ML14091A190

Initial Exam 2013-301 Final Admin Documents

ML14091A190
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	04/01/2014
From:	Division of Reactor Safety II
To:	Southern Nuclear Operating Co
References
Download: ML14091A190 (62)

Text

ES-201 Examination Preparation Checklist Form ES-201-1 Facility: Farley 2013-301 Date of Examination: 6/17/13 Facility NRC Examinations Developed by:

Written / Operating Test Written / Operating Test Chief Target Task Description (Reference) Examiners Date*

Initials

-180 1. Examination administration date confirmed (C.1.a; C.2.a and b) PGC

-120 2. NRC examiners and facility contact assigned (C.1.d; C.2.e) PGC

-120 3. Facility contact briefed on security and other requirements (C.2.c) PGC

-120 4. Corporate notification letter sent (C.2.d) PGC

[-90] [5. Reference material due (C.1.e; C.3.c; Attachment 2)] PGC

{-75} 6. Integrated examination outline(s) due, including Forms ES-201-2, ES-201-3, ES-301-1, ES-301-2, ES-301-5, ES-D-1's, ES-401-1/2, ES-401-3, and ES-401-4, as PGC applicable (C.1.e and f; C.3.d)

{-70} {7. Examination outline(s) reviewed by NRC and feedback provided to facility PGC licensee (C.2.h; C.3.e)}

{-45} 8. Proposed examinations (including written, walk-through JPMs, and scenarios, as applicable), supporting documentation (including Forms ES-301-3, ES-301-4, PGC ES-301-5, ES-301-6, and ES-401-6), and reference materials due (C.1.e, f, g and h; C.3.d)

-30 9. Preliminary license applications (NRC Form 398's) due (C.1.l; C.2.g; ES-202) PGC

-14 10. Final license applications due and Form ES-201-4 prepared (C.1.l; C.2.i; ES-202) PGC

-14 11. Examination approved by NRC supervisor for facility licensee review PGC (C.2.h; C.3.f)

-14 12. Examinations reviewed with facility licensee (C.1.j; C.2.f and h; C.3.g) PGC

-7 13. Written examinations and operating tests approved by NRC supervisor PGC (C.2.i; C.3.h)

-7 14. Final applications reviewed; 1 or 2 (if >10) applications audited to confirm qualifications / eligibility; and examination approval and waiver letters sent PGC (C.2.i; Attachment 4; ES-202, C.2.e; ES-204)

-7 15. Proctoring/written exam administration guidelines reviewed with facility licensee PGC (C.3.k)

-7 16. Approved scenarios, job performance measures, and questions distributed to PGC NRC examiners (C.3.i)

• Target dates are generally based on facility-prepared examinations and are keyed to the examination date identified in the corporate notification letter. They are for planning purposes and may be adjusted on a case-by-case basis in coordination with the facility licensee.

[Applies only] {Does not apply} to examinations prepared by the NRC.

ES-201 -2 Examination Outline Quality Checklist Facility: Farley Nuclear Plant Date of Examination: June 17, 2013 Operating Test Number: FA2013-301 Initials Item Task Description

1. a. Verify that the outline(s) fit(s) the appropriate model, in accordance with ES-401.

B b. Assess whether the outline was systematically and randomly prepared in accordance with I Section D.1 of ES-401 and whether all K/A categories are appropriately sampled.

T T c. Assess whether the outline over-emphasizes any systems, evolutions, or generic topics. 1O *11.-

d. Assess whether the justifications for deselected or rejected K/A statements are appropriate. J .

2. a. Using Form ES-301-5, verify that the proposed scenario sets cover the required number of normal evolutions, instrument and component failures, technical specifications, )it._

S and major transients.

M b. Assess whether there are enough scenario sets (and spares) to test the projected number U and mix of applicants in accordance with the expected crew composition and rotation schedule L without compromising exam integrity, and ensure that each applicant can be tested using A at least one new or significantly modified scenario, that no scenarios are duplicated T from the applicants audit test(s), and that scenarios will not be repeated on subsequent days.

c. To the extent possible, assess whether the outline(s) conform(s) with the qualitative and quantitative criteria specified on Form ES-301-4 and described in Appendix D.

3. a. Verify that the systems walk-through outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301 -2:

(1) the outline(s) contain(s) the required number of control room and in-plant tasks W distributed among the safety functions as specified on the form I (2) task repetition from the last two NRC examinations is within the limits specified on the form T (3) no tasks are duplicated from the applicants audit test(s)

(4) the number of new or modied tasks meets or exceeds the minimums specified on the form (5) the number of alternate path, low-power, emergency, and RCA tasks meet the criteria on the form.

b. Verify that the administrative outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301 -1:

(1) the tasks are distributed among the topics as specified on the form .

I, (2) at least one task is new or significantly modified (3) no more than one task is repeated from the last two NRC licensing examinations r- r

c. Determine if there are enough different outlines to test the projected number and mix ,n of applicants and ensure that no items are duplicated on subsequent days.

4. a. Assess whether plant-specific priorities (including PRA and IPE insights) are covered fj in the appropriate exam sections. 0

b. Assess whether the 10 CFR 55.41/43 and 55.45 sampling is appropriate. -e

c. Ensure that K/A importance ratings (except for plant-specific priorities) are at least 2.5.

R d. Check for duplication and overlap among exam sections.

L e. Check the entire exam for balance of coverage. j f.__Assess_whether_the_exam_fits_the_appropriate_job_level_(RO_or_SRO).

r ted Name/Signature Date

a. Author Billy Thornton / . 05/30/13

(*) Gary Ohmstede / 95/30/13

b. Facility Reviewer

c. NRC Chief Examiner (#) £ Ctri

d. NRC Supervisor AJL7.WLDAA4L

/

Note: # Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column C; chief examiner concurrence required.

Not applicable for NRC-prepared examination outlines

ES-301-1 Administrative Topics Outline Facility: Farley Nuclear Plant Date of Examination: June 17, 2013 Examination Level: RO X Operating Test Number: FA2013-301 Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (see Note) Code*

a. A.1.a

Title:

Evaluate Inoperable Plant Computer Based Alarm Conduct of Operations R, N Functions This will be a task to determine Acceptance Criteria by comparing GRPI to DRPI, and comparing NI readings to the COLR.

G2.1.37 4.3/4.6

b. A.1.b Title : Determine The Minimum Amount And Duration Conduct of Operation Required For An RCS Boration R, D Given an RCS Temp < 525ºF and an emergency boration flowrate, determine the amount of boration required & the time of boration per AOP-27.0. [calculate per step 9.3]

G2.1.7 4.4/4.7 G2.1.25 3.9/4.2 G2.1.20 4.6/4.6

c. A.2

Title:

RCP Seal Injection Leakage Test Equipment Control R, N This will be a task to determine RCP SI leakage and evaluate Acceptance Criteria test per STP-8.0, RCP Seal Injection Leakage Test.

G2.2.12 3.7/4.1

d. A.3

Title:

Determine Access Personnel Exposure Radiation Control R, D Determine if total personnel exposure for a containment entry is acceptable without exceeding the dose margin limits and which route allows the lowest exposure.

G2.3.4 3.2/3.7 NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.

• Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom 4 (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes) 2 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1) 2 (P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected) 0

ES-301-1 Administrative Topics Outline Facility: Farley Nuclear Plant Date of Examination: June 17, 2013 Examination Level: SRO X Operating Test Number: FA2013-301 Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (see Note) Code*

a. A.1.a

Title:

Evaluate Inoperable Plant Computer Based Alarm Conduct of Operations R, N Functions This will be a task to determine Acceptance Criteria by comparing GRPI to DRPI, and comparing NI readings to the COLR, then evaluate Tech Specs to determine if action is required. (SRO)

G2.1.37 4.3/4.6

b. A.1.b Title : Determine The Minimum Amount And Duration Conduct of Operation Required For An RCS Boration R, D Given an RCS Temp < 525ºF and an emergency boration flowrate, determine the amount of boration required & the time of boration per AOP-27.0 [calculate per step 9.3]

G2.1.7 4.4/4.7 G2.1.25 3.9/4.2 G2.1.20 4.6/4.6

c. A.2

Title:

RCP Seal Injection Leakage Test Equipment Control R, N This will be a task to determine RCP SI leakage and evaluate Acceptance Criteria test per STP-8.0, RCP Seal Injection Leakage Test, then evaluate Tech Specs. (SRO)

G2.2.12 3.7/4.1

d. A.3

Title:

Determine Access Personnel Exposure Radiation Control R, D Determine if total personnel exposure for a containment entry is acceptable without exceeding the dose margin limits and which route allows the lowest exposure.

G2.3.4 3.2/3.7

e. A.4

Title:

Classify an Emergency Event per NMP-EP-110, Emergency Procedures/Plan R, D Emergency Classification Determination and Initial Action, SRO ONLY and complete Checklist 1, Classification Determination.

G2.4.41 SRO 4.6 NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.

• Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom 5 (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes) 3 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1) 2 (P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected) 0

ES-301-2 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Facility: Farley Nuclear Plant Date of Examination: June 17, 2013 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U- Operating Test No.: FA2013-301 Control Room Systems (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)

System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function

a. CRO-065C: Perform an Emergency Boration A, D, L, S 1 024AA2.02 RO-3.9 SRO-4.4 024AA2.01 RO-3.8 SRO-4.1

b. CRO-406A: Verify CTMT Isolation Phase A Is Actuated And A, D, L, S 2 Aligned 013A4.01 RO-4.5 SRO-4.8

c. CRO-333C: Perform The Required Actions For Transfer to A, D, L, S 3 Simultaneous Cold Leg and Hot Leg Recirculation 006A4.07 RO-4.4 SRO-4.4 011EA1.11 RO-4.2 SRO-4.2

d. CRO-043: (modified) Start the 1C RCP. A, L, M, S 4P 003A1.01 RO-2.9 SRO-2.9 003A2.02 RO-3.7 SRO-3.9

e. CRO-239: (modified) Align Service Water to the AFW System L, M, S 4S 061A1.05 RO-3.6 SRO-3.7 009EA1.11 RO-4.1 SRO-4.1 009EA2.39 RO-4.3 SRO-4.7

f. CRO-406E: Two Train Verification Of ECCS Equipment A, D, S 6 064A4.06 RO-3.9 SRO-3.9

g. CRO-071: Lower The Refueling Cavity Level Using The D, S 8 Residual Heat Removal System 034A1.02 RO-2.9 SRO-3.7

h. CRO-395D: Obtain the Value of Thermocouple J12 D, S, P RO ONLY 7

017A4.01 RO-3.8 SRO-4.1 In-Plant Systems (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)

i. SO-344: Start Up An Instrumentation Inverter D 6 062A2.03 RO-2.9 SRO-3.4 057AA1.01 RO-3.7 SRO-3.7

j. SO-New: Start the MDFP and #2 DDFP locally E, N, 8 086A3.01 RO-2.9 SRO-3.3 086A4.01 RO-3.3 SRO-3.3

j. SO-386: (Modified) Commence a Waste Gas Release M, R 9 071A2.02 RO-3.3 SRO-3.6 071A4.09 RO-3.3 SRO-3.5 071A4.26 RO-3.1 SRO-3.9

@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

• Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I (A)lternate path 4-6 / 4-6 (5/5)

(C)ontrol room (0/0)

(D)irect from bank 9/8 (7/6)

(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1/1 (1/1)

(EN)gineered safety feature - / - ------

(L)ow-Power / Shutdown 1/1 (5/5)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2/2 (4/4)

(P)revious 2 exams 3 / 3 (randomly selected) (1/0)

(R)CA 1/1 (1/1)

(S)imulator (8/7)

ES-301-3 Operating Test Quality Checklist Facility: Farley Nuclear Plant Date of Examination: June 17, 2013 Operating Test Number: FA2013-301 Initials

1. General Criteria a b* c#

a. The operating test conforms with the previously approved outline; changes are consistent with -

sampling requirements (e.g., 10 CFR 55.45, operational importance, safety function distribution). i

b. There is no day-to-day repetition between this and other operating tests to be administered during this examination. F

c. The operating test shall not duplicate items from the applicants audit test(s). (see Section D.1 .a.)

d. Overlap with the written examination and between different parts of the operating test is within - o acceptable limits. .0

e. It appears that the operating test will differentiate between competent and less-than-competent applicants at the designated license level.

2. Walk-Through Criteria -- --

a. Each JPM includes the following, as applicable:

• initial conditions

• initiating cues

• references and tools, including associated procedures

• reasonable and validated time limits (average time allowed for completion) and specific designation if deemed to be time-critical by the facility licensee p

• operationally important specific performance criteria that include:

detailed expected actions with exact criteria and nomenclature system response and other examiner cues statements describing important observations to be made by the applicant criteria for successful completion of the task identification of critical steps and their associated performance standards restrictions on the sequence of steps, if applicable

b. Ensure that any changes from the previously approved systems and administrative walk-through outlines (Forms ES-301-1 and 2) have not caused the test to deviate from any of the acceptance criteria (e.g., item distribution, bank use, repetition from the last 2 NRC examinations) specified 4j-I) 2 4A sr on those forms and Form ES-201-2.

3. Simulator Criteria -- --

The associated simulator operating tests (scenario sets) have been reviewed in accordance with .

Form ES-301-4 and a copy is attached. .

Printed Name / Signature Date

a. Author: Billy Thornton I 05/30/13

b. Facility Reviewer(*) Gary Ohmstede / 05/30/13

c. NRC Chief Examiner(#)

d. NRC Supervisor L1AL1ATWU?iZL.wAW/

NOTE: The facility signature is not applicable for NRC-developed tests.

1. Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column c; chief examiner concurrence required.

ES-301-4 Simulator Scenaro Quality Checklist Facility: Farley Date of Exam: June 17, 2013 Scenario Numbers: 2/3/5/6 Operating Test No.: FA2013-301 QUALITATIVE ATTRIBUTES Initials a b* c#

1. The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue the operators into expected events. ( J4._

2. The scenarios consist mostly of related events.

3. Each event description consists of

. the point in the scenario when it is to be initiated

. the malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event

. the symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew \j /L;7

. the expected operator actions (by shift position)

. the event termination point (if applicable)

4. No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated into the scenario j.

without a credible preceding incident such as a seismic event. $.

5. The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics. 2lo fr\

6. Sequencing and timing of events is reasonable, and allows the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives. frk

7. If time compression techniques are used, the scenario summary clearly so indicates.

Operators have sufficient time to carry out expected activities without undue time constraints.

Cues are given.

8. The simulator modeling is not altered. k.o

9. The scenarios have been validated. Pursuant to 10 CFR 55.46(d), any open simulator performance deficiencies or deviations from the referenced plant have been evaluated to ensure that functional fidelity is maintained while running the planned scenarios. /

10. Every operator will be evaluated using at least one new or significantly modified scenario.

All other scenarios have been altered in accordance with Section D.5 of ES-301.

1 1. All individual operator competencies can be evaluated, as verified using Form ES-301 -6 (submit the form along with the simulator scenarios). /

12. Each applicant will be significantly involved in the minimum number of transients and events specif led on Form ES-301-5 (submit the form with the simulator scenarios).

13. The level of difficulty is appropriate to support licensing decisions for each crew position. j (

Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) Actual Attributes -- --

Scenario Numbers:

2/3/5/6

1. Total malfunctions (58) 7 / 10 / 10 / 8 j[ i2

2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (12) 3/4/5 / 3

3. Abnormal events (24) 4/5/ 5 / 4

4. Major transients (12) 1 /3/2/2

5. EOP5 entered/requiring substantive actions (12) 1 /2/ 1 /.O

6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (02) 0/1 /1 /1

7. Critical tasks (23) 3/2/3/2 .

4 rJ Page 1 of 1

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: Farley Nuclear Plant Date of Exam: June 17, 2013 Operating Test No.: FA2013-301 A E Scenarios P V 3 5 6 M P E T I L N CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION O N I T T I C A M A T S A B S A B S A B S A B L U N Y R T O R T O R T O R T O M( * )

T P O C P O C P O C P O C P E

R I U RX 5 6 1 1 1 0 M

NOR 5 26 1 1 1 1 A

S I/C 123 137 247 134 148 358 234 247 357 4 4 2 T 479 9 58 10 57 E 10 R MAJ 689 689 689 79 79 79 68 68 68 2 2 1 TS 235 134 25 0 2 2 RX 0 1 1 0 SRO-i NOR 0 1 1 1

I/C 0 4 4 2 MAJ 0 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 RX 1 1 1 1 0 RO1 NOR 0 1 1 1

I/C 247 3 4 4 2 MAJ 68 2 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 RX 0 1 1 0 BOP1 NOR 5 26 3 1 1 1

I/C 247 358 8 4 4 2 9 10 MAJ 689 79 5 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per section C.2.a of Appendix D. ( * ) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right hand columns.

NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 1 of 1 Farley Facsimile Rev. 0

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: Farley Nuclear Plant Date of Exam: June 17, 2013 Operating Test No.: FA2013-301 A E Scenarios P V 3 5 6 M P E T I L N CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION O N I T T I C A M A T S A B S A B S A B S A B L U N Y R T O R T O R T O R T O M( * )

T P O C P O C P O C P O C P E

R I U RX 5 6 1 1 1 0 M

NOR 5 26 1 1 1 1 A

S I/C 123 137 247 134 148 358 234 247 357 4 4 2 T 479 9 58 10 57 E 10 R MAJ 689 689 689 79 79 79 68 68 68 2 2 1 TS 235 134 25 0 2 2 RX 0 1 1 0 SRO-i NOR 0 1 1 1

I/C 123 234 11 4 4 2 Renaud 479 57 MAJ 689 68 5 2 2 1 TS 235 25 5 0 2 2 RX 6 1 1 1 0 RO2 NOR 0 1 1 1

I/C 148 3 4 4 2 Renaud MAJ 79 2 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 RX 0 1 1 0 BOP2 NOR 5 1 1 1

I/C 14 4 4 2 MAJ 8 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per section C.2.a of Appendix D. ( * ) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right hand columns.

NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 1 of 1 Farley Facsimile Rev. 0

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: Farley Nuclear Plant Date of Exam: June 17, 2013 Operating Test No.: FA2013-301 A E Scenarios P V 3 5 6 M P E T I L N CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION O N I T T I C A M A T S A B S A B S A B S A B L U N Y R T O R T O R T O R T O M( * )

T P O C P O C P O C P O C P E

R I U RX 5 6 1 1 1 0 M

NOR 5 26 1 1 1 1 A

S I/C 123 137 247 134 148 358 234 247 357 4 4 2 T 479 9 58 10 57 E 10 R MAJ 689 689 689 79 79 79 68 68 68 2 2 1 TS 235 134 25 0 2 2 RX 0 1 1 0 SRO-i NOR 0 1 1 1

I/C 134 6 4 4 2 58 10 MAJ 79 2 2 2 1 TS 134 3 0 2 2 RX 5 1 1 1 0 RO3 NOR 0 1 1 1

I/C 137 3 4 4 2 MAJ 689 3 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 RX 0 1 1 0 BOP3 NOR 1 1 1 1 1

I/C 357 3 4 4 2 MAJ 68 2 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per section C.2.a of Appendix D. ( * ) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right hand columns.

NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 1 of 1 Farley Facsimile Rev. 0

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: Farley Nuclear Plant Date of Exam: June 17, 2013 Operating Test No.: FA2013-301 A E Scenarios P V 2 3 5 6 M P E T I L N CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION O N I T T I C A M A T S A B S A B S A B S A B L U N Y R T O R T O R T O R T O M( * )

T P O C P O C P O C P O C P E

R I U RX 1 5 6 1 1 1 0 M

NOR 5 5 26 1 1 1 1 A

S I/C 234 248 368 123 137 247 134 148 358 234 247 357 4 4 2 T 678 7 479 9 58 10 57 E 10 R MAJ 7 7 7 689 689 689 79 79 79 68 68 68 2 2 1 TS 46 235 134 25 0 2 2 RX 0 1 1 0 SRO-i NOR 0 1 1 1

I/C 234 123 134 234 23 4 4 2 678 479 58 57 10 MAJ 7 689 79 68 8 2 2 1 TS 46 235 134 25 10 0 2 2 RX 1 5 6 1 4 1 1 0 RO NOR 0 1 1 1

I/C 248 137 148 247 13 4 4 2 7

MAJ 7 689 79 68 8 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 RX 0 1 1 0 BOP NOR 5 5 26 1 5 1 1 1

I/C 368 247 358 357 14 4 4 2 9 10 MAJ 7 689 79 68 8 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per section C.2.a of Appendix D. ( * ) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right hand columns.

NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 1 of 1 Farley Facsimile Rev. 0

ES-301-6 Competencies Checklist Facility: Farley Nuclear Plant Date of Examination: June 17, 2013 Operating Test No.: FA2013-301 APPLICANTS Competencies SRO-I X RO X BOP X SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 2 3 5 6 2 3 5 6 2 3 5 6 Interpret/Diagnose Events 23 12 13 23 24 13 14 24 368 24 35 35 and Conditions 46 34 45 45 78 57 8 7 5 7 8 10 7 78 56 9 67 9 89 8 Comply With and 23 13 13 12 24 13 14 14 356 24 23 13 Use Procedures (1) 45 45 48 34 78 7 67 7 8 79 56 57 67 67 9 56 8 8 10 8 8 9 10 7 8 Operate Control 12 13 14 12 356 24 23 13 Boards (2) 47 57 68 47 8 57 56 57 8 8 9 8 10 8 Communicate 23 12 13 12 24 13 14 12 356 24 23 13 and Interact 45 34 45 34 78 57 68 47 8 56 56 57 67 56 68 56 89 8 79 78 8 8 78 9 78 10 9

Demonstrate Supervisory 12 12 13 12 Ability (3) 34 34 45 34 67 57 68 56 8 89 10 78 Comply With and 46 23 13 25 Use Tech. Specs. (3) 5 4 Notes: (1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO. (2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SROs. .

Instructions:

Check the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant.

Page 1 of 1

ES-401, Rev. 9 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Facility: Farley Date of Exam: 2013 June RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points Tier Group K K K K K K A A A A G A2 G* Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4

• Total

1. 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 18 18 3 3 66 Emergency &

2 1 2 1 2 1 2 99 2 2 44 Abnormal Plant N/A N/A Evolutions Tier Totals 4 5 4 5 4 5 27 27 5 5 10 10 1 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 2 2 3 28 3 2 55 2.

2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 10 2 1 33 Plant Systems Tier Totals 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 3 2 4 38 5 3 88

3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities 1 2 3 4 10 1 2 3 4 7 Categories 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 1

1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the "Tier Totals" in each K/A category shall not be less than two).

2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table.

The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by 1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions.

The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.

3. Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.

4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.

5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected.

Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.

6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.

7. *The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable KAs.

8. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics=importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note # 1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.

9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43..

ES-401, REV 9 T1G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO 007EA2.06 Reactor Trip - Stabilization - Recovery 4.3 4.5 Occurrence of a reactor trip

/1 008AK1.01 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident / 3 3.2 3.7 Thermodynamics and flow characteristics of open or leak- ing valves 009EK2.03 Small Break LOCA / 3 3 3.3 S/Gs 011EK2.02 Large Break LOCA / 3 2.6 2.7 Pumps 015AA2.02 RCP Malfunctions / 4 2.8 3 Abnormalities in RCP air vent flow paths and/or oil cooling system 022AK1.04 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup / 2 2.9 3 Reason for changing from manual to automatic control of charging flow valve controller 025AA1.01 Loss of RHR System / 4 3.6 3.7 RCS/RHRS cooldown rate 026AG2.4.50 Loss of Component Cooling Water / 8 4.2 4.0 Ability to verify system alarm setpoints and operate controls identified in the alarm response manual.

038EK3.02 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture / 3 4.4 4.5 Prevention of secondary PORV cycling 054AA2.05 Loss of Main Feedwater / 4 3.5 3.7 Status of MFW pumps and regulating valves 056AK3.02 Loss of Off-site Power / 6 4.4 4.7 Actions contained in EOP for loss of offsite power Page 1 of 2 10/26/2012 12:39 PM

ES-401, REV 9 T1G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO 062AA1.07 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water / 4 2.9 3 Flow rates to the components and systems that are serviced by the SWS; interactions among the components 065AG2.4.11 Loss of Instrument Air / 8 4.0 4.2 Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures.

077AK3.02 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid 3.6 3.9 Actions contained in abnormal operating procedures for Disturbances / 6 voltage and grid disturbances WE04EA1.1 LOCA Outside Containment / 3 4.0 4.0 Components and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes and automatic and manual features.

we05EG2.4.2 Inadequate Heat Transfer - Loss of 4.5 4.6 Knowledge of system set points, interlocks and automatic Secondary Heat Sink / 4 actions associated with EOP entry conditions.

WE11EK2.1 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirc. / 4 3.6 3.9 Components and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes and automatic and manual features.

WE12EK1.1 Uncontrolled Depressurization of all S/Gs 3.4 3.8 Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems.

Page 2 of 2 10/26/2012 12:39 PM

ES-401, REV 9 T1G2 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO 001AA2.01 Continuous Rod Withdrawal / 1 4.2 4.2 Reactor tripped breaker indicator 036AG2.1.7 Fuel Handling Accident / 8 4.4 4.7 Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior and instrument interpretation.

037AK1.01 Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 2.9 3.3 Use of steam tables 051AK3.01 Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 2.8 3.1 Loss of steam dump capability upon loss of condenser vacuum 059AK2.01 Accidental Liquid RadWaste Rel. / 9 2.7 2.8 Radioactive-liquid monitors 068AK2.07 Control Room Evac. / 8 3.3 3.4 ED/G 076AA1.04 High Reactor Coolant Activity / 9 3.2 3.4 Failed fuel-monitoring equipment we08EG2.4.6 RCS Overcooling - PTS / 4 3.7 4.7 Knowledge symptom based EOP mitigation strategies.

WE15EA1.3 Containment Flooding / 5 2.8 3.0 Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

Page 1 of 1 10/26/2012 12:40 PM

ES-401, REV 9 T2G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO 003A3.05 Reactor Coolant Pump 2.7 2.6 RCP lube oil and bearing lift pumps 004K3.08 Chemical and Volume Control 3.6 3.8 RCP seal injection 005A2.02 Residual Heat Removal 3.5 3.7 Pressure transient protection during cold shutdown 006K5.06 Emergency Core Cooling 3.5 3.9 Relationship between ECCS flow and RCS pressure 006K6.18 Emergency Core Cooling 3.6 3.9 Subcooling margin indicators 007K5.02 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank 3.1 3.4 Method of forming a steam bubble in the PZR 008K2.02 Component Cooling Water 3.0 3.2 CCW pump, including emergency backup 010A2.01 Pressurizer Pressure Control 3.3 3.6 Heater failures 012A4.06 Reactor Protection 4.3 4.3 Reactor trip breakers 013G2.1.19 Engineered Safety Features Actuation 3.9 3.8 Ability to use plant computer to evaluate system or component status.

022A1.03 Containment Cooling 3.1 3.4 Containment humidity Page 1 of 3 10/26/2012 12:41 PM

ES-401, REV 9 T2G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO 022K4.03 Containment Cooling 3.6 4.0 Automatic containment isolation 026K2.01 Containment Spray 3.4 3.6 Containment spray pumps 039K1.09 Main and Reheat Steam 2.7 2.7 RMS 059A4.01 Main Feedwater 3.1 3.1 MFW turbine trip indication 059G2.2.44 Main Feedwater 4.2 4.4 Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions 061A3.01 Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater 4.2 4.2 AFW startup and flows 061K5.01 Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater 3.6 3.9 Relationship between AFW flow and RCS heat transfer 062K3.01 AC Electrical Distribution 3.5 3.9 Major system loads 063A1.01 DC Electrical Distribution 2.5 3.3 Battery capacity as it is affected by discharge rate 064K3.02 Emergency Diesel Generator 4.2 4.4 ESFAS controlled or actuated systems 064K6.07 Emergency Diesel Generator 2.7 2.9 Air receivers Page 2 of 3 10/26/2012 12:41 PM

ES-401, REV 9 T2G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO 073A2.02 Process Radiation Monitoring 2.7 3.2 Detector failure 073G2.2.42 Process Radiation Monitoring 3.9 4.6 Ability to recognize system parameters that are entry-level conditions for Technical Specifications 076K2.08 Service Water 3.1 3.3 ESF-actuated MOVs 076K4.03 Service Water 2.9 3.4 Automatic opening features associated with SWS isolation valves to CCW heat exchanges 078K1.01 Instrument Air 2.8 2.7 Sensor air 103K4.06 Containment 3.1 3.7 Containment isolation system Page 3 of 3 10/26/2012 12:41 PM

ES-401, REV 9 T2G2 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO 011K2.02 Pressurizer Level Control 3.1 3.2 PZR heaters 014K5.01 Rod Position Indication 2.7 3.0 Reasons for differences between RPIS and step counter 017K6.01 In-core Temperature Monitor 2.7 3.0 Sensors and detectors 029A1.02 Containment Purge 3.4 3.4 Radiation levels 033K4.05 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling 3.1 3.3 Adequate SDM (boron concentration) 035A2.01 Steam Generator 4.5 4.6 Faulted or ruptured S/Gs 045K1.19 Main Turbine Generator 3.4 3.6 ESFAS 055A3.03 Condenser Air Removal 2.5 2.7 Automatic diversion of CARS exhaust 071K3.05 Waste Gas Disposal 3.2 3.2 ARM and PRM systems 079G2.4.34 Station Air 4.2 4.1 Knowledge of RO tasks performed outside the main control room during an emergency and the resultant operational effects Page 1 of 1 10/26/2012 12:42 PM

ES-401, REV 9 T3 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO G2.1.18 Conduct of operations 3.6 3.8 Ability to make accurate, clear and concise logs, records, status boards and reports.

G2.1.5 Conduct of operations 2.9 3.9 Ability to locate and use procedures related to shift staffing, such as minimum crew complement, overtime limitations, etc.

G2.2.20 Equipment Control 2.6 3.8 Knowledge of the process for managing troubleshooting activities.

G2.2.25 Equipment Control 3.2 4.2 Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.

G2.3.12 Radiation Control 3.2 3.7 Knowledge of radiological safety principles pertaining to licensed operator duties G2.3.13 Radiation Control 3.4 3.8 Knowledge of radiological safety procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties G2.3.4 Radiation Control 3.2 3.7 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal and emergency conditions G2.4.20 Emergency Procedures/Plans 3.8 4.3 Knowledge of operational implications of EOP warnings, cautions and notes.

G2.4.23 Emergency Procedures/Plans 3.4 4.4 Knowledge of the bases for prioritizing emergency procedure implementation during emergency operations.

G2.4.29 Emergency Procedures/Plans 3.1 4.4 Knowledge of the emergency plan.

Page 1 of 1 10/26/2012 12:42 PM

ES-401, REV 9 SRO T1G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO 008AG2.2.22 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident / 3 4.0 4.7 Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.

029EA2.04 ATWS / 1 3.2 3.3 CVCS centrifugal charging pump operating indication 054AA2.01 Loss of Main Feedwater / 4 4.3 4.4 Occurrence of reactor and/or turbine trip 055EG2.2.12 Station Blackout / 6 3.7 4.1 Knowledge of surveillance procedures.

058AA2.02 Loss of DC Power / 6 3.3 3.6 125V dc bus voltage, low/critical low, alarm 077AG2.4.31 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid 4.2 4.1 Knowledge of annunciators alarms, indications or response Disturbances / 6 procedures Page 1 of 1 10/26/2012 12:43 PM

ES-401, REV 9 SRO T1G2 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO 024AA2.04 Emergency Boration / 1 3.4 4.2 Availability of BWST 051AG2.1.7 Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 4.4 4.7 Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judments based on op characteristics, reactor behaviour, etc.

WE02EA2.1 SI Termination / 3 3.3 4.2 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

we06EG2.1.27 Degraded Core Cooling / 4 3.9 4 Knowledge of system purpose and or function.

Page 1 of 1 10/26/2012 12:45 PM

ES-401, REV 9 SRO T2G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO 004A2.02 Chemical and Volume Control 3.9 4.2 Loss of PZR level (failure mode) 006G2.2.22 Emergency Core Cooling 4.0 4.7 Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.

059A2.12 Main Feedwater 3.1 3.4 Failure of feedwater regulating valves 064G2.2.44 Emergency Diesel Generator 4.2 4.4 Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions 073A2.01 Process Radiation Monitoring 2.5 2.9 Erratic or failed power supply Page 1 of 1 10/26/2012 12:46 PM

ES-401, REV 9 SRO T2G2 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO 001A2.17 Control Rod Drive 3.3 3.8 Rod-misalignment alarm 028G2.1.1 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge 3.8 4.2 Knowledge of conduct of operations requirements Control 071G2.2.25 Waste Gas Disposal 3.2 4.2 Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.

Page 1 of 1 10/26/2012 12:47 PM

ES-401, REV 9 SRO T3 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO G2.1.20 Conduct of operations 4.6 4.6 Ability to execute procedure steps.

G2.1.37 Conduct of operations 4.3 4.6 Knowledge of procedures, guidelines or limitations associated with reactivity management G2.2.21 Equipment Control 2.9 4.1 Knowledge of pre- and post-maintenance operability requirements.

G2.2.23 Equipment Control 3.1 4.6 Ability to track Technical Specification limiting conditions for operations.

G2.3.14 Radiation Control 3.4 3.8 Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities G2.3.6 Radiation Control 2.0 3.8 Ability to aprove release permits G2.4.6 Emergency Procedures/Plans 3.7 4.7 Knowledge symptom based EOP mitigation strategies.

Page 1 of 1 10/26/2012 12:49 PM

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 Tier / Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected K/A TxGx ORIGINAL KA Reason for replacement SRO/RO Examiner (NRC) randomly selected new KA# as the replacement K/A.

T1G1 026AG2.4.30 Facility was unable to generate an acceptable discriminatory level question because the RO position is not required to make reports RO to internal or outside agencies.

Examiner (NRC) randomly selected 026AG2.4.50 as the replacement.

T1G1 065AG2.4.3 Facility was unable to generate an acceptable discriminatory level question because there is no connection between Loss of Air and RO Post accident instrumentation.

Examiner (NRC) randomly selected 065AG2.4.11 as the replacement.

Facility was unable to generate an acceptable discriminatory level T1G2 WE08EG2.4.34 question because there are no RO tasks performed outside the RO main control room during a PTS event.

Examiner (NRC) randomly selected WE08G2.4.6 as the replacement.

Facility was unable to generate an acceptable discriminatory level T2G1 025K6.01 question because there are no ice condensers on site.

RO Examiner (NRC) randomly selected 006K6.18 as the replacement.

Facility was unable to generate an acceptable discriminatory level T2G1 061A3.05 question because there is no tie between the AFW and sump level RO changes for this facility.

Examiner (NRC) randomly selected 061A3.01 as the replacement.

Facility was unable to generate an acceptable discriminatory level T2G1 076K2.04 question because there is no Reactor building closed cooling water RO system for this facility.

Examiner (NRC) randomly selected 076K2.08 as the replacement.

Facility was unable to generate an acceptable discriminatory level T2G1 103K4.01 question because there is no containment Vacuum breaker RO protection for this facility.

Examiner (NRC) randomly selected 103K4.06 as the replacement.

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 Tier / Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected K/A Facility was unable to generate an acceptable discriminatory level T1G1 077AG2.4.9 question because there is no tie between the Grid voltage and the SRO Generic KA selected.

Examiner (NRC) randomly selected 077AG2.4.31 as the replacement.

Facility was unable to generate an acceptable discriminatory level T1G2 024AA2.06 question at the SRO level for this K/A.

SRO Examiner (NRC) randomly selected 024AA2.04 as the replacement.

T2G2 028A2.02 Facility was unable to generate an acceptable discriminatory level question at the SRO level for this K/A.

SRO Examiner (NRC) randomly selected 028G2.1.1 as the replacement.

Facility was unable to generate an acceptable discriminatory level T2G2 071G2.4.9 question because there is no tie between the Waste Gas Disposal SRO and the Generic KA selected.

Examiner (NRC) randomly selected 071G2.2.25 as the replacement.

T3 G2.1.18 Facility was unable to generate an acceptable discriminatory level question at the SRO level for this K/A.

SRO Examiner (NRC) randomly selected G2.1.20 as the replacement.

T3 G2.1.38 Facility was unable to generate an acceptable discriminatory level question at the SRO level for this K/A.

SRO Examiner (NRC) randomly selected G2.1.37 as the replacement.

K/A listed in column 2 is the rejected K/A

ES-401-6 Written Examination Quality Checklist Facility: FA2013-301 Date of Exam: June 17, 2013 Exam Level: RD x SAD x Initial Item Description a b* c#

1. Questions and answers are technically accurate and applicable to the facility. /

2. a. NRC K/As are referenced for all questions.

b. Facility learning objectives are referenced as available. .

3. SRD questions are appropriate in accordance with Section D.2.d of ES-401 ,t.o

4. The sampling process was random and systematic (If more than 4 RD or 2 SRD questions were repeated from the last 2 NRC licensing exams, consult the NRR DL program office).

5. Question duplication from the license screening/audit exam was controlled as indicated below (check the item that applies) and appears appropriate:

X the audit exam was systematically and randomly developed; or the audit exam was completed before the license exam was started; or the examinations were developed independently; or the licensee certifies that there is no duplication; or f 7J other (explain)

6. Bank use meets limits (no more than 75 percent Bank Modified New from the bank, at least 10 percent new, and the rest new or modified); enter the actual RD / SAD-only 27 I 7 21 I 4 27 I 14 question_distribution(s)_at_right.

7. Between 50 and 60 percent of the questions on the RD Memory C/A exam are written at the comprehension/ analysis level; the SRD exam may exceed 60 percent if the randomly selected K/As support the higher cognitive levels; enter the_actual_RD_/_SRD_question_distribution(s)_at_right.

8. References/handouts provided do not give away answers or aid in the elimination of distractors. -

9. Question content conforms with specific K/A statements in the previously approved ,

examination outline and is appropriate for the tier to which they are assigned; r deviations are justified.

10. Question psychometric quality and format meet the guidelines in ES Appendix B. p 1 1. The exam contains the required number of one-point, multiple choice items; (?!)t,.

the total is correct and agrees with the value on the cover sheet.

Printed Nam Signature Date

a. Author Billy Thornton / 05/30/2013

b. Facility Reviewer (*) Gary Dhmstede / 05/30/2013

c. NRC Chief Examiner (#) (c eLAJ eQA

d. NRC Regional Supervisor L1ALC.tLL T. \PIDAIA,JAJ _

Note:

• The facility reviewers initials/signature are not applicable for NRC-developed examinations.

1. Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column c; chief examiner concurrence required.

ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES4OI-9

2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK I (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= ISRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A IOnly I SRO SRO and RO Exam Submittal was easy to understand and contained supporting information, including a brief discussion of the authors intent. This was a good submittal.

SRO-only portion of the exam was PRELIMINARILY determined to SRO meet the quality guidelines contained in NUREG-1 021 based on only 4/25 (16%) questions being unacceptable. [ES-401 Section E.3 and ES-501, Section E.3] The four questions were preliminarily determined to be unacceptable based on the following reasons:

Cred Distracters: 1 SRO Only: 1 K/A: 1 Level of Difficulty: 1 SRO SRO Question Breakdown:

. 7 questions (28%) from the Bank

. 14 new questions (56%)

. 4 modified bank questions (16%)

RO RO portion of the exam was PRELIMINARILY determined to (borderline) meet the quality guidelines contained in NUREG-1 021 based on 15/75(20%) questions being unacceptable. [ES-401, Section E.3 and ES-501 Section E.3} The 15 questions were preliminarily determined to be unacceptable based on the following reasons:

Cred Distracters: 7 K/A: 5 Level of Difficulty: 3 RO RO Question Breakdown:

. 27 questions from the Bank (36%)

. 27 new questions (36%)

. 21 modified bank questions (28%)

. 30 lower cog questions (40%)

. 45 higher cog questions (60%)

Instructions

[Refer to Section D of ES-401 and Appendix B for additional information regarding each of the following concepts.]

1. Enter the level of knowledge (LOK) of each question as either (F)undamental or (H)igher cognitive level.

2. Enter the level of difficulty (LCD) of each question using a 1 5 (easy difficult) rating scale (questions in the 2 4 range are acceptable).

3. Check the appropriate box if a psychometric flaw is identified:

• The stem lacks sufficient focus to elicit the correct answer (e.g., unclear intent, more information is needed, or too much needless information).

• The stem or distractors contain cues (i.e., clues, specific determiners, phrasing, length, etc).

• The answer choices are a collection of unrelated true/false statements.

• The distractors are not credible; single implausible distractors should be repaired, more than one is unacceptable.

• One or more distractors is (are) partially correct (e.g., if the applicant can make unstated assumptions that are not contradicted by stem).

4. Check the appropriate box if a job content error is identified:

• The question is not linked to the job requirements (i.e., the question has a valid K/A but, as written, is not operational in content).

• The question requires the recall of knowledge that is too specific for the closed reference test mode (i.e., it is not required to be known from memory).

• The question contains data with an unrealistic level of accuracy or inconsistent units (e.g., panel meter in percent with question in gallons).

• The question requires reverse logic or application compared to the job requirements.

5. Check questions that are sampled for conformance with the approved K/A and those that are designated SRO-only (K/A and license level mismatches are unacceptable).

6. Enter question source: (B)ank, (M)odified, or (N)ew. Check that (M)odified questions meet criteria of ES-401 Section D.2.f.

7. Based on the reviewers judgment, is the question as written (U)nsatisfactory (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)ditorial enhancement, or (S)atisfactory?

8. At a minimum, explain any U ratings (e.g., how the Appendix B psychometric attributes are not being met).

ES-401 2 Form ES-401-9

2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only

._.ui Continuous Rod Withdrawal Ability to determine and ip erpret the following as they apply to the Continuous Rod ithdrawal : Reactor tripped breaker indicator 1/22/13 Meets K/A. OK i1 3 Added that PT-447 was the selected impulse pressure S channel. Removed be continuously from first Fill in the Blank and manually to second Fill in the Blank. Removed ing from rst Fill in the Blank distracters (insert vs. inserting).

2 003A3.05 Reactor Coolant Pump System (RCPS) Ability to monitor automatic operation of the RCPS, including: RCP lube oil and I bearing lift pumps 4/26/13 Meets K/A. The question cues the answer to the isi d

question. How about changing the 2 bullet in the stem to 2 mm.

timer instead of oil lift pump pressure.

5/6/13 After discussion with CE, changed the 2nd fill in the bank to read The RCP breaker closing operation is/is not interlocked with a 2 minute time delay. Changes correct answer to C 5/13/13 Changes made as noted.

004K3.O8 Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)

Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CVCS will have on the following: RCP seal injection.

i Meets K/A. Sat 005A2.02 Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RHRS, and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Pressure transient protection during cold shutdown.

I 4/26/13 Meets K/A. Sat

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia

1. 1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 5 006K5.06 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Knowledge of-the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to ECCS: Relationship between ECCS flow and RCS pressure.

4/26/13 Meets K/A. Is it plausible, to have 8 psig in Containment with no injection into the Reactor?

Site will test on simulator to validate numbers.

5/6/13 HHSI is injecting into the core at this time. After discussion with CE, there was a concern that Containment pressure in the stem was not operationally valid. Containment pressure was removed as it was not required to answer the question.

6 006K604 18 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the ECCS: Subcooling margin indicators.

4/26/13 Meets K/A. Lower vs. unaffected? Terminology seems incorrect. Why would you not ask, affected vs. unaffected or higher vs. lower.

Agreed to change terminology.

5/6/13 After discussion with CE, changed lower to be affected and changed unaffected to NOT be affected 5/1 3/13 The K/A number is incorrect at the top of the question with he other LXR information.

KA number corrected 006K6. 18

.06 Reactor Trip Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a reactor trip: Occurrence of a reactor trip 4/26/13 Meets K/A.

8

.02 Pressurizer Relief Tank/Quench Tank System (PRTS) l9 of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to PRTS: Method of forming a steam bubble in the PZR 4/26/13 Meets K/A.

2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other Q# LOK 6. 7. 8.

LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 9

OO8AKI .01 Pressurizer (PZR) Vapor Space Accident (Relief Valve Stuck Open) Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to a Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident: Thermodynamics and flow characteristics of open or I leaking valves 4/26/13 Meets K/A Is the PRT Pressure needed in the stem of the question? Otherwise you are telling them the safety relieves to the PRT. Why not have the sat. press. for the containment as one of the choices w/ cont. press.

given. LOD=1?

I 5/7/13 After review, I agree with the licensee. Remain as is. SAT 008K2.02 Component Cooling Water System (CCWS) Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: CCW pump, including emergency backup.

4/29/13 Meets K/A.

?.03 Small Break LOCA Knowledge of the interrelations oetween the small break LOCA and the following: S/Gs.

4/29/13 Meets K/A.

\.2 not plausible, Reflux Boiling is not a consideration for a small break LOCA.

No issue on review.

11 0A2.01 Pressurizer Pressure Control System (PZR PCS) Ability o (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations the PZR PCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Heater failures.

Meets K/k OK.

4/9/13 DistractorA states NO other actions required. This implies that something else had to be done. Remove other for distractor A and the word and. i.e. power available, no actions are required... License agreed to the change.

i/6/1 3 After discussion with CE, removed the words other and and from Distracter A

2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 [Back- SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Q

Focus Dist. Link units I ward K/A Only

- - Knowledge of the interrelations 13 between the Large Break LOCA and the following: Pumps 4/29/13 Meets K/A.

14 11K2.02 Pressurizer Level Control System (PZR LCS) Knowledge f bus power supplies to the following: PZR heaters 4/29/13 Meets K/A.

Verify no double jeopardy with question 12. Reviewed no jeopardy.

1 5P 12A4.O6 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Reactor trip breakers 1/22/13 Meets K/A, OK S.. 4/9/13 Added reactor Trip to the first Fill in the Blank.

Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) Ability to use plant computers to evaluate system or component status 1/22/13 Meets K/A. OK 4/9/13 Added s to the word statement in the sentence which one of the following... Changed line spacing to 1.5 in the stem for the data to improve readability. HV-3370A1B/C are NOT modeled on the IPC (Downstream MSIVs). Therefore, changed the second Fill in the Blank from MSIVs to HV-3369A/B/C, which are modeled, to ensure the applicant understands what they are evaluating.

Is the last bullet needed? Are we needlessly cueing the answer for the MSIVs being open?

5/7/13 After discussion with CE, added a plant computer screen shot for the applicant to evaluate MSIV status instead of the last bullet of the stem and changed the MSIVs that require evaluation.

Added steam header pressure channel reading from the plant computer to the stem.

014K5.O1 Rod Position Indication System (RPIS) Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the RPIS: Reasons for differences between RPIS and step counter 1/22/13 Meets K/A. OK 4/9/13 Add s to statement in Which one of the following statements...

5/6/13 After discussion with CE, added s to the word statement in the question statement.

015AA2.02 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Malfunctions Ability to determine and interpret Abnormalities in RCP air vent flow paths and/or oil cooling system as they apply to the Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow):

4/29/13 Meets K/A.

01 7K6.01 In-Core Temperature Monitor System (ITM) Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following ITM system components: Sensors and detectors 4/29/13 Meets K/A.

LCD? ROs know the flow chart for CSF from memory.

Site agreed that the ROs are expected to know this from memory.

th 5/7/13 Changed to ask about 5 CET.

5/7/13 After discussion with CE, changed 2nd fill in the blank to ask which CETC are used to enter FRP-C.2 (1st or 5th hottest) instead of requiring applicant to know CSF flow chart.

022A1 .03 Containment Cooling System (CCS) Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CCS controls including:

Containment humidity.

4/29/13 Does not meet K/A.

The addition of water vapor to air (making the air humid) reduces the density of the air. Reasoning in distractor analysis is incorrect.

Add a dewpoint indication to the stem of the question to improve plausibility.

5/8/13 After discussion with CE, added humidity levels to the stem and removed the timeline. Changed the stem to a LOCA since this is what the TS bases refers to. This was run on the simulator to ensure the values are operationally valid. On a medium size LOCA the values above can exist at a moment in time depending on initial ctmt temperature. Changed the feedback to reflect a higher mass in nent.

.i .04 Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup: Reason for changing from manual to automatic control of charging flow valve controller.

4/29/13 Meets K/A Distractor A.2 & C.2 is a subset of B.2 & D.2 therefore it has to be the correct answer.

Change to overheating or flashing.

5/6/13 After discussion with CE, removed flashing downstream of the letdown orifices from distracters B.2 and D.2

22 022K4.03 Containment Cooling System (CCS) Knowledge of CCS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Automatic containment isolation.

4/29/13 Meets K/A 23 025AA1 .01 Loss of Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System: RCS/RHRS cooldown rate.

4/29/13 Meets K/A Not sure how plausible feed & bleed is. Its part of the procedure but no information is given in the stem to even address this path.

Reviewed w/licensee and agreed to accept as is based on distractor plausibility..

24 026AG2.4.50 Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCW) Ability to verify system alarm setpoints and operate controls identified in the alarm response manual.

4/29/13 2 half of K/A not met.

Reword to open either DW or RMW valve on continued low level.

Licensee accepted comment to fix.

5/6/13 After discussion with CE, changed 2nd fill in the bank to from The (2) is the NORMAL source of makeup water to the CCW Surge Tank to Using the NORMAL source of makeup water, the operator will open (2) to make up to the CCW Surge Tank.

Changed Answer from Demin Water Storage Tank to MOV-3030A, MKUP TO CCW FROM DW STOR TK and distracter from Reactor Makeup Water Storage Tank to MOV-3031A, MKUP TO CCW FROM RMW 25 026K2.01 Containment Spray System (CSS) Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: Containment spray pumps.

4/29/13 Meets K/A

029A1 .02 Containment Purge System (CPS) Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the Containment Purge System I controls including: Radiation levels I 4/29/13 Meets K/A Distractor analysis needs to be changed to say control power or instrument &/or control power.

5/6/13 After discussion with CE, updated feedback (Al) to reflect

-it the question topic is loss of control power.

33K4.05 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System (SFPCS) Knowledge of design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Adequate SDM (boron concentration) 1/22/13 Meets K/A. OK 4/9/13 Changed providing an input to the Reactor Makeup Water System that is less than the actual flowrate. TO providing a flow input to the Reactor Makeup System that is less than the actual I fiowrate. for clarity.

1 Steam Generator System (S/GS) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of Faulted or ruptured S/Gs on the S/GS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations 4/29/13 Meets K/A Does the RO need to know the procedure or just the last bullet, i.e.

we are at Rx trip criteria due to high containment pressure?

Reviewed w/ licensee. SAT

036AG2.1.7 29 Fuel Handling Incidents -Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.

E 4/29/13 Meets K/A A not plausible. Nothing else supports Lo IvI condition in the stem of the question. Need to put actual SFP IvI to reflect Ic IvI (15310).

Agreed to put 153 4 inches.

5/6/13 After discussion with CE, added SEP level is 153 3 and stable at the 1000 time in the stem. This is 1 inch below the setpoint which would make it clear that the pool level was low.

5/13/13 Remove period from the end of the 2 bullet in the stem of the question.

30 -

037AK1 .01 Steam Generator (SIG) Tube Leak Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Steam Generator Tube Leak: Use of steam tables 4/29/13 Meets K/A B is not plausible with the reference given. The reference given states that SCM must be < 16 degrees to stop press reduction?

5/8/13 After discussion with CE, changed values to make all subcoolng values >16F. Then changed other values so that the question is not a DLU and the applicant will be required to evaluate the reference against RCS pressure, SG pressures and Pressurizer level to determine if depressurization can be stopped.

31 -

038EK3.02 Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as the apply to the SGTR:

Prevention of secondary PORV cycling 4/29/13 Meets K/A Last bullet in the stem is cueing. You only need to give information that relates to> 31%. Use 48% and rising. Also give info. To rule out adverse conditions for SCM and SG IvIs.

Chose 65% for C SG NR Lvl.

5/6/13After discussion with CE, changed 1C SG level to 65% but did not include CTMT pressure as it was decided that it was NOT required.

K1 .09 Main and Reheat Steam System (MRSS) Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the MRSS and the following systems: RMS 4/29/13 Meets K/A I For C & D 10% would be a more plausible number.

15/6/13After discussion with CE, changed 1% to 10% on C.2 and D.2.

045K1.19 Main Turbine Generator (MT/C) System Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the MT/C system and the following systems: ESFAS 4/29/13 Meets K/A 051AK3.01 Loss of Condenser Vacuum Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Condenser Vacuum: Loss of steam dump capability upon loss of condenser vacuum I 4/29/13 Meets K/A Does press read out in psia or vacuum?

Will change vacuum to pressure and use the actual P1 indicator nomenclature.

5/6/13 After discussion with CE, no time line is needed but changed vacuum to pressure since FNP uses psia. Also added Pressure Indicators.

I -

054AA2.05 Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW) Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW): Status of MFW pumps, regulating and stop valves 4/29/13 Meets K/A 055A3.03 Condenser Air Removal System (CARS) Ability to monitor automatic operation of the CARS, including: Automatic diversion of CARS exhaust 4/29/13 Meets K/A

056AK3.02 Loss of Offsite Power Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Offsite Power:

Actions contained in EOP for loss of offsite power 5/4/13 Meets K/A 059A4.O1 Main Feedwater (MFW) System Ability to manually operate and monitor in the control room: MFW turbine trip indication 5/4/13 Meets K/A 059AK2.O1 Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release Knowledge of the interrelations between the Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release and the following: Radioactive-liquid monitors 5/4/13 Meets K/A Need to change B & C distractor nomenclature to match procedure:

Discharge Valve & Dilution Discharge Valve. Valve title is not the same as used in Q43.

5/6/13 After discussion with CE, updated valve nomenclature per the checklist.

059G2.2.44 Main Feedwater System Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions.

5/4/13 Meets K/A 061A3.O1 Auxiliary / Emergency Feedwater (AFW) System Ability to monitor automatic operation of the AFW, including: AFW startup and flows 5/5/13 Meets K/A

1 K5.01 Auxiliary / Emergency Feedwater (AFW) System (nowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts s the apply to the AFW: Relationship between AFW flow and RCS heat transfer 5/5/13 Meets K/A B is not plausible. Why would you emergency borate FIRST with the conditions given? More plausible for CID concern if temp. changed to 534 degrees?

i Agreed to make the change 5/6/13 After discussion with CE, changed 543F to 534F in the stem.

2AM .07 Loss of Nuclear Service Water Ability to operate and / or nitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Nuclear Service

- - ..Ir (SWS): Flow rates to the components and systems that are serviced by the SWS; interactions among the components 5/5/13 Meets K/A Cueing the problem in the stem question low pond level. Change to response in pond level.

to the change.

5/6/13 After discussion with CE, changed response to the low nd level to response to the change in pond level Corrected nomenclature for RCV-23B, RCV-18, MOV-538/539, PCV 562/563.

.01 A.C. Electrical Distribution Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the ac distribution system will have on the following: Major system loads 5/5/13 Meets K/A Al .01 D.C. Electrical Distribution Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the DC electrical system controls including: Battery capacity as it is affected by discharge rate 5/5/13 Meets K/A

Emergency Diesel Generators (ED/C) Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the ED/C system will have on the following: ESFAS controlled or actuated systems.

c:c:i 3 Meets K/A 064K6.07 Emergency Diesel Generators (ED/G) Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the ED/G system: Air receivers 5/5/13 Meets K/A Loss of Instrument Air Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures

._.4.11 5/13 Meets K/A could control IvI.

5/6/13 After discussion with CE, changed A from Stop BOTH MDAFW pumps on the MCB to Place BOTH MDAFW pump MCB hand switches in the STOP position and release them 068AK2.07 Control Room Evacuation Knowledge of the interrelations between the Control Room Evacuation and the following: ED/C.

Meets KA. SAT 3.O5 Waste Gas Disposal System (WGDS) Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the Waste Gas Disposal System will have on the following: ARM and PRM systems.

4/19 drl. Does meets K/A.

Since when does a tank have any isolation on a safety relief valve?

The second question really has no discriminatory value.

icensee stated that Turbine relief valves have an isolation valve.

73A202 Process Radiation Monitoring (PRM) System Ability to (a) redict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the M system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Detector failure 4/19 drl. Meets K/A.

52 F 3 x -

.42 Process Radiation Monitoring (PRM) System Ability to N

Recognize system parameters that are entry-level conditions for Technical Specifications.

4/19 drl. KIA is met.

A. and B. can be considered a subset of C. as written. Suggest rewriting to make all equipment a list and have applicant choose which minimum equipment would cause LCO entry.

I R-1 2 R-11 CACCLMS land2ONLY

3. 2 and 3 ONLY 1 and 3 ONLY

3. 1,2AND3.

5/6/13 After discussion with CE, replaced question with a bank from FNP 05.

53 F 2 -

076AA1 .04 High Reactor Coolant Activity Ability to operate and / or B

monitor the following as they apply to the High Reactor Coolant Activity: Failed fuel-monitoring equipment.

4/19. drl K/A is met.

54 F 3 -

)76K2.08 Service Water System (SWS) Knowledge of bus power B

supplies to the following: ESF-actuated MOVs.

K/A is met.

55 H 3 -

rv.03 Service Water System (SWS) Knowledge of SWS design B

feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Automatic opening features associated with SWS isolation valves to CCW heat exchangers.

4/29 drl. K/A is met per discussion with Chief.

AK3.02 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances: Actions contained in abnormal operating procedure for voltage and grid disturbances.

4/29 drl. K/A is met.

5/7/13 l distractor not plausible. Doesnt meet physics criteria andis GFES related. Provide another question for the licensee.

Change question stem to give fluctuating voltages on one of the 4KV busses with any corresponding annunciator(s). Correct answer is now to trip the RX.

5)10/13 After discussion with CE, he agreed to review a new question we submitted from FNP 05 NRC Exam.

5/13/12 New question reviewed, SAT 078K1 .01 Instrument Air System Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the AS and the following systems: Sensor air.

4/29 drl. K/A is met.

Question is acceptable if these setpoints are expected to be known by the applicants.

5/7/13 OK by licensee.

079G2.4.34 Station Air System Knowledge of RD tasks performed outside the main control room during an emergency and the resultant operational effects.

4/29 drl. K/A is met.

I: Remove the word is from part 1 of the stem.

luestion is acceptable if the applicants are expected to know that the valve starts opening at 22 psig.

Licensee agrees with this 5/8/13 After discussion with the CE, removed the word is from the first fill in the blank.

ri3K4.O6 Containment System Knowledge of containment system design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Containment isolation system.

4/29 drl. K/A is met.

16.2 psig is not plausible since the first pressure is already given as 28 psig. If you want to test the knowledge of how many instruments to cause phase B, dont give a value in the stem. Just say it reached its setpoint and ask how many more need to reach setpoint (or just give correct setpoint).

Licensee agreed 5/8/13 After discussion with the CE, changed the stem to PT-953, CTMT PRESS has reached the PHASE B setpoint.

G2. 1.18 Ability to make accurate, clear, and concise logs, records, status boards, and reports.

4/29 drl. K/A is met.

Find a better method to express the compound fractions. Maybe leave a space after whole number.

5/7/13 Licesee agreed to use decimals instead of fraction.

5/8/13 After discussion with the CE, changed 1 3/16 and 3 1/16 to 1.5 and 1.25 respectively.

32.1.5 Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, such as minimum crew complement, overtime limitations, etc.

4/29 drl. K/A is met.

12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> max shift is not really plausible. Need to know the work history. If he worked 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> yesterday, then he cannot work 16 oday. Better question would be to ask the maximum number of hours he can work today based on working 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> yesterday. The choices would be 14 or 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />. 14 is plausible because there used 0 be a 24 in 48 limit.

i/713 Added per NMPAD-016-003, Scheduling and calculating work ours.

5/8/13 After discussion with the CE, added the procedure NMP-AD 116-003, Scheduling and Calculating Work Hours.

62 F 2 G2.2.20 Knowledge of the process for managing troubleshooting N

activities.

4/29 drl. K/A is met.

5/6/13 Change the stem to make this a routine start of the pump for equipment rotation. This would make A and B more plausible.

5/7/13 Agreed to change. Verify we dont run into potentially more than one correct answer.

5/8/13 After discussion with the CE, changed the pump to the charging pump and removed the reason why the pump is being started. This was to prevent the applicant from thinking that an emergent condition existed.

63 F 2 X .2.25 Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for B

limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.

4/29 drl. K/A is NOT met.

There is no knowledge of the bases required for this question.

5/7/13 Look at the bank to see how this KA has been handled for RO in the past.

Previous Farley Bank question appears to be more appropriate:

Which ONE of the following is the Technical Specification bases for the pressurizer water level reactor trip?

• Protects against loss of pressure control due to the spray nozzle being submerged.

• Protects the pressurizer safety valves against water relief.

• Prevents exceeding containment design pressure in the event of a LOCA.

• Prevents solid plant operation while the reactor is critical.

5/10/13 Submitted the above question to CE for review. Changed the last bullet on above example to prevent two correct answers.

Knowledge of radiological safety principles pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc.

4/29 drl. K/A is met.

65 F 2 x I 2.3.13 Knowledge of radiological safety procedures pertaining to x N licensed operator duties, such as response to radiation monitor alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc.

4/29 drl. K/A is NOT met. This is not really applying radiological safety procedures.

IS NOT answers are not plausible. This is still an RCA, you need to og into something. If there were some type of alternative, this would be better.

5/7113 Disagree with drl comments. The procedure in question contains radiological entry criteria for an area that could be perceived as not requiring any. Remove outside the HP office and the around (ACS) i.e. should read normal Aux Bldg ACS terminal to natch the procedure step. These are not in the procedure statement.

Per the sign on the Dry Cask Storage Area access, frisking is required upon exit from that RCA. Someone could possibly argue that this is not lAW AP-42. Switch the 1 and 2 question.

Upon exiting from the Dry Cask RCA you are required to perform a 2

.,.;iute frisk AND also use the Per AP-42, upon entry After moving the requirement to perform a frisk to the question statement and giving the choice of what portal monitor to use, both question statements refer to AP-42.

Removed outside the HP office from the question also.

66 F 2 G2.3.4 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or N

emergency conditions.

) drl. K/A is met.

67 H 3 (2.4.2O Knowledge of the operational implications of EOP warnings, M

cautions, and notes.

4/29 drl. K/A is met.

68 H 3 a2.4.23 Knowledge of the bases for prioritizing emergency B

procedure implementation during emergency operations.

drl. K/A is met.

69 F 2 .4.29 Knowledge of the emergency plan.

4/29 drl. K/A is met.

Have the SO still in the room immediately after initiating the release.

This make securing the release more plausible.

5/7/13 Reviewed with licensee, OK as is.

W/E04EA1 .1 LOCA Outside Containment Ability to operate and / or 70 H 3 N monitor Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features as they apply to the (LOCA Outside I Containment) drl. K/A is met.

71 H 3 EO5EG2.4.2 Loss of Secondary Heat Sink Knowledge of system M

setpoints, interlocks and automatic actions associated with EOP entry conditions.

29 drl. K/A is met.

EG2.4.6 Pressurized Thermal Shock - Knowledge of EOP 72 H 2 x x B E mitigation strategies.

4/30 drl. K/A is met.

Asking if a cooldown should be stopped when temperature has dropped about 250 degrees in 30 minutes is not very discriminating.

Instead give more data and have some controllable cooldown source still in service. Stopping this could be the answer.

5/7/13 Change to calculation, reduce c/d rate or change question to ask mitigation strategy.

5/8/13 After discussion with the CE, removed the statement from the stem RCS cold leg temperature has decreased to 25OF in the past 30 minutes and is decreasing slowly. Changed the stem to make the student determine the mitigation strategy of FRP-P.1.

73 H 3 W/E11EK2.1 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Knowledge B

of the interrelations between the (Loss of Emergency Coolant ecirculation) and the following: Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

i 4/30 drl. K/A is met.

74 H 3 N 1 .1 Uncontrolled Depressurization of all Steam Generators

- Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Uncontrolled Depressurization of all Steam Generators): Components:, capacity, and function of emergency systems.

4/30 drl. K/A is met.

Distractor D is not plausible. Three answers are at 20 gpm and one is not. If applicant did not know the answer, he would discount D.

because it is different than the other 3.

5/7/13 Change distractorAto zero.

5/8/13 After discussion with the CE, changed distracter A to 0 gpm to prevent excessive cooldown so there wasnt 3 choices with 20 gpm.

75 1-1 3 -

W/E1 5EA1 .3 Containment Flooding Ability to operate and / or B

monitor the following as they apply to the (Containment Flooding):

Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

4/30 drl. K/A is met.

76P H 3 N 001A2.17 Control Rod Drive -Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunction or operations on the CRDS and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Rod-misalignment alarm.

1/22/13 Meets K/A. Per the Rod Control LP: The insertion limits directly affect core power and fuel burnup distributions and assumptions of available ejected rod worth, SDM and initial reactivity insertion rate. If this reflects RD Knowledge, the incorrect answer can be deciphered w/o SRO knowledge and therefore the correct answer can be ascertained.

4/8/13 Meets K/A. Question modified: Added due to the rod malfunction to question 1 and added ensure to question 2.

Distractors changed to remove minimize the effects of a CR ejection accident and added total available rod worth is within safety analyses limits. SAT 77 H 3 Chemical and Volume Control Loss of PZR level (failure mode).

4/10/13 Meets K/A. 1 question: RD knowledge (above the line T.S. criteria). 2 question: is the RD responsible for knowing all immediate Rx Trip Criteria? If so, this is not SRD only 4/18/13 Afterdiscussion, CE determined that this is not RD knowledge.

.2.22 Emergency Core Cooling Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.

4/10/13 Meets K/A. SAT 2.2.22 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.

4/10/13 Meets K/A. Why is it necessary to state that the PORV can not be manually closed, you have already stated that it failed open?

1/1 8/13 Licensee will modify to add extra information so as to not cue that the valve will not manually close.

4/18/13 After discussion, removed PCV-444B cannot be manually closed, to prevent cueing. Added actual handswitch indication to determine valve position.

F 1? x -

izrT.. a... .y Boration Ability to determine and interpret x N the following as they apply to the Emergency Boration: When boron dilution is taking place.

1/22/13 Meets K/A.

4/9/13 The licensee restated the first part of the stem and put in a timeline based on validator comments that the sequence of events was confusing. No change of content or intent.

This is low LCD based on the 1 half being GFES knowledge and therefore we get to a 50/50 question for the SRO only portion.

Second part does NOT require Knowledge of tech spec bases that is required to analyze tech spec required actions and terminology.

This is just basis regurgitation.

Additionally, the basis portions of the question point towards the dilution answer. That is the only answer that is not a non-sequitur

,,d therefore would be the one that both answers deal with dilutions.

Wi 8/13 Requested K/A change on this question due to difficulty writing an acceptable SRO question for this K/A.

4/29/13 Changed K/A to 024AA2.04. Meets K/A. Is D plausible?

With a failed valve and an OOS DG, why would someone choose D?

Why is the ST data in the stem of the question? It does not appear to be relevant to the question and would also require a T.S. reference to answer? Why would you require them to know this from memory?

5/10/13 Additional information is included for plausibility of Distracter F)

Evaluated and removed the ST data in the stem of the question.

Agreed that it is not required for evaluation 0fTRM 13.1.3.

2.1.1 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control System (HRPS) Knowledge of conduct of operations requirements.

4/9/13 Meets K/A. Distractor D does not seem plausible as written, always does not seem appropriate. Give an activity level in the stem to make D more plausible? C Distractor wording implies this criterion comes from the ODCM not the SOP procedure. Change to state, Is aligned per the referenced ODCM requirement.

4/18/13 Change to remove always. Will leave the other distractor as is.

4/18/13 After discussion, CE determined distracter C acceptable since it is worded that way in the procedure. Modified distracter D to remove the word always to improve plausibility of the distracter.

029EA2.04 Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATVVS) Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a ATNS: CVCS centrifugal charging pump operating indication.

4/15/12 K/A in reference section shows EA2.O1?

Meets K/A. Verify that there is no above the line TS RD criteria for this that would make it RO knowledge, otherwise SAT.

4/18/13 After discussion, CE determined there was no TS RO a indicated in the question. Good as is.

.1.7 Loss of Condenser Vacuum Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.

4/15/13 Meets K/A. You inform the applicant in the stem that vacuum is degrading. This is inappropriate cueing. Do you need to use PT446/447 in the stem to be in compliance with the AOP RNO step vs Condenser Pressure? Also step 2.1 of the AOP requires correlating the given vacuum to a scale to determine that the RNO is applicable. Seems like this is a high LOD w/o the procedure?

4/18/13 Reviewed with licensee, agreed to remove vacuum degrading. Add the P1 for condenser vacuum to the stem.

After discussion, modified the stem of the question to remove vacuum degrading as this was determined to be cueing. Inserted the actual MCB indicators and the associated reading so that applicant could determine actual condenser pressure and trend.

5/13/13 Have not seen rewritten question with items noted above resolved.

p13 Question reviewed. SAT

-,-,-,2.01 Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW) Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Main Feedwater (MAN): Occurrence of reactor and/or turbine trip.

1/22/13 Meets K/A. B(2) Plausibility? How does a LOCA event occur on the feedline penetration?

4/9/13 Modified the second part of distracters B and D from a LOCA event to a Steam Generator Tube Rupture event based on comments during the 10 question pre-submittal review.

1 Also added the title of TS 3.7.3 in the stem of the question. It was not included.

055EG2.2.12 Loss of Offsite and Onsite Power (Station Blackout):

Knowledge of surveillance procedures.

1/22/13 This is after recovery from a blackout condition. There are no STs for while in a blackout therefore this is as close to the K/A as possible.

058AA2.02 Loss of DC Power Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of DC Power: 1 25V dc bus voltage, low/critical low, alarm.

K/A. SAT 2.12 .._i Feedwater (MFW) System Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the MAN; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Failure of feedwater regulating valves.

13 Meet K/A. SAT

.2.2.44 Emergency Diesel Generator (ED/G) System Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions.

1/23/13 Meets K/A. OK.

071 G2.2.25 Waste Gas Disposal System (\NGDS) Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.

04/15/13 Meet K/A. Does anyone not know that offsite rad releases are limited at the boundary not inside?

90 H 2

)73A2.01 Process Radiation Monitoring (PRM) System Ability x N to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PRM system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures o correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those nalfunctions or operations: Erratic or failed power supply.

f/15/13 Meets K/A. Question wording. Both LCOs are always applicable. The question should state: Which action statement is required to be performed?

Second part is NOT SRO knowledge. The question requires only picking out the proper action numbers. A better set of distractors ould involve using part of the wording from the actions (i.e., double sample and 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> grab samples).

4/18/13 Agreed to make changes and look at again.

4/18/13 Made changes as requested by CE to state implementation of which ODCM action is required.

Verify this does not overlap with a JPM. Doesnt the 2 d question need an additional qualifier to say, With R-14 OOS and to continue....

5/10/13 After review, there is possible overlap with In-Plant JPM K.

This JPM will be modified such that there is no overlap. Added With R-14 INOPERABLE, to continue to the 2fld question as requested by CE.

Two questions submitted: I prefer the question referenced.

91 F 1 I 077AG2.4.31 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances Knowledge of annunciator alarms, indications, or response Procedures.

04/15/13 As you point out in your distractor analysis, an RO can deduce the correct answer using GFES related knowledge.

04/18/13 Based on review and validation results I agree with licensees logic for this question.

4/18/13 After discussion, CE determined that second part of each answer choice is SRO level and GFES knowledge alone cannot be d to determine the correct answer.

92 H 3 N G2.1 .20 Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps.

04/15/13 Meets K/A. SAT.

93 F 2 G2.1 .37 Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or limitations associated with reactivity management.

04/15/13 Meets K/A. Not sure this is SRO Only knowle dge.

Shouldnt the RO know who can authorize him to change his reactivity rate?

04/18/13 Not a requirement for the RO to know this.

2.2.21 Knowledge of pre- and post-maintenance operability requirements.

il5I13 Meets K/A, SAT.

2.2.23 Equipment Control Ability to track Technical Specification imiting conditions for operations.

04/15/13 Meets K/A. SAT 2.3.14 Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities.

04/15/13 Meets K/A. SAT G2.3.6 Ability to approve release permits.

04/15/13 Meets K/A. mL vs ml A and B are not plausible in that a release must be possible under conditions of a rad monitor failure and the activity is presented as within normal limits.

4/18/13 Licensee agreed to add more to the question to add another option for the 2 half of distractor A.

I18/13 After discussion, CE determined that the one distracter related to tank activity was acceptable. The other distracter plausibility was increased by adding that the tank could not be released with R-18 INOPERABLE, but could be transferred to Unit 2 r release.

3/10/13 Changes made as requested. Sat G2.4.6 Knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies.

04/15/13 Meets K/A. Make sure this does not overlap with a scenario.

4/18/13 Licensee verified it does not overlap.

WEO2EA2.1 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (SI Termination) Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

04/15/13 Meets K/A WEO6EG2.1 .27 Degraded Core Cooling Knowledge of system purpose and/or function.

04/15/13 Meets K/A

ES-403, Rev. 9 Written Examination Grading Form ES-403-1 Quality Checklist Facility: Farley Nuclear Plant Date of Exam: 6/25/13 Exam Level: ROISRO]

Initials Item Description a b c

1. Clean answer sheets copied before grading NA

2. Answer key changes and question deletions justified and NA documented -

3. Applicants scores checked for addition errors NA (reviewers spot check> 25% of examinations) 1

4. Grading for all borderline cases (80 +/-2% overall and 70 or 80, NA as_applicable,_+/-4%_on_the_SRO-only)_reviewed_in_detail

5. All other failing examinations checked to ensure that grades NA are_justified

6. Performance on missed questions checked for training NA deficiencies and wording problems; evaluate validity of questions_missed_by_half_or_more_of the_applicants Printed Name/Signature Date

a. Grader Newton Lacy /

b. Facility Reviewer(*) NA

c. NRC Chief Examiner (*) Phillip Capeha / C / /I3

d. NRC Supervisor (*) Malcolm Widmann / t_._

(*) The facility reviewers signature is not applicable for examinations graded by the NRC:

two independent NRC reviews are required.