ML13325A948
| ML13325A948 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 11/18/2013 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-II |
| To: | Duke Energy Progress |
| References | |
| 50-400/13-301 | |
| Download: ML13325A948 (327) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO I Facility: SHEARON-HARRIS Scenario No.: 1 Facility: SHEARON-HARRIS Examiners: Operators: Examiners: Initial Conditions:
- IC-5, BOL, 42% power
- RHR pump B-SB is under clearance for pump seal package repairs
. 1 SI-3, Boron Injection Tank Outlet valve is under clearance for breaker repairs
. B Condenser Vacuum Pump is under clearance for makeup water supply valve problems
. Boric Acid Transfer Pump B-SB is under clearance for motor replacement Turnover: . Plant is at approximately 42% power. Plant startup is in progress lAW GP-005 step 131. After taking shift continue plant startup at 4 DEH Units/mm.
Critical Tasks: Isolate AFW flow toB Steam Generator prior to exiting EOP E-2
. Shut BIT Outlet valve ISI-4 prior to establishing flow through the charging header Event No. MaIf. No. Event Type*
R RO/SRO [ Event No. Continue plant startup to 100% power Malf. No. I N/A N BOP/SRO Start 2nd Main Feedwater Pump 2 pt:475 Failure of the A SG Pressure Transmitter PT-475 to 0% 3 lt:112 I RO/SRO VCT LT-112 fails high, letdown full divert to RHT (AOP-003) 4 zI 975td1 C Spurious start of the TDAFW pump (MS-70 Opens) 5 Pressurizer Spray Valve, PCV-444D, fails Open (with Manual p rsl 4b I RO/SRO Control available) (AOP-019) 6 mss0lb M All
- Steam line Break on B SG inside Containment 7 1 P I BOP/SRO Failure of Auto AFW Isolation on B SG zrpk 71 9a zrpk7l 9b 8 C RO/SRO Failure of PZR PORVs to auto open when required zrpk7loa zrpk7l Ob C RO/SRO Failure of BIT outlet isolation valve 1 SI-4 to close 10 nis06b SR Nuclear Instruments fail to energize post trip due to IR Nl-36 I RO/SRO undercompensated (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor.
Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 1 Rev. 2
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 1 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 2 Rev. 2
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 1 SCENARIO
SUMMARY
- 2013 NRC EXAM SCENARIO I Turnover provided to the crew is The plant is operating at -42% power in BOL. Criticality was achieved 8 hours ago, 74 hours after a trip from 100% power. A plant startup lAW GP-005 is in progress. After initial turbine loading, the load increase has been performed at 4 Units/mm.
The unit is currently at 42% power 82 hours post-trip. A startup has commenced and the crew has been directed to continue the power increase using GP-005, Power Operation Mode 2 to Mode 1, to 100% power at a ramp rate of 4 DEH Units/Minute. At approximately 45-50% power the Turbine will be placed in hold and the BOP place the second Main Feedwater Train Pump in service per OP-I 34.01 Section 5.4. Following the start of the B MEW Pump the crew will continue to ramp the unit towards full power operation. The following equipment is under clearance: RHR Pump B-SB is under clearance for pump seal package repairs. The pump has been inoperable for 12 hours and is expected to be repaired in the next 24 hours. The pump must be restored to operable status within the next 60 hours. Tech Spec 3.5.2 LCO Action a. and Tech Spec 3.3.3.5.b Action c. applies. OWP-RH-02 has been completed. MIRJENC CO COOLING SYSI 3/4, 52 Ecs SuBSYSTEMS - i GREATER TIWI R EOUN TO 35OF L UNTTIMO C0!DIT1O FOR OPERATION 3,G,2 Iwo 4Kiependeflt Firergeiicy Core Cooling System (ECCS) subsystems shall be OPERABU with each subsyst.ein coprised of:
- a. One OPER.421E Charginj/safet.y inj:ectin pwi.
b Oto GPRO1C R heat chn9e
- c. One OERAB&E RH pump, and
- d. ftn OPERABLE flo path capable of taking suction frcm the refeeling water storage tank on a Safety injection signal and, upon beinq manually-aligned. transferring ction to the contairnent sUn during the recirculsUon phase cf operation.
APit..IC/.BILITY: M3ES 1. 2. and 3. Oil
- a. lIUi one ECCS subsystem iaioperable, restore tue inoperable sub.,yslen to OPERABLE status within ?2 hours or be in at least HOT STANOV within the noxt 6 hows and in FIOT S FIThih within the foiówn 6 kOur.
Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 3 Rev. 2
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO I SCENARIO
SUMMARY
- 2013 NRC EXAM SCENARIO I (continued)
Tech Specs associated with inoperable RHR Pump B-SB continued INSTRUI4EWrATION RENOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.3.5.a The Remote Shutdown System monitoring instrtimantation channels shown in Table 3.39 shall be OPERABLE. 3.3.3.5.b All transfer switches. Auxiliary Control Panel Controls and Auxiliary Transfer Panel Controls for the OPERABIUTf of those coponent.s required by the SHNPP Safe Shutdown Analysis to (1) remove decay heat via auxiliary feedwatar ficu and steam generator poweroperated relief valve flow from steam generators A and 8, (2> control RC.S Inventory through the normal charging flow path, (3) control RCS pressure, (4) control reactivity, and (5) remove decay heat via the RHR system shall bi OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3. ACTION:
- c. With one or aCre inoperable Remote Shutdown System transfer switches, power, or control circuits required by 3.3.3.5.b, restore the lncç3er-able switch(s)/circuit(s) to OPERABL! status withIn 7 days. or be in I.OT S1ANflY wjthiri th. next 12 huro.
- B Condenser Vacuum Pump is under clearance for makeup water supply valve problems. Has been under clearance for 8 hours. Repairs are expected to be completed within 24 hours.
- iS 1-3, Boron Injection Tank Outlet valve is under clearance for breaker repairs. The valve is shut with power removed. The valve has been under clearance for 4 hours.
OWP-Sl-O1 has been completed. Repairs are expected to be completed within 24 hours. Tech Specs 3.5.2 and 3.6.3 apply. 1ECE cOCL1GJ 3/45.2 ECCS SUBSYSTES - 1 0REATE. THM OR EOUN TO 350°F LINTINO CO1IDITION FOR OPER/ITrON 3.5 2 F i eprdent Emergency Core oo1inq system (ECS) subsystn1s shall be OPERAI3LE with each subsytera comprised of: a, Oie OFERAULE Charging/safeLy injection
- b. Qo OFERAI3LE RHP hea. excanger,
- c. Oie OfERASLE RHR pump, anl d M t3EPAaLE flow path capble of taking suctomi fcoi the refueling water storage tank an a Safety Injection signal and, upon being manually- aligned, transferring suction to the containeent sun djrinç the reclrcula:ion ohase of eperation.
APPI,ICASILITY: FCOES 1. 2. and 3. ACT [OR:
- a. With cae ECCS subsys;em inoperable, restore che i9operable sibsytean to OPERAL. stews ithin 72 hours or b in ot 1st HOT STAUDEY wiThin the next 6 hours and [ri HOT SFJTCON within the f1ET F hi,n,s Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 4 Rev. 2
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 1 SCENARIO
SUMMARY
- 2013 NRC EXAM SCENARIO I (continued)
- 1 Sl-3, Boron Injection Tank Outlet valve, Tech Specs... continued 1
3CO 1 Y, tiTN . LIMITING COMUITION FOR OPEATION 3,F,3 Each cntaIrinent iso1aton valve specified in the Technical Specification Equipnient List Prorin, plaM procedure PLP-IO6 shall be OPERABLE with isolation tinses less than or equal t required isolation times. APPUCABILETY MODES 1, 2, 3) and 4. ACT ION With on.e or more of the contairvment isiation vaive(s inoperable, niaintajra at least oe Isolation valve OPERABLE in each affeded penetration that is- open and:
- a. Restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE statu within 4- hotars, 0
- b. isolate eaci affected penetration ifithIn 4 hGU}S by use of at least one deactivated autornatic valve secured In the isalalion position o
- Boric Acid Transfer Pump B-SB is under clearance for motor replacement. Has been under clearance for 12 hours. Repairs are expected to be completed within 24 hours.
Tech Spec 3.3.3.3.5.b which is a 7 day LCO and 3.1.2.2 applies (3.1.2.2 is for tracking only). OWP-CS-05 has been completed. E. 5HJTDOW SY5194 Ut4ITrNG CONOZITON FGR OPERATWN 3.3.5,a The Reot* Shutdown Systa itorlng wtrerttatlon channels 1han In Table 3.39 hl1 be ORLE. L3.15,b AU tansf.r wjtches Atfl1arj Control ael C tils and Auiltary Transfer Panel Cantrls fo tilS CPERAaIUTY of theta coonnts rtqairid by the SHNPP Safe Shut4wn Analysis to Cl) rcva decay iat via auxiliary feedwatar flaw and s-taai en.ratr poweoperated relief valve flc,w trai stem geflerators A and , (2) ontro1 RCS ttweritory through tile noal harr flew path, (3) contrøl CS pressure, (4) .ntrl rilvity, and (5) raove ücay hiat va the RiR syt shall be OPER8LE. APPLLCABl: 1IDES 1, Z, and 3. ActI ON:
- a. With the number of ØPEALE. reate he own onitoring channels lesi than the l4iMnu Clarnisls OPERA1 as reçuired by Table 3.3-9, restor* the inoperale channel(s) to CPRA8LE st*tus ftMn 7 days, or be in NOt SHUTOON within th. rext 12 hours.
- b. WItS te rnXer of OPERABII i-emøte shutdw montr1n channels less than tile Total N=ir of Channels requjr.4 by Table 3 3, reto the inoperable th&rnils t4 CPRMU status within 6 4* or submit -
Speeial Report in a ordanca with Sp.cifiation 9 2 wit.i1n 14 ational days. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 5 Rev. 2
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 1 SCENARIO
SUMMARY
- 2013 NRC EXAM SCENARIO I (continued)
Event 1: Continue plant startup to 100% power The crew will perform a power increase of approximately 5%-i 0% power then place the Turbine to hold until the (BOP) starts the standby B MFW pump lAW OP-i 34.01 Section 5.4. Following the start of the B MFW pump the crew will continue efforts to raise power to the Lead Examiners discretion. For the reactivity manipulation it is expected that the SRO will conduct a reactivity brief, the RD will dilute and monitor auto rod withdrawal per the reactivity plan and the BOP will operate the DEH Controls as necessary to raise Main Turbine power. Event 2: Failure of the A SG Pressure Transmitter PT-475 to 0%. This event will require the BOP to place the A SG level control to manual and control SG level within Reactor trip limits. The SRO should provide level band and trip guidance lAW OMM-001. The crew will take the channel out of service using OWP-ESF-02, Protection channel Ill Steam flow. The SRO should evaluate Tech Spec 3.3.1 action 6, Tech Spec 3.3.3.6 Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Action a (tracking only since minimum number of channels are met), and Tech Spec 3.3.2 i.e Steam Line Press Low Action 19 applies. T.S. 3.3.1: As a minimum, the Reactor Trip System instrumentation channels and interlocks of Table 3.3-i shall be OPERABLE REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION
- 14. Steam Generator Water Level-4ow 2 stm. gen. 1 ste. gen. 1 ste. yen. level 1, 2 6 Coincident With Steam/ level and level coincident and 2 stm./feed feedwater Flow Mismatch 2 stm./feed- with 1 water flow water flow stm./feedwater mismatch in seine mismatch in flow mismatch in ste. yen. or 2 each stm. yen. same stm. yen. stm. gen. level and 1 stm./feedwater flow mismatch in same stm. yen.
ACTION 6 With the number of OPERABLE channel.s one l.ess than the Total. Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION nay proceed provided the folloIQi.ng conditions are satisfied:
- a. The inoperable channeL is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours, and
- b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1.
TS 3.3.3.6 The Accident Monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3-10 shall be OPERABLE tracking only since the minimum number of channels operable are met ACTION a. With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumentation channels except In Core Thermocouples and Reactor Vessel Level less than the Total Required Number of Channels requirements shown in Table 3.3-10 restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days. or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 6 Rev. 2
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ESD-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO I SCENARIO
SUMMARY
- 2013 NRC EXAM SCENARIO I (continued)
Tech Spec 33.2 INSTRU1IENTATION 3/4 3.2 ENiNEEREO SAFEIUEAThRES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3 .2 The Enj ineered Safety Features ActuCon Sys tee CESFAS) I nstrurnentaton channels arni int.erloct..s shosi In Table 3.33 shall be OPERAGLE with their Trip Set9wrL et consiceriL wth .hr valuos shun in thc Trip Stpoint coluwai of TthIe 33-4 fJCAPjjjTY: As shcn in Table 3.3-3. ENI3NIPRFD 4FF1V FIATIIPFS A]IITTfl SVSTFM TNS1RI1FN1ATIP TOTAL NO. C*1ANELS CHANNELS APPLICALE lUACI oNAursLl OF CHANNELS IFIP NODES PCTI (X4
- 1. Scfet Injc.ctioo (Re.ctor Trip.
r:etsr lmoaticti, Cntrol Ros isolaticn. Start Dtcs& Gencratcr, Ccntaincnant Vcnlilation Isolation, Phasm A Ceriteinnert Ioolation, Start Auxi lary F d.iatr Sy tern 4otor Drirnn urrps, Start Conta1rerrt Fan c1ers, Start Enorgency Service 1ater Pui. Start nmrgency Service Jatwr ac.o tar Pumps)
- m. Steam LinC Pressure- -Le 3/steam 2/steam 2/steaan line 1. 2. 3 19 li4 l airy steam Ii ne ACTION 19 With the number of OPEft3LE charmels one less than the fotl Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in thC tripped conthtion within G hours. arid
- h. The Mi ninsan Channels OPERAGLE requl rewerlt s reeL; however.
the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3,2.1. The SRO should also prepare OMM-001, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist for the failure. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario I 7 Rev. 2
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 1 SCENARIO
SUMMARY
- 2013 NRC EXAM SCENARIO I (continued)
Event 3: LT-1 12 fails HIGH full divert to RHT. Enter AOP-003. This will require entry into AOP-003, Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control (no immediate actions). A failure of LT-112 high will cause 1 CS-i 20, Letdown VCT/Hold Up Tank valve to shift to the Hold Up Tank. The RO will have to return the MCB switch to the VCT position. Since VCT level has failed HIGH auto CSIP suction switch over on 5% VCT level to the RWST will not occur until Maintenance has lifted the leads associated with LT-1 12. The operator will have to monitor VCT level and communicate with Maintenance to resolve this failure. The SRO should also prepare OMM-001, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist for the failure. Event 4: Spurious start of the TDAFW pump (MS-70 Opens). The BOP should respond to annunciator ALB-1 7-7-1, Aux Feedwater Pump Turbine Disch Or Suct Low Press. The crew should recognize increasing SG levels. The crew should dispatch an AO to investigate the cause of the pump start. The crew should determine that MS-70 needs to be shut. The SRO should enter Tech Spec 3.7.1.2 action a. With one Auxiliary Feedwater pump inoperable, restore the required Auxiliary. Feedwater pumps to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. The CRS should also prepare OMM-001, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist for the failure. Tech Spec 3.7.1.2, Action a aIIUI.. ia FEE11irP YS1EM CMD1 (I EO. OPEIF1C 33.1.2 Pi lEt Lhree md wJ?nt sr (Jer1rain aUXi I 1ry In ddtnr pur and a c.ciaed iic ath ahali ha OPERARI..E tith
- a. 1 otor-r1,an auxiliary foedwaWr PnS. ch capable cI pored frm 5ep1rotQ eaerqericy hue. arid
- b. One stei Lurbine-irWen auxiHary feedwater pump capable of beinQ pcwered froTu cii OPER3E steini siJpply sys tail, aPPLCAa]LIT1 N31)E5 Jr .?. OIid 3 ACT1ON
- a. with one auxiliary ftedwater pump inoperabie, restore the reureb aii I iary foods at rr puinp t 1 OPEI3LC sta tu ntlnii 72 hcur. o I in at least HOT STANDBy withi ii Ua ne<t C hours arid in HOT SIILlTDCiN with ri thu following 6 hour.s Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 8 Rev. 2
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 1 SCENARIO
SUMMARY
- 2013 NRC EXAM SCENARIO I (continued)
Event 5: Pressurizer Spray Valve, PCV-444D, fails to maximum output in Auto (with manual control available). This failure will cause one of the Pressurizer spray valve to fail to 100% open while the other valve closes to 0% open. The crew should respond to multiple alarms and enter AOP-019, Malfunction of RCS Pressure Control. The RO should complete the immediate actions by gaining control of the Pressurizer Spray Valves. If RCS pressure decreases to <2185 psig during the event the SRO will have to evaluate Tech Spec 3.2.5 PONER D!STRIEIJT1OM L1.t1;ITS 3i42,.J PARAMETEiS L [NITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 325 The fe cr OJa-r&ated parameters shall be aintaired within the foilcwin linrits: lletor CooThnt Sytte?n T S9AOPF after adthtiin fo instrument uncertainty, and
- b. Pressurizer Pressure 21D5
- after subtraction for instrwilent uncertainty. and
- c. RCS total flow rate- 23.5nO gpm after subtraction for instrument uricertil nty APPLICABILITY RODE 1.
AUTIOR: With any of the above parameters not ithn its specified llmit.. restore the parameter to within i: limit within 2 hours or reduce THERIt&I. PONFB to less than &t of RATIO ThERNAL POWER within the next 6 hours. The SRO should also prepare OMM-001, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist for the failure. Event 6: MAJOR Steam line Break on B SG inside Containment. Once RCS pressure control has been established to the satisfaction of the Lead Examiner a Steam Line Break inside Containment on the B SG will occur. The crew should enter and carry out the immediate actions of EOP E-0. The crew should diagnose that a LOCA is NOT in progress and transition from EOP E-0 to EOP E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. While the crew is performing actions of E-2 the Containment pressure will continue to rise beyond 10 psig which will actuate a Containment Spray and a Phase B isolation signal. This will require ALL RCPs to be secured. Event 7: Failure of Auto AFW Isolation on B SG. The crew should identify that an actuation signal for AFW Auto Isolation has failed on the B SG and manually isolate AFW flow to the B SG. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 9 Rev. 2
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 1 SCENARIO
SUMMARY
- 2013 NRC EXAM SCENARIO I (continued)
Event 8: Failure of PZR PORVs to auto open when required. As RCS pressure increases the crew will be required to secure SI flow. If SI flow continues the RCS pressure will continue to increase as the PZR fills. If or when RCS pressure exceeds the PORV lift setting of 2335 psig the PORVs will NOT automatically open. The operator can manually open and close the PORVs to prevent an. overpressure condition which could cause the RCS Safety Relief Valves to lift at 2485 psig. The Technical Specification RCS Safety Limit is 2735 psig which is 110% of design pressure. Event 9: Failure of BIT outlet isolation valve I Sl-4 to close. While implementing EOP-E-2 the crew will be directed to reset SI and shut BIT outlet valves then establish a normal Charging lineup. Prior to the establishment of the Charging lineup High head SI flow should be isolated. When the crew attempts to shut lSl-4 from the MCB the valve will not close. RNO actions direct locally shutting the valves. The crew will direct an Aux Operator to locate and shut the valves. The actions and locally shutting ISI-4 need to be performed prior to filling the RCS to solid conditions which could cause the SRVs to lift. Event 10: Source Range channels will fail to energize post trip due to IR Nl-36 under compensation. The crew will need to identify the failure of the SR instrumentation MCB indication and audible counts. They will then manually energize the SR channels to establish an audio count rate. The scenario is ended when Safety Injection has been terminated and the crew restores letdown to service while implementing EOP-ES-1.1, SI Termination. With PZR level decreasing and RCS Hot Leg Temperatures stable or decreasing the RCS pressure challenge will be removed. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 10 Rev. 2
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 1 CRITICAL TASK JUSTIFICATION:
- 1. Isolate AFW flow to B1 Steam Generator prior to exiting EOP E-2.
Failure to isolate a faulted Steam Generator that can be isolated causes challenges to the Critical Safety Functions beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Also, depending upon the plant conditions, it could constitute a demonstrated inability by the crew to recognize a failure of the automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. This critical task requires the crew to recognize an automatic actuation should have occurred of an ESF system or component but has not and then take manual operator actions to perform the isolation.
- 2. Shut BIT Outlet valve 1 SI-4 prior to establishing flow through the charging header.
Isolation of Safety Injection is required to allow the operator to stabilize RCS plant conditions. Eventually the Pressurizer will fill with water rendering pressurizer control ineffective. Consequently, in order to decrease RCS pressure to conserve makeup water, Safety Injection flow must be decreased. Because Safety Injection flow cannot be throttled, once the criteria to reduce Safety Injection flow is met Safety Injection is terminated by isolating Safety Injection Flow, reducing to one CSIP in operation and realigning the CSIP discharge to the normal charging header. Shutting the BIT outlet valves is the first step in realigning normal charging to the RCS. BIT isolation allows the normal Charging flow path to be used. At HNP the flow through Charging line is required to be maintained less than 150 gpm to prevent damage to the CVCS Regenerative heat exchanger. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 11 Rev. 2
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 1 SIMULATOR SETUP For the 2013 NRC Exam Simulator Scenario # 1 Reset to IC-161 password dinner Goto RUN Silence and Acknowledge annunciators GO TO FREEZE and inform the lead examiner the Simulator is ready. DO NOT GO TO RUN until directed by the lead examiner. Set ERFIS screens (The examiner has provided to the candidate with initial conditions and the initiating cues prior to placing the simulator in RUN.) SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: Post conditions for status board from IC-5 Reactor Power 42% steady state Control Bank D at 148 steps RCS boron 1850 ppm Provide crew marked up copy of GP-005 up to step 131 for turnover Update the status board: B RHR Pump is under clearance for pump seal package repairs and has been under clearance for 12 hours. Tech Spec 3.5.2 Action a and Tech Spec 3.3.3.5.b action c applies, 72 hour LCO or HSB within the next 6 hours, HSD following 6 hours 1 SI-3, Boron Injection Tank Outlet valve has been under clearance for 4 hours. Tech Spec 3.5.2 applies 72 hour LCD or HSB within the next 6 hours and HSD within the following 6 hours. Tech Spec 3.6.3 also applies but is met by removing power and having the valve shut. Boric Acid Transfer Pump B-SB has been under clearance for 12 hours. Tech Spec 3.3.3.5.b Action a applies, restore to operable within 7 days or HSD within the next 12 hours. Tech Spec 3.1.2.2 also applies (tracking only).. Align equipment for repairs: B RHR Pump, hang CIT on MCB switch, place protected train placard on A RHR pump Boron Injection Pump B-SB, place pump switch to STOP, and hang CIT on MCB switch Condenser Vacuum Pump 1B, place pump switch to STOP, and hang CIT on MCB switch ISI-3, Boron Injection Tank Outlet valve, and hang CIT on MCB switch Place filled out copies of OWPs into the OWP book ensure they are removed at end of day: OWP-RH-02 for B RHR pump OWP-CS-05 for Boron Injection pump B-SB OWP-Sl-01 for 1 SI-3 Hang restricted access signs on MCR entry swing gates Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 12 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # I Event # 1 Page j. t Event
Description:
Power escalation from 42% power Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The crew has been directed to re-commence a power escalation from 42% to 100% power. The power increase is on hold for turnover. The SRO is expected to conduct a reactivity brief prior to commencing the power escalation. This brief may be conducted outside the simulator prior to starting the scenario. Lead Evaluator: When the crew has completed their board walk down and are ready to take the shift inform the Simulator Operator to place the Simulator in Run. When the Simulator is in run announce: CREW UPDATE (SROs Name) Your crew has the shift. END OF UPDATE When directed by the Lead Evaluator, ensure that the Simulator Operator: annunciator horns are on and place the Simulator in RUN. SRO GP-005, Step 131 Direct BOP to depress the GO button. BOP verifies turbine SRO/BOP settings and places DEH to GO. The crew should monitor diverse indications of power during the power escalation (NIs, Core T, Turbine First Stage Pressure, Main Generator Output, ERFIS Continuous Calorimetric) Evaluators Note: . Crew may determine to allow rods to withdraw in automatic instead of diluting per reactivity plan. If so, ramp will continue without makeup. Crew might also choose to dilute prior to starting the ramp. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 13 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 1.4 f Event
Description:
Power escalation from 42% power Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
. Requests PEER check prior to manipulations of DEH Control
. DEPRESS the GO push-button to start the power BOP escalation and informs crew through Crew Update Turbine in GO and DEH is properly responding.
. VERIFY the number in the REFERENCE display increases.
. VERIFY Generator load is increasing.
RO MONITORS primary systems response. NOTE: With only one Main Feedwater Pump running, Turbine First Stage Pressure should be monitored and the Second Main Feedwater Pump started prior to exceeding 456 psig Turbine First Stage Pressure. A Turbine Runback will occur at approximately 507.2 psig. Procedure Note: NOTE: The second Main Feedwater Pump should be started after exceeding 6.4 and before 7.0 MPPH total feed flow. If 6.4 MPPH is not obtainable prior to exceeding 456 psig Turbine First Stage Pressure, then the second Main Feedwater Pump should be started and Turbine loading continued until total feed flow is greater than 6.4 MPPH. WHEN Turbine First Stage Pressure between 360 psig and 456 psig (approximately 45% and 55% Turbine load), THEN SRO PLACE the second Main Feedwater Train Pump in service per OP-134.01 Section 5.4. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 14 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: NRC Scenario# 1 Event# I Page 15 of 69 Event
Description:
Power escalation from 42% power Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Monitors plant primary parameters while ramp is performed and places second Main Feedwater Train Pump in service when CREW indications of Turbine First Stage Pressure are between 360 psig and 456 psig (45% 55% Turbine load) RO OP-107.01, CVCS Boration, Dilution, and Chemistry Control If Blender Dilution (Alternate Dilution) Operation is for RCS temperature adjustments during steady state power Procedure Note: operations, Steps 5.12.1 through 5.3.2.3 are not applicable. Operator experience will dictate the required amount of makeup water needed.
. DETERMINE the reactor coolant boron concentration from chemistry OR Main Control Room status board (1842 ppm).
. DETERMINE the magnitude of boron concentration reduction required.
. DETERMINE the volume of makeup water to be added.
RO Reactivity plan: Reactor power 42% to 50% Dilute 320 gallons (155 + 164) Raise bank D rod height from 148 steps to 156 steps NOTE: IF crew determines power from 42% to 53% then: Dilute 430 gallons (155 + 164 + 114) Raise bank D rod height from 148 steps to 156 FIS-114 may be set for one gallon less than desired. A pressure transient caused by ICS-151 shutting results in Procedure Note: . FIS-114 normally indicating one gallon more than actual flow but two gallons more would not be unexpected. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 15 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 16 p 69 Event
Description:
Power escalation from 42% power Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior If the translucent covers associated with the Boric Acid Procedure Caution: and Total Makeup Batch counters FIS-113 and FIS-114, located on the MCB, are not closed, the system will not automatically stop at the preset value. SET FIS-1 14, TOTAL MAKEUP WTR BATCH COUNTER, to RD obtain the desired quantity. (320 or 430) Dilution of the RCS will be dependent on charging and Procedure Note: letdown flow rate. Placing additional letdown orifices in service will increase dilution rate of the RCS. Setting RMUW flow controller for a desired flow rate greater than 90 gpm when performing a dilution in the normal dilute mode will result in a flow deviation alarm. Procedure Caution: The reduced flow in this configuration is due to the additional back pressure from the spray nozzles and letdown flow to the VCT.
. SET total makeup flow as follows:
. IF performing DIL in Step 5.3.2.8, THEN SET controller 1 CS-i 51 FK-i 14 RWMU FLOW, for less than or equal to 90 gpm.
RD
- VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch has been placed in the STOP position.
- VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch green light is lit.
- PLACE the control switch RMW MODE SELECTOR to the DIL OR the ALT DIL position.
Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 16 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page Event
Description:
Power escalation from 42% power Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When PRZ backup heaters are energized in manual, PK-444A1, PRZ Master Pressure Controller (a P1 controller) will integrate up to a greater than normal output, opening PRZ Spray Valves to return and maintain RCS pressure at setpoint. The result is as follows:
- PORV PCV-444B will open at a lower than expected Procedure Note:
pressure
- ALB-009-3-2, PRESSURIZER HIGH PRESS DEVIATION CONTROL, will activate at a lower than expected pressure
- Increased probability for exceeding Tech Spec DNB limit for RCS pressure OPERATE the pressurizer backup heaters as required to limit the difference between the pressurizer and the RCS boron RO Concentration to less than 10 ppm.
(Identifies that they are already all ON) At least 10 minutes should be allowed for mixing before sample Procedure Note: is taken. Procedure Note: Dilution (Alternate Dilution) may be manually stopped at any time by turning the contr switch RMW CONTROL to STOP.
. START the makeup system as follows:
o TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarily. RO o VERIFY the red indicator light is lit.
. VERIFY dilution automatically terminates when the desired quantity has been added.
Harris 2013 NRC Scenario I 17 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 18 of 69 Event
Description:
Power escalation from 42% power Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The operation should be stopped if an unanticipated Procedure Caution: reactivity effect is seen. Do not resume the operation until the cause has been corrected.
. VERIFY Tavg responds as desired.
. IF rod control is in AUTO, THEN VERIFY the control rods are stepping out to the desired height.
RO Steps out to either 152 or 156 steps depending on target power level RD PLACE Reactor Makeup in Auto per Section 5.1. VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch: RD
- Is in the STOP position
. The green light is lit.
RD PLACE the RMW MODE SELECTOR to AUTO. START the makeup system as follows: RD . TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarily.
. VERIFY the red indicator light is lit.
Monitors plant parameters until target power level and target st 1 CREW stage pressure is reached to meet initial conditions for starting the B MFW pump BOP Places main Turbine to hold to start B MFW pump Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 18 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 19 of 69 Event
Description:
Power escalation from 42% power Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP OP-134.01, Feedwater System, Section 5.4 Verifies initial conditions are met:
. One Main FW Pump is running (YES)
. Two Condensate Pumps and two Condensate Booster Pumps are in operation (YES)
. At least 267 psig suction pressure exists at P1-2200, FW PMPS SUCT HDR PRESS (YES)
. Seal water pressure is greater than 325 psig, as evident by absence of alarm ALB-016-2-3, MAIN FW PUMP BOP SEAL WATER LOW PRESS OR HI DISCH TEMP (YES)
. An Operator is standing by to observe starting of the Main FW Pump and to report any abnormal conditions (Contacts TB Aux Operator)
. Starting second Main FW Pump is directed by GP-005.
All initial conditions are met Directs Turbine Building Aux Operator to perform prestart BOP checks on B MFW pump Simulator The prestart checks are completed on the B MEW pump. I Communicator: am standing by for the pump start. To ensure an adequate number of Condensate Polishing Beds are in service, NOTIFY the TB Operator prior to starting the BOP second Main FW Pump. Notifies TB Aux Operator to ensure an adequate number of Condensate Polishing Beds are in service. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 19 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # I Page 20 of 69 Event
Description:
Power escalation from 42% power Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator TB AO An adequate number of Condensate Polishing Communicator: Beds are in service. PLACE IFW-39, MFW PUMP B RECIRC CONTROL, to OPEN AND VERIFY 1FW-39 is open. BOP Locates MCB switch for I FW-39 and takes switch to OPEN and verifies I FW-39 red light lit. In modulate, the Main FW Pump Recirc Valves, I FW-8 and I FW-39, should shut when Main FW Pump total suction flow Procedure Note: reaches 8600 kpph (if available, the sum of ERFIS points FCE22IOA and FCE22I0B can be used). PERFORM the following:
. MOMENTARILY PLACE MAIN FW PUMP B Control Switch to START (Starts B MFW pump)
. CHECK MAIN FW PUMP B starts.
. MONITOR Condensate Booster Pumps controllers and flows to ensure proper operation when the second Main FW Pump is started.
. IF any SG level exceeds 62%, THEN PERFORM the BOP following:
o MANUALLY ADJUST the associated Main FW Regulating Valve(s) position until Feed Flow is just less than Steam Flow AND level is trending towards the normal operating band (55% to 59%). o WHEN Steam Generator level is trending to 55% to 59%, THEN PLACE the associated Main FW Regulating Valve controller back to AUTO.
. PLACE IFW39 control switch to MODU.
Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 20 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page of 69 Event
Description:
Power escalation from 42% power Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Locally VERIFY the Main Feed Pump B Aux Oil Pump has BOP stopped. Contacts TB AC to verify Aux Oil Pump has stopped. Simulator TB AO: Main Feed Pump B Aux Oil Pump has stopped Communicator: Crew Continues ramp to full power operations lAW GP-005 The. next procedural steps will occur when Reactor Power is between 49 and 50% Reactor Power. The ramp to start the 2 Iid MFW pump may have exceeded this power level and this step may have been performed. IF so, the RO would have been directed by the SRO to verify bistables below - Evaluators: VERIFY the following bistable and permissive status light conditions: PR P..8 NC 41N (ON) PR P-8 NC 42N (ON) PR P-8 NC 43N (ON) PR P-B NC 44N (ON) SINGLE LOOP LO FLOW TRIP BLOCKED P-8 (OFF) Cue Event 2 Failure of the A SG Pressure Transmitter Lead Evaluator: PT-475 to 0%. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 21 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # I Event # 2 Page 22 of 69 Event
Description:
Failure of the A SG Pressure Transmitter PT-475 to 0% Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from Lead Evaluator insert Trigger 2 Simulator Operator: Failure of the N SG Pressure Transmitter PT-475 to 0% Indications Available: . ALB-014-1-2, Loop A Hi Steam Line AP Low-Pi
. ALB-014-1-4, Loop A Hi Steam Line Press Rate Alert
. ALB-014-4-2A, Loop A Low Stm Line Press Alert
. ALB-014-4-IA, SG A FW> STM Flow Mismatch
. P1-475 SA failing to 0
. SG FE/SF mismatch
. SG level lowering
. Fl-474 SA Steam Flow failing to 0 BOP/RO RESPONDS to alarms and evaluates ALB-014.
lAW OPS-NGGC-1 000, the operator may take MANUAL Evaluator Note: control of a malfunctioning controller before being directed by a procedure. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 22 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 23 of 69 Event
Description:
Failure of the A SG Pressure Transmitter PT-475 to 0% Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
. CONFIRM alarm using P1-474.1 SB, Fl-474 SA, P1-484.1 SB, and P1-494 SB, Steam Generator A pressure.
o Reports P 1-475 or Fl-474 reading or failing low.
. VERIFY Automatic Functions: NONE
. Takes manual control of FK-478 (IFW-133) A SG Main FW Reg Valve and stabilizes A SG level
. PERFORM Corrective Actions:
BOP o Dispatch an operator to investigate for feed line break and steam line rupture (NONE) o Check Containment press, temp, and humidity for evidence of a Containment leak (NO) o CHECK for failed instrument (YES) o IF failed instrument identified then remove the failed instrument from service
- Restores level to normal (57% NR).
. Should provide guidance to maintain A SG level to be maintained between 52 to 62% lAW OMM-001, Attachment 13 SRO
. Refer to OWP-ESF-02 to remove channel from service.
. Contacts l&C to have channel removed from service.
. Dispatch AO to investigate The failed channel does NOT have to be removed from service to continue the scenario.
Evaluators Note: If time is an issue with this scenario then evaluation of SRO Tech Specs for any event can be performed as follow-up questions at the conclusion of the scenario. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario I 23 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 24 of 69 Event
Description:
Failure of the A SG Pressure Transmitter PT-475 to 0% Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Enters Instrumentation TS TS 3.3.1 Functional Unit 14 Steam Generator Water Level Low Coincident With Steam! Feedwater Flow Mismatch
. ACTION 6 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:
The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours, and the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel. may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1. SRO TS 3.3.2 Table 3.3-3 Functional Unit item I .e and 4.d
. ACTION 19. With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels. operation may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours. and
- b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.2.1.
TS 3.3.3.6 Accident Monitoring instrumentation Table 3.3-10 number of channels is met (tracking LCO only) BOP At request of the CRS Place main turbine ramp in hold Requests extra operator for dedicated feedwater operation Directs operator and l&C to perform OWP-ESF-02 SRO Reviews/prepares OMM-001, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist for the failure of A SG PT-475 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 24 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 25 of 69 Event
Description:
Failure of the A SG Pressure Transmitter PT-475 to 0% Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior It is not required to implement the entire OWP prior to Lead Evaluator Note: continuing with the scenario. BOP Performs OWPESF-02 (sheet 3 of 8) steps I and 2 Simulator Acknowledge request to perform OWP-ESF-02 for PT-475 Communicator: failure. If requested to perform OWP-ES-02 for PT 475 by the Lead Simulator Operator: Evaluator then: Run APP-OWP-ESF-02-lll-TST when directed. OWP-ESF-02 is attached at the end of scenario, see Attachment I While the crew is processing OWP-ESF-02 for PT-475 the scenario may continue. Evaluator Note: Cue Event 3 VCT LT-II2 fails high, letdown full divert to RHT (AOP-003). Insert failure after SG level is under control, the Tech Spec has been identified and the Work Control Center has been called. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 25 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: NRC Scenario# 1 Event# 6 Page 26 of 69 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break on B SG Inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from Lead Evaluator insert Trigger 3 Simulator Operator: VCT LT-1 12 fails high, letdown full divert to RHT lications . ALB-007-5-5, COMPUTER ALARM CHEM & VOL Available: SYSTEMS
. 1 CS-i 20 (LCV-1 1 5A), Letdown VCT I Holdup Tank, aligns to HUT Refers to ALB-007-5-5, COMPUTER ALARM CHEM & VOL RO SYSTEMS Evaluator Note: Crew may place ICS-120 (LCV-115A) to the VCT position per OPS-NGGC-1 000.
. CHECK instrumentation on MCB associated with alarm RO point.
. DISPATCH an operator to check local indications associated with alarminq points.
Simulator Acknowledge the request to check for local indications of Communicator: alarming points. Identifies entry conditions to AOP-003, Malfunction of Reactor CREW Makeup Control are met Enters and directs the actions of AOP-003, Malfunction of SRO Reactor Makeup Control Makes PA announcement RO
- Check IA available (YES)
Harris 2013 NRC Scenario I 26 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 27 of 69 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break on B SG Inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CHECK BOTH LT-1 12 and LT-1 15 functioning properly.
. Determines LK-112 output has failed and goes to Section SRO 3.1, LT-112 orLT-115 Malfunction (CONTINUOUS ACTION) Assesses effects of LT-1 12 failure (Attachment 1)
Simulator When directed to report local indication for LT:112, Communicator: Wait 1 minute then report that local indication is 100%. Procedure Note: An instrument malfunction may manifest itself as a slow drift rather than a full high or full low failure. Until the instrument has failed fully high or fully low, all steps should be reviewed for applicability periodically, even if not continuously applicable.
. CHECK that LT-115 is FAILING (NO)
SRO
- Determines that LT-1 12 is failed high and DIRECTS RO to place ICS-120 (LCV-115A), Letdown VCTI Holdup Tank, to VCT position
- Determines failure is NOT due to LT-1 15 and go to Step 8
- Determines failure caused by LT-1 12
. Monitor VCT level using either:
RO
- ERFIS point LCSOI 15
- LT-115
. Check LT-1 12 is failing LOW (NO)
. RNO action: Place 1 CS-I 20 (LCV-I I 5A), Letdown VCT I Holdup_Tank,_to_VCT_position (places_control_to_VCT)
Normally, VCT level is maintained between 20 and 40% by Procedure Note: auto makeup. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 27 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # I Event # 6 Page 28 of 69 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break on B SG Inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
. Reviews note SRO
. DIRECTS RO to CONTROL VCT level in AUTO RO Maintains VCT level > 5%
Lifting leads in the following Step will simulate a low-low level Procedure Note: signal from the failed instrument. This allows a valid low-low level signal from the good instrument to initiate emergency makeuo.
. Reviews note:
SRO
- Determines LT-112 has failed high and directs Maintenance to lift leads in SSPS for auto switchover to RWST (Step 19)
RO . Maintain LCV-1 I 5A in VCT position
. DIRECT Maintenance to investigate and repair the instrument malfunction.
SRO
- Completes an Equipment Problem Checklist and contacts WCC for assistance. (WR, EIR and Maintenance support)
Simulator Acknowledge requests for assistance. Communicator: Cue Event 4 (Spurious start of the TDAFW pump) after Evaluator Note: SRO communications with WCC are completed. On cue from Lead Evaluator Actuate Trigger 4 Simulator Operator: Spurious start of TDAFW Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 28 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: NRC Scenario# 1 Event# 6 Page 29 of 69 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break on B SG Inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALB-017-7-1 AFW TURB DISCHARGE OR SUCTIONILOW PRESSURE (flashes in on start)
- Increasing power Indications Available
. Rising SG Levels
. Open indication on IMS-70
. Tavg lowers BOP Identifies the indications of a spurious start of the TDAFW BOP Refers to APP-ALB-1 7-7-1 CREW Determines TDAFW pump should not be running The crew may stop the reactivity impact by securing the TDAFW pump different ways. These differences are acceptable.
. They may close I MS-70, but it will reopen once shut Evaluator Note:
. They may throttle shut the TDAFW flow control valves Both will render the TDAFW pump inoperable and require entry into Tech Specs.
CREW Dispatches an AO to investigate Simulator IF I When contacted, wait 2-3 minutes then report TD AFW Communicator: Pump is running. No indications locally as to the cause. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 29 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # I Event # 6 Page 30 of 69 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break on B SG Inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Crew may opt to refer to OP-I 37, Auxiliary Feedwater, section 7.2, Normal Shutdown of the TD AFW pump
. Verify 1MS-70 SA SHUT (NO) o Shuts IMS-70
. Verify 1MS-72 SB Shut (YES)
BOP . Verify AFW FCV and Isolations indicate OPEN (YES)
. Set AFW FCVs Output Demand to 100% for 1AF-129, 1AF-130, 1AF-131. (YES)
. Verify TDAFW Speed Controller in AUTO and set per Curve F-X-10. (YES)
Complete Attachment 7, TD AFW Restoration. Procedure Note: The following step makes the TD AFW pump operable, and aligns TD AFW pump to a standby alignment. SRO Reference OWP-MS-05 OP-I 37 Attachment 7 is attached to end of this guide: See Attachment I at end of scenario the crew will not be Evaluator Note: afforded time to perform these actions and this is NOT required to be completed to continue with the scenario. The SRO may also reference OWP-MS-05, but this OWP has no actions. Evaluates Tech specs from APP and OWP T.S. 3.3.2, Table 3.3-3 function 6.b Action 21. (6 hours) SRO T.S. 3.6.3, Containment Isolation valves Action a. (4 hours) T.S. 3.7.1.2, AFW pumps and flow paths Action b. ( hours) T.S. 3.9.4. Containment Building penetrations (Not applicable) Reviews/prepares OMM-001, Attachment 5 Equipment SRO Problem Checklist Contacts Work Control and/or System Engineer for assistance. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 30 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 1 Event# 6 Page 31 of 69 Event Qescription: Steam Line Break on B SG Inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Acknowledge SRO requests Communicator: After communications with the Work Control Center are Evaluator Note: completed cue Event 5 Pressurizer Spray Valve, PCV-444D, fails OPEN. On cue from the Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 5 Simulator Operator: Pressurizer Spray Valve, PCV-444D, fails OPEN When Pressurizer Spray Valve PCV-444D fails open the plant and expected crew responses are:
. PZR pressure will decrease
. All PZR heaters will energize
. Annunciators for PZR low pressure will alarm
. The crew should respond by entering AOP-019, Evaluator Note: Malfunction of RCS Pressure Control, and place the malfunctioning spray valve in manual per the immediate actions
. RCS pressure drop below the DNB limit depending on how fast the operator responds to the failure
. If RCS pressure decreases to < 2185 psig the SRO should evaluate Tech Spec 3.2.5, DNB Parameters
. ALB-09-3-3 PRESSURIZER LOW PRESS DEVIATION CONTROL Indications Available
- ALB-09-5-1 PRESSURIZER HIGH-LOW PRESS
- Pressurizer Pressure decreasing
- Responds to ALB-09 alarms.
RO
- Reports malfunction in the RCS Pressure Control system.
Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 31 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 32 of 69 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break on B SG Inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Enters AOP-019, MALFUNCTION OF RCS PRESSURE CONTROL. Makes PA announcement Perform AOP-019 Immediate Actions.
. CHECK that a bubble exists in the PRZ. (YES)
. VERIFY ALL PRZ PORVs AND associated block valves properly positioned for current PRZ pressure and plant conditions. (YES)
. CHECK Both PRZ spray valves properly positioned for current PRZ pressure and plant conditions. (NO)
The malfunction only affects PCV-4440. It is expected that Evaluator Note: the operator will recognize that only one spray valve is malfunctioning and operate that controller in MANUAL. CONTROL PRZ spray valves in MANUAL using ONE of the following (listed in order of preference):
- AFFECTED Spray Valve controller in MANUAL (if only one is obviously malfunctioning)
Immediate OR Actions RO
. PK-444A, Master Pressure Controller OR
. Both individual spray valve controllers Reports Immediate Actions are complete
. GO TO Section 3.1, Pressure Control Malfunctions While SRO Operating With a Pressurizer Bubble.
Procedure Note: Loss of RCS pressure control may require initiation of the SHNPP Emergency Plan. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 32 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 33 of 69 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break on B SG Inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
. Inform SM to REFER to PEP-hO, Emergency SRO Classification and Protective Action Recommendations, AND ENTER the EAL Matrix.
With Pressurizer Spray valve controller in manual a control band and trip limits should be established lAW OMM-QOl Attachment 13 SRO Pressurizer 2210 2260 PSIG 2050 PSIG 2350 PSIG Pressure MONITOR PRZ pressure by observing other reliable RO indications. SRO CHECK plant in MODE I OR 2. (YES)
. CHECK PRZ pressure CONTROLLED. (YES)
RO
. CHECK PRZ pressure 2335 PSIG OR LESS. (YES)
. If PT-445 is failed low, normal plant operation is not affected. However, PORVs I RC-1 18 (PCV-445A SA) and I RC..1 16 (PCV-445B) will NOT open on high PRZ pressure Procedure Note: when in AUTO.
. Auto actuation is NOT required for PORV operability.
. CHECK ALL of the following PRZ PORV block valves OPEN:
RO o I RC-1 17 (for PCV-445A SA) (YES) o I RC-I 15 (for PCV-445B) (YES) o 1RC-113 (for PCV-444B SB) (YES) Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 33 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 34 of 69 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break on B SG Inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Procedure Note: Attachment 2 lists the controller outputs corresponding to heater, spray, and PRZ PORV operation that are applicable durinq normal operation.
. CHECK that a malfunction of one or more of the following has occurred:
o PT-444 (NO) o PK-444A (NO) RO o PRZ heater(s) (NO) o PRZ spray valve(s) or controller(s) (YES 1 RC-1 03 in AUTO)
. CHECK PK-444A controlling properly in AUTO. (YES)
. CONTROL PRZ pressure as follows:
Procedure Note: If individual Spray Valve controllers are already in MAN, DO NOT return to AUTO. o CHECK BOTH PRZ spray valve controllers in AUTO AND BOTH spray valves operating as desired. (NO) o VERIFY PRZ Spray Valve controllers in ONE of the following alignments: RO
- AFFECTED Spray Valve controller in MANUAL (if only one is obviously malfunctioning) (YES) o OPERATE Spray Valves as necessary to control PZR pressure.
Procedure Note: Cycling a heater control switch to OFF and back to AUTO will restore normal heater function if the anti-pumping circuit has disabled the heater. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 34 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario 1 Event # 6 Page 35 of 69 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break on B SG Inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior o CHECK ALL PRZ heaters operating as desired. (YES)
. CHECK at least one of the following conditions present:
RO o PRZ pressure is UNCONTROLLED (NO) Status of a normal spray valve or a PRZ heater bank is UNCONTROLLED (NO)
. REFER TO Tech Spec 3.2.5 (DNB Parameters) AND IMPLEMENT action where appropriate.
(Limit is 2185 psig required to restore within 2 hours) SRO
- Completes an Equipment Problem Checklist and contacts WCC for assistance.
(WR, EIR and Maintenance support) The Lead Evaluator can cue Event 6 (Steam line break on B SG inside containment) once the plant has stabilized Evaluator Note: back in its normal pressure band, the Tech Spec identification is completed and the Work Control Center communications are completed.. On cue from the Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 6 Simulator Operator: Major Event: Steam Line Break B SG Inside Containment The crew should identify the leak and initiate a manual Safety Injection. The crew will enter E-0 and perform the immediate actions. The SRO may also direct a manual Steam Line Isolation. The crew should diagnose that a LOCA is NOT in progress and transition from E-0 to E-2, Evaluator Note: Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.
. When SG B pressure is < 100 psi of A and C SG (with MSLI) an AFW isolation signal should have closed the B MD and TD AFW valves but fails to do so.
Harris 2013 NRC Scenario I 35 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 36 of 69 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break on B SG Inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
. When Containment pressure> 3 psig the crew should identify Adverse Containment conditions are required to be implemented.
. When RCS Pressure exceeds 2385 psig the PORVs should open but will fail to open when required to
. When ISI-4 is closed from the MCB it will fail to close requiring the RAB Aux Operator to locally close the valve
. The Source Range will fail to auto energize due to Intermediate Range NI-35 being undercompensated
. When Containment pressure exceeds 10 psig CNMT Spray pumps will auto start.
. ALB-028-5-1 CONTAINMENT AIR HIGH VACUUM will clear (if in due to earlier ESW Pump start)
. ALB-028-8-5 COMPUTER ALARM VENTILATION SYSTEM
. Rising pressure in containment Indications Available
- Rising temperature in containment
- Increased SG steam flow
- Tavg lowers
- Prz level and pressure lower
- Power rises Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 36 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # I Event # 6 Page 37 of 69 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break on B SG Inside Containment Time 1 Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Identifies an ESF actuation setpoint will be exceeded on any RD Safety Injection parameter. Informs SRO then actuates a Manual Safety Injection SRO Directs manual Reactor Trip and Safety Injection activation E-O Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection Steps through immediate actions with crew SRO Makes plant PA announcement Verifies Reactor is Tripped (YES) ZAC?OR TRIP ONJIRKAIOH Immediate Action RD Reactor ri.p ffi KRe - OPEN Ro4 Sotton glvs (Zero $tepø) - LII Neutroz ?Iax - DROPIHG Verifies Turbine is Tripped All throttle valves shut (YES) UR STOP Vt.V 1 TSL2fl-i Immediate Action BOP 2 TURD 9TOP VI.V 3 ¶L2-1i-.3 TURfl STOP ThV 4 Z11# Immediate Verify Power To AC Emergency Buses (YES) Action BOP AC emergency buses BOTH energized Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 37 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 38 of 69 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break on B SG Inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Safety Injection Activated (YES) Both Trains Immediate RO Action BPLP -asi TUA1E LIT (CONTINDOUSLX) Assigns foldout items of E-O to both the RO and BOP
. RO:
o RCP Trip criteria o Alternate Miniflow Open/Shut criteria SRO o RHR restart criteria BOP o Ruptured SG AFW Isolation criteria o AFW supply switchover criteria Evaluator Aide: E-O Foldout [ REACTOR TRIP OR SAFEV( IUJECTION FOLDOUT
. RCF TRIP CRITERIA Fbthof the Iollcwing occur, THE1 stop all RCPs:
SI how- GREVrER 9-lAN 200 (3PM
. tCS pieanure LESS THAN t0O PSC
. ALTERt4ATh WNtFI.OW OPtISHUT CRITERW
. IF RCS reasure copsta less than 18(0 PSIG, THE11 verify alternate miriflow Rnletin OR n,inifnw hIak nIves Stl IT
. If ROS reanurn roes to greater then 2200 PIG, ]3!1!j veify alternele minilow telalion AND rninhlow block valves OEN
. RHRRESTARTCRITERIA F RCS prcoovrc dropo to Icon then 233 PIC in on unconboflod manner, restart RHR punwa to stpty water to lbs RCS. I!iE!i
. RUPTURED 5(3 AFW ISOLATION CRITERIA F &l at the folowng occur to soy SO, THEM otop feed lloa by shutting the olallon valves Ipreferred) OR flow control valviWat SO:
a ri SG level rises in uncon:rolted manner OR has abnomial seccrrdsry radttkx
, Htrnv reivjn lovel RFTFR THAN 5°A [4fl%
. AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRETEnIA W CST level drops to less man 10% 1I-IN switch the /FW water supply to lle ESW system usir CR137, AUXEIY FEEDWATER SYSTEM. Seclbn 31.
Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 38 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 39 of 69 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break on B SG Inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Identifies Containment Adverse Conditions CREW Containment Pressure> 3 psig SRO Evaluate EAL Matrix. Verifiy CSIPs all running (YES) RO A and B running Verify RHR Pumps all running (YES) RO A and B running Safety Injection flow> 200 gpm (YES) RO RCS pressure LESS than 230 PSIG (NO) J Acknowledge communications: Simulator Run CAEP :cvcpath-1 att 6 csip suction valves power.txt. Communicator! When the CAEP is complete, report completion to the Simulator Operator MCR. Main Steam Line Isolation Actuated (YES) Afl4 STEAK IJN3 IEOLATION ACWAUON CRITERIA BOP CH$? prea8ae - (REME TW GR EQUAL TO SI Any LRS TEAK O IG &Q1 t44K3AL GRADATtOI4 tOWI.RDS WtOKATIC IIATIO1 BOP Verify All MSIVs AND Bypass Valves SHUT (YES) Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 39 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 40 of 69 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break on B SG Inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Any SG pressure 100 PSIG LOWER THAN PRESSURE IN TWO OTHER SGs (YES) Event 7 Verify MDAFW AND TDAFW Isolation Valves AND Flow Failure of Control Valves To Affected SG SHUT (NO) Auto BOP Shuts both MDAFW and TDAFW isolation valve and FCV to AFW the B SG Isolation
. 1AF-93 (SHUT)
. 1AF-143 (SHUT)
With Containment pressure approaching 10 psig the SRO Evaluator Note: may assign a pressure value to the RO to manually actuate Containment Spray prior to Auto actuation. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 40 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: NRC Scenario# I Event# 6 Page 41 of 69 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break on B SG Inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Directs RO to manually actuate Containment Spray at a SRO Containment pressure below 10 psig to prevent auto Containment Spray actuation. Check CNMT Pressure HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 PSIG (YES I NO time dependant) Manually actuate Containment Spray by taking 2 switches to the actuate position RO
. Verify Containment Spray Actuated
. Stop ALL RCPs o Locates MCB switches for RCPs and STOPS ALL 3 RCPs BOP Verify AFW flow AT LEAST 210 KPPH ESTABLISHED (YES)
BOP Sequencer Load Block 9 Actuated I Both Trains (YES) BOP Energize AC buses IAI AND I Bi Evaluator Note: E-O, Attachment 3 is located in the back of this guide. E-O Attachment 3 is included in the back of this scenario. The RO will perform all board actions until the BOP completes Attachment 3. The BOP is permitted to properly align plant equipment lAW E-O Attachment 3 without SRO Evaluator Note: approval. The Scenario Guide still identifies tasks by board position because the time frame for completion of Attachment 3 is not predictable. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 41 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 42 of 69 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break on B SG Inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Verify Alignment Of Components From Actuation Of ESFAS BOP Signals Using Attachment 3, Safeguards Actuation Verification, While Continuing With This Procedure. Directs AO to place 1A and I B Air Compressor in the local BOP control mode per E-O Attachment 3 step 22 Acknowledge the request to place IA and lB Air Simulator Compressor in the local control mode per Communicator E-O Attachment 3 step 22 When directed to place the IA and lB Air Compressor in Simulator Operator the local control mode: Run APP\airacs_to_local When the APP for IA and lB Air Compressor has Simulator completed running call the MCR and inform them that the Communicator . air compressors are running in local control. I RCPs are secure therefore WR CL temperatures should be Examiners Note: used when checking RCS temperature. RCS temp trend will be < 5570 and dropping control FF, maintain total FF > 210 KPPH until SG level > 40% (all MSIVs are shut) Harris 2013 NRC Scenario I 42 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 43 of 69 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break on B SG Inside Containment Time Position Appicants Actions or Behavior Stabilize AND Maintain Temperature Between 555°F AND 5590 F Using Table 1. tAELE 1 RCS TKNPERAT1RE GONTROL GUIDELINES ROLWWING RI TRIP
- Guidance ig applicable until another procedure directs otherw ise,
. . no ROPe running. use wide range cold leg temperature.
lOS TENPERATDRE TREND LESS E GREATER THAN STAEJ2 AT OR 557P ANU 557P AND TRENDING TO DROPPING RISING 557
- Stop dumping * . coadenaer
- Control feed steam available flow and steam RO IflEil tranefer ctup to
- Control feed steam dump to establish and.
flow STEAM FRI SURE maintain RUE mode using temperature
- Nana total OP-126, between 555P feed flov Section 5.3 AND 55Y OPERATOR greater tban AND dump steam ACTIOtI 110 IPRE to condenser until level greater than - OR -
Z5 4o%) in at least one e Dump steen on intact SG using intact SG PORVa
- cooldown conrifluee.
- Cottol feed THEN, shut flow to NEWs AND maintain SG bIHASS valves levels Evaluator Note: PORVs will NOT auto open when required 2235 psig)
(> Event 8 Failure of PRZ PORVs SHUT (YES) PORVs RO PRZ Spray Valves SHUT (YES RCPs are secured) to Auto PRZ PORV Block Valves AT LEAST ONE OPEN (YES) Open Any SG pressure DROPPING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER OR COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED (YES B) SRO GO TO E-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION, Step 1. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario I 43 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 44 of 69 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break on B SG Inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior E..2 FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION
. At least one SG must be maintained available for RCS cooldown.
Procedure Caution: . Any faulted SG OR secondary break should remain isolated during subsequent recovery actions unless needed for RCS cooldown. SRO Initiate Monitoring Of Critical Safety Function Status Trees. Verify all MSIVs SHUT (YES) BOP Verify all MSIV bypass valves SHUT (YES) Check any SG pressure STABLE OR RISING (NOT BOP - FAULTED) (YES A and C SG) Any SG pressure DROPPING IN AN UNCONTROLLED BOP - MANNER OR COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED (YES B SG) Isolate Faulted SG: BOP Verify faulted SG(s) PORV SHUT (YES) Verify main FW isolation valves SHUT (YES automatically) Verify MDAFW AND TDAFW pump isolation valves to faulted SG(s) SHUT Crftical
- 1AF-93 (SHUT)
BOP
- IAF-143 (SHUT)
Event 7 (YES I NO time dependant may have identified and isolated these valves in E-O) Critical Task to isolate both valves prior to exiting E-2 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 44 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 45 of 69 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break on B SG Inside Containment Time Position f Applicants Actions or Behavior Shut faulted SG(s) steam supply valve to TDAFW pump SHUT Critical SG L 1MS-70 BOP g c 1MS-72 Task #1 1 MS-70 (SHUT should have shut in E-0 actions) Critical Task to isolate both valves prior to exiting E-2 Verify main steam drain isolation(s) before MSIVs SHUT: - (YES) BOP
*1NS-231 E B iNS-26
.SG C: 1MS-301 Verify SG blowdown isolation valves SHUT (YES)
SG B1pwdo I81atia a1vea Froceag Oiatsde CIB4T Irtsicte CNMT BOP Line (N1B.i4-S) tNLB- 1-S) S 1 jowdowr 1BD-U lED-I SG B E1owdou 1D-3O lED-20 S4 C Biovdown IED-49 lED -39 Verify main steam analyzer isolation valves SHUT (YES) BOP Check CST Level GREATER THAN 10% (YES) Procedure Note: A SG may be suspected to be ruptured if it fails to dry out following isolation of feed flow. Local checks for radiation can be used to confirm primary-to-secondary leakage. Any SG ABNORMAL RADIATION OR UNCONTROLLED CREW LEVEL RISE (NO) Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 45 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # I Event # 6 Page 46 of 69 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break on B SG Inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Secondary RadIation Monitors And Indications RM-OIMS-3591 55, Main Steam Line A RM-O16S-35G2 SB, Main Steara Line B H-O1NS-3593 SB, air Steam Line C RER-OITV-3534. Condenser Vantuin Pimp EffTunt (RN-IH Crd 2 or Group 16) R!N-ThD-3527. Steam Generator 51ov4on (RM-1t Grid 2 or Group 16) RMITV35361. Turbine Building Vent Stack 3ffluen (RM11: t Grid 2 or Group 16) SC Activity Snip1o Check If SI Has Been Terminated: Check for all of the following: Check BIT outlet valves SHUT OR ISOLATED
. 1 SI-3 (YES under clearance SHUT)
RO
- 1SI-4 (NO OPEN)
Check cold leg AND hot leg injection valves SHUT
. lSl-52 (YES)
. ISI-86 (YES)
. 151-i 07 (YES)
Check SI Termination Criteria: BOP Check Subcooling > 40°F (YES) Level in at least one SG > 40% (YES) RCS pressure STABLE OR RISING (YES) RD PRZ level -> 30% (YES I NO time dependant action) PRZ level > 30% Evaluator Note: IF YES then crew will continue with E-2 below IF NO then crew will transition to E-1 the actions for E-1 follow E-2 in this guide beginning on page 50 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 46 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # I Event # 6 Page 47 of 69 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break on B SG Inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior E-2 RO Reset SI continues Manually Realign Safeguards Equipment Following A Loss Of Crew Offsite Power. (There is no loss of power N/A) RD Reset Phase A AND Phase B Isolation Signals. (BOTH signals) Open Instrument Air AND Nitrogen Valves to Containment 11fr119 (ISOL VAlVE ON EIJ)
.236 PENETRAflOW (N40.))
RO 1SI-87 (AcUWJLAOR & RZ PORV
]2 SIWPV( IS vLfl Locates and OPENS both valves Stop all but ONE CSIP (STOPS Al B CSIP)
RD RCS pressure STABLE OR RISING (YES) Check CSIP suction ALIGNED TO RWST (YES) RO r (SRUT) (O?E.N) 1CS-165 (Lcv-115c) ICS-291 (LuV-115B) ICS-166 (LGV-115X) ICS-292 (Lcv-115D) RD Open Normal Miniflow Isolation Valves: Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 47 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 48 of 69 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break on B SG Inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior C81P A ICS-1a2 EIP ICS-19 CIP C.1:CS 310 CO]O*ON CS-21. Locates controls and OPENS each valve Event 9 Failure of lSl-4 to close Shut BIT Outlet Valves: iI-:. 1SI-4 Critical I Sl-3 is under clearance and SHUT RO Task #2 lSl-4 will not SHUT from MCB switch Dispatches RAB Aux Operator to locally shut I Sl-4 (may also request that the breaker for the valve OPEN) Critical Task to shut BIT Outlet valve 1 Sl-4 prior to establishing flow through the charging header IF this valve has not been previously shut then: Simulator Acknowledge request to locally shut ISI-4 (A-230-FX32-Communicator: W3-S2) AND if requested acknowledge request to OPEN breaker prior to locally valve operation. Report back approximately 1 minute after Simulator Operator completes actions below that ISI-4 is SHUT. ISI-4 operations: Sim Diagram SISO2 (IF requested) OPEN control power rf sisOl6 Simulator Operator - Engage handwheel rfsisOl7 Shut valve rfsisOl8 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 48 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 49 of 69 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break on B SG Inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Verify Cold Leg AND Hot Leg Injection Valves SHUT (YES) RO iS1-5 1f 06
)S]H-107 Procedure Note: High head SI flow should be isolated before continuing.
Establish Charging Lineup: Shut charging flow control valve: FK-122.1 (SHUTS) RO Open charging line isolation valves: 1CS-235 (OPENS) ICS-238 (OPENS) Monitor RCS Hot Leg Temperature: Check RCS hot leg temperature STABLE (YES I NO time RD dependant probably still lowering) YES I NO BOP action next step YES Manually dump steam AND control feed flow to mainta in RCS temperature stable. BOP NO If temperature rising, THEN manually dump steam from intact SG PORVs at maximum rate to stabilize temperature. Procedure Caution: Charging flow should NOT exceed 150 GPM to prevent damage to the regenerative heat exchanger. Control Charging Flow To Maintain PRZ Level: RD Control charging using charging flow control valve: FK-1 22.1 I Maintain charging flow less than 150 GPM Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 49 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ESD-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 50 of 69 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break on B SG Inside Containment Time - Position Applicants Actions or Behavior PRZ level CAN BE MAINTAINED STABLE OR RISING SRO GO TO ES-1.1, SI TERMINATION, step I IF the crew transitioned to E-1 based on PRZ level < 30% then continue on next page. Evaluator Note: If PRZ level is> 30% then go to PAGE 54 to continue with ES-1.1, SI Termination step 1. E-1 Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant Procedure Note: Foldout applies Assigns Foldout items to RO and BOP RO: RCP Trip criteria, RHR Restart criteria, Alternate Miniflow SRO Open/Shut criteria, Cold Leg Recirculation switchover criteria BOP: AFW supply switchover criteria, Secondary integrity criteria, E-3 transition criteria Evaluator Note: See next page for foldout criteria Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 50 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # I Event # 6 Page 51 of 69 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break on B SC Inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Evaluator Aide: E-1 Foldout LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT FOLUOUT
. RCP TRIP C1RITERIA IF both of the following occur, j)j4 stop all ItCPs:
SI how - GREATER THAN 200 GPM
. RCS pressure - LESS THAN 1400 P510
. AEW Cl (001 V cAanrrs.n,so norroosa IF OST level drops to less than 10%, Ti-hEM switch the .AFW the ESW system using OP-137, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER water supply to SYSTEM, Section 8.1.
PNI PFTAPT CPflFPI IF ROS pressure drops to tess than 23(1 PS 10 in an uncontrolled restart RHR pumps to supply water manner, TI-lEN to the RCS
- a. I -rn.a,arn n,r.1rrf 0
E N1$1-IUT JE RCS pressure drops to teas then 180(1 PSIG, HEll verify alternate miniflow isolation OR miniftow bio.ck valves SHUT -
. IF RCS pressure rises to greater than 2200 PSl, )jj isolation AN mlniflow block valves OPEN verify alternate n,iniflow C.,*JIlIJflfl.1 (Pt I C%flI I I ,..flI I CZflJfl IF anyor the following o.ccurs, jJ:jfjGO TO E-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION, Step 1.
. Any SG pressure DROPS IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANN HAS NOT BEEN ISOLATED ER5 TI-tAT SO
. Any SG - COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZEUANO THAT SO HASJQI8EEN ISOLATED F IUAIiCrnflh1 fIITFOT5 IF any SO level rises in an uncontrolled manner any SQ rediatton levels, Jh5 GO TO E-3, STEAM GENERATO has abnormal R TUBE RUPTURE, Step 1.
CoLD orrInrIfl flnM RWST level drops to less than 23.4% (214 Low-Low alani), ES-I .3, TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION, flI4 GO TO Step 1. CREW Initiate Monitoring Of Critical Safety Function Status Trees. Maintain RCP Seal Injection Flow Between 8 GPM And 13 RO GPM. Check Intact SG Levels: Any level GREATER THAN 40% (YES) BOP Control FE to maintain all intact levels between 40% 50% - Any level RISING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (NO) Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 51 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 52 of 69 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break on B SG Inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The PRZ PORVs are failed. The crew should identify that when RCS pressure exceeds 2285 psig the PZR PORVs Evaluator Note: failed to open and will MANUALLY open the PORVs to prevent the PRZ Safety valves from lifting. Check PRZ PORV AND Block Valves: Verify AC buses 1A1 AND I Bi ENERGIZED (YES) Check PRZ PDRVs SHUT (YES failed) RD Check block valves AT LEAST ONE OPEN (YES) IF a PRZ PORV opens on high pressure, THEN verify it shuts after pressure drops to less than opening setpoint. (should open / close when RCS pressure reaches 2385 psig) Check SI Termination Criteria: RD RCS subcooling >40°F Level in at least one intact SG > 40% (YES) BOP Total feed flow to intact SGs > 210 KPPH (YES) PRZ level > 30% (YES I NO time dependant) RD YES GO TO ES-1.1, SI Termination, Step I (PAGE 54) NO Continue with E-1 actions below E-1 Cc ntinued Check CNMT Spray Status: Check any CNMT spray pump RUNNING (YES) Consult plant operations staff to determine if CNMT spray RD should be placed in standby. CNMT spray TO BE PLACED IN STANDBY (When directed by plant operations staff) Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 52 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 53 of 69 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break on B SG Inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The Intermediate Range channel N-36 is Evaluator Note: undercompensated and the crew must identify the failure and manually energize the SR detectors. Check Source Range Detector Status: Intermediate range flux LESS THAN 5x10-1 1 AMPS Event 10 Verify source range detectors ENERGIZED (NO) SR NI RO Identifies NI-35 under-compensation, reports finding to SRO fails to and manually energizes the SR detectors energize Transfer nuclear recorder to source range scale. Check RHR Pump Status: Check RHR pump suction ALIGNED TO RWST RO RwBr sucTIot (WEK) RRR A 151-322 RUR D RCS Pressure GREATER THAN 230 PSIG (YES) RO RCS pressure STABLE OR RISING (YES) Stop RHR pumps (STOPS both RHR pumps) Check RCS And SG Pressures: (time dependant) Check for both of the following: All SG Pressures STABLE OR RISING (YES I NO) RO RCS pressure STABLE OR DROPPING (YES I NO) IF NO the crew will return to step 1 and loop back to step 1. When they reach step 5 to check PRZ level they will have adequate level and transition to ES-1.1, SI Termination. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 53 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 54 of 69 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break on B SG Inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SI Termination ES-1.1 Entered from either E-2 step 29 or E-1 Step 5.e Procedure Note: Foldout Applies Assigns foldout action items to RD and BOP RD Cold leg recirculation switchover criteria and RHR restart SRO criteria BOP Secondary integrity criteria and AFW switchover criteria Evaluator Aide: ES-1.1 Foldout
- 1. SI TERMINATION FOI.flOUT Ctflflf.Ifl Any I.vrnflfl-y rnrrrnra IF any of the foflowing occurs, THEN GO TO E-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION, Step 1.
. Any SO pressure DROPS IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER 8NTHATSG HAS jI BEEN ISOLATED
. Any SO COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED AND THAT SG HAS I BEEN ISOLATED I tfl fltrlnnl II flyinfli AflrrLlnUfl flfltflI A IE RWST level drops to less than 23.4% (214 Low-Low alarrn, IIIEM Go TO ES-I .3, TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION, Step 1.
AFW IE CST level drops to lesS than 10%, THEN switch the AFW water supply to the ESW system using OP-137, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM, Section 8.1. RHR RESTART CRITERIA IERCS pressure drops to less than 230 PSIG in an uncontrolled manner, THEN restart RHR pumps to supply water to the RCS. SRO Initiate Monitoring Of Critical Safety Function Status Trees. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario I 54 Rev. 2
Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: NRC Scenario # I Event # 6 Page 55 of 69 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break on B SG Inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Check If SI Has Been Terminated: Check for all of the following: Check BIT outlet valves SHUT OR ISOLATED
. 1 SI-3 (YES shut and under clearance)
. 1 SI-4 (YES / NO shut in E-2 step 22 OR will be shut in ES-I .1 step 9.c coming up)
IF answer is NO then perform actions on following pages for NO response to reset SI RO If YES then do this action then pick up again after NO response ends. Check cold leg AND hot leg injection valves SHUT
. 1SI-52(YES)
. lSl-86 (YES)
. 1SI-107 (YES)
Harris 2013 NRC Scenario I 55 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 56 of 69 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break on B SG Inside Containment Time Position Appicants Actions or Behavior Reset SI (DONE) Manually realign Safeguards Equipment Following A Loss of Offsite Power (NO action required) Reset Phase A and Phase B Isolation Signals (DONE) Open IA and Nitrogen Valves to CNMT: (DONE) ii-ai (SQt VATV CONT. IDG 23 4WJRATIO (-a>) 151-287 (Acc!JNULAOR & PRZ P0KV N2 SUPPLY ISO IV) Stop all but ONE CSIP (DONE) Check RCS Pressure STABLE OR RISING (YES) Isolate High Head SI Flow: Check CSIP suction aligned to RWST RO VC? OUTZ. RtST SUCTIOW (SHUT) (OPEN) ICS-:165 (ICVH5O) 1CS-291 (LCV-115B) 105-166 (LV-11E) 105-292 (icV-1150) Open normal miniflow isolation valves: CSI A ICS-1a2 IP : ICS- 196 sIP c ics-uo COHON US-214 Shut BIT outlet valves: (1SI-4 is failed OPEN) ISI-3 RNO for 1 Sl-4 dispatch an Aux Operator to locally shut or isolate valve ISI-4 (A-230-FX-W3-S2) Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 56 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 57 of 69 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break on B SG Inside Containment Time Position j Apphcants Actions or Behavior IF this valve has not been previously shut then: Simulator Acknowledge request to locally shut lSl-4 Communicator: (A-230-FX32-W3-S2) AND if requested acknowledge request to OPEN breaker prior to locally valve operation. Report back approximately 1 minute after Simulator Operator completes actions below that lSl-4 is SHUT. ISI-4 operations: Sim Diagram SlSO2 (IF requested) OPEN control power rfsisOl6 Simulator Operator - Engage handwheel rfsisOl7 Shut valve rfsisOl8 Verify cold leg AND hot leg injection valves SHUT (YES) NO iSI2 RO response 151-86 ISI- 107 Procedure Caution: High head SI flow should be isolated before continuing Establish Charging Lineup: Shut charging flow control valve:
. FK-122.1 (SHUTS valve)
Open charging line isolation valves:
. 1CS-235 (OPEN)
. ICS-238 (OPEN)
Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 57 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 58 of 69 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break on B SG Inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Charging flow should NOT exceed 150 GPM to prevent Procedure Caution: damage to the regenerative heat exchanger. Control Charging Flow To Maintain PRZ Level: Control charging using charging flow control valve: FK-122.1 RD Maintain charging Ifow < 150 gpm PRZ level CAN BE MAINTAINED STABLE OR RISING (YES) Check If RHR Pumps Should Be Stopped: Check RHR pumps ANY RUNNING WITH SUCTION ALIGNED TO RWST (YES) RD Stop RHR pumps (locates MCB stop switches and STOPs both RHR pumps)
. Simultaneous flow through the charging and SI lines may cause CSIP runout (as indicated by oscillating Procedure Caution: discharge pressure).
. Charging flow should NOT exceed 150 GPM to prevent damage to the regenerative heat exchanger.
Check SI Reinitiation Criteria: RCS subcooling > 40° (YES) RD PRZ level -> 30% (YES) PRZ level Can Be Maintained> 30% (YES) Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 58 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 59 of 69 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break on B SG Inside Containment time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Additional foldout item, SI REINITIATION CRITERIA applies. SI TERMINATION Ff1 fl1UT Procedure Note: r...,rr,
- cmi&
F,lkwiii $1 IF any ,r IuIIuwii.j uc,ui.
- RC3ubcoIThg-LES&THN 1OF [4&fl-C 20F
. PRZ Icvd - NOT SE MMNTMNED GREATER ThAN 10% 0%J SRO Assigns RO SI Reinitiation criteria Establish Steam Generator Pressure Control Mode:
Check if steam dump to condenser AVAILABLE: (NO) Condewer Available RquLemata My Intact PG NSIV OPEN BOP - Conaenser Available (C-9) LII (RPLE. 33) Steaz Duip Coiitol - AYAiLAl? Use intact SG PORV for steam dumping in subsequent steps. RCS temperature must be stabilized to allow evaluation of PRZ Procedure Note: level trend. Monitor RCS Hot Leg Temerature: RO Check RCS hot leg temperature STABLE - Excessive RCS activity can cause adverse radiological Procedure Caution: conditions when letdown is placed in service. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario I 59 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 60 of 69 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break on B SG Inside Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Pressure controller PK-145.l is normally set to maintain 350 Procedure Note: PSIG (58%). If RCS pressure is low, the setpoint may have to be reduced to obtain proper letdown flow. Check If Letdown Can Be Placed In Service: RO Check PRZ Level > 40% (YES) Establish Letdown (Refer to OP-I 07, section 5.4) After letdown is established Pressurizer level can be lowered and Pressurizer pressure should no longer be a problem. The PORVs not functioning in Automatic will no longer pose a Examiners Note: challenge since the Pressurizer level can be reduce to where it will not be solid. END OF SCENARIO With RCS hot leg temperature stable or stabilizing under the crews control and letdown established then: TERMINATE THE SCENARIO. Direct the Simulator Operator to place the Simulator to Lead Evaluator FREEZE Announce CREW UPDATE The NRC has the shift Inform the crew to remain seated at their desk and to not discuss the scenario. Simulator Operator When directed by Lead Evaluator go to FREEZE Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 60 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 EO Attachment 3 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECT1O Attachment 3 Sheet I of;8 Safeguards Actuation Verification NOTE General guidance fonerificatiori of safeguards equipment is contained in Attachment 4 of this procedure. ERF1S displays of safeguards equipment status are not reliable while any associaled safety-related electrical buses are de-energizacL fl 1 Verify Two CSIPS RUNNIING Q I Verify Two RHR Pumps RUNNING - ll 3. Verify Two CCW Pumps RUFINING-0 4. Veaify All EWNEW Booster Pumps RUNNIN .- 0 5. Verify SI Valves PR0PEFLY ALIGNED (Refer to Attachment I.)
- 6. Verify CNMT Phase A lsolaliors Valves- SHUT (Referto OMM-004, POSTTRIPISAFEGUARDS ACTUATION REV1EW Attachment 4.)
EOP-E-O I RevI I PageS5 of 78 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 61 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 E-O Attachment 3 TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION REACTOR Attachment 3 heet2 of B Safeguards Actuation Verilication fl 7. Verify SC Blowdown AND SG Sample Isolation Valves In Table I - SHUT TbIa 1: SG iowdavu And amp1e Iaalatien V1vea cocea Otaicle V1HT Iusjde CNtT LiEe (NLE-.A-gA) ($L-.).B-S) SG SanipTh 1SP-217 1SP-zl412i SC Saple lS -222 1F-Z9/22I SC C Saap1a ISP -227 iSP-224/226 SG 4 1owdou iI-II ThD-I SG B E1owdow lED -30 IED-20 SC C Elowdown iD-*9 1ED-39
- 8. IL Main Steam Line IsoLation Actuated 2R Is. Required By Any Of The Folrowing, THEN Verify MS1Vs AND MSIV Bypass Valv.es SHUT -
[]
- Steam tine p:ressura LESS TI-IAN 601 PSIG
[J
- CNMT pressure GREATER ThAN 3.0 PSLG
- 9. IL CNMT Spray Actuation Sgnal A ctuat:ed OR Is Required, THEN Verify The Following:
Referto OMM-004,, POSTTHIP!SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION REVIEW. Attachment 9.) D
- CNMTsprsypurnps-RUNNING O
- CNMT spray valves PROPERLY ALIGNED 0
- Phase B isotation valves SHUT O
- All RCPs STOPPED EOP-E.0 I Rev. I I Page 55 of 73 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 62 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 E-O Attachment 3 REAT0R TRIP OR SAFElY INJECTION Attachment 3 Slieet3 of 8 Safeguards Actuaiton Verification 0 1O Verify Both 4ain FW Pumps TRIPPED 0 11. Verflj FW Isolation Valves -SI-fliT (Refer to OMM-004, POST TRIPISAFEGUARDS ACTUATION REVIEW, Attachment G) C] 12. Verify both MDAFW pumps RUNNING-
- 13. IF any of the folIowin conditiona exist, verify the TDAFW pump -
RUNNING Cl . Undervoltage on either 69 K/ emergency bus C]
- Level in two SGs LESS THAN 25%
C]
- Manual actuation to control SC level
- 14. Verify AFW Wives PROPERLY ALLONED
[]
- j no AFW isolation Signal, IHEfI verify isolation and 110w control valves -
OPEN NOTE An AFW Isolation signal signal requires a Main Steam Line Isolation coincident with one SC pressure 100 PSIG below the other two SGs. C]
- IFAFW Isolation Signal present, ThEN verify MDAFW and TDAFW isoltion arid flow control valves to affected SC Si-IUT C] 15. Verify Both EDGa RUNNING C] 1& Verify CNMT Fan Coolers - ONE FAN PER UNIT RUNN ING IN SLOW SPEED EOP-E-0 I Rev.. I I Page 57 of 78 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 63 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 E-O Attachment 3 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY Ir1JECTI0N Attachrment 3 Shet4 of 8 Saftguards Actuation Verification fl 17 Verify CNMT Ventilation Isolatio.n Valves SHUT (Refer to 0MM-U 04, POST TRIPISAFEGUARDS ACTU ATION REViEW, Attachment 7.) 0 18. Verify Cntr.oI Rasm Area Ventilation MAIN CONTROL ROOM ALIGNED FOR EMERGENCY OPERATION (Refer to 0MM-U 04, POST TRJP!SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION REVIEW, Attachment 5, Sheets I and 2, Sections for MAIM CONTROL BOARD, SLB-5 and SLB-6.>
- t. Verify Essential Service Chilled Water System Operation:
LI Verify both WC-2 chillers- RUNNiNG LI
- Verify both P-4 pumps RUNNING El (Referto AOP-028, LOSS OF ESSENTIAL SERVICE CHILLED WATER SYSTEM for loss of any WC-2 chiller.)
- 20. Verify OSIP Fan Coolers RUNNING LI AH- A BA LI Ai-1-9 S SB LI AH-IOASA LI AH-iO 655 NOTE Security systems are powered by bus IM (norn,a supply) or bus 181 alternate supply).
Backup power will be available for approimatety 30 MINUTES alter the supplying bus is de-energized. (Refer to tDP-i15, CENTRAL ALARM STATION ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS, Section &9 and 8.10.) D 21. Verify AC buses IAI AD 181 - ENERGiZED Q 22. Place Air Compressor 1A AND 18 lr The LOCAL CONTROL Mode. (Refer to Attachment 7 EOP-E-0 I Rev. I I Page 58 of 78 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 64 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 E-O Attachment 3 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Attachment 3 Shaet5f.8 Sfegurds Actuation Verification CAUTION The maximum calculated dose rate in the vicinity of :00 1A35-SA and MCCI 35.SB is batveen ID MREMIHR and 150 MREMIKR. D 23. Dispatch An Operator To Unlock MSID Turn ON The Breakers For The CSIP Suction AND Discharge Cross-Connect Valves: (Refer to Attachment 2.) GC 1A35 -SA wcc 1E35 SE VALVE CUEICLE VALVE CIJEICLE ICS-170 4A CS-171 40 1CS-1 4 iCS-1R 70 ICS-218 141> ICS-22V 91) 1C-Zi 14 ICS-217 1W
- 24. Check If C OSIP 5huld e Placed In Service:
Q
- IF two charging pumps can _T be verified to be running, AND C CSIP is available, THEN place C CSIP in servce in place of the non-mnnin CSIP using OP-107, OHEMICAL AND VOLUME OONTROI SSTEM, Section 83 or 8.7.
EOP-E-D I Rev.. I I PBcleS9 of 78 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 65 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 E-O Attachment 3 REILCTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Attachment 3 Sheet 6 of B SafeguaTds Actuation Verification
- 25. Start The Spent Fuel Pump Room Ventilation System:
- a. At AEP.-1, verify the tollowing ESCWS isolation valves OPEN
- 1) SL-1 I (Train A)
C
- Al-i-17 SUP 01-1 100 (Window 9.-I)
C
- Al-1-17 RTII OH 105 (Window 10-1)
- 2) SLB-9 (Train B)
[]
- A1-1-17 SUP Cli ITI (Window 9-1)
C
- AF-1-17 RTN Cli 182 (Window 10-1)
- b. At AEF-1, start one SF? P&J1JIP ROOM FAN COOLER:
C
- AH-171-4ASA C
- AH17 1-46 SB EOP-E--0 I Rev 1 I Page 60 of 78 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 66 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 E-O Attachment 3 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Attachnent 3 Sheet 7 of 8 Safeguards Ackiation Veritlcation NOTE Fuel pool levels AND temperatures stiould be monitoied approx imately every 1 to 2 HOURS. Following the inal check of fuel pooi levels and temperature, monitoring responsiblities may be assumei by he plant operations staff 1ncluding the TSC or STA) a Only fuel pools containing fuel are required to Ue monitored. 2 Check Stafus Of Fuel Pools: a Operate spent fuel: coding pumps to maintain fuel pool temper between 85 F arid fi)5 F. atures b Monitor fuel pool levels AND temperatures: C
- Refer to AOPO4l, SPENT FUEL POOL EVEN Attach ments 7, 8, 9, 1G and It for SFP parameter monitoring methods.
C
- Refer to Curves H-X-24, H-X--25 and H-X-26 for SEP rne to 2CQ F.
C
- Levels GREATER THAN LO AlARM (284 F, 0 IN) a Temperatures LESS TI-IAN I-H TEMP ALARM (lO5 F)
EcW-E-O I Rev. 1 I Page 61 of 78 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 67 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 E-O Attachment 3 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Attachment 3 Sheet 8 of 8 Safeguards Actuation Verification NOTE IF control room ventilation was previously aligned to an emergency outside air intale fcw postaccident operations. THEN follow-up actions will be required to restore the alignment
- 27. Consult Plant Operations Staff Regarding Alignment Of The Control Room Ventilation System:
- Site Emergency Co-ordinator Control Room LI
- Site Emergency Co-ordinator Technical Support Center (Refer to PEP-23O CONTROL ROOM OPERATIONS.)
- END -
EOP-E-O I Rev. I I Pace 62 of 78 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 66 Rev. 2
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 1 Revision Summary Rev. I Revised per NRC comments provided on 75 day outli ne submittal. Archie Lucky 6/17/2013 Rev. 2 Revised per Operations validation comments. Archie Lucky 6124/2013 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 1 69 Rev. 2
Rppendlx l Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 2 Facility: SHEARON-HARRI S Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: 05000400/201 3301 Examiners: Operators: SRO: RO: BOP: Initial Conditions:
- lC-26, MOL, 88% power B MD AFW Pump is under clearan ce for pump packing replacement
. ISI-3, Boron Injection Tank Outlet valv e is under clearance for breaker rep airs
. B Condenser Vacuum Pump is under clearance for makeup water supply valve problems
- Boric Acid Transfer Pump B-SB is unde r clearance for motor replacemen t
A unit shutdown is in progress due to the B MD AFW Pump LCO expiring. ramp is currently on hold at 88% pow The er for turnover. Due to high seal leak Turnover Sys tem Eng ineer and Operations required that the age the
- secured as soon as possible lAW OP-1 A Heater Drain pump be 36 Section 7.1.2. After the A HD removed from service continue the pump is plant shutdown at 4 DEH units/mm.
notifications have been made to indiv All required iduals concerning the reason for the shutdown. Critical Tasks
- Insert negative reactivity into the core by inserting control rods during an ATW before verification of the immediate S action steps of FR-S.1
. Trip RCPs once RCP Trip Foldout Criteria is met and prior to exiting E-1 Event No.
[ Malf. No. [ Event Type* [ Event Description I R ROISRO Secure the A HD pump, continue plan N/A t shutdown at 4 DEH N BOP/SRO
- Units/mm.
2 crfl4b RO/SRO Rods fail to operate in AUTO (manual control works- setting up for ATWS) Enter AOP-00i ft:497 I BOP/SRO Feed flow transmitter on C SG FT-497 imfcfwl9c Channel IV (selected TS SRO - for 1C SG) fails low OMM-001, FRVC fails in Auto 4 C BOPISRO or espo34c Loss of MCC-24A causing CRDM failure TS SRO - 5 cvc05a C ROISRO CSIP Trip 1 available, requiring AOP-018 entry TS SRO ASI Pump start I Respond to Boron addi tion to RCS from ASI 6 n/a N ROISRO
- Restore letdown lAW OP-i 07 7 rcsi8b N/A 30 gpm RCS leak to Containment. Ente r AOP-0i6 increase ramp rate lAW AOP-038 rcsi8b M ALL RCS leakage exceeds VCT makeup capa 8 -
bility E-0 manual Rx rpsOib Trip with ATVIS Reactor Trip Breakers ATWS fail to open in auto or manual I Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 I Rev. 2
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 2 SCENARIO 2 continued Event No. 9 Malt. No. rcsl8b [ Event Type* M ALL Event Description RCS leakage increases to SBLOCA 650 gpm 10 ior xci i078 C RD or BOP/SRO Failure of RCP C to trip from the MCB switch zrpk643b ii zrpk644b C ROISRO B Containment Spray Pump auto start and discharge valve failure. zrpk645b (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor SCENARIO
SUMMARY
- 2013 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 Turnover provided to the crew is A power reduction to place the unit in mode 3 was in progress due to the LCO for the B MD AFW pump expiring.
The ramp is on hold for turnover. Engineering has recommended removing the A HD pump from service lAW OP 136 Section 7.1.2 as soon as possible. The plan is to remove the A HD pump from service then continue the downpower at 4 DEH units/mm. Currently the plant is operati ng at --88% power in MOL. Control Bank D is at 200 steps. 300 gallons of boric acid have been injected lAW the reactivity plan. The latest RCS Boron sample was 1067 ppm. GP-006 step 9 is in progress. All required notifications have been made concerning the reason for the down power. The following equipment is under clearance: B MDAFW Pump is under clearance for pump packing repairs. The pump has been inoperable for 66 hours and will not be restored to operable status within the next 6 hours. Tech Spec 3.7.1.2 LCO Action a and Tech Spec 3.3.3.5.b Action c applies. PUdIT SYS IEMS AUlJAI FEE{Y)kTES SVSJlt1 t[-llT!NG COEJOI DR OPP.AHaP1
- 3. Li .2 At est three indeendpnt steon eneror pU(PpS driG CSS{C1. tCC1 flcy. petirs sha I bE 3PERAFH r nth: fe&1.acer vu roto-driven ix.r 1 e ry fuuc.urtrr punus. cn pce.ered 1ror seperate etnerjenty bue. dud cipib1e u h in b cne .st:earp turbine-dr tvefl aufl iay reertviater frowerecf rrom n 0P4I3LF st.ean supply sySteni. Ui c aoie ol bJ APPL ICABf4JT i4)i3C:S I , 2. md 3.
ACT ION:
, i1h one uxiiary ftc-t,ter puw inoperable, wi1 rary eedvet .iJrrS restore the reoured vi a lcot 43T 3AF1DB wrthrn
, 0PLA0LE Lus cthrr ?2 hour u be 1u t 6 hours ard n 1T SlIUTEO,JN wth in Lh lol 1c lli I nOuf; SCENARIO
SUMMARY
- 2013 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 (continued)
Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 2 Rev. 2
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 2 Tech Specs associated with inoperable MDAFW Pump B-SB contin ued 1NTRU1E?{TAT!ON HIJtool SYSItH t.LITtG c(!TT FOR L3.1$.h Al t ti,if.v eftch.g, ?wefH*ry Transf.i ne Controls fo the Ct1 nm1Cnt1t .ix4 Awdtie PERA8LLTY af thus C netits raquu.d by the SHNPP Sf, Shit4own A*lyss to (1) rae flow nd steae wrztor poweroa.rat rtl decay ht via uxlliary fdwatei ef A arx* (2) antri RC v.ntory throuh t1. vaT a flaw from ste. ç.rteator1 nora1 chaiiq low pat?i, () ccntrol RCS prenuri, (4) cátral itatv ity ai4 (5) r*rnoe dea heat via the RNR yt* sh1 be PERAaLE.
?!S 1. Z. and 1.
ACT!: C. With tiø*r!i ta Shutdawn Syrta tiisnfmr iWtes a OntrI circut* r.quh by 3.3.3.S..b rItat the inoir bie %wfth(s)fdrCut(s) to OPEF U eutus withia 7 da ar bi Ha, STA1UY wtthln tie next 12 hauri.
- B Condenser Vacuum Pump is under clearance for makeu p water supply valve problems. Has been under clearance for 8 hours. Repairs are expect ed to be completed within 24 hours.
I Sl-3, Boron Injection Tank Outlet valve is under clearance for breake r repairs. The valve is shut with power removed. The valve has been under clearance for 4 hours. OWP-Sl-01 has been completed. Repairs are expected to be completed within 24 hours. Tech Specs 3.5.2 and 3.6.3 apply. LE1liCL L QUNS, Si,ii 314. .2 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T {REATER 1W OR EQUAL TO 350°F L IH1TItIG COtIDR1ON OH OPERATION 35,2 Tw ineendent Emergency Core Cooling System ECCS> subsys be OPERABLE with each subsysten* canprised ot tems shall
- a. One OPERABLE Charging/safety injection pp.
- b. One OPERABLE RHR heat exchanger,
- c. One OPERABLE BHR pummip. and
- d. An OPERABLE floi poth capable of taking suction fran water storage tank on a Safety I njecti on signal and, the refueling manuafly-&tigned, transfe upon beleg rring suction to the contaimment sumimp during the recirculation p1iase of operation, APPLICABILITY: HOOPS 1. 2. and 3.
flO:
- a. l4ith on ECCS subsstan rnoparable. restore tte inoper subsystea to OPERABLE status i thin 72 hours or be able STPJ3B wmthmn the ncx 6 hows and in HOT S[JTEWt4 In at least HOT f,i iii within tIe Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 3 Rev. 2
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 2 SCENARIO
SUMMARY
- 2013 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 continued 1 S 1-3, Boron Injection Tank Outlet valve, Tech Specs... continued 3COTAINWNT_ISLI1QtLY.AI3LE.
LiMITING COtIT1O4 FOR OPERATION 3.&.3 Each contaln(nnt o1attori valve pec1fled In the Tchnica Spedficatian Equipment tist Proqrant, plant procedure PLP-1 OP[RDL[ with isolation tinaes lesa than or equal to required06, shall b isolation tinies. PPucAal1fly MODES I ? 3 and 4 ACT 1ON With one or more of the containxent isolation valve(s) inpereble ieat oe isolat.ion value OPERABLE in each affected penetration maintaift at that Is- open
- a. Restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status withiin or 4. huur,
- b. Isolate each affected penetration wIthin 4 hours by use least ore deactivated autonatft valve secued n the of at isolation positi or
- Boric Acid Transfer Pump B-SB is under clearance for motor replace ment. Has been under clearance for 12 hours. Repairs are expected to be compl eted within 24 hours.
Tech Spec 3.3.3.3.5.b which is a 7 day LCO and 3.1.2.2 applies (3.1.2. 2 is for tracking only). OWP-CS-05 has been completed. wnc s IKITI CO?TON- FOR OPERATtON 33,3.5a The Reota Shutdown Systa onitortng in Table 3. 3 shl I be QPERA2I.L hstr antation channels shOwn 3.I.b 411 transfer swltch.s Auxiliary Tine Panil C3ntiols for thi OPEftA Comtrl Panel C to1s and AuxiHary SHNPP Safe Shutowr Aalysi: to (1) rv. tUT of thse coaonerIts raquirt by the Ilw and stasis decay lait via auxiliary feadw;t.er naratnr poweroperated rilitf valve flOw frois Stia 1etators A ,d B, 2) ovtl RCS inventory t1lrouh the normal ar1ni flow path, () czn-trl RGS rassure, (4) control reactivity, and CS) raisova decay heat via the RI4R sytn shall be OP.ABLL PU8I1..!T: ES 1, 2, and 3. ACltQ:
- a. With tte number of OPERAaLE rebate shtiawn moniit rinq channels Ie.si than the Ninir,t hann.ls OPEALE as i*qulred ertore the t peral e &iaiinel (s) to OPEA8L,E statusby Table 3.3, Or be in )4i SHkJtOw,+ i tM n the next wi thin 7 days, U hours.
- b. With the nt.er of OPRAS1i rete shitdowi eonitcr ing than the lotal Muer of Ch*nnls reçuire4 y Table 3 channels lass the inoperable channeI to apAaL, status w1thi O days 39, restore a Special Report in accordance with Specification 9 2 within or a4itlonal dayt. 14 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 4 Rev. 2
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 2 SCENARIO
SUMMARY
- 2013 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 continued Event 1: Secure the A HD pump, continue plant shutdown at 4 DEH Units/m
- m. The crew will assume the shift with directions to secure the A HD Pump due to high seal leakage. They will secure the pump lAW OP-i 36, Section 7.1.2. When the HD pump is secure d they will continue the plant shutdown at 4 DEH Units/mm. The crew performs a power decrease of approximately 5%-10% power (Lead Examiners discretion). For this reactivity manipulation it is expected that the SRO will conduct a reactivity brief, the RO will borate and monitor auto rod insertion per the reactivity plan and the BOP will operate the DEH Controls as necessary to reduce Main Turbine load.
Event 2: Rods do not move in AUTO (manual control works- setting up for ATWS) Enter AOP 001. During the downpower the rod control system will fail to operate in AUTO and the crew will be required to enter AOP-001, Malfunction of Rod Control and Indication System. The crew must take immediate actions and place rods in MANUAL. The SRO will have a Tech Spec call to check Tech Spec 3.1.3.1, 3.1.3.5 and determine that all rods are trippable per Attachment 5 of AOP-001. System Engineering will be contacted. The crew will be expect ed to continue with the power reduction. If necessary, to get the crew moving, prompting by the Manager of Operations can be used. TS 3.1.3.1 All shutdown and control rods shall be OPERABLE and positioned within
+ 12 steps (indicated position) of their group step counter demand positio n.
Applicability: Modes I and 2 TS 3.1.3.4 All shutdown rods shall be fully withdrawn as specified in the CORE OPER ATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR), plant procedure PLP-106. Applicability: Modes I and 2 AOP-001 Attachment 5 I MALFUNCTION OF ROD CONTROL AND NDICAT1ON SYSTEM ttachment 5 Determination of Control Rod Trippability Sheet 1 of 1 The following guidance is provded for making the determination of control rod trippability: A control rod may be considered trippable under any of the following circumstances:
- Rod Control System URGENT FAILURE siarm exists Inspection of the affected system cabinets reveals obvious electrical problems (for example, blown fuses)
All rods of a particular group or bank are simultaneously affected NO control rod moUon is possible If none of the foir conditions exist the rod must be considered untrippable until proven otherwise. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 5 Rev. 2
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 2 SCENARIO
SUMMARY
- 2013 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 continued Event 3: Feed flow transmitter on C SG FT-497 Channel IV (selected for I C SG) fails low OPS-NGGC-1 000, FRV C fails in Auto. When the plant is in a stable condition, the Lead Evaluator can cue the SG C Feed Flow channel failure. The crew should respon d in accordance with the alarm response procedure and OPS-NGGC-1 000. The BOP will be controlling SG C level with the FRV in MANUAL and may switch controlling FF channels to restore control to AUTO. The crew will take the channel out of service using OWP-RP-1 0, SF/FF Loop 3. IF FRV C is placed back into Auto the controller will fail to 60%
output and the valve will respond accordingly. The SRO should evaluate the following Tech Specs for failure of FT-497: T.S. 3.3.1: As a minimum, the Reactor Trip System instrumentation channels and interlo cks of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION
- 14. Steam Generator Water Level--Low 2 stm. gee. 1 stm. yen. 1 stm. yen. level 1, 2 6 Coincident With Steam! level and level coincident and 2 stm./feed Feedwater Flow Mismatch 2 stm,/feed with I water flow water flow stm./feedwater mismatch in same mismatch in flow mismatch in stm. gen. or 2 each stm. yen. same stm. yen. stm. gen. level and 1 ste. /feedwater flow mismatch in same stm. yen.
ACTION 6 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one l.ess than the total. Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may procee d provided the following conditions are satisfied:
- a. the inoperable channel. is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours, and 1,. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel. may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1.
The crew should implement OWP-RP-10 for this failure. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 6 Rev. 2
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 2 SCENARIO
SUMMARY
- 2013 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 continued Event 4: Loss of MCC-1A24 causing CRDM fan failure. The crew will respond to multiple alarms and evaluate the condition. The crew should identify that the equipment powere d from MCC 1A24 has lost power. The CRDM fans should have the highest priority since the fans are designed to maintain CRDM temperatures to prevent overheating. The annunciator response for the loss of the CRDMs (ALB-027-8-4 and 8-5) will have the operator verify that the standby fan starts. When checked the operator will find that neither fan has started and will manua lly start the fans. If only one of the CRDM Cooling Fans were available the APP directs immediately contacting the Manager-Operations and to start a Reactor shutdown lAW GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown from Power Operation to Hot Standby. The SRO should evalua te the following Tech Specs for failure of MCC-1A24 Tech Spec 3.4.4 Action c LIHITING CONDTTION FOR aPERATLO 3,4.4 Aflpor-aperted relief valves (PORVs) and their associated block valves shall be OPERABLE.
APPLlCABIUt: DbES 1. 2, and 3 ACTION:
- t. With one or nore block valve(s) inoperable. v1 thin 1 hour:
U) restore the block valve(s) to UPERASL,E stotu, or close the block valve(s) anl raove poter Froo the llock valve(s) or close thr PORV and reiiove pcier frot its associ ated solenoid valve arid (2) apply the ACT[Oi b.. above, as appropriate. for the Isolated PORV(s). Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 7 Rev. 2
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 2 SCENARIO
SUMMARY
- 2013 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 continued Event 5: Trip of the running A Charging Pump breaker. The crew will enter AOP-01 8 and carry out the immediate actions. The crew should isolate letdown and then implement actions to place the B Charging Pump in service. The crew will have to secure the ASI pump after the CSIP is started and evaluate the boration caused by the ASI pump running.
The efficiency that the crew has in progressing through AOP-01 B to the point of securing the ASI pump will determine the amount of boric acid added to the RCS through the RCP seals. This could require the SRO to direct the RO and BOP to coordinate Reactor and Turbin e controls (dilute, rod movement and / or Turbine reduction) to accommodate the boron additio n for Tavg/Tref stabilization. The SRO should evaluate the loss of the CSIP in accordance with Tech Specs 3.1.2.2, 3.1.2.4 and 3.5.2 TS 3.1.2.2 At least two of the following three boron injection flow paths shall be OPERABLE:
- b. Two flow paths from the refueling water storage tank via charging/safety injection pumps to the RCS.
ACTION: With only one of the above required boron injection flow paths to the RCS OPERABLE, restore at least two boron injection flow paths to the RCS to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY and borated to a SHUT DOWN MARGIN as specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR), plant proced ure PLP-106 at 200°F within the next 6 hours; restore at least two flow paths to OPER ABLE status within the next 7 days or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours. TS 3.1.2 4 With only one Charging/safety injection pump OPERABLE restore at least two charging/safety injection pumps to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN as specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR) plant procedure PLP-106 at 200°F within t he next 6 hours: restore at least two charging/safety injection pumps to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours. TS 3.5.2- Two independent Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS
) subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of:
One OPERABLE Charging/safety injection pump One OPERABLE RHR heat exchanger One OPERABLE RHR pump and An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank on a Safety Injection signal and. upon being manually aligned transfe rring suction to the containment sump during the recirculation phase of operation. ACTION: a. With one ECCS subsystem inoperable restore the inoper able subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. The SRO should also prepare OMM-001, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist for the failure Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 8 Rev. 2
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 2 SCENARIO
SUMMARY
- 2013 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 (continued)
Event 6: Restore letdown lAW OP-107 once the B Charging Pump is in service, the crew will restore letdown lAW OP-I 07 Section 5.4 to establish inventory control. Once letdow n has been restored, Tech Specs have been evaluated for the loss of the A CSIP, and the crew response to the boron addition from the ASI system have been addressed to the satisfaction of the Lead Examiner the next event can be initiated. Event 7: -30 gpm RCS leak to Containment. Enter AOP-01 6 increase ramp rate lAW AOP 038. This will be the initiating event for the Major event. The crew will identify that leakage is present by radiation monitor alarms associated with increasing Containment sump leakage. Pressurizer level will decrease and Charging flow will increase. The crew should enter AOP 016, Excessive Primary Plant Leakage (no immediate actions) based on the indicat ions of unidentified RCS leakage. The crew should determine that RCS leakage is now exceeding TS 3.4.6.2 leakage of 1 gpm Unidentified Leakage but RCS leakage is within VCT makeup capability <120 gpm). They should determine that Attachment 7 for leakage inside Containment is the applicable attachment and stop Containment Purge. Since a shutdown is already in progress lAW GP-006, the crew should evaluate that a more rapid means of plant shutdown is required and enter AOP-038. Since AOP-016 for leakage to Containment does not require using a rapid shutdown of the plant for this condition, if the crew does not implem ent AOP-038 a call from the Manager of Shift Operations to get the plant off line rapidly will be made. The SRO should implement AOP-038, Rapid Downpower and direct an increase of the ramp rate to some value> 5 DEH Units/mm in an attempt to rapidly remove the unit from service Event 8: RCS leakage exceeds VCT makeup capability E-0 manual Rx Trip with ATWS Reactor Trip Breakers fail to open in auto or manual. The crew will continue actions of AOP 038 and attempt a manual Reactor trip when leakage exceeds VCT makeup capabi lity lAW AOP-016 continuous action step 4. When the RO attempts to perform a Manua l Reactor trip he/she will find that the Reactor will not trip from either of the MCB trip switches. The crew will enter FR-SI, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS and perform the immediate actions of manually inserting control rods (auto rod insertion is not available due to the malfunction in event 2), tripping the main Turbine. The Booth Operator acting as the field operator will locally trip the Reactor trip breakers when the crew initiates emerge ncy boration of the RCS. The crew will then continue with FR-S.I until completing step 10 or when the foldout for Reactor Subcriticality Criteria is met. At that time they will be directed to the end of FR-S.I and transition from FR-S.I to E-0. Event 9: RCS leakage increases to SBLOCA -650 gpm. After the crew transiti ons from FR-S.I to E-0 they will verify the E-0 immediate actions and actuate Si if automa tic SI initiation (PRZ Pressure less than 1850 psig) did not occur after the Reactor trip breake rs were opened. The RCS leakage will increase in magnitude. RCS pressure will decrease to less than 1400 psig which will require the crew to trip the RCPs based on E-0 foldout criteria of RCS pressure less than 1400 psig and SI flow greater than 200 gpm. Event 10: Failure of RCP C to trip from the MCB switch, When the MCB switch for C RCP is taken to the stop position the pump will continue to run. The CRS will have the option of opening Breaker 109, Aux Bus A To Aux Bus C to de-energize the Aux Bus C or locally trip open the C RCP breaker at the Aux Bus C Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 9 Rev. 2
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 2 SCENARIO
SUMMARY
- 2013 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 2 (continued)
Event II: B Containment Spray Pump auto start and discharge valve failure
. The B Containment Spray pump will fail to automatically start from the sequencer or from Containment High Pressure and the discharge valve (1 CT-88) will fail to open. This failure require s the crew to manually start the B Containment Spray pump and open the pump discharge valve.
The scenario can be terminated when directed to initiate RCS cooldown in ES-I
.2.
Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 10 Rev. 2
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 2 CRITICAL TASK JUSTIFICATION:
- 1. Insert negative reactivity into the core by inserting control rods during an ATWS before verification of the immediate action steps of FR-S.1.
Control rod insertion to add negative reactivity to the core attempting to bring the reactor core subcritical is crucial to prevent the possibility of core damage. Not performing rod insertion prior to verification of the immediate actions of FR-S.1 is demonstrating the lack of ability to complete a required operator action during a function restoration procedure.
- 2. Trip RCPs once RCP Trip Foldout Criteria is met and prior to exiting E-1.
Securing RCPs during a SB LOCA event will prevent depleting the RCS to a critical inventory by pumping more mass through the break than would occur if the RCP operation were ceased. (Critical inventory is defined as the amount of inventory remaining in the RCS when the break completely uncovers and the break flow changes from a mixture of liquid and steam to all steam.) Both E-0 and E-1 foldout criteria requires RCPs to be secured when SI flow of> 200 gpm is established and when RCS pressure is < 1400 psig. IF the crew continues to allow the RCPs to operate then RCS inventory will continue to deplete. Manually tripping the RCPs before depletion below the critical inventory conservatively ensures that Peak Clad Temperature remains below 2200°F. If the crew does NOT secure the RCPs prior to transition from El then RCP trip criteria will no longer exist and the RCPs could continue to run. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 11 Rev. 2
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 2 SIMULATOR SETUP For the 2013 NRC Exam Simulator Scenario # 2 Reset to IC-161 password dinner Go to RUN Silence and Acknowledge annunciators GO TO FREEZE and inform the lead examiner the Simulator is ready. DO NOT GO TO RUN until directed by the lead examiner. Set ERFIS screens SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS Post conditions for status board from IC-26, Reactor Power, 88% power Control Bank D at 200 steps RCS boron 1067 ppm GP-006 step 8 Update the status board: B MDAFW Pump is OOS for pump packing problems Pump has been QOS for 12 total hours and is expected back within the next 24 hours Tech Spec 3.7.1.2, 72 hour LCO or HSB within the next 6 hours, HSD following 6 hours ISI-3, Boron Injection Tank Outlet valve has been under clearance for 4 hours. Tech Spec 3.5.2 applies 72 hour LCO or HSB within the next 6 hours and HSD within the following 6 hours. Tech Spec 3.6.3 also applies but is met by removing power and having the valve shut. Boric Acid Transfer Pump B-SB has been under clearance for 12 hours. Tech Spec 3.3.3.5.b Action a applies, restore to operable within 7 days or HSD within the next 12 hours. Tech Spec 3.1.2.2 also applies (tracking only). Align equipment for repairs: Hang CIT on B MDAFW Pump MCB switch then place protected train placards per OMM-001 6 on A MDAFW Pump, MS-70 and 72, B ESW Pump, B RHR Pump and B CCW Pump Place the B BA Transfer Pump switch in the stop, Hang CIT on switch for B BA Transfer Pump and place protected train placard on A BA Transfer Pump switch Condenser Vacuum Pump I B, place pump switch to STOP, and hang CIT on MCB switch 1SI-3, Boron Injection Tank Outlet valve, and hang CIT on MCB switch Place filled out copies of OWPs into the OWP book ensure they are removed at end of day
- OWP-SI-01 and place in MCR OWP book for ISI-3 clearance
- OWP-CS-05 and place in MCR OWP book for B BA Transfer Pump clearance Hang restricted access signs on MCR entry swing gates Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 12 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 13 of 98 Secure the A HD pump Event
Description:
Continue plant shutdown at 4 DEH Unitslmin. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The crew has been directed to shutdown the plant in accordance with GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown due to the B MDAFW Pump LCO expiring. GP-006 is signed off through step 8. The power reduction is on hold for turnover to secure the A HO pump. The SRO is expected to conduct a reactivity brief prior to commencing the power reduction. This brief may be Lead Evaluator: conducted outside the simulator prior to starting the scenario. When the crew has completed their board walk down and are ready to take the shift inform the Simulator Operator to place the Simulator in Run. When the Simulator is in run announce: CREW UPDATE (SROs Name) Your crew has the shift. END OF UPDATE When directed by the Lead Evaluator, ensure that the Simulator Operator: annunciator horns are on and place the Simulator in RUN. OP-136 OP-I 36, Feedwater Heaters, Vents, and Drains Section 7.0 Shutdown 7.1 Shutdown of Heater Drain Pumps 7.1.1 Initial Conditions Normally the Heater Drain Pumps are stopped when reactor Procedure Note: power is 40 to 45% per GP-006. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 13 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event# 1 Page 14 of Event
Description:
Secure the A HD pump Continue plant shutdown at 4 DEH Units/mm. Time Position Appiicants Actions or Behavior
- 1. IF only one Heater Drain Pump is to be stopped, THEN the following conditions should be met:
- a. Reactor power is less than 99% to accommodate for the loss of secondary efficiency. (MET initials step)
BOP b. The MW feedback loop is removed from service (MET initials step)
- 2. IF both Heater Drain pumps are to be stopped, THEN Maintenance has verified that PS-01 MS-I 10 is reset to prevent a turbine runback (N/As step)
OP-i 36 Section 7 1 2 Procedure Steps
. The intent of this section is to establish 4A (B)
Feedwater Heater level control on the Condenser Dump valve before stopping the Heater Drain Pump. This minimizes the level transient when the pump is secured. Procedure Note:
- As the Condenser Dump valves starts to control level the HDP discharge level control valve will start to shut and discharge flow will decrease.
- The Main Control Room operator must monitor HDP flow and provide trending information to the operator at the pneumatic alternate level controller.
Stopping Heater Drain Pumps at power levels greater than 50% can result in oscillations in heater levels. Heater 4A (4B) Procedure Caution: Condenser Dump Controller may need adjustment to stabilize levels. ERFIS group display or quick plot HDPA previously Evaluator Note: created Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 14 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 15 of 98 Secure the A HD pump Event
Description:
Continue plant shutdown at 4 DEH Units/mm. Time Position Appicants Actions or Behavior
- 1. CREATE a plot on ERFIS to monitor Heater Drain Pump BOP discharge flow, discharge pressure and heater level.
(FHD-1255A, PHD1255A and LHDI25OA)
- 2. ESTABLISH communications between the Main Control BOP Room and the operator at 4A pneumatic alternate level controller Simulator Acknowledge directions to establish communications with Communicator: the BOP.
Simulator Operator: Monitor the FW Heater 4A using simulator drawing FWHO2
- 3. IF desired, THEN PLACE the 4A (B) Feedwater Heater Sight Glass in service by slowly opening the applicable isolation valves listed below:
. I HD-293-Ll1-2 (1 HD-299-Ll 1-2), LG-O1 HD-1 250A (B)
BOP Instrument Valve.
. 1 HD-293-HI1-2 (1 HD-299-Hll-2), LG-O1 HD-1 250A (B)
Instrument Valve. N!A Not desired
- 4. PERFORM the following at LC-O1HD-1251A(B):
BOP a. RECORD as-found LC-OIHD-1251A (B) pneumatic controller setting in the control room log. Actions in Step 7.1.2.4.b cause response being monitored in Procedure Note: Step 7.1.2.4.c. Step 7.1 .2.4.b will cause HDP discharge flow to lower. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 15 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # I Page 16 of 98 Secure the A HD pump Event
Description:
Continue plant shutdown at 4 DEH Unitslmin. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
- b. While monitoring Heater Drain Pump discharge flow, BOP DIRECT the local operator to slowly lower the set point on 4A (B) pneumatic alternate level controller.
Simulator Operator: Run Trigger 20 to open the 4A FWH alternate level control valve to lower HDP A discharge flow BOP c. WHEN Heater Drain Pump discharge flow is less than or equal to 50Q kpph, THEN STOP Heater Drain Pump A (B Simulator Operator: Trigger 21 do not run: conditionally activates when A HDP control switch is taken to STOP.
- d. DIRECT the operator at LC-O1 HD-1 251A (B) to slowly BOP adjust 4A (B) Feedwater Heater level to approximately 2 inches.
BOP e. RECORD as-left LC-OIHD-1251A (B) pneumatic controller settinci in the control room loi. BOP 5. IF necessary, THEN REPEAT Steps 7.1.2.1 through 7.1.2.4 for the remaining pump.
- 6. VERIFY the 4A and 4B Feedwater Heater Sight Glasses are isolated by shutting isolation valves listed below:
BOP
- 1 HD-293-Hll -2, LG-O1 HD-1 250A Instrument Valve
- 1 HD-293-Ll1 -2, LG-O1 HD-1 250A Instrument Valve
- I HD-299-Hl 1 -2, LG-O I H D-1 250B Instrument Valve
- 1 HD-299-Lll -2, LG-O1 HD-1 25DB Instrument Valve After the crew has secured the Heater Drain pump they Evaluator Note: should brief the down power and continue to reduce plant load in accordance with GP-006 and the reactivity plan.
I Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 16 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # Event # 2 Page :i pf Event
Description:
Rod Control fails to respond in AUTO Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Event 2 (Rods do not move in AUTO) will become apparent when the crew identifies that rod control system signals Evaluator Note: from power and temperature mismatches have no affect on the rod control system. GP-006 Step 5.2.9 Provides a brief and continues plant down power at 4 DEH units I mm. SRO WHEN Turbine load is less than 75%, THEN VERIFY the SGBD Regenerative Heat Exchanger Condensate Outlet is aligned to the CPD effluent per OP-I 27, Section 7.1. Routine load changes should be coordinated with the Load Procedure Note: Dispatcher to meet system load demands. DIRECTS BOP to start power reduction at 4 DEH Units/Mm SRO with target value set at 120. May direct initiation of a boration before the power reduction begins.
. Requests PEER check prior to manipulations of DEH BOP Control
- DEPRESS the LOAD RATE MW/MIN push-button There is no procedural guidance directing when the Evaluator Note: boration to lower power is required. The crew may elect to perform the boration prior to place the Turbine in GO.
Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 17 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # Event # 2 Page i Qt Event
Description:
Rod Control fails to respond in AUTO Time H Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
. Verifies the desired rate, NOT to exceed 5 MW/MIN, in the DEMAND display. (4 Units/minute)
. DEPRESS the ENTER push-button
. DEPRESS the REF push-button BOP
. Verifies the desired load (120 MW per step 5.2.5.e) in the DEMAND display
. DEPRESS the ENTER push-button. The HOLD push button should illuminate The unloading of the unit can be stopped at any time by depressing the HOLD push-button. The HOLD lamp will Procedure Note: illuminate and the GO lamp will extinguish. The load reduction can be resumed by depressing the GO push-button. The HOLD lamp will extinguish and the GO lamp will illuminate.
. DEPRESS the GO push-button to start the load reduction and inform crew through Crew Update Turbine in GO BOP
. VERIFY the number in the REFERENCE display decreases
. VERIFY Generator load is decreasing
- MONiTORS primary systems response.
RO
- INITIATES boration, as necessary (with SRO concurrence) per OP-i 07.01.
Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 18 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # Event # 2 Page 19 of 98 Event
Description:
Rod Control fails to respond in AUTO Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior OP CVCS Boration, Dilution, And Chemistry Control 107.01 Section 5.2 and then 5.1 DETERMINE the Reactor coolant boron concentration from chemistry OR the Main Control Room status board (1067 ppm) DETERMINE the magnitude of boron concentration increase required RO DETERMINE the volume of boric acid to be added using the reactivity plan associated with the IC o Per the reactivity plan to reduce power from 88% to 83% 70 gallon of boration will be required. o In addition to the boration control bank D should automatically step in 5 steps FIS-113, BORIC ACID BATCH COUNTER, has a tenths Evaluator Note: position. If the translucent covers associated with the Boric Acid and Total Makeup Batch counters FIS-113 and FIS-114, located on Procedure Caution: the MCB, are not closed, the system will not automatically stop at the preset value. SET FIS-1 13, BORIC ACID BATCH COUNTER, to obtain the RO desired quantity. Boration of the RCS will be dependent on charging and letdown Procedure Note: flow rate. Placing additional letdown orifices in service will increase the boric acid delivery rate to the RCS. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 19 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # Event # 2 Page 20 of 98 Event
Description:
Rod Control fails to respond in AUTO Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
. SET controller ICS-283, FK-113 BORIC ACID FLOW, for the desired flow rate
. VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch has been placed in RO the STOP position
. VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch green light is lit
. PLACE control switch RMW MODE SELECTOR to the BOR position When PRZ backup heaters are energized in manual, PK 444A1, PRZ Master Pressure Controller (a P1 controller) will integrate up to a greater than normal output, opening PRZ Spray Valves to return and maintain RCS pressure at setpoint.
The result is as follows: Procedure Note:
- PORV PCV-444B will open at a lower thanexpected pressure.
- ALB-009-3-2, PRESSURIZER HIGH PRESS DEVIATION CONTROL, will activate at a lower than expected pressure.
- Increased probability for exceeding Tech Spec DNB limit for RCS pressure.
OPERATE the pressurizer backup heaters as required to limit the difference between the pressurizer and RCS boron concentration to less than 10 ppm.
- MAKE boron concentration adjustments as dictated from sample results.
Procedure Note: Boration may be manually stopped at any time by turning control switch RMW CONTROL to STOP. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 20 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D..2 OpTestNo.: NRC Scenario# Event# 2 Page 21 of 98 Event
Description:
Rod Control fails to respond in AUTO Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior START the makeup system as follows:
. TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START RO momentarily
. VERIFY the RED indicator light is LIT The operation should be stopped if an unanticipated reactivity Procedure Caution: effect is seen. Do not resume the operation until the cause has been corrected.
. VERIFY Tavg responds as desired.
. IF rod control is in AUTO, o THEN VERIFY the control rods are responding properly.
. VERIFY boration automatically terminates when the desired quantity of boron has been added.
. PLACE Reactor Makeup in Auto per Section 5.1.
Additional steps are included in section 5.1 but none will be applicable since the system just came out of Automatic. Evaluator Note: The only steps included here are the ones with verifiable action.
. VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch:
- Is in the STOP position
. The GREEN light is LIT
- PLACE the RMW MODE SELECTOR to AUTO.
RO
- START the makeup system as follows:
- TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarily VERIFY the RED indicator light is LIT Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 21 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 22 of 98 Event
Description:
Rod Control fails to respond in AUTO Time Position L Applicants Actions or Behavior Rods Fail To Respond The crew may take action to enter AOP-OO1 prior to receiving any alarms based on monitoring TAVG-TREF Evaluator Note: deviation indicated by ERFIS points TRCO4O8Z (median TAVG) and TRCO4O8b (TREF). The first section of the guide is written to the response of the APP and then AOP-OO1. Indications
- ALB-O1O-6-4B, RCS TREF!TAVG HIGH-LOW Available:
- TavgiTref recorder indications RD
- Responds to ALB-O1O-6-4B, RCS TREFITAVG HIGH-LOW
. CONFIRM alarm using:
CREW o Tavg/Tref recorder TR-408 (MCB) o Turbine first stage pressure indicators (P1-446 and P1 447) If I&C is contacted to investigate the rod control failure, Simulator wait approximately 3 minutes and report back that an l&C Communicator technician is at the rod control system and looking for indications of a failure.
- VERIFY Automatic Functions:
o None IF there is an indication of a control rod malfunction (MCB and AEP-1), THEN GO TO AOP-OO1, Malfunction of Rod Control and Indication System. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 22 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: NRC Scenario# 2 Event# 2 Page Event
Description:
Rod Control fails to respond in AUTO Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior AOP-OO1 AOP-OO1, Malfunction of Rod Control System
. Enters AOP-OO1, MALFUNCTION OF ROD CONTROL AND INDICATION SYSTEM.
SRO . Direct placing the turbine in HOLD (not procedurally driven)
. Conducts a plant status brief RO Perform AOP-OO1 Immediate Actions.
. CHECK that LESS THAN TWO control rods are dropped Immediate (YES)
Action RO
. POSITION Rod Bank Selector Switch to MAN.
- CHECK Control Bank motion STOPPED. (YES)
Throughout this procedure, Westinghouse Rod Control Procedure Note: System Troubleshooting Guidelines refers to Section 6O of EPRI document TR-1 081 52, Rod Control System Maintenance Westinghouse PWRs. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 23 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # *.__ Event # 2 Page 24 of 98 Event
Description:
Rod Control fails to respond in AUTO Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Reviews note GO TO the appropriate section: Section 3.3, Failure of a Control Bank To Move CHECK that AT LEAST ONE of the following conditions is present:
. ALB 13-7-1, ROD CONTROL URGENT ALARM, is ALARMED (NO)
SRO . Control Bank will NOT move (YES)
. Shutdown Bank will NOT move (NO)
PERFORM the following:
. ADJUST Turbine load OR Boron concentration to equalize Tavg with
. Tref.MONITOR Reactor power and temperature to verify proper rod motion.
. GOTOStep6.
. DIRECTS RO to equalize Tavg with Tref (Boron or Turbine adjustments) then proceeds to step 6
. Directs RO to maintain TAVG within 2°F of Tref per OMM-OO1 attachment 13.
Ccnircller Control Bsnd Trip 1irni Low i-thjh SRO Rod ConLl TAvgwith 2 ofT Ref T Av Within TAvg Within tb4 nt 1 QfT Ref iUfTRf Rod Control TAvi witni of T Ref T Av Within YAvg Within Trsiem Pbnt 10 of T Ref 10 of 1 Ref nd the trend asd the trend show no -sgo c shc, no sign c,f tirntflO umng RO/BOP Adjusts RCS Boron or turbine load to equalize Tavg with Tref SRO CHECK automatic AND manual Rod Control FUNCTIONING PROPERLY. (NO) Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 24 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario 4 Event # 2 Page of 98 Event
Description:
Rod Control fails to respond in AUTO Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Step 6 of AOP-OO1 will not be met until rod control has been repaired. Plant shutdown will need to continue with Evaluator Note: rod control in MANUAL. Tech Specs (3.1.3.1 and 3.1.3.5) do not apply in this situation since rod control is demonstrated operable by rods moving in MANUAL.
. Completes an Equipment Problem Checklist and contacts SRQ WCC for assistance. (WR, EIR and Maintenance support)
. Dispatch operators to rod control cabinets to determine if CREW urgent failure alarms are on locally.
. Determines control rod trippability per AOP-OO1, Att. 5 Three minutes after directed to investigate local urgent
. failure conditions, report that there are no problems locally Simulator at the cabinet.
Communicator Report that System Engineer has identified the problem exists in the AUTO circuit only inside PIC-8. The Lead Evaluator can cue Event 3 (SG C Feed flow transmitter failure) after TAVG is matched with TREE. Power reduction should continue but does NOT need to be commenced in order to continue in this scenario. Evaluator Note: If necessary promt crew to continue the plant shutdown by having the Manager of Operations call and direct that the plant shutdown continue with rod control in manual. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 25 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: NRC Scenario# ..._ Event# 3 Page 26 of 98 Event
Description:
C Feed Flow Channel (FT-497 Channel IV) fails low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When directed by the Lead Evaluator Actuate Trigger 5 Simulator Operator SG C FE Channel fails LO FT:497 SG C feed flow controlling channel Indications Available: ALB-O1 4-6-1 B, SG C STM> FW FLOW MISMATCH BOP . Performs actions of APP-ALB-01 4-6-1 B/6-1 A13-1 B. CONFIRM alarm using:
. FI-496, FI-497, SG C Feed Flow
. FI-494, Fl-495, SG C Steam Flow (YES)
. Reports Fl-497 failed LOW PERFORM Corrective Actions: (OMM-001 and OPS BOP NGGC-1 000)
. IF FCV-498, Feedwater Reg Valve, is NOT controlling SG level, THEN MANUALLY CONTROL FK-498 AND REDUCE feed flow.
. DISPATCH an operator to check for indications of feedwater leaks.
Simulator
. Acknowledge requests for assistance.
Communicator: DIRECTS BOP to maintain SG level within control band and within trip limits of OMM-OQI Attachment 13 SRO Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 26 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # _ Event # 3 Page 27 of 98 Event
Description:
C Feed Flow Channel (FT-497 Channel IV) fails low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Refers to Tech Spec 3.3.1: As a minimum, the Reactor Trip System instrumentation channels and interlocks of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE REACTOR TRIP SYSTEK WIN IRAN TOTAL HO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNEFS P OPERABLE BABES hiIi
- 14. Steam Generator Water Level--Low 2 ste. yen. 1 ste. yen. I ste. yen, level I, 2 6 Coincident With SteaW level and Teel coincident and 2 ste/feed Feedwater Flow Kisinatch 2 ste/feed- with 1 water flow water flow stni./feedwater mismatch in sane mismatch in flow mismatch in stn. yen. or 2 each ste. yen, same ste. yen. ste. yen. level SRO and I ste./feedwater flow mismatch in sane sti. yen.
ACTION 6 With the number of OPERABLE channels one lesm than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION nay proceed provided the foLlowing conditions are satisfied a, The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours, and
- b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for eurveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1.
. DIRECT Maintenance to investigate and repair the instrument malfunction.
SRO
. Completes an Equipment Problem Checklist and contacts WCC for assistance. (WR, EIR and Maintenance support)
Simulator Acknowledge any request for assistance from Communicator: Maintenance or the WCC. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 27 Rev. 2
Cli m 0 3. C,, m N) 11 C/) D l- I-. - .- , . o H, - - CD Z . CD C C) 0 w :.
--Cl C . ° - R (F) Cl I- I) t ir ) I- / /-- Cl - Cl Ill Ci If z 0 C) .Cl Cl i/Cl Cl0<w -- (1 Cl o Cl)
CD I-- IP m ot lb X Cl w CD ip m 0 ci t-.- CD -- IClCl . - Cl. -Cl
*rt tC/)P) l3 l-/lICi- r Cl 0 m C)
CD.-!-) -ti rt CDID Onto CDti ri l C) II C) I1II!I Cl Cur) CD cr-i i t-1F1 Cl ,l) I bCl Ott rtQ Cu o 0 -. I-- (bOO I-- I /-- Curt-0. C) fl I lb Cl I 0 0 0 Cl i- Cl 0 Cl U 0 Cl N) Cl ti Cl Clii )i ClCl,Dm r C) C) i-ri-i, rt r)-o Clip c ocrir ipi-. i-F i- CD I-- 0 V Cl i-i mo. Cl otiir-oii--- tii- oi Cl) Cl V Pr CD -1 it, lb Cl ri CD it < 0 0 0) -Cl C) o 1Db Ii ClOD .0 0 (1 ri ClI--.-) rOD I-/ . H/-i I-) I- ti-H Cl Cl C) i--tClIbOt) lb C) i z o I lb I Cl lb Cl /-/ lb C) /l r-v CD Cl -/ i-i V CD ri, 0 Cli T L . i i° Cut-- Cl Cl % cr Wt-hCP - t, - CD to Cl. to ci Cl to ClmClCum ii ci Cl. i-It-. o Cl. Cl. C)rtClr) (3 ClID ci . a Cl Clii 0) p.CuCuCDrtrt Cl. C/) (0 Ci Cl I-. i-i Cl Cl t I- I-- / t-- Cl C) I-.- lb it, ri lb C) Cl Cl Cu t Ci t:.. 0 I I) ID 11 il i1 0 N) Cl ii ci . 0(0 CD w Cu 0 .0 Cu CD 011/ti Cl ri r ci ii Cl ft rPrHr1mqCu Curt I-.- Ci lb I-- t ci 11 t1 Cl 0 fiJ t-/ ro Cu V Cu ii lb 0. ri 0 (_) CD it C, 0 CD (I 0 r- Cu U) ID C 0 I-I I-- C)ri,t-/ ci CI 0. ,- Cr Cl. .--I- I t I 0 Clt--CI CD C) Cl II Cu CD It i-b I-I w if, . - e-- . 1r C it-.. C) Cli-1 ia 01 0. I-- -,,((iCu-3 5
/t ci i-- I-- 0ClCuNt-- I Cl -
Q no ictti Cl ID 0) Cl) ii Cl lbCii-/I.ClCu i-i
- bi - Ft (01 i-i ClOCl l-.t P ii t i-i Iii 0 (ci
* .p- $
Cl Cl Cl . 1.3111 0 o Cu Cl Cl Cu ipOb-D)0 Cl ci Cl CT - 0 Cl -CU) Cl (1) lb Cl Ut CD Cl -.U)0/-- i-i (rb-b O III 1 0 Ii iScOD. 0) (DIDID 0 lb t-- C) lb t.rcir+C). nt- /uiil-t U Cl 3rCll--Ci lb . W Ill ItCl ClCl (0 CD () Cl t- UXlb Cl
- ii Cl D Cu CuClCurICl tt1 0 F) l-- CD Cl 0 II I-) rjj -
0 0) ii CltW 0 0 C) ID )ntt--D C ID - (I Cl ID 0. 011W Cl Q O Cl Cl C) ci Cl rcit-- lb 0 (0 If) Ii (1, CT 1.l. U III I (0 f - rFI-- C). ci CD Cl CD to Cl. OW OCl Cl. i-I CD 0 I-.
- 0) tiC Cl
= 0 U, o
-t, ci Cl 0 lb IC0 N) N)
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # . Event # 3 Page Event
Description:
C Feed Flow Channel (FT-497 Channel IV) fails low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
- wp-pp- i of
[ight Lieu1 Po6itiai fcr P..estored Coierlt ID InoprlIi:v og it ion or Thimber Xttitii. /;Jifid itL ,; if id OTETIOT cNTt III TJ4 FLOW :rT-94) ND;o FW FLOW FT-4?) 1n FIC 3 cr Catd 3-9$7 OT: Coicuroent verLfiet ion i preErred While tripping bietabie. Si J499 SPJFF Mi5rn6tch RX Trip TL7 / NOTMAL Cn Main Ccntr31 ard: FS-$9Y (G C 9W F1 jf .r 47 Recorder and Con:rol (cirol osition 9e1e+/-or wi:ch( 496 / eelected 9S-t9Z (55 C Steam 1cw 94 or 495 Reconler an con:roi (Ciro1 ?osSric.n
;eletor swi:ch( 495 / ee1eted)
On TSL8-2 (rheck th f1ewinj G C SW SE1 PS Win.i.ow -2fl EIZ!D J D-ThP.GIZD rroT5cro cuauerr I 5751+/-4 FLOW FT-495 NDIoR w now p-4ns In PlC 4 ci Card C4-93 SOTE Colcurreflt verification iB preEerred while tripping biatab].es.
- /F Mirnetch Rx Trip P557 / O3MIL trt e,.atn cttrr1 ar1:
FS-i99Y (SO C SW F1O 695 or 497 R..LdL dJIi k.LU1 ciii JuiLicIL e1etor 2wi:ch 497 ee1eted
/
tC 4)05 OD c ctre jor O4 rr 4)e Recolder and Con:rol (circle position eLeztor Swi:ch 49$ / celected) On 7515-2 (Check the foilowinp C 9W . STM PS (Window -4) 3E-E5IZ5D Simulator Operator: When directed to implement OWP-RP-1O run AMS file: rps/OWP-RP-1 O-Ill-TST Simulator Communicator: Contact MCR when complete Wait for OWP-RP-1O to be completed prior to next event. Evaluator Note: Once the SG level has been restored and the Tech Spec has been identified, direct initiation of Event 4. H&rris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 29 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # .__ Event # 4 Page Event
Description:
Loss of MCC-24A causing CRDM failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 1 When directed by the Lead Evaluator Actuate Trigger 4 Simulator Operator: Loss of MCC-1A24 causing CRDM failure Annunciators:
- ALB-08-1-3, RWMU Pumps Low Discharge Pressure
. ALB-15-2-4, 125 VDC (NNS) Trouble
. ALB-22-9-5, Computer Alarm Elec Dist System
. ALB-27-8-4, Control Rod Drive Mech CIg Fans E81 Low Flow O/L-
. ALB-27-8-5, Control Rod Drive Mech CIg Fans E80 Low Flow O/L-
. ALB-20-5-4A, Turb Emer Oil Pmp RunlTrbl Lost indication:
Indications Available: . PRZ PORV Isol I RC-1 13
. Reactor Make Up Water Pump A
- RCP Oil Lift Pump C
- MCC A24 Supply Breaker A24 Status
- CRDM Cooling Fan E-80 and E-81
- AC bearing oil pump
- A&C CSIP Aux Lube Oil pumps Other indication:
. DC bearing oil pump starts RO
- RESPONDS to multiple MCB alarms
. Identifies multiple components have been affected
- Review alarm responses and identifies equipment that have CREW lost power
- Determines that MCC 1A24 has lost power Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 30 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No: NRC Scenario # Event # 4 Page 31 of Event
Description:
Loss of MCC-24A causing CRDM failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Identifies that CRDM Cooling Fans E-80 and E-81 do not have power and the standby fans have not started Reviews APP corrective action response BOP
. Verify two CRDM Cooling Fans are running
. Starts both standby CRDM Cooling Fans powered from MCC 1824 Reviews Tech Specs associated with loss of power to PRZ PORV 1RC-113 Tech Spec 3.4.4 Action c 14&4 [F1 T1F VAtVFS UNITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION
.4 ,4 All power-operated rehef valves (P0Vs) and their associated block SRO valves shall be OPE:RA&E.
APPLICA8IL1T: HOlES 1, 2, and 3 ACTION: With an o rnor bl faIv(s) incerab1e ithin I hOur: (I) restore the Wock vaWe(s) t0PP[3LE status, or close the block valve(s) and riioe par fran the blo valve(s) or close te POV and enie imr froD its associated soleroid v1e nd (Z> apply the iTtONJ ., abDve. a approrlate for the isolated POR?()
. Contacts Auxilary Operator to investigate MCC 1A24
. DIRECT Maintenance to investigate and repair the SRO instrument malfunction.
. Completes an Equipment Problem Checklist and contacts WCC for assistance. (WR, EIR and Maintenance support)
Acknowledge request to investigate MCC 1A24 Report back in 2 minutes that the breaker has an Simulator overcurrent trip. Communicator: Acknowledge any request for assistance from Maintenance or the WCC. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 31 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: NRC Scenario# Event# 5/6 Page 2 Event
Description:
A CSIP Trip I Restore Letdown Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from the Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 5 Simulator Operator: A CSIP trip ALB-06-1-1 Charging Pump Discharge Header High-Low Flow ALB-06-1-2 Chrg PumpATrouble Indications Available: ALB-06-1-3 Chrg Pump A Trip Or Close Ckt Trouble ALB-08-2-1 RCP Seal Water Injection Low Flow ALB-08-2-2 ASI Pump Auto Start Timer Initiated
- RESPONDS to multiple alarms on ALB-06 (1-1, 1-2, 1-3)
RO and ALB-08 (2-1 & 2-2).
- REPORTS CSIP A tripped.
Identifies Entry Conditions met for AOP-01 8, Reactor Coolant CREW Pump Abnormal Conditions AOP-01 8 Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions PERFORMS immediate actions.
. CHECK ANY CSIP RUNNING. (NO)
Immediate
- ISOLATE letdown by verifying the following valves SHUT:
RO Action o 1CS-7, 45 GPM Letdown Orifice A o ICS-8, 60 GPM Letdown Orifice B o ICS-9, 60 GPM Letdown Orifice C Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 32 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5I6 Page 33 of 98 Event
Description:
A CSIP Trip I Restore Letdown Time Position Applicants Actior or Behavior ENTERS AOP-O1 8, RCP Abnormal Conditions SRO Makes PA announcement for AOP entry Conducts a plant status brief BOP Dispatch operators to investigate cause of trip If dispatched to investigate, wait 3-4 minutes then report a breaker overcurrent trip flag on Phase A. Report as Communicator: second AO that there are no obvious problems at the pump. Informs SM to REFER to PEP-hO, Emergency Classification SRO and Protective Action Recommendations, AND ENTER the EAL Matrix. Minimum allowable flow for a CSIP is 60 gpm which is provided by normal miniflow during normal operation and Procedure Note: alternate miniflow during safety injection. Maintaining CSIP flow greater than or equal to 60 gpm also satisfies this requirement. EVALUATE plant conditions AND GO TO the appropriate SRO section: MALFUNCTION SECTION PAGE Loss of CCW and/or Seal Injection to RCPs 3 1 5 CHECK ALB-5-1-2A, RCP Thermal Bar HDR High Flow, alarm RD CLEAR. (YES) Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 33 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5/6 Page 34 of 98 Event
Description:
A CSIP Trip I Restore Letdown Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 34 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # .j. Event # 5/6 Page Event
Description:
A CSIP Trip I Restore Letdown Time Position 1 Applicants Actions or Behavior CHECK ALL RCPs operating within the limits of Attachment 1. SRO (YES)
- CHECK ALL RCPs RUNNING. (YES)
. CHECK the following NORMAL for ALL RCPs:
RO o Cow flow (YES) o Seal Injection flow (NO) SRO RESTORE using the applicable attachment: MALFUNCTION ATTACHMENT Loss of Seal Injection flow only Attachment 4 (Page 33) The ASI System will actuate in 2 minutes and 45 seconds Procedure Note: . from timer initiation. ALB-8-2-4 AS! pump start will alarm The ASI system when actuated will provide RCP seal injection of highly borated water. During the time the ASI Evaluator Note: pump is running a negative reactivity addition is being conducted in the form of boration. The sooner the system is shut down the less effect it will have on reactivity.
. CHECK at least one CSIP RUNNING. (NO)
. Dispatch an operator to monitor operation of the ASI System Simulator Acknowledge request.
Communicator: Be prepared to STOP the ASI pump when requested to. Simulator Operator: RF CVC 195 STOP Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 35 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5 /6 Page 36 of 98 Event
Description:
A CSIP Trip I Restore Letdown Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
. PLACE controller FK-1 22.1, Charging Flow in MANUAL AND SHUT.
. SHUT HC-1 86.1, RCP Seal WTR INJ Flow.
. VERIFY a suction path for the standby CSIP by performing the following:
o VERIFY CSIP suction flowpath from VCT as follows: RO
- VERIFY greater than 5% level is established in VCT. (YES)
- VERIFY the following valves are OPEN:
. LCV-115C, VCT Outlet (1CS-165)
(YES)
. LCV-1 I 5E, VCT Outlet (1 CS-i 66)
(YES) Provide Pressurizer level control bands and trip limits per SRO OMM-001 Att. 13 Control band Maintain level within 5% of Reference level trip limits of 10% low and 90% high Procedure Caution: Low VCT level is a precursor to gas binding the CSIPs CHECK VCT level is greater than 5%, AND STABLE OR RD RISING (YES) RD MAINTAIN CCW HX outlet temperature less than 1 05° F. RD START the standby CSIP. (Starts B CSIP) CHECK seal injection flow being supplied by the ASI System. RD (YES) Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 36 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5/6 Page 37 of 98 Event
Description:
A CSIP Trip I Restore Letdown Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior OPEN HC.-1 86.1, RCP Seal WTR INJ Flow. DIRECT the operator monitoring the AS! System to STOP the RD AS! Pump by placing CS-210.1, AS! PUMP MOTOR CONTROL SWITCH, in STOP. (At the AS! System Control Panel) Simulator Acknowledge request to secure the AS! pump Communicator: Secure the AS! pump when communications are complete Simulator Operator: CVC 195 STOP Evaluator Note: ALB-8-2-3 AS! system Trouble will alarm when AS! pump is stopped I Simulator Report back that the ASI pump is secured Communicator: ADJUST HC-1 86.1, RCP Seal WTR !NJ Flow, to establish seal injection flow as necessary to maintain the following: RD
. Less than 31 gpm total flow to all RCPs.
. Between 8 and 13 gpm to all RCPs.
DIRECT the operator monitoring the ASI System to PLACE RD CS-210.1, ASI PUMP MOTOR CONTROL SWITCH, in AUTO. (At the ASI System Control Panel) Simulator Acknowledge request Communicator: Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 37 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # _ Event # 5 /6 Page 38 of 98 Event
Description:
A CSIP Trip I Restore Letdown Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Place ASI control back to AUTO Simulator Operator: CVC 195 AUTO report back to MCR when back in AUTO START CSIP room ventilation per OP-i 72, Reactor Auxiliary Building HVAC System. IF B Train is being started, THEN PLACE the following Air BOP Handling Units control switches to START AND VERIFY proper damper and valve operation (if they start):
. CSIP SB AREA FAN COOLER AH-9 B SB RFTflRF (.hrriinr, inH I fcn,n fIrA nr flP1fl7 (.hmirI RO and Volume Control System.
OP-I 07, Chemical and Volume Control System is included Evaluator Note: at the end of this scenario. (See Attachment I, page 73) Start B Chiller per OP-148, section 5.2. BOP Contact AC for Chiller pre-start checks (NOTE: At this time the crew may only start Pump P-4 B) OP-148, section 5.2 is included on page 78 of this scenario Evaluator Note: guide. It is NOT intended to wait for the crew to place the standby Chiller in service Continue with scenario. MONITOR Tavg to Tref. (ASI injection has added negative RO reactivity) INITIATE action to determine and correct the cause of the loss SRO of the CSIP. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 38 Rev, 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # _ Event # 5 /6 Page 39 of 98 Event
Description:
A CSIP Trip I Restore Letdown Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CHECK seal injection flow between 8 and 13 gpm has been RD established to all RCPs. WHEN seal injection flow has been established between 8 and 13 gpm, THEN PERFORM OST-1126, Reactor Coolant Pump RD Seals Controlled Leakage Evaluation Monthly Interval Modes 1 -4. RD CHECK CCW flow is established to the RCPs. SRO EXIT this procedure. (AOP-O1 8) Reviews/prepares OMM-OO1, Attachment 5 Equipment SRO Problem Checklist for the failure of the CSIP. Contacts support personnel for repairs. ENTERS TS:
- 3.1.2.4, CSIPs SRO
. 3.5.2, ECCS Subsystems All are 72 hours to restore action statements.
The Lead Evaluator can cue Event 7 (30 gpm RCS leakage Evaluator Note: to Containment) after Tech Spec evaluation is completed. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 39 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # Event # 7 Page 4Q i Event
Description:
RCS leak into Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from the Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 7 Simulator Operator: RCS leak to Containment ALB-I0-4-5 RAD MONITOR SYSTEM TROUBLE
. REM-I LT-3502A Cont Leak Detection in Alert
. Containment temperature and pressure increasing Indications Available: . Containment sump level rising
. Rad monitor RM 3502 in ALERT
. Increasing Charging flow, VCT level decrease
. Pressurizer Level decreasing RESPONDS to alarms on ALB-I0-4-5 and changing plant RO conditions CREW Identifies entry condition to AOP-016, Leakage Inside CNMT SRO CONFIRM alarm on RM-1I, MCB and ERFIS indications ENTERS AOP-016, EXCESSIVE PRIMARY PLANT LEAKAGE SRO Makes PA announcement Conducts a plant status brief AOP-01 6 EXCESSIVE PRIMARY PLANT LEAKAGE Procedure Note: This procedure contains no immediate actions.
SRO CHECK RHR in operation. (NO) REFER TO PEP-I 10, Emergency Classification And Protective SRO Action Recommendations, AND ENTER the EAL Matrix. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 40 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # _. Event # 7 Page 41 of 98 Event
Description:
RCS leak into Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO CHECK RCS leakage within VCT makeup capability (YES) Evaluator Note: Estimated leakage is -3O gpm Procedure Note: If CSIP suction is re-aligned to the RWST, negative reactivity addition should be anticiDated. RO MAINTAIN VCT level> 5% If a Containment Ventilation Isolation signal has occurred, Tech Procedure Note: Spec 3.0.3 is applicable, since both trains of Containment Vacuum Relief are inoperable. CHECK valid CNMT Ventilation Isolation monitors SRO (REM-3561A, B, C and D) ALARM CLEAR. (YES) CHECK RM 3502A, RCS Leak Detection Radiation Monitor, SRO ALARM C CLEAR. (NO) VERIFY CNMT normal purge and supply fans isolate on high radiation level signal. BOP
- AH-82 SAl
- CP-9
- 1CP-5
. CHECK ALL valid Area Radiation Monitors ALARM CLEAR. (YES)
. CHECK valid Stack Monitors ALARM CLEAR (YES)
SRO
- Determine if unnecessary personnel should be evacuated from affect areas (No local evac alarm or PA announcement required)
- Notify Chemistry to stop an primary sampling activities
. DIRECT RO to perform RCS flow balance calculation Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 41 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # ._2 Event # 7 Page 4? i Event
Description:
RCS leak into Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
- The following qualitative flow balance is to quickly determine if RCS leakage exceeds Tech Spec limits, AL classification thresholds, or RCS makeup capability.
Procedure Note:
- RCS influent and effluent flow rates are compared and PRZ level rate of change is used to determine the RCS flow balance.
PERFORM a qualitative RCS flow balance, as follows: ESTIMATE leak rate considering the following parameters:
- PRZ level rate of change (55 gal/% at 653° F)
. Charging flow RO
- Total seal injection flow
. Letdown flow
. Total seal return flow Performs RCS flow balance calculates 30 gpm (+/-10 gpm)
Evaluate RCS leakage Tech Spec 3.4.6.2
. > 1 gpm Unidentified leakage Action b reduce leakage to within limits within 4 hours or HSB within next 6 and SRO CSD within following 30 hours (If informed by BOP to review TS 3.4.6.1 and 3.4.8 they do not apply for this situation)
DETERMINE leak location: Using MCB indications, Valid CREW Radiation Monitors and CNMT sump in-leakage the crew should determine leak location as Inside Containment. Evaluator Note: ALB-1-6-1 CNMT Unidentified Leakage or Trouble will alarm at the hour or half hour Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 42 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event# 7 Page 4 f 98 Event
Description:
RCS leak into Containment Time J Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Transitions to Attachment 7 SRO DIRECTS BOP to perform attachment 7 BOP Performs AOP-016 Attachment 7 actions AOP-O1 6 Attachment 7 is on 84 of this guide Some of actions that will be performed are: Stopping Cnmt purge Evaluator Note:
- Starting an Airborne Radioactivity Removal fan
- Verifying damper and Cnmt Vacuum Relief valve positions
- Notifications to Health Physics, Chemistry and Engineering Although NOT directed by AOP-016 for RCS leakage the SRO may determine that a rapid shutdown should be performed and use AOP-038 to quickly get the plant off line.
AOP-038 observation is NOT required. If desired to reduce the time required to complete the scenario the Evaluator may initiate next event when desired. Evaluator Note: The next step will be a decision to continue the plant shutdown using either GP-006 or rapidly shutting the plant down IAW-AOP-038. If the SRO asks for guidance, the MSO will direct that the plant shutdown will be conducted using AOP-038 if no guidance is request then a plant shutdown will be continued based on the SRO decision EITHER WAY IS OK. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 43 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # _ Event # 7 Page 44 of 98 Event
Description:
RCS leak into Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Continue with the plant shutdown using ONE of the following: SRO . GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown from Power Operation to Hot Standby OR
. AOP-Q38, Rapid Downpower IF the SRO calls for recommendation for continuation of Simulator the plant shutdown then:
Communicator: Continue the plant shutdown lAW AOP-038 with a ramp rate of 25 Unitslmin. If AOP-038 is performed, then follow the actions below. If not performed, then crew will continue with downpower Evaluator Note: lAW GP-006. The actions will be to continue as a normal plant shutdown. AOP-038 is optional and NOT required. ADP-038 Rapid Downpower Enters AOP-038, RAPID DOWNPOWER SRO Makes PA announcement Conducts a plant status brief The crew may make calls to notify plant management Simulator before or during the power reduction. Acknowledge and Communicator: request a report from the MCR when more information becomes available. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 44 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # Event # 7 Page 4 f Event
Description:
RCS leak into Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
- This procedure contains no immediate actions.
- Steps may be performed simultaneously or out of sequence at the discretion of the Shift Manager.
- If the ASI System is supplying RCP seal injection and no CSIP is available, boration is accomplished by the operation Procedure Note: of the ASI pump and is not under control of the operator.
Steps that perform boration or dilution cannot be performed and should be marked NA. Turbine load should be reduced at a rate between 5 MW/MIN (EOL) and 10 MW/MIN (BOL). Target rod heights as a function of power in Attachment 2 remain valid. REFER TO PEP-i 10, Emergency Classification And Protective SRO Action Recommendations, AND ENTER the EAL Matrix. BOP NOTIFY Load Dispatcher that the Unit is reducing load. Procedure Note: Boration of the RCS commences at Step 10. DETERMINE required boric acid addition for desired power reduction, as follows: CHECK BOTH of the following conditions exist:
. Reactor power is 100%
. Target power level is provided in OPT-i 525, Reactivity Plan Generation Weekly Interval MODE 1 at Full Power RO (50%, 30% or 5%).
OBTAIN values from the latest completed OPT-i 525, Reactivity Plan Generation Weekly Interval MODE 1 at Full Power.
- Desired Boration gal
- Target Rod height (D Bank)
Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 45 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario _ Event# 7 Page 98 Event
Description:
RCS leak into Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
- If load reduction rates in excess of 45 MWlmin are required, the Unit should be tripped.
If OSI-Pl is available, VIDAR is functioning properly if the DEH MEGAWATTS point is updating.
- If OSI-PI is NOT available, accessing the ANALOG INPUTS screen on the Graphics Display Computer (located in the Termination Cabinet Room near the ATVVS Panel) will show several points, most of which should be updating if the VIDAR Unit is functioning properly.
- If the DEH graphics computer is out of service, VIDAR can be checked as updating on the operator panel as follows:
Procedure Note:
- 1) DEPRESS TURBINE PROGRAM display button.
- 2) CHECK TURBINE PROGRAM display button is illuminated.
- 3) CHECK REFERENCE and DEMAND displays indicate 0000.
- 4) DEPRESS 1577.
- 5) DEPRESS ENTER.
- 6) If the DEMAND display indicates 0000 then VIDAR is updating.
- 7) If the DEMAND display indicates 0001 then VIDAR is not updating.
Failure of the DEH computer VIDAR Unit while in OPER AUTO Procedure Caution: has resulted in a plant trip. CHECK BOTH of the following: BOP
- DEH System in AUTO (YES)
VIDAR functioning properly (YES) Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 46 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2_ Event # 7 Page 41 Qt Event
Description:
RCS leak into Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior PERFORM the following at the DEH panel:
- a. DEPRESS the Load Rate MW/MIN pushbutton.
- b. ENTER desired rate (NOT to exceed 45 MW/MIN) in DEMAND display.
- c. DEPRESS ENTER pushbutton.
BOP
- d. DEPRESS REF pushbutton.
- e. ENTER desired load (120 MW if shutting down) in DEMAND display.
- f. DEPRESS ENTER pushbutton.
- g. CHECK HOLD pushbutton LIT.
CHECK Rod Control in AUTO (NO auto is failed) RO
- MANUALLY POSITION Control Rods to maintain Tavg within 5°F of Tref.
RO ENERGIZE ALL available PRZ Backup heaters. (ALL ON) SRO DISCUSS Attachment 3, Reactivity Brief, with the MCR staff. With the Megawatt Feedback Loop out of service, the MW Procedure Note: indication in the REFERENCE display will not reflect actual MW output. An accurate indication of Main Generator output can be obtained from ERFIS point JEE1568B (Gross MWe). COMMENCE turbine load reduction at the DEH panel: BOP
- CHECK OPER AUTO Mode AVAILABLE. (YES)
- DEPRESS GO pushbutton.
- VERIFY the value in the REFERENCE display LOWERS.
Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 47 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # Event # 7 Page 48 p Event
Description:
RCS leak into Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
. To prevent over-boration, only the amount of boron required to reduce power to the desired power level should be added.
Procedure Note:
. Adjustments should be made to boric acid flow based on actual corelrod responses.
COMMENCE RCS boration as required to maintain Control RO Rods above the Rod Insertion Limit (Curve F-X-1). The following boration steps of OP-I 07.01 are provided for Evaluator Note: evaluator use. They are not in AOP-038. Section 8.7 is provided below. OP 10701 CVCS BORATION, DILUTION, AND CHEMISTRY CONTROL Section 8.7 Rapid Addition of Boric Acid to the RCS
. If performing a rapid shutdown of the plant per AOP-038, the following calculation does not have to be completed before boration begins but should be completed before half of the Procedure Note:
estimated (or before 500 gallons whichever is less) boron addition has been dispensed.
. Reactivity Evolution category to be determined by the CRS.
Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 48 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # Event # 7 Page 49 of 98 Event
Description:
RCS leak into Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
- DETERMINE the volume of boric acid necessary to achieve the required RCS boron concentration.
- VERIFY the backup Boric Acid Transfer Pump control switch is in STOP.
- Record the initial BAT level for backup calculation of Boric Acid Addition %
- Calculate the final BAT level Final BAT Lvl Initial BAT Lvi 1(RequiIed gaHons BA) 1(330 gi%)J
-c 1330)
- START the Boric Acid Transfer Pump aligned for Auto Make up (switch in AUTO) by placing the control switch to START.
RO
- Simultaneously OPEN 1CS-278 SB, EMERGENCY BORIC ACID ADDITION and MARK the START time Time ICS-275 opened. Time
- RECORD the Boric Acid flowrate from Fl-i 10 gpm
- CALCULATE the amount of time in minutes it will take to deliver the required amount of Boric Acid.
Time = Required gallons BA! BA fiarate mm. = ÷ P,7.2:.i 9J.2.3.e:
- Control charging and letdown to maintain normal PRZ and VCT levels BOP INDEPENDENTLY VERIFY the calculations Boration flow may be interrupted as needed by cycling 1CS-278, while maintaining the total boration time calculated.
Procedure Note: During makeup operations following an alternate dilution, approximately 10 gallons of dilution should be expected due to dilution water remaining in the primary makeup lines. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 49 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # Event # 7 Page Event
Description:
RCS leak into Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
. WHEN the calculated amount of time has elapsed, THEN SHUT ICS-278 SB and MARK the STOP time Time 1CS-278 shut
. VERIFY using calculated final BAT level, that the required amount of Boric Acid has been dispensed.
. STOP the Boric Acid Transfer Pump started previously.
RD
. VERIFY Boric Acid pumps in the following alignment:
o One pump is in AUTO. o One pump is in STOP.
. REQUEST Chemistry to sample the RCS boron concentration.
. PLACE Reactor Makeup in Auto per Section 5.1.
AOP-038 Rapid Downpower Actions Continued (step 11) BOP VERIFY Generator load AND Reactor power LOWERING. BOP MAINTAIN Generator reactive load (VAR5) within guidelines. Opening 3A and 3B Feedwater Heater vents helps minimize Procedure Note: water hammer in 3A and 3B Feedwater Heaters. RD CHECK Tavg within 5 °F of Tref. (YES) NOTIFY Chemistry of the following: Reactor power change will CREW exceed 15% in a one hour period. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 50 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # Event # 7 Page 51 of 98 Event
Description:
RCS leak into Containment Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The following surveillances specified in the applicable sections require performing: SRO . RST-204, Reactor Coolant System Chemistry and Radiochemistry Surveillance
. RST-211, Gaseous Effluent Radiochemistry Surveillance
- CHECK that a planned load reduction will take the Unit to Turbine shutdown. (YES)
- DISPATCH an operator to start the Auxiliary Boiler using SRO OP-I 30.02,
- Auxiliary Boiler and Fuel Oil.
- NOTIFY Radwaste Control Room to be prepared for the increased water processing requirements due to boration.
CREW CHECK Power level at the target value. (NO) BORATE OR DILUTE as necessary to maintain AFD RO (Curve F-X-2) as close to the target value as possible while maintaining rods above the Rod Insertion Limit (Curve F-X-I) SRO REQUEST Chemistry to sample the RCS for boron. RO ALIGN RCS makeup for AUTO operation using OP-107.0I, CVCS Boration, Dilution, and Chemistry Control. Examiner Note: With AOP-038 in progress: Initiate Event 8 Small Break LOCA. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 51 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 8 Page 52 of 98 Event
Description:
Small Break LOCA I ATWS Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from the Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 8 Simulator Operator: Small Break LOCA I ATWS Event 8 is a Small Break LOCA exceeding VCT makeup capability. The leak size will increase after the Reactor trip breakers are opened. The crew should diagnose that the leak has grown significantly larger and is beyond the capacity of the make-up system. Per AOP-016 Section 3.0 Evaluator Note: continuous action step 4 when RC S leakage exceeds the VCT makeup capability the crew should TRIP the Reactor AND go to E-0. The Rx trip breakers will not open when the crew attempts to manually trip the Rx. The crew will enter FR-S.1. After the Rx trip breakers are locally opened and when directed in FR-S.1 they will transition into E-0.
. Lowering RCS Pressure
. Lowering Pressurizer Level
. Increased Charging flow Indications . ALB-009-2-2 PRESSURIZER CONTROL LOW LEVEL Available: DEVIATION
. ALB-O10-6-5A OITEMP )T BLK ROD C-3 ALER T
. Rising pressure in containment and temperature
- Rising Containment sump level Reports that plant conditions are degrading and RCS leakage RO is no longer within makeup capability SRO DIRECTS a MANUAL reactor trip.
Attempts to initiate a MANUAL Reactor Trip at both MCB E-O RO switch #1 and #2 (NOT successful) Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 52 Rev. 2
Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # Event # 8 Page of Event
Description:
Small Break LOCA I ATWS Time Position 1 Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Manually Trips Main Turbine when Rx Trip is NOT successful When the Main Turbine is tripped RCS pressure will rapidly increase and one or more Pressurizer PORVs will lift. In conjunction with RCS break flow RCS pressure will steadily decrease. SG pressure will increase due to the Evaluator Note: Turbine trip which will cause the SG PORVs to OPEN and some of the SG safety valves to lift. After the Rx is locally tripped RCS pressure will rapidly decrease and the leak size will increase. SRO Enters E-O, Rx WILL NOT trip from RPS or MCB switches. Transitions to FR-S.1 SRO Makes PA announcement Conducts a plant status brief Directs the operators to perform the immediate actions FR-S.1 SRO of FR-S.1 Verify Reactor Trip:
. Check for all of the following:
. Check for any of the following:
. Trip breakers RTA AND BYA OPEN (NO)
Immediate
- Trip breakers RTB AND BYB OPEN (NO)
Action RO
- Rod bottom lights LIT (NO)
- Neutron flux DECREASING (NO)
IF the reactor will NOT trip (automatically OR using either manual trip switch), THEN verify negative reactivity inserted by any of the following while continuing with this procedure: CRITICAL Insert negative reactivity into the core by inserting control TASK #1 RO rods during an ATWS before verifying the immediate action I___________ steps of FR-S.1 (Auto rod control is not an optIon) Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 53 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # Event # 8 Page 54 of 98 Event
Description:
Small Break LOCA I ATWS Time - Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Verify Turbine Trip ALL THROTTLE VALVES SHUT (YES) TtJR3 STOP vtv i TS2 11-1 Immediate UR5 STOP VtV 2 BOP TSLE-2-i12 Action rUR STOP VtV 3 TSt21i-3 IUR STOP vr.v TStE-2 fl4 Verify All AFW Pumps RUNNING (YES / NO SG level dependnt) BOP o Starts A MDAFW pump a OPENS IMS-70 and 1MS-72 Direct an operator to report to the MCR to receive instructions SRO for local actions. SRO Evaluate EAL Matrix.
. Actuation of the sequencer inhibits operation of the boric acid pumps. (If the sequencer runs on Program A, the Procedure Note: pumps can be started manually after LB-9.
. Otherwise, the sequencer must be reset to restore operation of the pumps) SI flow accomplishes emergency boration.
Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 54 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # Event # 8 Page 21 Event
Description:
Small Break LOCA I ATWS Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Initiate Emergency Boration of RCS:
. Check SI flow GREATER THAN 200 GPM (NO)
Emergency borate from the BAT:
. Start a boric acid pump.
Perform any of the following (listed in order of preference):
- Open Emergency Boric Acid Addition valve:
SOP o ICS-278
. Open normal boration valves:
o 1CS-283 o 1CS-156
. Verify boric acid flow to CSIP suction AT LEAST 30 GPM
. Verify CSIP flow to RCS AT LEAST 30 GPM
. Check RCS PRZ Pressure < 2235 iski Isolate CNMT Ventilation:
. AH-82 A NORMAL PURGE SUPPLY FAN BOP . AH-82 B NORMAL PURGE SUPPLY FAN
. E-5A CNMT PRE-ENTRY PURGE EXHAUST FAN
. E-5B CNMT PRE-ENTRY PURGE EXHAUST FAN Verify the valves and dampers listed in the table SHUT TP.AIN . Components TRAIN B Cornpenta WB2 SA VAGUU1{ RELI? ICB-6 SB VACUUH REJ.IEP CBD51, S1 VAGUU) R1JR G-D52 SE V#GUIJ){ REUEY BOP PURGE IN[.ET ICP-6 SB NGRKAL PURGE INLET WP5 SA NORMAL PURGE DISCH: 1CP- SB NGR14AI PURGE ISQE tP1.O SA PREEiU EURGE INLET KP-7 SB PEE-ENTRY PURGE INIET 1CP-4 RA PRE-ENTRY PURCE DISCE ice-a SB PEE-ENTRY PURGE DISCH Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 55 Rev. 2
Appendix ID Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No: NRC Scenario Event# 8 Page 56 gf 98 Event
Description:
Small Break LOCA I ATWS Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Check Trip Status: Check reactorTRIPPED (NO) Provides direction to AO to: Locally trip reactor using any of the following (listed in order of RO preference):
- 1) Locally trip reactor trip breakers.
- 2) Locally trip both rod drive MG set generator output breakers.
- 3) Locally trip both rod drive MG set motor breakers.
Simulator Acknowledge request to locally trip Reactor. Communicator: (any time not necessarily here) Simulator Operator: Reactor trip directions provided to AO 30 seconds later: Insert Trigger 15 to trip Rx trip breakers OPEN Evaluator Note: Reactor is now tripped RO Reports the reactor is tripped. OP Check turbine TRIPPED (YES) Check Reactor Subcritical:
. Check for both of the following:
RO . Power range channels LESS THAN 5% (YES)
. Intermediate range startup rate channels NEGATIVE (YES)
SRO Observe CAUTION prior to step 25 and GO TO Step 25 Initiate Monitoring Of Critical Safety Function Status Trees. SRO Return to procedure and step in effect (E-O) Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 56 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario Event# 9,10,11 Page 57 of 98 Event
Description:
RCS Leakage increase I Failure of RCP C to trip I B CS pump auto start failure Time Position D Applicants Actions or Behavior EOP-E.-O Reactor Trip OR Safety Injection
. Steps 1 through 4 are immediate action steps. (All high level steps and confirmatory steps are performed and broadcast by the OAC and BOP from memory.
. Subsequently, the CRS confirms the immediate actions reading the high level steps only.)
Procedure Note:
. Informational. NOTES, including this one, the phrase Perform the following, and information presented in table format need not be verbalized.
. Foldout applies. (Immediate actions should be completed prior implementing Foldout Page items.)
SRO Enters E-O and directs actions VERIFY Reactor Trip:
. Rx Trip and Bypass breakers OPEN (YES)
RO -
. ROD Bottom lights LIT (YES)
- NEUTRON flux DROPPING (YES)
BOP Check Turbine Trip ALL throttle valves shut (YES) Perform the Following: BOP AC emergency buses AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED (YES) AC emergency buses BOTH ENERGIZED (YES) Safety Injection ACTUATED (YES) RO EPLP 4-1.S MTEIATED - (CONTINUOUSLY) Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 57 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# Event# 9,10,11 Page f 98 Event
Description:
RCS Leakage increase I Failure of RCP C to trip I B CS pump auto start failure Time Position 7 Applicants Actions or Behavior Procedure Note: Foldout Page review should be completed before continuing Assigns foldout items of -O to both the RO and BOP
- RO:
o RCP Trip criteria o Alternate Miniflow Open/Shut criteria SRO o RHR restart criteria
- BOP o Ruptured SG AFW Isolation criteria AFW supply switchover criteria Evaluator Aide E-O Foldout Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 58 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event# 9,10,11 Page 59 of Event
Description:
RCS Leakage increase I Failure of RCP C to trip I B CS pump auto start failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior FOLUOIJT
. RCP rRIP CRITERIA IF both of the following occur. THEN stop all ROPs:
. flow GREATER THAN 200 GPM
. PCS prsur9 LESS THAN 1lOO PSIG
. ALTERNLTE MINIFLOW OPEHISH 1SF CFTERIA
. IF ROS prscndrcpsto 1e than 1000 P510, TI LN verify alternate miniflow 1oIation QRmtniflow block valves-SHUT
. F RCS pressure rises to 4 ireater than 2200 PSIG, THB1 verify altemste miniflow rscation /.ND minflow block valves OPEN
. RHRRESTARTCRI[ERIA if RCS çressure drops to less than 230 PSIG in an uncorrolled manner THEN rostart RHR purrç lo supply wator to thG RCS.
. RUPTIJRDSG AFW ISOLATION CFEA aIlf the fulluwinu cjucui lo any &3, UIEN J.cip feed fk,v by shutliny the io1ahiun valves (prefened) O1 flow control valves to that SG:
a ny SO level rises in uncontrolled manner OR has abnormal secondary radiation a Nrrnw rng kw1 GRFATFP TI-IAN 2% [411%] AFW SUPPLY SWITCKOVER CRITERIA IF CST lcvcl drops t loss than 10%. THEN witchthe AFiN wator sua,plyto We ESW system usrg op-i 37, AUXIliARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM iectic>n 81. CHECK SI Actuation: CHECK for any of the following LIT a SI Actuated bypass permissive light (YES) RO
- ALB-11-2-2 (NO)
. ALB-11-5-1 (NO)
. ALB-11-5-3 (NO/YES)
. ALB-12-1--4 (NO/YES)
Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 59 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2_ Event # 9, 10, 11 Page 60 of 98 Event
Description:
RCS Leakage increase I Failure of RCP C to trip I B Cs pump auto start failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Event 9 RCS leakage will noticeably increase after the Reactor RCS Trip breakers are opened. This increase leak rate will SBLOCA continue to escalate for several minutes. The crew should identify Adverse Containment conditions Evaluator Note: when Containment pressure exceeds 3 psig. SRO Evaluate EAL Matrix. When CNMT pressure exceeds 3 psig identifies Containment CREW - Adverse Conditions Verifly CSIPs all running (YES) RO A and B running Verify RHR Pumps all running (YES) RO A and B running Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 60 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 9, 10, 11 Page 61 of 98 Event
Description:
RCS Leakage increase I Failure of RCP C to trip I B CS pump auto start failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RCP fold out trip criteria will be met when Containment pressure is < 1400 psig and with Safety Injection flow> 200 Evaluator Note: gpm. The crew will also have trip ALL RCPs if Containment pressure is> 10 psig and Phase B actuates closinq the CCW source to RCP oil and motor coolers. Safety Injection flow> 200 gpm (YES) RO RCS pressure < 230 PSIG (NO) Main Steam Line Isolation Actuated (YES) AIN AK JN XGLAT.TON CAJON RuRrA CHM pzeaci.re GEMFER. T.iA1 GR EQWJ TO 3.0 PSIG Any S pau - LS TEAW oR OUAL T 61 PIG BOP AUAL DGRADATLON TOWiJkiS AUVHATIC ACJTIO) (IF NO then the crew should manually actuate MSLI since Containment pressure is rapidly raising. IF a manual actuation is not directed then an automatic actuation will occur) BOP Verify All MSIVs AND Bypass Valves SHUT (YES) Any SG pressure 100 PSIG LOWER THAN PRESSURE IN BOP TWO OTHER SGs (NO) Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 61 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Sceriario# 2 Event# 9,10,11 Page 98 Event
Description:
RCS Leakage increase I Failure of RCP C to trip I B CS pump auto start failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior With Containment pressure approaching 10 psig the SRO may assign a pressure value to the RO to manually actuate Containment Spray prior to Auto actuation. When Containment Pressure exceeds 10 psig a Evaluator Note: Containment spray actuation signal and Phase B signal will be generated. B Containment Spray pump will NOT auto start and B CS pump discharge valve ICT-88 will NOT auto open. Additionally, the crew will be required to trip ALL RCPs. C RCP will NOT trip from the MCB switch. Directs RO to manually actuate Containment Spray at a SRO Containment pressure below 10 psig to prevent auto Containment Spray actuation. Check CNMT Pressure HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 Event 10 PSIG (YES I NO time dependant) C RCP Manually actuate Containment Spray by taking 2 switches to fails to the actuate position trip
- Verify Containment Spray Actuated o B Containment Spray pump and ICT-88 fail RO Event 1 1 o Informs CRS and STARTS B CS pump and B CS OPENS 1CT-88 and 1CT-Il pump
- Stop ALL RCPs failure o Locates MCB switches for RCPs and STOPS ALL 3 RCPs o C RCP will NOT trip informs CRS of condition Critical Trip RCPs after RCP Trip Foldout Criteria is met and prior to Task # 2 exiting E-1 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 62 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# ._...... Event# 910,11 Page 63 of 98 Event
Description:
RCS Leakage increase I Failure of RCP C to trip I B CS pump auto start failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Determines method to secure C RCP (Either option is acceptable) SRO Dispatch Aux Operator to locally trip the RCP breaker OR On the MOB OPEN breaker 109, Aux Bus A to Aux Bus C to de-energize Aux Bus C (C RCP is the ONLY component powered by Aux Bus C) OPTION I IF contacted: acknowledge the request to locally trip C Local RCP TRIP RCP breaker. Simulator Contact MCR after Simulator Operator trips C RCP. Communicator Simulator Operator Insert Trigger 15 to open control power knife switch and 3 seconds later open the breaker. OPTION Locates MOB switch for breaker 109, Aux Bus A to Aux Bus 2 C. OPENS breaker and de-energizes Aux Bus C. Informs MCB CRS that breaker is OPEN. Trip BOP RO verifies C RCP is OFF OPEN breaker NOTE: Either OPTION 1 or OPTION 2 will accomplish the 109 Critical task of securing ALL RCPs BOP Verify AFW flow AT LEAST 210 KPPH ESTABLISHED (YES) BOP Sequencer Load Block 9 Actuated I Both Trains (YES) BOP Energize AC buses 1A1 AND 1 BI Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 63 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 9, 10, 11 Page 64 of 98 Event
Description:
RCS Leakage increase I Failure of RCP C to trip I B CS pump auto start failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 64 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D--2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# Event# 9,10,11 Page 65 of 98 Event
Description:
RCS Leakage increase I Failure of RCP C to trip I B CS pump auto start failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Evaluator Note: E-O, Attachment 3 is located in the back of this guide. E-O Attachment 3 is included in the back of this scenario. The RO will perform all board actions until the BOP completes Attachment 3. The BOP is permitted to properly align plant equipment lAW E-O Attachment 3 without SRO Evaluator Note: approval. The Scenario Guide still identifies tasks by board position because the time frame for completion of Attachment 3 is not predictable. Verify Alignment Of Components From Actuation Of ESFAS BOP Signals Using Attachment 3, Safeguards Actuation Verification, While Continuing With This Procedure. Directs AO to place 1A and I B Air Compressor in the local BOP control mode per E-O Attachment 3 step 22 Acknowledge the request to place IA and lB Air Simulator Compressor in the local control mode per E-O Attachment Communicator 3 step 22 When directed to place the IA and lB Air Compressor in Simulator Operator the local control mode: Run APPairiacs_to_local When the APP for IA and lB Air Compressor has Simulator completed running call the MCR and inform them that the Communicator air compressors are running in local control. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 65 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2._.. Event# 9, 10, 11 Page 66 of 98 Event
Description:
RCS Leakage increase I Failure of RCP C to trip I B CS pump auto start failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RCPs are secure therefore WR CL temperatures should be Examiners Note: used when checking RCS temperature. RCS temp trend will be < 557° and dropping control FF, maintain total FF
> 210 KPPH until SG level > 40% (all MSIVs are shut)
Stabilize AND Maintain Temperature Between 555°F AND 559° F Using Table 1. rABLE 1: ROS T NPERATURR CORTROL GUIDRIJNES POLLOWING RE TRIP
- Guidance Is applicable (intU another procedure directs otherid.ae,
. no RCPB runnIng. use wide range cold leg teapesture ROS TEMPERArI)RK TREND LESS ¶HAN GRE.TER TITAN STABLE AT OR 557Z AND 557CR AND TRENDING TO DROPPING RISING 57?
. Stop dumpIng IF condeuwer e Control feed steam available flow and steam RO 2RE?L transfer uwp to
. Control feed steam dump to estahlish and flow STEAN FRES SURE maintaIn RCS mode using temperature
- Maintain total OP-126, between 555CR fee4 flow Section 5.3 AND 5591 OPERATOR greater than AND dump steam ACTION 210 XPPR to condenser until level greatet than - OR -
25 L401 in at least one Dump steam on intact SG using intact SG PORVs
- IF cooldown continues. Control feed iRL shut flow to NSIVs AND iTiInta.in SC BYPASS valvee levels PRZ PORVs SHUT (YES)
RO PRZ Spray Valves SHUT (YES
- RCPs are secured)
PRZ PORV Block Valves AT LEAST ONE OPEN (YES) Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 66 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 9, 10, 11 Page 67 of 98 Event
Description:
RCS Leakage increase I Failure of RCP C to trip I B CS pump auto start failure Time Position L Applicants Actions or Behavior Any SG pressure DROPPING IN AN UNCONTROLLED SRO MANNER OR COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED (NO) Any SG ABNORMAL RADIATION OR UNCONTROLLED SRO LEVEL RISE (NO) CNMT Pressure NORMAL (NO) SRO GO TO E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 1. E-1 Loss Of Reactor or Secondary Coolant Procedure Note: Foldout applies Assigns foldout items of E-1 to both the RO and BOP (may give all to RO if BOP is performing E-O, Att. 3) RO: o RCP Trip criteria o RHR restart criteria SRO o Alternate Miniflow Open/Shut criteria o Cold Leg Recirculation Switchover criteria
. BOP o AFW supply switchover criteria o Secondary Integrity criteria o E-3 Transition criteria Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 67 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# Event# 9,10,11 Page 68 of 98 Event
Description:
RCS Leakage increase I Failure of RCP C to trip I B CS pump auto start failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Evaluator Aide: E-1 Foldout FOLDOUT
- RCP TRIP CRITERIA IF both of the following occur 11IEN stop all RCPs:
- St how - GREATER THAN 200 GPM
- RCS pressure LESS ThAN 141)0 PSIG
- AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERiA IF CST level drops to less than I0% THEN switch the AFW water supply to the ESW system using OF-i37, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM. Section &1
- RIIR RESTART CRITERIA IF RCS pressure drops to lless than 230 PSIG in an unoontrolled manner, THEN restart RHR pumps Ic, supply water to the RCS.
- ALTERNATIE MINIFLOW }PENISHUT CRITERIA
- IF RCS pressure drops to less than 1800 PSIG, ThEN verify altemate miniflciw isolation OR rniriiflow block waIves SHUT
- IF R.CS pressure uses to greater than 2200 P51G. g4venfy alternate minifiow isolation ANI) uriinillaw block valves OPEN
- SECONDARY INTEGRITY CRITERIA IF any iot the following occurs, THEN GO TO E-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATIONi, Step 1.
- ArThr SO pressure DROPS IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNERTHAT SO lIAS NOT EN ISOLATED
- Any SG - COMPLETELY DEPRSSURIZE1AN ThAT SO HASJNI BEEN ISOLATED
- E-3 TRANSrnON CRLFERA IF any SQ level rises in sn unc,ontrolled manner OR any SQ has abnormal radiation levels, THEN GO TO E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE, Step 1.
- COLD LEG R[CIRCULATION SWITCHOVER CRITERiA IF RWST level drops to less than 23.4% (2!4 Low-Low Iarlm), Ti-TEN GO TO ES-I .3 9RANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULA11Ot4, Step I -
Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 66 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# Event# 9,10,11 Page 69 of 98 Event
Description:
ROS Leakage increase I Failure of RCP C to trip I B CS pump auto start failure Time 1 Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Initiate Monitoring Of Critical Safety Function Status Trees. RO Maintain RCP Seal Injection Flow Between 8 GPM And 13 GPM.
. Check Intact SG Levels: Any level -> 25% [40%]
(YES I NO depends on monitoring and control should be YES IF NO then Maintain total FF> 210 KKPH until level > 40% in BP at least I intact SG)
- Control feed flow to maintain all intact levels between 25%
And 50% [40% And 50%].
- Any level Rising in an uncontrolled manner (NO)
Check PRZ PORV AND Block Valves:
. Verify AC buses IA1 AND I Bi ENERGIZED (YES)
RO . Check PRZ PORVs SHUT (YES)
- Check block valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN (YES)
. IF a PRZ PORV opens on high pressure, THEN verify it shuts after pressure drops to less than opening setpoint.
Check SI Termination Criteria: RO RCS subcooling -> 1OF [40F] C 20F [50F]
- M (NO)
Check CNMT Spray Status:
. Check any CNMT spray pump RUNNING (YES)
SRO
. Consult plant operations staff to determine if CNMT spray should be placed in standby.
Simulator IF contacted for CNMT spray pump evaluation tell CRS that Communicator at this time leave the CNMT spray pumps running. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 69 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# .._ Event# 9,10,11 Page Q Event
Description:
RCS Leakage increase I Failure of RCP C to trip I B CS pump auto start failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Check Source Range Detector Status: Intermediate range flux < 5x10-1 1 AMPS (YES) RO Verify source range detectors ENERGIZED (YES) Transfer nuclear recorder to source range scale. (Transfers NR-45 to source rançe scale) Check RHR Pump Status: Check RHR pump suction ALIGNED TO RWST RWST Suction OPEN
. RHRA: ISI-322 (YES)
RO
. RHR B: lSl-322 (YES)
RCS Pressure > 230 psig (YES) RCS pressure STABLE OR RISING (YES) Stop RHR pumps (STOPS BOTH RHR PUMPS) Check RCS And SG Pressures: BOP Check for both of the following:
/RO All SG pressures Stable or Rising (YES)
RCS pressure Stable or Dropping (YES) Establish CCW Flow To The RHR Heat Exchangers:
. Verify both CCW pumps RUNNING
. Open the following valves: ICC-I47 and ICC-167
. Verify CCW flow to the RHR heat exchanger(s).
RO
- Perform one of the following to establish two independent CCW systems:
- Shut train A CCW non-essential supply AND return valves: 1CC-99 and 1CC-I 28
- Shut train B CCW non-essential suppy AND return valves: ICC-113 and 1CC-I 27 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 70 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 2 Event# 910,11 Page 71 of 98 Event
Description:
RCS Leakage increase I Failure of RCP C to trip I B CS pump auto start failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Check EDG Status: Check AC emergency buses IA-SA AND I B-SB ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER (YES) Check bus voltages BOP Check breakers 105 and 125 CLOSED (YES) Check any EDG RUNNING UNLOADED (YES) RO Reset SI Manually realign safeguards equipment following a loss of BOP offsite power Shutdown any unloaded EDGs using OP-I 55 section 7 Initiate Evaluation Of Plant Status:
. RHR system CAPABLE OF COLD LEG RECIRCULATION (YES)
. Check auxiliary AND radwaste processing building radiation
- NORMAL (YES)
SRO Check RCS Status: Check for both of the following:
. RCS pressure LESS THAN 230 PSIG (NO)
. Any RHR HX header flow GREATER THAN 1000 GPM (NO)
GO TO ES-i .2, POST LOCA COOLDOWN AND I DEPRESSURIZATION, Step 1. Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 71 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# Event# 9,10,11 Page 72 of 9. Event
Description:
RCS Leakage increase I Failure of RCP C to trip I B CS pump auto start failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ES-I .2 POST LOCA COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION SRO Implements ES-I.2
. Reset SI
. Manually Realign Safeguards Equipment Following A Loss Of Offsite Power.
RO . Reset Phase A AND Phase B Isolation Signals.
. Open Instrument Air AND Nitrogen To CNMT:
o 1IA-819 o ISl-287 Monitor AC Buses:
. Check AC emergency buses IA-SA AND I B-SB ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER (YES)
- Check bus voltages SOP
. Check breakers 105 and 125 CLOSED (YES)
. Check all non-emergency AC buses ENERGIZED (YES/NO) (could be NO if Aux Bus C was de-energized to stop C RCP)
PRZ heaters should NOT be energized until PRZ water level Procedure Caution indicates greater than minimum recommended by plant operations staff to ensure heaters are covered, Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 72 Rev. 2
Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event# 9, 10, 11 Page 73 of 98 Event
Description:
RCS Leakage increase I Failure of RCP C to trip I B CS pump auto start failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Secure PRZ Heaters:
. Place backup heaters in the OFF position.
. Verify control heaters OFF (YES)
. Consult Plant Ops Staff for recommended minimum PRZ water level to keep heaters covered Check RHR Pump Status: (OFF)
RO . Aligned to RWST (YES)
. RCS Pressure> 230 psig (YES)
. RCS Pressure stable or increasing (YES)
. Check RHR pump suction aligned to RWST (YES)
. Stop RHR pumps o Previously Stopped
. Check Intact SG Levels: Any level GREATER THAN 25%
eo [40%] (YES)
- Control feed flow to maintain all intact levels between 25%
and 50% [40% and 50%1. Procedure Note: After the low steam pressure SI signal is blocked, main steamline isolation will occur if the high steam pressure rate setpoint is exceeded.
. Check PRZ Pressure: Pressure LESS THAN 2000 PSIG (YES)
RO o Block low steam pressure SI o Initiate RCS Cooldown To Cold Shutdown: Maintain cooldown rate in RCS cold legs LESS THAN 100°F/HR Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 73 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ESD-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 9, 10, Ii Page 74 of 98 Event
Description:
RCS Leakage increase I Failure of RCP C to trip I B CS pump auto start failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiners Note: END OF SCENARIO Direct the Simulator Operator to place the Simulator to FREEZE Lead Evaluator Announce CREW UPDATE The NRC has the shift. Inform the crew to remain seated at their desk and to not discuss the scenario. Operator When directed by the Lead Evaluator go to FREEZE __Simulator Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 74 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OP-I 07 Initiating Normal Letdown 5.4. Initiating Normal Letdown 5.4.1. Initial Conditions
- 1. Charging flow has been established per Section 5.3.
- 2. Pressurizer level iscireaterthan 17%
- 3. The following valves are shut:
ICS-7, 45 GPM LETDOWN ORIFICE A lCS-8 60 GPM LETDOWN ORIFICE B 1CS-9, 60 GFM LETDOWN ORIFICE C 5.42. Procedural Steps CAL TION It Charging flow was stopped or greaty reduced prior to letdown being se-cured, there is a possibilThj that the Letdown line contains voids due to insuffi cient cooling. This is a precursor to water hammer, and should be evaluated prior to initiati ng letdown flow.
- 1. VERIFY 100-337, lrK-144 LTDN TEMPERATURE, coritrIlr is:
- In AUTO AND o Set for 110 to i20F (4.0 to 4.7 on potentiometer) normal operati on OR
- Set for 0 to i20 (267 to 4.7 on potentiometer) if operating Section 8.11 per NOTE: PK-1&1 LTDN PRESSURE, ICS-38, may have to be adjuste d to control at lower pressures.
- 2. VERIFY 103-38 Controller, PK-145.1 LTDN PRESSURE, in MAN with output set at 5%.
OP-107 Rev, 10 Fage 2 of 149 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 75 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OP-107 Initiating Normal Letdown 5.4.2 Procedural Steps (connued)
- 3. VERIFY OPEN the fonciwing Letdown Isolation Valves:
1CS2, LETDOWN ISOLATION LCV-459 1 LETDOWN ISOLATION LCV-4130 1CSl
- 4. VERIFY OPEN lOS-li, LETDOWN ISOLATION, NOTE: The following table gives the minimum charging flow required to keep the regenerative heat exchanger temperature below the high teiripewature alarm when letdown is established Letdown flow (to be established) Minimum Cl aring Flow necessary when letdown is esta bUshed 45gpm 2Ogpm 6Ogpm 26gpm 105 gpm 46 gpm 120 gpm 53 gpm NOTE; Ut Pressurizer level is above the programmed level setpoint, charging flow should be adjusted to a point above the mininum required to preven t
regenerative heat exchanger high temperature alarm but low enough to reduce pressurizer level. (Reference ESR 9500065)
- 5. ADJUST controller ICS-231 FK-1221 CHARGING FLOW, as required to:
Maintain normal pressurizer level program
- Keep regenerative heat exchanger temperature below the high teniparature- alarnr when the desired letdown orifice is placed in service.
OP-107 Rev. 1.00 Pag&27o1149j Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 76 Rev. 2
Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OP-I 07 Initiating Normal Letdown 5.4.2 Procelura I Steps (contiflLled NOTE: If CVCS Demins have cooled from norna[ operating temperature. an increased reactivity affect may he oIseed. Consideration may be given to increasing CVCS Demins to operating temperature by flushing them to the RHT prior to restoring letdown. TIS-250, Recycle Evaporator Feed Demineralizer Temperature Switch, can be used to determine temperature during flushing to the RHT..
- 6. IF flushing cVCS Denins to the RHT is desired for increasincj temperature.
THE N PERFORM the following: a NOTIFY Radwaste Control Room that letdown flowMlI be diverted to the RHT..
- b. PLACE 1CS-120, LETDOWN TO VcTJI-IOLDUP TANK LCV-115A to the RHT position.
NOTE: Changes in. Letdown flowrate will affect the displayed iaIue for RM-3502A (Chnnne4 2303) due to the detectors proximity to the LTDN line.
- 7. OPEN an Orifice Isolation Valve (1CS7, 1CS-8, ICS-S) for the oritice to be placed in service.
- 8. ADJUST 1CS-38 position by adjusting :pK1451 output as necessarryto control. LP LTDN Pressure (P1.145.1) at 340 to 360 psiq to prevent lifting the LP Letdown RelieE.
- 9. WHEN Letdown pressure has stabilized at 340 to 360 psig on P1-145.1, LP LTDN PRESS.
THEN PERFORM the following:
- a. ADJUST PK-145.1 LTON PRESSURE. setpoint to 58%.
- 13. PLACE the controller in AUTO.
- 10. VERIFY PK-1 45.1 LTDN PRESSURE Controller mintain Letdown pressure stable at 340 to 3130 psig.
OF-107 Rev. 100 . Page2aofl49 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 77 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D2 OP-I 07 Initiating Normal Letdown 54.2 Procedural Steps (conJnued)
*l1. [F Step 5A.2. was performed AND CVCS DemEn temperature is at norlnal operatincj temperature, THEN PERFORM the following:
- a. PLACE 1CS-120, LETDOWN TO UCTLKOLDUP TANK LCV-115A to the AUTO position..
Ii NOTIFY Radwaste Control Room that diversion to the RHiT has been terminated, NOTE: Changes in Letdown flowrate will affect the displayed value for RM-3502A Channel 2303) due to the detectors proximity to the LTDN line..
- 12. OPEN additional orifice isolation valves (1 CS-7, 1CS-8, 1CC-WI as required.
13.. ADJUST charging 110w as necessary to:
- Prevent high tenperature alarm (per table above)
Maintain pressurizer programmed level.
- 14. PLACE PRZ level controller, LK-459F, in AUTO, as follows:
- a. PLACE PRZ level controller, LK-459F, in MAN to cancel any integrated signal.
- b. RECORD Fl-122A.1, CHARGING FLOW.
GPM j OP-l07 Rev. 100 Page 29 of l4 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 78 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OP-107 Initiating Normal Letdown 54.2 Procedural Steps tconhinued c, DETERMIN.E PRZ [eve! controller, LK-45F setpoint 1y one of the tio methods. (Ref 2.714) (N?A Step not peorrnd) DETERMINE LK-450F bed on the tab[e below: LK-459F Selpoint LTDN Flow Charging Flow (apprQx. value) 45 pn 27 gprn SOgpni 42gpm 105 gprn 87 gprn 34% 120 gprn 102 gpm Approximate values based on NOT/NOP CALCULATE PRZ level controller, LK-45F setoinL (Ref. 2J.14) LK-459F setpoint = (Desired Charging Flow 150 GPM) X 100% (Desired flow X 100% = ThO gprn Setpolnt Verified
- d. ADJUST PRZ level control[er. LK-459F 1 to the calculated setpoint.
- e. PLACE PRZ level controller, LK-45F. in AUTO.
OP-107 Rev. 100 Page 30 of 149 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 79 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OP-I 07 Initiating Normal Letdown 5.4.2 Procedural Steps (conhnued) i& WHEN the tol[owrici occurs:
- Program pressurizer level: S mtcMn the current pressurizer [evel AND
- Letdown arid seal return are balanced with ea1 injection flow and charging flow.
TI-IFN place coritrcillerlCS-231, FK-22.1 CHARGING PWN, in AUTO. 16, COMPLETE. Section 5.4.3. O?-107 Rev. 100 Page 31 01149 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 80 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OP-148 Section 5.2 CHILLER Placing Standby Train In Operation 5.2. Placing Standby Train In Operation NOTE: It is necessary to shift associated trains of HVAC units when shifting tra[ns of Essential Services Chilled Water. NOTE: This Section is written for swapping from Train B ESCW to Train A ESOW, Mth components for swapping from Train A ESCW to Train B ESCW in parentheses. 5,2,1. Initial Conditions
- 1. Service water is being supplied to the non-operating chiller WC-2 1ASA Qc-2 18-SB).
- 2. One train of ESGW is aiready in operation.
- 3. For non-emergency starts the prestart checks of Attachment 5 have been performed and an operator should be present to observe start of chiller.
- 4. Section 8.12, Manual Chiller Reset performed if necessary for non-operating chiller.
- 5. The L.O heaters have been in service for twelve hours. (See Precaution and Limitation 4.0.3 for applicability of this initial Condition)
NOTE: If service water header temperature is greater than 85F and the ESW pump is available startup of ESW is required. The pump should run for approJmately 30 minutes before chiller start. ESW provides additional flow at typically lower temperatures when used for service water supply. Starting ESW prior to a chiller start minimbes condenser pressure. Historically, High Condenser Pressure alarnis have been received during summer months due to high service ter temperatures and high chilled water loads.
- 6. IF desired due to Service Water temperatures being high, THEN VERiFY a same tra[n 28W Pump is running. Pump should run for approximately 30 minutes before chiller start.
OP-1 48 Rev. 63 Page 14 of 164 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 81 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OP-148 Section 5.2 CHILLER Placing Standby Train In Operation 522, Procedural Stepa NOTE: The local alarm indication for low chilled water flow and low chilled vater temperature will lock in ufltil manually reset at the WC-2 control parel. NOTE: If starting The chiller compressor is delayed ollong the start of the P-4 Pump in the next Step, the compressor oil could cool clown to the point that the compressor will trip on low oil pressure. NOTE: Step 5.2.2.7 can be perfom,ed anytime after Step 522.1. Itis preferable to start the fans before the chill& in Winter rnonth& This allows the chIll water to heat up and prevents the cIiIler cycling on and off on low temperature. 1.. At AEP-.1, START the non-operating Chiller WC-2 A-SA (R-SB Chilled Water Pump P4 A-SA (B-SB) to establish chilled water flow in the non-operating train.
- 2. At the local Control panel, RESET the Low Chilled Water Flow alarm using the CHILLED WATER lO FLOW TRIP INDICATION RESET pJsh-button.
- 3. IF starting the chiller forthe first time following maintenance where the chiller tube oil heater circuit was under clearance, THEN PERFORM the following:
- a. locally START the oil pump on the standby chiller compressor by taking the corvtrol switch on the local panel to the MAN position.
- b. tRUN. pump for 5 minutes.
- c. STOP the standby chiller compressor oil pump by taking the control switch on the local panel to the AtJTc) position.
4.. At, the 1_ocal control Panel, CHECK that all alarm lights are NOT lit.
- 5. IF ally alaim Iights ts lit.
THEN PERFORM the following:
- a. IF the Local Select switch is in the LOCAL position, THEN locally DEPRESS the STOP push-button.
- b. IF the Local Slec.t switch is in the MCB HVAC position, THEN place the standby chiller compressor control switch on AEP-i to STOP..
OP-148 Rev. 63 Page 15 of 14 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 82 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OP-148 Section 5.2 CHILLER Placing Standby Train In Operation 5.2,2 Procedural Steps (continued)
- c. IF any alarm light is still lit, THEN PERFQRM the following:
(1 ) DECLARE the chiller inoperable. f2 INITIATE corrective actions. NOTE: OPT-i 512 rotates the Temperature. Control Point potentiometer to clean the surfaces. While OPT-i 512 restores the potentiometer to its original position, it is possible that due to the surface cleaning The characteristics; of the potentiometer have changed sittlicientlyto require a manual temperabire adjustment persection 8.14 of this procedure. This will be determined by monitoring temperature after chiller start in the following Step. 4OTE ALB-0231-i4(2-14),WC-2 CH IA (18) GNDSR REFRIGHI PRESS, may alarm during startup of the Chillers. High chiller condenser pressure is caused by inadequate coaling of the refrigerant. Causal factors for high condenser pressure include high chiller service water inlet temperature, condenser tube fouling, condenser shell air binding, or reduction of service water flow.
- 6. START the chiller by performing. ONE of the following:
- a. At AEP-1, PLACE Water Chiller Compressor WC-2 A-SA cNC-2 B-SD) ontrol ewith t the START position AND RELEASE.
OR
- b. DEPRESS the START push-button at the local control panel with the local select switch in the LOCAL positiorL
- 7. START Train A(B) ESF Equipnent Cooling System per OP-i 72, Section 5.6.
OP-148 I Rev. 133 Page 16 f 14 I Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 83 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OP-148 Section 5.2 CHILLER - Placing Standby Train In Operation 5.2.2 Procedurnl Steps (continued) NOTE: ESR 99-00142 has evaluated and determined that long-term closure of the supply and return valves to the NNS AH units wilt not affect operability of the Essential Services Chiller system. The next two Steps will align the NNS AH units however, if itis desired to maintain the NNS isolation valves shut, then steos 5.2.2.8 and 5.2.2.9 may be skipped.
- 8. ISOLATE the supply and return valves to the NNS Al-I units from the train that was already operating by shutting the following valves:
ICH-19& SB (1CH-125 SB) CHILLED WATER FROM NESSR FAN CLRS 1301 ICH-197 SA (1CH-126 SA) CHILLED WATER FROM NE.SSR FAN CLRS 1301 1CH-i48 SB (1 CH-115 SA) CHILLED WATER TO NESSR FANS CLR ISOL 1CH-14 SA(1CH-116 SB) CHILLED WATER TO NESSR FAN CLRS 1301
- 9. ALIGN NNS AK units to the train that will remain operating by opening the following valves:
1CH-125SB(1CH-1963B) CHILLED WATERFROM NESSR FAN CLRS 1301, ICH-126 SA (1CH-197 SA) CHILLED WATER FROM NE.SSR FAN CLRS ISOL. ICH-1 15 SA (1CH-148 SB) CHILLED WATER TO NESSR FANS CLR ISOL iCR-i 16 SB (1CH-149 S/k) CHILLED WATER TO NESSR FAN CLRS ISOL
- 10. IF shitting chillers to support placing the standby safety equipment train in service, THEN PERFORM Attachment 8.
OP-148 Rev. 63 I Page 17 of 164 I Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 84 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OP-148 Section 5.2 CHILLER Placing Standby Train In Operation 5.2.2 Procedural Steps (continued) NOTE: Service water to the chiller condenser will isolate O seconds .fterthe chiller has stopped SW FROM VC-2 B-SB (A-SA) CONDENSER 1SW-1208 SB (ISW-1 055 SKi will close MOTE: AL923Ii-1 S and ALR-22.ii-16 ALB-23)2-15 and ALB-23J2-1) are expected alarms when securing A (B)CNIler. CAUTIO N Failure of equipment to secure in the following step will result in the associated EDG being ii perable. Tech Spec 3.8.1. lie applicable until the breaker for the a1fectd load is opened.
- 11. STOP the cNllerby performing one of the following:
- a. At AEP-i, PLACE Water Chiller conpres.sor WC-2 -S (A-SA) contro4 switch to the STOP position and release.
OR
- h. DEPR.ESS the STOP push-button. at the local control panel with the local select switch in The LOCAL posilion.
- 12. AtAEP-1, STOP the Chiller WC-2 BSB (A-SAl Chilled Water Pump P-4 B-SB (A-SA) in the train just Secured.
NOTE: Engineering recommends running ESW for about 5-jO minutes after the chiller starts to ensure it reaches steady state operation. Operator udgmeiit should be used to determine ii conllnuing to run the ESW pump to prevent the High Condenser Pressure slarm is warranted. There is no operability impact, Lut a nuisance alarm can be prevented.
- 13. IF desired, THEN STOP the ESW Pump started in tep5.2i,6,
- 14. NOTiFY the following to update the protected train placards:
- 3ecurity
- A/CC
- Maintenance Shop
- Operations (Update the Protected Train placard in the Operations Turnover area)
I OP-148 Rev. 63 I Pace I 8 of 16$ Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 85 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 AOP-016 Attachment 7 EXCESSIVE PRIMARY PLANT LEAKAGE Attachmeflt 7 Sheet I ct4 Leakage Ins ide CNMT INSTRUCTIONS Ff. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
- 1. STOP CNMT purcie, as follows:
- a. STOP Normal Purge srppIy fans:
O
- AH-82A O
- AH-82B b, VERIFY the rolowng Normal CNMT Purge Inlet/Discharge dampers are SHUT:
C
- ICP-93A LI
- 1CP-5SA 0
- 1CP-6SB O
- 1CP-38B
- c. VERIFY ONE Airborne RadioactMty Remova[ fan is RUNNING:
O
- S-IA o
- S-lB CI. VERIFY CNMT Pre-entrj Purge Lsolaton dampers are SHUT:
0 1CP-4SA 0
- 1CP-IOSA fJ I:
1CP-1SB O
- 1CP-7SB 0
- CP-D50 (Continued on Next Page)
AOP-016 Rev. 53 Page 30 of 120 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 86 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 AOP-016 Attachment 7 EXCESSIVE PRIIMARY PLANT LEAKAGE Attachment 7 sheet 2o14 Lkçje InicFe CNMT LNSTR1JCTIONS RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
- 1. (continued)
- e. VERIFY CNMT Vacuum Relief vaIvesldanpers are SHUT:
El 1 CB-2. Vacuum Relief 1]
- CB-5i SA, Vacuum ReFief 0
- 1 CR-C, Vacuum Relief O
- CB-U52--SB, Vacuum Relief
[12. NOTIFY Health Physics that CNMT Purge: has been STOPPED.
- 3. PERFORM the follov/lng Attachments to monitor the leakage:
O
- Attachment 18 O
- Attachment ig NOTE If a Gontainmen Ventilation Iso[ation signal has ocwrred, Tech Spec 3.03 is applicable, since: both trains of Containment Vacuum Relief are inoper able.
- 04. CKECK Containment condtions 0 4. IF Containment Ventilation Isotation NORMAL. has ACTUATED.
THEN VERilFY proper equipment alignment (refer to oMM-Q04, Post-trip! Safegu ars Actuation Reiew, A1]
- 05. NOTIFY Chemistry to sample the RCS for Dose Equivalent 1-131.
AOP-016 Rev. 53 Page 31 of 120 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 87 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 AOP-016 Attachment 7 F EXCESSIVE PRIMARY PLANT LEAKAGE Attachment 7 Sheet 3 of 4 Leakage Inside CNMT INSTRUCTIONS _[ RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED NOTE Radiation ontroi personnel must identify radiological conditions or provide corage and issue a special RWP prior to CNMT entry.
- 6. CHECK the following indications Q 6. MAKE a CNMT entry wtien NORMAL: [A.I. 31 permissible to locate, identify and O
- PRZ level isolate: the leak.
U
- CNMT temperature a. IF desired to increase D
- CNMT prsure Containment cooling.
THEN PLACE Containment U
- CNMT radiation levels Cooling in Maximum Cooling O
- CNMT sum p levl Mode per OP-i 69, Containment Cooling and Ventilation, I]
- CNMT sump pumpdown Section 81.
frequency U
- RMW System operation b. IF desired to increase frequency Containment cooling AND Maximum Cooling Mode is Unavailable.
THEN PLACE Containment Cooling in Increased Cooling Mode per OP-i 69, Containment Cooling and Ventilation, Section &7.
- 07. REFER TO the following Tech Specs:
- 3A.6.1
- 34.6.2
- 348 AOP-016 Rev. 53 Page 32 of 120 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 88 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 AOP-016 Attachment 7 EXCESSIVE PRIMARY PLANT LEAKAGE Attachment 7 Sheet 4 of 4 Leakage Inside CNMT INSTRUCTIONS RESPONSE NOT OBTAiNED
- 8. EVALUATE plant conditions br continued operation:
C] a. INITIATE appropriate action to repair the Ieak I] b. CONSULT the Responsible Engineer for further leak isolatIon guidance. El c. VERIFY any valves or breakers manipulated for leak isolaon are documented per the following: C]
- OMM-GOl, Operations Adrn[nistrafive Requirements I]
- OPS-NGGC-i303, Verification Practices 1] ci. CONSULT with Operations Management for other recoveiy actions.
- 09. EXIT this procedure.
--END OFATFACHMENT7 --
AOP-016 I Rev53 I Page 33of 120 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 89 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 E-O Attachment 3 TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION REACTOR Attachment 3 Sheet I of 8 feguard AcLuation Verification NOTE General guidance for verification of sofeguard equipment is contained in Aitachrnent4 of this procedure. ERFIS displays of safeguards equipment status are not reliable wli1e any asaociated safety-rnlatsd electrical buses airs de-energiiecL LI I. Verify Two CSIPs RUNNIING LI 2. Verify Two RHR Purrips RUNNING D 3. Verify Two CCW Pumps UNN1NG - LI 4. Verify All ESW jP ESW Booster Pumps RUNN INS - LI 5. Verify SI Vslve& PROPEILY ALIGNE[> (Refer to Allachnient 1.) 0 6. Verify CNMT Phase A Isolation Wktes- SHUT (Refer toO MM-004, POSTTRIP!SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION REVIEW, Attachment 4.) EOP-E-O I Rev. 1 I Page 55 0178 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 90 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 E-O Attachment 3 TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION REACTOR Attachment 3 Sheet 2 of 8 Safcguarci Actuation Veriflcatirn [] 7. Verify SG Slowdown M SO Sample Isolation Valves In Table I SHUT - Table 1 Sc Blow4iQv And Sale leojatien Yaiveig Proceag Outside UtMT Ixiside CN4T Line (NL-IA-sA) cLE-1.a-s6) SG A Saiuple IS?-217 SG 18 Seapie ISP-222 1SP-239!221 SG C Sample ISP-227 1S-224f226 SG A Elowdoim 150-U 1BD-1 Sf1 15 Slowdown lP-3O 150-20 Sf1 C Slowdown iED-*9 150-39
- 8. 1[ Main Steam Une Isolation Actua(ed Q is Required By Any Of The Following, TI-HEN Verily MSIVs MSIV Sypass Valves SHUT 11
- Steam Line pressure LESS TI-iAN 601 PSIG 0
- CFIMT pressure GREATER ThAN 3.0 P510
- 9. If. CIJMT Spray Actuation Signal Actuated OR Is Required, IIiEiL{ Verily The Following:
Refer to OMM-Q04,, POST TRIPISAFEGUARDS ACTUATION EV1EW. Attactiment 9.) 0
- CNMT spray pumps RUNNING 0
- C4MT spray valves PROPERL ALIGNED D
- PIiase B isoLation valves- SHUT 0 * ?JlRCPs-ST0PPED EQP-E0 I Rev. I I Page 56 of 78 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 91 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 E-O Attachment 3 TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION REACTOR Attachnient Stheet3 of 8 Safeguarda Actuation Venfication D 10. Verify Both f4ain FW Pumps TRIPPED 0 11. Verify FW lsoation Valves -SHUT (Refer to OMM-004, POST TRIPISAFEUAIWS ACTUATION REVIE Attachment 6.) W, O 12. Verify both MDAFW pumps RUNNING-
- 13. IF any of the following conditIons exists JEN verify the TDAF W pump RUNNING -
0 i Undervoltage nit either 6.9 KV emergency bus O i Level in two SGs LESS THAN 25% O Manual actuation to control SC level
- 14. Verify AFW Valves PROPERLY ALIGNED O
- lEna AFW Isolation Signal, THEN verify isolation and flow control valves OPEN -
NOTE An AFW Isolation signal signal reqtiiires Main Steam Une Isolation ooincdent with one SC pressure 100 PSIG below the other two SGs. El
- JAFW Isolation Signal present. THEN verify MDAFW end TDAF W isolation and how control valves to affected SQ SHUT O 15. Verify Doth EDOs RUNNING 0 16. Verify CNMT Fan Coolers ONE FA PER UNiT RUNNING iN SLOW SPEED EOP-E-0 I Rev. 1 I Page 57 of 78 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 92 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 E-O Attachment 3 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Attachment 3 Sheet 4 of 3 Sareguards Actuation Verification D 17. Verify CNMT Ventilation Isolation Valves SHUT - (Refer to 0MM-fl 04, POST TRIPISAFEGUAR.DS ATUAT10N REVIE Attachment 7.) W, IJ 18. Verify Control Room Area Ventilation MAIN CONTROL ROOM ALIGN ED FOR EMERGENCY OPERATIO N (Refer to OMM-004 POST TR)PISAFEGUARDS ACTUATION REVIE Attachment 5, Sheets I and 2, Sections for MAIN CONTROL BOAR W, D, SL8-5 and SL8-j
- 19. Verify Essential Service Ctiilled Water System Operation:
Da Verify both WC-2 chillers RUNNING D
- Veriry.both P4purnps - RUNNING O (Refer to AOP-026, LOSS OF ESSENTIAL SERVICE CHILLED WATER SYSTEM for Io of any WC-2 chWer.)
- 20. Verify CSLP Fan Coolers RUNNING 0 AH-9ASA o AH-flS8 0 AH-IOASA 0 AH-1QUSl NOTE Security systems are powered by bus IAI (normal supply) or bus tEl (alternate supply).
Backup power will be available for preximately 30 MI NUTE S alter the suppIying bus is de-energized. (Refer to OP-uS, CENTRAL ALARM STATION ELECT RICAL SYSTEMS, Section 6.8 and 8.10.) [1 21. Verify AC buses IA! i4fl 181 -ENERGiZED D 22. Place Air Compressor IA AND lB :ln The LOCAL CONTROL Mode. (Refer to Attachment 7.> EOP-E-O Rev. I I Page 58 of 78 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 93 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 E-O Attachment 3 TRIP OR SAFET( INJECTION REACTOR Attachment 3 Sheet S of 8 Safeguards Actuation Vacation CAD11ON The maximum calculated dose rate in the vicinity of IiACC 1A35-SA and is between 10 t1REM/HR and 150 MREMII-{IR. MCC 1 35-S0 C 2& Dispatch An Operator To tiniock ANO Turn ON The 8reakers For The CSIP Suction AND Discharge Cross-Connect Valvea: (Refer to Attachment I) 1OC iA.35-A lc4 m35-s VALVR uBIaLE VALVE OURICLE ICE-ho 4A ICS-171 4D hOS-69 4B ICS-168 70 108-218 14. 1CS-220 1CS-219 14Z IOS-217 120
- 24. Check: If C CSIP Should Be Placed In Service:
C
- j two thargh-ig pumps can NOT be verified to be running, AND C GSIP is available, ThEN place C CS[P in axvice in p[ace of the non-running CS1!P using OP-107, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM, Section &5 or 8.7.
EOP-E-0 I Re,. I I Page 59 of 78 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 94 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 E-O Attachment 3 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTiON Attachment 3 Sheet 6 of8 Safeguards Actuation Verification
- 25. Start The Spent Fuel Pump Room Venlilation System:
- a. At AEP-1, verify the following ESCWS isdation valves OPEN
- 1) SLB-1 I (Train A)
U
- Ai-L-17 SUP CH 100 (Window 9-1)
U
- Al-t-17 RTN CII 105 (Window 10-1)
- 2) SLB-9 (Train B)
U
- AH-17 SUP CII 171 (Window 9-1)
U a AFI-17 RTN CII 182 (Window 10-1)
- b. AtAEP-I, start one SFP PUMP ROOM FAN COOLER:
U a AH-171-4ASA U
- AFI-17 1-4B SB EOP-E-0 I Rev. I I Page 60 of 78 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 95 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 E-OAttachment3 REACTORTRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Attachnent 3 Sheet7 of8 Safeuarcfs AcLiationt Verification tIOTE
- Fuel pool levels AND t eratures stiould be monitoredi approxiniateIy every 2 HOURS. I to
- Followiii the initial check f fuel pool levels and temperature., monitoring responsibilities may be asuned by e plant operations staff (inIuding the STA). TSC or
- Only fuel pools containEng fuel are required to be monitored.
- 26. Check Stalus Of Fuel Pools:
D a. 0perate spent fuel cooling pumps to maintain fuel pool temperatures: between 85 F and 105° F.
- b. Monitor fuel pooi levels MID teiperatures
- Refer to AOP-04I., SPENT FUEL. POOL EVENT Attchnents 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 for SFP parametermonitcthng methods.
[1
- Refer to Curves H-X24, H-X-25 and H..X-2& for SFP time to 200°F.
D
- Levels GREATER 11-IAN LO ALARM (284 FT. 0(N)
- Temperatures -LESSTI-IAN I-Il TEMP ALARM (105°F)
EOP-E-O I Rev. I I Pace 61 olf8 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 96 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 E-O Attachment 3 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Attachment 3 Sheet 8 of 6 Safeguards Actuation Verification NOTE IF conti-oI room ventilation was previously aligned to an emergency outside air intake for past-accident operations, TI-lEN follow-up actions will be required to restore the alignment
- 27. Consult Plant Operations Staff Regarding Alignment Of The Control Room Ventilation System:
Q
- Site Emergency Co-ordinator Control Room
[]
- Site Emergency Co-ordinator Technical Support Center (Refer to PEP-230, CONTROL ROOM OPERATIONS.)
- END -
EOPE-O I Rev. I I Pacie 62 of 7 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 97 Rev. 2
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 1 Revision Summary Rev. I Revised per NRC comments provided on 75 day outline submittal. Archie Lucky 6/19/2013 Rev. 2 Revised per Operations validation comments. Archie Lucky 7/02/2013 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 2 98 Rev. 2
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 3 Facility: SHEARON-HARRIS Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: 05000400/2013301 Examiners: Operators: Initial Conditions: IC-19, MDL, 100% power
. B MD AFW Pump is under clearance for pump packing replacement
. lSl-3, Boron Injection Tank Outlet valve is under clearance for breaker repairs
. B Condenser Vacuum Pump is under clearance for makeup water supply valve problems
. Boric Acid Transfer Pump B-SB is under clearance for motor replacement Turnover: Plant is operating at 100% steady state power. Maintain present conditions.
. Isolate AFW flow to the ruptured C SG prior to entering ECA-3.i, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant: Subcooled Recovery Critical Tasks:
- Start the A MD AFW Pump to prevent a Loss of Heat Sink and prior to entering FR-H.1
- Shut A and B MSIVs prior to exiting E-2, Faulted SG Isolation Event No.
[ MaIf. No. Event Type* f Event Description 1 CRO/SRO prso6a Pressurizer PORV 445A Leakage 2 nis03a I BOPISRO NI-31 high voltage block failure and energization at power (OP-i 05) ccw0ia C RO/SRO Trip of A CCW Pump on 0/C with standby CCW pump B failure ccwO47 TS SRO to auto start (AOP-014) 4 eps05a C BOPISRO Loss of iA-SA Emergency Bus with failure of A CSIP Room zdsq94:6a TS SRO HVAC to restart (AOP-025) 5 R RO/SRO SG C PORV Pressure Instrument fails high and the PORV stays t308c N BOP/SRO open requiring the crew to reduce power below 100%. (AOP-042) 6 sgno5c M ALL C Steam Generator tube rupture 200 gpm (AOP-016) dsgo4a 7 C BOP/SRO TDAFW pump trips and A MDAFW pump fails to auto start cfw0lc 8 mssii Main Steam Header break outside Containment MALL (downstream of MSIV5) zrpk5o4a 9 zrpk5o4a C BOP/SRO Main Steam Line Isolation Signal Fails, C MSIV fails to shut mss05c (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor L Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev.2
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 3 SCENARIO
SUMMARY
- 2013 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 The plant is operating at 100% power in MOL. When turnover is complete the crew will be directed to maintain the current plant conditions.
The following equipment is under clearance: B MDAFW Pump is under clearance for pump packing repairs. The pump has been inoperable for 12 hours and will be restored to operable status within the next 24 hours. Tech Spec 3.7.1.2 LCO Action a and Tech Spec 3.3.3.5.b Action c applies
. 72 hour LCO or HSB within the next 60 hours, HSD following 6 hours.
YSTEI A1lXiLIAR FFEfYiATEF S1Et1 t[11TIG DOIDJ1W rGR OPERAT)ON 3.71,2 Ptt least three inieendent s:earn 9enert9tor ajxiary puns and asscca ted firy pa its ai I be OPEFW3I..[ ith: feeater
- a. fwc niotordrieri i>l1i.arj fIxr punips, ch caprb,1e of bisi po.ered rotn separate emeigency buses. and h One steaa turbine iri yen ui1 Luy eciater pir capable of be I n poired from ai OPt ME3LF tearmm wpob system.
APPLICABILITY 1ODE 1.. 2. and .3,
- a. Wit one auxiliary fed,ater Uffl incperable, restore the required cuiliar edte urnps o OPERABLE _.ttis t1n i at least 4T STANJBY wLhin the 2 hour 3 a be next 6 hours nd n OT SHlJTEOJN wItnl n the fol 1 6 hur.
tTti!H1AtION RTE NtflDQbiN SYSTt1 txrr1_oiTN PERAflG All transfer witch Atxmary Transfer Panel Cantrolt far hi OPERABIUTY Contl Pinl C4nti aM Axfliafy of tio cpoMnm.s riquired by th. SHNPP Sdf Satown lyhi to (1 rave d.cay hQI ia ax1l1aiy feee** flag and staa2 r.ratw pow.ro.atd re1lf a1ti. r A and low fom stia gen*ratar (2) antoI RtS imwtntory thro4 to. ora1 c+/-marin flnw path C) rtrT RCS pe**u-e (4) contrl an4 () rtmov decay hiat 1i the )iR sta hafl he OPERgLE. Pcxnrrt eD t M a. C. Wtth on. or im naprala Reati S.t4awn Syt. transf.r pcw. or control C Cti(t r.qulrtd by .3.3.5.b, ristore the slWas aiI. swttch(i)/circuit(u) to OPERASLI st.atul within 7 d*y or inopeT HOT ST?Y itMn the next 12 hours. b. in Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. 2
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 3 SCENARIO
SUMMARY
- 2013 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 continued
- B Condenser Vacuum Pump is under clearance for makeup water supply valve problems. Has been under clearance for 8 hours. Repairs are expected to be compl eted within 24 hours.
- 1 S 1-3, Boron Injection Tank Outlet valve is under clearance for breaker repairs. The valve is shut with power removed. The valve has been under clearance for 4 hours.
OWP-SI-01 has been completed. Repairs are expected to be completed within 24 hours. Tech Specs 3.5.2 and 3.6.3 apply. CyCORE GOOLINSJ 3/4. .2 EGCS SUBSSTEfrS - - 6EATER TfA4 O EO4JJ_ TO 3&F L1ML1IN( OMt)i1KJ4 F{Jk UftRAI ION 3&. 2 rwc ndprident Energency Core CooI I rig Systin (ECCS) bystis shall he OPEPABLE with each subsystem ctnpri sid f: a One OPERAULE Chargng/afety inject n Mflp,
- b. One OPERAULE RHR heat exchanger.
c, Ore 0RMtE R1R pup, and
- d. Ar (WERALE fia path capable of aki suctoi frcn the refueli water toraqe tnk cn a Safety Injection s qnal and ui beinq ng fflanualiy- a1ine& transferring suction to the itairient sui dLrThg the recirculation phase of operation.
PPUCABILITY.: MOGES 1. 2, and 3.
!T10N:
- a. 4th cie ECCS subsystem rnoprab1e, restore the inoerab1e sbs>steift to OPERABLE stflus withiri 72 hcvrs or be in at least HCT STANO8.( within -he rext tiour5 an1 1 r HOT HUTcN within the Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. 2
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 3 SCENARIO
SUMMARY
- 2013 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 continued 1 SI-3, Boron Injection Tank Outlet valve, Tech Specs... continued L1:NJTHFG COtWITION FOR OPERATION 3,6.3 Each contatnment tsolat4on vl spcifod In tho TechnicaT SecifI-catioo Equipnent List. Program plant procedure PLP-106, shafl OPEPJBLE with isolation Unes less th&n or equal to required iso1tion be tinos, APpLrcA*RILrry 1ODES 1, 2, 3,and 4, AtTION 1tith on or moro of tho contairment isolation valve(s) inoper.ablo, inainta east o isolation va1v OPERABL in each affected penetration that is ir at open and
- a. Rostore the inoperable valve(s) to QPRRLE status within 4- hours, or
- b. solate eadi affected penetration with in 4 hours by use of at least oiie deaetivated autoiatic valve secured In the olation positiow, or
- Boric Acid Transfer Pump B-SB is under clearance for motor replacement.
Has been under clearance for 12 hours. Repairs are expected to be completed within 24 hours. Tech Spec 3.3.3.3.5.b which is a 7 day LCO and 3.1.2.2 applies (3.1.2.2 is for tracking only). OWP-CS-05 has been completed. REIOrE SiJtø1N SYiEM rTtNomcN FR PRAT!CN 3.33.5,a flit Regote Shutdowi System cntcrtn In Table 3.3i shall be OPE.RML,E. ç hist entation hann*1s shown 3.3.3.$.b AlT transfer rtchms AXiI1W1 Transfer Panel Contr1* far the O?ERAatUi COnt1 .flt1 COfltlO1S and Aulaiy SHKPP Safe Shutdoi.n Analyti: to (IJ rnve decayof those nopan.nts requited by the flow and steam pfl.rat,r po aroperated rilief valveheat ia auxilfary faedwatir A and B, (2) control CS lnwentory through the flow ft st.ea gerators normal hat1n flow path. () control RCS r*ssure, (4) control reactivity, an4 (5) egov decay heat a the RHR system haU be OP!,I2L!. APPUILT: 4DES 1, 2, and 3. ACrWN:
- a. with the oweber of QPRA8LE recte 5tutown a torhi than the M1it Canri.Ts OPERL as required channils le r,tor the i1øeral chatnal(s) to OPERAaLE status by Table 3.39, or be hi )IO? SHUTDOWN within the next U hours. ithin 7 days,
- b. WIth the rn of OPtRABtI rte shutdown onit*ring channels less than the lotal Ner of Channels requr.d by Table 3 39, the inoperable hanneT to GPASL v.atus within C 4*yS orrestore utit a Special Report in accordance with pe ficat-ton 6.92 within 14-additional days.
Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. 2
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 3 SCENARIO
SUMMARY
- 2013 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 continued Event 1: Pressurizer PORV 445A Leakage: Pressurizer PORV 445A leakage. This failure will cause PRZ PORV 445A to leak, resulting in rising PRT pressure and level.
PORV Line Temp indicator Tl-463 will increase as observed on the MCB and the crew will respon d lAW ALB 009-8-2, PRESSURIZER RELIEF DISCHARGE HIGH TEMP. The crew may utilize AOP-016 to determine which PORV is leaking. The SRO will evaluate Tech Spec 3.4.4, Reactor Coolant System Relief Valves. TS 3.4.4 applicable LCO is Action a, 1 hour to restore REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.4 RELIEF VALVES LIIIITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.4 AU power-operated relief v&Ives (PQRVs) and their associated valves shaIl be OPERABLE. block APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2. and 3 ACTION:
- a. With one or more PORV(s) inoperable, because of excessive leakage, within 1 hour either restore the PORV(s) to OPERABLE seat status or close the associated block valve(s) with power maintained to the block valve(s): otherwise, be in at least STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the HOT following 6 hours.
Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. 2
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 3 SCENARIO
SUMMARY
- 2013 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 continued Event 2: Nl-31 high voltage block failure and energization at power (OP-i 05). The high voltage block on NI-31 will fail and cause the Source Range to suddenly energize and the audio count rate to become audible. The crew should respond to the failure by implementing OP-i 05, Excore Nuclear Instrumentation, Section 8.2 Inadvertent Source Range Detector Energization at Power. They will promptly de-energize Nl-31 by removing the 118V 5A instrument power fuse. The SRO should refer to TS 3.3.1 (no action required above P-6) and direct the implementation of OWP-RP-i 9.
3/4.3 INST RUEkTATION 314 3. 1 EAC1CR TRIP SYSTEI JSTRUEFITATJOI LIMITING 0NDITION FOR 0PER.TIDN. 33.i As a niinirnun. the Reactor Trip Systeii instrumentation channels interlack3 of Tabie 3.3-i shall be OPERABLE. and APPLICARILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-1. ACTION: s shmn in Table 3.3-1, NIH ilIUM TOTAL NO. CNAELS CHANNELS PPLICBLE FVNCTIOUAI JNIT OFCHS TQJJ 2SLE _MOOES ACTION
- 6. Source Range, Neutron Flux
- a. Stertup 1 2
- b. Shutdown Z# 4 2 1 2 3 4,
##Belaw the P-6 (interrneHate Range Neutron flux Interlock) Setpoint.
Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. 2
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 3 SCENARIO
SUMMARY
- 2013 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 continued Event 3: Trip of A CCW Pump on 0/C with standby CCW pump failure to auto start (AOP-014). The standby B CCW Pump fails to Auto Start due to a pressure transm itter failure (instrument is isolated therefore pressure decrease is not sensed). The crew should recognize the loss and enter AOP-014, Loss of Component Cooling Water. AOP-014 will direct the restoration of the CCW system. The RO will be directed by the SRO to manually start the B CCW (or will have started it lAW OPS-NGGC-1 000 when it did not auto start). The SRO should also evaluate Tech Spec 3.7.3, Component Cooling Water System.
PLANT SYSTEMS 314.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.3 At least two conponent cooling water (CCW) pumps. heat exchangers and essenti&l flow paths shall be OPERABLE. APPLIAB1LITY: MODES 1, 2. 3. and 4. ACTION: Iith only one component cooling water flow path OPERABLE. restore at least flow paths to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in t least HOT STANDBYtwo within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the foflowing 30 hours.
*ih breaker for CcW pump 1CSA6 shall not be racked into either power (SA or SB) unless the breaker from the applicable CC1J source pUmp (IA-SA or 18-SB) is racked out.
Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 7 Rev. 2
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-i HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 3 SCENARIO
SUMMARY
- 2013 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 continued Event 4: Loss of 1A-SA Emergency Bus with failure of CSIP A Room HVAC to restart (AOP-025). Emergency Bus A SA to Aux Bus D Tie Breaker 105 SA trips open causin g a loss of power to the Emergency Bus A. The Emergency Diesel Generator A starts and loads the bus. The crew will enter AOP-025 and perform the immediate action of checking any CSIP running. The crew should NOT perform the RNO action to isolate letdown since guidan ce is provided in AOP-025 Basis Document stating that this should only be done if the sequencer does not start the CSIP. IF the letdown flow is secured then the crew will have to restore letdown lAW OP-i 07. During the recovery steps of AOP-025 the BOP should identif y that the CSIP A room HVAC is NOT running. Since this is a Verify step the BOP should start the fan.
The SRO will be directed by AOP-025 to review multiple Tech Specs due to the loss of power to Tech Spec related systems. Tech Spec 3.0.3 is the most limiting action due to the isolation of the CNMT vacuum relief valves caused by 2/4 Radiation monitors failing high after losing power. Q4. REFER TO the following Tech Specs: a 30.3 (Due to loss of 214 a 34.6.1 ROS Leak Detection containment lad (Due to RM-3502A monitors and GVIS riop) affect on CNMT
- 3J3.5 Vacuum Reflet System vacuum reliefs) * &.1.i AC Sources Operating
- 38.1.2 AC Sources Shutdown a 33.3.1 Radiation Monitoring tor * &8.21 DC Sources Operating Plant Operations
- 3..8.31 Onsite Power (Due to inoperable Dstrib:ution Operating Control Room Outside
- 38.3.2 Orisite Power Air Intake Monitors) Distribution Shutdown Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. 2
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 3 SCENARIO
SUMMARY
- 2013 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 continued Event 5: SG C PORV Pressure Instrument fails high and the PORV stays open requiring the crew to reduce power below 100% (AOP-042). A transmitter failure will cause the C SG PORV to fail 100% open. Steam Generator C PORV Pressure transmitter PT-308c fails high causin g
the C SG PORV to open in automatic. The crew should identify this failure by annunc iator ALB-014-8-5, Computer Alarm Steam Generators alarming and status light indications for the C SG PORV. Note: The PT-308c does not have MCB indications. The BOP will be directe d by the SRO to take manual control of the PORV and shut it. The valve control will NOT respon d and an Aux Operator will be dispatched to locally shut the isolation valve to the PORV. During this time Reactor Power will exceed 100%. The combination of the steam leak and Reacto r power will cause the crew to enter AOP-042, Secondary Steam Leak/Efficiency Loss. AOP-0 42 is used to rapidly reduce Reactor power to < 100% at a ramp rate of up to 45 MW/mm. When Reactor power has been stabilized below 100% the AO that was dispatched to locally isolate the PORV will report back that the valve has been shut. When power is stabilized to the satisfaction of the Lead Examiner event 2 can be introduced. The SRO should evaluate Tech Specs 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves and PLP-1 06 Technical Specification Equipment List Program and Core Operating Limits Report. If the Tech Specs are not referred to during the scenario, then (if required) ask a follow up questio n at the end of the scenario dealing with the LCO. TS 3.6.3 Action c, isolate the affected penetration within 4 hours. The redundant manua l isolation valve per PLP-106 is Containment Isolation valve 1MS-63. (The 4 hour action is met by shutting the PORV Isolation valve.) CONTA1NMET $YSTEHS 3/4. 6.3 ONTA!NENT iSOLATION VPIVE,S LiMITING CO4DfTN FOR OPRATION 36 Each coiitainrient isolation valve pecifie.d the Techn{cal SpocifcaQien £guiprnert List Frograni, plant.. pi-acedin ure PLP-4O, shall be OPERA8LE with isolatioe tiees less then or equal tu required isolatin tines. APPLICP3ILITV: MXNIES l Z, 3. and 4 AC T0fd With ore ar core of the coytai neent iolti on valv(s) least oa isolation valve 0PEIABLE in each aFfected pcnetra inoperable, iintatn at and ti.an that s open
- Restore the in ,abl alve(s) t 0iERABLE status 1th4r 4 or hours,
- b. isolate each affected penetet4on within 4 hours by use cf at least orse dectivatedl awitcaaatic valve secired in positiora, r the isolation c Isolate eah affected penetration withIn 4 hours least one closed marnial valve or bi irid Fl an9e, or by use of at J. Se in at l*-s.t i-sOT ST4L I th hi th ne hours .,nd hi COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. 2
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 3 SCENARIO
SUMMARY
- 2013 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 3 cont inued Event 6: C Steam Generator tube rupture 200 gpm (AOP-016).
NOTE: prior to inserting event 6 the crew should have secured the A MDAFW pump to allow event 7 to unfold. C Steam Generator (SGTR) one tube sheared. Break flow of 200 gpm. The crew should recognize the presence of a large leak in the primary and announ ce entry into AOP-016. Due to the leak size the crew will promptly recognize that the leak is beyond CVCS makeup capability and the RCS pressure is being rapidly reduced. Prior to reaching the Reactor trip setpoint on Pressurizer Low Pressure (1960 psig) they should manually trip the Reactor, carry out the immediate actions of E-0 and time permitting manually initiate Safety Injection (an automatic Safety Injection may occur if actions are not promptly taken). Event 7: TDAFW pump trips and A MDAFW pump fails to auto start. A Reactor trip and Safety Injection actuation due to the SG Tube Rupture will cause a trip signal to both Main Feedwater pumps. The reduction in feedwater flow and contin ued steam release through either the Steam Dumps or SG PORVs will cause SG level to decrease. When low level (<25% on 2/3 transmitters) is reached in I SG an auto start signal will be sent to start both MD AFW pumps. Since the B MD AFW pump is under clearance the remaining A MD AFW pump should start and supply feed flow to the SGs to maintain a heat sink. A failure to auto start will occur at this time and no annunciators will be present to indicate any problem. Additionally, when 2 of 3 SG levels are low the TD AFW pump should auto start. This pump will auto start but upon starting it will trip. Annunciator alarm panel 17 window 7-4, Aux Feedwater pump Turbine Trip will alarm. The crew must manually start the A MD AFW pump or there will be an inadequate heat sink condition. This condition would require the crew to enter FR-H I. Event 8: Main Steam Line Header break outside Containment
. Five minutes after the Reactor is tripped a Main Steam line break on the main steam header outside Containment will occur. It is expected that the crew transition from E-0 to E-3 to address the ruptured Steam Generator.
While in E-3 the faulted Steam Generator will become apparent by the rapid reduction in Steam Generator pressure. Event 9: Main Steam Line Isolation Signal Fails, C MSIV fails to shut. The crew should attempt to manually actuate the Main Steam Line Isolation due to approaching the criteria Any SG Pressure Less Than or Equal to 601 psig. With this failure the crew will attempt to shut the MSIVs manually on the MCB, but only A and B MSIV can be manually shut. C MSIV will not shut from the MCB or locally. The crew should use the Second ary Integrity Foldout Criteria to address the faulted C Steam Generator and transition to E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, (if isolation attempts were not performed during the implementation of E-3). After entry into E-2 for C Steam Generator isolation the crew will return to E-3. The scenario will end after the crew transitions to ECA-3. 1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant: Subcooled Recovery and initiates an RCS Cooldown. Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 10-Rev. 2
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 3 CRITICAL TASK JUSTIFICATION:
- 1. Isolate AFW flow to the ruptured C Steam Generator prior to entering ECA-3.1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant: Subcooled Recovery.
Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of differential pressure between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs. Upon a loss of differential pressure, the crew must transition to a contingency procedure that constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy. This critical task requires the crew to isolate the feedwater flow to the ruptured SG. Any delay in the isolation of feedwater adds additional inventory along with the primary to secondary leakage. If the primary to secondary leakage is not stopped, SG inventory increase leads to water release through the PORV or safety valve which has the potential for an unmonitored radiation release. Continued filling of the SG could lead to SG overfill which could fill the SG steam lines with water and potentially cause a steam line pipe failure due to the additional weight of the water in the steam lines.
- 2. Start the A MD AFW Pump to prevent a Loss of Heat Sink and prior to entering FR-H.1 Failure to start the A MD AFW pump will cause a Loss of Heat Sink to occur since the B MD AFW pump was under clearance and the TD AFW pump trips upon starting and will not be available. The critical task requires to crew to identify that the MD AFW pump is still available and manually start the pump.
- 3. Shut A and B MSIVs prior to exiting E-2, Faulted SG Isolation.
Failure to isolate a faulted Steam Generator that can be isolated causes challenges to the Critical Safety Functions beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Also, depending upon the plant conditions, it could constitute a demonstrated inability by the crew to recognize a failure of the automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. This critical task requires the crew to recognize an automatic actuation should have occurred of an ESF system or component but has not and then take manual operator actions to perform the isolation. Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. 2
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 3 SIMULATOR SETUP For the 2013 NRC Exam Simulator Scenario # 3 Reset to IC-163 password dinner Go to RUN Silence and Acknowledge annunciators GO TO FREEZE and inform the lead examiner the Simulator is ready. DO NOT GO TO RUN until directed by the lead examiner. Set ERFIS screens SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS Press START on Counter Scaler Post conditions for status board from IC-19 Reactor Power 100% steady state Control Bank D at 218 steps RCS boron 1034 ppm B MDAFW Pump is OOS for pump packing problems Pump has been OOS for 12 total hours and is expected back within the next 24 hours Tech Spec 3.7.1.2, 72 hour LCO or HSB within the next 6 hours, HSD following 6 hours 1SI-3, Boron Injection Tank Outlet valve has been under clearance for 4 hours. Tech Spec 3.5.2 applies 72 hour LCO or HSB within the next 6 hours and HSD within the following 6 hours. Tech Spec 3.6.3 also applies but is met by removing power and having the valve shut. Boric Acid Transfer Pump B-SB has been under clearance for 12 hours. Tech Spec 3.3.3.5.b Action a applies, restore to operable within 7 days or HSD within the next 12 hours. Tech Spec 3.1.2.2 also applies (tracking only).. Align equipment for repairs: Hang CIT on B MDAFW Pump MCB switch then place protected train placards per 0MM-aOl 6 on A MDAFW Pump, MS-70 and 72, B ESW Pump, B RHR Pump and B CCW Pump Boron Injection Pump B-SB, place pump switch to STOP, and hang CIT on MCB switch Condenser Vacuum Pump 1 B, place pump switch to STOP, and hang CIT on MCB switch 1 Sl-3, Boron Injection Tank Outlet valve, and hang CIT on MCB switch Place filled out copies of OWPs into the OWP book ensure they are removed at end of day
- OWP-SI-01 and place in MCR OWP book for 1SI-3 clearance
- OWP-CS-05 and place in MCR OWP book for B BA Transfer Pump clearance Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 13 of Event
Description:
Pressurizer PORV 445A Leakage Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When the crew has completed their board walk down and are ready to take the shift inform the Simulator Operator to place the Simulator in Run. When the Simulator is in run Lead Evaluator: announce CREW UPDATE (SROs Name) Your crew has the shift. END OF UPDATE When directed by the Lead Evaluator, ensure that the Simulator Operator: annunciator horns are on and place the Simulator in RUN. Simulator Operator: When directed by Lead Evaluator: Actuate Trigger I PRZ PORV 445A leakage
- Tl-463 rising Indications Available:
- ALB-009-8-2 PRESSURIZER RELIEF DISCHARGE HIGH TEMP
. RESPONDS to alarms ALB-OO9-8.2.
RO
- ENTERS and performs APP-ALB-009-8-2.
SRO Refer to TS 3.4.4 and 3.4.6.2 as referenced by ALB-009-8-2 CONFIRM alarm using:
- PRZ PORV discharge line temperature TI-463.
- PRESSURIZER relief tank level, pressure, and temperature Ll-470.1, P1-472.1, and Tl-471 .1.
ALB-009-RO
- PRESSURIZER PORV position indication.
VERIFY Automatic Functions: (None) PERFORM Corrective Actions:
- IF a PORV is open (NO), THEN CHECK PRZ pressure using P1-444, P1-445.1, P1-456, and P1-457.
Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 -13 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 14 of 77 Event
Description:
Pressurizer PORV 445A Leakage Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Procedure Note: For minor leakage, it may be necessary to have Engineering assistance to develop proper strategies. Procedure Caution: Any PORV isolations that are shut due to decreasing RCS Pressure should NOT be reopened without further evaluation.
. IF all PORVs are closed and RCS pressure is normal, THEN DETERMINE which PORV is leaking and isolate it:
. IF leakage is significant, THEN SHUT all PORV isolations.
SRO REOPEN one at a time to identify affected PORV. o Determines leakage is NOT significant and ONLY directs shutting one valve at a time Evaluator Note: ERIS Point TRC-0463 can be used to evaluate if PORV is leaking.
. Shuts PORV isolations as directed by SRO o After shutting I RC-1 17, PRT Relief Line Temperature RO starts to decrease
. Determines/reports PORV-445A leaking.
SRO Directs RO to reopen I RC-1 15 and or 1 RC-1 13 if shut. Declares 1 RC-1 18 inoperable for excessive seat leakage (power will be maintained with block valve closed) SRO ENTER TS 3.4.4.a within one hour either restore the PORV to operable or close the block valve with power maintained. Evaluator Note: Cue Event 2 Nl-31 high voltage block failure and energization at power (OP-I 05). Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 - 14 Rev. 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 15 of 77 Event
Description:
Nl-31 high voltage block failure and energization Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from Lead Evaluator insert Trigger 2 Simulator Operator: Nl-31 High Voltage Block Failure Scaler Timer produces audible rapid count rate Available Indications Nl-31 indicating, with voltage on drawer Diagnoses that the SR Nl-31 high voltage off block has failed Crew and the channel is energized OP-105 Directs RD to Refer to OP-i 05 section 8.2, Inadvertent Source SRO Range Detector Energization at Power (see next 2 pages) RD Removes the instrument fuses to de-energize the channel Refers to OWP-RP-19 to insure channel is removed from SRO service (included in guide after the pages of OP-I 05) Ensure crew peer checks impmentation of OWP Applies T.S. 3.3.1 Above P-6 no actions are required SRO When below P-6 then restore the inoperable channel to operable status within 48 hours or open reactor trip breakers, and verify compliance with the shutdown margin requirements of 3.1.1.2 within 1 hour and at least 12 hours thereafter Reviews/prepares OMM-00i, Attachment 5 Equipment SRO Problem Checklist for the failure of Nl-31. Contacts WCC and support personnel for repairs. Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. 2
0 0
- m o Fb I) I- 0 J CD Q CD h -
x HH- mr b1.I4P1ltI LIbI ri r CD lb CD P lb 0 0 lb 0 P 1 UI f -s l- II * ( q o Cl O -D w !l ltJ bib bl1 no in 10 (p l-- w lb cl ft 1 lb H r* ri lb a P1 Cv i- o I_I I_I l)1 0 ft .
,-tI- lb 0 lb ITl)- ff0 tn%0 CII l-F-- P101 0 lb (A) 0 t 0 0 W01R11C0 .0 LIUIftft 0 P1 0 UI UI P1111 C) 1j1 CA111) OlIn triiIrT i -
._W UI 0
- Oft Cl - -O 100i ff000 p i 0J-P- 0 ft Z ft .1U UIIFOHI11 *rt C lb0 OH Ht- ft Z 2!.
0 IV II 0 0 OItllb VOIVCLO ClID Ofl C i- ft.. L.ft H 1 rI - WIn- £1 H V1-1D UI ID IflQ I 0 O oft I-- ft I- ft IV ft Ift I lb lb bI l LI 0 H ft I-- Z ft LI lb I-C lb rn 0 lb ft P1 0 IJ1-- 0 0 1-11-C lb 00 lb .J) fl UI
>< ft 1I ti II ft. ti O lb ft (II 1 Ceft Il F l- - III IttIr1-bl i--I- ftfl Ia IbbI P1 e .LI ClIP t 0 C)
HlJ 1-0 -1 Z0 ILI 0 ft in CD p LI I- w ft II 0 r X P rt 1-i rr 1 III I-C lIbIl- I-IIftH.n ft l-l I- C) oft ft ft 0 lb OF lb a nZft1--l Vft 0 lb IT. 0 1 , ft Uft 1--J IFII CD InOOlPIfI Oft 10 UI 0 Fl-j- ft ft ft lb F lbftI-- - m (P 0. 10 I- ft F10 0 ft -OIft II p UI 0. LI 0 rtlD4I.Cl lb 0 lb LI IF I ft L. Dl , - Q, L. P1 CI) ft I-U LI II Olb ft 000 II) 0 , rI Z o 1- lb lb ftPlIlft a Itlbt- Cl- I 10 I Ii CII H. lb I-( CII1- lbft ft (I (I) (A) t+ l1*1tl 1-I 0 CII UI 0 Ill P3 CII I) lbllI,CJ ftpIt!Cl I. ft ft ft I-I tI11-ft III C)H It ri ft l-*- ft I- I- ft LII .J ft CD H I-I, ft IllId ft Ublb LI (ft Ill ft 0 0 Cl ft UI 0.1)1 v-V l-CD -. :l H III 0 lb It t 0 ft. ft m 0 lb lb 0)0 0 CI0 10 0 ft 13, 0 Oft lb 0CI- P101 0 IT. (II ill P10C1 -o CD
- 0. ft IF ,-.-
I-U 0 C) 0 lb ft Cl CI) 0 0. LI I-I 1) . 0) C) CII RI ft ft0.00 Oft IIII I.I 5 i ft l,l (ft I tClb< IDftft Cl 0 lb 0 0 ft II) H F lb LI H UI Cl) F C) ft l lb lb0 III I-C D ft L Ill III ft (i) CII LI to Ce) P11I-tft LI oØolP 1)1W () 0pP1 0 0 1-- ft ft I-Il ft ft ft J Cl ft ft I - H ( 10 I-tI)l1I ijftCII 0.0. iUI IbQ > III Cii ft ! 13 1)1 H ft UI 1-4 LI Vi tl Ii) 1(1 I- Its 0 lb fTI-ft 0 5.1 II lblIllb 0 CI ft IOZIOO UI 05114 51 OtIlb 5-Ift 4ff l It 01110 H --o o II ftlftsft 1000 0 0 ft CD D CII t,IttIH 0.LIJI-11 H 0. II 0,
- 1) IVI1-- - I)( lb bl (1)
LII 01 OLib) toEI3l- IF 0 CD
- lb I5<I_()
0Cl 3) lb . C I o- II-1 -, -u 10 ft ft III ft ft V0301-1 ft lil 11) Q ft CO 0) IV ft Il I-lIOn I-I . CO
- 0) ft 1) OH. ID 113 N ft 0)
I--I 1 urn Oil CI) 10 lb ()
- 53) F LIII) 03 0 - -fl o 0 0) 0 ft -,
g o B S 1,)
______/ _____/_____ Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 17 of 77 Event
Description:
Nl-31 high voltage block failure and energization r Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior C-RE-1 ht 2 of 2 s.itableJstatos Light: Lineup Pc3iL1UU Cut Coeponettt W or nIwer npbi1ity ociticn rnit.ial/vets fied Inicial/Ve rifled
)n 5O3RC RNG Drawer Nfl LEV5L I? .SwlLi
/_____
Det:ermioe required poaltion per P in proqress en circle position oit.zL t1. IG3 LtJX r urrciN LOCX / CLOCK / rb,, oo p R?CI,qt:T.tP T,TP9 Pp1 ichec}: the fo1iowiiig mCE TR.t WLPZS t4-i Wind0w i-li ENERLtZED /_____ D-NERGIzED ON AuDIO COuNT RATE OI2L DRAWER
- Circle position selected, ct,st, SELECTOR SelL t1i u.
/______
I HeY. 1U Vageot1U4I Once the crew completes implementation of OWP-RP-19 Lead Evaluator: and Tech Specs have been evaluated, cue Event 3, (Trip of Running CCW Pump, A) Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 - 17- Rev. 2
Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-i Worksheet Facility: Shearon Harris Task No.: 001001 H201 Task
Title:
Perform Control Rod and Rod JPM No.: 2013 NRC Exam Position Indicator Exercise per Simulator JPM CR a OST-1 005 K/A
Reference:
001 A2.1 1 RO 3.7 I SRO 4.0 ALTERNATE PATH -YES Examinee: NRC Examiner: Facility Evaluator: Date: Method of testing: Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Classroom Simulator X Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.
. The plant is operating at 100% power.
. OST-1 005, Control Rod and Rod Position Indicator Exerci se Initial Conditions Quarterly Interval Modes 1 3, is in progress. All prerequisites to perform the test have been met and a briefing has been conduc ted.
The CRS has given permission to perform this OST.
. A PRZ backup heaters have been energized to support OST-i 005.
Continue OST-1 005, commencing with Control Bank D. Initiating Cue: Another operator is standing by to report DRPI position, when requested. To expedite the examination schedule, the candidate shou Examiners Note: ld review the INITIAL CONDITIONS, INITIATING CUE, and the mark ed up copy of OST-1005 prior to entering the simulator to perform the JPM. 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM a Rev 1
Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-I Worksheet Task Standard: The Reactor has been manually Tripped in response to continuous inward rod motion with rod control in manual. Required Materials: None OST-1 005, Control Rod and Rod Position Indicator Exercise Quarte rly General
References:
Interval Modes 1 3, Rev. 21 AOP-001, Malfunction of Rod Control and Indication System, Rev. 40 Handouts: OST-1 005 marked up with prerequisites and step 7.1 completed. To expedite the examination schedule, the candidate shou ld review the INITIAL CONDITIONS, INITIATING CUE, and the marked up copy of OST-1005 prior to entering the simulator to perform the JPM. Time Critical Task: N/A Validation Time: 10 minutes 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM a Rev. 1
Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-i Worksheet CRITICAL STEP JUSTIFICATION Selecting the bank for control rod motion is a deter Step 4 mination of the magnitude for the reactivity manipulation that is to be performed and must be controlled at all times by the operator. Selecting the direction of control rod motion is a Step 5 determination of the type of reactivity manipulation (Positive or Nega tive) that is to be performed and must be controlled at all times by the operator. Selecting the direction of control rod motion is Step 7 a determination of the type of reactivity manipulation (Positive or Negative) that is to be performed and must be controlled at all times by the operator. Selecting the bank for control rod motion is a deter Step 11 mination of the magnitude for the reactivity manipulation that is to be performed and must be controlled at all times by the operator. Selecting the direction of control rod motion is Step 12 a determination of the type of reactivity manipulation (Positive or Nega tive) that is to be performed and must be controlled at all times by the operator. Determining Reactor Trip criteria is required to Step 14 understand that the Reactor is no longer in a safe controlled condition and is critical to determine that the system is not functioning prop erly. 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM a Rev. i
Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-i Worksheet 2013 NRC Exam - SIMULATOR SETUP Simulator Operator
- ResettolC-166
- Password dinner
- Place reactivity data sheet for IC-19 on plant status board (this obtaining boron concentrations for the RCS and BAT) will be used for
- May have to update rods
- Place Restricted Access signs on swing gates
- CRT displays CRT 3: QP Startup and display QP POAH on CRT 4
- Go to RUN and wait 10 seconds then silence and acknowledge alarms.
GO TO FREEZE and inform the lead examiner the Simulator is ready. DO NOT GO TO RUN until directed by the lead examiner. (The examiner has provided to the candidate with initial conditions and the initiating cues prior to placing the simulator in RUN.) To recreate the IC setup for this JPM: o ResettolC-19, iOO%powerMOL o Place Rod Control Selector Switch to AUTO o Rod height CBD 218 steps o Create malfunction to fail the rod selector switch to the selected bank and continuously demand rod motion on Trigger 1 o imf crfl5a (1 00:00:00 00:00:00) TRUE o iorxcliil0(1 00:00:00 00:00:00) ASIS o FREEZE and SNAP. o After the candidate is ready, place simulator in RUN. o While Control Bank A is being inserted to 10 steps from the origina l position, activate Trigger 1 2013 NRC Exam CRJPMa Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 5 of 12 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Simulator Operator: When directed by the Lead Examiner go to Run. Performance Step: I Obtain procedure. Standard: Reviews handout. Evaluators Cue: Provide the handout. Comment: START TIME: OST-1 005, 7.2.4 Procedure Note: NOTE: IF in Mode 1, THEN testing of Control Bank D can be conducted during lowering of plant power per Section 7.4. and the next section may be marked N/A. NOTE: IF Control Bank D is less than 10 steps, THEN testing of Control Bank D rods can be conducted per Section 7.3. and the next section may be marked N/A. NOTE: When inserting rods, the Bank Low Insertion and Bank Low-Low Insertion Limit Alarm may be actuated. Performance Step: 2 Control Bank D Testing For CONTROL BANK D, REFER to Attachment I and test the rod bank per the following instructions: Standard: Circle / Slash notes to verify that notes are read and understood. Comment: V Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM a Rev. i
Appendix C Page 6 of 12 Form ESC-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION OST-1 005, Step 7.2.4.1.a Performance Step: 3 For Control Bank D, record on Attachment 1 the initial rod heights as indicated by Group Step Counters and DRPI. Standard: On Attachment 1, for Control Bank D: o Records both Group Position indications as 218. o Records all DRPI position indications as 216. Comment: OST-1005, Step 7.2.4.1.b q Performance Step: 4 Rotate the Rod Bank Selector to CBD. Evaluator Note: OMM-001 Att 13 provides Stable Plant TAVG Control Band of
+1- 2° F and Trip Limit of +T 10° F from TREF with Rod Control in manual.
Standard: Locates the ROD BANK SELECTOR switch and rotates position to the CB D position. Verifies 48 steps per minute on rod speed indicator, Sl-408 Comment: OST-1 005, Step 7.24.1.c q Performance Step: 5 With the Rod Motion lever, insert Control Bank D IN 10 steps as indicated by Group Step Counters. Standard: Places the ROD MOTION lever to the IN position and inserts Control Bank D rods 10 steps by observing Group Step Counters. Comment: V Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM a Rev. I
Appendix C Page 7 of 12 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION OST-1 005, Step 7.2.4.1.d Performance Step: 6 Record on Attachment 1, the rod heights for Control Bank D, as indicated by Group Step Counters and DRPI. Standard: On Attachment 1, for control Bank D:
- Records both Group Position indications as 208.
o Requests/records all DRPI position indications as 204. Evaluator Cue: If requested: DRPI indicates 204 steps for all Control Bank D rods. Comment: OST-1 005, Step 7.2.4.te j Performance Step: 7 With the Rod Motion lever, WITHDRAW Control Bank D OUT 10 steps as indicated by Group Step Counters. Standard: Places the ROD MOTION lever in the OUT position and withdraws Control Bank D rods 10 steps by observing Group Step Counters. Comment: OST-1 005, Step 7.2.4.1.f Performance Step: 8 Record on Attachment 1, the final rod heights for Control Bank D, as indicated by Group Step Counters and DRPI. Standard: On Attachment 1, for control Bank D: o Records both Group Position indications as 218.
- Requests/records all DRPI position indications as 216.
Evaluator Cue: If requested: DRPI indicates 216 steps for all Control Bank D rods. Comment: V Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM a Rev. I
Appendix C Page 8 of 12 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION When control bank D rods have been exercised the Lead Evaluator: candidate may ask which bank to exercise next. IF asked direct the operator as CRS to exercise Control Bank A OST-1 005, 7.2.1 Procedure Note: NOTE: When inserting rods, ALB 13/8-2, BANK LOW INSERTION and ALB 13/8-3, BANK LOW-LOW INSERTION LIMIT Alarms may be actuated. NOTE: ALB 13/8-5, COMP ALARM ROD DEVIATION/SEQU ENCE will annunciate during this procedure due to bank out of sequence, and should be considered an expected alarm. Performance Step: 9 Control Bank A Testing For CONTROL BANK A, REFER to Attachment I and test the rod bank per the following instructions: Standard: Circle I Slash notes to verify that notes are read and understood. Comment: OST-1 005, Step 7.2.1.1.a Performance Step: 10 For Control Bank A, record on Attachment 1 the rod heights as indicated by Group Step Counters and DRPI. Standard: On Attachment 1, for Control Bank A:
- Records both Group Position indications as 225.
- Requests/records all DRPI position indications as 222.
Evaluator Cue: If requested: DRPI indicates 222 steps for all Control Bank A rods. Comment: V Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM a Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 9of 12 Form ES-C-I PERFORMANCE INFORMATION OST-I 005, Step 7.2.1.tb
.J Performance Step: 11 Rotate the Rod Bank Selector to CBA.
Standard: Rotates the ROD BANK SELECTOR switch to the CB A position. Comment: When rods have been inserted 2-3 steps, cue the Simula Lead Evaluator: tor Operator to insert Trigger I to insert malfunctions for the continuous demand for rod motion.
. When directed by the Lead Examiner actuate Trigger Simulator Operator: I (continuous demand for rod motion)
Alternate Path Starts Here OST-I 005, Step 7.2.I.1.c q Performance Step: 12 With the Rod Motion lever, insert Control Bank A IN 10 steps as indicated by Group Step Counters. Standard: Places the ROD MOTION lever in the IN position and inserts Control Bank A rods 10 steps by observing Group Step Counters. Comment: Alternate Path Performance Step: 13 Monitors Rod Motion. When Rod Motion level is released CB A rods continue to step IN. Standard: Determines rod motion continues without a demand observ ing:
- Group Step Counter continues to count in
- DRPI continues to lower
- Lowering Rx power
- Lowering Tavg Comment:
V Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM a Rev. I
Appendix C Page 10 of 12 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Alternate Path AOP-OO1 Immediate Action J Performance Step: 14 Informs the CRS of the continued rod motion with rods in manual and states entry conditions for AOP-001, (Malfunction of Rod Control and Indication System) Standard:
- Informs the CRS.
- Initiates immediate actions of AOP-001 Check that < 2 control rods are dropped (YES)
Position Rod Bank Selector Switch to MAN (YES) Check Control Bank motion STOPPED (NO)
- Trip the Reactor AND GO TO E-0 Locates MOB Reactor trip switch and turns switch to TRIP. (q)
- E-O Verify Reactor Trip Rx Trip and Bypass Bkrs OPEN (YES)
Rod Bottom Lights LIT (YES) Neutron Flux DROPPING (YES) o Check Turbine Trip All Throttle Valves Shut (YES) TURI STOP \ELV 1 TSL-2Uj TtJRB STOP VLV 2 PSL-2-fl-2 TURB STOP VLJ 3 rsLE-2-u3 TIIRB STOP W.V TSLB-2U-4 Evaluators Cue: Another Operator will complete the remaining actions of E-O. Comment: When the first immediate action of E-O is implem ented: Evaluator Cue: Evaluation on this JPM is complete. Direct Simulator Operator to place the Simulator in Freeze. Simulator Operator: When directed by the Lead Examiner then go to Freeze. STOP TIME: V Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM a Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 11 of 12 Form ES-C-i VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2013 NRC Exam JPM CR a Perform Control Rod and Rod Position Indicator Exercise per OST-1 005 Examinees Name: Date Performed: Facility Evaluator: Number of Attempts: Time to Complete: Question Documentation: Question:
Response
Result: SAT UNSAT Examiners Signature: Date: 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM a Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 12 of 12 Form ES-C-i JPM CUE SHEET
. The plant is operating at 100% power.
. OST-1005, Control Rod and Rod Position Indicator Exerci se Quarterly Interval Modes 1 3, is in progress. All Initial Conditions: prerequisites to perform the test have been met and a briefin g
has been conducted. The CRS has given permission to perform this OST.
. A PRZ backup heaters have been energized to support OST-1 005.
Continue OST-1 005, commencing with Control Bank D. Initiating Cue: Another operator is standing by to report DRPI position, when requested. 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM a Rev. I
Appendix C Page 1 of 12 Form ES-C-I Worksheet Facility: Shearon Harris Task No.: 013003H101 Task
Title:
Respond to the loss of the running JPM No.: 2013 NRC Exam CSIP Simulator JPM CR b KIA
Reference:
APE022 AA1 .01 RO 3.4 SRO 3.3 ALTERNATE PATH YES - Examinee: NRC Examiner: Facility Evaluator: Date: Method of testing: Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Classroom Simulator X Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiati ng cues.. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Perform ance Measure will be satisfied. The unit is operating at 100% power and is in a steady state alignment. Initial Conditions: The ASI system has been under clearance for the last 3 hours for scheduled maintenance and will be restored to service within the next hour. Initiating Cue: You are the OAC. Maintain current plant conditions. Ci I) 2013 NRC Fm imift-r IP (D k Ds 4
Appendix C Page 2 of 12 Form ES-C-i Worksheet Task Standard: Letdown isolated, MANUAL Rx Trip, afl RCPs stopped with PZR Spray valves shut. Required Materials: None General
References:
AOP-018, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions, Rev. 43 Time Critical Task: No Validation Time: 10 minutes Critical Step Justification Isolation of letdown is an immediate action step that is expect ed to be Step 4 performed from memory. Isolation of letdown stops the depleti on of RCS inventory. When the RCPs have exceeded their trip limits described in AOP-018, Attachment 1, it is an operator expectation that the Reactor will be Step 10 placed in a safe condition then the RCPs will be secured to protect valuable plant equipment from damage. Tripping the Reacto r and ensuring that the Reactor is tripped is the responsibility of the QAC. Determining that ALL RCPs have been affected and then Ste p 11 stopping ALL RCPs is critical to protect the RCPs from potential damag e. 9fl1 NIP( trmi fr- ,
Appendix C Page 3 of 12 Form ES-C-i Worksheet 2013 NRC Exam - SIMULATOR SETUP Simulator Operator
- Reset to IC-167
- Password dinner
- Gotorun
- Silence and Acknowledge annunciators GO TO FREEZE and inform the lead examiner the Simulator is ready. DO NOT GO TO RUN until directed by the lead examiner. (The examiner has provided to the candidate with initial conditions and the initiating cues prior to placing the simulator in RUN.)
To recreate the IC setup for this JPM:
- Initial Simulator IC was IC-19
- Gotorun
- Take ASI system Out of Service o Run AMS file ASI QOS o Verify annunciator ALB-O8-2-3 is on ASI System Trouble
- Place a trip of the A CSIP on a trigger 1 o imf cvc05a (1 00:00:00 00:00:00) true
- Engage the handwheel for CC 252 and then close valve over 10 second s
o irf ccwO44 (2 00:00:00 00:00:00) ENGAGED o irf ccwO45 (2 00:00:00 00:00:00) 0 00:00:10 0
- Silence Acknowledge and Reset Annunciators
- Freeze and Snap these conditions to your exam IC 2013 NRC. Iv2m imHl+rr IDM (LD L.. J-..... .1
Appendix C Page4of 12 Form ES-C-I PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Simulator Operator: When directed by the Lead Examiner go to Run. Evaluator Cue: Approximately 10 seconds after taking shift have Simulator Operator insert Trigger 1 (Trip of the running CSIP) START TIME: Annunciator Alarms Performance Step: I ALB 7-1-3 CHRG Pumps A Trip or Close CKT Trouble Standard: Announces annunciator and responds to alarm Identifies:
. CSIP discharge pressure is lowering e CSlPAmpsareO Recognizes entry conditions to AOP-018 Evaluator Cue: Acknowledges annunciator and entry into AOP-018 (using proper communications)
Comment: The Immediate Action Steps of AOP-018 are to be perform ed from memory WITHOUT the aid of the procedure. Performance Step: 2 Respond to CSIP trip. Standard: Enters AOP-018. Comment: 201 NR1 PY2m ,miiI+rr ID!A (ID L- r-.-..
Appendix C Page 5 of 12 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION AOP-O18, Step 1 Procedure Note:
- Step 1 is an immediate action.
- RCP abnormal conditions may require implementation of the SHNPP Emergency Plan.
Performance Step: 3 CHECK ANY CSIP RUNNING. Standard: Answers NO and proceeds to RNO Comment: 2013 NRC Pym imi,lfrr IDtA (ID k ID.-, l
Appendix C Page 6Of 12 Form ES-C-I PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Evaluator Note: When candidate begins to isolate letdown instruct the Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 1, ICC-252 fails shut. ALB-5-I-2B, RCP THERMAL BAR HDR LOW FLOW, will alarm when ICC-252 shuts. The applicant may stop activities associated with AOP-0 18, address the annunciator and attempt to open ICC-252 valve will NOT open from MCB switch. Simulator Operator: When directed by the Evaluator: Actuate trigger to fail ICC-252 SHUT AOP-018, Step 1 RNO q Performance Step: 4 ISOLATE letdown by verifying the following valves SHUT: o 1CS-7, 45 GPM Letdown Orifice A o 1CS8, 60 GPM Letdown Orifice B
- 1 CS-9, 60 GPM Letdown Orifice C Evaluator Note: OPS-NGGC-I 000 Attachment 3 Two Handed Operat ions states: When the need arises due to inability to operate the system as designed or time constraints associated with multiple switch operation with a single hand, then Two-handed Operation should be used. SMICRS approval is required unless two-handed operation is required to meet an urgent need, or is required by procedure direction or controlling interlocks.
An example of when 2 handed operation is accepted at HNP is appropriate: Letdown orifice isolation (placing and holding to SHUT) when directed by AOP!EOP immed iate actions. Two handed operations is recommended (to achieve fast closure) without having to ask permission. Standard: Locates MCB controls for letdown valves and shuts ICS-7 and 1CS-8 and verifies 1CS-9 is shut. Comment: 2013 NRC Frn imiil+r IptA r k D
Appendix C Page 7 of 12 Form ES-C-I PERFORMANCE INFORMATION AOP-018, Step 2 After the candidate completes the immediate actions of AOP-0 18 the candidate should obtain a MCR copy of AOP-018 and Evaluator Note: perform actions accordingly. Performance Step: 5 Step 2: REFER TO PEP-i 10, Emergency Classification And Protective Action Recommendations, AND ENTER the EAL Matrix. Standard: Informs CRS/SM. Evaluator Cue: Acknowledge report. Comment: AOP-018, Step 3 Minimum allowable flow for a CSIP is 60 gpm which is provided Procedure Note: by normal miniflow during normal operation and alternate miniflow during safety injection. Maintaining CSIP flow greater than or equal to 60 gpm also satisfies this requirement. Performance Step: 6 EVALUATE plant conditions AND GO TO the appropriate section: MALFUNCTION I SECTION Page Loss ci COW and:oc Non-aol Seat Injection 31 f,_ f)fl. 5 1L NLt Hiph Reoctor Cooiant Pump VibraUon 3.2 8 Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Malfunction 3.3 10 Reactor Cooant Pump Motor Trouble 3,4 18 Standard: Circle / Slash note to verify that notes are read and unders tood. Evaluates current plant conditions and selects Section 3.1: Loss of COW and/or Seal Injection to RCPs Comment: Qm, I-+,- IrTi rr, i. -.. .4
Appendix C Page 8 of 12 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION AOP-018, Step 3.1.1 Performance Step: 7 CHECK ALB-5-1-2A, RCP THERMAL BAR HDR HIGH FLOW, alarm CLEAR. Standard: Answers YES Comment: AOP-OO1, Step 3.1.1 Performance Step: 8 CHECK ALL RCPs operating within the limits of Attachment 1 (Page 23). Standard:
- Reviews Attachment 1 conditions Determines Condition 4 not met and answers NO Exceeding Limits and proceeds to carry out the actions of Step 4
- Reactor Coolant Pump Trip Limits I NOTE I
- ALB-Srl-2B, RCP THERM BAR HDR LOW FLOW, indIcates RCP [h&rna! bardes.
loss of CCWto all
- The AS! System .iH actuate in2 ninutes and 45 seconds from timer initiation. If 2 ruo und 45 suconUs rue ui etupsed WAIT Iui iniUutiow.
- 4. [c-as of RCP sect reclian nciudhci AS!) when ANY of the following condlions
* (CW flaw nm In the assnamlert RC:P ThnmaI Rarrer HX
- RCS teirperature e greater than or equal o 4OOF AND ccw HX outlet temperature is greater thar 1 O5F
- ROS temperature is less then 4D[F AND CCW -IX outlet temperature is greater than t25F Evaluator Note: Applicant may make this determination without referencing Attachment 1. Also, dependent on the rate of progress through the procedure, temperature limits may be exceeded.
Comment: AOP-OO1, Step 3.1.4 Performance Step: 9 CHECK the Reactor is TRIPPED. Standard: Answers NO. Comment: 2fl1? NRC. Pyem Qimi,l.,f.-r IA fITh L. r.....
Appendix C Page 9 of 12 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION AOP-OO1, Step 3.1.4 RNO q Performance Step: 10 TRIP the Reactor AND GO TO EOP-E-O. (Perform Steps 5 through 8 as time permits.) Standard:
- Initiates a MANUAL Reactor Trip (J)
- Performs E-O Immediate Actions from memory Locates MCB Reactor trip switch and turns switch to TRIP. (/)
E-O Verify Reactor Trip Rx Trip and Bypass Bkrs OPEN (YES) Rod Bottom Lights LIT (YES) Neutron Flux DROPPING (YES) a Check Turbine Trip All Throttle Valves Shut TIrIU STOP VLV I TSL5-2-.1-TU1U STOP VLV 2 TSL1I,2 T1JRB STOP ?LV 3 TSL-2-11-3 TUT STOP VLV 4 TSLB2j1-(YES All Throttle valves are Shut) After the applicant performs E-0 immediate action steps I and 2 from memory announce: Evaluator Cue: Another Operator will complete the remaining actions of E-0. Continue with the actions of AOP-O1 8 Comment: 9fl1 MP( 11Th. fr I-
Appendix C Page 10 of 12 Form ES-C-I PERFORMANCE INFORMATION AOP-001, Step 3.1.5 q Performance Step: 11 STOP affected RCP(s). Standard: Determines that ALL RCPs are affected: Locates MCB switches for RCPs A, B, and C o Takes individual control switch to STOP for each RCP Comment: AOP-001, Step 3.1.6 Performance Step: 12 3.1.6: CHECK RCP A RUNNING. Standard:
- Answers NO and performs RNO steps.
Locates MCB manual/auto station and places PK-444C.1 in MANUAL then decreases demand to 0% to SHUT 1RC-107, PRZ Spray Loop A Comment: AOP-001, Step 3.1.7 Performance Step: 13 3.1.7: CHECK RCP B RUNNING. Standard:
- Answers NO and performs RNO steps.
Locates MCB manual/auto station and places PK-444D.1 in MANUAL then decreases demand to 0% to SHUT 1RC-103, PRZ Spray Loop B Comment: When both PRZ Spray valves have been taken to MANUAL Evaluator Cue: and SHUT: Evaluation on this JPM is complete. Direct Simulator Operator to place the Simulator in Freeze Simulator Operator: When directed by the Lead Examiner then go to Freeze STOP TIME: 2fl1 r\IP( Tvm Qrv,, I1 rr- i i-..
Appendix C Page 11 of 12 Form ES-C-i VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2013 NRC Exam JPM CR b Respond to the loss of the running CSIP AOP-01 8 Examinees Name: Date Performed: Facility Evaluator: Number of Attempts: Time to Complete: Question Documentation: Question:
Response
Result: SAT UNSAT Examiners Signature: Date: 9fl12 NIDr .i.-...... r, ,-..,-
Appendix C Page 12 of 12 Form ES-C-i JPM CUE SHEET The unit is operating at 100% power and is in a steady state alignment. Initial Conditions: The ASI system has been under clearance for the last 3 hours for scheduled maintenance and will be restored to service within the next hour. Initiating Cue: You are the GAG. Maintain current plant conditions. 2013 NRC Exam Simulator JPM CR b Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 1 of 9 Form ES-C-i Work Sheet Facility: Shearon Harris Task No.: 301073H401 Task
Title:
Pressurizer PORV Failure JPM No.: 2013 NRC Exam JPM CR c K/A
Reference:
APE 027 AM .01 RO 4.0 SRO 3.9 ALTERNATE PATH YES - Examinee: NRC Examiner: Facility Evaluator: Date: Method of testing: Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Classroom Simulator X Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied. Initial Conditions: The unit is operating at 100% power steady state alignment. Initiating Cue: You are the DAC. Maintain current plant conditions. 2013 NRC Exam JPM c Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 2 of 9 Form ES-C-I Work Sheet Task Standard: All steps necessary to mitigate the Pressurizer Pressure Master failure that caused a RCS low-pressure transient have been performed. Required Materials: None General
References:
AOP-019, Malfunction of RCS Pressure Control, Rev. 24 Time Critical Task: No Validation Time: 5 minutes Critical Step Justification Prevent an unnecessary automatic Reactor Trip and actuation of ESF components by manually shutting the block valve to a failed open PZR Step 4 PORV.
- Reactor Trip on OTAT
. Safety Injection on Low RCS Pressure of 1850 psig 2013 NRC Exam JPM c Rev. I
Appendix C Page 3 of 9 Form ES-C1 Work Sheet 2013 NRC Exam SIMULATOR SETUP Simulator Operator
- ResettolC-168
- Password dinner
- 100% power steady state conditions Silence and Acknowledge annunciators GO TO FREEZE and inform the lead examiner the Simulator is ready. DO NOT GO TO RUN until directed by the lead examiner. (The examiner has provided to the candidate with initial conditions and the initiating cues prior to placing the simulator in RUN.)
To recreate the IC setup for this JPM:
- Initial Simulator IC was IC-19
- Create Trigger I Fail Pressurizer PORV 445A OPEN (25%)
NOTE: To allow the candidate ample time to respond to annunciators associated with this failure and implement the immediate actions of AOP-01 9 the failure of a PORV beyond 25% open will not provide enough response time for a competent operator and will cause a Reactor Trip and Safety Injection. (With the PZR PORV failed 25% open and without an operator response the Reactor will Trip in I mm. 25 seconds) o imf prso3d (1 0 0) 25 0 0
- Silence Acknowledge and Reset Annunciators
- Freeze and Snap these conditions to your exam IC 2013 NRC Exam JPM c Rev. I
Appendix C Page 4 of 9 Form ES-C-I PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Simulator Operator: When directed by the Evaluator place Simulator in RUN Evaluator Cue Approximately 20 seconds after taking shift have Simulator Operator insert Trigger 1 (Pressurizer PORV 445A failure) START TIME: Annunciator Alarms Performance Step: I ALB 9-8-2, Pressurizer Relief Discharge High Temp ALB 9-8-1, PRT High-Low level Press or Temp ALB 9-3-3, PRZ Cont Low Press And Heaters On ALB 9-5-1, Pressurizer High-Low Press Standard: Announces multiple annunciators associated with Pressurizer and responds to alarm Identifies: RCS pressure is lowering Both Pressurizer Spray valves are shutting Pressurizer PORV 445A has dual indication (Red and Green Light lit) Recognizes entry conditions to AOP-019 Evaluator Cue: Acknowledges annunciator and entry into AOP-019 (using proper communications) Comment: The Immediate Action Steps of AOP-019 are to be performed from memory WITHOUT the aid of the procedure. V - Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam JPM c Rev. I
Appendix C Page 5 of 9 Form ES-C-I PERFORMANCE INFORMATION AOP-019, Step I Performance Step: 2 NOTE: Steps I through 3 are immediate actions. CAUTION: A pressure transmitter or indicator malfunction may exist. When referred to throughout this procedure, actual RCS pressure should be obtained by cross-checking of diverse instrumentation, such as P1-455.1, P1-456, and P1-457. CHECK THAT BUBBLE EXISTS IN THE PRZ. Standard: Verifies bubble in Pressurizer by checking parameters. (Pressure, Temperature, and Level.) (YES) Comment: AOP-0I9, Step 2 Performance Step: 3 VERIFY ALL PRZ PORVs AND associated block valves properly positioned for current PRZ pressure and plant conditions. Standard: Identifies PRZ PORV PCV-445A indicates partially OPEN Comment: V - Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam JPM C Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 6 of 9 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Alternate Path Starts Here AOP-019, Step 2 RNO it Performance Step: 4 IF ANY PRZ PORV will NOT shut when required, THEN SHUT its associated block valve. Standard: Locates block valve PRZ PORV Isolation 1RC-117 MCB switch and takes switch to SHUT Comment: AOP-019, Step 3 Performance Step: 5 CHECK BOTH PRZ Spray Valves properly positioned for current PRZ pressure and plant conditions. Standard: Determines both spray valves are properly positioned for current PRZ pressure and plant conditions. Comment: A Reactor Trip and Safety Injection results in JPM Failure. IF the candidate fails to shut the failed open Pressurizer PORV block valve RCS pressure will continue to lower until a Reactor Trip from OTL\T and a Safety Injection on Low RCS Pressure. Evaluator NOTE: In the case of preventing a Reactor Trip the candidate should be considered to PASS the JPM. If the Reactor Trips allow the candidate to perform the immediate actions of E-O to verify that the Reactor has tripped and then end the JPM. V - Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam JPM c Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 7 of 9 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION After the candidate has completed the immediate actions and goes to obtain AOP-019 inform the candidate: Evaluator Cue: End of JPM Direct the Simulator Operator to place the Simulator in Freeze. STOP TIME:
. When directed by the Lead Examiner place Simulator in Simulator Operator:
FREEZE V Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam JPM c Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 8 of 9 Form ES-C-i VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2013 NRC Exam JPM c Pressurizer PORV Failure AOP-01 9 Examinees Name: Date Performed: Facility Evaluator: Number of Attempts: Time to Complete: Question Documentation: Question:
Response
Result: SAT IJNSAT Examiners Signature: Date: 2013 NRC Exam JPM c Rev. 1
Appendix C Form ES-C-i JPM CUE SHEET Initial Conditions: The unit is operating at 100% power steady state alignment. Initiating Cue: You are the QAC. Maintain current plant conditions. 2013 NRC Exam JPM c Rev. I
Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-i Worksheet Facility: Shearon Harris Task No.: 013002H101 Task
Title:
Verify Main Feedwater Actuation Per JPM No.: 2013 NRC Exam OMM-004 Attachment 6 Simulator JPM CR d K/A
Reference:
013 A3.02 RO 4.1 SRO 4.2 ALTERNATE PATH YES - Examinee: NRC Examiner: Facility Evaluator: Date: Method of testing: Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Classroom Simulator X Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.
. The plant was operating at 100 % power when a Reactor Trip Initial Conditions:
. and Safety Injection occurred.
. E-0 is being implemented. ERFIS is not available.
. You are the BOP.
Initiating Cue:
- The CRS has directed you to verify Main Feedwater Isolation in accordance with E-0 Attachment 3, step 11 and reminded you that ERFIS is not available.
2013 NRC Exam CR JPM d Rev. 1 I
Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-I Worksheet The candidate will be using the procedures from the Simulator for this Simulator Instructor: JPM. You will need to have pre-made copies of OMM-004 Attachment 6 sheet I of I ready for replacements after the JPM is complete. Task Standard: Main Feedwater Isolation has been verified. Required Materials: None General
References:
E-O Attachment 3, Rev. 0, OMM-004 Attachment 6, Rev. 35 Time Critical Task: No Validation Time: 6 minutes CRITICAL STEP JUSTIFICATION Each valve must be in the correct position to ensure Containment isolation and each pump must be off to prevent an inadvertent RCS Step 2-4 and 6-13 cooldown. Critical to isolate IFW-191 since the valve is out of position and must be Step 5 manually shut to ensure Containment Isolation. 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM d Rev. 1
Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-I Worksheet 2013 NRC Exam SIMULATOR SETUP Simulator Operator
- Reset to ic-i 68 password dinner
- Got0RUN
- TURN OFF THE ERFIS SCREENS
- Silence and Acknowledge annunciators
* (IF NEEDED) The 86 relays should roll when the simulator is placed in run. If not then run the APP file Roil 86 Gen or they can be manually overridden with override LOs XGAOO18A GEN LOCKOUT G1A-TRIP COIL ON
- XGBOO17A GEN LOCKOUT GIB-TRIP RELAY ON
- Silence and Acknowledge annunciators
- GO TO FREEZE and inform the lead examiner the Simulator is ready. DO NOT GO TO RUN until directed by the lead examiner. (The examiner has provided to the candidate with initial conditions and the initiating cues prior to placing the simulator in RUN.)
The following setup information is how this exam IC was developed.
- Initialized to lC-19 (100 % power condition)
- Override the RED position indicating lamp to ON for I FW191 (FCV-498) lb xsblcO6 ON
- Initiate a Reactor trip and SI via MCB switches.
- Verify both RED and GREEN position indicating lamps are ON for IFWI91 on SLB-1 window 3-3.
- Turn off the ERRS screens.
- Acknowledge and reset all alarms and place the simulator in FREEZE. Snap thisto an IC
- When you reset to this condition you would want to have the 86 relays rolled.
2013 NRC Exam CR JPM d Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 4 of 11 Form ES-C-I PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Prior to JPM start Ensure the ERFIS SCREENS are OFF Simulator Operator: When directed by the Lead Examiner go to Run. Page 9 contains a copy of OMM-004 Attachment 6 to allow Evaluator Note: you to follow the candidate. This attachment can be performed in any order. START TIME: E-O, Attachment 3 step 11 Performance Step: I Obtains laminated (operator aid) copy of E-O Attachment 3 or refers to CRS or BOP copies of E-O. Reviews step I I which provides reference to OMM-004 Attachment 6. Candidate may refer to OMM-004 Attachment 6 but completion (initialing position check) is not required. IF the candidate checks ONLY the MCB components with a MFI engraved in the upper left hand corner of the placard
- Examiners note: they will NOT verify ALL of Feedwater Isolation which will result in a failure of this JPM.
Additional components are listed in OMM-004 Attachment 6. Standard: Locates procedure and reviews steps. Operator may complete sub steps in JPM steps 2 and 3 in any order. Comment: V - Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM d Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 5 of I I Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION When the candidate starts OMM-004 Attachment 6 stop them and state: During your performance of this Attachment Evaluator Note: please say out loud what you are doing so I may evaluate
- you performance.
E-O, Att. 3 to OMM-004 Att. 6, SLB-i component checks V Performance Step: 2 VERIFIES ALL COMPONENTS LOCATED ON SLB-I: WINDOW 3-i, A FW-133, SHUT Standard: Locates SLB-1, window 3-1 and verifies valve shut. (YES) Comment: OMM-004 Att. 6, SLB-1 component checks continued V Performance Step: 3 WINDOW 3-2, B FW-249, SHUT (YES) Standard: Locates SLB-I, window 3-2 and verifies valve shut Comment: OMM-004 Att. 6, SLB-1 component checks continued V Performance Step: 4 WINDOW 3-3, C FW9, SHUT Standard: Locates SLB-i, window 3-3 and verifies valve shut (DUAL INDICATION both RED and GREEN lights are ON) Comment: V Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM d Rev. I
Appendix C Page 6 of 11 Form ES-C-I PERFORMANCE INFORMATION OMM-004 Att. 6, SLB-1 component checks continued V Performance Step: 5 (May inform CRS at this time or wait until this attachment is completed that I FW-1 91 does not indicate that it is SHUT) Dispatches an Operator to locally verify IFW-191 is shut. The candidate may try to shut IFW-191 using the MCB M!A station since the MIA station is reading 100%. There will be no changes IF they make this attempt. IF CRS is informed that IFW-191 has dual indication then Evaluator Cue: acknowledge the communication but let the candidate determine what to do. IF pressed state: you understand the indications.. .take appropriate actions. Standard: Contacts local operator for valve verification and I or directions to SHUT IFW-191. Acknowledge request to check or shut I FW-1 91. If directed to check valve position wait 20 seconds and Simulator Communicator I report that the valve indication is 25% open. Operator: If directed to SHUT IFW-191 then acknowledge request, wait about 20 seconds and delete malfunction lb xsblc06 ON. Report that you have manually shut I FW-1 91. Comment: OMM-004 Att. 6, SLB-1 component checks continued V Performance Step: 6 WINDOW4-1,ABYP 1FW-140, SHUT Standard: Locates Window 4-1 and verifies valve shut. Comment: V Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM d Rev. I
Appendix C Page 7 of 1 1 Form ES-C-I PERFORMANCE INFORMATION OMM-004 Mt. 6, SLB-1 component checks continued / Performance Step: 7 WINDOW 4-2, B BYP IFW-256, SHUT Standard: Locates Window 4-2 and verifies valve shut. Comment: OMM-004 Aft. 6, SLB-1 component checks continued v Performance Step: 8 WINDOW 4-3, C BYP FW-198, SHUT Standard: Locates Window 4-3 and verifies valve shut. Comment: OMM-004 Att. 6, MOB component checks
/ Performance Step: 9 VERIFIES ALL COMPONENTS LOCATED ON THE MAIN CONTROL BOARD:
IFW-159 MAIN FWA ISOLATION SHUT - Standard: Locates I FW-1 59 MCB switch and verifies valve is shut. Comment: OMM-004 Att. 6, MCB component checks continued v Performance Step: 10 IFW-277 MAIN FW B ISOLATION SHUT - Standard: Locates IFW-277 MCB switch and verifies valve is shut. Comment: V Denotes Critical Steps
- 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM d Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 8 of 11 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION OMM-004 Att. 6, MCB component checks continued I Performance Step: 11 1FW-217 MAIN FW C ISOLATION SHUT - Standard: Locates 1FW-217 MCB switch and verifies valve is shut.. Comment: OMM-004 Att. 6, MCB component checks continued I Performance Step: 12 A MAIN FW PUMP STOP - Standard: Locates A MFW Pump MCB switch and verifies pump is stopped. Comment: OMM-004 Att. 6, MCB component checks continued v Performance Step: 13 B MAIN FW PUMP STOP - Standard: Locates B MFW Pump MCB switch and verifies pump is stopped. Informs the CRS that E-O Attachment 3 step ii verification of Main Feedwater Actuation was complete. I FW-1 91 did not fully shut and had to be locally shut. It is now in the correct position. (May direct the CRS to contact the Work Control Center... a Work Request, EIR and CR will need to be generated for the failure.) Comment: CRS acknowledges communications and completion of Feedwater Isolation verification. Evaluator Cue: Evaluation on this JPM is complete. Direct Simulator Operator to place the Simulator in Freeze. Simulator Operator: I When directed by the Lead Examiner then go to Freeze. STOP TIME: V Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM d Rev. I
Appencflx C Page 9 of ii Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION OMM-004 Attachment 6 Attachment 6 - Main Feedwater Isolation Verfication Sheet 1 oIl Components REQ P03 Comporient REQ P08 P03 OK P03 OK ALL COMPONENTS ACTUATED BY EITHER TRIN A ORTRAIN B SIB-I 3-1 ArW.I33 SHUT 4-I ABYPFW-140 SHUT 3-2 B FW*-24. SHUT 4-2 B GYP FW25 SHUT 3-3 0 FW-1Qi SHUT 4-3 C BYP FW-I8 SHUT MAIN CONTROL BOARD IFW-15 MAIN FW A ISOLATLON SHUT A MAIN FW PUMP STOP 1 FW-277 MAIN FW B lS0LA10N ShUT B MAIN FW PUMP STOP iFW-217 MAIN FW CSOLATI0N SHUT F
-J Comment No, Descdplion Signature: Time Date OMM-0o4 Rev. 35 Paqe 51 of 69 V - Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM d Rev, I
Appendix C Page 10 of 11 Form ES-C1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2013 NRC Exam JPM CR d Verification of Main Feedwater Actuation Per OMM-004 Attachment 6 E-0 Attachment 3 and OMM-004 Attachment 6 Examinees Name: Date Performed: Facility Evaluator: Number of Attempts: Time to Complete: Question Documentation: Question:
Response
Result: SAT UNSAT Examiners Signature: Date: 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM d Rev. I
AppenchxC Page 11 of ii Form ES-C-i
.JPMCUESHEET
. The plant was operating at 100 % power when a Reac tor Trip Initial Conditions:
and Safety Injection occurred.
. E-0 is being implemented. ERFIS is not available.
. You are the BOP.
Initiating Cue:
- The CRS has directed you to verify Main Feedwater Isolation in accordance with E-0 Attachment 3, step 11 and remi nded you that ERFIS is not available.
2013 NRC Exam CR JPM d Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 1 of 14 Form ES-C-i Worksheet Facility: Shearon-Harris Task No.: 022001H10i Task
Title:
Return the Containment Fan JPM No.: 2013 NRC Exam Coolers to normal following an SI Simulator JPM CR e actuation. K/A
Reference:
022 A4.Oi RO 3.6 I SRO 3.6 ALTERNATE PATH - NO Examinee: NRC Examiner: Facility Evaluator: Date: Method of testing: Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Classroom Simulator X Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.
. An automatic SI initiation occurred due to a combination of
. equipment failure and technician error Initial Conditions:
. SI has been terminated You have been directed to return Containment Fan Coolers to the normal alignment per ES-li, SI TERMINATION, Attachment 1 step 6.a Initiatin g Cue using OP-169, CONTAINMENT COOLING AND VENTILATION, Section 8.4. The A-SA train will be used for normal operation.
2013 NRC Exam CR JPM e Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 2 of 14 Form ES-C-I Worksheet Task Standard: Containment Fan Coolers are returned to NORMAL lineup. Required Materials: None General
References:
ES-1.i, SI TERMINATION, Revision 0 OP-169, CONTAINMENT COOLING AND VENTILATION, Revision 23 Handout: ES-1.1 Attachment 1 Sheet 3 of 6 OP-i 69 Section 5.1 and 8.4 Time Critical Task: No Validation Time: 15 Minutes CRITICAL STEP JUSTIFICATION To comply with OP-i 69, Precaution and Limitation #11 Step 7 After any fan cooler is started in low speed, the fan should be allowed to come up to speed for approximately 15 seconds before shifting to fast speed. This reduces the starting current required for high speed operation. Step 8 Same as step 7 Step 9 Same as step 7 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM e Rev. I
Appendix C Page 3 of 14 Form ES-C-I Worksheet 2013 NRC Exam - SIMULATOR SETUP Simulator Operator
- ResettolC-170
- Password dinner
- Go to RUN and wait 10 seconds then silence and acknowledge alarms.
GO TO FREEZE and inform the lead examiner the Simulator is ready. DO NOT GO TO RUN until directed by the lead examiner. (The examiner has provided to the candidate with initial conditions and the initiating cues prior to placing the simulator in RUN.) To recreate the IC setup for this JPM: o Reset to IC-19, 100% power MOL o Insert a Manual SI or MALF for Inadvertent SI o Perform actions of E-0, transition to ES-i .1 and perform actions up to step 35 which is Realign Plant Systems for Normal Ops using Attachment 1 (where restoration of Containment Fan Coolers is performed) o Leave Fan Coolers in SI Mode o FREEZE and SNAP. o After the candidate is ready, place simulator in RUN. 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM e Rev. I
Appendix C Page 4 of 14 Form ES-C-I PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Simulator Operator: When directed by the Lead Examiner go to Run. START TIME: OP-I 69, 8.4.1 Performance Step: I Review applicable procedure. Standard: Verifies Initial Conditions are met.
- SI Reset (YES)
- Instrument Air restored to dampers (YES)
Comment: OP-I 69, 8.4.2 Caution prior to step I and step 1 Failure of equipment to secure in this section will result in the Procedure Caution: associated EDG being inoperable. Tech Spec 3.8.1.1 is applicable until the breaker for the affected load is opened. Performance Step: 2 Circle the train Select train for normal operation and place the control switches for that trains Air Handling Units to STOP. Evaluator Cue: The CRS designates Train A for normal operation. 1 Standard: Circles Caution, reads Caution and slashes circle after reading.
- Places AH-2 A-SA control switch in STOP.
- Places AH-3 A-SA control switch in STOP.
Comment: V - Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM e Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 5 of 14 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION OP-I 69, 8.4.2.3 Performance Step: 3 CHECK the following post-accident discharge nozzle dampers SHUT on Status Light Box 5 () for the selected train of fans:
- a. CV-D3 for AH-2 (GV-D-1-fcw-AF4-4)
- b. CV-D5 for AH-3 (GVD-for-Al=f-4)
Standard: Verifies CV-D3 and CV-D5 indicate SHUT on Status Light Box 5. Comment: OP-169, 8.4.2.4 Performance Step: 4 Place the train secured in Step 8.4.2.2 in operation per Section
5.1. Standard
Proceeds to Section 5.1. Comment:
- Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM e Rev. i
Appendix C Page 6 of 14 Form ES-C-I PERFORMANCE INFORMATION OP-I 69, 5.1.1 Procedure Note: Where the Operator has a choice between Train A or Train B, this procedure will list Train A number and letter identification first with Train B in parentheses. Evaluator Cue: Attachments I and 2 have been completed. Performance Step: 5 Circles Note, reads Note and slashes circle after reading. Verify Initial Conditions:
- Attachments I and 2 are completed.
- ESW train is in service which corresponds to the AH unit train to be started.
Standard:
- Acknowledges cue for Attachments 1 and 2.
- Verifies ESW Train A in service.
Comment: V - Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM e Rev. I
Appendix C Page7ofl4 Form ES-C-I PERFORMANCE INFORMATION OP-I 69, 5.1.2.1 Procedure Note: When changing Containment Cooling modes, or swapping Containment Fan Cooler Trains, care must be taken to prevent the following:
- Entering Technical Specification 3.6.1.4 at -1 .0 inwg Containment pressure (1 hour action).
- Opening the Containment Vacuum Breakers at -2.25 inwg Containment pressure.
This may be accomplished by performing the evolution slowly, monitoring CNMT pressure effects using ERFIS point PCP76I 1. Also, placing the Containment Normal Purge Exhaust flow controller (FK-7624) in manual and shutting CP-B9, will allow CNMT pressure to slowly rise, thus compensating for the CNMT pressure drop that will occur during each fan start. Procedure Caution Failure of equipment to secure in this section will result in the associated EDG being inoperable. Tech Spec 3.8.1.1 is applicable until the breaker for the affected load is opened. Performance Step: 6 IF CNMT Normal Purge needs to be restored at any time during the performance of this procedure section, THEN PERFORM the following: (1) IF CNMT Normal Purge has NOT tripped, THEN RESTORE FK-7624 to AUTO. (2) IF CNMT Normal Purge has tripped, THEN STARTUP CNMT Normal Purge per OP-168. Standard: Circles Note, reads Note and slashes circle after reading. Circles Caution, reads Caution and slashes circle after reading. Checks CNMT Normal Purge secured and N/As steps 1.a, 1.b, and 1.c Evaluator Cue: CNMT Normal Purge will be restored by another operator per ES-1.I Attachment I step 12. Comment: V - Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM e Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 8 of 14 Form ES-C-I PERFORMANCE INFORMATION OP-I 69, 5.1.2.2 Procedure Note In winter months, the operating train should be secured per Section 7.1 prior to starting the idle train, to minimize the potential for entering Technical Specification 3.6.1.4 at -1.0 inwg Containment pressure (1 hour action), or opening the Containment Vacuum Breakers at 2.25 inwg Containment pressure. q Performance Step: 7 Place the control switches for both fans in each Containment cooler unit AH-2 ASA (AI=I-1-B--SB) and AH-3 A-SA (AH 4 B SB) to LO-SPD. Standard: Circles Note, reads Note and slashes circle after reading.
- Places control switch for AH-2 A-SA in LO-SPD.
- Places control switch for AH-2 B-SA in LO-SPD.
- Places control switch for AH-3 A-SA in LO-SPD.
- Places control switch for AH-3 B-SA in LO-SPD.
Comment: V Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM e Rev. 1
Appendix C Page9of 14 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION OP-I 69, 5.1.2.3 Procedure Note: After any fan cooler is started in low speed, the fan should be allowed to come up to speed for approximately 15 seconds before shifting to fast speed. This reduces the starting current required for high speed operation. Step 5.1.2.4 must be performed without delay following Step 5.1.2.3. The fan should not be allowed to coast down before being started in fast speed. These two steps should be performed together, one fan at a time. Performance Step: 8 Place the control switch for the fans started in Step 5.1.2.2 to STOP. Standard: Circles Note, reads Note and slashes circle after reading.
- Places control switch for AH-2 A-SA in STOP.
- Places control switch for AH-2 B-SA in STOP.
- Places control switch for AH-3 A-SA in STOP.
- Places control switch for AH-3 B-SA in STOP.
Comment: OP-I 69, 5.1.2.4 J Performance Step: 9 Place the control switches for the fans stopped in Step 5.1.2.3 to Hl-SPD. Standard:
- Places control switch for AH-2 A-SA in HI-SPD.
- Places control switch for AH-2 B-SA in HI-SPD.
- Places control switch for AH-3 A-SA in HI-SPD.
- Places control switch for AH-3 B-SA in Hl-SPD.
Comment: V Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM e Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 10 of 14 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION OP-I 69, 8.4.2.5, .6, and .7 Performance Step: 10
- IF FK-7624was taken to MANUAL in Step 5.1.2.1.a, THEN RESTORE FK-7624 to AUTO.
IF CNMT Normal Purge is not in service, AND it is desired to place CNMT Normal Purge in service, THEN STARTUP CNMT Normal Purge per OP-i 68.
- IF both trains of Containment Fan Cooler fans are running (such as during a train swap evolution), THEN PROCEED to Section 7.1 to secure the desired train.
Standard: Reviews steps 5, 6, and 7 and marks these steps N/A Returns to Section 8.4.2 and proceeds with step 5 Comment: OP-169, 8.4.2.5 Performance Step: II PLACE the following control switches for the standby train to STOP:
- AH-1 A-SB (Al=I-2-A-SA)
- AH-i B-SB (AH2-B-SA)
- AH-4 A-SB (AH3-A-SA)
- AH-4 B-SB (AI=I--B--SA)
Standard: Takes control switches for fans and Stops fans AH-i A-SB (Stop) AH-i B-SB (Stop) AH-4 A-SB (Stop) AH-4 B-SB (Stop) Comment: V Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM e Rev. I
Appendix C Page 1 1 of 14 Form ES-C-I PERFORMANCE INFORMATION OP-169, 8.4.2.6 Performance Step: 12 CHECK the following post-accident discharge nozzle dampe rs SHUT on Status Light Box 5 (6) for the standby train of fans:
- a. CV-Di for AR-i (Q,V-D-for-AW2) (Shut)
- b. CV-D7 for AH-4 (OV-D5-for-AH-) (Shut)
Standard: Checks CV-D1 for AH-1 and CV-D7 for AH-4 indicate SHUT on Status Light Box 6. Comment: OP-I 69, 8.4.2.7 Performance Step: 12 If containment temperature is greater than 118 F or if additio nal cooling is desired, refer to Section 8.1, Start-Up of Fan Cooler Units (Maximum Cooling mode). Standard: Verifies containment temperature is less than 118 °F. (Maybe> 118° but trending DOWN at this time.) Marks step 7 as N/A I I Evaluator Cue: It is not desired to start up additional cooling. Comment: V Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM e Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 12 of 14 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION After containment temperature is verified at or trending to less than 118 F: Evaluation on this JPM is complete. Evaluator Cue: Direct Simulator Operator to place the Simulator in Freeze. ) Simulator Operator: When directed by the Lead Examiner then go to Freeze. STOP TIME: V Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM e Rev. I
Appendix C Page 13 of 14 Form ES-C-i VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2013 NRC Exam Simulator JPM CR e Return the Containment Fan Coolers to normal following an SI actuation. OP-169 Examinees Name: Date Performed: Facility Evaluator: Number of Attempts: Time to Complete: Question Documentation: Question:
Response
Result: SAT UNSAT Examiners Signature: Date: 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM e Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 14 of 14 Form ES-C-i JPMCUESHEET
. An automatic SI initiation occurred due to a combination of equipment failure and technician error Initial Conditons:
. SI has been terminated You have been directed to return Containment Fan Coolers to the nitia ing normal alignment per ES-il, SI TERMINATION, Attachment 1 step6.a ue.
using OP-169, CONTAINMENT COOLING AND VENTILATION, Section 8.4. The A-SA train will be used for normal operation. 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM e Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 1 of 12 Form ES-C-i Worksheet Facility: Shearon Harris Task No.: Task
Title:
LOSP While Paralleling EDG from JPM No.: 2013 NRC Exam MCB for Testing Simulator JPM CR f K/A
Reference:
064 A4.06 RD 3.9 SRO 3.9 ALTERNATE PATH YES - Examinee: NRC Examiner: Facility Evaluator: Date: Method of testing: Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Classroom Simulator X Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.
. The plant is operating at 100% power.
. Emergency Diesel Generator lB-SB has been started and is Initial Conditions: ready to be paralleled to the grid.
. An operator is on station to locally monitor B EDG in accordance with_OP-i 55_attachments.
. You are the MCR 3 board operator, and the CRS has directed you to parallel EDG 1 B-SB to the grid in accordance with OP-i 55, section 5.3.
Initiating Cue:
. All initial conditions of Section 5.3.1 have been completed.
. The monthly voltage and governor controls exercise are required to be performed.
- To expedite the examination schedule, the candidate should be briefed outside of the Simulator prior to performing this JPM.
. Provide a copy of OP-i 55, Rev. 67, pages 1-13, 25-29,178,190 for them to task preview and mark up prior to entering the Simulator to Examiners Note: perform the JPM.
. Inform them that ALL initial conditions are satisfied.
. This will allow them to review the Precautions and Limitations associated with OP-i 55 and have time for a task preview of the steps to accomplish paralleling the EDG. Expect that the candidates will_take_about_10_-_15_minutes_to_complete_this_review.
2013 NRC Exam CR JPM f Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 2 of 12 Form ES-C-i Worksheet Task Standard: EDG 1 B-SB output breaker 126 is operated in accordance with OP-i 55; breaker closed per section 5.3, and manually opened per Precaution and Limitation 4.0.24 upon LOSP. Required Materials: OP-i 55 Rev. 67, sections 3.0, 4.0, 5.3, Att9, and Att.15 (pp.1-13, 25-29,178,190) General
References:
OP-155, Rev. 67 Time Critical Task: No Validation Time: 15 minutes Critical Step Justification Step: 4 Without Sync, EDG output breaker will not close on energized bus Upon closing EDG output breaker, prompt loading is required to prevent Ste 14 a reverse power automatic trip (30 seconds). Must recognize the implications of LOSP without EDG output breaker Ste p. 17 126 tripping: Sequencer fails to load. 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM f Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 3 of 12 Form ES-C-i Worksheet 2013 NRC Exam SIMULATOR SETUP Simulator Operator
- ResettolC-170
- Password dinner
- GotoRUN
- Silence and Acknowledge annunciators GO TO FREEZE and inform the lead examiner the Simulator is ready. DO NOT GO TO RUN until directed by the lead examiner. (The examiner has provided to the candidate with initial conditions and the initiating cues prior to placing the simulator in RUN.)
To recreate the IC setup for this JPM:
- ResettolC-19
- Start EDG B
- Insert malfunction to prevent EDG B breaker 126 from automatically opening on subsequent LOSP (allowing manual operation to open) o imfZCR3l748 FAIL ASIS
- Set Trigger 1 for a loss of Offsite power to the plant o imfepsol (1 OO)W/O_DELAY
- Set up a failure of the A EDG output breaker so it will trip prior to reaching load block 9 o Trigger 39 created for conditional trigger when A EDG starts
- TRG= 39 DGAEMERSTART o A EDG output breaker trips 20 seconds after A EDG starts
- hi dsg38 (39 00:00:20 00:00:00) TRIP
- GotoRUN
- Silence and Acknowledge annunciators
- Freeze and Snap these conditions to your exam IC 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM f Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 4 of 12 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Simulator Operator: When directed by the Lead Examiner go to Run. START TIME: OP-I 55 Performance Step: I Implements OP-i 55, Section 5.3, Diesel Synchronizing and Paralleling at MCB Standard: Reviews Prerequisites, Precautions and Limitations and InitiaT Conditions (Previously informed that all initial conditions have been satisfied) Comment: OP-I 55, Section 5.3.2 Step I Performance Step: 2 1. NOTIFY Load Dispatcher EDG 1A SA (1 B-SB) will be loaded. Standard: Contacts Load Dispatcher
. - Acknowledge as the Load Dispatcher notification has been Simulator Communicator:
completed. Comment: V - Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM f Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 5 of 12 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION OP-I 55, Section 5.3.2 Step 2 Performance Step: 3 2. PERFORM the following:
- REVIEW Precaution 4.0.21 to determine if UPP-iA is aligned to its normal power source.
- REVIEW Precaution 4.0.22 to determine if ALB-15-4-i is unlit.
- REVIEW Precautions 4.0.24 and 4.0.25 before paralleling.
Standard: Reviews precautions Evaluator Cue: (If asked when reviewing Precaution 4.0.21) UPP-IA is aligned to its normal source. Comment: OP-I 55, Section 5.3.2 Step 3 i Performance Step: 4 3. PLACE DIESEL GEN A SA (B-SB) SYNCHRONIZER control switch to SYNC. Standard:
- Places Key in B-SB EDG sync switch and turns to SYNC.
- Checks that Sync scope is on.
Comment: OP-I 55, Section 5.3.2 Note prior to Step 4 Performance Step: 5 NOTE: Steps 5.3.2.4.a, 5.3.2.4.b, 5.3.2.5.a, and 5.3.2.5.b, which exercise the Voltage and Governor adjustment, only need to be accomplished once per month. Standard: Reviews and circle/slashes note. Recognizes steps are required per the Initiating Cue. Comment: V Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM f Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 6 of 12 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION OP-I 55, Section 5.3.2 Steps 4.a,b Performance Step: 6 4. POSITION DIESEL GEN A-SA (B-SB) AUTO VOLTAGE ADJUST control switch to RAISE or LOWER as necessary to perform the following:
- a. Lower voltage to 6.6kV
- b. Raise voltage to 7.2kV Standard:
- Lowers EDG B Auto Voltage Adjust until EDG voltage indicates 6.6 kV.
- Raises EDG B Auto Voltage Adjust until EDG voltage indicates 7.2 kV.
Comment: OP-I 55, Section 5.3.2 Note prior to Step 4.c Performance Step: 7 NOTE: EI-6953A SA (B SB) has a scaling factor of x300. Therefore the range of the meter reflects an actual voltage range of -9000 VAC to +9000 VAC. Standard: Reviews and Circle/Slash Note Comment: OP-I 55, Section 5.3.2 Step 4.c Performance Step: 8 c. ADJUST EDG voltage to match the associated Emergency 6.9KV Bus voltage as indicated by zero differential voltage indicated on EI-6953A SA (B SB), A (B) SYNC VOLTS. Standard: Precisely adjusts EDG B Auto Voltage Adjust until EDG voltage matches 6.9KV Bus I B-SB voltage (0 A VOLTS). Comment: V Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM f Rev. I
Appendix C Page 7 of 12 Form ES-C-I PERFORMANCE INFORMATION OP-I 55, Section 5.3.2 Step 5 Performance Step: 9 5. POSITION DIESEL GEN A SA (B-SB) GOVERNOR CONTROL switch to RAISE or LOWER as necessary to perform the following:
- a. LOWER frequency to 59hz
- b. RAISE frequency to 61 hz
- c. ADJUST EDG speed until the synchroscope is rotating slowly in the FAST direction (CLOCKWISE).
Standard:
- Adjusts EDG B Governor Control until EDG B frequency is indicating 59 Hz.
- Adjusts EDG B Governor Control until EDG B frequency is indicating 61 Hz.
- Adjusts EDG B Governor Control until EDG B sync scope is indicating slow CW movement.
Comment: OP-I 55, Section 5.3.2 Step 6 Performance Step: 10 6. CHECK synchronizing lights are cycling (OUT when the synchroscope is at the 12 oclock position) in agreement with the synchroscope rotation. Standard: Checks sync lights are cycling properly. Comment: OP-I 55, Section 5.3.2 Note Prior to Step 7 Performance Step: II NOTE: EI-6955A SA (B SB), EMERGENCY DIESEL OUTPUT VOLTAGE, compared with El-6956A1 SA (Bi SB), EMERGENCY BUS VOLTAGE, can be used as diverse indications to verify differential voltage indicated in the next step.. Standard: Reviews and Circle/Slash Note Comment: V - Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM f Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 8 of 12 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION OP-I 55, Section 5.3.2 Step 7 Performance Step: 12 7. As necessary, POSITION DIESEL GEN A SA (B-SB) AUTO VOLTAGE ADJUST control switch to adjust EDG voltage to zero differential voltage is indicated on El-6953A SA (B SB), A (B) SYNC ti VOLTS. Standard: Verifies precisely 0 \ VOLTS, using AUTO VOLTAGE ADJUST control switch as needed. Comment: OP-155, Section 5.3.2 Caution Prior to Step 8 Performance Step: 13 Performing the following three steps in rapid succession will prevent a reverse power trip of the EDG output breaker. The reverse power trip relay has a 30 second time delay from when the breaker is closed until trip. Standard:
- Reviews and Circle/Slash Caution
- The candidate should review the next few steps and may use flagging to promptly pick up load sync Comment:
V Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM f Rev. i
Appendix C Page 9 of 12 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION OP-I 55, Section 5.3.2 Steps 8,9,10,11 v Performance Step: 14 8. WHEN the synchroscope reaches the 12 oclock position and the synchronizing lights are TOTALLY DARK, THEN PLACE the DIESEL GEN A SA (B-SB) BREAKER 106 SA (126 SB) control switch to CLOSE.
- 9. CHECK DIESEL GEN A SA (B-SB) BREAKER 106 SA (126 SB) is CLOSED.
- 10. POSITION DIESEL GEN A SA (B-SB) GOVERNOR CONTROL switch to increase generator load to 2.2 to 2.4 MW on El-6957Ai SA (Bi SB), A (B) POWER.
Ii. POSITION DIESEL GEN 4-SA (lB-SB) AUTO VOLTAGE ADJUST control switch to obtain 1.0 MVARs on EI-6958A SA (B SB), A (B) REACTIVE. Standard:
- Closes Breaker 126 when synchroscope is at 12 oclock
- Promptly checks Breaker 126 is closed
- Promptly raises generator load to 2.2 2.4 MW
- Raises generator MVARs to 1.0
* (Avoids reverse power trip)
Comment: OP-I 55, Section 5.3.2 Step 12 Performance Step: 15 12. PLACE DIESEL GEN A SA (B-SB) SYNCHRONIZER control switch to OFF. Standard: Turns Sync key switch to OFF. Comment: OP-I 55, Section 5.3.2 Step 13 Performance Step: 16 13. CHECK DIESEL GEN ASA (B-SB) BREAKER 106 SA (126 SB) amber light is LIT. Standard: Checks amber light lit for breaker 126. Comment: Evaluator Note: After performance of step 13, cue Simulator Operator to insert Loss of Off-site Power malfunction. V - Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM f Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 10 of 12 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Simulator Operator: When directed by Lead Examiner, insert LOSP Trigger 1. Loss of Off-site Power Performance Step: 17 Recognize LOSP and evaluate proper response of breaker 126 lAW P&L 4.0.24 (breaker 126 should automatically trip and re close to allow the sequencer to start loading) Standard:
- Recognize LOSP condition
- Determine breaker 126 does not automatically trip as expected
- Notify CRS of breaker status
. Place breaker 126 to TRIP Evaluator Note: After LOSP, candidate may observe Rx Trip and perform immediate actions of E-O. These are not required for this task per the initiating cue (
ft 3 board operator). However, breaker 126 should be tripped prior to referring to E-O. Comment: Evaluator Note: After candidate trips EDG output breaker 126, the JPM is complete. Evaluator Cue: Evaluation on this JPM is complete. Direct Simulator Operator to place the Simulator in Freeze. STOP TIME: Simulator Operator: When directed by the Lead Examiner go to Freeze. V Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM f Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 1 1 of 12 Form ES-C-i VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2013 NRC Exam Sim CR JPM q LOSP While Paralleling EDG from MCB for Testing OP-i 55, E-0 Examinees Name: Date Performed: Facility Evaluator: Number of Attempts: Time to Complete: Question Documentation: Question:
Response
Result: SAT UNSAT Examiners Signature: Date: 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM f Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 12 of 12 Form ES-C-i JPM CUE SHEET
. The plant is operating at 100% power.
. Emergency Diesel Generator 1 B-SB has been started and Initial Conditions: is ready to be paralleled to the grid.
- An operator is on station to locally monitor B EDG in accordance with OP-i 55 attachments.
. You are the MCR board operator, and the CRS has directed you to parallel EDG 1 B-SB to the grid in accordance with OP-i 55, section 5.3.
Initiating Cue: . .. ..
. All initial conditions of Section 5.3.1 have been completed.
- The monthly voltage and governor controls exercise are required to be performed.
2013 NRC Exam CR JPM f Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 1 of 15 Form ES-C-i Worksheet Facility: HARRIS Task No.: 015005H401 Task
Title:
Restore an Excore NI Channel to JPM No.: 2013 NRC JPM CR g Service (at power, NI failed low) K/A
Reference:
015 A4.03 RO 3.8 SRO 3.9 ALTERNATE PATH - NO Examinee: NRC Examiner: Facility Evaluator: Date: Method of testing: Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Classroom Simulator X Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE: I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied. The plant is at 100 percent power. N 1-43 has failed low earlier this shift. Initial Conditions: I&C have completed the repairs to Nl-43. All other parameters are normal. The CRS has directed you to return NI-43 to service in accordance with Initiatin g Cue OWP-RP-25.
/Vb 2013 NRC Exam Simulator JPM CR g Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 2 of 15 Form ES-C-I Worksheet Task Standard: N 1-43 returned to service. Required Materials: ,OWP-RP-25, Rev. 16 General
References:
OWP-RP (Rev. 16) Handout: None Time Critical Task: No Validation Time: 15 minutes Critical Step Justification Must place Rod Control System to Manual to prevent inadvertent Step 4 reactivity changes while implementing the OWP. Must select correct switch and correct switch position for Nl-43 to Step 7 restore upper detector comparator Must select correct switch and correct switch position for Nl-43 to Step 8 restore rod stop bypass and power mismatch Must select correct switch and correct switch position for N 1-43 to Step 9 restore comparator channel defeat Must return Nl-43 to processing for correct alarms and indication Step 19 on ERFIS 2013 NRC Exam Simulator JPM CR g Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 3 of 15 Form ES-C-i Worksheet 2013 NRC Exam SIMULATOR SETUP Simulator Operator
- ResettolC-171
- Password dinner
- Load 2013 exam AMS file from the portable hard drive o OWP-RP-25-NRM Part 1-
- Place OWP-RP Bistables Tripped OWP-RP in Affect signs on NI 43 drawer
- GotoRun
- Silence and Acknowledge annunciators GO TO FREEZE and inform the lead examiner the Simulator is ready. DO NOT GO TO RUN until directed by the lead examiner. (The examiner has provided to the candidate with initial conditions and the initiating cues prior to placing the simulator in RUN.)
To recreate the IC setup for this JPM:
- Initial Simulator IC was lC-19, stay in freeze
- Insert a malfunction to fail low PRNIS Channel 43 o imf NISO8C 0.0
- GotoRUN
- Silence and Acknowledge annunciators
- FREEZE and SNAP these conditions for future use NOTE: Running AMS file APP-rps-OWP-Nl-07-TST (PIC-3) will simulate tripping bistables BS3 and BS4 in PIC-3 on Card C3-822.
- Run AMS file APP-rps-OWP-Nl-07-TST (PIC-3)
NOTE: Running AMS file APP-rps-OWP-Nl-07-TST (NI Drawer A) will simulate disconnecting P312 from J31 2 at the rear of N43 Drawer A.
- Run AMS file APP-rps-OWP-Nl-07-TST (NI Drawer A)
- FREEZE and SNAP 2013 NRC Exam Simulator JPM CR g Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 4 of 15 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Simulator Operator: When directed by the Lead Examiner go to Run. START TIME: Performance Step: I Obtain procedure (Provided by Examiner) Standard: Obtains OWP-RP-Section 25. Comment: OWP-RP-25 Sheet I Performance Step: 2 Sheet 1 contains information on which component the OWP is written for, the scope, applicable requirements, precautions, the component lineup, testing requirements, testing action, component lineups restore, remarks and reviewed by. Standard: Reads sheet 1 to ensure the correct component and scope is for N-43 Comment: Evaluator Cue: If needed, LCO actions have already been addressed. OWP-RP-25 Sheet 2 Performance Step: 3 Reviews NOTE: This OWP must be performed in order to prevent possible spurious rod motion or level control swings. Standard: Reads and circles I slashes note Comment:
- Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam Simulator JPM CR g Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 5 of 15 Form ES-C-I PERFORMANCE INFORMATION OWP-RP-25 Sheet 2 continued V Performance Step: 4 On Main Control Board Check position:
. Rod Bank Selector switch MANUAL Standard: Places Rod Bank Selector Switch from Auto to MANUAL.
Reads I reviews OMM-O0I Attachment 13 control bands and trip limits with rod control system in Manual Controller Control Sand I Trtp Limit
. Low l-igh Rod Control T Avg within 2 of T Ref T Avg Within T Avg Within Stable Plant 10 ci T Ref 10 of T Ref Rod Control T Avg within 5 of T Ref T Avg Within T Avg Within Transient Plant 10 of T Ref 10 of T Ref and the trend and the trend show no sign of show no sign of turning turning IF informing the CRS: Acknowledge the 0MM-CO 1 Rod Control -
Evaluator Cue: control band and trip limits. Comment: OWP-RP-25 Sheet 2 continued Performance Step: 5 On Main Control Board check position: FW Reg BYP Valve Controllers:
- FK-479.1 MANUAL
- FK-489.1 MANUAL
- FK-499.1 MANUAL Standard: Verifies FK-479.1, FK-489.1, and FK-499.1 controllers all in MAN UAL.
Comment: V - Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam Simulator JPM CR g Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 6 of 15 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION OWP-RP-25 Sheet 2 continued Performance Step: 6 NOTE: Concurrent verification is preferred in while tripping bistables. In PlC 3 on Card C3-822 position:
- BS3 (TB/432C1 OTAT) to NORMAL
- BS4 (TB/432C2 OTAT C-3) to NORMAL Contact Maintenance to restore the trip bistables to NORMAL Standard: Calls Maintenance to trip bistables to NORMAL in PlC 3 on Card C3-822 and requests that second I&C person accompanies person tripping bistables to NORMAL to perform Concurrent verification If candidate calls for Maintenance acknowledge request with proper communications.
Inform the applicant that time compression is being used for l&C to report to MCR and that l&C is ready to restore the trip bistables to NORMAL in PlC 3 on Card C3-822 Evaluator I Simulator (Contact Simulator Operator to run AMS file OWP-RP Operator Cue: NRM Part 1 to simulate restoring bistables BS3 and BS4 to NORMAL) NOTE: The applicant may request that the step for restoring the tripped bistables to NORMAL is initialed prior to continuing. IF SO then cue them to assume that the step is initialed. Run AMS file: APP-rps-OWP-RP-25-NRM Part 1 - This file simulates restoring the tripped bistables BS3 and BS4 in PIC-3 on Card C3-822. Simulator Operator: After the file is completed wait 10 seconds then report back that the tripped bistables BS3 and BS4 in PIC-3 on Card C3-822 has been restored to NORMAL. Comment: V Denotes Critical Steps
- 2013 NRC Exam Simulator JPM CR g Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 7 of 15 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION OWP-RP-25 Sheet 2 continued V Performance Step: 7 On Detector Current Comparator Drawer position:
. Upper Section Switch to NORMAL
. Lower Section Switch to NORMAL Standard: Selects NORMAL on UPPER SECTION SWITCH Selects NORMAL on LOWER SECTION SWITCH Evaluator Note: Channel Defeat lights on drawer will extinguish.
Comment: v Performance Step: 8 On Miscellaneous Control and Indication Panel position:
- Rod Stop Bypass Switch to Bypass NORMAL
- Power Mismatch Bypass Switch to NORMAL Standard: Selects OPERATE on ROD STOP BYPASS SWITCH Selects OPERATE on POWER MISMATCH BYPASS SWITCH Comment:
V - Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam Simulator JPM CR g Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 8 of 15 Form ES-C-I PERFORMANCE INFORMATION OWP-RP-25 Sheet 2 continued v Performance Step: 9 On Comparator and Rate Drawer position: Comparator Channel Defeat Switch to NORMAL. Standard: Selects NORMAL on the COMPARATOR CHANNEL DEFEAT switch Evaluator Note: Defeat light on drawer extinguishes. Comment: OWP-RP-25 Sheet 2 continued On Power Range Drawer N43A Performance Step: 10 NOTE: The purpose of the sign installed below is to alert personnel of tripped bistables that may not be obvious at the NI drawer. The wording in quotations is the recommended wording, but similar words may also be used. Standard: Reviews and circle I slashes Note Comment: OWP-RP-25 Sheet 2 continued Performance Step: 11 Removed Sign stating Bistables Tripped OWP-RP in Affect Standard: Locates sign and removes it from the obvious position on the NI drawer for N 1-43. Comment: V - Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam Simulator JPM CR g Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 9 of 15 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION OWP-RP-25 Sheet 3 Performance Step: 12 NOTE: Concurrent verification is preferred in the following step. At the rear of N43 Drawer A, disconnect P312 from J3i 2 Contact Maintenance to disconnect leads Standard: Calls Maintenance to connect leads at rear of N43 Drawer A and requests that second l&C person accompanies person landing leads to perform Concurrent verification Evaluator! Simulator If candidate calls for Maintenance acknowledge request Operator Cue: with proper communications. Inform the applicant that time compression is being used for l&C to report to MCR and that l&C is ready to connect leads. (Contact Simulator Operator to insert remote function nisO3l connect to simulate landing leads) NOTE: The applicant may request that the step to connect the lead is initialed prior to continuing. IF SO then cue them to assume that the step is initialed. Simulator Operator: When contacted by Evaluator irfnis03l connect This file simulates connecting P312 from J312. After the file is completed wait 10 seconds then report back that the connecting of P312 from J312 has been completed. Comment: V Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam Simulator JPM CR g Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 10 of 15 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION OWP-RP-25 Sheet 3 continued On completion of the above lineup, check the following. Performance Step: 13 On TSLB-3 C TRIP 0/TEMP AT TB432C1 (Window 9-1) DE-ENERGIZED Standard: Locates window 9-1 and initials DE-ENERGIZED line Comment: OWP-RP-25 Sheet 3 continued Performance Step: 14 On TSLB-3 C RUN BK 0/TEMP AT TB432C2 (Window 9-3) DE-ENERGIZED Standard: Locates window 9-3 and initials DE-ENERGIZED line Comment: OWP-RP-25 Sheet 3 continued
*Circle required state as determined by present plant conditions.
Performance Step: 15 On TSLB-4 PR LO PWR HI FLUX NC 43P (Window 5-3) ENERGIZED OR DE-ENERGIZED Standard: Locates window 5-3, circles current status of Window 5-3 and initials ENERGIZED OR DE-ENERGIZED line Comment: V - Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam Simulator JPM CR g Rev. 1
Appendix C Page ii of 15 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION OWP-RP-25 Sheet 3 continued Performance Step: 16 On TSLB-4 PR HI PWR HI FLUX NC 43R (Window 6-3) DE-ENERGIZED Standard: Locates window 6-3 and initials DE-ENERGIZED line Comment: OWP-RP-25 Sheet 3 continued May require manual reset of rate trips at drawer Performance Step: 17 On TSLB-4 PR HI FLUX RATE NC 43U1K (Window 7-3) ** DE-ENERGIZED Standard: Locates window 7-3 and initials DE-ENERGIZED line Comment: OWP-RP-25 Sheet 3 continued Performane Step: 18 On BYPASS PERMISSIVE LIGHTS Panel. PR OVERPWR ROD WTHDRWL BLK BYPASS CHAN Ill (Window 3-7) DE-ENERGZED Standard: Locates window 3-7 and initials DE-ENERGIZED line Comment:
- Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam Simulator JPM CR g Rev. I
Appendix C Page 12 of 15 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION OWP-RP-25 Sheet 4 V Performance Step: 19 On ERFIS Computer After status lights have been checked, perlorm the following using the DR function. ANMO122M PWR RNG CHANNEL N43 Qi 1-MIN AVG RESTORE TO PROCESSING Standard: Logs onto ERFIS Computer using DR function and restores ANMO122M PWR RNG CHANNEL N43 Qi 1-MIN AVG to processing Comment: OWP-RP-25 Sheet 4 continued Performance Step: 20 On MAIN CONTROL BOARD: Circle appropriate position as determined by plant conditions. ROD BANK SELECTOR Switch MAN/AUTO+ Standard: Checks Rod Bank Selector Switch position (can circle MAN after cue provided) Evaluator Cue: The applicant may determine that AUTO rod control can be accomplished CUE them prior to obtaining the procedure: The CRS directs that the Rod Bank Selector Switch be left in MANUAL until a second operator is available in the MCR. Comment: V - Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam Simulator JPM CR g Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 13 of 15 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION OWP-RP-25 Sheet 4 continued Performance Step: 21 FW Reg Byp Valve Controllers: Circle appropriate position as determined by plant conditions: FK-479. 1 MAN/AUTO+ FK-489.i MAN/AUTO+ FK-499. 1 MAN/AUTO+ Standard: (Per current plant conditions) Circles MAN for FK-479. 1, FK-489. 1 and FK-499. 1 Comment: OWP-RP-25 Sheet 4 continued Performance Step: 22 Reports to CRS Standard: Reports to CRS that N43 has been returned to service lAW OWP-RP-25 Evaluator Cue: The CRS acknowledges that N43 has been returned to service lAW OWP-RP-25 Comment: After lineup has been completed and the report provided to CRS then: Evaluation on this JPM is complete. Lead Evaluator Cue: Inform the Simulator Operator to place the Simulator in Freeze. Simulator Operator: When directed by the Lead Examiner then go to Freeze. STOP TIME: V - Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam Simulator JPM CR g Rev. I
Appendix C Page 14 of 15 Form ES-C-i VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2013 NRC JPM CR q Restore an Excore NI Channel to Service (at power, NI failed low) OWP-RP-25 Examinees Name: Date Performed: Facility Evaluator: Number of Attempts: Time to Complete: Question Documentation: Question:
Response
Result: SAT UNSAT Examiners Signature: Date: 2013 NRC Exam Simulator JPM CR g Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 15 of 15 Form ES-C-i JPM CUE SHEET Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100 percent power. Nl-43 has failed low earlier this shift. I I&C have completed the repairs to Nl-43. All other parameters are normal. Initiating Cue: The CRS has directed you to return NI-43 to seice per OWP-RP-25. 2013 NRC Exam Simulator JPM CR g Rev. 1
Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-i Worksheet Facility: Shearon Harris Task No.: 008010H101 Task
Title:
Align CCWto Support RHR JPM No.: 2013 NRC Exam Initiation (OP-145) Simulator JPM CR h K/A
Reference:
008 A4.01 RD 3.3 I SRO 3.1 ALTERNATE PATH - NO Examinee: NRC Examiner: Facility Evaluator: Date: Method of testing: Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: X Classroom Simulator X Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provid e initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Perform ance Measure will be satisfied.
. The unit is in Mode 4, going to Mode 5 Initial Conditions:
.
- Preparations are underway to place both trains of RHR in service
. Both ESW Trains are in service
. CCW Pump A is running Align CCW to support RHR operation in accordance with OP-i45, Initiating Cue: COMPONENT COOLING WATER. All Section 3.0 Prerequisites are met.
. To expedite the examination schedule, the candidate should be briefed outside of the Simulator prior to performing this JPM.
. Provide a copy of OP-145, Rev. 69, pages 1-11, 15-16, and 43-47.
The initial conditions should be signed off and section 5.2 initial conditions signed off. This will allow them time to task preview and Examiners Note: mark up prior to entering the Simulator to perform the JPM.
. Inform them that ALL initial conditions are satisfied.
. This will allow them to review the Precautions and Limitations associated with OP-145 and have time for a task preview of the steps to accomplish aligning CCW to support RHR operation.
Expect that the candidates will take about 10 15 minutes to complete this review. 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM h Rev. I
/
Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-i Worksheet Task Standard: Two CCW Pumps running and the required 0GW flow rate established through both RHR Heat Exchangers Required Materials: None General
References:
OP-145, COMPONENT COOLING WATER, Rev 69 Handout:
- OP-145, Sections 1.0-4.0
. OP-i45, Section 5.2 with the Initial Conditions signed off
. OP-i45, Section 8.9 with the Initial Conditions signed off (pages 1-il, 15-16, and 43-47)
Time Critical Task: No Validation Time: 15 minutes CRITICAL STEP JUSTIFICATION Critical because two COW Pumps are required to support two RHR Ste p 5 Trains and other loads. Critical to align flow through RHR HX A or heat exchanger will not Step 9 provide cooling. Step 11 Critical to isolate Train A from Non-Essential Header. Step 12 Critical to isolate Train A from Non-Essential Header. Step 14 Critical to align flow through RHR HX B. 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM h Rev. 1
Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-i Worksheet 2013 NRC Exam SIMULATOR SETUP Simulator Operator NOTE: The setup time for this JPM may take> 5 minutes
- ResettolC-172
- Password dinner
- Go to RUN and wait 10 seconds then silence and acknowledge alarms.
GO TO FREEZE and inform the lead examiner the Simulator is ready. DO NOT GO TO RUN until directed by the lead examiner. (The examiner has provided to the candidate with initial conditions and the initiating cues prior to placing the simulator in RUN.) To recreate the IC setup for this JPM:
- ResettolC-16
- Place LTOPS in NORMAL and establish feed with AFW to prevent distracting alarms
- Start both ESW Pumps
- Throttle 1 CC-575 irf ccwO8O (n 0 0) 50 0 0
- ShutlCC-522 irfccwl22(nOO)000
- Open 1CC-512 irfccw083 (n 00)10000
- Check Fl-652.1 in normal band 10,000 gpm to 11,000 gpm
- IF VCT makeup occurs during this set up allow the VCT to fill
- Return CCWto normal lineup per OP-145
- Stabilize the plant including AFW flows
- FREEZE and SNAP 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM h Rev. i
Appendix C Page 4 of 15 Form ES-C1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Simulator Operator: When directed by the Lead ExamIner go to Run. START TIME: OP-I 45 Performance Step: I Implements procedure Standard:
- Reviews Sections 1.0 through 4.0.
- Proceeds to Section 8.9.
- Reviews the initial conditions for 8.9 (RHR System operation desired)
Comment: V - Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM h Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 5 of 15 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION OP-145, 8.9.2.1 Procedure Notes:
- The purpose of this section is to ensure CCW pump runout does not occur. Maximum flow through one CCW pump is 12,650 gpm. This section will ensure that one CCW pump is not supplying both essential cooling loops and the non essential loop simultaneously.
- Normally it is desirable to place both RHR cooling trains in operation in Mode 4. This will require both COW pumps to be in operation and one train of non-essential supply and return valves to be shut.
Procedure Caution: To prevent pump runout when aligning COW flow to the RHR Hx, verify flow rate to the Non-essential header with one pump running is less than 8500 gpm, as indicated on Fl-652.i (Fl 653.1) prior to opening 100-147 (ICC-167). Performance Step: 2 PERFORM the following to verify total CCW flow rate is between 7850 gpm and 8500 gpm:
- IF SFP 2&3A is in service, THEN THROTTLE SHUT 100-508, SFP HX 2&3A CCW Outlet Isolation Valve.
. IF SFP 2&3B is in service, THEN THROTTLE SHUT 1 CC-521, SFP HX 2&3B CCW Outlet Isolation Valve.
Standard: Reads and circle I slashes notes and caution Determines flow is NOT within band and contacts Aux Operator to throttle shut 1CC-508 to their mark When contacted to throttle shut I CC-508 use Simulator Drawing CCWO7 I open window for 1 CC-508 and adjust the percent open in three increments to allow the candidate to monitor the progress on ERFIS you should be in open communication with Simulator Operator I the candidate during this evolution Communicator:
- 41% to 25% with a 10 second ramp
- 25% to 10% with a 10 second ramp This last adjustment will get flow to be within band and you will be instructed to stop.
- 10% to 4% with a 10 second ramp Fl-652.1 reads 8400 gpm and 8200 gpm on ERFIS Evaluator Note: FI-652.1 Tolerance is +/- 200 gpm Band 8200 1 8600 gpm outside of this band is not acceptable Comment:
V Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM h Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 6 of 15 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION OP-145, 8.9.2.2 Performance Step: 3 IF both trains of RHR cooling are to be placed in service, START the second CCW pump per Section 5.2. Standard: Proceeds to Section 5.2 to start CCW Pump B. Comment: OP-145, 5.2.1 Performance Step: 4 Verifies Initial Conditions Standard: Notes all Initial Conditions are signed (including the prestart checks) Contacts Aux Operator to standby for B CCW pump start Simulator Communicator: When requested: Report you are standing by. Comment: V - Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM h Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 7 of 15 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION OP-145, 52.2.1 Procedure Notes:
- Starting the second pump could cause LiP fluctuations across REM-O1CC-35O1ASA (BSB) which may shut solenoid valves 1CC-23 and 1CC-40.
- Starting the second pump may cause flow oscillations which could shut 1CC-252. Re-opening of 1CC-252 should not be attempted until the second pump is secured.
- APP-ALB-005 Windows 1-3, 2-1, and 3-2 are expected alarms when starting the second CCW Pump.
Procedure Caution:
- With one CCW pump running and the standby pump capable of an automatic start, ensure a minimum flowrate of 7850 gpm exists as indicated on Fl-652.i (FI-653.1). If both CCW pumps are running OR the CCW trains are separated, a minimum of 3850 gpm per pump is required. This lower flowrate should only be allowed for short durations to accomplish pump swapping or system realignment.
q Performance Step: 5 Reviews and circle / slashes notes and caution Makes PA announcement for pump start then: At the MCB, START CCW Pump Train B-SB. Standard: Selects CCW Pump B to start and releases Verifies pump start indications Contacts Aux Operator to ensure good start IF contacted OR asked to report on B CCW pump start Simulator Communicator: Report the B CCW pump had a good start and you will continue to monitor during pump warm up to full operating conditions. Comment:
- Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM h Rev. I
Appendix C Page 8 of 15 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION OP-I 45, 5.2.2.2 Performance Step: 6 VERIFY flow is greater than or equal to 3850 gpm on FI-653.1 and Fl- 652.1. Standard: Verifies 3850 gpm on FI-653.1 and Fl-652.1. FI-653.I reads 5000 gpm Fl-653.I Tolerance is +/- 500 gpm Evaluator Note: Band 4500 I 5500 gpm outside of this band is not acceptable FI-652.I reads 4500 gpm Fl-652.I Tolerance is +/- 500 gpm Band 4000 I 5000 gpm outside of this band is not acceptable Comment: OP-145, 5.2.2.3 Performance Step: 7 VERIFY OPEN, 1CC-23 and 1CC-40, REM 3501 A CCW Inlet Solenoid Valve and REM 3501 B CCW Inlet Solenoid Valve respectively. Standard: Contacts Aux Operator for verification Simulator Communicator: Report: ICC-23 and ICC-40 are OPEN Comment: V Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM h Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 9 of 15 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION OP-145, 5.2.2.4 and 5.2.2.5 Performance Step: 8 F 1 CC-23 or 1 CC-40 shut as a result of starting the CCW pump, THEN INITIATE a CR. PERFORM one of the following:
- SECURE a second CCW Pump using Section 7.1
- ALIGN CCW to support RHR cooling using Section 8.9 Standard: N/As step 4 and step 5 Comment:
OP-145, 8.9.2.3 Procedure Note: If A (B) train RHR cooling is placed in service first, the A (B) CCW pump will only supply the A (B) CCW essential header. B (A) CCW pump will supply the non-essential CCW header and the B (A) CCW essential header. q Performance Step: 9 OPEN 1CC-147 (1CC-167), CCW FROM RHR HEAT EXCHANGER A-SA (B-SB). Standard: Reads and circle / slashes note Places 1CC-147 in OPEN (RED indication). Comment:
- Denotes Critial Steps 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM h Rev. I
Appendix C Page 10 of 15 Form ES-C-I PERFORMANCE INFORMATION OP-145, 8.9.2.4 Procedure Caution: With one CCW pump running and the standby pump capable of an automatic start, ensure a minimum flowrate of 7850 gpm exists as indicated on Fl-652.I (Fl-653.1). If both COW pumps are running OR the COW trains are separated, a minimum of 3850 gpm per pump is required. This lower flowrate should only be allowed for short durations to accomplish pump swapping or system realignment. (Reference 2.6.6) Performance Step: 10 VERIFY RHR HXA (B) outflow is 5600 to 8150 gpm on Fl-688A1 (Fl 689A1). Standard: Reads circle I slashes caution Verifies RHR HX A out flow is 5600 to 8150 gpm on Fl-688A1. FI-688A1 reads 7900 gpm Evaluator Note: Fl-688A1 Tolerance is +/- 200 gpm Band 7700 1 7900 gpm outside of this band is not acceptable Comment: OP-145, 8.9.2.5 Procedure Note: If a leak occurs, and surge tank level is less than 40% (below the divider plate), make up water for the B COW header will be supplied by demin water. Makeup water for the A CCW header must be supplied by the Reactor Makeup Water System. Procedure Caution: Shutting both 1 CC-99 and 1CC-I 13 will result in the loss of the Nonessential Header. q Performance Step: 11 IF both COW pumps are in service, CLOSE 100-99 (1CC-113), COW HEAT EXCHANGER A(B) TO NONESSENTIAL SUP. Standard: Closes only 100-99 (GREEN indication). Comment: V Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM h Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 11 of 15 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION OP-145, 8.9.2.6 Procedure Caution: Shutting both ICC-128 and 1CC-i27 will result in the loss of the Nonessential Header. J Performance Step: 12 IF both CCW pumps are in service, CLOSE 1CC-i 28 (1 CC-i 27), CCW NONESSENTIAL RETURN TO HEADER A(B). Standard: Reads circle I slashes note Closes 1CC-i28 (GREEN indication). Comment: OP-145, 8.9.2.7 Performance Step: 13 VERIFY the following:
- a. IF both CCW Pumps are in service, THEN PERFORM the following:
- CHECK CCW Pump A-SA (B-SB) flow between 7850 and 8050 gpm on MCB indicator FI-688A1 (Fl-689A1).
- IF necessary, THEN ADJUST and LOCK 1CC-146 (1 CC-I 66), RHR Hx A (B) Outlet Throttle Valve, to obtain desired flow.
Standard: Verifies flow between 7850 and 8050 gpm on Fl-688Ai
- Determines that there is no need to adjust I CC-246
- Determines steps 7.a.2 and 7.b.1 and 2 are N/A Fl-688A1 reads 8000 gpm FI-688A1 Tolerance is +/- 200 gpm Evaluator Note: Band 7800 I 8200 gpm NOTE: IF a value of> 8050 is read then they may ask for the Aux Operator to adjust the flow to get within band If asked to adjust flow then reduce the percent open of Simulator Operator: 1CC-I 46 on Sim drawing for CCWO3 from 46 to 44 to obtain slightly lower flow rate on Fl-688A1 Comment:
V Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM h Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 12 of 15 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION OP-145, 8.9.2.8 Procedure Caution: Do not supply CCW to both RHR Heat Exchangers simultaneously with only one CCW pump running. q Performance Step: 14 IF both trains of RHR cooling are to be placed in service, OPEN 1CC-I 67 (ICC-147), CCW FROM RHR HEAT EXCHANGER B-SB (A-SA). Standard: Opens 1CC-i 67 (RED indication). Comment: OP-I 45, 8.9.2.9 Performance Step: 15 VERIFY CCW Pump B-SB (A-SA) flow rate in the required range, as follows:
- CHECK CCW Pump B-SB (A-SA) flow rate is between 10,000 and 12,500 gpm on MOB indicator Fl-.653.1 (Fl-652.1). IF flow rate is not between 10,000 and 12,500 gpm, THEN ADJUST the applicable valve.
Standard: Verifies flow rate is between 10,000 and 12,500 gpm on FI-653.1 and there is NO need for flow adjustment and N/As step 9.b. FI-653.1 readsll200gpm Evaluator Note: j Fl-653.1 Tolerance is +/- 200 gpm I Band 11000111400 gpm outside of this band is not acceptable Comment:
- Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM h Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 13 of 15 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION OP-145, 8.9.2.10 Performance Step: 16 Locally VERIFY Fl-693, CCW Flow Gross Failed Fuel Detector, is between 8 and 12 gpm. Standard: Contacts Aux Operator to verify flow on Fl-693 between 8 and 12 gpm Simulator Communicator: Flow on Fl-693 reads 10 gpm Comment: OP-145, 8.9.2.11 Performance Step: 17 WHEN CCW is no longer required for RHR Operation, PERFORM the following steps: Standard: Step is N/A at this time. Comment: When Step 8.9.2.11 is read: Evaluation on this JPM is Evaluator Cue: complete. Direct Simulator Operator to place the Simulator in Freeze. Simulator Operator: When directed by the Lead Examiner then, go to Freeze. STOP TIME:
- Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM h Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 14 of 15 Form ES-C-i VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2013 NRC Exam Simulator JPM CR h Align CCW to Support RHR Initiation OP-145 Examinees Name: Date Performed: Facility Evaluator: Number of Attempts: Time to Complete: Question Documentation: Question:
Response
Result: SAT UNSAT Examiners Signature: Date: 2013 NRC Exam CR JPM h Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 15 of 15 Form ES-C-i JPM CUE SHEET
. The unit is in Mode 4, going to Mode 5
. Preparations are underway to place both trains of RHR in service Initial Conditions:
. Both ESW Trains are in service
. CCW Pump A is running Align COW to support RHR operation in accordance with OP-145, Initiating Cue: COMPONENT COOLING WATER. All Section 3.0 Prerequisites are met.
2013 NRC Exam CR JPM h Rev. 1
Appendix C Page lot 13 Form ESC-1 Worksheet Facility: Shearon Harris Task No.: 121 001 H404 Task
Title:
Place the ASI System in Standby JPM No.: 2013 NRC Exam Alignment (OP-185) In-Plant JPM I K/A
Reference:
AA2.67 RO 2.9 SRO 3.1 ALTERNATE PATH - NO Examinee: NRC Examiner: Facility Evaluator: Date: Method of testing: Simulated Performance: X Actual Performance: Classroom Simulator Plant X READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied. A Normal Plant Heatup is in progress in accordance with GP-002, Normal Plant Heatup From Cold Solid To Hot Subc ritical Initial Conditions: Mode5To Mode 3.
. Current RCS temperature is 335° F
. The A CSIP is in service and providing 10 gpm to all 3 RCP Seals.
The MCR has directed you to perform OP-i 85, Alte rnate Seal Injection, Section 5.1, Automatic Standby Alignment Prior to MODE 3. Initiating Cue: Initial Conditions have been met with the exception of step 5.1.1.6. You are to complete initial conditions and perform section 5.1.2. 2013 NRC Exam In-Plant JPM i Rev 1 \
Appendix C Page 2 of 13 Form ES-C-I Worksheet Task Standard: Place the ASI System in Standby Alignment (OP-i 85) Required Materials: OP-i 85 Section 5.1 General
References:
OP-i 85 Section 5.1 Rev. 7 Time Critical Task: No Validation Time: 10 minutes Critical Task Justification Ste p 4 Required to ensure proper Alternate Seal Injection Stan dby Alignment Prior to entering Mode 3. 2013 NRC Exam In-Plant JPM I Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 3 of 13 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: Do NOT operate actual plant equipm ent. Follow standard ALARA practices in the RCA. START TIME: Performance Step: I OBTAIN PROCEDURE Standard: Obtain OP-i 85 Section 5.1 and review procedure. Provide operator with a copy of predete Evaluator Cue: rmine pages for OP-I 85, marked-up procedure with all initial conditions completed except 5.1.16. Comment: OP-185, 5.1.1 Caution prior to Step I Performance Step: 2 CAUTION: If normal seal injection flow to 2/3 RCPs (FIS-7207, 7208, 7209) is less than 4.0 gpm for 150 seconds the squib valves will fire; the ASI pump will start after a 15 second delay. Standard: Circle, reads then slashes Caution Comment: V Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam In-Plant JPM i Rev. I
Appendix C Page 4 of 13 Form ES-C-I PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Evaluator Note: In accordance with PRONGGC-0200, Initi al Conditions may be performed in any order. OP-I 85, 51.I Step 6 Performance Step: 3 ASI Tank level is 99% or greater ([1-7206 at AS! Tank) Standard: Locates LI-7206 and reads AS! Tank level. Evaluator Cue: LI-7206 reads 99%. Evaluator Note: Ll-7206 should read 99% or greater. OP-185, 5.1.2 Note prior to step I Performance Step: 4 The valves in step 5.1.2.1 and 5.1.2.2 are located in the CVCS Filter Valve Gallery. Standard: Circle, reads then slashes Note Comment: V Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam In-Plant JPM i Rev. I
Appendix C Page5of 13 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATIO N OP-I 85, 5.1.2.1 Performance Step: 5 Verify Locked Open 1 CS-828, AS I Supply Header Upstream Isolation VIv. The location of ICS-828 and ICS
-827 may be difficult to see when following the candidate into the CVCS filter valve gallery since the area to stand in is small. Have the candidate show you where the valves are located on the valve map outside the CVCS filte r gallery before entering the area.
Evaluator Note: There may have be a change in dose conditions from when this JPM was validated. DO NO T ENTER THE AREA TO IDENTIFY THE VALVES IF YOU WILL RECEIVE A DOSE OF
>lmilliRem during the performanc e of this JPM. Instead use the valve map exclusively and con duct a reverse brief on what would be done.
Standard: Locates 1CS-828, ASI Supply Hea der Upstream Isolation valve (or on the valve map outside the CVCS filter valve gallery) (#51 on the map). Evaluator Cue: Provide feedback that ICS-828 as found position is locked open. Comment: OP-I 85, 5.1.2.2 Performance Step: 6 Verify Locked Open 1CS-827, ASI Supply Header Downstream Isolation Vlv. Standard: Locates ICS-827, ASI Supply Hea der Downstream Isolation valve (or on the valve map out side the CVCS filter valve gall (#50 on the map). ery) Evaluator Cue: Provide feedback that I CS-827 as found position is locked open. Comment: V Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam In-Plant JPM I Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 6 of 13 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION OP-I 85, 5.1.2.3 Evaluator Cue: Provide feedback as each component is checked that I the associated light indication is OFF. Performance Step: 7 CHECK the ASI System Control Panel for the follow ing: Tit1 ndicati on ttu lnitiai Color ASI Pump Aut Sr. Tmier Red OFF initiated ASl Pump Nci in Aulo Amber OFF 24\ DC L. - il P OFF 12UVA(. CDii.fOi iwr Aacile Ahlte oH Squib V n pi .mbcr OFF IASI21 Firinq Circt 3reen Available 2:i orr 1ASI22 Fii iri Ci: AvaiIN OFF ASI Pump Runnmci Red OFF ASI Pump Stoppd 13reen OFF Standard: Locates each indication in step 3 and checks that all lights are off. Comment: OP-I 85 section 5.1.2 Note prior to step 4 Performance Step: 8 The actions in Step 5.1.2.4 will clear ALB-S-2-3, ASI SYSTE M TROUBLE, if no other inputs to the ALB are active. Standard: Circle, reads then slashes Note Comment: V - Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam In-Plant JPM i Rev. I
Appendix C Page 7 of 13 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION OP-I 85 section 5.1.2.4.a Performance Step: 9 At the ASI System Control Panel, PERFOR M the following:
- a. PLACE CS-210.1, AS! PUMP, in AUT O.
Evaluator Cue: The initial switch position of CS-210.1 is OFF Standard: Locates CS-210.1 and places CS-210.1, ASI PUMP, in the AUTO position. NOTE: Both lights are OUT and both ligh ts will STILL BE OUT when CS-210.1 is placed in AUTO Evaluator Cue: Once the switch is turned provide feedbac k: CS-210.I is now in AUTO Comment: V - Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam In-Plant JPM i Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 8 of 13 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION OP-185 section 5.1.2.4.b (Begin Critical Step s) V Performance Step: 10 Place CS-210.2. SQUIB VALVE IASI-21 BYP ASS, in NORMAL Evaluator Cue: The initial switch position of CS-210.2 is in BYPASS Standard: Identifies that this step is a critical step. Loca tes CS-210.2 and determine that switch is in the bypass position. Repositions switch to NORMAL NOTE: Both lights are OUT and both lights will STILL BE OUT when CS-210.2 is placed in NORMAL Evaluator Cue: Once the switch is turned: CS-210.2 is now in NORMAL. Comment: OP-185 section 5.i.2.4.c v Performance Step: 11 Place CS-210.3, SQUIB VALVE IASI-.22 BYP ASS, in NORMAL Evaluator Cue: The initial switch position of CS-210.3 is in BYPASS Standard: Locates CS-210.3 and determine that switch is in the bypass position. Repositions switch to NORMAL NOTE: Both lights are OUT and both light s will STILL BE OUT when CS-210.3 is placed in NORMAL Evaluator Cue: Once the switch is turned: CS-210.3 is now in NORMAL. Comment:
- Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam lnPIant JPM i Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 9of 13 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATIO N OP-I 85 section 5.1.2.5 V Performance Step: 12 PLACE breaker PP-i D232-6, Fee d to ASI System Control Pan to ON. el, Evaluator Cue: PP-I D232-6, Feed to AS1 Syste m Control breaker Panel is OFF Standard: Locates PP-i D232-6 and determ ines that the breaker is OFF. Places breaker to the ON positio n. Once the breaker is manipula ted: The breaker is now ON NOTE: Candidate may go bac k to the panel after the breake Evaluator Cue: is ON to check light condition r
- s. IF they do and they wa response for the light indicatio nt a ns then cue:
24VDC control power availab le (white light ON) I2OVAC control power availab le (white light ON) ALL 4 Green lights on Firing Cir cuit Available (green ON) Comment: V - Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam In-Plant JPM I Rev. I
Appendix C Page 10 of 13 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION OP-I 85 section 5.1.2.6 V Performance Step: 13 PLACE breaker 1 D23-1 B, Alternate Seal Injection Pump, to ON. 1D23-IB, Alternate Seal Injection Pump breaker is OFF Evaluator Cue: IF ASKED: (both red and green lights should be OFF) Standard: Locates breaker 1D23-1B, Alternate Seal Injection Pump is OFF and once the breaker is manipulated provide feedback that breaker is now ON. Once the breaker is manipulated: The breaker is now ON. Evaluator Cue: IF ASKED: green light is LIT on breaker AND above the Auto switch 210.1 on the panel Comment: V Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam In-Plant JPM i Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 1 1 of 13 Form ES-C-I PERFORMANCE INFORMATION End Critical Steps OP-185 section 5.1.2.7 Performance Step: 14 Check the ASI system control Panel for the following: Title lndict[on Status in!tils Cc or ASI Pump Aut Lm*er Rd OFF Initiated ASI Pump Nor Auto Aothr OFF 24VDC Contro wr Ava.ie ne ON 1 2OVAC Comco Fr A.aaoe Aoute ON Squib \aves n Anbor OFF 1 ASl21 Firinç! Cifot Available (>2) lASl22 Firinu Cirot Geei Available ASI Pump Runnn Red OFF ASI Pump Steppes:! 3ren ON Evaluator Cue: As each indicator is read, provide feedback that each light is properly lit as determined fromthe table in this step. Standard: Locates each indication listed in step 7 and verifies that the lights are indicating properly. Once Student reacis step 5.1.2.8, Announce Evaluator Cue: End of JPM. STOP TIME: V - Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam In-Plant JPM I Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 12 of 13 Form ES-C-i VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2013 NRC Exam In-Plant JPM i Place the ASI System in Standby Alignment (OP-i 85) Examinees Name: Date Performed: Facility Evaluator: Number of Attempts: Time to Complete: Question Documentation: Question:
Response
Result: SAT UNSAT Examiners Signature: Date: 2013 NRC Exam In-Plant JPM I Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 13 of 13 Form ES-C-i JPM CUE SHEET SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: Do NOT operate actual plant equipment unless specifically authorized to do so. Follow standard ALARA practices in the RCA. A Normal Plant Heatup is in progress in accordance with GP-002, Normal Plant Heatup From Cold Solid To Hot Subcritical Mode 5 To Mode 3. Initial Conditions:
. Current RCS temperature is 335°F
. The A CSIP is in service and providing 10 gpm to all 3 RCP Seals.
. The MCR has directed you to perform OP-i 85, Alternate Seal Injection, Section 5.1, Automatic Standby Alignment Prior to MODE 3.
Initiating Cue:
- Initial Conditions have been met with the exception of step 5.1.1.6.
- You are to complete initial conditions and perform section 5.1.2.
2013 NRC Exam In-Plant JPM i Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 1 of 24 Form ES-C-i Worksheet Facility: Shearon Harris Task No.: 301ii7H401 Task
Title:
Local Inspection of Annunciator JPM No.: 2013 NRC Exam Cabinets Inplant JPM KJA
Reference:
2.1.23 ALTERNATE PATH: NO Examinee: NRC Examiner: Facility Evaluator: Date: Method of testing: Simulated Performance: X Actual Performance: Classroom Simulator Plant X READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied. ALB-03-4-5, Annunciator System 2 Power Supply Failure, has Initial Conditions: alarmed in the Main Control Room. The crew has entered AOP-037, Loss of Main Control Room Annunciators. You have been directed by the CRS to check the status of System 2 Initiating Cue: annunciator power supplies per Attachment 2. Provide the candidate a blank copy of AOP-037, Attachment 2 System 2 Annunciator Power Supply Status Determination, Sheets I and 2. 2013 NRC Exam lnPlantJPMj Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 2 of 24 Form ES-C-i Worksheet Task Standard: Determine Status of Annunciator power supplies and number of annunciators affected and report to the Main Control Room. Required Materials: Annunciator cabinet key #48 General
References:
AOP-037, Attachment 2, Rev. 21 Time Critical Task: No Validation Time: 15 Minutes
. N/A In-Plant JPM Critical Task Justification Step 4 Without proper diagnosis of the affected power supplies, the MCR will not be able to fully determine total number of affected annunciators.
Step 5 Without proper diagnosis of the affected power supplies, the MCR will not be able to fully determine total number of affected annunciators. Step 6 Without proper diagnosis of the affected power supplies, the MCR will not be able to fully determine total number of affected annunciators. Step 7 Without proper diagnosis of the affected power supplies, the MCR will not be able to fully determine total number of affected annunciators. 2013 NRC Exam lnPlantJPMj Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 3 of 24 Form ES-C-i Worksheet Examiners Note: Key #48 is required to open the Annunciator power supply cabinets. Prior to exam administration, the key will be checked out by someone from the Exam Development team and given to the NRC Lead Examiner. The key will be checked back in at the end of the day by the person that originally checked the key out. Details of how to obtain a key will be left to the Examiner. One method to obtain a key and return it after use is listed below:
- Obtain Safety Key Locker key from the CRSs desk
- Identify which key is required based on the Key Locker Index in key locker area
- Unlock the Safety Key Locker door and obtain proper key
- Sign key out
- Return the Safety Key Locker key to the CRSs desk
- At conclusion of task the key to the Safety Key Locker should again be obtained from the CRSs desk
- Unlock the Safety Key Locker and return key to its Safety Key Locker location and re-lock the locker door
- The key should be signed back in
- The Safety Key Locker CRS key should be returned to the desk By getting a key ahead of time and just asking the candidates how to obtain a key will alleviate the need to check out and check in the key each time the JPM is administered to the candidates for this JPM. This will reduce the overall time required to perform this JPM 2013 NRC Exam InPlant JPM j Rev. i
Appendix C Page 4 of 24 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Note: The candidate will need to check out key #48 to open the Annunciator power supply cabinets. e Allow the candidate to either start to obtain a cabinet door key OR go to the cabinets then realize the need for a key when the cabinets are attempted to be Evaluator Cue: opened.
. When the need for a key is determined ask the candidate how to obtain the proper key and note the response. (See details on page 2 for obtaining a cabinet door key). Then provide the candidate with the correct cabinet key.
AOP-037, Attachment 2 System 2 Annunciator Power Supply Status Determination Step I Performance Step: I OBTAIN Annunciator Cabinet key
- NOTE: the candidate may proceed to the cabinet without a key and determine a key is needed when they try to open the locked door.
Standard: Discuss how to obtain key (see page 2 write up). Obtains key from CRSs desk to unlock Safety Key locker and checks out key #48. Proceeds to Annunciator Power Supply Cabinet door area. Comment:
- Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam lnPlantJPMj Rev. 1
Form ES-C-i Page 5 of 24 INFORMATION PERFORMANCE k PlC CASh PIG CAB3 PlC CAB7 BI PIC PlC CAB12 PIG CAB4 PlC CABS PlC CAB 16 PlC CAB 2 PIG CAB 9 PIG CAB 13 SA PlC CAB 15 1 s 14 SOLCA8 2A SOLCB 1AI 2A2 1A1 1A2 2A1 ISCLCA 3 IN SA fN SA ]N SAI ISOLCAE2B ANN. CAB-2 INSA
.18 2B1 282 3M 3A2 ANN. CAB-I
- BAY I BAY BAY ---I-SA-I SA -
SA SA 1BI 182 SA NSAj BAY BAYI BAYI BAY I BAY 2 I I SA 1 I 2 I 3 I SB SB SB SB TRAIN A SB MiX RELAY RA CKS I TEST TRAIN B AR-I 1 OE MULT INPUT I OUTPIJIIOUT LOGIC 1 PUT TEST
# I TEST I TEST AR-S AR-S PLEXER
#2 1 OTECTION SY STEM RACKS SOUD STATE PR UTtPDI, 2119/200909:47 Display PlC ROOM LAYO START TIME:
the he n ca nd id ate has opened ld begi n w first che E Start time shou er supply cabinet to begin the w Evaluator Note: Annunciator po InPiant JPM j 4 at Steps 2013 NRC Exam V Denotes Critic
Appendix C Page 6 of 24 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION NOTE prior to Step 2 Performance Step: 2
- All power supplies are located in the east side of the cabinets. Indicating lights for the 24 VDC and 12 VDC are on the top side of the power supply.
Equipment designators used below in brackets [] are those listed in the MCB Annunciator Reference Guide. The equipment is not labeled in the field. Standard: Circles, Reads and slashes Note: Locates annunciator cabinet, System 2, Bay 1 unlocks and opens door. Comment: V - Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam InPIantJPMj Rev. 1
Form ES-C-I Page 7 of 24 Appendix C ION PERFORMANCE INFORMAT 2 a different order than System The candidate MAY start in yd og oo uto f 5thenBay4. lFthe Bayl then Bay3thenBay h the are providing them wit E valuator N o e. order then make sure you binet that they are in. correct drawing for each ca Attach ment 2, Step 2 ciator each of the following Annun CHECK the indicated lights for if LIT . Performance Step: 3 chment) AND INI TIA L Cabinets (drawing page 2 of atta t rator aid posted inside cabine Reviews table (may check ope Standard: g as sheet 2 in procedure) door which is the same drawin Bay I cabinet door for System 2, Once candidate opens the rke d-up ication, give candidate ma and identifies the first ind Cue: attachment for Bay I and shown on this attachment. Evaluator Cue: Indications for this Bay are as e the candidate check the Performance steps 4-7 hav and record the findings on appropriate indicating lights Attachment 2 Sheet I. nued) Attachment 2, Step 2 (conti g lights in SYSTEM 2, BAY I Performance Step: 4 Checks appropriate indicatin g lights in Bay 1 and INITIALS all Standard: Checks appropriate indicatin 2 Bay 1 spaces on Attachment Comment: V Denotes Critical Steps Rev. 1 2013 NRC Exam lnPlantJPMj
Appendix C Page 8 of 24 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Attachment 2, Step 2 continued Performance Step: 5 Checks appropriate indicating lights in SYSTEM 2, BAY 3 Once candidate opens the cabinet door for System 2, Bay 3 and identifies the first indication, give candidate the Evaluator Cue: marked-up attachment for Bay 3 and Cue: Indications for this Bay are as shown on this attachment. Standard: Checks appropriate indicating lights in Bay 3 and INITIALS all Bay 3 spaces on Attachment 2 except left 12 VDC power supply (2C#i) Comment: Attachment 2, Step 2 continued Performance Step: 6 Checks appropriate indicating lights in SYSTEM 2, BAY 5 Once candidate opens the cabinet door for System 2, Bay 5 and identifies the first indication, give candidate marked-up Evaluator Cue: attachment for Bay 5 and Cue: Indications for this Bay are as shown on this attachment. Standard: Checks appropriate indicating lights in Bay 5 and INITIALS all Bay 5 spaces on Attachment 2 except left 24 VDC power supply (2E#1) Comment: V Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam InPIantJPMj Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 9 of 24 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION Attachment 2, Step 2 continued / Performance Step: Checks appropriate indicating lights in SYSTEM 2, BAY 4 Once candidate opens the cabinet door for System 2, Bay 4 and identifies the first indication, give candidate marked-up Evaluator Cue: attachment for Bay 4 and Cue: Indications for this Bay are as shown on this attachment. Standard: Checks appropriate indicating lights in Bay 4 and INITIALS all Bay 4 spaces on Attachment 2 Comment: Attachment 2, Step 2 continued Performance Step: 8 Report findings to MCR Since the MCR is close by the candidate may start moving in the Evaluator Note: direction of the MCR to report their findings. Have them stay in the location they are in and simulate a phone call to the MCR. Standard: Candidate calls the MCR using local phone and reports that all power supply indicating lights are lit for System 2 Annunciators except 12 VDC power supply (2C#1) in Bay 3 and the left 24 VDC power supply in Bay 5. Acknowledge call: Repeat back the information the candidate provides. The CRS now want you to determine the total number of AFFECTED annunciator WINDOWS that are affected based Evaluator Cue: . . . . on the indications you have identified in Attachment 2 sheet I using AOP-037, Attachment 3 then report your finding. (Now provide the candidate a copy of Attachment 3 and the sheet they can write their name and answer on). Comment: V Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam InPlantJPMj Rev. 1
Appendix Page ii of 24 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION KEY LOSS OF MA[N CONTROL ROOM ANNUNCIATORS Attachment 2 - System 2 Annunciator Power Supply Status Determination Sheet 1 of 2 Dl. O5TAIN Annunciator Cabinet key. NOTE
. All power supplies are located in the east side of the cabinets. Indicating lights for the 24 \/DC and 12 YDC are on the top side of the power supply.
. Equipment designators used below in brackets [j are those listed in the MCB Annunciator Reference Guide. The equipment is not labeled in the field.
D2 CHECK the ndicateJ lights or each of the fallo inq Ann unciitor Cabinets idr9 ing poe 2 of attachrnenti AND INITIAL if LIT. EVA.LuAro NOTE
****3Q identifieo the b1ocks that needo to be 1nitiaied***
CABINET [NV AC 125 VDC PWR ON 12 VDC PWR ON 24 VDC PWR ON iTop Row Lefti towLefti ITop Row (Seoond Raw, Outside [SmsIl& iSecotid Row Inner [Largeri) Light Inithl Light Iriitil light La) Initial Light Lot) Initial Light lLo) JnthI Light (L) initial Light (L) Irnitiai Systrri2 LIT j LIT LIT jr: LiT LIT LIT j LIT 5y ([2A1)rtçht) ([2A#iJ t) ([2A#2lrigi,t) (2A#1] left) ([2M21rigflt System2 LIT UT JQ LIT LIT LIT LIT LIT Bay 3 ([2c1] ight) ([2C1J ieft) ([2C2J right) . 2C#TJ left) i[2c2] right) Safem 2 LIT LIT LIT LIT NM N/A LIT N/A N/A Ba 5 [221) night) [2E1 e JO f[2E.1J left) N/A Nt- N/A NIM LIT .. NA NM tf N A. N(A WA ([2D1) left) System 2 N/A N/A N/A N/A LIT ti/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Bay 4 t[2D21 ricjht) N/A N/A NfA N/A LIT .. fl/A N/A. N/A N/A NSA NM N/A NM f2D3] second ro.v) AOP-037 I Rev. 21 I Page 12 of 52 V - Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam InPlant JPM j Rev. 1
Appendix Page 12 of 24 Form ES-C-i PERFORMANCE INFORMATION KEY 24VDC System 2 2A#i 134 13. 14.15,20 2A2 87 1721,30 2C#1 124 23.25.26, 2c-#2 90 22, 27.. 28, 29 2E1 82 16,18,19,24 POWER AFFECTED AFFECTED ALRs SUPPLIES WINDOWS 12 VDC System I 1A1?r ii 1. 2,3,4, 5(51 of52), 7 (3 of 18), 8 (3 of 23), 9(4 of 29), 10(6o145) 1A2 193 2 (4of39), 4(150121), 5,0, 7.8,9(21 0129), 10 (3Oct45) 1C1 104 1 (3 of 33), 9.10,11,12 I2VDC Systeni2 2M1 171 13, 14. 15, 16(7 of 12), 17 (8 of 16). 20. 21 (22 of 3.7) 13(3 of 32), 14 (5 of 41, 16 (5 of 12). 17 (15 of 16), 19, 22 192 20i3 c 7 fD9 21 22115of47j 24 (2 of 10 2.Ei2f10j 26(1 OF 14,. 30 2C1 198 14(3 of 41), 15 (20 0122), 18 (10 of 2$), 22(29 of 47), 23, 24aorl3) 25 26 27(40115) All System 2 power supplies are initialed EXCEPT left 12 VDC power supply (2C#1) in Bay 3 and left 24 VDC power supply (2E#1) in Bay & Candidate determines that 262 annunciators are affected. V Denotes Critical Steps
- 2013 NRC Exam InPlant JPM j Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 13 of 24 Form ES-C-i VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2013 NRC Exam InPlant JPM i Local Inspection of Annunciator Cabinets AOP-037 Examinees Name: Date Performed: Facility Evaluator: Number of Attempts: Time to Complete: Question Documentation: Question:
Response
Result: SAT UNSAT Examiners Signature: Date: 2013 NRC Exam lnPlantJPMj Rev.
Appendix C Page 14 of 24 Form ES-C-i JPM CUE SHEET Name: Date: Identify the number of AFFECTED annunciators WINDOWS based on your findings Answer: 2013 NRC Exam InPIantJPMj Rev.
Appendix C Page 15 of 24 Form ES-C-i JPM CUE SHEET LOSS OF MAIN CONTROL ROOM ANNUNCIATORS AttachrnGnt 3 Affect&d ALB Determination Sheet 3 of 3 General Description ot Systems Associated with ALBS: ALB-T Containment Spray & ACcumulator System ALB-2 Emergency Service Normal Service Water System ALB-3 Miscellaneous Systems ALB-4 RH R/RWST System ALB-5 Component Cooling Water System ALB-6 Chemical Volume Control System ALB-7 Chemical Volume Control System ALB-8 RCP System ALB-EI Pressurizer System ALS-ID Reactor Coolant System ALB- Reactor First Out System ALB-12 Reactor First Out System ALS-13 Nuclear Instrumentation System and Rod Control System ALB-14 Steam Generator System ALB-15 Various Protective Panels Trouble Alarms ALB-16 Feedwater System ALB-17 Auxiliary Feedwater System ALB-I8 Turbine First Out System ALB-19 Heater Drain Pump & Condensate System ALB-20 MSR & Turbine System ALB-21 LP/HP Heaters & Circulating Water System ALB-22 Generator Exciter, Startup & Unit Transformer ALB-23 Various Area & Room Ventilation & Equipment, Fuel Pool System ALB-24 Diesel Generator A System ALB-25 Diesel Generator B System ALB-26 Control Panels Trouble Alarm System ALB-27 .. HVAC System (DC & Containment) ALB-23 HUAC System (Containment) ALB-29 HVAC System (Containment) ALB-30 HVAC System (Control Room)
--END OF ATTACHMENT 3--
AOP-037 Rev. 21 I Page 16 of 52 2013 NRC Exam InPiant JPM j Rev.
Appendix C Page 16 of 24 Form ES-C-i JPM CUE SHEET
- LOSS O MAIN CONTROL ROOM ANUNC1ATORS Attachment 3 Affected ALB
- Determiration Sheet 2 of 3 2E#1 82 16, 18, 19, 24 POWER AFFECTED AFFECTED ALB SUPPLIES WINDOWS 12VDC System 1 iA1 1,2.3,4,5 (51 0152). 7(30118), 8(30123), 9 (40129).
10(Eot45) 1A#2 193 .2(4 of 39). 4(15 of 21), 5, 6, 7. 8,9 (21 of 29), 10(36 of 45) iC1 104 1 (3 of 33). 9,10,11, 12 I2VDC Sytm2 2A#1 ii 13,14,15,16ç10112), 17(8or1), 20, 21 (22 cr37) 13(3of 32,14 (5of41), 16(Sof 12), 17(lSof 16), 19, 2A#2 19.2 20(37of39),21. 22(150147), 24(20110), 25(20110). 26 (1 OF 14). 30 14(3 0141:), 15 (20 0122), 18 (10 o24), 22 (29 0147), 23, 2C1 198
. 24(Bof10),25,28,27(4o15) 20#2 12.5 22, 23 (8 of 100). 26(9 of 14). 27, 28. 29. 30 i7 of 31) 2E1 208 16, 18, 19. 20(2 of 39), 21 (13 of 37), 22(3 of 47),
.23(2orl0o).2430(i4or3i)
AOP-037 R.ev 21 I Page 15 01:52 2013 NRC Exam InPiant JPM j Rev.
Appendix C Page 17 of 24 Form ES-C-i JPM CUE SHEET LOSS O MAIN CONTROL ROOM ANNUNCIATORS Attachment 3 Affected ALB Determinatton Sheet 1 013 NOTE
- When ( ) follow the ALB. number, this indicates the number of windows affected.
- Total number of annunciators is 834 in Iviodes 1 4 (AL85 I 39) and 607 in Modes 5 5 (ALBs 1 2, 4 13, 15, 22, 23, either 24 or 25 based on EDG Gperbility, 26 28 and 30)..
- A given ALS has 3 power supplies. For multiple power supply failures, care must be taken NOT to count an ALB more than once.
- Only one 125 VDC power supply is required. (Loss of only IA#1 does not make associated ALBs inoperable if 1 c#i remains in ser1ce.)
POWER AFFECTED AFFECTED ALES SUPPLIES WINDOWS 125 VDC Systeni I 1A#landic#i_[ 315 J1,2,3,4.56,7.S,9,10.,11,12 125 VDC Sysen1 2 13, 14(38.0141), 15(2 0122), 16, 17, 19, 20(370139). 2A1 2D#3 217 21 (24 of 37), 22 (iS of 47) 24 (2 of 10). 25(2 of 10) 26 (1 of 14 14(3 of 41), 15 (20 of 22). 18 (10 of 24), 22(29 ot47), 2C#1 and 2D#1 160 23 (8 of ) 24 (8 of 10). 25 (8 of 10), 26 (13 of 14), 27, 28, 29, 30( 701 31) 2E1 nd 2D2 18 (14 of 24), 20(201 39). 21 (13 of 37), 22(3 of 47), 10
, 23(92of100),30{14of31) 24VDC Systenil 1A#1 97 1,2,3,4 1A#2 117 5.6,7,8 IC#1 101 9, 10, 11, 12 24 VDC System 2 2A#i 134 13, 14, 15, 20 2A#2 87 17,21,30 2C#t 124 23, 25, 26, 2C2 90 22,27,28,29 AOP-037 Rev. 21 I Page 14 of 52 2013 NRC Exam InPiant JPM j Rev.
Appendix Page 18 of 24 Form ES-C-i JPM CUE SHEET AY 4 tICTE LIH I LIT 125 VDC 125 VDC POWER SUPPLY POWER SUPPLY
$4ci 125 VOC POWER SUPPLV MI NUNCIATOR CARDS ANNUNC[ATO CARDS SYSTEM 2, BAY 4 2013 NRC Exam InPiant JPM j Rev.
Appendix c Page 19 of 24 Form ES-C-i JPM CUE SHEET PAY S INDICATES LIGHT IS LIT AVJLA BLE LIGHTS Nce: tights on 12V00 and 24V0C rkyasc. sup phes are top of por suppiy. 12 VE)C SYSTEM 2 BAY 2013 NRC Exam InPIantJPMj Rev.
Appendix u - Page 20 of 24 Form ES-C-i JPM CUE SHEET PJ&Y :3 INDICATES LIGHT IS LIT 2013 NRC Exam InPiant JPM j Rev.
Appendix Page 21 of 24 Form ES-C-i JPM CUE SHEET BAY 1 INDICATES LIGHT IS LT AVAL4BLE UGHTS N: Ughts on I2VDG and 24VD pow uppes re cf pcr suppy. 12 VUC SYSTEM 2 a 1 2013 NRC Exam InPIantJPMj Rev.
Appendix Page 22 of 24 Form ES-C-i JPM CUE SHEET LOSS CF MAIN CONTROL ROOM ANNUNCIATORS Atwhrnnt 2 - Syst.m 2 Ai:miniatcr Pcwr Supply Mattis fltrnnticn Sheer 2 o2 135 VDC i2 VOD
?CWPSUFLY PDWER SUPPLY 1NVERTE -i- L 4*
AC FF - FJC[4L CF DN VDC FCW SUFL
-$M 0
0
/ 2 VD FOW SLPPL POWER AVALABLE L!GrS
,\
c; o 24 VOC 24VOC 2PdDC ppee ci
- - lop of po ipc 4-ZL 2-,k Ri4-0 ANNJNCIATOR CARJS ANWUNCIATCR sw-i CA)S
\-,-.,
No SWI lcc1E i Ep i or y:n 2 SY3TE 2, BAY 4 SYsTEr 2 BY 1,3 and 5 AOP-037 I RBV. 21 I P& 13 or 52 2013 NRC Exam InPlant JPM j Rev.
Appendix Page 23 of 24 Form ES-C-i JPM CUE SHEET LOSS OF MAIN CONTROL ROOM ANNUNCIATORS Attachment 2 System 2 Annunciator Power Supply Status Determination Sheet 1 of 2 Di. OBTAIN Annurtciator Cabinet key. NOTE
. pc*er suppiies ve located in the east sde of the cDL. nets. lndccatirg ights for the 24 VDC and 2 VDC are or the top side of the pcv er supoly.
. Equipment ce!Inators LISJ b&o in brackets [ ] ar those listed ir he MC Annt.nc ator Refeence Guce. The ecpuiornen is not a heed in the field.
D2. Ch ECK he Indicated lights or each of the following Annunciator Cbrets cm/ing page 2 of atchment( ND INITIAL if LIT. CABINET INV AC 125 VUC PWRON 12VDC PWR ON 24VDC PWR ON (Top Row Lefti JooRowLefti (Top Row ISe:ond Rov. Outside [Smaller] (Second Row lnrer [Larier Light Initial ht 5 Li lnitia.l Light (Lool nitial Light (Loc) Initial LOht Lo: . Inttia Lght (Loc) Initial Lt (Lo) lnitiaI System 2 UT UT LE 5ay I ;[2A1] rr: :[2A#11 e.: .[DA2I nittl [2A11 eIt [A2} System 2 LIT UT LIT LJ UT LIT BayS [2C#i] ng(t :[2Ct] ett [DDD1 rkn:.i ([C] effi 2C2] riarn) Sycteni 2 UT LIT LI UT NJ cA LIT N/A N/A 5ayS [2El1 rght :[2EIj e I2E#11 elt: N.. N/& N/A N/A LIT NIA N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A (2D] eIt: System 2 NA N/A A N/A N/A NA N NA N/A (VA N/A N/A 5ay4 [2D2j 19bts ti/A [J/.L. 4 NA lilA J/A N/A o N/A N/A WA N/A [2D3]
&cor row:
AOP-037 I Rev. 21 I Page 12 of2 2013 NRC Exam InPiant JPM j Rev.
Appendix C Page 24 of 24 Form ES-C-i JPM CUE SHEET ALB-03-4-5, Annunciator System 2 Power Supply Failure, has Initial Conditions: alarmed in the Main Control Room. The crew has entered AOP-037, Loss of Main Control Room Annunciators.
.. . You have been directed by the CRS to check the status of System 2 Initiating Cue: .
annunciator power supplies per Attachment 2. 2013 NRC Exam InPIantJPMj Rev.
Appendix C Page 1 of 7 Form ES-C-i Worksheet Facility: Shearon Harris Task No.: 078008H404 Task
Title:
Perform An Instrument Air System JPM No.: 2013 NRC Exam Leak Isolation Locally In-Plant JPM k KIA
Reference:
2.1.30 RO 3.9 SRO 3.4 ALTERNATE PATH - NO Examinee: NRC Examiner: Facility Evaluator: Date: Method of testing: SmuIated Performance: X Actual Performance: Classroom Simulator Plant X READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which step s to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied. Initial Conditions The plant was manually tripped due to lowering instrument air pressure. MCR personnel have implemented AOP-017 The CRS has directed you to implement Atta Initiating Cue: chment 3 of AOP-017 due to reduced plant air capacity. Contact the MCR after each valve is isolated for leak isolation determination. ) Evaluator: Provide operator with a copy of AOP-017 Attachment 3.
\\J.
2013 NRC Exam In-Plant JPM k Rev. U 1
Appendix C Page 2 of 7 Form ES-C-i Worksheet Task Standard: Valves listed in Attachment 3 of AOP-0i7 have been located and simulated shut. Required Materials: AOP-017, Attachment 3, Rev 35 General
References:
AOP-017, Attachment 3 Time Critical Task: No Validation Time: 15 minutes Critical Task Justification Isolating selected portions of the system may reduce deman Step 2 d enough to allow the air header pressure to recover. Shutting i IA-500 first has the least effect on plant operations as it supplies IA to yard loads. Isolating selected portions of the system may reduce deman d enough to allow the air header pressure to recover. Isolating these valves could Ste p s 4 5 6 possibly isolate the leaking instrument air and restore plant contro l back to the MCR. Communicating to MCR after each isolation allows the MCR to evaluate Instrument Air pressure and prevent isolating more than is absolutely necessary. 2013 NRC Exam In-Plant JPM k Rev. i
Appendix C Page 3 of 7 Form ES-C-I PERFORMANCE INFORMATION START TIME: Performance Step: I OBTAIN PROCEDURE Standard: Reviews AOP-017 Attachment 3 for Reducing Instrument Air header Loads. Comment: AOP-017, Attachment 3 Shutting any of the following will reduce Instrument Air demand (in order of preference): AOP-017, Attachment 3, Step I V Performance Step: 2 I IA-500, Instrument Air to Yard Piping (north of Turb Bldg elevator Machine Rm). Standard: Locates and SHUTS, 1IA-500, Instrument Air to Yard Piping, then contacts the Main Control Room to inform them 1 IA-500 is SHUT. The MCR acknowledges IIA-500 is SHUT. Instrument air system pressure is still lowering. Evaluator Cue: Another Operator completed step 2 and reported back to the MCR that 3IA-300 is shut. Instrument Air pressure is still lowering and you have been directed to continue with step 3. Comment: V Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam In-Plant JPM k Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 4 of 7 Form ES-C-I PERFORMANCE INFORMATION AOP-017, Attachment 3, Caution prior to Step 3 Performance Step: 3 CAUTION: Items 3 through 5 must NOT be shut if the Reac tor is critical, because they isolate Instrument Air to the FW regulat ing valves, steam dumps, MSIVs, and CVCS valves. Standard: Circle, reads then slashes caution Bullets in Step 3 dont have to be performed in a particular order. Evaluator Note: IF the candidate shuts the valves in a different order than listed only cue that Instrument Air header pressure has stabilized AFTER all 3 valves in Step 3 have been shut Comment: AOP-017, Attachment 3, step 3 Turbine Bldg valves: AOP-017, Attachment 3, step 3.a v Performance Step: 4 1 IA-42, Instrument Air to 261 TB Loop (north of 1A Compress or) IIA-42 is located 13 feet above 261 TB floor. Evaluator Note: Do NOT let the candidate remove a ladder from its hanger. Let the candidate show you which ladder helshe wou ld use to reach I lA-42 and then simulate use of the ladder. Standard: Locates a ladder that is tall enough to reach I IA-42, positio ns ladder, climbs up then SHUTS, I IA-42, Instrument Air to 261 TB Loop, then contacts the Main Control Room to inform them 1 lA-42 is SHUT. Evaluator Cue: The MCR acknowledges IIA-42 is SHUT. Instrume nt air system pressure is still lowering. Comment:
- Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam In-Plant JPM k Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 5 of 7 Form ES-C-I PERFORMANCE INFORMATION AOP-017, Attachment 3, step 3.b V Performance Step: 5 1 IA-59, Instrument Air to 261 TB Loop (above the southwest corner of the alternate area [OSC]) Standard: Locates and SHUTS, IIA-59, Instrument Air to 261 TB Loop, then contacts the Main Control Room to inform them 1 IA-59 is SHUT. When the Candidate identifies I IA-59 from north of the Main Feed Pumps on 261 or attempts to climb from the stairs onto the Alternate OSC roof present the picture of I IA-59. Evaluator Cue: The MCR acknowledges IIA-59 is SHUT. Instrument air system pressure is still lowering. Comment: AOP-017, Attachment 3, step 3.c V Performance Step: 6 1 lA-67, Instrument Air to 286 And 314 TB Loop (North Of CVPETS) Standard: Locates and SHUTS, 1 IA-67, Instrument Air to 286 And 314 TB Loop, then contacts the Main Control Room to inform them I IA-67 is SHUT. The MCR acknowledges IIA-67 is SHUT. Instrument air system pressure has stabilized. Evaluator Cue: END OF JPM Comment: STOP TIME: V Denotes Critical Steps 2013 NRC Exam In-Plant JPM k Rev. 1
Appendix C Page 6 of 7 Form ES-C-i VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2013 NRC Exam In-Plant JPM k Perform An Instrument Air System Leak Isolation Locally AOP-017 Attachment 3 Examinees Name: Date Performed: Facility Evaluator: Number of Attempts: Time to Complete: Question Documentation: Question:
Response
Result: SAT UNSAT Examiners Signature: Date:
Appendix C Page 7 of 7 Form ES-C-i JPM CUE SHEET SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: Do Not operate actual plant equipment unless specifically authorized to do so. Follow standard ALARA practices in the RCA. The plant was manually tripped due to lowering instrument air pressure. I n itial Conditions MCR personnel have implemented AOP-0i7. The CRS has directed you to perform Attachment 3 of AOP-017 due to
. reduced plant air capacity.
Initiating Cue:
- Contact the MCR after each valve is isolated for leak isolation determination.
2013 NRC Exam In-Plant JPM k Rev. 1}}