting
(2) Although some cases may
point would be when the NRC puts the
An event," as used here, means (1)
consider a of the above factors, the
licensee on notice, which could be
liceseeon
ntic, wich oul bean
event characterized by an active adverse
importance of each factor will vary
during the inspection, at the inspection
duigteisetontteiseto
impact on equipment or personnel, readily
based on the type of case as discussed
exit meeting, or as part of post-
obvious by human observation or
in the following general guidance:
inspection communication.
If te crreciveactin
i juded o b
instrumentation, or (2) a radiological(iLces-Intfd.W
na
If the corrective action is judged to be
problem requiring corrective action is
prompt and comprehensive, a Notice of
Violation normally should be issued
excess of regulatory limits, such as an
licensee-identified (i.e., identified
Vioatonnoraly hold e ssed
overexposure, a release of radioactive
before the problem has resulted in an
with no associated civil penalty. If the
material above NRC limits, or a loss of
event), the NRC should normally give
corrective action is judged to be less
the licensee credit for actions related to
than prompt and comprehensive, the
Noticemof
an ormally sh
e
equipment failure discovered through a spill
identification, regardless of whether
Notce f Volaionnorall shuldbe
of liquid, a loud noise, the failure to have a
prior opportunities existed to identify
issued with a base civil penalty.
system respond properly, or an annunciator
the problem.
alarm would be considered an event; a
(ii) Identified Through an Event.
b. Credit for Actions Related to
system discovered to be inoperable through
When a problem requiring corrective
Identification.
a document review would not. Similarly, if
action is identified through an event,
a liense dicovredthrugh uanrly
the decision on whether to give the
(1) If a Severity Level I or I1 i
licesedis
, throh q
a
licensee credit for actions related to
or a willful Severity Level III violation
been inadequately monitored for radiation
identification normally should consider
has occurred--or if, during the past 2
the issue would normally be considered
the ease of discovery, whether the
years or 2 inspections, whichever is
licensee-identified; however, if the same
event occurred as the result of a
longer, the licensee has been issued at
licensee self-monitoring effort (i.e.,
least one other escalated action--the civil
dosietr ran
disclose
an
V
overexposure, the issue would beh
penalty assessment should
et
the problem"), the degree of licensee
normallygnieredi for
event
identifcation
Compilation of NRC Enforcement Policy as of September 10, 1997
iative in identifying the problem or
matter would be treated as licensee-
employees and contractors, and failure
4Woblems requiring corrective action,
identified for purposes of assessing the civil
to take effective corrective steps. It
and whether prior opportunities existed
penalty. In such cases, the question of
may include findings of the NRC, the
to identify the problem.
identification credit shifts to whether the
licensee, or industry made at .other
Any of these considerations may be
licensee should be penalized for NRC's
facilities operated by the licensee
overriding if particularly noteworthy or
identification of the problem.
where it is reasonable to expect the
particularly egregious. For example, if
(iv) Mixed Identification. For "mixed"
licensee to take action to identify or
the event occurred as the result of
identification situations (i.e., where
prevent similar problems at the facility
conducting a surveillance or similar self-
multiple violations exist, some NRC-
subject to the enforcement action at
monitoring effort (i.e., the licensee was
identified, some licensee-identified, or
issue. In assessing this factor,
looking for the problem), the licensee
where the NRC prompted the licensee to
consideration will be given to, among
should normally be given credit for
take action that resulted in the identification
other things, the opportunities available
identification. As a second instance,
of the violation), the NRC's evaluation
to discoverthe violation, the ease of
even if the problem was easily
should normay determine whether the
discovery, the similarity between the
discovered (e.g., revealed by a large
licensee could reasonably have been
violation and the notification, the
spill of liquid), the NRC may choose to
expected to identify the violation in the
period of time between when the
give credit because noteworthy licensee
NRC's absence. This determination should
violation occurred and when the
effort (vas exerted in ferreting out the
consider, among other things, the timing of
notification was issued, the action
root cause and associated violations, or
the NRC's discovery, the information
taken (or planned) by the licensee in
simply because no prior opportunities
available to the licensee that caused the
response to the notification, and the
(e.g., procedural cautions, post-
NRC concern, the specificity of the NRC's
level of management review that the
maintenance testing, quality control
concern, the scope of the licensee's efforts,
notification received (or should have
failures, readily observable parameter
the level of licensee resources given to the
received).
trends, or repeated or locked-in
investigation, and whether the NRC's path
The evaluation of missed
Adb~inciator warnings) existed to identify
of analysis had been dismissed or was being
opportunities should normally depend
Wproblem.
pursued in parallel by the licensee,
on whether the information available to
(iii) NRC-Identified. When a
In some cases, the licensee may have
the licensee should reasonably have
problem requiring corrective action is
addressed the isolated symptoms of each
caused action that would have
NRC-identified, the decision on whether
violation (and may have identified the
prevented the violation. Missed
to give the licensee credit for actions
violations), but failed to recognize the
opportunities is normally not applied
related to identification should normally
common root cause and taken the necessary
where the licensee appropriately
be based on an additional question:
comprehensive action. Where this is true,
reviewed the opportunity for
should the licensee have reasonably
the decision on whether to give licensee
application to its activities and
identified the problem (and taken action)
credit for actions related to Identification
reasonable action was either taken or
earlier?
should focus on identification of the
planned to be taken within a reasonable
In most cases, this reasoning may be
problem requiring corrective action (e.g.,
tune.
based simply on the ease of the NRC
the programmatic breakdown). As such,
In some situations the missed
inspector's discovery (e.g., conducting a
depending on the chronology of the various
opportunity is a violation in itself. In
walkdown, observing in the control
violations, the earliest of the individual
these cases, unless the missed
room, performing a confirmatory NRC
violations might be considered missed
opportunity is a Severity Level III
radiation survey, hearing a cavitating
opportunities for the licensee to have
violation in itself, the missed
pump, or finding a valve obviously out
identified the larger problem.
opportunity violationmay be grouped
of position). In some cases, the
(v) Missed Oppornitiesto Identify.
with the other violations into a single
licensee's missed opportunities to
Missed opportunities include prior
Severity Level III "problem.'
identify the problem might include a
notifications or missed opportunities to
However, if the missed opportunity is
similar previous violation, NRC or
identify or prevent violations such as (1)
the only violation, then it should not
industry notices, internal audits, or
through normal surveillances, audits, or
normally be counted twice (i.e., both
readily observable trends.
quality assurance (QA) activities; (2)
as the violation and as a missed
fthe NRC identifies the violation but
through prior notice i.e., specific NRCor
opportunity--"double counting") unless
ludes that, under the circumstances,
industry notification; or (3) through other
the number of opportunities missed was
l icensee's actions related to
reasonable indication of a potential problem
particularly significant.
Identification were not unreasonable, the
or violation, such as observations of
The timing of the missed opportunity
-10-
Compilation of NRC Enforcement Policy as of September 10, 1997
should also be considered. While a rigid
In assessing this factor, consideration will
action that (1) addresses the broader
time-frame is unnecessary, a 2-year
be given to the timeliness of the corrective
environent for raising safety conceri
period should generally be considered
action (including the promptness in
in the workplace, and (2) provides a
for consistency in implementation, as
developing the schedule for long term
remedy for the particular
the period reflecting relatively current
corrective action), the adequacy of the
discrimination at issue.
performance.
licensees root cause analysis for the
In response to violations of 10 CFR
(3) When the NRC determines that the
violation, and, given the significance and
50.59, corrective action should
licensee should receive credit for actions
complexity of the issue, the
normally be considered prompt and
related to Identification, the civil penalty
comprehensiveness of the corrective action
comprehensive only if the licensee
assessment should normally result in
(i.e., whether the action is focused
(i) Makes a prompt decision on
either no civil penalty or a base civil
narrowly to the specific violation or broadly
operability; and either
penalty, based on whether Corrective
to the general area of concern). Even in
(ii) Makes a prompt evaluation under
Action is judged to be reasonably
cases when the NRC, at the time of the
10 CFR 50.59 if the licensee intends to
prompt and comprehensive. When the
enforcement conference, identifies
maintain the facility or procedure in the
licensee is not given credit for actions
additional peripheral or minor corrective
as found condition; or
related to Identification, the civil penalty
action still to be taken, the licensee may be
(iii) Promptly initiates corrective
assessment should normally result in a
given credit in this area, as long as the
action consistent with Criterion XVI of
Notice of Violation with.either a base
licensee's actions addressed the underlying
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, if it intends
civil penalty or a base civil penalty
root cause and are considered sufficient to
to restore the facility or procedure io
escalated by 100%, depending on the
prevent recurrence of the violation and
the FSAR description.
quality of Corrective Action, because the
similar violations.
licensee's performance is clearly not
Normally, the judgment of the adequacy
d. Exercise of Discretion.
acceptable.
of corrective actions will hinge on whether
the NRC had to take action to focus the
As provided in Section VII, "Eercise
c. Credit for Prompt and
licensee's evaluative and corrective process
of Discretion," discretion may b
Comprehensive Corrective Action.
in order to obtain comprehensive corrective
exercised by either escalating or
action. This will normally be judged at th~e
mitigating the amount of the civil
The purpose of the Corrective Action
time of the enforcement conference (e.g.,
penalty determined after applying the
factor is to encourage licensees to (1)
by outlining substantive additional areas
civil penalty adjustment factors to
take the immediate actions necessary
where corrective action is needed). Earlier
ensure that the proposed civil penalty
upon discovery of a violation that will
informal discussions between the licensee
reflects the NRC's concern regarding
restore safety and compliance with the
and NRC inspectors or management may
the violation at issue and that it
license, regulation(s), or other
result in improved corrective action, but
conveys the appropriate message to the
requirement(s); and (2) develop and
should not normally be a basis to deny
licensee. However, in no instance will
implement (in a timely manner) the
credit for Corrective Action. For cases in
a civil penalty for any one violation
lasting actions that will not only prevent
which the licensee does not get credit for
exceed SI 10,000 per day.
recurrence of the violation at issue, but
actions related to Identification because the
will be appropriately comprehensive,
NRC identified the problem, the assessment
TABLE IA-BASE CIVIL PENALTIES
given the significance and complexity of
of the licensee's corrective action should
the violation, to prevent occurrence of
begin from the time when the NRC put the
violations with similar root causes.
licensee on notice of the problem.
aePowerireactorsan
Regardless of other circumstances
Notwithstanding eventual good
b. Fuel fabricators, industrial
(e.g., past enforcement history,
comprehensive corrective 'ction, if
processors, and independent
identification), the licensee's corrective
immediate corrective action was not taken
s
fuel and monitored
actions should always be evaluated as
to restore safety and compliance once the
retrievable storage
wa ietiiecoretveacin
.installations...................
27,500
part of the civil penalty assessment
violation
Test reactors, mills and
process. As a reflection of the
Would not be considered prompt and
uranium conversion facilities.
importance given to this factor, an NRC
comprehensive,
contractors, vendors, waste
judmen tat he
icnse's orectve
orectve cton orviolations involving
disposal licensees, and
judgment that the licensee's correctiveradiographers..000
action has not been prompt and
discrimination should normally only be
d. Research reactors, academic.
comprehensive will always result in
considered comprehensive if the licensee
medical, or other material
issuing at least a base civil penalty.
takes prompt, comprehensive corrective
licensee
............... S5.500
be give to
th
tieineso
hcretv
Compilation of NRC Enforcement Policy as of September 10, 1997
This
legally authorized.
oppornity for a hearing on the order
othewis caeoie.nti almbl
ula
Suspensions may apply to al or part of
is afforded. -For cases in which the
otherwise categorized in this table, mobile nuclear
services, nuclear pharmacies, and physician
the licensed activity. Ordinarily, a licensed
NRC believes a basis could reasonably
offices.
activity is not suspended (nor is a
exist for not taking the action as
suspension prolonged) for failure to comply
proposed, the licensee will ordinarily
TABLE 1B-BASE CVL PENALTIES
with requirements where such failure is not
be afforded an opportunity to show
willful and adequate corrective action has
why the order should not be issued in
been taken.
the proposed manner by way of a *
Severity Level
Base Civil Penalty
3. Revocation Orders may be used:
Demand for Information. (See 10 CFR
Amount (Percent of amount
(a) When a licensee is unable or
2.204)
listed in Table IA)
___________________
unwilling to comply with NRC
I.......
..........
100%
requirements;
D. Related Administratve Actions
II.................. 80%
(b) When a licensee refuses to correct a
M ........................ 50%
m.........50%violation;
In addition to the formal enforcement
(c) When licensee does not respond to a
actions, Notices of Violation, civil
C. Orders
Notice of Violation where a response was
penalties, and orders, the NRC also
required;.
uses administrative actions, such as
An 6rder is a written NRC directive to
(d) When a licensee refuses to pay an
Notices of Deviation, Notices of
modify, suspend, or revoke a license; to
applicable fee under the Commission's
Nonconformance, Confirmatory Action
cease and desist from a given practice or
regulations; or
Letters, Letters of Reprimand, and
activity; or to take such other action as
(e) For any other reason for which
Demands for Information to
may be proper (see 10 CFR 2.202).
revocation is authorized under section 186
supplement its enforcement program.
Orders may also be issued in lieu of, or
of the Atomic Energy Act (e.g., any
The NRC expects licensees and
in addition to, civil penalties, as
condition which would warrant refusal of a
vendors to adhere to any obligations
opriate for Severity Level I, II, or
license on an original application).
and commitments resulting from these
iolations. Orders may be issued as
4. Cease and Desist Orders may be used
actions and will not hesitate toissue
oows:
to stop an unauthorized activity that has
'-
appropriate orders to ensure that these
1. License Modification orders are
continued after notification by the NRC that
obligations and commitments are met.
issued when some change in licensee
the activity is unauthorized.
1. Notices of Deviation are written
equipment, procedures, personnel, or
5. Orders to unlicensed persons,
notices describing a licensee's failure
management controls is necessary.
including vendors and contractors, and
to satisfy a commitment where the
2. Suspension Orders may be used:
employees of any of them, are used when
commitment involved has not been
(a) To remove a threat to the public
the NRC has identified deliberate
made a legally binding requirement. A
health and safety, common defense and
misconduct that may cause a licensee to be
Notice of Deviation requests a licensee
security, or the environment;
in violation of an NRC requirement or
to provide a written explanation or
(b) To stop facility construction when,
where incomplete or inaccurate information
statement describing corrective steps
(i) Further work could preclude or
is deliberately submitted or where the NRC
taken (or planned), the results
significantly hinder the identification or
loses its reasonable assurance that the
achieved, and the date when corrective
correction of an improperly constructed
licensee will meet NRC requirements with
action will be completed.
safety-related system or component; or
that person involved in licensed activities.
2. Notices of Nonconformance are
(ii) The licensee's quality assurance
Unless a separate response is warranted
written notices describing vendor's
program implementation is not adequate
pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, a Notice of
failures to meet commitments which
to provide confidence that construction
Violation need not be issued where an order
have not been made legally binding
activities are being properly carried out;
is based on violations described in the
requirements by NRC. An example is
(c) When the licensee has not
order. The violations described in an order
a commitment made in a procurement
responded adequately to other
need not be categorized by severity level,
contract with a licensee as required by
enforcement action;
Orders are made effective immediately,
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. Notices
(d) When the licensee interferes with
without prior opportunity for hearing,
e onduct of an inspection or
whe never it is determined that the public
stigation; or
health, interest, or safety. so requires, or
For any reason not mentioned
when the order is responding to a violation
above for which license revocation is
involving willfulness. Otherwise, a prior
- 12
Compilation of NRC Enforcement Policy as of September 10, 1997
of Nonconformances request
may apply its fall enforcement authority
identifies and reports the loss to the
non-licensees to provide written
where the action is warranted. NRC action
NRC, these cases should normally
0
explanations or statements describing
may include (1) escalating civil penalties,
result in a civil penalty in an amount at
corrective steps (taken or planned), the
(2) issuing appropriate orders, and
least in the order of the cost of an
results achieved, the dates when
(3) assessing civil penalties for continuing
authorized disposal of the material or
corrective actions will be completed,
violations on a per day basis, up to the
of the transfer of the material to an
and measures taken to preclude
statutory limit of $I 10,000 per violation,
authorized recipient; or
recurrence.
per day.
(h) Severity Level II or II violations
3. Confirmatory Action Letters are
1. Civil penalties. Notwithstanding the
associated with departures from the
letters confirming a licensee's or
outcome of the normal civil penalty
Final Safety Analysis Report identified
vendor's agreement to take certain
assessment process addressed in Section
after two years from October 18, 1996.
actions to remove significant concerns
VI.B, the NRC may exercise discretion by
Such a violation or problem would
about health and safety, safeguards, or
either proposing a civil penalty where
consider the number and nature of the
the environment.
application of the factors would otherwise
violations, the severity of the
4. Letters of Reprimand are letters
result in zero penalty or by escalating the
violations, whether the violations were
addressed to individuals subject to
amount of the resulting civil penalty (i.e.,
continuing, and who identified the
Commission jurisdiction identifying a
base or twice the base civil penalty) to
violations (and if the licensee identified
signifitant deficiency in their
ensure that the proposed civil penalty
the violation, whether exercise of
performance of licensed activities.
reflects the significance of the
Section VII.B.3 enforcement discretion
5. Demands for Information are
circumstances and conveys the appropriate
is warranted).
demands for information from licensees
regulatory message to the licensee.
The
2. Orders. The NRC may, where
or other persons for the purpose of
Commission will be notified if the deviation
necessary or desirable, issues orders in
enabling the NRC to determine whether
in the amount of the civil penalty proposed
conjunction with or in lieu of civil
an order or other enforcement action
under this discretion from the amount of the
penalties to achieve or formalize
should be issued.
civil penalty assessed under the normal
corrective actions and to deter further
process is more than two times the base
recurrence of serious violations.
VII. EXERCISE OF DISCRETION
civil penalty shown in Tables 1A and 1B.-
3. Daily civil penalties. In order to
Examples when this discretion should be
recognize the added technical safety
Notwithstanding the normal guidance
considered include, but are not limited to
significance or regulatory significance
contained in this policy, as provided in
the following:
for those cases where a very strong
Section III, "Responsibilities," the NRC
(a) Problems categorized at Severity
message is warranted for a significant
may choose to exercise discretion and
Level I or 11,
violation that continues for more than
either escalate or mitigate enforcement
(b) Overexposures, or releases of
one day, the NRC may exercise
sanctions within the Commission's
radiological material in excess of NRC
discretion and assess a separate
statutory authority to ensure that the
requirements;
violation and attendant civil penalty up
resulting enforcement action
(c) Situations involving particularly poor
to the statutory limit of S110,000 for
appropriately reflects the level of NRC
licensee performance, or involving
each day the violation continues. The
concern regarding the violation at issue
willfulness;
NRC may exercise this discretion if a
and conveys the appropriate message to
(d) Situations when the licensee's
licensee was aware or clearly should
the licensee,
previous enforcement history has been
have been aware of a violation, or if
paticularly poor, or when the current
the licensee had an opportunity to
A. Escalation of Enforcement Sanctions
violation is directly repetitive of an earlier
identify and correct the violation but
violation;
-failed
to do so.
The NRC considers violations
(e) Situations when the violation results
categorized at Severity Level I, II, or III
in a substantial increase in risk, including
B. Mitigation of Enforcement Sanctions
to be of significant regulatory concern.
cases in which the duration of the violation
If the application of the normal guidance
has contributed to the substantial increase;
The NRC may exercise discretion and
in this policy does not result in an
(f) Situations when the licensee made a
refrain from issuing a civil penalty
appropriate sanction, with the approval
conscious decision to be in noncompliance
and/or a Notice of Violation, if the
of the Deputy Executive Director and
in order to obtain an economic benefit;
outcome of the normal process
consultation with the EDO and
(a) Cases involving the loss of a source.
described in Section VI.B does not
Commission, as warranted, the NRC
In addition, unless the licensee self-
result in a sanction consistent with an
- 13
Compilation of NRC Enforcement Policy as of September 10, 1997
propriate regulatory message.
action committed to by the licensee by the
result of a comprehensive program for
owever, even if the NRC exercises
end of the inspection, including immediate
problem identification and correction
this discretion, when the licensee failed
corrective action and comprehensive
that was developed in response to the
to make a required report to the NRC, a
corrective action to prevent recurrence;
shutdown or identified as a result of an
separate enforcement action will
(d) It was not a willful violation or if it
employee allegation to the licensee; (If
normally be issued for the licensee's
was a willful violation;
the NRC dentifies the violation and all
failure to make a required report. The
(i) The information concering the
of the other criteria are met, the NRC
approval of the Director, Office of -
violation, if not required to be reported,
should determine whether enforcement
Enforcement, with consultation with the
was promptly provided to appropriate NRC
action is necessary to achieve remedial
Deputy Executive Director as
personnel, such as a resident ispector or
action, or if discretion may still be
warranted, is required for exercising
regional section or branch chief;
appropriate.)
discretion of the type described in
(ii) The violation involved the acts of a.
(b) It is based upon activities of the
Section VII.B. 1.b where a willful
low-level individual (and not a licensee
licensee prior to the events leading to
violation is involved, and of the types
official as defned in Section IV.C;
the shutdown;
described in Sections VII.B.2 through
(iii) The violation appears to be the
(c) It would not be categorized at a
VII.B.6.. Commission notification is
isolated action of the employee without
severity level higher than Severity
required for exercising discretion of the
management involvement and the violation
Level 11;
type ascribed in: (1)Section VII.B.2
was not caused by lack of management
(d) It was not willful; and
the first time discretion is exercised
oversight as evidenced by either a history
(e) The licensee's decision to restart
during that plant shutdown, and (2)
of isolated willful violations or a lack of
the plant requires NRC concurrence.
Section VII.B.6 where appropriate
adequate audits or supervision of
3. Violations Involving Old Design
based on the uniqueness or significance
employees; and
Issues. The NRC may refrain from
of the issue. Examples when discretion
(iv) Significant remedial action
proposing a civil penalty for a Severity
should be considered for departing from
commensurate with the circumstances was
Level II or III violation involving a
nlormal approach in Section VI.B
taken by the licensee such that it
past problem, such as in engineeng,
ude but are not limited to the
demonstrated the seriousness of the
design, or installation, provided that
Ilowing:
violationtoother employees and
the violation is documented in an
1. Licensee-Identified Severity Level
contractors, thereby creating a deterrent
inspection report (or official field notes
IV Violations. The NRC, with the
effect within the licensee's organization.
for some material cases) that includes a
approval of the Regional Administrator
Although removal of the employee from
description of the corrective action and
or his or her designee, may refrain from
licensed activities is not necessarily
that it meets all of the following
issuing a Notice of Violation for a
required, substantial disciplinary action is
criteria:
Severity Level IV violation that is
expected.
(a) It was a licensee-identified as a
documented in an inspection report (or
2. Violations Identified During Extended
result of its voluntary initiative;
official field notes for some material
Shutdowns or Work Stoppages. The NRC
(b) It was or will be corrected,
cases) and described therein as a Non-
may refrain from issuing a Notice of
including immediate corrective action
Cited Violation (NCV) provided that the
Violation or a proposed civil penalty for a
and long term comprehensive
inspection report includes a brief
violation that is identified after (i) the NRC
corrective action to prevent recurrence,
description of the corrective action and
has taken significant enforcement action
within a reasonable time following
that the violation meets all of the
based upon a major safety event
identification (this action should
following criteria:
contributing to an extended shutdown of an
involve expandingthe initiative, as
(a) It was identified by the licensee;
operating reactor or a material licensee (or
necessary, to identify other failures
(b) It was not a violation that could
a work stoppage at a construction site), or
caused by similar root causes); and
reasonably be expected to have been
(ii) the licensee enters an extended
(c) It was not likely tobe identified
prevented by the licensee's corrective
shutdown or work stoppage related to
(after the violation occurred) by routine
action for a previous violation or a
generally poor performance over a long
licensee efforts such as normal
previous licensee finding that occurred
period of time, provided that the violation
surveillance or quality assurance (QA)
within the past 2 years of the inspection
is documented in an inspection report (or
activities.
at issue, or the period within the last
official field notes for some material cases)
In addition, the NRC may refrain
inspections, whichever is longer;
and that it meets a of the following
from issuing a Notice of Violation for
It was or will be corrected within
criteria:
cases that meet the above criteria
a reasonable time, by specific corrective
(a) It was either licensee-identified as a
provided the violation was caused by
- 14-
Compilation of NRC Enforcement Policy as of September 10, 1997
conduct that is not reasonably linked to
after the NRC has taken escalated
that the matter was settled to the
present performance (normally,
enforcement action for a Severity Level 11
satisfaction of the employee (the terms*
violations that are at least 3 years old or
or III violation, provided that the violation
of the specific settement agreement
violations occurring during plant
is documented in an inspection report (or
need not be posted), and that, if the
construction) and there had not been
official field notes for some material cases)
DOL Area Office found
prior notice so that the licensee should
that includes a description of the corrective
discrimination, the licensee has taken
have reasonably identified the violation
action and that it meets all of the following
action to positively reemphasize that
earlier. This exercise of discretion is to
criteria:
discrimination will not be tolerated.
place a premium on licensees initiating
(a) It was licensee-identified as part of
Similarly, the NRC may refrain from
efforts to identify and correct subtle
the corrective action for the previous
taking enforcement action if a licensee
violations that are not likely to be
escalated enforcement action;
settles a matter promptly after a person
identified by routine efforts before
(b) It has the same or similar root cause
comes to the NRC without going to the
degraded safety systems are called upon
as the violation for which escalated
DOL. Such discretion would normally
to work.
enforcement action was issued;
not be exercised in cases in which the
Section VII.B.3 discretion would not
(c) It does not substantially change the
licensee does not appropriately address
normally.be applied to departures from
safety significance or the character of the
the overall work environment (
by
the FSAR if:
regulatory concern arising out of the initial
using training, postings, revised
(a)
T4he NRC identifies the violation
violation; and.
policies or procedures, any necessary
unless it was likely in the staff's view
(d) It was or will be corrected, including
disciplinary action, etc., to
that the licensee would have identified
immediate corrective action and long term
communicate its policy against
the violation in light of the defined
comprehensive corrective action to prevent
discrimination) or in cases that involve:
scope, thoroughness, and schedule of
recurrence, within a reasonable time
allegations of discrimination as a result
the licensee's initiative (provided the
following identification.
of providing information directly to the
schedule provides for completion of the
5. Violations Involving Certain
NRC, alegations of discrimination
licensee's initiative within two years
Discrimination Issues. Enforcement
caused by a manager above first-line
after October 18, 1996;
discretion may be exercised for
supervisor (consistent with current
(b) The licensee identifies the
discrimination cases when a licensee who,"-
Enforcement Policy classification of
violation as a result of an event or
without the need for government
Severity Level I or 11 violations),
surveillance or other required testing
intervention, identifies an issue of
allegations of discrimination where a
where required corrective action
discrimination and takes prompt,
history of findings of discrimination
identifies the FSAR issue;
comprehensive, and effective corrective
(by the DOL or the NRC) or
(c) The licensee identifies the
action to address both the particular
settlements suggests a programmatic
violation but had prior opporunities to
situation and the overall work environment
rather than an isolated discrimination
do so (was aware of the departure from
for raising safety concerns. Similarly,
problem, or allegations of
the FSAR) and failed to correct it
enforcement may not be warranted where a
discrimination which appear
earlier;
complaint is filed with the Department of
particularly blatant or egregious.
(d) There is willfulness associated
Labor (DOL) under Section 211 of the
6. Violations Involving Special
with the violation;
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as
Circumstances. Notwithstanding the
(e) The licensee fails to make a report
amended, but the licensee settles the matter
outcome of the normal civil penalty
required by the identification of the
before the DOL makes an initial finding of
assessment process addressed in
departure from the FSAR; or
discrimination and addresses the overall
Section VI.B, as provided in Section
(f) The licensee either fails to take
work environment. Alternatively, if a
III, "Responsibilities," the NRC may
comprehensive corrective action or fails
finding of discrimination i§ made, the
reduce or refrain from issuing a civil
to appropriately expand the corrective
licensee may choose to settle the case
penalty or a Notice of Violation for a
action program. The corrective action
before the evidentiary hearing begins. In
Severity Level II or III violation based
should be broad with a defined scope
such cases, the NRC may exercise its
on the merits of the case after
and schedule.
discretion not to take enforcement action
considering the guidance in this
4. Violations Identified Due to
when the licensee has addressed the overall
statement of policy and such factors as
Previous Escalated Enforcement Action.
work environment for raising safety
the age of the violation, the safety
The NRC may refrain from issuing a
concerns and has publicized that a
significance of the violation, the overall
Notice of Violation or a proposed civil
complaint of discrimination for engaging in
sustained performance of the licensee
penalty for a violation that is identified
protected activity was made to the DOL,
has been particularly good, and other
- 15 -
Compilation of NRC Enforcement Policy as of September 10, 1997
vant circumstances, including any
emergency or exigent license amendment
NRC staff has chosen to issue a
I may have changed since the
under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.91(a)(5)
NOED, enforcement action will
violation. This discretion is expected to
- r (6). The person exercising enforcement
normally be taken for the root causes,
be exercised only where application of
discretion will document the decision.
to the extent violations were involved,
the normal guidance in the policy is
For an operating plant, this exercise of
that led to the noncompliance for which
unwarranted.
enforcement discretion is intended to
enforcement discretion was used. The
minimize the potential safety consequences
enforcement action is intended to
C. Exercise of Discretion for an
of unnecessary plant transients with the
emphasize that licensees should not
Operating Facility
accompanying operational risks and impacts
rely on the NRC's authority to exercise
or to eliminate testing, inspection, or
enforcement discretion as a routine
On occasion, circumstances may arise
system realignment which is inappropriate
substitute for compliance or for
where a licensee's compliance with a
for the particular plant conditions. For
requesting a license amendment.
Technical Specification (TS) Limiting
plants in a shutdown condition, exercising
Finally, it is expected that the NRC
Condition for Operation or with other
enforcement discretion is intended to reduce
staff will exercise enforcement
license conditions would involve an
shutdown risk by, again, avoiding testing,
discretion in this area infrequently.
unnecessary plant transient or
inspection or system realignment which is
Although a plant must shut down,
performance of testing, inspection, or
inappropriate for the particular plant
refueling activities may be suspended,
systenrrealignment that is inappropriate
conditions, in that, it does not provide a
or plant startup may be delayed, absent
with the specific plant conditions, or
safety benefit or may, in fact, be
the exercise of enforcement discretion,
unnecessary delays in plant startup
detrimental to safety in the particular plant
the NRC staff is under no obligation to
without a corresponding health and
condition. Exercising enforcement
take such a step merely because it has
safety benefit. In these circumstances,
discretion for plants attempting to staup is
been requested. The decision to forego
the NRC staff may choose not to
less likely than exercising it for an
enforcement is discretionary. When
enforce the applicable TS or other
operating plant, as simply delaying startup
enforcement discretion is to be
rs e condition. This enforcement
does not usually leave the plant in.a
exercised, it is to be exercised only if
etion, designated as a Notice. of
condition in which it could experience
the NRC staff is clearly satisfied that
forcement Discretion (NOED), will
undesirable transients. In such cases, the
such action is warranted from a health
only be exercised if the NRC staff is
Commission would expect that discretion
and safety perspective.
clearly satisfied that the action is
would be exercised with respect to
consistent with protecting the public
equipment or systems only when it has at
VIII. ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
health and safety. A licensee seeking
least concluded that, notwithstanding the
INVOLVING INDIVIDUALS
the issuance of a NOED must provide a
conditions of the license: (1) The equipment
written justification, or in circumstances
or system does not perform a safety
Enforcement actions involving
where good cause is shown, oral
function in the mode in which operation is
individuals, including licensed
justification followed as soon as possible
to occur; (2) the safety function performed
operators, are significant personnel
by written justification, which
by the equipment or system is of only
actions, which will be closely
documents the safety basis for the
marginal safety benefit, provided remaining
controlled and judiciously applied. An
request and provides whatever other
in the current mode increases the likelihood
enforcement action involving an
information the NRC staff deems
of an unnecessary plant transient; or (3) the
individual will normally be taken only
necessary in making a decision on
TS or other license condition requires a
when the NRC is satisfied that the
whether or not to issue a NOED.
test, inspection or system realignment that
individual fully understood, or should
The appropriate Regional
is inappropriate for the particular plant
have understood, his or her
Administrator, or his or her designee,
conditions, in that it does not provide a
responsibility; knew, or should have
may issue a NOED where the
safety benefit, or may, in fact, be
known, the required actions; and
noncompliance is temporary and
detrimental to safety in the particular plant
knowingly, or with careless disregard
nonrecurring when an amendment is not
condition.
(i.e., with more than mere negligence)
practical. The Director, Office of
The decision to exercise enforcement
failed to take required actions which
Nuclear Reactor Regulation, or his or
discretion does not change the fact that a
have actual or potential safety
esignee, may issue a NOED if the
violation will ocur nor does it imply that
significance. Most transgressions of
ted noncompliance will occur
enforcement discretion is being exercised
individuals at the level of Severity
g the brief period of time it
for any violation that may have led to the
Level III or IV violations will be
requires the NRC staff to process an
violation at issue. In each case where the
handled by citing only the facility
- 16-
Compilation of NRC Enforcement. Policy as of September 10, 1997
licensee.
conduct not amounting to deliberate action
e Willfully taking actions that viola
More serious violations, including
by an unlicensed individual in these
Technical Specification Limiting
those involving the integrity of an
situations may result in enforcement action
Conditions for Operation or other
individual (e.g., lying to the NRC)
against a licensee that may impact an
license conditions (enforcement action
concerning matters within the scope of
individual. The situations include, but are
for a willful violation will not be taken
the individual's responsibilities, will be
not limited to, violations that involve:
if that violation is the result of action
considered for enforcement action
Willfully causing a licensee to be in
taken following the NRC's decision to
against the individual as well as against
violation of NRC requirements.
forego enforcement of the Technical
the facility licensee. Action against the
0 Willfully taking action that would have
Specification or other license condition
individual, however, will not be taken if
caused a licensee to be in violation of NRC
or if the operator meets the
the improper action by the individual
requirements but the action did not do so
requirements of 10 CFR 50.54 (x),
was caused by management failures.
because it was detected and corrective
(i.e., unless the operator acted
The following examples of situations
action was taken.
unreasonably considering all the
illustrate this concept:
- Recognizing a violation of procedural
relevant circumstances surrounding the
- Inadvertent individual mistakes
requirements and willfully not taking
emergency.)
resulting from inadequate training or
corrective action.
Normally, some enforcement action is
guidance provided by the facility
Willfully defeating alarms which have
taken against a licensee for violations
license.
safety significance.
caused by significant acts of
- Inadvertently missing an
Unauthorized abandoning of reactor
wrongdoing by its employees,
insignificant procedural requirement
controls.
contractors, or contractors' employees.
when the action is routine, fairly
0 Dereliction of duty.
In deciding whether to issue an
uncomplicated, and there is no unusual
0 Falsifying records required by NRC
enforcement action to an unlicensed
circumstance indicating that the
regulations or by the facility license,
person as well as to the licensee, the
procedures should be referred to and
- Willfully providing, or causing a
NRC recognizes that judgments will
foll6wed step-by-step.
licensee to provide, an NRC inspector or
have to be made on a case by case
- Compliance with an express
investigator with inaccurate or incomplete
basis. In making these decisions, the
direction of management, such as the
information on a matter material to the
NRC will consider factors such as the
Shift Supervisor or Plant Manager,
NRC.
following:
resulted in a violation unless the
0 Willfully withholding safety significant
1. The level of the individual within
individual did not express his or her
information rather than making such
the organization.
concern or objection to the direction.
information known to appropriate
2. The individual's training and
- Individual error directly resulting
supervisory or technical personnel in the
experience as well as knowledge of the
from following the technical advice of
licensee's organization.
potential consequences of the
an expert unless the advise was clearly
e Submitting false information and as a
Wrongdoing.
unreasonable and the licensed individual
result gaining unescorted access to a
3. The safety consequences of the
should have recognized it as such.
nuclear power plant.
misconduct.
- Violations resulting from
Willfully Providing false data to a
4. The benefit to the wrongdoer,
inadequate procedures unless the
licensee by a contractor or other person
e.g., personal or corporate gain.
individual used a faulty procedure
who provides test or other services, when
5. The degree of supervision of the
knowing it was faulty and had not
the data affects the licensee's compliance
individual, i.e., how closely is the
attempted to get the procedure
with 10 CER part 50, appendix B, or other
individual monitored or audited, and
corrected.
regulatory requirement.
the likelihood of detection (such as a
Listed below are examples of
- Willfully providing false certification
radiographer working independently in
situations which could result in
that components meet the requirements of
the field as contrasted with a team
enforcement actions involving
their intended use, such as ASME Code.
activity at a power plant).
individuals, licensed or unlicensed. If
0 Willfully supplying, by vendors of
6. The employer's response, e.g.,
the actions described in these examples
equipment for transportation of radioactive
disciplinary action taken.
are taken by a licensed operator or taken
material, casks that do not comply with
7. The attitude of the wrongdoer,
deliberately by an unlicensed individual,
their certificates of compliance.
e.g., admission of wrongdoing,
enforcement action may be taken
e Willfully performing unauthorized
acceptance of responsibility.
directly against the individual.
bypassing of required reactor or other
8. The degree of management
However, violations involving willful
facility safety systems.
responsibility or culpability.
. 17 -
Compilation of NRC Enforcement.Policy as of September 10, 1997
Who identified the misconduct.
activities,
integrity, competence, fitness-for-duty,
Any proposed enforcement action
0 Require the person to tell a prospective
or other matters that may not
involving individuals must be issued
employer or customer engaged in licensed
necessarily be a violation of specific
with the concurrence of the Deputy
activities that the person has been subject to
Commission requirements.
Executive Director. The particular
an NRC order.
In the case of an unlicensed person,
sanction to be used should be
In the case of a licensed operator's failure
whether a firm or an individual, an
determined on a case-by-case basis. 0
to meet applicable fitness-for-duty
order modifying the facility license
Notices of Violation and Orders are
requirements (10 CFR 55.530)), the NRC
may be issued to require (1) the
examples of enforcement actions that
may issue a Notice of Violation or a civil
removal of the person from all licensed
may be appropriate against individuals.
penalty to the Part 55 licensee, or an order
activities for a specified period of time
The administrative action of a Letter of
to suspend, modify, or revoke the Part 55
or indefnitely, (2) prior notice to the
Reprimand may also be considered. In
license. These actions may be taken the
NRC before utilizing the person in
addition, the NRC may issue Demands
first time a licensed operator fails a drug or
licensed activities, or (3) the licensee to
for Information to gather information to
alcohol test, that is, receives a confirmed
provide notice of the issuance of such
enable it to determine whether an order
positive test that exceeds the cutoff levels of
an order to other persons involved in
or other enforcement action should be
10 CFR Part 26 or the facility licensees
licensed activities making reference
issued.
cutoff levels, if lower. However, normally
inquiries. In addition, orders to
Orders to NRC-licensed reactor
only a Notice of Violation will be issued for
employers might require retraining,
operators may involve suspension for a
the first confirmed positive test in the
additional oversight, or independent
specified period, modification, or
absence of aggravating circumstances such
verification of activities performed by
revocation of their individual licenses.
as errors in the performance of licensed
the person, if the person is to be
Orders to unlicensed individuals might
duties or evidence of prolonged use. In
involved in licensed activities.
include provisions that would:
addition, the NRC intends to issue an order
- Prohibit involvement in NRC
to suspend the Part 55 license for up to 3
IX. INACCURATE AND
sed activities for a specified period
years the second time a licensed operator
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
W in e (normally the period of
exceeds those cutoff levels. In the event
suspension would not exceed 5 years) or
there are less than 3 years remaining in the
A violation of the regulations
until certain conditions are satisfied,
term of the individuals license, the NRC
involving submittal of incomplete
e.g., completing specified training or
may consider not renewing the individuals
and/or inaccurate information, whether
meeting certain qualifications.
license or not issuing a new license after
or not considered a material false
- Require notification to the NRC
the three year period is completed. The
statement, can result in the full range
before resuming work in licensed
NRC intends to issue an order to revoke the
of enforcement sanctions. The labeling
Part 55 license the third time a licensed
of a communication failure as a
operator exceeds those cutoff levels. A
material false statement will be made
'o Except for individuals subject to
licensed operator or applicant who refuses
on a case-by-case basis and will be
civil penalties under section 206 of the
to participate in the drug and alcohol testing
reserved for egregious Violations.
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as
programs established by the facility licensee
Violations involving inaccurate or
amended,or
who is involved in the sale, use, or
incomplete information or the failure to
amended
NR wiil
nlt notinormal
possession of an illegal drug is also subject
provide significant information
impose a civil penalty against an
inivdul.Hweer scto 24 f h
to license suspension, revocation, or denial,
identified by a licensee normally will
individual. However, section 234 of the
In addition, the NRC may take
be categorized based on the guidance
Atomic Energy Act (AEA) gives the
Commission authority to impose civil
enforcement action against a licensee that
herein, in Section IV, Severity of
penalties on "any person." "Person" is
may impact an individual, where the
Violations, and in Supplement VII.
broadly defined in Section
"so th
conduct of the individual places in question
The Commission recognizes that oral
AEA to include individuals, a variety of
the NRCs reasonable assurance that
information may in some situations be
AE t icldeinivduls avaiey f
licensed activities will be properly
inherently less reliable than written
organizations, and any representatives
.Iztns
conducted. The NRC may take
submittals because oi the absence of an
or agents. This gives the Commission
0enforcement
action for reasons that would
opportunity for reflection and
authority to impose civil penalties on
management review. However, the
loyees of licensees or on separate
- lov es
o licnsee orrnisenaat
application. Accordingly,
Commission must be able to rely on
ies when a violation of a
o
a
quirement directly imposed on them is
appropriate enforcement actions may be
oral communications from licensee
taken regarding matters that raise issues of
officials concering
18-
Compilation of NRC Enforcement Policy as of September 10, 1997
information. Therefore, in determining
promptly identified and corrected by the
X. ENFORCEMENT ACTION
whether to take enforcement action for
licensee prior to reliance by the NRC, or
AGAINST NON-LICENSEES
an oral statement, consideration may be
before the NRC raised a question about the
given to factors such as (1) the degree of
information, no enforcement action will be
The Commission's enforcement
knowledge that the communicator
taken for the initial inaccurate or
policy is also applicable to
should have had, regarding the matter,
incomplete information. On the other
non-licensees, including employees of
in view of his or her position, training,
hand, if the misinformation is identified
licensees, to contractors and
and experience; (2) the opportunity and
after the NRC relies on it, or after some
subcontractors, and to employqes-of
time available prior to the
question is raised regarding the accuracy of
contractors and subcontractors, who
communication to assure the accuracy or
the information, then some enforcement
knowingly provide components,
completeness of the information; (3) the
action normally will be taken even if it is in
equipment, or other goods or services
degree of intent or negligence, if any,
fact corrected. However, if the initial
that relate to a licensee's activities
involved; (4) the formality of the
submittal was accurate when made but later
subject to NRC regulation. The
communication; (5) the reasonableness
turns out to be erroneous because of newly
prohibitions and sanctions for any of
of NRC reliance on the information;
discovered information or advance in
these persons who engage in deliberate
(6) the importance of the information
technology, a citation normally would not
misconduct or submission of
which was wrong or not provided; and
be appropriate if, when the new
incomplete or inaccurate information
(7) thi reasonableness of the explanation
information became available or the
are provided in the rule on deliberate
for not providing complete and accurate
advancement in technology was made, the
misconduct, e.g., 10 CFR 30.10 and
information.
initial submittal was corrected.
50.5.
Absent at least careless disregard, an
The failure to correct inaccurate or
Vendors of products or services
incomplete or inaccurate unsworn oral
incomplete information which the licensee
provided for use in nuclear activities
statement normally will not be subject to
does not identify as significant normally
are subject to certain requirements
enforcement action unless it involves
will not constitute a separate violation.
designed to ensure that the products or
significant information provided by a
However, the circumstances surrounding
services supplied that could affect
licensee official. However,
the failure to correct may be considered
safety are of high quality. Through
enforcement action may be taken for an
relevant to the determination of
procurement contracts with reactor
unintentionally incomplete or inaccurate
enforcement action for the initial inaccurate
licensees, vendors may be required to
oral statement provided to the NRC by a
or incomplete statement. For example, an
have quality assurance programs that
licensee official or others on behalf of a
unintentionally inaccurate or incomplete
meet applicable requirements including
licensee, if a record was made of the
submission may be treated as a more severe
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, and 10
oral information and provided to the
matter if the licensee later determines that
CFR Part 71, Subpart H. Vendors
licensee thereby permitting an
the initial submittal was in error and does
supplying products or services to
opportunity to correct the oral
not .correct it or if there were clear
reactor, materials, and 10 CFR Par 71
information, such as if a transcript of
opportunities to identify the error. If
licensees are subject to the
the communication or meeting summary
information not corrected was recognized
requirements of 10 CFR Part 21
containing the error was made available
by a licensee as significant, a separate
regarding reporting of defects in basic
to the licensee and was not subsequently
citation may be made for the failure to
components.
corrected in a timely manner.
provide significant information. In any
When inspections determine that
When a licensee has corrected
event, in serious cases where the licensee's
violations of NRC requirements have
inaccurate or incomplete information,
actions in not correcting or providing
occurred, or that vendors have failed to
the decision to issue a Notice of
information raise questions about its
fulfill contractual commitments (e.g.,
Violation for the initial inaccurate or
commitment to safety or itsfndamental
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B) that
incomplete information normally will be
trustworthiness, the Commission may
could adversely affect the quality of a
dependent on the circumstances,
exercise its authority to issue orders
safety significant product or service,
including the ease of detection of the
modifying, suspending, or revoking the
enforcement action will be taken.
error, the timeliness of the correction,
license. The Commission recognizes that
Notices of Violation and civil penalties
whether the NRC or the licensee
enforcement determinations must be made
will be used, as appropriate, for
identified the problem with the
on a case-by-case basis, taking into
licensee failures to ensure that their
communication, and whether the NRC
consideration the issues described in this
vendors have programs that meet
relied on the information prior to the
section.
applicable requirements. Notices of
correction. Generally, if the matter was
Violation will be issued for vendors
- 19-
Compilation of NRC Enforcement Policy as of September 10, 1997
violate 10 CFR Part 21. Civil
was incorrectly applied, consideration may
1. A system designed to prevent or
W nalties will be imposed against
be given, dependent on the circumstances,
mitigate serious safety events not being
individual directors or responsible
to reopening a closed enforcement action to
able to perform its intended safety
officers of a vendor organization who
increase or decrease the severity of a
function;
knowingly and consciously fail to
sanction or to correct the record.
2. A licensed operator involved in
provide the notice required by 10 CFR
Reopening decisions will be made on a
the use, sale, or possession of illegal
21.21(b)(1). Notices of
case-by-case basis, are expected to occur
drugs or the consumption of alcoholic
Nonconformance will be used for
rarely, and require the specific approval of
beverages, within the protected area;
vendors which fail to meet commitments
the Deputy Executive Director.
3. A licensed operator at the control
related to NRC activities.
of a nuclear reactor, or a senior
SUPPLEMENT I- REACTOR
operator directing licensed activities,
XI. REFERRALS TO THE
OPERATIONS
involved in procedural errors and who,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
as a result of subsequent testing,
This supplement provides examples of
receives a confirmed positive test result
Alleged or suspected criminal
violations in each of the four severity levels
for drugs or alcohol; or
violations of the Atomic Energy Act
as guidance in determining the appropriate
4. Failures to meet 10 CFR 50.59
(and of other relevant Federal laws) are
severity level for violations in the area of
including several unreviewed safety
referred to the Department of Justice
reactor operations,
questions, or conflicts with technical
(DOJ) for investigation. Referral to the
A. Severity Level I - Violations involving
specifications, involving a broad
DOJ does not preclude the NRC from
for example:
spectrum of problems affecting
taking other enforcement action under
1. A Safety Limit, as defined in 10 CFR
multiple areas, some of which impact
this policy. However, enforcement
50.36 and the Technical Specifications
the operability of required equipment.
actions will be coordinated with the DOJ
being exceeded;
C. Severity Level III - Violations
in accordance with the Memorandum of
2. A system" designed to prevent or
involving for example:
erstanding between the NRC and the
mitigate a serious safety event not being
1. A significant failure to comply
9
, 53 FR 50317 (December 14,
able to perform its intended safety
with the Action Statement for a.
8)
funiction' 2 when actually called upon to
technical Specification Limiting
work;
Condition for Operation where the
XII. PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF
3. An accidental criticality; or
appropriate action was not taken within
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
4. A licensed operator at the controls of a
the required time, such as:
nuclear reactor, or a senior operator
(a) In a pressurized water reactor, in
Enforcement actions and licensees'
directing licensed activities, involved in
the applicable modes, having one
responses, in accordance with
procedural errors which result in, or
high-pressure safety injection pump
10 CFR 2.790, are publicly available for
exacerbate the consequences of, an alert or
inoperable for a period in excess of
inspection. In addition, press releases
higher level emergency and who, as a result
that allowed by the action statement; or
are generally issued for orders and civil
of subsequent testing, receives a confirmed
(b) In a boiling water reactor, one
penalties and are issued at the same time
positive test result for drugs or alcohol,
primary containment isolation valve
the order or proposed imposition of the
B. Severity Level II - Violations
inoperable for a period in excess of
civil penalty is issued. In addition,
involving for example:
that allowed by the action statement.
press releases are usually issued when a
2. A system designed to prevent or
proposed civil penalty is withdrawn or
substantially mitigated by some amount.
Press releases are not normally issued
The term "system" as used in these
(a) Not being able to perform its
for Notices of Violation that are not
supplements, includes administrative and
intended function under certain
accompanied by orders or proposed civil
managerial control systems, as well as
conditions (e.g., safety system not
b
hivenoperable
unless offsite power is
Sse
s
eavailable;
materials or components not
X11I. REOPENINGCLOSED
12 "Intended safety function" means the
environmentally qualified); or
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
total safety function, and is not directed
(b) Being degraded to the extent that
toward a loss of redundancy. A loss of one
a detailed evaluation would be required
i~nifccant new information is
subsystem doesnot defeat the intended
to determine its operability (e.g.,
ed or obtained by NRC which
safety function as long as the other
component parameters outside
indicates that an enforcement sanction
subsystem is operable.
approved limits such as pump flow
- 20 -
Compilation of NRC Enforcement Policy as of September 10, 1997
rates, heat exchanger transfer
accuracy of the FSAR or a concern that 10
6. A relatively isolated failure to
characteristics, safety valve lift
CFR 50.59 requirements are not being met.
document an evaluation where there is
serpoints, or valve stroke times);
Application of this example requires
evidence that an adequate evaluation
3. Inattentiveness to duty on the part
weighing factors such as: a) the time period
was performed prior to the change in
of licensed personnel;
over which the violations occurred and
the facility or procedures, or the
4. Changes in reactor parameters that
existed, b) the number. of failures, c)
conduct of an experiment or test;
cause unanticipated reductions in
whether one or more systems, functions, or
7. A failure to update the FSAR as
margins of safety;
pieces of equipment were involved and the
required by 10 CFR 50.71(e) where an
5. [Reserved]
importance of such equipment, functions,
adequate evaluation under 10 CFR
6. A licensee failure to conduct
or systems, and d) the potential significance
50.59 had been performed and
adequate oversight of vendors resulting
of the failures;
documented; or
in the use of products or services that
13. The failure to update the FSAR as
8 A past programmatic failure to
are of defective or indeterminate quality
required by 10 CFR 50.71(e) where the
meet 10 CFR 50.59 and/or 10 CFR
and that have safety significance;
unupdated FSAR was used in performing a
50.71(e) requirements not involving
7. A breakdown in the control of
10 CFR 50.59 evaluation and as a result, an
Severity Level I1 or III violations that
licensed activities involving a number of
inadequate decision was made
does not reflect a current safety or
violatjons that are related (or, if
demonstrating a significant regulatory
regulatory concern about the accuracy
isolated, that are recurring violations)
concern; or
of the FSAR or a concern that 10 CFR
that collectively represent a potentially
14. The failure to make a report required
50.59 requirements are not being met.
significant lack of attention or
by 10 CFR 50.72 or 50.73 associated with
E. Minor Violations
carelessness toward licensed
(a) an unreviewed safety question, (b) a
A failure to meet 10 CFR 50.59
responsibilities;
conflict with a technical specification, or
requirements that involves a change to
8. A licensed operator's confirmed
(c) any other Severity Level III violation,
the ESAR description or procedure, or
positive test for drugs or alcohol that
D. Severity Level V-Violations
involves a test or experiment not
does not result in a Severity Level I or
involving for example:
described in the FSAR, where there
II violation;
1. A less significant failure to comply
was not a reasonable likelihood that thee
9. Equipment failures caused by
with the Action Statement for a Technical
change to the facility or procedure or
inadequate or improper maintenance that
Specification Limiting Condition for
the conduct of the test or experiment
substantially complicates recovery from
Operation where the appropriate action was
would ever be an unreviewed safety
a plant transient;
not taken within the required time, such as:
question. In the case of a 10 CFR
10. The failure to meet 10 CFR 50.59
(a) In a pressurized water reactor, a 5%
50.71(e) violation, where a failure to
where an unreviewed safety question is
deficiency in the required volume of the
update the FSAR would not have a
involved, or a conflict with a technical
condensate storage tank: or
material impact on safety or licensed
specification, such that a license
(b) In a boiling water reactor, one
activities. The focus of the minor
amendment is required;
subsystem of the two independent MSIV
violation is not on the actual change,
11. The failure to perform the
leakage control subsystems inoperable;
test, or experiment, but on the potential
required evaluation under 10 CFR 50.59
2. [Reserved]
safety role of the system, equipment,
prior to implementation of the change in
3. A failure to meet regulatory
etc., that is being changed, tested, or
those situations in which no unreviewed
requirements that have more than minor
experimented on.
safety question existed, but an extensive
safety or environmental significance;
evaluation would be needed before a
4. A failure to make a required Licensee
SUPPLEMENT Il-PART 50 FACILITY
licensee would have had a reasonable
Event Report;
CONSTRUCTION
expectation that an unreviewed safety
5. Relatively isolated violations of 10
question did not exist;
CFR 50*59 not involving severity level 11
This supplement provides examples of
12. Programmatic failures (i.e.,
or III violations that do not suggest a
violations in each of the four severity
multiple or recurring failures) to meet
programmatic failure to meet 10 CFR
levels as guidance in determining the
the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59
50:59. Relatively isolated violations or
appropriate severity level for violations
and/or 50.71(e) that show a significant
failures would include a number of recently
in the area of Par 50 facility
lack of attention to detail, whether or
discovered violations that occurred over a
construction.
not such failures involve an unreviewed
period of years and are not indicative of a
A. Severity Level I.- Violations
safety question, resulting in a current
programmatic safety concern with meeting
involving structures or systems that are
safety or regulatory concern about the
10 CFR 50.59 or 50.7 1(e);
-21 -
Compilation of NRC Enforcement Policy as of September 10, 1997
pleted" in such a manner that they
involving failure to meet regulatory
2. The theft, loss or diversion of
ouuld not have satisfied their intended
requirements including one or more Quality
SNM of moderate strategic
safety related purpose.
Assurance Criterion not amounting to
significance" in which the security
B. Severity Level II - Violations
Severity Level 1, 11, or III violations that
system did not function as required: or
involving for example:
have more than minor safety or
3. Actual unauthorized production of
1. A breakdown in the Quality
environmental significance.
SNM.
Assurance (QA) program as exemplified
C. Severity Level III - Violations
by deficiencies in construction QA
SUPPLEMENT II-SAFEGUARDS
involving for example:
related to more than one work activity
1. A failure or inability to control
(e.g., structural, piping, electrical,
This supplement provides examples of
access through established systems or
foundations). These deficiencies
violations in each of the four severity levels
procedures, such that an unauthorized
normally involve the licensee's failure to
as guidance in determining the appropriate.
individual (i.e., not authorized
conduct adequate audits or to take
severity level for violations in the area of
unescorted access to protected area)
prompt corrective action on the basis of
safeguards.
could easily gain undetected access'
such audits and normally involve
A. Severity Level I - Violations involving
into a vital area from outside the
multiple examples of deficient
for example:
protected area;
construction or construction of unknown
1. An act of radiological sabotage in
2. A failure to conduct any search at
qualitf due to inadequate program
which the security system did not function
the access control point or conducting
implementation; or
as required and, as a result of the failure,
an inadequate search that resulted in
2. A structure or system that is
there was a significant event, such as:
the introduction to the protected area of
completed in such a manner that it could
(a) A Safety Limit, as defined in 10 CFR
firearms, explosives, or incendiary
have an adverse effect on the safety of
50.36 and the Technical Specifications, was
devices and reasonable facsimiles
operations.
exceeded;
thereof that could significantly assist
. Severity Level III - Violations
(b) A system designed to prevent or
radiological sabotage or theft of
lving for example:
mitigate a serious safety event was not able
strategic SNM;
A deficiency in a licensee QA
to perform its intended safety function
3. A failure, degradation, or.other
program for construction related to a
when actually called upon to work; or
deficiency of the protected area
single work activity (e.g., structural,
(c) An accidental criticality occurred;
intrusion detection or alarm assessment
piping, electrical or foundations). This
2. The theft, loss, or diversion of a
systems such that an unauthorized
significant deficiency normally involves
formula quantity" of special nuclear
individual who represents a threat
the licensee's failure to conduct
material (SNM); or
could predictably circumvent the
adequate audits or to take prompt
3. Actual unauthorized production of a
system or defeat a specific zone with a
corrective action on the basis of such
formula quantity of SNM
high degree of confidence without
audits, and normally involves multiple
B. Severity Level II - Violations
insider knowledge, or other significant
examples of deficient construction or
involving for example:
degradation of overall system
construction of unknown quality due to
1. The entry of an unauthorized
capability;
inadequate program implementation;
individual' who represents a threat into a
4. A significant failure of the
2. A failure to confirm the design
vital area' from outside the protected area;
safeguards systems designed or used to
safety requirements of a structure or
Prevent or detect the theft, loss, or
system as a result of inadequate
diversion of strategic SNM;
preoperational test program
See 10 CFR 73.2 for the definition
5. A failure to protect or control
implementation; or
of "formula quantity."
classified or safeguards information
3. A failure to make a required 10
CFR 50.55(e) report.
" The term unauthorized individual
D. Severity Level IV - Violations
D. evriy
evl V Voltins
as used ini this supplement means someone 1
1 See 10 CFR 73.2 for the
who was not authorized for entrance into
definition of "special nuclear material
the area in question, or not authorized to
of moderate strategic significance."
a The term "completed" as used in
enter in the manner entered.
e
supplement means completion of
In determining whether access
truction including review and
The phrase "vital area" as used in
can be easily gained, factors such as
qW ceptance by the construction QA
this supplement includes vital areas and
predictability, identifiability, and ease
organization.
material access areas.
of passage should be considered.
22-
Compilation of NRC Enforcement Policy as of September 10, 1997
considered to be significant while the
5. A failure to conduct a proper search at
reis total effective dose equivalent;
information is outside the protected area
the access control point;
3. A radiation exposure during any
and accessible to those not authorized
6. A failure to properly secure or protect
year of a minor in excess of 2.5 rems
access to the protected area;
classified or, safeguards information inside
total effective dose equivalent, 7.5
6. A significant failure to respond to
the protected area which could assist an
reis to the lens of the eye, or 25 reis
an event either in sufficient time to
individual in an act of radiological sabotage
to the skin of the whole body, or to the
provide protection to vital equipment or
or theft of strategic SNM where the
feet, ankles, hands or forearms, or to
strategic SNM, or with an adequate
information was not removed from the
any other organ or tissue;
response force;
protected area;
4. An annual exposure of a member
7. A failure to perform an appropriate
7. A failure to control access such that an
of the public in excess of 1.0 rem total
evaluation or background investigation
opportunity exists that could allow
effective dose equivalent;
so that information relevant to the
unauthorized and undetected access into the
5. A release of radioactive material
access determination was not obtained
protected area but which was neither easily
to an unrestricted area at
or considered and as a result a person,
or likely to be exploitable;
concentrations in excess of 50 times the
who would likely not have been granted
8. A failure to conduct an adequate
limits for members of the public as
access by the licensee, if the required
search at the exit from a material access
described in 10 CFR 20.1302(b)(2)(i);
investigation or evaluation had been
area;
or
perfofined, was granted access; or
9. A theft or loss of SNM of low
6. Disposal of licensed material in
8. A breakdown in the security
strategic significance that was not detected
quantities or concentrations in excess
program involving a number of
within the time period specified inthe
of 10 times the limits of 10 CFR
violations that are related (or, if
security plan, other relevant document, or
20.2003.
isolated, that are recurring violations)
regulation; or
B. Severity Level 11 - Violations
that collectively reflect a potentially
10. Other violations that have more than
involving for example:
significant lack of attention or
minor safeguards significance.
1. A radiation exposure during any
carelessness toward licensed
year of a worker in excess of 10 reis
responsibilities.
SUPPLEMENT T-HEALTH PHYSICS (10
total effective dose equivalent, 30 reisW
D. Severity Level IV - Violations
CFR PART 20)
to the lens of the eye, or 100 reis to
involving for example:
inovnCoreape
the skin of the whole body, or to the
1. A failure or inability to control
.
This supplement provides examples of
feet, ankles, hands or forearms, or to
access such that an unauthorized
violations in each of the four severity levels
any other organ or tissue;
individual (i.e., authorized to protected
as guidance in determining the appropriate
2. A radiation exposure over the
area but not to vital area) could easily
severity level for violations in the area of
gestation period of the embryo/fetus of
gain undetected access into a vital area
health physics, 10 CFR Part 20.19
a declared pregnant woman in excess
from inside the protected area or into a.
A. Severity Level I - Violations involving
of 1.0 rem total effective dose
controlled access area;
for example:
equivalent;
1. A radiation exposure during any year
3. A radiation exposure during any
2. A failure to respond to a suspected
of a worker in excess of 25 rems total
year of a minor in excess of I rem total
event in either a timely manner or with
effective dose equivalent, 75 reis to the
effective dose equivalent, 3.0 reis to
an adequate response force;
lens of the eye, or 250 rads to the skin of
the lens of the eye, or 10 reis to the
3. A failure to implement 10 CFR
the whole body, or to the feet, ankles,
skin of the whole body, or to the feet,
Parts 25 and 95 with respect to the
hands or forearms, or to any other organ or
ankles, hands or forearms, or to any
information addressed under Section 142
tissue;
other organ or tissue;
of the Act, and the NRC approved
2. A radiation exposure over the
4. An annual exposure of a member
security plan relevant to those parts;
gestation period of the embryo/fetus of a
of the public in excess of 0.5 rem total
4. A failure to make, maintain, or
declared pregnant woman in excess of 2.5
effective dose equivalent;
provide log entries in accordance with
5. A release of radioactive material
10 CFR 73.71 (c) and (d), where the
to an unrestricted area at
omitted information (i) is not otherwise
Personnel overexposures and
concentrations in excess of 10 times the
available in easily retrievable records,
associated violations incurred during a
limits for members of the public as
and (ii) significantly contributes to the
described in 10 CFR 20.1302(b)
ability of either the NRC or the licensee
or other emergency response
(
effort will be treated on a case-by-case
at
to identify a programmatic breakdown;.
year has been approved by the
-23 -
Compilation of NRC Enforcement Policy as of September 10, 1997
ission under Section 20.1301(c));
CFR 20.2202(b) or an immediate
environmental radiation standards, such
Disposal of licensed material in
notification required by
as 40 CFR Part 190;
quantities or concentrations in excess of
6. A failure to make the 30-day
five times the limits of 10 CFR
8. A substantial potential for exposures
notification required by 10 CFR
20.2003; or
or releases in excess of the applicable limits
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) or 20.2203(a);
7. A failure to make an immediate
in 10 CFR Part 20 Sections
7. A failure to make a timely written
notification as required by
20.1001-20.2401 whether or not an
report as required by 10 CFR
10 CFR 20.2202 (a)(1) or (a)(2).
exposure or release occurs;
20.2201(b), 20.2204, or 20.2206;
C. Severity Level III - Violations
9. Disposal of licensed material not
8. A failure to report an exceedance
involving for example:
covered in Severity Levels I or II;
of the dose constraint established in 10
1. A radiation exposure during any
10. A release for unrestricted use of
CFR 20.1101(d) or a failure to take
year of a worker in excess of 5 rems
contaminated or radioactive material or
corrective action for an exceedance, as
total effective dose equivalent, 15 rems
equipment that poses a realistic potential for
required by 10 CFR 20.1101(d); or
to the lens of the eye, or 50 rems to the
exposure of the public to levels or doses
9. Any other matter that has more
skin of the whole body or to the feet,
exceeding the annual dose limits for
than a minor safety, health, or
ankles, hands or forearms, or to any
members of the public, or that reflects a
environmental significance.
other prgan or tissue;
programmatic (rather than an isolated)
2. A radiation exposure over the
weakness in the radiation control program;
SUPPLEMENT V
gestation period of the embryo/fetus of a
11. Conduct of licensee activities by a
TRANSPORTATION
declared pregnant woman in excess of
technically unqualified person;
0.5 rem total effective dose equivalent
12. A significant failure to control
This supplement provides examples of
(except when doses are in accordance
licensed material; or
violations in each of the four severity
with the provisions of
13. A breakdown in the radiation safety
levels as guidance in determining the
ion 20.1208(d));
program involving a number of violations
appropriate severity level for violations
A radiation exposure during any
that are related (or, if isolated, that are
in the area of NRC transportation
of a minor in excess of 0.5 tem
recurring) that collectively represent a
requirements20 .
total effective dose equivalent; 1.5 rems
potentially significant lack of attention or
A. Severity Level I - Violations
to the lens of the eye, or,5 rems to the
carelessness toward licensed
involving for example:
skin of the whole body, or to the feet,
responsibilities.
1. Failure to meet transportation
ankles, hands or forearms, or to any
D. Severity Level IV - Violations
requirements that resulted in loss of
other organ or tissue;
involving forexample:
control of radioactive material with a
4. A worker exposure above
1. Exposures in excess of the limits of 10
breach in package integrity such that
regulatory limits when such exposure
CFR 20.1201, 20.1207, or 20.1208 not
the material caused a radiation
reflects a programmatic (rather than an
constituting Severity Level I, Il. or I
exposure to a member of the public and
isolated) weakness in the radiation
violations;
there was clear potential for the public
control program;
2. A release of radioactive material to an
to receive more than . 1 rem to the
5. An annual exposure of a member
unrestricted area at concentrations in excess
whole body;
of the public in excess of 0.1 rem total
of the limits for members of the public a
2. Surface contamination in excess of
effective dose equivalent (except when
referenced in 10 CFR 20.1302(b)(2)(i)
50 times the NRC limit; or
operation up to 0.5 rem a year has been
(except when operation up to 0.5 rem a
3. External radiation levels in excess
approved by the Commission under
year has been approved by the Commission
Section 20.1301(c));
under Section 20.1301(c));
6. A release of radioactive material to
3. A radiation dose rate in an unrestricted
20
an unrestricted area at concentrations in
or controlled area in excess of 0.002 rem in
reurmensra
iom
excess of two times the effluent
any 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (2 millirem/bour) or 50
one licensee involved in the same
concentration limits referenced in 10
millirems in a year;
activity such as a shipper and a carrier.
CFR 20.1302(b)(2)(i) (except when
4. Failure to maintain and implement
When a violation of such a requirement
operation up to 0.5 rem a year has been
radiation programs to keep radiation
roved by the Commission under
exposures as low as is reasonably
directed against the responsible
ion 20.1301(c));
achievable;
licensee which, under the
A failure to make a 24-hour
5. Doses to a member of the public in
circumstances of the case, may be one
notification required by 10
excess of any EPA generally applicable
or more of the licensees involved.
- 24 -
Compilation of NRC Enforcement Policy as of September 10, 1997
of 10 times the NRC limit.
D. Severity Level IV - Violations
activities, including chemical process
B. Severity Level II - Violations
involving for example:
that are integral to the licensed or
involving for example:
1. A breach of package integrity without
certified activity, whether radioactive
1. Failure to meet transportation
external radiation levels exceeding the NRC
material is released or not.
requirements that resulted in loss of
limit or Without contamination levels
B. Severity Level II - Violations
control of radioactive material with a
exceeding five times the NRC limits;
involving for example:
breach in package integrity such that
2. Surface contamination in excess of but
1. Radiation levels, contamination
there was a clear potential for the
not more than five times the NRC limit;
levels, or releases that exceed five
member of the public to receive more
3. A failure to register as an authorized
times the limits specified in the license;
than .1 rem to the whole body;
user of an NRC-Certified Transport
2. A system designed to prevent or
2. Surface contamination in excess of
package;
mitigate a serious safety event being
10, but not more than 50 times the NRC
4. A noncompliance with shipping
limit;
papers, marking, labeling, placarding,
3. A substantial programmatic failure
3. External radiation levels in excess
packaging or loading not amounting to a
in the implementation of the quality
of five, but not more than 10 times the
Severity Level 1, Il,'or III violation;
management program required by 10
NRC limit; or
5. A failure to demonstrate that packages
CFR 35.32 that results in a
4. A failure to make required initial
for special form radioactive material meets
misadministration;
notifications associated with Severity
applicable regulatory requirements;
4. A failure to establish, implement,
Level I or II violations.
6. A failure to demonstrate that packages
or maintain all criticality controls (or
C. Severity Level III - Violations
meet DOT Specifications for 7A Type A
control systems) for a single nuclear
involving for example:
packages; or
criticality scenario when a critical mass
1. Surface contamination in excess of
7. Other violations that have more than
of fissile material was present or
five but not more than 10 times the
minor safety or environmental significance.
reasonably available, such that a
NRC limit;
nuclear criticality accident was
2. External radiation in excess of one
SUPPLEMENT VI-FUEL CYCLE AND
possible; or
but not more than five times the NRC
MATERIALS OPERATIONS
5. The potential for a significant
limit;
injury or loss of life due to a loss of
3. Any'noncompliance with labeling,
This supplement provides examples of
control over licensed or cerified
placarding, shipping paper, packaging,
violations in each of the four severity levels
activities, including chemical processes
loading, or other requirements that
as guidance in determining the appropriate
could reasonably result in the following:
severity level for violations in the area of
certified activity, whether radioactive
(a) A significant failure to identify the
fuel cycle and materials operations.
material is released or not (e.g.,
type, quantity, or form of material;
A. Severity Level I - Violations involving
movement of liquid UF 6 cylinder by
(b) A failure of the carrier or
for example:
unapproved methods).
recipient to exercise adequate controls;
1. Radiation levels, contamination levels,
C. Severity Level III - Violations
or
or releases that exceed 10 times the limits
involving for example:
(c) A substantial potential for either
specified in the license;
1. A failure to control access to
personnel exposure or contamination
2. A system designed to prevent or
licensed materials for radiation
above regulatory limits or improper
mitigate a serious safety event not being
protection purposes as specified by
transfer of material;
operable when actually required to perform
NRC requirements;
4. A failure to make required initial
its design function;
2. Possession or use of unauthorized
notification associated with Severity
3. A nuclear criticality accident;
equipment or materials in the conduct
Level III violations; or
4. A failure to follow the procedures of
of licensee activities which degrades
5. A breakdown in the licensee's
the quality management program, required
safety;
program for the transportation of
by 10 CFR 35.32, that results in a death or
3. Use of radioactive material on
licensed material involving a number of
serious injury (e.g., substantial organ
humans where such use is not
violations that are related (or, if
impairment) to a patient;
authorized;
isolated, that are recurring violations)
5. A safety limit, as defined in 10 CFR
4. Conduct of licensed activities by a
that collectively reflect a potentially
76.4, the Technical Safety Requirements,
technically unqualified or uncertified
significant lack of attention or
or the application being exceeded, or
carelessness toward licensed
6. Significant injury or loss of life due to
5. A substantial potential for
responsibilities,
a loss of control over licensed or certified
exposures, radiation levels,
- 25 -
Compilation of NRC Enforcement Policy as of September 10, 1997
tamination levels, or releases,
conduct and/or complete decommissioning
available, such that a nuclear criticality
cluding releases of toxic material
activities in accordance with regulation or
accident was possible; or
caused by a failure to comply with NRC
license condition, or failure to meet
19. A failure, during radiographic
regulations, from licensed or certified
required schedules without adequate
operations, to stop work after a pocket
activities in excess of regulatory limits;
justification;
dosimeter is found to have gone off
6. Substantial failure to implement the
12. A significant failure to comply with
scale, or after an electronic dosimeter
quality management program as
the action statement for a Technical Safety
reads greater than 200 mrem, and
required by 10 CFR 35.32 that does not
Requirement Limiting Condition for
before a determination is made of the
result in a misadministration; failure to
Operation where the appropriate action was
individual's actual radiation exposure.
report a misadministration; or
not taken within the required time, such as:
D. Severity.Level IV - Violations
programmatic weakness in the
(a) In an autoclave, where a containment
involving for example:
implementation of the quality
isolation valve is inoperable for a period in
1. A failure to maintain patients
management program that results in a
excess of that allowed by the action
hospitalized who have cobalt-60,
misadministration;
statement; or
cesium-137, or iridium-192 implants or
7. A breakdown in the control of
(b) Cranes or other lifting devices
to conduct required leakage or
licensed activities involving a number of
engaged in the movement of cylinders
contamination tests, or to use properly
violations that are related (or, if
having inoperable safety components, such
calibrated equipment;
isolatet, that are recurring violations)
as redundant braking systems, or other
2. Other violations that have more
that collectively represent a potentially
safety devices for a period in excess of that
than minor safety or environmental
significant lack of attention or
allowed by the action statement;
significance;
carelessness toward licensed
13. A system designed to prevent or
3. Failure to follow the quality
responsibilities;
mitigate a serious safety event:
management QM) program, including
8. A failure, during radiographic
(a) Not being able to perform its intended
procedures, whether or not a
,
rations, to have present at least two.. function under certain conditions (e.g.,
misadmiristration occurs, provided the
fled individuals or to use
safety system not operable unless utilities
failures are isolated, do not
graphic equipment, radiation
available, materials or components not
demonstrate a programmatic weakness
survey instruments, and/or personnel
accordin to specifications); or
iii the implementation of the QM
monitoring devices as required by 10
(b) Being degraded to the extent that a
program, and have limited
CFR Part 34;
detailed evaluation would be required to
consequences if a misadministration is
9. A failure to submit an NRC Form
determine its operability;
involved; failure to conduct the
241 as required by 10 CFR 150.20;
14. Changes in parameters that cause
required program review; or failure to
10. A failure to receive required NRC
unanticipated reductions in margins of
take corrective actions as required by
approval prior to the implementation of
safety;
a change in licensed activities that has
15. A significant failure to meet the
4. A failure to keep the records
radiological or programmatic
requirements of 10 CFR 76.68, including a
required by 10 CFR 35.32 or 35.33;
significance, such as, a change in
failure such that a required certificate
5. A less significant failure to
ownership; lack of an RSO or
amendment was not sought;
comply with the Action Statement for a
replacement of an RSO with an
16. A failure of the certificate holder to
Technical Safety Requirement Limiting
unqualified individual; a change in the
conduct adequate oversight of vendors or
Condition for Operation when the
location where licensed activities are
contractors resulting in the use of products
appropriate action was not taken within
being conducted, or where licensed
or services that are of defective or
the required time;
material is being stored where the new
indeterminate quality and that have safety
6. A failure to meet the requirements
facilities do not meet safety guidelines;
significance;
of 10 CER 76.68 that does not result in
or a change in the quantity or type of
17. Equipment failures caused by
a Severity Level 1, 11, or III violation;
radioactive material being processed or
inadequate or improper maintenance that
7. A failure to make a required
used that has radiological significance;
substantially complicates recovery from a
written event report, as required by
11. A significant failure to meet
plant transient;
decommissioning requirements including
18. A failure to establish, maintain, or
8. A failure to establish, implement,
gailure to notify the NRC as required
implement all but one criticality control (or
or maintain a criticality control (or
gulation or license condition,
control systems) for a single nuclear
control system) for a single nuclear
,41W
antial failure to meet
criticality scenario when a critical mass of
criticality scenario when the amount of
decommissioning standards, failure to
fissile material was present or reasonably
fissile material available was not, but
-26 -
Compilation of NRC Enforcement Policy as of September 10, 1997
could have been sufficient to result in a
4. Action by senior corporate
7. A failure to take reasonableacti
nuclear criticality.
management in violation of 10 CFR 50.7 or
when observed behavior within the
O
similar regulations against an employee;
protected area or credible information
SUPPLEMENT VII-MISCELLANEOUS
5. A knowin and intentional failure to
concerning activities within the
MATTERS
provide the notice required by 10 CFR Part
protected area indicates possible
21; or
unfitness for duty based on drug or
This supplement provides examples of
6. A failure to substantially implement
alcohol use;
violations in each of the four severity
the required fitness-for-duty program.
8. A deliberate failure of the
levels as guidance in determining the
B. Severity Level H - Violations
licensee's Employee Assistance
appropriate severity level for violations
involving for example:
Program (EAP) to notify licensee's
involving miscellaneous matters.
1. Inaccurate or incomplete information
management when EAP's staff is
A. Severity Level I - Violations
that is provided to the NRC (a) by a
aware that an individual's condition
involving for example:
licensee official because of careless
may adversely affect safety related
1. Inaccurate or incomplete
disregard for the completeness or accuracy
activities; or
information' that is provided to the
of the information, or (b) if the
9. The failure of licensee
NRC (a) deliberately with the
information, had it been complete and
management to take effective action in
knowledge of a licensee official that the
accurate at the time provided, likely would
correcting a hostile work environment.
inforrrtion is incomplete or inaccurate,
have resulted in regulatory action such as a
C. Severity Level III - Violations
or (b) if the information, had it been
show cause order or a different regulatory
involving for example:
complete and accurate at the time
position;
I. Incomplete or inaccurate
provided, likely would have resulted in
2. Incomplete or inaccurate information
information that is provided to the
regulatory action such as an immediate
that the NRC requires be kept by a. licensee
NRC (a) because of inadequate actions
order required by the public health and
which is (a) incomplete or inaccurate
on the part of licensee officials but not
safety;
because of careless disregard for the
amounting to a Severity Level I or II
2. Incomplete or inaccurate
accuracy of the information on the part of a
violation, or (b) if the information, ha
information that the NRC requires be
licensee official, or (b) if the
it been complete and accurate at the
kept by a licensee that is (a) incomplete
had it been complete and accurate when.
time provided, likely would have
or inaccurate because of falsification by
reviewed by the NRC, likely would have
resulted in a reconsideration of a
or with the knowledge of a licensee
resulted in regulatory action such as a show
regulatory position or substantial
official, or (b) if the information, had it
cause order or a different regulatory
further inquiry such as an additional
been complete and accurate when
position;
inspection or a formal request for
reviewed by the NRC, likely would
3. "Significant information identified by a
information;
have resulted in regulatory action such
licensee" and not provided to the
2. Incomplete or inaccurate
as an immediate order required by
Commission because of careless disregard
information that the NRC requires be
public health and safety considerations;
on the part of a licensee official;
kept by a licensee that is (a) incomplete
3. Information that the licensee has
4. An action by plant management above
or inaccurate because of inadequate
identified as having significant
first-line supervision in violation of 10 CFR
actions on the part of licensee officials
implications for public health and safety
50.7 or similar regulations against an
but not amounting to a Severity Level I
or the common defense and security
employee;
or 11 violation, or (b) if the
("significant information identified.by
5. A failure to provide the notice
information, had it been complete and
a licensee") and is deliberately withheld
required by 10 CFR Part 21;
accurate when reviewed by the NRC,
from the Commission;
6. A failure to remove an individual from
likely would have resulted in a
unescorted access who has been involved in
reconsideration of a regulatory position
the sale, use, or possession of illegal drugs
or substantial further inquiry such as an
1 In applying the examples in this
within the protected area or take action for
additional inspection or a formal
supplement regarding inaccurate or
on duty misuse of alcohol, prescription
request for information;
incomplete information and records,
drugs, or over-the-counter drugs;
3. A failure to provide "sigificant
reference should also be made to the
information identified by a licensee" to
guidance in Section IX, "Inaccurate and
t Comm Io an noating
Incomplete Information," and to the
The example for violations for
S
r
Lv ior by
ilat
ion
definition of "licensee official"
fitness-for-duty relate to violations of 10
4n
ation
firt-
.7 srisiol
contained in Section
1.C0
CFR Part 26.
-27-
Compilation of NRC Enforcement Policy as of September 10, 1997
lations against an employee;
CFR Part 21 with more than minor safety
2. A licensee failure to meet or
. An inadequate review or failure to
significance;
implement more than one emergency
review such that, if an appropriate
4. Violations of the requirements of Part
planning standard involving assessment
review had been made as required, a 10
26 of more than minor significance;
or notification.
CFR Part 21 report would have been
A failure to report acts of licensed
C. Severity Level III - Violations
made;
operators or supervisors pursuant to 10
involving for example:
6. A failure to complete a suitable
CFR 26.73; or
1. In an alert, licensee failure to
inquiry on the basis of 10 CFR Part 26,
6. Discrimination cases which, in
promptly (1) correctly classify the
keep records concerning the denial of
themselves, do not warrant a Severity Level
event, (2) make required notifications
access, or respond to inquiries
III categorization,
to responsible Federal, State, and local
concerning denials of access so that, as
agencies, or (3) respond to the event
a result of the failure, a person
SUPPLEMENT VIII-EMERGENCY
(e.g., assess actual or potential offsite
previously denied access for
PREPAREDNESS
consequences, actiyate emergency
fitness-for-duty reasons was improperly
response facilities, and augment shift
granted access;
This supplement provides examples of
staff);
7. A failure to take the required action
violations in each of the four severity levels
2. A licensee failure to meet or
for a person confirmed to have been
as guidance in determining the appropriate
implement one emergency planning
testecFpositive for illegal drug use or
severity level for violations in the area of
standard involving assessment or
take action for onsite alcohol use; not
emergency preparedness. It should be
notification; or
amounting.to a Severity Level II
noted that citations are not normally made
3. A breakdown in the control of
violation;
for violations involving emergency
licensed activities involving a number
8. A failure to assure, as required,
preparedness occurring during emergency
of violations that are related (or, if
that contractors or vendors have an
exercises. However, where exercises
isolated, that are recurring violations)
five fitness-for-duty program;
reveal (i) training, procedural, or repetitive
that collectively represent a potentially
A breakdown in the fitness-for-duty
failures for which corrective actions have
significant lack of attention or
ram involving a number of
not been taken, (ii) an overall concern
carelessness toward licensed
violations of the basic elements of the
regarding the licensee's ability to
fitness-for-duty program that
implement its plan in a manner that
D. Severity Level IV - Violations
collectively reflect a significant lack of
adequately protects public health and
attention or carelessness towards
safety, or (iii) poor self critiques of the
A licensee failure to meet or
meeting the objectives of 10 CFR 26.10;
licensee's exercises, enforcement action
or
may be appropriate,
standard or requirement not directly
10. Threats of discrimination or
A. Severity Level I - Violations involving
related to assessment and notification.
restrictive agreements which are
for example:
violations under NRC regulations such
In a general emergency, licensee failure to
as 10 CFR 50.7(f).
promptly (1) correctly classify the event,
D. Severity Level IV - Violations
(2) make required notifications to
involving for example:
responsible Federal, State, and local
1. Incomplete or inaccurate
agencies, or (3) respond to the event (e.g.,
information of more than minor
assess actual or potential offsite
significance that is provided to the NRC
consequences, activate emergency response
but not amounting to a Severity Level 1,
facilities, and augment shift staff.)
11, or III violation;
B. Severity Level II - Violations
2. Information that the NRC requires
involving for example:
be kept by a licensee and that is
L' In a site emergency, licensee failure to
incomplete or inaccurate and of more
promptly (1) correctly classify the event,
than minor significance but not
(2) make required notifications to
amounting to a Severity Level I, II, or
responsible Federal, State, and local
e
violation;
agencies, or (3) respond to the event (e.g.,
An inadequate review or failure to
assess actual or potential offsite
ew under 10 CFR Part 21 or other
consequences, activate emergency response
procedural violations associated v4ith 10
facilities, and augment shift staff); or
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