ML14028A478
| ML14028A478 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 01/28/2014 |
| From: | Michael Kunowski NRC/RGN-III/DRP/B5 |
| To: | Harkness E FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co |
| References | |
| IR-13-005 | |
| Download: ML14028A478 (52) | |
See also: IR 05000440/2013005
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
2443 WARRENVILLE ROAD, SUITE 210
LISLE, IL 60532-4352
January 28, 2014
Mr. Ernest Harkness
Site Vice President
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company
Perry Nuclear Power Plant
P. O. Box 97, 10 Center Road, A-PY-A290
Perry, OH 44081-0097
SUBJECT: PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000440/2013005
Dear Mr. Harkness:
On December 31, 2013, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a routine
inspection at your Perry Nuclear Power Plant. The enclosed report documents the results of
this inspection, which were discussed on January 9, 2014, with you and members of your staff.
No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified during this inspection. However, the
inspectors documented in this report two licensee-identified violations which were determined to
be of very low safety significance in this report. The NRC is treating these violations as
noncited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or significance of these NCVs, you should provide a response within
30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with
copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident
Inspector at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant.
As a result of the Safety Culture Common Language Initiative, the terminology and coding of
cross-cutting aspects were revised beginning in calendar year (CY) 2014. New cross-cutting
aspects identified in CY 2014 will be coded under the latest revision to Inspection Manual
Chapter (IMC) 0310. Cross-cutting aspects identified in the last 6 months of 2013 using the
previous terminology will be converted to the latest revision in accordance with the
cross-reference in IMC 0310. The revised cross-cutting aspects will be evaluated for
cross-cutting themes and potential substantive cross-cutting issues in accordance with
IMC 0305 starting with the CY 2014 mid-cycle assessment review.
Enclosure
E. Harkness
2
In accordance with 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of
Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available
electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly
Available Records System (PARS) component of NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and
Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Michael Kunowski, Chief
Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket No. 50-440
License No. NPF-58
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000440/2013005
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServTM
Enclosure
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Docket No:
50-440
License No:
Report No:
Licensee:
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC)
Facility:
Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1
Location:
Perry, Ohio
Dates:
October 1, 2013 through December 31, 2013
Inspectors:
M. Marshfield, Senior Resident Inspector
J. Nance, Resident Inspector
S. Bell, Health Physicist
M. Bielby, Senior Operations Engineer
J. Laughlin, Emergency Preparedness Inspector
M. Phalen, Senior Health Physicist
W. Pursley, Health Physicist
Approved by:
M. Kunowski, Chief
Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ........................................................................................................... 1
REPORT DETAILS ....................................................................................................................... 2
Summary of Plant Status ........................................................................................................... 2
1.
REACTOR SAFETY .................................................................................................... 2
1R01
Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01) ............................................................ 2
1R04
Equipment Alignment (71111.04) ....................................................................... 3
1R05
Fire Protection (71111.05Q) ............................................................................... 5
1R06
Internal Flooding (71111.06) .............................................................................. 5
1R11
Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11) .................................... 6
1R12
Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12) .............................................................. 8
1R13
Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13) ......... 8
1R15
Operability Determinations and Functional Assessments (71111.15) ................ 9
1R18
Plant Modifications (71111.18) ......................................................................... 10
1R19
Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19) ............................................................. 10
1R22
Surveillance Testing (71111.22) ....................................................................... 11
1EP4
Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes (IP 71114.04) .......... 13
2.
RADIATION SAFETY ................................................................................................ 13
2RS3
In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation (71124.03) ................... 13
2RS4
Occupational Dose Assessment (71124.04) .................................................... 17
2RS5
Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation (71124.05) ............................................ 19
2RS6
Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment (71124.06) ..................... 24
4.
OTHER ACTIVITIES ................................................................................................. 29
4OA1
Performance Indicator Verification (71151) ...................................................... 30
4OA2
Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152) ........................................... 30
4OA3
Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153) .............. 33
4OA6
Management Meetings ..................................................................................... 34
4OA7
Licensee-Identified Violations ........................................................................... 34
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION ............................................................................................... 1
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT..................................................................................................... 1
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED ......................................................... 1
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED ......................................................................................... 2
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ................................................................................................. 11
1
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Inspection Report (IR) 05000440/2013005, 10/01/2013 - 12/31/2013; Perry Nuclear Power
Plant.
This report covers a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced
baseline inspections by regional inspectors. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe
operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor
Oversight Process Revision 4.
Licensee-Identified Violations
Two violations of very low safety significance that were identified by the licensee have been
reviewed by the NRC. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been
entered into the licensees corrective action program (CAP). These violations and CAP
tracking numbers are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.
2
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
The plant began the inspection period at 100 percent power. With the exception of minor
reductions in power to support routine surveillances and rod pattern adjustments, the unit
remained at full power for the remainder of the quarter.
1.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, and
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)
.1
Readiness of Offsite and Alternate AC Power Systems
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors verified that plant features and procedures for operation and continued
availability of offsite and back-up alternating current (AC) power systems during adverse
weather were appropriate. The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedures affecting
these areas and the communications protocols between the transmission system
operator (TSO) and the plant to verify that the appropriate information was being
exchanged when issues arose that could impact the offsite power system. Examples of
aspects considered in the inspectors review included:
coordination between the TSO and the plant during off-normal or emergency
events;
explanations for the events;
estimates of when the offsite power system would be returned to a normal state;
and
notification from the TSO to the plant when the offsite power system was
returned to normal.
The inspectors also verified that plant procedures addressed measures to monitor and
maintain availability and reliability of both the offsite AC power system and the onsite
alternate AC power system prior to or during adverse weather conditions. Specifically,
the inspectors verified that the procedures addressed the following:
actions to be taken when notified by the TSO that the post-trip voltage of the
offsite power system at the plant would not be acceptable to assure the
continued operation of the safety-related loads without transferring to the onsite
power supply;
compensatory actions identified to be performed if it would not be possible to
predict the post-trip voltage at the plant for the current grid conditions;
re-assessment of plant risk based on maintenance activities which could affect
grid reliability, or the ability of the transmission system to provide offsite power;
and
communication between the plant and the TSO when changes at the plant could
impact the transmission system, or when the capability of the transmission
system to provide adequate offsite power was challenged.
3
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. The inspectors also
reviewed corrective action program (CAP) items to verify that the licensee was
identifying adverse weather issues at an appropriate threshold and entering them into
their CAP in accordance with station corrective action procedures.
This inspection constituted one readiness of offsite and alternate AC power systems
sample as defined in Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.01-05.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
.2
Winter Seasonal Readiness Preparations
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted a review of the licensees preparations for winter conditions to
verify that the plants design features and implementation of procedures were sufficient
to protect mitigating systems from the effects of adverse weather. Documentation for
selected risk-significant systems was reviewed to ensure that these systems would
remain functional when challenged by inclement weather. During the inspection, the
inspectors focused on plant specific design features and the licensees procedures used
to mitigate or respond to adverse weather conditions. Additionally, the inspectors
reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and performance
requirements for systems selected for inspection, and verified that operator actions were
appropriate as specified by plant specific procedures. Cold weather protection, such as
heat tracing and area heaters, was verified to be in operation where applicable. The
inspectors also reviewed CAP items to verify that the licensee was identifying adverse
weather issues at an appropriate threshold and entering them into the CAP in
accordance with station corrective action procedures. Documents reviewed are listed in
the Attachment to this report. The inspectors reviews focused specifically on the
condensate storage tank systems, including heat tracing, auxiliary boiler systems, and
building heating systems, due to their risk significance or susceptibility to cold weather
issues.
This inspection constituted one winter seasonal readiness preparations sample as
defined in IP 71111.01-05.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)
.1
Quarterly Partial System Walkdowns
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed partial system walkdowns of the following risk-significant
systems:
4
motor control center A switchgear and miscellaneous electrical equipment areas
heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system;
control room ventilation and emergency recirculation systems; and
125-volt direct current (DC) Division 2, Units 1 and 2.
The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk significance relative to the
Reactor Safety Cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors attempted
to identify any discrepancies that could impact the function of the system and, therefore,
potentially increase risk. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures,
system diagrams, UFSAR, Technical Specification (TS) requirements, outstanding work
orders (WOs), condition reports (CRs), and the impact of ongoing work activities on
redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have rendered
the systems incapable of performing their intended functions. The inspectors also
walked down accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and
support equipment were aligned correctly and operable. The inspectors examined the
material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment
to verify that there were no obvious deficiencies. The inspectors also verified that the
licensee had properly identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could
cause initiating events or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers and
entered them into the CAP with the appropriate significance characterization.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
These activities constituted three partial system walkdown samples as defined in
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
.2
Semi-Annual Complete System Walkdown
a.
Inspection Scope
On October 9, 2013, the inspectors performed a complete system alignment inspection
of the Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) and its sub-systems to verify the
functional capability of the system. This system was selected because it was considered
both safety significant and risk significant in the licensees probabilistic risk assessment.
The inspectors walked down the system to review mechanical and electrical equipment
lineups; electrical power availability; system pressure and temperature indications, as
appropriate; component labeling; component lubrication; component and equipment
cooling; hangers and supports; operability of support systems; and to ensure that
ancillary equipment or debris did not interfere with equipment operation. A review of a
sample of past and outstanding WOs was performed to determine whether any
deficiencies significantly affected the system function. In addition, the inspectors
reviewed the CAP database to ensure that system equipment alignment problems were
being identified and appropriately resolved. Documents reviewed are listed in the
Attachment to this report.
These activities constituted one complete system walkdown sample as defined in
5
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05Q)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted fire protection walkdowns which were focused on availability,
accessibility, and the condition of firefighting equipment in the following risk-significant
plant areas:
Diesel Building Hallway, Fire Zone DG-1d;
Control Rooms, Fire Zones 1CC-5A and 2CC-5A;
Service Building Elevations 604 and 620;
Fuel Handling Building, Elevations 574 and 599; and
Intermediate Building, Fire Zones 0IB-4 and 0IB-5.
The inspectors reviewed areas to assess if the licensee had implemented a fire
protection program that adequately controlled combustibles and ignition sources within
the plant, effectively maintained fire detection and suppression capability, maintained
passive fire protection features in good material condition, and implemented adequate
compensatory measures for out-of-service, degraded, or inoperable fire protection
equipment, systems, or features in accordance with the licensees fire plan.
The inspectors selected fire areas based on their overall contribution to internal fire risk
as documented in the plants Individual Plant Examination of External Events with later
additional insights, their potential to impact equipment which could initiate or mitigate a
plant transient, or their impact on the plants ability to respond to a security event.
Using the documents listed in the Attachment to this report, the inspectors verified that
fire hoses and extinguishers were in their designated locations and available for
immediate use; that fire detectors and sprinklers were unobstructed; that transient
material loading was within the analyzed limits; and fire doors, dampers, and penetration
seals appeared to be in satisfactory condition. The inspectors also verified that minor
issues identified during the inspection were entered into the licensees CAP.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
These activities constituted five quarterly fire protection inspection samples as defined in
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
1R06 Internal Flooding (71111.06)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed selected risk important plant design features and licensee
procedures intended to protect the plant and its safety-related equipment from internal
flooding events. The inspectors reviewed flood analyses and design documents,
including the UFSAR, engineering calculations, and abnormal operating procedures to
identify licensee commitments. The specific documents reviewed are listed in the
6
Attachment to this report. In addition, the inspectors reviewed licensee drawings to
identify areas and equipment that may be affected by internal flooding caused by the
failure or misalignment of nearby sources of water, such as the fire suppression or the
circulating water systems. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees corrective action
documents with respect to past flood-related items identified in the CAP to verify the
adequacy of the corrective actions. The inspectors performed a walkdown of the
emergency service water pump house to assess the adequacy of watertight doors and
verify drains and sumps were clear of debris and were operable, and that the licensee
complied with its commitments.
Documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This inspection constituted one internal flooding sample as defined in IP 71111.06-05.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11)
.1
Resident Inspector Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Requalification (71111.11Q)
a.
Inspection Scope
On October 7, 2013, the inspectors observed a crew of licensed operators in the plants
simulator during licensed operator requalification training to verify that operator
performance was adequate, evaluators were identifying and documenting crew
performance problems, and training was being conducted in accordance with licensee
procedures. The inspectors evaluated the following areas:
licensed operator performance;
crews clarity and formality of communications;
ability to take timely actions in the conservative direction;
prioritization, interpretation, and verification of annunciator alarms;
correct use and implementation of abnormal and emergency procedures;
control board manipulations;
oversight and direction from supervisors; and
ability to identify and implement appropriate TS actions and Emergency Plan
actions and notifications.
The crews performance in these areas was compared to pre-established operator action
expectations and successful critical task completion requirements. Documents reviewed
are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This inspection constituted one quarterly licensed operator requalification program
simulator sample as defined in IP 71111.11 and satisfied the inspection program
requirement for the resident inspectors to observe a portion of an in-progress annual
requalification operating test during a training cycle. This test had not been observed by
NRC region-based inspectors during the biennial portion of this IP.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
7
.2
Resident Inspector Quarterly Observation of Heightened Activity or Risk (71111.11Q)
a.
Inspection Scope
On October 30, 2013, the inspectors observed operating crew response in the control
room to the report of a strong burning odor of plant insulation reported by a security
officer through the secondary alarm station and to the report of a non-activated fire
impairment for removed floor plugs in the west side of the Auxiliary Building 620
elevation. On November 9, the inspectors observed operating crew preparations and
response in the control room to a walk-through of the procedures and processes for
responding to potential aircraft threats, in preparation for the Temporary Instruction (TI)
2515/186 inspection which was documented in security NRC IR 05000440/2013406 and
completed on December 6. These were activities that required heightened awareness.
The inspectors evaluated the following areas:
licensed operator performance;
crews clarity and formality of communications;
ability to take timely actions in the conservative direction;
prioritization, interpretation, and verification of annunciator alarms (if applicable);
correct use and implementation of procedures;
control board (or equipment) manipulations;
oversight and direction from supervisors; and
ability to identify and implement appropriate TS actions and Emergency Plan
actions and notifications (if applicable).
The performance in these areas was compared to pre-established operator action
expectations, procedural compliance, and task completion requirements. Documents
reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This inspection constituted one quarterly licensed operator heightened activity/risk
sample as defined in IP 71111.11.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
.3
Biennial Written and Annual Operating Test Results (71111.11A)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the overall pass/fail results of the Annual Operating Test,
administered by the licensee from November 4 - December 16, 2013, as required by
10 CFR 55.59(a). The results were compared to the thresholds established in
Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix I, Licensed Operator Requalification
Significance Determination Process," dated December 6, 2011, to assess the overall
adequacy of the licensees Licensed Operator Requalification Training Program to meet
the requirements of 10 CFR 55.59. (02.02)
This inspection constituted one annual licensed operator requalification examination
results sample as defined in IP 71111.11-05.
8
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated degraded performance issues involving the following
risk-significant systems:
E22, high-pressure core spray system; and
G33, reactor water cleanup.
The inspectors reviewed events, such as where ineffective equipment maintenance had
resulted in valid or invalid automatic actuations of engineered safeguards systems, and
independently verified the licensee's actions to address system performance or condition
problems in terms of the following:
implementing appropriate work practices;
identifying and addressing common cause failures;
scoping of systems in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(b) of the maintenance rule;
characterizing system reliability issues for performance;
charging unavailability for performance;
trending key parameters for condition monitoring;
ensuring 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2) classification or re-classification; and
verifying appropriate performance criteria for structures, systems, and
components/functions classified as (a)(2), or appropriate and adequate goals and
corrective actions for systems classified as (a)(1).
The inspectors assessed performance issues with respect to the reliability, availability,
and condition monitoring of the system. In addition, the inspectors verified maintenance
effectiveness issues were entered into the CAP with the appropriate significance
characterization. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This inspection constituted two quarterly maintenance effectiveness samples as defined
in IP 71111.12-05.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation and management of plant risk for the
maintenance and emergent work activities affecting risk-significant and safety-related
equipment listed below to verify that the appropriate risk assessments were performed
prior to removing equipment for work:
9
motor control center, switchgear, and miscellaneous electrical equipment areas
HVAC system and battery room exhaust system on Division 2 for multiple
maintenance items;
unfused remote DC ammeter circuits could result in secondary fires due to
multiple fire-induced faults; and
Division 2 EDG carbon dioxide system degradation.
These activities were selected based on their potential risk significance relative to the
Reactor Safety Cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that
risk assessments were performed as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and were accurate
and complete. When emergent work was performed, the inspectors verified that the
plant risk was promptly reassessed and managed. The inspectors reviewed the scope
of maintenance work, discussed the results of the assessment with the licensee's
probabilistic risk analyst or shift technical advisor, and verified plant conditions were
consistent with the risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed TS requirements and
walked down portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to verify risk
analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met.
Documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report.
These maintenance risk assessments and emergent work control activities constituted
three samples as defined in IP 71111.13-05.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functional Assessments (71111.15)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following issues:
Reactor pressure vessel (RPV) Level 3 and 8 reactor protection system (RPS)
and residual heat removal (RHR) shutdown isolation channel 'B' operability
determination;
control rod operability; and
emergency closed cooling 'B' gas entrainment from control complex chill water
chiller 'B' tube leak.
The inspectors selected these potential operability issues based on the risk significance
of the associated components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical
adequacy of the evaluations to ensure that TS operability was properly justified and the
subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in
risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the
appropriate sections of the TSs and UFSAR to the licensees evaluations to determine
whether the components or systems were operable. Where compensatory measures
were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures
in place would function as intended and were properly controlled. The inspectors
determined, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations associated with the
evaluations. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sampling of corrective action
documents to verify that the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies
10
associated with operability evaluations. Documents reviewed are listed in the
Attachment to this report.
This operability inspection constituted three samples as defined in IP 71111.15-05.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
1R18 Plant Modifications (71111.18)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following modifications:
valve replacements permanent modification in the hydrogen analyzing system;
and
temporary modification for correction of hot short conditions in control room
DC ammeter circuits.
The inspectors reviewed the configuration changes and associated 10 CFR 50.59 safety
evaluation screening against the design basis, the UFSAR, and the TSs, as applicable,
to verify that the modification did not affect the operability or availability of the affected
systems. The inspectors, as applicable, observed ongoing and completed work
activities to ensure that the modifications were installed as directed and consistent with
the design control documents; the modifications operated as expected; post-modification
testing adequately demonstrated continued system operability, availability, and reliability;
and that operation of the modifications did not impact the operability of any interfacing
systems. As applicable, the inspectors verified that relevant procedure, design, and
licensing documents were properly updated. Lastly, the inspectors discussed the plant
modification with operations, engineering, and training personnel to ensure that the
individuals were aware of how the operation with the plant modification in place could
impact overall plant performance. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to
this report.
This inspection constituted one temporary modification sample and one permanent plant
modification sample as defined in IP 71111.18-05.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following post-maintenance activities to verify that
procedures and test activities were adequate to ensure system operability and functional
capability:
rod control and information system and rod gang drive system analyzer repair;
radwaste building ventilation radiation monitor digital upgrade;
11
control room emergency recirculation train B electo-hydraulic control flow switch
repair;
Division 1 EDG allowed outage time retesting;
nuclear closed cooling pipe through wall leak on instrument line repair;
control room return fan 'B' repair
These activities were selected based upon the structure, system, or component's ability
to impact risk. The inspectors evaluated these activities for the following (as applicable):
the effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed; testing was adequate
for the maintenance performed; acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated
operational readiness; test instrumentation was appropriate; tests were performed as
written in accordance with properly reviewed and approved procedures; equipment was
returned to its operational status following testing (temporary modifications or jumpers
required for test performance were properly removed after test completion); and test
documentation was properly evaluated. The inspectors evaluated the activities against
TSs, the UFSAR, 10 CFR Part 50 requirements, licensee procedures, and various
NRC generic communications to ensure that the test results adequately ensured that the
equipment met the licensing basis and design requirements. In addition, the inspectors
reviewed corrective action documents associated with post-maintenance tests to
determine whether the licensee was identifying problems and entering them in the CAP
and that the problems were being corrected commensurate with their importance to
safety. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This inspection constituted six post-maintenance testing samples as defined in
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the test results for the following activities to determine whether
risk-significant systems and equipment were capable of performing their intended safety
function and to verify testing was conducted in accordance with applicable procedural
and TS requirements:
Surveillance Instruction (SVI)-R43-T1318; Diesel Generator Start and Load
Division 2; dated October 9, 2013 (routine testing);
SVI-B21-T0035-B; RPV Level 3 and Level 8 RPS and RHR Shutdown Isolation
Channel B Calibration for 1B21-N680B; dated October 10, 2013 (routine testing);
Reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) steam line flow high channel functional test
(routine testing);
RCIC system pump and valve operability test (inservice testing); and
Nuclear Management and Control (NUMAC) leak detection monitor functional
test (reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage).
12
The inspectors observed in-plant activities and reviewed procedures and associated
records to determine the following:
did preconditioning occur;
the effects of the testing were adequately addressed by control room personnel
or engineers prior to the commencement of the testing;
acceptance criteria were clearly stated, demonstrated operational readiness, and
were consistent with the system design basis;
plant equipment calibration was correct, accurate, and properly documented;
as-left setpoints were within required ranges; and the calibration frequency was
in accordance with TSs, the UFSAR, procedures, and applicable commitments;
measuring and test equipment calibration was current;
test equipment was used within the required range and accuracy; applicable
prerequisites described in the test procedures were satisfied;
test frequencies met TS requirements to demonstrate operability and reliability;
tests were performed in accordance with the test procedures and other
applicable procedures; jumpers and lifted leads were controlled and restored
where used;
test data and results were accurate, complete, within limits, and valid;
test equipment was removed after testing;
where applicable for inservice testing activities, testing was performed in
accordance with the applicable version of Section XI, American Society of
Mechanical Engineers code, and reference values were consistent with the
system design basis;
where applicable, test results not meeting acceptance criteria were addressed
with an adequate operability evaluation or the system or component was
declared inoperable;
where applicable for safety-related instrument control surveillance tests,
reference setting data were accurately incorporated in the test procedure;
where applicable, actual conditions encountering high resistance electrical
contacts were such that the intended safety function could still be accomplished;
prior procedure changes had not provided an opportunity to identify problems
encountered during the performance of the surveillance or calibration test;
equipment was returned to a position or status required to support the
performance of its safety functions; and
all problems identified during the testing were appropriately documented and
dispositioned in the CAP.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This inspection constituted three routine surveillance testing samples, one inservice
testing sample, and one RCS leak detection inspection sample, as defined in
IP 71111.22, Sections -02 and -05.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
13
1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes (IP 71114.04)
a.
Inspection Scope
The Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response headquarters staff performed an
in-office review of the latest revisions to the Emergency Plan and various Emergency
Plan Implementing Procedures.
The licensee transmitted the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures revisions to the
NRC pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section V,
Implementing Procedures. The NRC review was not documented in a safety
evaluation report and did not constitute approval of licensee-generated changes;
therefore, this revision is subject to future inspection. The specific documents reviewed
during this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This emergency action level and emergency plan change inspection constituted one
sample as defined in IP 71114.04-05.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
2.
RADIATION SAFETY
Cornerstones: Occupational Radiation Safety and Public Radiation Safety
2RS3 In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation (71124.03)
This inspection constituted one complete sample as defined in IP 71124.03-05.
.1
Inspection Planning (02.01)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the UFSAR to identify areas of the plant designed as potential
airborne radiation areas and any associated ventilation systems or airborne monitoring
instrumentation. Instrumentation review included continuous air monitors (continuous
air monitors and particulate-iodine-noble-gas-type instruments) used to identify changing
airborne radiological conditions such that actions to prevent an overexposure may be
taken. The review included an overview of the Respiratory Protection Program and a
description of the types of devices used. The inspectors reviewed the UFSAR, TSs, and
emergency planning documents to identify location and quantity of respiratory protection
devices stored for emergency use.
Inspectors reviewed the licensees procedures for maintenance, inspection, and use of
respiratory protection equipment including self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA),
as well as procedures for air quality maintenance.
The inspectors reviewed any reported performance indicators related to unintended
dose resulting from intakes of radioactive material.
14
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
.2
Engineering Controls (02.02)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees use of permanent and temporary ventilation to
determine whether the licensee uses ventilation systems as part of its engineering
controls (in lieu of respiratory protection devices) to control airborne radioactivity. The
inspectors reviewed procedural guidance for use of installed plant systems, such as
containment purge, spent fuel pool ventilation, and auxiliary building ventilation, and
assessed whether the systems were used, to the extent practicable, during high-risk
activities (e.g., using containment purge during cavity floodup).
The inspectors selected installed ventilation systems used to mitigate the potential for
airborne radioactivity, and evaluated whether the ventilation airflow capacity, flow path
(including the alignment of the suction and discharges), and filter/charcoal unit
efficiencies, as appropriate, were consistent with maintaining concentrations of airborne
radioactivity in work areas below the concentrations of an airborne area to the extent
practicable.
The inspectors selected temporary ventilation system setups (high-efficiency particulate
air/charcoal negative pressure units, down-draft tables, tents, metal Kelly buildings,
and other enclosures) used to support work in contaminated areas. The inspectors
assessed whether the use of these systems was consistent with licensee procedural
guidance and the as-low-as-is-reasonably-achievable (ALARA) concept.
The inspectors reviewed airborne monitoring protocols by selecting installed systems
used to monitor and warn of changing airborne concentrations in the plant and evaluated
whether the alarms and setpoints were sufficient to prompt licensee/worker action to
ensure that doses were maintained within the limits of 10 CFR Part 20 and the ALARA
concept.
The inspectors assessed whether the licensee had established trigger points (e.g., the
Electric Power Research Institutes Alpha Monitoring Guidelines for Operating Nuclear
Power Stations) for evaluating levels of airborne beta-emitting (e.g., plutonium-241) and
alpha-emitting radionuclides.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
.3
Use of Respiratory Protection Devices (02.03)
a.
Inspection Scope
For those situations where it was impractical to employ engineering controls to minimize
airborne radioactivity, the inspectors assessed whether the licensee provided respiratory
protective devices such that occupational doses were ALARA. The inspectors selected
work activities where respiratory protection devices were used to limit the intake of
15
radioactive materials, and assessed whether the licensee performed an evaluation
concluding that further engineering controls were not practical and that the use of
respiratorswais ALARA. The inspectors also evaluated whether the licensee had
established means (such as routine bio-assay) to determine if the level of protection
(protection factor) provided by the respiratory protection devices during use was at least
as good as that assumed in the licensees work controls and dose assessment.
The inspectors assessed whether respiratory protection devices used to limit the intake
of radioactive materials were certified by the National Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health/Mine Safety and Health Administration or have been approved by the NRC
per 10 CFR 20.1703(b). The inspectors selected work activities where respiratory
protection devices were used. The inspectors evaluated whether the devices were used
consistent with their National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health/Mine Safety
and Health Administration certification or any conditions of their NRC approval.
The inspectors reviewed records of air testing for supplied-air devices and SCBA bottles
to assess whether the air used in these devices met or exceeded Grade D quality. The
inspectors reviewed plant breathing air supply systems to determine whether they met
the minimum pressure and airflow requirements for the devices in use.
The inspectors selected several individuals qualified to use respiratory protection
devices, and assessed whether they had been deemed fit to use the devices by a
physician.
The inspectors selected several individuals assigned to wear a respiratory protection
device and observed them donning, doffing, and functionally checking the device as
appropriate. Through interviews with these individuals, the inspectors evaluated
whether they knew how to safely use the device and how to properly respond to any
device malfunction or unusual occurrence (loss of power, loss of air, etc.).
The inspectors chose multiple respiratory protection devices staged and ready for use
in the plant or stocked for issuance for use. The inspectors assessed the physical
condition of the device components (mask or hood, harnesses, air lines, regulators,
air bottles, etc.) and reviewed records of routine inspection for each. The inspectors
selected several of the devices and reviewed records of maintenance on the vital
components (e.g., pressure regulators, inhalation/exhalation valves, hose couplings).
The inspectors reviewed the respirator vital components maintenance program to ensure
that the repairs of vital components were performed by the respirators manufacturer.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
.4
Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus for Emergency Use (02.04)
a.
Inspection Scope
Based on the UFSAR, TSs, and emergency operating procedure requirements, the
inspectors reviewed the status and surveillance records of SCBAs staged in-plant for
use during emergencies. The inspectors reviewed the licensees capability for refilling
and transporting SCBA air bottles to and from the control room and operations support
center during emergency conditions.
16
The inspectors selected several individuals on control room shift crews and from
designated departments currently assigned emergency duties (e.g., onsite search and
rescue duties) to assess whether control room operators and other emergency response
and radiation protection personnel (assigned in-plant search and rescue duties or as
required by emergency operating procedures or the emergency plan) were trained and
qualified in the use of SCBAs (including personal bottle changeout). The inspectors
evaluated whether personnel assigned to refill bottles were trained and qualified for that
task.
The inspectors determined whether appropriate mask sizes and types were available for
use (i.e., in-field mask size and type match what was used in fit-testing). The inspectors
determined whether on-shift operators had no facial hair that would interfere with the
sealing of the mask to the face and whether vision correction (e.g., glasses inserts or
corrected lenses) was available as appropriate.
The inspectors reviewed the past 2 years of maintenance records for select SCBA units
used to support operator activities during accident conditions and designated as ready
for service to assess whether any maintenance or repairs on any SCBA units vital
components were performed by an individual, or individuals, certified by the
manufacturer of the device to perform the work. The vital components typically are the
pressure-demand air regulator and the low-pressure alarm. The inspectors reviewed the
onsite maintenance procedures governing vital component work to determine any
inconsistencies with the SCB A manufacturers recommended practices. For those
SCBAs designated as ready for service, the inspectors determined whether the
required, periodic air cylinder hydrostatic testing was documented and up to date, and
the retest air cylinder markings required by the U.S. Department of Transportation were
in place.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
.5
Problem Identification and Resolution (02.05)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated whether problems associated with the control and mitigation of
in-plant airborne radioactivity were being identified by the licensee at an appropriate
threshold and were properly addressed for resolution in the CAP. The inspectors
assessed whether the corrective actions were appropriate for a selected sample of
problems involving airborne radioactivity and were appropriately documented by the
licensee.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
17
2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment (71124.04)
The inspection activities supplement those documented in NRC IR 05000440/2012003
and constitute one complete sample as defined in IP 71124.04-05.
.1
Internal Dosimetry (02.03)
.1.1 Special Bioassay (In Vitro)
a.
Inspection Scope
There was no internal dose assessments obtained using in vitro monitoring for the
inspectors to review. The inspectors reviewed and assessed the adequacy of the
licensees program for in vitro monitoring (i.e., urinalysis and fecal analysis) of
radionuclides (tritium, fission products, and activation products), including collection and
storage of samples.
The inspectors reviewed the vendor laboratory quality assurance program and assessed
whether the laboratory participated in an industry-recognized cross-check program,
including whether out-of-tolerance results were resolved appropriately.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
.1.2 Internal Dose Assessment - Whole Body Count Analyses
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed several dose assessments performed by the licensee using the
results of whole body count analyses. The inspectors determined whether affected
personnel were properly monitored with calibrated equipment and that internal
exposures were assessed consistent with the licensee's procedures.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
.2
Special Dosimetric Situations (02.04)
.2.1 Dosimeter Placement and Assessment of Effective Dose Equivalent for External
Exposures
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's methodology for monitoring external dose in
non-uniform radiation fields or where large dose gradients exist. The inspectors
evaluated the licensee's criteria for determining when alternate monitoring, such as use
of multi-badging, was to be implemented.
The inspectors reviewed dose assessments performed using multi-badging to evaluate
whether the assessment was performed consistently with licensee procedures and
dosimetric standards.
18
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
.2.2 Shallow Dose Equivalent
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed shallow dose equivalent dose assessments for adequacy.
The inspectors evaluated the licensees method (e.g., VARSKIN or similar code) for
calculating shallow dose equivalent from distributed skin contamination or discrete
radioactive particles.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
.2.3 Neutron Dose Assessment
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the licensees neutron dosimetry program, including dosimeter
types and/or survey instrumentation.
The inspectors reviewed neutron exposure situations (e.g., independent spent fuel
storage installation operations or at-power containment entries) and assessed whether
(a) dosimetry and/or instrumentation was appropriate for the expected neutron spectra,
(b) there was sufficient sensitivity for low dose and/or dose rate measurement, and (c)
neutron dosimetry was properly calibrated. The inspectors also assessed whether
interference by gamma radiation had been accounted for in the calibration and whether
time and motion evaluations were representative of actual neutron exposure events, as
applicable.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
.2.4 Assigning Dose of Record
a.
Inspection Scope
For the special dosimetric situations reviewed in this section, the inspectors assessed
how the licensee assigns dose of record for total effective dose equivalent, shallow dose
equivalent, and lens dose equivalent. This included an assessment of external and
internal monitoring results, supplementary information on individual exposures (e.g.,
radiation incident investigation reports and skin contamination reports), and radiation
surverys and/or air monitoring results when dosimetry was based on these techniques.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
19
.3
Problem Identification and Resolution (02.05)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed whether problems associated with occupational dose
assessment are being identified by the licensee at an appropriate threshold and are
properly addressed for resolution in the licensees CAP. The inspectors assessed the
appropriateness of the corrective actions for a selected sample of problems documented
by the licensee involving occupational dose assessment.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
2RS5 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation (71124.05)
This inspection constituted one complete sample as defined in IP 71124.05-05.
.1
Inspection Planning (02.01)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the plant UFSAR to identify radiation instruments associated
with monitoring area radiological conditions including airborne radioactivity, process
streams, effluents, materials/articles, and workers. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed
the instrumentation and the associated TS requirements for post-accident monitoring
instrumentation, including instruments used for remote emergency assessment.
The inspectors reviewed a listing of in-service survey instrumentation, including air
samplers and small article monitors, along with instruments used to detect and analyze
workers external contamination. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed personnel
contamination monitors and portal monitors, including whole-body counters, to detect
workers internal contamination. The inspectors reviewed this list to assess whether an
adequate number and type of instruments were available to support operations.
The inspectors reviewed licensee and third-party evaluation reports of the radiation
monitoring program since the last inspection. These reports were reviewed for insights
into the licensees program and to aid in selecting areas for review (smart sampling).
The inspectors reviewed procedures that govern instrument source checks and
calibrations, focusing on instruments used for monitoring transient high radiological
conditions, including instruments used for underwater surveys. The inspectors reviewed
the calibration and source check procedures for adequacy and as an aid to smart
sampling.
The inspectors reviewed the area radiation monitor alarm setpoint values and setpoint
bases as provided in the TSs and the UFSAR.
The inspectors reviewed effluent monitor alarm setpoint bases and the calculational
methods provided in the offsite dose calculation manual.
20
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
.2
Walkdowns and Observations (02.02)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors walked down effluent radiation monitoring systems, including at least one
liquid and one airborne system. Focus was placed on flow measurement devices and all
accessible point-of-discharge liquid and gaseous effluent monitors of the selected
systems. The inspectors assessed whether the effluent/process monitor configurations
aligned with Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) descriptions and observed
monitors for degradation and out-of-service tags.
The inspectors selected portable survey instruments that were in use or available for
issuance and assessed calibration and source check stickers for currency as well as
instrument material condition and operability.
The inspectors observed licensee staff performance as the staff demonstrated source
checks for various types of portable survey instruments. The inspectors assessed
whether high-range instruments were source checked on all appropriate scales.
The inspectors walked down area radiation monitors and continuous air monitors to
determine whether they were appropriately positioned relative to the radiation sources or
areas they were intended to monitor. Selectively, the inspectors compared monitor
response (via local or remote control room indications) with actual area conditions for
consistency.
The inspectors selected personnel contamination monitors, portal monitors, and small
article monitors and evaluated whether the periodic source checks were performed in
accordance with the manufacturers recommendations and licensee procedures.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
.3
Calibration and Testing Program (02.03)
.3.1 Process and Effluent Monitors
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors selected effluent monitor instruments (such as gaseous and liquid) and
evaluated whether channel calibration and functional tests were performed consistent
with radiological effluent Technical Specifications (RETS)/ODCM. The inspectors
assessed whether (a) the licensee calibrated its monitors with National Institute of
Standards and Technology traceable sources; (b) the primary calibrations adequately
represented the plant nuclide mix; (c) when secondary calibration sources were used,
the sources were verified by the primary calibration; and (d) the licensees channel
calibrations encompassed the instruments alarm setpoints.
21
The inspectors assessed whether the effluent monitor alarm setpoints were established
as provided in the ODCM and station procedures.
For changes to effluent monitor setpoints, the inspectors evaluated the basis for
changes to ensure that an adequate justification existed.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
.3.2 Laboratory Instrumentation
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed laboratory analytical instruments used for radiological analyses
to determine whether daily performance checks and calibration data indicated that the
frequency of the calibrations was adequate and there were no indications of degraded
instrument performance.
The inspectors assessed whether appropriate corrective actions were implemented in
response to indications of degraded instrument performance.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
.3.3 Whole Body Counter
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the methods and sources used to perform whole body count
functional checks before daily use of the instrument and assessed whether check
sources were appropriate and aligned with the plants isotopic mix.
The inspectors reviewed whole body count calibration records since the last inspection
and evaluated whether calibration sources were representative of the plant source term
and that appropriate calibration phantoms were used. The inspectors looked for
anomalous results or other indications of instrument performance problems.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
.3.4 Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation
a.
Inspection Scope
Inspectors selected containment high-range monitors and reviewed the calibration
documentation since the last inspection.
The inspectors assessed whether an electronic calibration was completed for all range
decades above 10 rem/hour and whether at least one decade at or below 10 rem/hour
were calibrated using an appropriate radiation source.
22
The inspectors assessed whether calibration acceptance criteria were reasonable,
accounting for the large measuring range and the intended purpose of the instruments.
The inspectors selected effluent/process monitors that were relied on by the licensee in
its emergency operating procedures as a basis for triggering emergency action levels
and subsequent emergency classifications, or to make protective action
recommendations during an accident. The inspectors evaluated the calibration and
availability of these instruments.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees capability to collect high-range, post-accident
iodine effluent samples.
As available, the inspectors observed electronic and radiation calibration of these
instruments to assess conformity with the licensees calibration and test protocols.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
.3.5 Portal Monitors, Personnel Contamination Monitors, and Small Article Monitors
a.
Inspection Scope
For each type of these instruments used onsite, the inspectors assessed whether the
alarm setpoint values were reasonable under the circumstances to ensure that licensed
material is not released from the site.
The inspectors reviewed the calibration documentation for each instrument selected and
discussed the calibration methods with the licensee to determine consistency with the
manufacturers recommendations.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
.3.6 Portable Survey Instruments, Area Radiation Monitors, Electronic Dosimetry, and Air
Samplers/Continuous Air Monitors
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed calibration documentation for at least one of each type of
instrument. For portable survey instruments and area radiation monitors, the inspectors
reviewed detector measurement geometry and calibration methods and had the licensee
demonstrate use of its instrument calibrator as applicable. The inspectors conducted
comparison of instrument readings versus an NRC survey instrument if problems were
suspected.
As available, the inspectors selected portable survey instruments that did not meet
acceptance criteria during calibration or source checks to assess whether the licensee
had taken appropriate corrective action for instruments found significantly out of
calibration (greater than 50 percent). The inspectors evaluated whether the licensee
had evaluated the possible consequences of instrument use since the last successful
calibration or source check.
23
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
.3.7 Instrument Calibrator
a.
Inspection Scope
As applicable, the inspectors reviewed the current output values for the licensees
portable survey and area radiation monitor instrument calibrator units. The inspectors
assessed whether the licensee periodically measures calibrator output over the range of
the instruments used through measurements by ion chamber/electrometer.
The inspectors assessed whether the measuring devices had been calibrated by a
facility using National Institute of Standards and Technology traceable sources and
whether corrective factors for these measuring devices were properly applied by the
licensee in its output verification.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
.3.8 Calibration and Check Sources
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees 10 CFR Part 61, Licensing Requirements for
Land Disposal of Radioactive Waste, source term to assess whether calibration sources
used were representative of the types and energies of radiation encountered in the plant.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
.4
Problem Identification and Resolution (02.04)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated whether problems associated with radiation monitoring
instrumentation were being identified by the licensee at an appropriate threshold and
were properly addressed for resolution in the licensee CAP. The inspectors assessed
the appropriateness of the corrective actions for a selected sample of problems
documented by the licensee that involve radiation monitoring instrumentation.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
24
2RS6 Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment (71124.06)
This inspection constituted one complete sample as defined in IP 71124.06-05.
.1
Inspection Planning and Program Reviews (02.01)
.1.1 Event Report and Effluent Report Reviews
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the radiological effluent release reports issued since the last
inspection to determine if the reports were submitted as required by the RETS/ODCM.
The inspectors reviewed anomalous results, unexpected trends, or abnormal releases
identified by the licensee for further inspection to determine if they were evaluated, were
entered in the CAP, and were adequately resolved.
The inspectors selected radioactive effluent monitor operability issues reported by the
licensee as provided in effluent release reports, to review these issues during the onsite
inspection, as warranted, given their relative significance and determine if the issues
were entered into the CAP and adequately resolved.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
.1.2 Offsite Dose Calculation Manual and Final Safety Analysis Report Review
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed UFSAR descriptions of the radioactive effluent monitoring
systems, treatment systems, and effluent flow paths so they could be evaluated during
inspection walkdowns.
The inspectors reviewed changes to the ODCM made by the licensee since the last
inspection against the guidance in NUREG-1302 and 0133, and Regulatory Guides
1.109, 1.21, and 4.1. When differences were identified, the inspectors reviewed the
technical basis or evaluations of the change during the onsite inspection to determine
whether they were technically justified and maintained effluent releases ALARA.
The inspectors reviewed licensee documentation to determine if the licensee has
identified any non-radioactive systems that have become contaminated as disclosed
either through an event report or the ODCM since the last inspection. This review
provided an intelligent sample list for the onsite inspection of any 10 CFR 50.59
evaluations and allowed a determination if any newly contaminated systems had an
unmonitored effluent discharge path to the environment, whether any required ODCM
revisions were made to incorporate these new pathways and whether the associated
effluents were reported in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.21.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
25
.1.3 Groundwater Protection Initiative Program
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed reported groundwater monitoring results and changes to the
licensees written program for identifying and controlling contaminated spills/leaks to
groundwater.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
.1.4 Procedures, Special Reports, and Other Documents
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed Licensee Event Reports, event reports and/or special reports
related to the effluent program issued since the previous inspection to identify any
additional focus areas for the inspection based on the scope/breadth of problems
described in these reports.
The inspectors reviewed effluent program implementing procedures, particularly those
associated with effluent sampling, effluent monitor set-point determinations, and dose
calculations.
The inspectors reviewed copies of licensee and third party (independent) evaluation
reports of the effluent monitoring program since the last inspection to gather insights into
the licensees program and aid in selecting areas for inspection review (smart sampling).
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
.2
Walkdowns and Observations (02.02)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors walked down selected components of the gaseous and liquid discharge
systems to evaluate whether equipment configuration and flow paths align with the
documents reviewed in 02.01 above and to assess equipment material condition.
Special attention was made to identify potential unmonitored release points (such as
open roof vents in boiling water reactor turbine decks, temporary structures butted
against turbine, auxiliary or containment buildings), building alterations which could
impact airborne or liquid effluent controls, and ventilation system leakage that
communicated directly with the environment.
For equipment or areas associated with the systems selected for review that were not
readily accessible due to radiological conditions, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's
material condition surveillance records, as applicable.
The inspectors walked down filtered ventilation systems to assess for conditions such as
degraded high-efficiency particulate air/charcoal banks, improper alignment, or system
26
installation issues that would impact the performance or the effluent monitoring capability
of the effluent system.
As available, the inspectors observed selected portions of the routine processing and
discharge of radioactive gaseous effluent (including sample collection and analysis) to
evaluate whether appropriate treatment equipment was used and the processing
activities align with discharge permits.
The inspectors determined if the licensee has made significant changes to the effluent
release points (e.g., changes subject to a 10 CFR 50.59 review or require NRC approval
of alternate discharge points).
As available, the inspectors observed selected portions of the routine processing and
discharging of liquid waste (including sample collection and analysis) to determine if
appropriate effluent treatment equipment was being used and that radioactive liquid
waste was being processed and discharged in accordance with procedure requirements
and aligns with discharge permits.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
.3
Sampling and Analyses (02.03)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors selected effluent sampling activities, consistent with smart sampling, and
assessed whether adequate controls have been implemented to ensure representative
samples were obtained (e.g., provisions for sample line flushing, vessel recirculation,
composite samplers, etc.).
The inspectors selected effluent discharges made with inoperable (declared out-of-
service) effluent radiation monitors to assess whether controls were in place to ensure
compensatory sampling was performed consistent with the RETS/ODCM and that those
controls were adequate to prevent the release of unmonitored liquid and gaseous
effluents.
The inspectors determined whether the facility was routinely relying on the use of
compensatory sampling in lieu of adequate system maintenance, based on the
frequency of compensatory sampling since the last inspection.
The inspectors reviewed the results of the inter-laboratory comparison program to
evaluate the quality of the radioactive effluent sample analyses and assessed whether
the inter-laboratory comparison program included hard-to-detect isotopes as
appropriate.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
27
.4
Instrumentation and Equipment (02.04)
.4.1 Effluent Flow Measuring Instruments
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the methodology the licensee used to determine the effluent
stack and vent flow rates to determine if the flow rates were consistent with
RETS/ODCM or UFSAR values, and that differences between assumed and actual stack
and vent flow rates did not affect the results of the projected public doses.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
.4.2 Air Cleaning Systems
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed whether surveillance test results since the previous inspection
for TS-required ventilation effluent discharge systems (high-efficiency particulate air and
charcoal filtration), such as the standby gas treatment system and the
containment/auxiliary building ventilation system, met TS acceptance criteria.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
.5
Dose Calculations (02.05)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed all significant changes in reported dose values compared to the
previous radiological effluent release report (e.g., a factor of 5, or increases that
approached Appendix I criteria) to evaluate the factors which may have resulted in the
change.
The inspectors reviewed radioactive liquid and gaseous waste discharge permits to
assess whether the projected doses to members of the public were accurate and based
on representative samples of the discharge path.
Inspectors evaluated the methods used to determine the isotopes that were included in
the source term to ensure all applicable radionuclides were included within detectability
standards. The review included the current Part 61 analyses to ensure hard-to-detect
radionuclides were included in the source term.
The inspectors reviewed changes in the licensees offsite dose calculations since the
last inspection to evaluate whether changes were consistent with the ODCM and
Regulatory Guide 1.109. Inspectors reviewed meteorological dispersion and deposition
factors used in the ODCM and effluent dose calculations to evaluate whether
appropriate factors were being used for public dose calculations.
28
The inspectors reviewed the latest Land Use Census to assess whether changes (e.g.,
significant increases or decreases to population in the plant environs, changes in critical
exposure pathways, the location of nearest member of the public or critical receptor,
etc.) had been factored into the dose calculations.
For the releases reviewed above, the inspectors evaluated whether the calculated doses
(monthly, quarterly, and annual dose) were within the 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I and
TS dose criteria.
The inspectors reviewed, as available, records of any abnormal gaseous or liquid tank
discharges (e.g., discharges resulting from misaligned valves, valve leak-by, etc.) to
ensure the abnormal discharge was monitored by the discharge point effluent monitor.
Discharges made with inoperable effluent radiation monitors, or unmonitored leakages
were reviewed to ensure that an evaluation was made of the discharge to satisfy
10 CFR 20.1501 so as to account for the source term and projected doses to the public.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
.6
Groundwater Protection Initiative Implementation (02.06)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed monitoring results of the groundwater protection initiative to
determine if the licensee had implemented its program as intended and to identify any
anomalous results. For anomalous results or missed samples, the inspectors assessed
whether the licensee had identified and addressed deficiencies through its CAP.
The inspectors reviewed identified leakage or spill events and entries made into
10 CFR 50.75(g) records. The inspectors reviewed evaluations of leaks or spills and
reviewed any remediation actions taken for effectiveness. The inspectors reviewed
onsite contamination events involving contamination of groundwater and assessed
whether the source of the leak or spill was identified and mitigated.
For unmonitored spills, leaks, or unexpected liquid or gaseous discharges, the
inspectors assessed whether an evaluation was performed to determine the type and
amount of radioactive material that was discharged by:
1) Assessing whether sufficient radiological surveys were performed to evaluate the
extent of the contamination and the radiological source term and assessing
whether a survey/evaluation had been performed to include consideration of
hard-to-detect radionuclides.
2) Determining whether the licensee completed offsite notifications, as provided in
its groundwater protection initiative implementing procedures.
The inspectors reviewed the evaluation of discharges from onsite surface water bodies
that contain or potentially contain radioactivity, and the potential for groundwater leakage
from these onsite surface water bodies. The inspectors assessed whether the licensee
was properly accounting for discharges from these surface water bodies as part of the
effluent release reports.
29
The inspectors assessed whether onsite groundwater sample results and a description
of any significant onsite leaks/spills into groundwater for each calendar year were
documented in the Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report for the
radiological environmental monitoring program or the Annual Radiological Effluent
Release Report for the RETS.
For significant new effluent discharge points (such as significant or continuing leakage to
groundwater that continues to impact the environment if not remediated), the inspectors
evaluated whether the ODCM was updated to include the new release point.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
.7
Problem Identification and Resolution (02.07)
a.
Inspection Scope
Inspectors assessed whether problems associated with the effluent monitoring and
control program were being identified by the licensee at an appropriate threshold and
were properly addressed for resolution in the licensees CAP. In addition, they
evaluated the appropriateness of the corrective actions for a selected sample of
problems documented by the licensee involving radiation monitoring and exposure
controls.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
4.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, and
Occupational Radiation Safety, and Public Radiation Safety
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)
.1
Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Leakage
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the RCS leakage performance indicator
(PI) for Perry Nuclear Power Plant for the fourth quarter 2012 through the third quarter
2013. To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported, PI definitions and guidance
contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment
Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, dated August 31, 2013, were used. The
inspectors reviewed the licensees operator logs, RCS leakage tracking data, issue
reports, event reports, and NRC integrated IRs to validate the accuracy of the
submittals. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees issue report database to
determine if any problems had been identified with the PI data collected or transmitted
for this indicator and none were identified. Documents reviewed are listed in the
Attachment to this report.
This inspection constituted one RCS leakage sample as defined in IP 71151-05.
30
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2
RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent Occurrences
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for RETS/ODCM radiological effluent
occurrences PI for the fourth quarter 2012 through the third quarter 2013. The
inspectors used PI definitions and guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory
Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revisions 7, to determine the accuracy
of the PI data reported. The inspectors reviewed the licensees issue report database
and selected individual reports generated since this indicator was last reviewed to
identify any potential occurrences such as unmonitored, uncontrolled, or improperly
calculated effluent releases that may have impacted offsite dose. The inspectors
reviewed gaseous effluent summary data and the results of associated offsite dose
calculations for selected dates to determine if indicator results were accurately reported.
The inspectors also reviewed the licensees methods for quantifying gaseous and liquid
effluents and determining effluent dose. Documents reviewed are listed in the
Attachment to this report.
This inspection constituted one RETS/ODCM radiological effluent occurrence sample as
defined in IP 71151-05.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)
.1
Routine Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program
a.
Inspection Scope
As part of the various baseline inspection procedures discussed in previous sections of
this report, the inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities
and plant status reviews to verify they were being entered into the licensees CAP at an
appropriate threshold, that adequate attention was being given to timely corrective
actions, and that adverse trends were identified and addressed. Attributes reviewed
included: identification of the problem was complete and accurate; timeliness was
commensurate with the safety significance; evaluation and disposition of performance
issues, generic implications, common causes, contributing factors, root causes,
extent-of-condition reviews, and previous occurrences reviews were proper and
adequate; and that the classification, prioritization, focus, and timeliness of corrective
actions were commensurate with safety and sufficient to prevent recurrence of the issue.
Minor issues entered into the licensees CAP as a result of the inspectors observations
are included in the Attachment to this report.
31
These routine reviews for the identification and resolution of problems did not constitute
any additional inspection samples. Instead, by procedure they were considered an
integral part of the inspections performed during the quarter and documented in
Section 1 of this report.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
.2
Daily Corrective Action Program Reviews
a.
Inspection Scope
To assist with the identification of repetitive equipment failures and specific human
performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items
entered into the licensees CAP. This review was accomplished through inspection of
the stations daily condition report packages.
These daily reviews were performed by procedure as part of the inspectors daily plant
status monitoring activities and, as such, did not constitute any separate inspection
samples.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
.3
Annual Sample: Review of Operator Workarounds
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the licensees implementation of the process used to identify,
document, track, and resolve operational challenges. Inspection activities included, but
were not limited to, a review of the cumulative effects of the operator workarounds
(OWAs) on system availability and the potential for improper operation of the system, for
potential impacts on multiple systems, and on the ability of operators to respond to plant
transients or accidents.
The inspectors performed a review of the cumulative effects of OWAs. The documents
listed in the Attachment to this report were reviewed to accomplish the objectives of the
IP. The inspectors reviewed both current and historical operational challenge records to
determine whether the licensee was identifying operator challenges at an appropriate
threshold, had entered them into the CAP and proposed or implemented appropriate and
timely corrective actions which addressed each issue. Reviews were conducted to
determine if any operator challenge could increase the possibility of an Initiating Event, if
the challenge was contrary to training, required a change from long-standing operational
practices, or created the potential for inappropriate compensatory actions. Additionally,
all temporary modifications were reviewed to identify any potential effect on the
functionality of Mitigating Systems, impaired access to equipment, or required equipment
uses for which the equipment was not designed. Daily plant and equipment status logs,
degraded instrument logs, and operator aids or tools being used to compensate for
material deficiencies were also assessed to identify any potential sources of unidentified
OWAs.
32
This review constituted one OWA annual inspection sample as defined in IP 71152-05.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
.4
Selected Issue Follow-Up Inspection: Root Cause Analysis; NRC ID 2013-95002; NRC
Debriefed a Finding with Multiple Examples of Radiological Work Control/Work Planning
Issues
a.
Inspection Scope
During a review of items entered in the licensees CAP, the inspectors reviewed a
corrective action item documenting a root cause analysis of an NRC-identified finding
with multiple examples of radiological work control/work planning issues. Specifically, as
part of the various baseline IPs discussed in previous sections of this report, the
inspectors reviewed corrective actions scheduled and implemented as a part of the
corrective actions for radiological work control and radiological work planning. The
inspectors assessed whether adequate attention was being given to timely
implementation of corrective actions.
The inspectors evaluated whether attributes for the corrective action document itself
included: (1) a complete and accurate identification of the problem statement; (2)
timeliness of the licensees review was commensurate with the safety significance;
(3) evaluation and disposition of performance issues was complete; and (4) the licensee
reviewed the issue for generic implications, common causes, contributing factors, root
causes, extent-of-condition reviews, and previous occurrences.
This review constituted one in-depth problem identification and resolution sample as
defined in IP 71152-05.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
.5
Selected Issue Follow-Up Inspection: Full Apparent Cause Analysis of NRC
Cross-Cutting Theme in Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) Aspect P.1(c)
a.
Inspection Scope
During a review of items entered in the licensees CAP, the inspectors reviewed a
corrective action item documenting a full apparent cause analysis of three
NRC-identified findings. Each of the findings which had occurred within the previous
12-month period were assigned a cross-cutting aspect for the licensees ability to
properly evaluate problems so that identified causes, corrective actions and extent of
conditions would address the problem identified. The inspectors evaluated the causes
presented by the licensee in the evaluation of each one of the specific findings. Several
discussions were held with licensee personnel to review the conclusions of the licensee.
Specifically, the licensee found that the corrective actions program was at fault for not
allowing the licensee to conduct extent-of-cause reviews when previous CRs had not
been categorized at a high enough level. A review of apparent causes identified by the
licensee was completed and will be evaluated based on future performance and
33
effectiveness reviews planned for the 12- and 24-month periods after completion of the
report.
This review constituted one in-depth problem identification and resolution sample as
defined in IP 71152-05.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA3 Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153)
.1
(Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000440/2013-003-01: Shutdown Required by
Technical Specifications Due to RCS Pressure Boundary Leakage
This document updated the cause of the leak following the licensees root cause
determination and laboratory evaluation of the weld crack that was found to be leaking
during the event. The event, which occurred on June 15, 2013, was identified by the
licensee inside the drywell while the reactor was in Mode 1, at approximately 8 percent
rated thermal power. A planned down power on June 14 had been conducted to inspect
the drywell for sources of unidentified leakage. During those inspections, two sources of
leakage were identified and one was later classified as through-wall leakage from the
RCS. A plant shutdown was performed in accordance with TS 3.4.5, RCS Operational
Leakage, and the plant entered into cold shutdown on June 16 at 1:58 p.m. Repairs
were made during the shutdown and the licensee subsequently completed an
extent-of-condition investigation and root cause analysis under CR 2013-09255. The
inspectors reviewed the LER submittal and root cause. The inspectors determined that
no additional deficiencies were identified by the licensee. Documents reviewed are
listed in the Attachment to this report. This LER is closed.
This event follow-up review constituted one sample as defined in IP 71153-05.
.2
(Closed) LER 05000440/2013-004-0: Vulnerability to Cause Secondary Fire Due to
Unfused Control Room Ammeters
This event was initially reported on October 17, 2013, by the licensee as the result of a
review that was conducted of industry operating experience. Ammeters that provided
current indication for the safety-related batteries in the control room were found to be
connected to unfused electrical lines with the potential to cause a fire in electrical trays.
The subsequent fire could cause damage to safety-related equipment wiring in the same
tray. A temporary modification was installed to eliminate the potential for the potential
fire as a result of the original design issue. A permanent plant modification was being
designed to isolate the indication circuits in the event of a control room fire. The
inspectors reviewed the LER submittal. Documents reviewed are listed in the
Attachment to this report. This LER is closed.
This event follow-up review constituted one sample as defined in IP 71153-05.
34
4OA6 Management Meetings
.1
Exit Meeting Summary
On January 9, 2014, the inspectors presented the inspection results Mr. E. Harness and
other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented.
The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was
considered proprietary.
.2
Interim Exit Meetings
Interim exits were conducted for:
The inspection results for the areas of in-plant airborne radioactivity control and
mitigation; occupational dose assessment; radiation monitoring instrumentation;
radioactive gaseous and liquid effluent treatment; reviews of compliance with the
offsite dose calculation manual; and radiological effluent occurrences PI verification
were reviewed with Mr. E. Harkness, Site Vice-President and other members of the
staff, on November 1, 2013.
The inspectors discussed the licensed operator requalification training annual
operating test results with Mr. R. Torres, Perry Lead Instructor, via telephone on
December 20, 2013.
The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was
considered proprietary.
4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations
The following violations of very low significance (Green) were identified by the licensee
and are violations of NRC requirements which meet the criteria of the NRC Enforcement
Policy for being dispositioned as NCVs.
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 20.1703(b) states If the licensee
wishes to use equipment that has not been tested or certified by NIOSH, or for which
there is no schedule for testing or certification, the licensee shall submit an
application to the NRC for authorized use of this equipment except as provided in
this part. The application must include evidence that the material and performance
characteristics of the equipment are capable of providing the proposed degree of
protection under anticipated conditions of use. This must be demonstrated either by
licensee testing or on the basis of reliable test information. The licensees
20.1703(b) application for the use of the Delta Suit dated December 6, 2005,
(ML053480357) and March 6, 2006, (ML060740647) made a commitment to
integrate the Delta Suits into the licensees respiratory program using manufacturers
recommendations that were included as part of the application. These
recommendations included descriptions of the devices that include a quick release
strip for undressing or emergency egress. This application was approved by the
NRC on March 23, 2006.
35
Contrary to the approved 20.1703(b) application described above, on
November 1, 2013, the licensee was using Delta Suits in a non-approved
configuration. Specifically, the quick release strips were taped over and
therefore non-functional. This issue was documented in the licensees CAP in
CR 2013-05877. Corrective actions included aborting the practice of defeating the
quick release strips and using the Delta Suits in their approved configuration. The
finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was
not an ALARA planning issue, there was no overexposure nor potential for
overexposure, and the licensees ability to assess dose was not compromised.
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 20.1703(c), requires, in part, that
the licensee implement and maintain a respiratory protection program that includes:
(4) Written procedures regarding--(vii) Storage, issuance, maintenance, repair,
testing, and quality assurance of respiratory protection equipment. Licensee
procedure NOP-OP-4310 Firehawk M7 Self Contained Breathing Apparatus
Section 4.6 requires monthly inspections of the respiratory protection equipment.
Contrary to the above, as of November 1, 2013, the licensee missed three monthly
SCBA respirator checks for calendar year 2013. This issue was documented in the
licensees CAP in CR 2013-05908. Corrective actions included implementing the
required monthly inspections of the respiratory protection equipment. The finding
was determined to be of very low safety significance because it was not an ALARA
planning issue, there was no overexposure nor potential for overexposure, and the
licensees ability to assess dose was not compromised.
ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
1
Attachment
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
E. Harkness, Site Vice-President
D. Hamilton, Site Operations Director
T. Brown, Performance Improvement Director
J. Ellis, Recovery Director
D. Reeves, Site Engineering Director
J. Veglia, Maintenance Director
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED
Opened
None
Closed
05000440/2013-03-01
LER
Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications Due to
RCS Pressure Boundary Leakage (Section 4OA3.1)
05000440/2013-04-00
LER
Vulnerability to Cause Secondary Fire Due to Unfused
Control Room Ammeters (Section 4OA3.2)
Discussed
2515/186
TI
Potential Aircraft Threats (Section 1R11)
2
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
- PTI-GEN-P0026; Preparations for Winter Operations; Revision 7
- CR 2013-15855; House Keeping Standards Not Being Met in Quincy Load Center at Perry;
dated October 6, 2013
- CR 2013-16342; Manholes/Excavation in Need of Covers for Winter Operation; dated
October 13, 2013
- NOP-WM-2001; Work Management Scheduling, Assessment and Seasonal Readiness
Processes; Revision 15
- eSOMS Plant Narrative Logs; dated October 31, 2013 and November 1, 2013
- ONI-ZZZ-1; Tornado or High Winds; Revision 19
- Winter Work List 2013; dated November 1, 2013
- PTI-GEN-P0026; Preparations for Winter Operation; Revision 7
1R04 Equipment Alignment
- VLI-M43; Diesel Generator Building Ventilation System (Unit 1); Revision 4
- VLI-R44; Division 1 and 2 Diesel Generator Starting Air System (Unit 1); Revision 4
- VLI-R45; Division 1 and 2 Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System (Unit 1); Revision 5
- VLI-R46; Division 1 and 2 Diesel Generator Jacket
Water Systems; Revision 4
- VLI-R47; Division 1 and 2 Diesel Generator Lube Oil; Revision 7
- VLI-R48; Division 1 and 2 Diesel Generator Exhaust, Intake and Crankcase Systems;
Revision 6
- 912-0609-00000; MCC Switchgear and Misc. Electrical Equipment Areas HVAC System;
Revision CC
- SOI- M23/24; MCC, Switchgear, and Miscellaneous Electrical Equipment Area HVAC System;
Revision 15
- VLI-M23/24; MCC, Switchgear, and Miscellaneous Electrical Equipment Area HVAC System;
Revision 8
- DWG 912-0610-00000; Control Room HVAC and Emergency Recirculation System;
Revision FF
- Perry System Health Report 2013-1 for System M25 and M26; dated August 22, 2013
- System Description Manual M25/26; Control Room HVAC and Recirculation System;
Revision 5
- Updated Safety Analysis Report Section 6.4; Habitability Systems; Revision 14
- SOI-M25/26; Control Room HVAC and Emergency Recirculation System; Revision 22
- VLI-M25/26; Control Room HVAC and Emergency Recirculation System; Revision 7
- DWG 256-0051-00000; Unit 2 Electrical One Line Diagram Class 1E DC System; Revision DD
- DWG 206-0051-00000; Unit 1 Electrical One Line Diagram Class 1E DC System; Revision
AAA
- SOI-R42 (Div. 2); Division 2 DC Distribution, Buses ED-1-B and ED-2-B, Batteries, Chargers,
and Switchgear; Revision 11
- ELI-R42; DC Systems: Batteries Chargers Switchboards; Revision 8
1R05 Fire Protection
- ONI-P54; Fire; Revision 15
- FPI-1DG; Diesel Generator Building; Revision 6
- FPI-SB; Service Building; Revision 2
3
- FPI-0FH; Fuel Handling Building; Revision 4
- FPI-0IB; Intermediate Building; Revision 7
- FPI-0CC; Control Complex; Revision 9
- CR 2013-20014; NRC Identified Housekeeping Deficiency IB 682; dated December 21, 2013
1R06 Flooding
- PRA-PY1-FP-R0b; Perry Nuclear Power Plant Probabilistic Risk Assessment Model IF-001;
dated December 20, 2012
- Drawing (DWG) D-126-001; Emergency Service Water Pump House Floor Plans; Revision G
- DWG D-926-005; Emergency Service Water Pump House Floor, Equipment, and Roof Drains;
Revision A
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program
- OTLC-3058201304_PY-SGC2; Cycle 4, 2013 Evaluated Scenario C2
- NOBP-TR-1112; FENOC Conduct of Simulator Training and Evaluation; Revision 2
- LOR Cycle 04 (2013) Simulator Notes (Discrepancies and Modifications)
- eSOMS Plant Narrative Logs; dated October 30, 2013
- CR 2013-17523; Abnormal Odor Reported from Condensate Booster Pump 'A' While Running;
dated October 30, 2013
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
- CR 2013-17525; Failure to Activate Fire Impairment to Support Work; dated October 31, 2013
- ONI-P56-3; Aircraft Security Threat; Revision 11
- Perry System Health Report 2013-1 for System E22A, High Pressure Core Spray
Components; dated August 22, 2013
- WO 200318426; Replace HPCS Pump Motor; Scheduled for 1R15
- WO 200267406; Replace Pump Element of HPCS Pump; Scheduled for 1R15
- CR 2013-03364; High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) Pump Performance Degraded; dated
March 7, 2013
- Perry System Health Report 2013-1 for System G33, Reactor Water Clean Up and G36,
RWCU Filter and Demineralizer; dated August 22, 2013
- DWG 302-0671-00000; Reactor Water Cleanup System; Revision AA
- DWG 302-0672-00000; Reactor Water Cleanup System; Revision LL
- DWG 302-0675-00000; Reactor Water Cleanup Filter Demineralizer System; Revision X
- VLI-G33; Valve Lineup Instruction for Reactor Water Cleanup System; Revision 9
- CA-G202-2008-47856-001; Outage Management to Track Order 200262943 to Completion
- CA-G202-2009-58471-001; Track to TSTC Status Order 200368317 to Repair the 1G33F0042
Valve
- CA-G202-2009-58471-002; Track to TSTC Status Order 200262943 and/or 200368316 to
Repair the 1G33F0107 Valve
- CA-G202-2009-56933-001; Repair 1G33-F0101 RWCU from Vessel Drain Suction Valve
- CR-G202-2008-47856; RWCU System Thermal Efficiency is Degraded; dated
October 14, 2008
- CR-G202-2009-58471; Excessive RWCU Valve Seat Leakage; dated May 2, 2009
- CR-G202-2009-61751; Performance of RWCU HX Bypass Valve (F107) not Acceptable for
Long Term Reliability; dated July 13, 2009
4
- CR-G202-2009-56933; Past SVI-G33-T9131 Performance Potential Issues; dated
April 8, 2009
- CR 2013-10604; RWCU from Vessel Drain Suction Valve Erratic Position Readings; dated
July 11, 2013
- CR 2013-10217; LTA Organizational Effectiveness for G33F0101 Repair; dated July 3, 2013
- CR 2013-10680; Possible Tolerance of Equipment Issues at Perry; dated July 12, 2013
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
- PYBP-POS 2-2; Control Complex Chilled Water B Outage Protected Equipment Posting
Checklist; dated October 7, 2013
- CR 2013-16632; Vulnerability to Cause Secondary Fire Due to Unfused Control Room
Ammeters for the Divisional DC Buses from Fire Induced Shorts; dated October 17, 2013
- WO 200579930; Remove Hot Short Potential; dated October 18, 2013
- CR 2013-16200; Unplanned Impairment for Unit 1 Division 2 CO2 System; dated
October 10, 2013
- CR 2013-16600; Unexpected Result During Performance of PTI-P54-P0034C for DIV 3 Diesel
CO2; dated October 17, 2013
- CR 2013-16936; Extent of Condition for Div 1 DG CO2 System Based on Results of Div 2 and
Div 3 CO2 Systems and Unplanned Fire Impairment Created; dated October 22, 2013
- eSOMS Plant Narrative Log; dated October 17, 2013
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
- WO 200475411; SVI-B21T0035B (24M) RPV Low Level 3 and High Level 8 RPS and
RHR Shutdown Isolation Channel B Calibration for 1B21-N680B; dated
October 10, 2013
- SVI-B21-T0035-B; RPV Level 3 and Level 8 RPS and RHR Shutdown Isolation
Chanel B Calibration for 1B21-N680B; Revision 13
- eSOMS Plant Narrative Logs; dated October 9 and 10, 2013
- CR 2013-16681; Inability to Move Control Rods; October 18, 2013
- eSOMS Plant Narrative Logs; dated October 16 through October 22, 2013
- WO 200580232; Replace Power Supply 1C11K0100 (PS1); dated October 22, 2013
1R18 Plant Modifications
- ECP 13-0723-000; Reference Docs - Temporary Modification for Unit 1 and Unit 2 R42
Control Room Ammeters; Revision 0
- ECP 13-0723-000; Temporary Modification for Unit 1 and Unit 2 R42 Control Room Ammeters;
Revision 0
- WO 200579930; Hot Short Potential Temporary Modification ECP 13-0723-001, 13-0723-002,
13-0723-003, 13-0723-004, 13-0723-005; dated October 29, 2013
- ECP 11-0418-002; Replacement of Valves PY-1M51F0260B and 270B with Manual Valves to
Address Sporadic Operation Issues; Revision 0
- Dwg 302-0832-00000; Combustible Gas Control Hydrogen Analysis System; Revision FF
- Dwg 208-0140-00016; Combustible Gas Control System Hydrogen Analyzer Isolation Valves
B; Revision K
- Regulatory Applicability Determination for ECP 11-0418; dated February 23, 2012
- 10CFR 50.59 Screen for ECP 11-0418; dated February 23, 2012
5
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
- WO 200580232; Replace Power Supply 1C11K0100 (PS1); dated October 22, 2013
- PI-D17-P0720; Radwaste Building Ventilation Radiation Monitor 0D17-K720 Calibration; dated
October 25, 2013
- WO 200412048; Radwaste Building Ventilation Exhaust Radiation Monitor; dated
October 23, 2013
- WO 200466694; Control Room Emergency Recirculation Train B EHC Flow Switch Repair;
dated October 11, 2013
- SVI M26-T1259-B; Control Room Emergency Recirculation Train B Operability Test; dated
October 11, 2013
- WO 200488554; Pop Test Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generators Air Start Valves; dated
November 16, 2013
- SVI-R43-T1317; Diesel Generator Start and Load Division 1; Revision 18
- CMI-0016; Division 1 & 2 Emergency Diesel Generators Starting Air Valve Repair; Revision 6
- PMI-0011A; Division 1 Diesel Generator Woodward Governor Maintenance; Revision 1
- GWI-0004; General Welding Requirements; Revision 20
- WO 200585638; Repair Leaking Weld on Instrument Line for 0P42N0305C; dated
December 21, 2013
- CR 2013-19720; Degraded Weld on Flow Element 0P42-FE305C Upstream from 0P42-F544C
CC Chiller C ECC Flow Instrument Root; dated December 14, 2013
- WO 200585240; Control Room B Return Fan Outboard Fan Bearing Loose in Housing; dated
December 18, 2013
- SOI-M25/26; Control Room HVAC and Emergency Recirculating System; Revision 22
- TAI-2000-2; Vibration Monitoring; Revision 5
- GMI-0001; Coupling Alignment; Revision 9
1R22 Surveillance Testing
- WO 200551008; Diesel Generator Start and Load Division 2; dated October 9, 2013
- SVI-R4-T1318; Diesel Generator Start and Load Division 2; Revision 15
- NOP-WM-2003; Work Management Surveillance Process; Revision 8
- SVI-R45-T1325; Division 2 Diesel Generator Day Tank Fuel Oil Water Test; Revision 4
- SOI-R43; Division 1 and 2 Diesel Generator System; Revision 43
- SVI-R44-T2002; Division 2 Diesel Generator Starting Air SCV and FCV Operability Test;
Revision 15
- SVI-R10-T5227; Offsite Power Availability Verification; Revision 8
- SOI-M43; Diesel Generator Building Ventilation System, Revision 12
- PTI-R43-P0002; Division 2 Standby Diesel Generator Auxiliary System Monitoring;
Revision 17; dated October 9, 2013
- WO 200475411; SVI-B21T0035B (24M) RPV Low Level 3 and High Level 8 RPS and RHR
Shutdown Isolation Channel B Calibration for 1B21-N680B; dated October 10, 2013
- SVI-B21-T0035-B; RPV Level 3 and Level 8 RPS and RHR Shutdown Isolation Chanel B
Calibration for 1B21-N680B; Revision 13
- SVI-E31-T5395-A; RCIC Steam Line Flow High Channel Functional Test for 1E31-N684A;
dated October 29, 2013
- SVI-E31-T0085-A; NUMAC LDM Functional for 1E31-N700A; dated October 30, 2013
- CR 2013-17518; Annuciator P601-19A-B4 Failed to Annunciate During Performance of SVI-
E31-T0085-A; dated October 30, 2013
- Notification No. 600863076; PY-E31 Leak Detection; dated October 30, 2013
- SVI-E51-T2001; RCIC Pump and Valve Operability Test; dated October 3, 2013
6
- WO 200549425; Quarterly RCIC Pump and Valve Operability Test; dated October 31, 2013
- WO 200481459; Bi-Annual RCIC Pump and Valve Operability Test; dated October 31, 2013
1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
- Emergency Plan; Revision 39
- Evacuation Time Estimate Study Update
2RS3 In-Plant Radioactivity Control and Mitigation
- Air Sample Records/Collection and Evaluation Forms for Various Work Activities and
Locations; Various Dates in 2013
- American Analytical Laboratory Inc.; Breathing Air Quality Sample Results; dated 2012
and 2013
- HPI-G0007; Maintenance of Respiratory Protective Equipment and Operation of the
Respirator Cleaning / Issue Facilities; Revision 22
- HPI-G0008; Requalification of Respirators; Revision 07
- IP-SA-PY-2013-0038; IPAT - Site Integrated Performance Assessment and Trending; dated
October 24, 2013
- NOP-LP-1020; Health Assessment; Revision 04
- NOP-OP-4301; Respiratory Protection Program; Revision 03
- NOP-OP-4302; Issuing Respiratory Protection; Revision 02
- NOP-OP-4303; Respirator Quantitative Fit Test Portacount PRO 8030; Revision 02
- NOP-OP-4310; Firehawk M7 Self Contained Breathing Apparatus; Revision 07
- NOP-OP-4401; Equipment History; Revision 01
- NOP-OP-4702; Air Sampling; Revision 04
- NOP-OP-4703; Determination of Alpha Monitoring Levels; Revision 02
- NVLAP Certificate of Accreditation to ISO/IEC 17025:2005; Effective Dates July 1, 2013
through June 30, 2014
- PSI-0022; Emergency Plan Training Program; Revision 03
- PYBP-RPS-0038; Radiologically Controlled Area HEPA Ventilation and HEPA Vacuum Unit
Program; Revision 03
- Radiation Work Permit 130207; 1N32D0001 E Septa Filter Replacement and Shipment
Activities; Revision 00
- Radiation Work Permit 130209; Reactor Water Clean-Up (G36F0031A Valve Repair and leak
Identification; Revision 01
- SCBA Respirator Qualification Records; Selected Personnel; dated October 30, 2013
- SN-SA-2013-0323; Airborne Radioactivity Control; dated October 30, 2013
2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment
- Acute Inhalation Whole Body Count Dose Assessments Summary; Individual Assessments for
Selected Personnel; Various Periods in 2013
- FO-SA-2013-0009; Perry ALARA - Dose Control, Dose Monitoring Aspect of the Radiation
Protection Program; dated October 30, 2013
- HPI-B0003; Processing Personnel Dosimetry; Revision 26
- HPI-B0015; Operation of the ABACOS 2000 Whole Body Counting System; Revision 07
- Multiple Whole Body Exposure Monitoring Records; Selected Records; various dates 2013
- Neutron Assessment and Monitoring Plan; Perry Dry Cask Storage Campaign #1; dated
October 30, 2013
- NOP-OP-4201; Routine External Exposure Monitoring; Revision 02
7
- NOP-OP-4202; Declared Pregnant Workers; Revision 00
- NOP-OP-4204; Special External Exposure Monitoring; Revision 06
- NOP-OP-4204-04; Effective Dose Equivalent Dose Determination; Individual Assessments for
Various Personnel in 2013
- NOP-OP-4205; Dose Assessment; Revision 04
- NOP-OP-4206; Bioassay Program; Revision 00
- NOP-OP-4207; Occupational Exposure Reporting; Revision 00
- NOP-OP-4503; Personnel Contamination Monitoring; Revision 08
- NRC Letter to First Energy Nuclear Operating Company; Re: Safety Evaluation for Application
of Weighting Factors for External Exposure; dated November 20, 2008
- Perry Refuel Outage 14; Under Vessel Multiple Location Whole Body Monitoring Plan;
March 18, 2013 - May 16, 2013
- Radiological Engineering Assessment; Source Term Determination for Cycle 14; 2013
- Refueling Outage 14 Alpha Monitoring Plan; March 18, 2013 - May 16, 2013
- SN-SA-2013-0324; Occupational Dose Assessment; dated October 30, 2013
- TLD/DRD Deviation Investigation Reports; Selected Individuals; various dates 2013
- TLD Quality Assessment March 1, 2013 through May 31, 2013
- Whole Body Count Reports; Selected Records; Various dates 2013
2RS5 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation
- 10CFR 50.75(g) Decommissioning File; dated November 1, 2013
- 10 CFR Part 61 Analyses; Dry Active Waste (DAW); January 4, 2012
- Abacos 2000 Whole Body Calibration; February 2013
- AMS-4 Air Sampler Calibration Records; Various 2013 Records
- CHI-0006; Radiation Monitoring Alarm Set-point Determination; Revision 17
- CHI-0053; Operation of the Gamma Spectroscopy System; Revision 14
- CNMT High Range Radiation Monitor Channel A Calibration; dated February 2013
- CNMT High Range Radiation Monitor Channel B Calibration; dated August 2012
- CR-2012-14312; MS-C-12-08-02 Instrument Performance Checks for Gamma Spectroscopy
System are not Being Performed as Required; dated September 18, 2012
- CR-2012-19358; Radiological Posting Change as a Result of Extent of Condition (HRA to
LHRA); dated December 13, 2012
- CR-2013-05812; FO-SA-2013-0012; Identified a Gap in Regards to Portal Monitor Calibration
and Radiation Response Checks; dated April 15, 2013
- CR-2013-12722; During NRC Debrief 8/12/2013, Identified Discrepancies between T-Pole and
Ion Chamber instruments; dated August 16, 2013
- CR-2013-14665; Completion of Chemistry Inter-laboratory Assignments not Timely; dated
September 20, 2013
- CR-2013-17020; Disagreement on Radio-Analytical Inter-Laboratory Sample; dated
October 23, 2013
- ESW Loop A Radiation Monitor Channel Calibration; December, 2012
- Fleet Oversight Audit Report; Radiation Protection/Radwaste; August 8. 2013 through
October 10, 2013
- Focused Self-Assessment Report; Perry Radiation Monitoring - Instruments and Surveys
Aspect of the Radiation Protection Report; April 2013
- HPI-A0003; Radiation Monitor Alarm Set-point Determination; Revision 06
- HPI-J0006; Calibration of Portable Ion Chamber Instruments; Revision 08
- HPI-J0052; Calibration of the Eberline AMS-4; Revision 04
- HPI-J0054; Calibration of the Abacos 2000 Whole Body Counting System; Revision 02
- HPI-J0061; Operation and Calibration of the J.L. Shepherd Calibrators, Revision 07
8
- HPI-J0065; Calibration and Use of the MGP Telepole; Revision 01
- HPI-J0072; Fluke 451P Calibration and Use; Revision 00
- Gamma Spectroscopy Efficiency Determinations; October 2012
- Gamma Spectroscopy System #1 Calibration; Various Dates
- Liquid Scintillation Counter Calibration; September 15, 2013
- NOP-OP-32020; FENOC Radiochemistry Quality Control Program; Revision 03
- PCM-2 Calibration Records; Various 2013 Records
- Radiochemistry Cross Check Program Data; Second Quarter 2013
- Small Article Monitor (SAM) Calibration Records; Various 2013 Records
- Snapshot Assessment; Monitoring Instrumentation; September 27, 2013
- SPM-906 Calibration Records; Various 2013 Records
- TB/HB Vent Noble Gas Radiation Monitor Calibration; October 2012
2RS6 Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment
- Annual Environmental and Effluent Release Report (AEERR); Calendar Years 2011 and 2012
- CHI-0007; MIDAS; Revision 17
- CHI-0009; Tritium; Revision 10
- CR-2011-06069; Radioactivity in NCC System; dated November 11, 2011
- CR-2012-09346; Errors Identified in Methodology used to Prepare the 2011 AEERR; dated
June 6, 2012
- CR-2012-08122; Unit 2 Plant Vent Gaseous Effluent Monitor Gas Channel Out of Service for
Greater than 30 Days; dated May 17, 2012
- CR-2013-11933; Unit 1 Plant Vent Effluent Monitor Out of Service for Greater than 30 Days;
dated August 3, 2013
- EPRI Liquid Radwaste Processing Assessment - Perry Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP),
September 2013
- Floor Drain Sample Tank (FDST) B; Liquid Radwaste Discharge #13124L; dated
September 30, 2013
- Liquid Radwaste Discharge No. 13-111L; Pre-Release Summary; dated September 22, 2013
- Liquid Radwaste Discharge No. 13111-L; dated September 30, 2013
- NOP-OP-2012; Groundwater Monitoring; Revision 06
- Off-Gas Vent Pipe Effluent Rad Monitor Sample; dated September 08, 2013
- Off-Site Dose Calculation Manual; Revision 20
- PNPP Work Order 200539402; Turbine Bldg (TB)/Heater Bay Vent Effluent System and
Sampler Flow Rate Functional/Calibration 1H51-P757 and 1H51-P756; dated July 25, 2013
- PNPP Work Order 200537280; B Annulus Gas Exhaust Gas Treatment System (AEGTS)
Methyl Iodide Verification; dated March15, 2013
- PNPP Work Order 200436180; B Annulus Gas Exhaust Gas Treatment System (AEGTS)
Methyl Iodide Verification; dated May 30, 2012
- PNPP Work Order 2004828081; 18M AEGTS Train A Flow and Filter Operability Test; dated
August 29, 2013
- PNPP Work Order 200494449; 18M AEGTS Train B Flow and Filter Operability Test; dated
October 11, 2013
- PNPP 10 CFR Part 50/61 Certificate of Analysis DAW; dated May15, 2012
- PNPP W/O No. 200471678, Turbine Building Heater Bay Vent Sample; dated
October 22, 2013
- Priority Corrective Maintenance Work Orders Radwaste (RW) System Status Report; dated
October 30, 2013
- PY-SVI-M15T3015; B Annulus Exhaust Gas Treatment Charcoal Adsorber Operability Test
and Plenum Inspection; Revision 10
9
- Results of Analyses for Fe-55, Ni-63, Sr-89, Sr-90 in Liquid Effluent Samples 2nd Qtr 2013
- Results of Analyses for Sr-89 and Sr-90 in Air Particulate Composite Samples 2nd Qtr 2013
- SV1-D17-8047; Turbine Building/Heater Bay Vent Effluent System and Sampler Flow Rate
Monitor Functional/Calibration for 1H51-P757 and Functional for 1H51-P756; Revision 09
- SVI-G50-T5265; Liquid Radwaste Release Permit; Revision 19
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
- NEI 99-02; Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline; Revision 7
- NEI 99-02; Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline; Revision 6
- NOBP-LP-4012-10; Reactor Coolant System Leakage; Revision 02; dated October 2012
through September 2013
- NOBP-LP-4012; NRC Performance Indicators; Revision 04 and Selected Records
- NOBP-LP-4012-15; NRC Performance Indicator Data Sheets; Public Radiation Safety;
October 2012 through September 2013
- Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance
Indicator Guideline, Revisions 06 and 07
- Perry Computer Automated Laboratory System (CALS) Data; Various Entries; Various Dates
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
- Perry Operations Aggregate Risk Chart for Second Quarter 2013
- NOP-OP-1002; Conduct of Operations; Revision 8
- CR 2013-08135; Core Plate Recorder 1B33-R613 Spiking; dated May 26, 2013
- CR 2013-11825; Potential Adverse Solenoid Operated Valve Trend; dated August 1, 2013
- CR G202-2010-81012; ECC Cooling Valve to H2 Analyzer B Found Closed Following Pump
Start; dated August 10, 2010
- CR 2013-08148; Condensing Chamber 1B21-D002 Reference Leg Temperature; dated
May 27, 2013
- CA 2011-06729-01; Corrective Action for Unit 1 Replacement Start-up Transformer Tap
Settings to Support Hydrogen Igniter Minimum Voltage Requirements; dated January 11, 2012
- CA 2012-16824-01; Corrective Action for Completion of ODMI to Support Operations at High
Grid Voltage Due to Replacement Unit 1 Start-up Transformer; dated November 20, 2012
- CR 2013-13709; Administrative Deficiencies Identified with ODMI in Control Room; dated
September 4, 2013
- CR 2013-15701; Possible Abnormal Noises During B33 HPU Subloop Shift from B-2 to B-1;
dated October 4, 2013
- CR 2013-07818; Elevated Off-Gas Glow Following 1R14; dated May 20, 2013
- CR 2013-17652; Work Order Intended to Close PFA Associated with FPCC System Did Not
Include a Verification of Seat Leakage as Part of the Post Maintenance Test; dated
November 1, 2013
- WO 200564949; Core Plate D/P Recorder Fluctuating; Scheduled for 1R15
- DWG 208-0040-00008; Reactor Protection System Channel D - Sensor Relays; Revision Y
- DWG 208-0040-00009; Reactor Protection System Channel A, B,C& D Scram Trip Logic;
Revision T
- DWG 04-4549-B-208-040;Reactor Protection System Scam Discharge Volume Isolation and
Backup Valves, Recirculating Pumps A and B Trip Logic; Revision T
- CR 2013-09891; NRC ID 2013-95002: NRC Debriefed a Finding with Multiple Examples of
Radiological Work Control/Work Planning Issues; dated June 27, 2013
- CR 2013-10627; NRC Cross-Cutting Theme in Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R)
Aspect P.1(c); dated July 11, 2013
10
4OA3 Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
- LER 05000440/2013-003-01; Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications Due to RCS
Pressure Boundary Leakage; dated October 4, 2013
- CR 2013-09255; Perry Drywell Unidentified Leakage Inspection Results 6/15/2013 B33 Vent
Valve; dated June 15, 2013
- LER 05000440/2013-004-00; Vulnerability to Cause Secondary Fire Due to Unfused Control
Room Ammeters; dated December 9, 2013
- LER 05000440/2011-001-00; Fire Protection Design Vulnerability Results in an Unanalyzed
Condition; dated August 23, 2011
11
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
Alternating Current
Agencywide Document Access Management System
As-Low-As-Is-Reasonably-Achievable
Corrective Action Program
CFR
Code of Federal Regulations
CR
Condition Report
Direct Current
Final Safety Analysis Report
Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning
IMC
Inspection Manual Chapter
IP
Inspection Procedure
IR
Inspection Report
LER
Licensee Event Report
Non-Cited Violation
NEI
Nuclear Energy Institute
NUMAC
Nuclear Management and Control
Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
Operator Workaround
Performance Indicator
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications
Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus
SVI
Surveillance Instruction
TI
Temporary Instruction
TS
Technical Specification
Transmission System Operator
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
Updated Safety Analysis Report
Work Order
E. Harkness
2
In accordance with 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of
Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available
electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly
Available Records System (PARS) component of NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and
Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Michael Kunowski, Chief
Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket No. 50-440
License No. NPF-58
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000440/2013005
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServTM
DISTRIBUTION:
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DOCUMENT NAME: Perry 2013 005
Publicly Available
Non-Publicly Available
Sensitive
Non-Sensitive
To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the concurrence box "C" = Copy without attach/encl "E" = Copy with attach/encl "N" = No copy
OFFICE
RIII
RIII
RIII
RIII
NAME
MKunowski:rj
DATE
01/28/14
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
Letter to Ernest Harkness from Michael Kunowski dated January 28, 2014
SUBJECT: PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000440/2013005
DISTRIBUTION:
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