ML13311A728

10CFR50.59 Annual Rept 1987

ML13311A728
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre
Issue date:	12/31/1987
From:	Morgan H Southern California Edison Co
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
NUDOCS 8807130107
Download: ML13311A728 (87)

Text

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION 10 CFR 50.59 ANNUAL REPORT 8807130107 071231 1987 PDR ADOCK 05000206 R

PNU

ENCLOSURE 1 SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNITS 1, 2 AND 3 FACILITY CHANGES APPROVED FOR CONSTRUCTION DURING 1987 Index Unit 1 Facility Change No.

Title Paae 1-87-002 Modification to Convert an Instrument Repair Room into an Office 1

1-87-3449.0 Chemistry Lab Remodeling 2

Index Facility Change No.

Title Page 2-85-6420, Revision 1 Halon 1301 Fire Protection System for the Telecommunication Room 4

2-86-6571 Upgrade Computer Room HVAC Recirculation for New Plant Monitoring System (PMS)

Computers 5

2-86-6621, Revision I Modification of Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Hydraulic Actuator Dump Valves; Relocation of Barksdale Pressure Switches to Wall for MSIV, Feedwater Isolation Valve (FWIV) and Feedwater Block Valve (FWBV)

Hydraulic Skids 7

2-86-6640 Deletion of Part Length Group Select Switch and Disabling of the Auto Sequential Mode of CEDMCS Operation 9

2-87-014, Revision 1 Containment Utility Power Source 11 2-87-6554.01 Charging Pumps and Control Room Fan Fusing 12 2-87-6554.03 Mechanical Pressure and Level Indicators, Damper Motor 14 2-87-6554.06 Power-Lockout of Shutdown Cooling (SDC)

Suction, Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray and Component Cooling'Water (CCW) Crosstie Valves 15 2-87-6554.07 EPPM Steam Generator Pressure Indicator Cable Reroute 17 2-87-6554.08 Engineering Safety Features (ESF) HVAC 18 2-87-6554.10 Saltwater Cooling Pump Logic Bypass 19 2-87-6554.12, Revision 1 Fire Isolation Switch Rewiring 20 2-87-6554.14 Revision 1 Shutdown Cooling Indicators 22 2-87-6554.15, Revision 2 Tendon Access Hatches 24 2-87-6554.16, Revision 1 Addition of Control/Isolation Switches 26 2-87-6554.17 Provide Alternate Power Source (Train A) To Excore Flux Monitoring System 28 2-87-6554.22 Install Penetration Seals in Heavy Concrete Walls 30 2-87-6570, Revision 1 One Ton Jib Crane Inside Containment 31

Index Facility Change No.

Title Pacie 2-87-6592.0 Removal of Boric Acid Heat Trace from Service and Heat Trace Panel Alarm Modification 32 2-87-6593.1 Decommissioning of the Spray Chemical Addition System 34 2-87-6599 Main Control Room Panel Modifications 36 2-87-6604 Remote Shutdown Panel Modifications 38 2-87-6605, Revision 2 Control Room Modifications, Unit 2, Panels 2CR-56, 2CR-5i, 2CR-59, 2/3 CR-60 and 2/3 CR-63 39 2-87-6637 Scaffolding and Lead Blanket Storage in Contai nment 40 2-87-6672.0 SIT Access Ladders and Platforms 42 2-87-6692 Drain Modifications for 50' And 30' Elevation Cable Riser Gallery Hall 44

Index Units 2/3 Facility Change No.

Title Page 2/3-84-221, Revision 2 Installation of a Unit 3 Refueling Machine Auxiliary Hoist 45 2/3-85-6161.8, Revision 3 Remodeling of Auxiliary Building (Control Area) Elevation 70' 46 2/3-87-6313 Oily Waste Water System 49 2/3-87-6554.02 Install 8 Hour Emergency Lights for Appendix R Compliance 51 2/3-87-6554.05 Exposure Fire Barriers on Electrical Raceways 52 2/3-87-6554.21 To Provide Train 'A' Backup Power Source to The Control Room Emergency Lights 53 2/3-87-6554.24 Sound Powered Telephone System Installation Description 55 2/3-87-6695 Auxiliary Building Control Area Kitchen Remodeling 56

Index Unit 3 Facility Change No.

Title Paqe 3-85-6238, Revision 1 Modification to Improve Flow Through the Boronometer and Process Radiation Monitor 58 3-85-6574, Revision 1 Emergency Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Control Modification 59 3-86-6637 Scaffolding and Lead Blanket Storage in Contai nment 61 3-86-6640 Deletion of Part Length Group Select Switch and Disabling of the Auto Sequential Mode of CEDMCS Operation 63 3-87-6554.01 Charging Pumps and Control Room Fan Fusing 65 3-87-6554.03 Installation of Level Indicators, Damper Motor Replacement 67 3-87-6554.08 Engineering Safety Features (ESF) HVAC Separation Barrier 68 3-87-6554.10 Saltwater cooling Pump Logic Bypass 69 3-87-6554.15 Tendon Access Hatches 70 3-87-6554.17 Provide Alternate Power Source (Train A) to Excore Flux Monitoring System 71 3-87-6554.22 Install Penetration Seals in Heavy Concrete Walls 73 3-87-6570, Revision 1 One Ton Jib Crane Inside Containment 74 3-87-6592.0 Removal of Boric Acid Heat Trace from Service and Heat Trace Panel Alarm Modification 75 3-87-6599 Main Control Room Panel Modifications 76 3-87-6692 Drain Modifications for 50' and 30' Elevation Cable Riser Gallery Hall 78 0n ialn fteAt eunilMd

Index Common Facilities Facility Change No.

Title Pace CF-85-9173, Revision 1 Installation of 800 MHz UHF Radio Consoles 79 5059-87. rpt

Facility Change: 1-87-002 Title Modification to Convert an Instrument Repair Room Into an Office Description This modification converts an existing Instrument Repair Room in the Control Administration Building into an office for the use of Nuclear Operations Assistance personnel.

The conversion will involve:

1. Installing eight (8) new duplex 120 VAC power receptacles;

2. Installing two (2) new communication conduits;

3. Installing five (5) coax cables;

4. Installing one (1) 25 pair telephone cable; and

5. Relocating existing fire extinguisher within the office room.

Safety Evaluation There are no control or other active functions of plant process systems affected by the modification. Additionally, seismic interaction and Fire Protection criteria (including Appendix R) have been incorporated so as to preclude any reduction of structural or other passive functions of plant systems. Conduit to cable fire stops have been included to prevent a reduction in either the ventilation or flooding boundary function.

The only plant systems which will be affected by the proposed change are the non-safety related communications, convenience power (receptacles) and the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation (envelope) systems. However, based on the above, the modification will not adversely impact the function of any of these systems or create new system interfaces which could impact plant response to perturbations. As such, all accident and malfunction scenarios will remain bounded by existing analyses. Therefore, neither the consequences nor the probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSA will be increased.

The FHA will require revision to reflect a decrease in oil and grease loading and an increase in Class A and plastic loadings. The overall increase in fire loading will not exceed the permissible limits previously analyzed, therefore, this modification neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System/Program nor violates the FHA.

The margin of safety-as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced by this change. The equipment affected by this change is not governed by Technical Specifications. This change will not affect any existing Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements.

Facility Change:

1-87-3449.0 O

Title Chemistry Lab Remodeling Description This change provides remodeling of Rooms 115 and 116 at Elevation 20'-9" in the Control/Administration Building of SONGS, Unit 1. The remodeling will convert these two rooms into a new chemistry lab complete with cabinets, counter space, a fume hood, an emergency shower, sinks, and gas cylinder rack and outlets.

Safety Evaluation This change does not modify the function of any existing safety related equipment. The work related to the modification is Nonsafety-Related except the installation of a beam and two columns to support the existing safety related slab, drilling into the existing safety related slab to install support for the gas cylinder rack, and drilling into the existing safety related roof slab for the anchor bolts for a new fan. These three items are classified as Safety Related and Seismic Category A and they have been designed accordingly. No changes in structural design margins results from this modification.

Therefore, the failure modes and related effects are identical to that previously analyzed in the FSA. On the same basis, the results of any potential accident or malfunction are bounded by existing evaluations in the FSA. There are no changes in the equipment or in one design function of the system, and there are no additional administrative or operational constraints imposed on the affected systems. Therefore, neither the consequences nor the probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSA will be increased. In addition, this modification will not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSA.

This modification has no effect on existing Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements governed by the existing Technical Specifications. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced.

Due to the remodeling, the following changes will be made to the UFHA:

1. Since the East wall of Room 115 will be removed, the existing emergency light No. EL-L5-34-3 installed on the west wall will no longer be needed. The light was installed to provide light in the area for personnel -ingress and egress. However, by removing the wall, this area will -be converted to an--open-area and-the light EL-L5-34-3 will be removed. The existing light No. EL-L5-34-5 on the North wall will be sufficient for persohnel ingress and egress in this area.

Facility Change:

1-87-3449.0 Safety Evaluation (Continued)

2. This change will increase the total quantity of the combustible material to 9445 BTU/sq. ft. However, this new total fire loading in the area will still be within the allowable limit of 20,000 BTU/sq. ft.

3. A new ionization type smoke detector will be added in this area.

4. One of the existing fire extinguishers, 10 B:C (Chemical type), will be replaced by a new fire extinguisher, 2A:40:B:C (Halon type).

The total number of the fire extinguishers in this area will remain the same.

The chemical type fire extinguisher is being replaced by a halon type because a halon type fire extinguisher is less detrimental to electronic equipment and microprocessors. In addition, it is easier and cheaper to clean the area after its use. A halon type extinguisher is more suitable for use in the chemistry lab and it does not downgrade the required effectiveness of the fire extinguishers in this area.

All these modifications remain bounded by the existing analyses and therefore, this modification does not adversely impact the Fire Protection system/Program or violate the UFHA.

Facility Change: 2-85-6420. Revision 1 O

Title Halon 1301 Fire Protection System for the Telecommunication Room Description This modification provides for the addition of a fixed pipe, automatic total flooding Halon 1301 fire protection system in the Telecommunications Room of the 70' floor elevation of the Auxiliary Building. Revision 1 to the modification incorporates the new design change that is required in order to meet the NFPA 12A, Paragraph 1-8.3.6 and the Technical Specification 3/4.7.9. The new additions are as follows:

1. Bypass the existing 30-second time delay from the manual operation of the pull station to immediately release the Halon into the Telecommunication Room. However, the 30-second time delay will remain intact during automatic operation.

2. Remove the signal for the door magnets in order to keep the fire doors closed at all times. These doors will be key locked from outside only and remain unlocked from the inside room.

This modification also provides for the relocation of one existing ionization type detector from the Telecommunications Room to the Cable Riser Gallery.

Safety Evaluation This modification does require a revision to the UFSAR to incorporate the addition of the Halon 1301 fire protection system in the Telecommunications Room, but it will not affect the design basis of any safety related systems.

All potential accidents and consequences are bounded by existing analyses.

As such, this change does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident evaluated in the UFSAR, nor does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

This change has no effect on the existing Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements governed by the existing Technical Specifications. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specifications is not reduced.

The UFHA will be revised to account for this modification; but the maximum permissible fire loadings are not exceeded. The Halon Fire Protection System serves the fire area 2-AC-70-175. All penetrations for this modification will be provided with approved and appropriately-rated fire seals. Therefore, the consequences of a design basis fire, previously evaluated in the UFHA, will not be increased by this change.

Facility Change: 2-86-6571 Title Upgrade Computer Room HVAC Recirculation for New Plant Monitoring System (PMS) Computers Description This proposed facility change is being implemented to upgrade the HVAC system in the computer room to accommodate the new Plant Monitoring System (PMS) computer equipment and improve the air distribution within the room.

The existing room cooling is not acceptable during the hot days and the Control Room isolation modes (CRIS and TGIS) due to hot spots in the room.

Station has been using mobile fans and temporary arrangement of the floor and ceiling air openings to ensure adequate cooling to the crucial cabinets that were hotter and located farther from the recirculation unit, E-668.

In the recent PMS upgrade program, new equipment will be added with a new layout and heat load. Accordingly, the HVAC has to be modified.

The modification only affects the recirculation unit E-668 as follows:

1. The chilled water piping sizes will be increased to allow full cooling capacity;

2. Three dedicated booster fans, baffles in unit supply plenum and ducting through the ceiling space will be provided to more efficiently distribute the air.

Safety Evaluation The probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously established in the UFSAR will not be increased as a result of this change. The change will only enhance the ability of the Computer Room HVAC to obtain and maintain its required cooling inside the Computer Room envelope. This change has no impact on the original design basis or function of the Control Room complex HVAC Systems during normal and emergency modes as defined in UFSAR Sections 9.4.2.1.1 and 9.4.2.2.1. Therefore, the consequences of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be increased as a result of this change.

This change will not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR. As stated above, this alteration will only enhance the ability of the Computer Room HVAC to obtain and maintain its required cooling inside the Computer Room envelope. The proposed modification will provide more cooling capacity and more efficiently distributed air flow for the new computer equipment configuration.

Facility Change:

2-86-6571 (Continued)

Safety Evaluation (Continued)

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced. This change has no effect on any of the Limiting Conditions of Operation or Surveillance Requirements of any existing Technical Specifications. As such, no Technical Specification basis or associated margin of safety is affected.

This change does not adversely impact the fire protection system/program or violate the UFHA.

Facility Change: 2-86-6621, Revision 1 O

Title Modification of Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Hydraulic Actuator Dump Valves; Relocation of Barksdale Pressure Switches to Wall for MSIV, Feedwater Isolation Valve (FWIV) and Feedwater Block Valve (FWBV) Hydraulic Skids Description The purpose of this change is to modify the hydraulic system of the MSIV actuator by replacing the Marotta hydraulic dump valves with Paul Munroe hydraulic dump valves and removing the restructing surface provided with the Marotta valves.

In addition, MSIVs (2HV-8204 and 2HV-8205) limit switch assemblies will be relocated from inside the yoke to outside the yoke with new redesign limit switch assemblies by WKM to provide better access for maintenance and adjustment.

Currently, Barksdale pressure switches are mounted on the existing hydraulic skids for each MSIV, FWIV and FWBV actuation system. These pressure switches (eighteen total) will be relocated to the adjacent wall by this change to minimize vibration and to improve system operability. In addition, the above modifications will minimize spurious MSIV closures and plant shutdowns due to less reliable components.

Safety Evaluation The probability or consequence of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment previously evaluated ih the UFSAR, will not be increased as a result of this change. The modifications will not affect the design basis of the main steam system since the nature of the modifications do not impact the systems function.

Figure 10.3-1 of the UFSAR does require a revision to show that MSIV Marotta dump valve was replaced by Panel Munroe dump valve and hydraulic accumulation was added. The new equipment does not create any internal missile effect. All potential accidents and consequences are bounded by existing analyses.

This modification will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously'evaluated in the UFSAR.

In case of a hydraulic line break and resultant fluid loss, the MSIV will close. A break in the hydraulic line will not create an unsafe plant condition.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification is not reduced. The equipment affected by this change is governed by, but does not modify, Technical Specifications 3/4.3.1, 3/4.3.6 and 3/4.7.1.5.

This change will not affect any existing Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements. As such, no Technical Specification basis or associated margin or safety is affected.

Facility Change: 2-86-6621, Revision 1 (Continued)

Safety Evaluation (Continued)

This change does not adversely impact the fire protection system/program or violate the UFHA. A revision is required which adds seven gallons of hydraulic fluid but does not add combustible load over the maximum allowable fire load.

Facility Change:

2-86-6640 Title Deletion of Part Length Group Select Switch and Disabling of'the Auto Sequential Mode of CEDMCS Operation Description This modification provides for the following changes:

1. Removal of the Part Length Group Select Switch from the CEDMCS control panel UI-9134 at CR-51;

2. Disabling of the Automatic Sequential (AS) Mode of CEA Operation; and

3. Modification of the CEDMCS logic voltage supply low voltage detector (LVD) circuitry to allow adjustment on the LVD detector setpoint to a level which is compatible with the voltage requirements of the new ACTM cards.

Each CEA is assigned to one of three control groups: Shutdown, regulating or part length. The part length groups are used for Axial Shape Index (ASI) dampening. There are two part length groups identified as P1 and P2.

Currently, the part length group select switch allows selection of either or both part length groups for movement. Selection of P1 or P2 individually is administratively prohibited to eliminate the possibility of CPC generated trips due to a deviation between P1 and P2 of 7" or greater. Removal of the part length group select switch will make it physically impossible to select groups P1 or P2 independently for motion thereby eliminating this potential trip scenario. A part length group motion demand will result in both part length groups moving in unison.

The AS mode of operation is provided to allow the Reactor Regulating System (RRS) to control the rate and direction of CEA motion. The AS mode of operation is not normally used. The reason for this operating practice is based upon industry operating experience. Previously, plants operated with CEAs inserted a slight amount from the All Rods Out (ARO) configuration to provide what was called "Control Rod Bite" (i.e., as soon as the CEAs start to fall, the CEAs turn power). This practice was subsequently stopped when it was found that many fuel pins experienced clad damage near the top end of the fuel pin. The damage analysis theorized that.the fuel was not burned up around the slightly inserted CEA (over long periods) and whenever the RRS caused CEAs to withdraw in high speed, localized power peaks could occur and possibly cause cladding damage. Additionally, the automatic RRS response to minor parameter changes caused the ASI to fluctuate unnecessarily.

Consequently, in order to comply with fuel operating guidelines, the plant is operated in the ARO and Manual Sequential mode.

Facility Change: 2-86-6640 (Continued)

Safety Evaluation These modifications will provide the following benefits:

1. Increased Unit availability due to eliminating potential trips resulting from inadvertent misalignment of part length CEA groups;

2. Increased Unit availability due to eliminating potential trips resulting from ACTM misoperation as a result of improper logic voltage levels;

3. A substantial reduction in the amount of operator training required for the RRS, SBCS and CEDMCS Systems;

4. Elimination of administrative controls prohibiting selection of individual part length groups and the AS mode; and

5. Deletion of unnecessary Annunciator Windows and CEDMCS controls from the Control Room.

The changes do not affect any safety-related system or equipment., Normal CEDM control is not adversely affected, nor is the reactor trip system affected in any way. UFSAR Section 7.7.1.1 will be revised to reflect these changes; however, the design basis of the Reactor Regulating System will not be affected by this change.

Therefore, neither the consequences nor the probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR will be increased. In addition, this modification will not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR and UFHA.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced by this change. This change will not affect any existing Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements.

10

Facility Change:

2-87-014, Revision 1 Title Containment Utility Power Source Description This modification will provide for a permanently-installed 400 amp "Containment Utility Power" source inside of Containment, fed from Load Center 2B08 Breaker 02.

The modification will alleviate the need to route temporary cabling through an open hatch or an open penetration, only to disconnect and remove the temporary cabling when the integrity of Containment needs to be re-established.

Safety Evaluation This modification will install a "Containment Utility Power" supply to the inside of Unit 2 Containment. The intended purpose of this power supply is for utility 480 volt loads greater than can be handled by existing 480 volt welding receptacles. Power will be supplied from a Quality Class III Load Center, 2B08 Breaker 02.

The installation of this modification will have no adverse impact on the load center, its associated loads, or the containment penetration. All accident probabilities, consequences and scenarios remain bounded by the existing UFSAR analyses. As such, this change does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR, nor does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

This change does not affect any Limiting Condition of Operation or Surveillance Requirements of any existing Technical Specifications.

Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced by this change.

The UFHA will require revision to reflect the additional combustible material resulting from this modification. The additional fire loading will not exceed the permissible limits. Therefore, this modification neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System/Program nor violates the UFHA.

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Facility Change: 2-87-6554.01 Title Charging Pumps and Control Room Fan Fusing Description This modification provides for isolation of Train 'X' cables from the (Chemical Volume and Control System) CVCS Charging Pumps control circuitry and, the Toxic Gas Isolation Signal (TGIS) cable to the Train 'A' Control Room Emergency Cooling Unit E-418 control circuitry for compliance with Appendix R. Isolation of these cables will ensure operability of the pumps and HVAC unit in the event of an electrical failure on these cables due to a plant fire.

In addition, the Charging Pump control circuitry is being modified for alternative shutdown capability. Cables to the Charging Pumps which route through or terminate in alternative shutdown areas will be isolated by rewiring the existing fire isolation switch. Control of the Charging Pumps will then be available at the respective 480V Load Centers in the event of a fire in the alternative shutdown fire areas.

Safety Evaluation This modification provides isolation of Train 'X' cables from the charging pump suction trip and the pressurizer level interlocks by rewiring the circuits to include a ten amp fuse and two interposing relays. In order to isolate the TGIS auto start control cable from the Train 'A' Control Room Emergency Cooling Unit E-418 control scheme, a similar ten amp fuse and dual interposing relay arrangement is used. Additionally, the charging pump control circuitry is being modified for alternate shutdown capability.

By isolating the charging pumps and modifying the pumps alternate shutdown, the modification ensures the inventory and pressure control of the reactor coolant system during a fire scenario. In addition, isolation of the Control Room Emergency Cooling Unit ensures Control Room habitability and equipment cooling requirements. Therefore, the design basis of any safety related systems will not be affected and all potential accidents and consequences are bounded by existing analyses. As such, this change does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident evaluated in the UFSAR, nor does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type then any previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

This change has no effect on the existing Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements governed by the existing Technical Specifications. The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specifications is-not reduced by this modification.

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Facility Change: 2-87-6554.01 (Continued)

The UFHA will require revision to reflect the addition of combustible material in cable trays and to document Charging Pump and Cooling Unit control circuitry fusing. The additional fire loading will not exceed the maximum permissible limits. Therefore, this modification neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System/Program nor violates the UFHA.

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Facility Change: 2-87-6554.03 Title Mechanical Pressure and Level Indicators, Damper Motor Description This modification provides for the installation of local mechanical indicators by which the level of the Component Cooling Water (CCW) Surge Tank, the Condensate Storage Tanks (CST), and the Boric Acid Makeup (BAMU)

Tanks can be determined. In addition, a pressure indicator will be added to the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) discharge line and the existing motor actuator for the damper for the Control Room Cabinet Area Emergency Air-Conditioning Unit will be replaced with a spring-return type actuator.

Safety Evaluation This modification provides for the installation of various local pressure and level indicators and a mechanical damper actuator for the Control Room Cabinet Air-Conditioning Unit to achieve compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R. The new pressure and level instruments are mechanical and local with no interconnection to the existing instrumentation and therefore, do not affect the existing instrumentation in the Control Room. This modification will increase the efficiency and reliability of safe shutdown in the event of a fire resulting in loss of indications in the Control Room. Therefore, although this modification requires a revision to the UFSAR, the functional design basis described in the applicable sections are not affected. All potential accidents and consequences are bounded by existing analysis. As such, this change does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR, nor does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced by this change. This change has no impact on the original design objectives and system functions. Thus, this change has no impact on any Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements of any existing Technical Specifications. Hence, no Technical Specification basis or associated margin of safety is affected.

This change neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System/Program nor violates the UFHA.

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Facility Change:

2-87-6554.06 Title Power Lockout of Shutdown Cooling (SDC) Suction, Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray and Component Cooling Water (CCW) Crosstie Valves Description This modification will provide for power lockout of the following Motor Operated Valves (MOVs) by opening their respective 480V feeder breakers to prevent the valve from spurious operation that may result from fire damage to valve motor operating control circuits:

1. Shutdown Cooling System Suction valves 2HV-9337 and 2HV-9377-;

2. Pressurizer auxiliary spray valve 2HV-9201; and

3. Component Cooling System Crosstie valves 2HV6222A, 2HV-6224A, 2HV-6226A, 2HV-6227, 2HV-6228A and 2HV-6229.

This modification also provides for a separate 120 VAC source for powering remote valve status -indicating lights and/or MOV limit switch space heaters for the above motor'operated valves. The provision of separate 120 VAC circuits facilitates power lockout of MOV 480V circuit breaker without causing loss of all remote indication and power supply to MOV space heaters.

This additional design feature for space heating is provided for equipment maintenance purposes and is not required for Appendix R compliance.

Safety Evaluation This modification will provide for power lockout of the aforementioned valves which will prevent spurious operation due to fire damage on valve control circuits and therefore will not adversely affect plant shutdown in an Appendix R fire scenario. Valves will be locked out in their normal plant operations position, with plant shutdown requirements also being achievable through limited operator actions. The 120 VAC power for the MOV position indicating lights and/or space heaters is obtained from the nearest source which has the same quality class and level of reliability as the respective MOV 480V power source. Although this modification requires a revision to the UFSAR, all potential accidents and consequences are bounded by existing analysis. As such, this change does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident evaluated in the UFSAR, nor does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any.previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced. The change has no impact on the existing Technical Specifications, Limiting.-Conditions of Operation or Surveillance Requirements. Therefore, no technical basis or associated margins of safety are affected as a result of this change.

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Facility Change: 2-87-6554.06 (Continued)

The UFHA will require revision to reflect the changes to cable tray fill.

The additional fire loading will not exceed the maximum permissible limits previously analyzed. Therefore, this modification neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System/Program nor violates the UFHA.

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Facility Change: 2-87-6554.07 Title EPPM Steam Generator Pres.sure Indicator Cable Reroute Description This modification will provide Steam Generator pressure indication physically and electrically independent of the normal (Control Room) safe shutdown capability. This modification will, utilizing portions of existing cable located outside the alternate shutdown fire areas where available, reroute the required instrument cables used to indicate Unit 2 Steam Generators (E088 and E089) pressure of the Essential Plant Parameters Monitoring (EPPM) panel 2L411.

Safety Evaluation This modification reroutes the Steam Generator pressure indication outside fire areas utilizing the normal shutdown capability. Materials and procedures utilized in rerouting of cables, including cutting, splicing, relogging and abandoning cables, installation of conductors and splice box, and in adding a conduit penetration through an existing blockout are similar to those used for the existing design.

Therefore, all potential accidents and consequences are bounded by existing analysis. As such, this change does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR, nor does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced by this change. This change will not affect any existing Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements.

The UFHA will require revision to reflect the additional cable routing resulting from this modification. The additional fire loading will not exceed the permissible limits previously analyzed, therefore, this modification neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System/Program nor violates the UFHA.

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Facility Change: 2-87-6554.08 Title Engineering Safety Features (ESF) HVAC Description This modification provides a new partial height partition between ESF HVAC Units 2E-255 and 2E-257, located in the control area of the Auxiliary Building, Elevation 50'-0". The function of the partition is to provide a radiant energy shield between these HVAC units. The partition will also provide support to an existing electrical conduit. A light fixture will be relocated and an additional fixture added above the partition. In addition, a one-hour rated fire barrier will be installed on three cable trays. The partition is designed for isolation and protection of the HVAC units to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R.

Safety Evaluation This modification provides additional assurance that one ESF HVAC unit will remain available for post fire shutdown by the addition of a partial height wall which will act as a radiant energy shield to prevent the heat from fire in one unit from affecting the adjacent unit. This modification acts only to provide additional separation between the ESF HVAC units and does not adversely impact equipment access to the units.

The partition will be constructed of one-hour fire rated materials, however, the partition will be non-rated. The partition will not significantly impact sprinkler coverage since the existing sprinkler heads are located symmetrically on both sides of the partition.

This modification has no impact on the original design basis or function of any system or component. All potential accidents and consequences are bounded by existing analysis. As such, this change does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR, nor does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced by this change. This change has no effect on any of the Limiting Conditions of Operation or Surveillance Requirements of any existing Technical Specification.

The partition constitutes an exposure fire barrier as part of a possible fire protection system. The UFHA will require revision to reflect the partition and additional fire barriers. This modification neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System/Program nor violates the UFHA.

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Facility Change: 2-87-6554.10 Title Saltwater Cooling Pump Logic Bypass Description This modification will change the Salt Water Cooling (SWC) pump 2P114 start interlock circuitry such that the pump can be started by bypassing the SWCP discharge valve 2HV-6203, Component Cooling Water (CCW) heat exchanger outlet valve 2HV-6495 and Pump Bearing Seal Water Valve 2HV-6379 limit switch interlock contacts by activating a fire isolation switch in panel 2L413. A new ten conductor control cable is required to be routed between the 4 kV switchgear 2A06 cubicle 11 and fire isolation switch panel 2L413.

The routing is exclusively in existing trays in the 4kV 2AO6 switchgear room (Fire Area 2-AC-50-34).

Internal wiring modifications are required in switchgear 2AO6 cubicle 11 and in panel 2L413.

The purpose for modifying the Saltwater Cooling Pump Start Interlock Circuitry is to ensure cooling water supply to the component cooling water system heat exchangers during an Appendix R fire scenario.

Safety Evaluation This modification will change the SWC pump 2P114 start interlock circuitry so that interlocks to various associated valves can be bypassed by actuating a fire isolation switch at panel 2L413. A new ten conductor control cable is required to be routed between the 4 kV switchgear 2A06 cubicle 11 and the fire isolation switch panel 2L413. The routing is exclusively in existing trays in the 4 kV 2A06.Switchgear Room. Internal wiring modifications are required in switchgear 2AO6 cubicle 11 and in panel 2L413.

All materials used are QCII and installation methods are similar to those used for existing installation. The design change will have no adverse impact in operation of salt water cooling system during normal or emergency safe shutdown of the plant or during design basis LOCA. The design change will also not have any adverse impact whatsoever on any other safety equipment, structure, or system. All potential accidents and consequences are bound by existing analysis.

As such, this change does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR, nor does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

This modification does not affect existing Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements; therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification will not be reduced.

The UFHA will require revision to reflect the additional fire loading resulting from this modification. However, this modification neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System/Program nor violates the UFHA.

19 -

Facility Change: 2-87-6554.12, Revision 1

)

Title Fire Isolation Switch Rewiring Description This modification changes the control circuits for the alternative shutdown components listed below by rewiring the existing fire isolation switches and installing fuses as needed to isolate fire damage so that local control is not affected. These modifications are being made to Train 'A' components only since this is the designated shutdown method for alternative shutdown fire areas. These modifications are designed for the isolation and protection of these components to meet the realignments of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R.

Component System

a. Pressurizer Backup Heaters E128 RCS

b. Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump P015 SDS

c. Auxiliary Feedwater Pump P141 AFW

d. Component Cooling Water Pump P024 CCW

e. Salt Water Cooling Pump P112 SWC

f. Containment Emergency Fan E399 HVAC

g. Containment Emergency Fan E401 HVAC

h. Auxiliary Building Emergency Chiller E336 ECW

i. Diesel Generator Building Emergency Cooling Fan A274 HVAC

j.

Diesel Generator Building Emergency Cooling Fan A275 HVAC

k. Control Building ESF Switchgear Room Emergency AC Unit E255 HVAC

1. Safety Equipment Building LPSI Pump Room Emergency Unit E417 HVAC In addition, the following components are being modified to provide flexibility in taking the Train 'A' pumps (P024 and P112) out of service for maintenance. These pumps are not required for Appendix R Compliance.

Component Cooling Water Pump P025 CCW Salt Water Cooling Pump P307 SWC Safety Evaluation This modification is designed for the isolation and protection of alternative shutdown components to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, to ensure that local component control is available post fire.

This modification is applicable to Train 'A' of the RCS, SDC, CCW, SWC, AFW, ECW and HVAC systems.

The new cables, switches, and fuses for the control circuitry of the affected-components are classified as safety-related and will be Quality Class II Seismic Category I. The new cables will be routed through existing safety-related raceways and meet all other pertinent requirements of the project design criteria. The control cabling to be used meets the intent and specific requirements (where stated) of UFSAR Section 8.3.3.1, including flame retardancy per IEEE Standard 383-1974.

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Facility Change:

2-87-6554.12, Revision 1 (Continued)

Safety Evaluation (Continued)

Although this modification requires a revision to UFSAR Table 7.4-5, this modification will not adversely impact safety-related equipment or systems.

Therefore, neither the consequences nor the probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR will be increased.

This modification has no effect on any Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements or Limiting Conditions for Operation. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not altered.

The UFHA will require revision to reflect the addition of combustible material in cable trays and the addition of Alternative Shutdown Capability for the components listed below. This modification neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System/Program nor violates the UFHA.

Component System

a. Pressurizer Backup Heaters E128 RCS

b. Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump P015 SDS

c. Auxiliary Feedwater Pump P141 AFW

d. Component Cooling Water Pump P024 CCW

e. Salt Water Cooling Pump P112 SWC

f. Containment Emergency Fan E399 HVAC

g. Containment Emergency Fan E401 HVAC

h. Auxiliary Building Emergency-Chiller E336 ECW

i. Diesel Generator Building Emergency Cooling Fan A274 HVAC

j.

Diesel Generator Building Emergency Cooling Fan A275 HVAC

k. Control Building ESF Switchgear Room Emergency AC Unit E255 HVAC

1. Safety Equipment Building LPSI Pump Room Emergency Unit E417 HVAC 21 -

Facility Change: 2-87-6554.14, Revision 1 Title Shutdown Cooling Indicators Description This modification adds local temperature and flow indication for the Shutdown Cooling System. A local bimetal type temperature indicator and a local mechanical flow indicator are to be installed to monitor shutdown cooling in the event that temperature and flow indicators in the Control Room are lost due to a postulated fire.

A bimetal temperature indicator (2TI-0352L) will be installed in process pipe 038-14"-C-KEI. A mechanically operated flow indicator (2FI-0306L) will be installed using the sensing lines for the existing flow transmitter, 2FT-0306. The new indicator will be mounted on the wall adjacent to this flow transmitter.

Safety Evaluation This modification installs two permanently mounted indicators which provide local Shutdown Cooling System temperature and flow indication. These indicators provide the ability to monitor shutdown cooling in the event that Control Room indicators are lost as a result of a fire.

The new temperature indicator will be installed for ease of operator viewing. This bimetal temperature indicator will be housed in a thermowell which is threaded into a new 1", 3,000# threadolet attached to the process pipe while the system is filled. The threadolet will be welded to the pipe and the pipe leak tested. Pressure boundary penetrations of 1 inch or less are exempt from hydrotesting. The thermowell will be screwed into the threadolet and the threads will be seal welded. The threadolet and the thermowell materials will be in accordance with the same classification of the pipe, ASME Section III, Class 2, 1974 Edition, Summer 1974 Addenda. The installation will be in accordance with the SCE ASME Section XI Repair and Replacement Program. This will ensure that the modification does not affect the integrity of the piping pressure boundary. The temperature and flow indicators are local instruments and can not affect operation of any other instruments.

Therefore, although this modification requires a revision to the UFSAR, the functional design basis described in the applicable sections are not affected. All potential accidents and consequences are bounded by existing analysis. As such, this change does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

The margin of safety,-as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced by this change. This change has no impact on the original design objectives and systemifunctions. Thus, this change has no impact on any Limiting Conditions for Operation-or Surveillance Requirements of any existing Technical Specifications. Hence, no Technical Specification basis or associated margin of safety is affected.

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Facility Change: 2-87-6554.14, Revision 1 (Continued)

Safety Evaluation (Continued)

This change neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System/Program nor violates the UFHA.

23 -

Facility Change: 2-87-6554.15, Revision 2 O Title Tendon Access Hatches Description This modification provides two removable steel hatches at the tendon access openings, elevation 63.5 feet, Unit 2 penetration area. The hatches and supporting framing will be constructed with 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> fire rated material.

This hatch is removable in order to accommodate Tendon Surveillance inspections and is designed to meet security barrier requirements when the containment security boundary area is expanded to include the penetration area.

The addition of hatches for the tendon access openings of the penetration area are required to provide separation for redundant trains of safe shutdown cables. To provide an adequate level of protection, the hatches are to have a minimum 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> equivalent fire rating.

Safety Evaluation This modification provides two new removable hatches to provide a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> equivalent fire rated barrier for Appendix R Compliance, while maintaining necessary access for the Containment Structure Inservice Tendon Surveillance. The removable hatches are supported by permanent steel angle members which are attached to the Auxiliary Building floor slab with Hilti HDI expansion anchors. The expansion anchors are tack welded to the supporting angles to meet security requirements. A TSI 1 inch thick, 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> fire rated panel is provided on the bottom side of the main support plate, with a protective galvanized checkerplate on the top surface with a 1" air void between the plates. All of the support members are also covered with the fire rated panels. The attachment does not impact the structural integrity of the containment or Penetration Building floor slab. The hatches will buckle in a seismic event, but this will not affect the containment structure or the hatch supports. The hatches are designed for a 100 pound per square foot live load which is consistent with the floor design requirements of the Auxiliary Building. The load limit will be posted. The support members are also designed to carry a two ton load for supporting the hydraulic ram weight used in the tendon surveillance.

This modification does not change any existing safety related equipment. In addition, the new hatches have been evaluated per Seismic Category I and no potential missiles are created. Therefore, this change does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR, nor does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

24 -

Facility Change:

2-87-6554.15, Revision 2 (Continued)

Safety Evaluation (Continued)

The modification will not modify or affect any existing Technical Specification, Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements. As such, no Technical Specification bases or associated margin of safety will be affected.

This-change will not adversely impact the Fire Protection System/Program or violate the UFHA. However, a UFHA change is required to document this modification.

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Facility Change: 2-87-6554.16, Revision 1 O Title Addition of Control/Isolation Switches Description This change resulted from the 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Compliance Assessment Evaluation which required the addition of "second points of control" for safe shutdown components used for alternative shutdown capability in the event of a fire. The following components require modification:

1. Diesel Generator 2G002-Panel 2L160;

2. DG002 Supply to Bus 2AO4 - 4kV Breaker 2AO413;

3. Feeder from Bus 2AO4 to 2BO4 - 4kV Breaker 2AO420;

4. Supply to Bus 2B04 from Bus 2AO4 - 480V Breaker 2B0401;

5. Aux Feedwater Valve 2HV-4731 - MCC 2BE36;

6. Aux Feedwater Valve 2HV-4713 - MCC 2BE06; and

7. Fire Isolation Switch Panel 2L412.

This change installs local fire isolation switches, handswitches, fuses and position lights in the associated switchgear/MCC cubicles and electrical panels. Also, a new 12" cable tray will be installed to accommodate new cables in the fire isolation panel 2L412.

Safety Evaluation The probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be increased. UFSAR Table 7.4-6 will be revised to reflect the additional manual controls for Remote Hot Shutdown. Diesel Generator 2G002, DG Supply breaker and 2BO4 Supply/Feeder breakers are addressed by UFSAR section 8.3.1 and the AFW Valves are addressed by UFSAR section 10.4.9. Also, an UFHA revision is necessary to document the addition of combustible material in cable trays. The combustible load is well within the allowable limit and, as such, the revision does not adversely affect the fire protection system/program or violate the UFHA. Due to the fact that operation of these components is not affected by this modification the change does not increase the probability of adversely affecting the required safety related operation of these systems and all potential accidents and consequences are bounded by existing analysis.

The consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be increased. This change adds raceway, switches, lights, fuses and cabling. Accordingly, the consequences of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety are not impacted and are bounded by existing analysis.

26 -

Facility Change: 2-87-6554.16, Revision 1 (Continued)

Safety Evaluation (Continued)

In addition, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be created. The potential failure modes have been analyzed in the existing Failure Modes and Effects Analysis Tables. No new hazards or interactions with existing systems are created. Hence, all potential accident scenarios remain bounded by existing analyses.

This change does not impact any Technical Specification Limiting Condition of Operation Parameters, or Surveillance Requirements. As such, no Technical Specification basis or associated margin of safety is affected.

27 -

Facility Change:

2-87-6554.17 Title Provide Alternate Power Source (Train A) to Excore Flux Monitoring System Description This modification provides for the addition of an alternate power source (120 VAC - Train 'A') for the Train 'B' flux monitor preamp, signal processor and sigma indicator. The Train 'A' flux monitor signal processor and indicator are located in the Control Room and therefore would be lost due to a fire in the Control Room. The Train 'B' monitor signal flux processor is located in the EVSD room. For alternative shutdown, only Train

'A' is credited, therefore, Train 'A' 120 VAC power will be required to be supplied to the Train 'B' flux monitor preamp, signal processor and indicator. This modification is being accomplished using isolation and transfer switches and affects fire areas 2-AC-50-35, 2-AC-50-29, 2-AC-50-42 and 2-AC-50-60.

Safety Evaluation This modification provides for the addition of an alternate power source (120 VAC - Train 'A') for the Train 'B' flux monitor preamp, signal processor and sigma indicator. Source range flux indication is required for alternative shutdown capability.

The Train 'A' feed from panel Q039 will not result in overloading of MCC 2BY because this power feed is normally not supplying a load and has a 20A circuit breaker to isolate any electrical faults. Power would be supplied from Train 'A' only during an Appendix R fire scenario and the panel has sufficient load capability. Actuation of the switches will be annunciated in the Control Room.

The rearrangement of power feeds to the Train 'B' Source Range flux monitor will not adversely impact any loads being supplied from panel Q041 or MCC 2BZ. During normal plant operation and for design basis accidents other than an Appendix R scenario the Source Range power is aligned through Train

'B' panel Q041. A 20A breaker provides isolation from electrical faults.

Source Range Flux monitors are addressed by UFSAR Section 7.5 under Safety Related Display Instrumentation. This change does not affect the required safety related operation of this monitor during a design basis accident as both the power transfer switch and the power isolation switch are designed and installed to the same quality requirements as other components in the existing circuitry.

Splicing of cables inside 120 VAC panel Q041 does not violate any regulatory requirements or commitments in the UFSAR. The splicing materials, design and procedures controlled through construction specification will be similar to those used for existing installations.

28 -

Facility Change:

2-87-6554.17 (Continued)

Safety Evaluation (Continued)

Therefore, although this modification requires a revision to the UFSAR, the functional design basis described in the applicable sections are not affected. All potential accidents and consequences are bounded by existing analysis. As such, this change does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced by this change. This change has no impact on the original design objectives and system functions. Thus, tWis change has no impact on any Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements of any existing Technical Specifications. Hence, no Technical Specification basis or associated margin of safety is affected.

This change neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System/Program nor violates the UFHA.

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Facility Change: 2-87-6554.22 Title Install Penetration Seals in Heavy Concrete Walls Description This modification provides for the installation or replacement of approximately 150 penetration seals in unsealed and non fire-rated seal penetrations which are located in 14 fire area boundaries that are heavy concrete walls in the Safety Equipment Building at elevation (-)15'-6",

(-)5'-6" and 8'-0", in the Radwaste Building at elevation 9'-0" and in the Penetration Building as it interfaces with the Turbine Building at elevation 9'0".

Safety Evaluation The proposed modification, when implemented will provide separation between redundant trains of Safe Shutdown equipment in the fire areas specified.

The modification has no effect on the operability of systems which perform safety related functions or the operability of safety related structures.

This modification enhances the fire protection system since it adds penetration seals and correspondingly requires changes to the UFHA.

However, this modification does not adversely impact the Fire Protection System Program or violate the UFHA.

In addition, all potential accidents and consequences are bounded by existing analysis. As such, this change does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR, nor does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced by this change. This modification is not specifically addressed in the Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements.

Facility Change: 2-87-6570, Revision 1 Title One Ton Jib Crane Inside Containment Description This modification will install a wall mounted one ton jib crane on the secondary shield wall inside the Unit 2 containment building next to the equipment hatch. The approximate boom centerline elevation will be at elevation 79' 6". A support frame off the secondary shield wall is provided to straddle the existing cable trays.

Safety Evaluation Although a change is required to Section 9.1.4 of the USFAR to include a description of the jib crane and its design requirements as well as a change to the amount of hydrogen producing materials, the probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be increased as a result of this change.

The design requirements for the jib crane are similar to the polar crane and cask handling crane and as such do not provide a change to the design basis analysis of the UFSAR. In addition, the jib crane has been evaluated for Seismic Interaction II/I and no potential missiles are created.

Since the function of any existing equipment important to safety is not modified, the consequences of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be increased.

In addition, no new equipment is added other than the jib crane and it has been designed per Seismic Interaction II/I requirements. Therefore, this change will not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously analyzed in the UFSAR.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Section is not reduced. These changes do not impact the safety function of any other plant equipment and are designed per the criteria established in SONGS 2 and 3 Design Criteria Manual, the UFSAR, NUREG-0612 Evaluation, and the UFHA.

This alteration does not adversely impact the Fire Protection System/Program or violate the UFHA. A revision will be made to the UFHA which provides for the addition of approximately 5 lbs. of exposed cable insulation.

31 -

Facility Change: 2-87-6592.0 Title Removal of Boric Acid Heat Trace from Service and Heat Trace Panel Alarm Modification Description This modification will remove boric acid heat trace circuits from service, modify heat trace panel alarms, revise Boric Acid Makeup (BAMU) tank temperature control and alarm setpoints, revise the BAMU tanks low level alarm setpoint and defeat Makeup Demineralizer (MUD) heat trace panel 2/3L273 alarm input to the main Control Room. Components of boric acid heat trace circuits removed from service that interfere with the maintenance of or access to other components will be removed. The remaining boric acid heat trace components for the circuits affected by this change will be abandoned in place.

Safety Evaluation The requirements for boric acid heat trace have been deleted from the Technical Specifications. Removal of boric acid heat trace form service has no adverse impact on the operation of the BAMU system. Modifying the heat trace panel alarm logic will not decrease the capability of detecting malfunctions of remaining heat trace circuits. All panel alarms will continue to operate in the present manner.

The decrease in the BAMU tank temperature and low level alarm are consistent with operation with a reduced boric acid concentration. The low level alarm setpoint is to be set at the minimum level required in one BAMU tank with the BAMU boric acid concentration at 3 wt. % and Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) concentration at 2300 ppm per Technical Specification Fig. 3.1-1 for Modes 1-4 operation. The low level alarm setpoint corresponds to a value on Technical Specification Fig. 3.1-1 that can be determined without requiring interpolation between curves. The BAMU tanks and RWSTs are expected to be normally operated at boric acid concentrations greater than the above values.

Therefore, although this modification does require revision to the UFSAR for the reduction in loads supplied by the Class 1E AC system and deletion of reference to heat trace and insulation in the BAMU pumps, it will not affect the design bases of any safety related system. All potential accidents and.

consequences are bounded by existing analysis. As such, this change does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident evaluated in the UFSAR, nor does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type then any previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced. The change has no impact on the existing Technical Specifications, Limiting-Conditions of Operation or Surveillance Requirements. Therefore, no technical basis or associated margins of safety are affected as a result of this change.

32 -

Facility Change: 2-87-6592.0 (Continued)

Safety Evaluation (Continued)

The UFHA will require.revision to reflect, the deletion of heat trace circuits. However, this alteration neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System/Program nor violates the UFHA.

Facility Change: 2-87-6593.1 Title Decommissioning of the Spray Chemical Addition System Description The existing Spray Chemical Addition System (SCAS) is used to add NaOH into the borated containment spray water for removing iodine from the atmosphere during the initial phase of containment spray following a LOCA. In addition, during the long term recirculation phase, the pH level of the containment spray water is maintained to minimize the potential for chloride induced stress corrosion cracking of austenitic stainless steel.

The system consists of a Spray Additive Tank with electric heaters, two injection pumps, and associated heat traced piping, valves and controls.

This change decommissions the existing SCAS and replaces it with a passive system for pH control by adding trisodium phosphate (TSP) to the containment floor area and permanently isolating and abandoning in place the SCAS.

Blind flanges and caps are to be installed on the sodium hydroxide injection piping leading to the Containment Spray System. The nitrogen supply to the Spray Chemical Storage Tank is to be capped. Electrical power to the system components (pumps, heaters, valves, heat tracers) are to be disconnected.

Handswitches and annunciator windows in the main control panel are to be blanked off. This change also installs trisodium phosphate in the baskets.

Five perforated stainless baskets are to be located at the containment floor level (Elevation 18'2") in the major flow paths to the containment emergency sump.

Each basket is sized to hold a maximum of 70 cubic feet of hydrated TSP. The total storage capacity of 350 cubic feet exceeds the minimum Technical Specification requirement of 256 cubic feet.

TSP will be used in place of NaOH to adjust the pH of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) solution. To minimize the potential for chloride induced stress corrosion cracking of austenitic stainless steel components while minimizing the hydrogen produced by the corrosion of galvanized surfaces and zinc-based paints, the long-term pH of the ECCS solution should be in the range of 7.0 to 9.5. Since the pH of the boric acid ECCS solution, without spray additive, will be approximately 4.5, baskets containing trisodium phosphate will be added to the containment to raise the long term ECCS solution pH into the required range.

Safety Evaluation The probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be increased.

This change renders inoperable the existing SCAS and replaces it with TSP stored in baskets inside containment. The SCAS is permanently isolated and abandoned in-place. All electrical components are de-energized. The abandoned piping -system will -maintain--its integrity to meet Seismic II/I requirements. The TSP system is a passive method of pH adjustment which is inherently more reliable than the SCAS in reducing the potential for plant shutdown caused by equipment malfunction, and in minimizing equipment corrosion post-LOCA. The TSP system has no significant impact on the radiological environment in the plant area.

34 -

Facility Change: 2-87-6593.1 (Continued)

Safety Evaluation (Continued)

This change will not increase the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR, nor will it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR. The TSP system that replaces the SCAS will not cause any significant effect on the radiological consequences of a LOCA as the calculated doses remain well within the 10 CFR 100 guidelines. It will still provide long term pH adjustment to minimize the potential for stress corrosion cracking of austenitic stainless steel components. Moreover, the passive TSP system is more reliable than the SCAS. The substitution of a passive system for an active system for the mitigation of the consequences of a postulated LOCA actually reduces the potential radiological consequences and equipment corrosion due to the failure of the active Iodine Removal System.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification will not be reduced. Revised Technical Specification 3/4.6.2.2 specifies TSP requirements which ensure a post-accident recirculation sump pH of greater than 7.0 consistent with Standard Review Plan Section 6.1.1, for prevention of stress corrosion cracking of stainless steel components. In addition, an analysis was performed which found that the replacement of the SCAS with baskets containing TSP will have no significant effect on the radiological consequences of a LOCA.

The TSP and baskets are non-combustible and the SCAS is de-energized and abandoned in place. Therefore, this change does not adversely impact the UFHA. However, it does require a revision to the UFHA to incorporate the change described above.

35 -

Facility Change: 2-87-6599 O Title Main Control Room Panel Modifications Description This change modifies and relocates instruments and controls in the Main Control Room on the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) panel 2CR-56, Engineered Safety Features System (ESFS) panel 2CR-57, and Chemical Volume and Control Systems (CVCS) panels 2CR-58, 50 and 51, and the Unit 2 Heating Ventilating Common panel 2CR-60.

NUREG-0700 provided guidelines for Human Factors criteria pertaining to Control Room design. A Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR)-was conducted based on criteria that satisfied NUREG-0700. The review resulted in the generation of numerous Human Engineering Discrepancies (HEDs) which identified the areas relating to improvement with respect to human factors layout of the main control panels.

The purpose of this change is to revise the CVS control panel in order to improve operator performance and eliminate errors caused by deficiencies in human factors design.

The modifications contained in this change meet the guidelines set forth in NUREG-0700. The DCRDR was reviewed and approved by the NRC.

Safety Evaluation The probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be increased. This design change affects sections 7.3, 7.4, 7.5 and 9.5 of the UFSAR which relocates and deletes existing controls and adds some new controllers, for the purpose of consolidation of controls in the Reactor Coolant System, Chemical Volume and Control System, and Shutdown Cooling System. The controls arrangement presented in this change provide the operator a better arrangement by system than the original design. This change does not adversely affect any safety function as previously reviewed in the UFSAR. Therefore, no design change bases have been changed, and any potential accident scenarios, consequences, and probabilities remain bounded by existing analysis.

The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be created. As stated above, this change simply relocates and deletes existing controls and adds some new controllers. All potential accident scenarios remain bounded by existing analyses.

36 -

Facility Change: 2-87-6599 (Continued)

Safety Evaluation (Continued)

This modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification. This change has no effect on any of the Limiting Conditions of Operations or Surveillance Requirements of any existing Technical Specification. As such, no technical basis or associated margin of safety is affected.

This alteration does not adversely impact the Fire Protection System/Program or violate the UFHA. However, the UFHA will require revision to reflect the additional combustible and fire loading in five fire zones resulting from the modifications of the Unit 2 Control Room and the Unit 2 Heating Ventilating Common panel.

Permissible fire loading limits previously analyzed will not be exceeded.

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Facility Change: 2-87-6604 Title Remote Shutdown Panel Modifications Description This change modifies the existing Remote Shutdown Panel to bring it into compliance with NRC requirements of NUREG-0700, "Guidelines for Control Room Design Reviews". Based on the Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR)

Report, the following modifications are to be implemented to eliminate Remote Shutdown Panel 2L-42 deficiencies:

1. Relocation of indicators, switches and lights on 2L-42;

2. Provide new cutouts and cover plate details;

3. Repaint panel background and instrument bezels and install demarcation lines;

4. Provide new nameplates per Control Room Design Review (CRDR) Criteria;

5. Provide seismic calculations and fabrication details;

6. Provide internal wiring changes;

7. Install a new reactor coolant hot leg (loop 1) temperature indicator;

8. Pull new cable from 2L-411 to 2L-42; and

9. Install new conduits and supports.

Safety Evaluation This change does not adversely affect any safety function as previously reviewed in the UFSAR, therefore, no design change bases have been changed, and any potential accidents scenarios, consequences, and probabilities remain bounded by existing analyses. Thus, neither the consequences nor the probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR will be affected, nor will the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR be created.

This change does not impact any existing Technical Specification Limiting Conditions of Operation or Surveillance Requirements. As such no technical specification bases or associated margin of safety are affected.

The UFHA will require revision to reflect the additional combustible and fire loading in two fire zones resulting from this change. However, permissible fire loading limits previously analyzed will not be exceeded, and thus this modification neither adversely impacts-the Fire Protection System/Program nor the UFHA.

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Facility Change: 2-87-6605, Revision 2 O Title Control Room Modifications, Unit 2, Panels 2CR-56, 2CR-57, 2CR-59, 2/3 CR-60 and 2/3 CR-63 Description This change modifies and relocates instruments and controls in the Main Control Room on the Plant Protection System panel 2CR-56, the Engineered Safety Features System (ESFS) panel 2CR-57, Post Accident Recorder panel 2CR-59, the Heating and Ventilating panel 2/3 CR-60 and the Electrical Mimic Bus panel 2/3 CR-63.

A Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) was conducted based on criteria that satisfies NUREG-0700, "Guidelines for Control Room Design Review". The review resulted in the generation of numerous Human Engineering Discrepancies (HEDs) which identified areas relating to improvement, with respect to human factors layout, or the main control panels. This change is to revise the above mentioned panels in order to improve operator performance and eliminate errors caused by deficiencies in human factors design.

Safety Evaluation The probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be increased.

This change implements DCRDR recommendations designed to improve the human engineering of Control Room design. The intent of the DCRDR is to reduce the probability of an accident due to human error. A revision to Table 7.3 8 of the UFSAR is necessary to show change of switch numbering due to the modifications made. This change does not represent any functional changes.

Rearrangement of the control panel instruments will not increase the consequences of any accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

The possibility of an accident or malfunction or a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be created. The change rearranges existing equipment in a human engineering oriented manner per the recommendations of the DCRDR.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification will not be reduced. This change does not functionally alter any equipment governed by the Technical Specifications as modified by Technical Specification Proposed Change NPF-10/15-234, nor does it alter the bases to any Technical Specifications.

This change neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System/Program nor violates the UFHA.

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Facility Change: 2-87-6637 Title Scaffolding and Lead Blanket Storage in Containment Description This modification provides storage racks and containers to store scaffolding and lead blankets inside the containment during plant operation to reduce handling and decontamination costs. There will be two racks to store scaffolding and three containers to store lead blankets and scaffolding fittings. The size of each rack will be 6'-0" wide, 8'-0" high and 14'-6" long and the size of each container will be 4'-6" wide, 2'-6" high and 6'-6" long.

The racks and the containers will be made of carbon steel and painted with decontaminable paint and will be securely attached to the containment base mat with Maxi-Bolts. The racks and the containers will be designed so that no scaffolding, fittings, lead blankets or structural component will impair any safety related item during seismic event. The containers will have lockable covers.

Safety Evaluation This modification will provide racks and containers for storing scaffolding and lead blankets inside the containment during plant operation. The storage racks will provide enough storage space to accommodate the normal scaffolding needs during a refueling outage. During plant operation scaffolding materials will be stored in the racks in bundles tied with metal straps. The racks will have vertical structural members at 3'-6" on centers to prevent the scaffolding bundles from moving laterally during a seismic event. Also, the racks will be enclosed with 3/16 inch removable plates at each end to prevent the movement of the bundles longitudinally. One of the containers will be used to store scaffolding fittings. This container will have internal partitions for segregating different types of fittings. The remaining two proposed containers will be used to store approximately 27,000 lbs of lead blankets. The storing of the lead blankets inside the containment during plant operation will not impact adversely any safety related system All containers will be securely attached to the containment floor with 1/2 inch diameter Maxi-Bolts and will have lockable covers which will be kept locked during plant operation. The covers will prevent water ingress, and prevent the lead blankets from blocking emergency sumps during a LOCA.

40

Facility Change: 2-87-6637 (Continued)

Safety Evaluation (Continued)

The total amount of scaffolding and fittings to be stored inside the containment is approximately 40,000 lbs with a surface area of 13,200 sq.

ft. The impact on the post LOCA hydrogen generation inside the containment due to this modification was evaluated assuming that all the scaffolding would be galvanized steel.

UFSAR Section 6.1.2.1 and Table 6.2-38 will be revised to indicate the increase in the amount of zinc in the galvanized steel to be stored inside the containment as a result of this modification.

The result of the increased hydrogen generation rate was determined not to impact the hydrogen removal capability of the hydrogen recombiners.

Therefore, this change does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR, nor does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced by this change. This change has no impact on the original design objectives and system functions. Thus, this change has no impact on any Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements of any existing Technical Specifications. Hence, no Technical Specification bases or associated margin of safety is affected.

This change neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System/Program nor violates the UFHA.

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Facility Change: 2-87-6672.0 Title SIT Acces§ Ladders and Platforms Description There are four Safety Injection Tanks (SITs) with three ladders on each tank. The existing ladders terminate below the top of the tanks and maintenance access is difficult and unsafe.

This modification provides ladder extensions and handrails which provide safe access to the top of the tank and a secure work place for Maintenance and Operations personnel. The existing safety climb devices will be removed since adequate platforms and safety cages will be provided in this change.

In order to provide required clearances per OSHA standards, instrumentation tubing relocations are also included in this change.

Safety Evaluation This modification provides ladder extensions, platforms, safety cages, handrails, and instrumentation tubing relocations. Two of the ladders on each tank are extended, with the exception that Tank T-008 has one ladder extension. Handrails are provided across the top of the tanks, and a small stair tread at the top ladder rung.accommodate access from the ladders.

Platforms across the top of the tanks are not needed. Access to the top of the tanks will be provided only from one ladder at each tank.

Platforms will be provided on tanks T-007 and T-009 at an approximate elevation of 72'-0 and 72'-6, respectively, because of interferences. The platform on tank T-007 utilizes the normal A/C unit E-397 for support. The platform on tank T-009 uses the normal A/C unit E-398 for support. A/C units are non-safety related. The affect of the platform loads on the housings were evaluated and were determined to be acceptable. Small, short platforms will also be provided where conduits and piping run on the floor at the base of the ladders. The platforms and ladder extensions are designed per Seismic Category II/I, because of their proximity to the safety injection tanks.

The relocation of instrumentation tubing lines for level and pressure transmitters on the safety injection tanks are required for adequate clearances of safety cages and for the ladder access. The tubing relocations do not result in changes to the existing stress analysis. No new equipment is added.

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Facility Change: 2-87-6672.0 (Continued)

Safety Evaluation (Continued)

A change to UFSAR Table 6.2-38 is required to incorporate the Zinc quality of the galvanized platforms and ladder extensions. However, this modification does not modify the function of any existing safety related components or equipment. The instrumentation tubing lines are relocated in conformance to existing standards and analyses. In addition, the new platforms, ladder extensions and handrails have been evaluated per Seismic Category II/I and no potential missiles are created. Therefore, neither the consequences nor the probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR will be increased. In addition, this modification will not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR and UFHA.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced by this change. This change will not affect any existing Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements.

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Facility Change: 2-87-6692 Title Drain Modifications for 50' and 30' Elevation Cable Riser Gallery Hall Description Actuation of the deluge fire suppression system in the 50' and 30' elevation cable riser gallery rooms will cause water accumulation in these rooms due to the absence of floor drains. As a result, water can migrate from these areas into the adjacent Engineered Safety Features Switchgear Rooms (at 50' elevation) and the Control Room (at 30' elevation). The presence of water in the Switchgear and Control Rooms potentially creates human factor consideration concerns regarding manual operator actions that may be required following a fire. This modification includes installation of floor drains and other water containment modifications in the 50' and 30' cable riser gallery areas; The modifications will preclude migration of water form the 50' and 30' riser gallery areas into the adjacent switchgear and control rooms if the fire suppression spray water systems are activated.

Safety Evaluation The installation of raised door sills that prevent the migration of water into the 50' elevation cable riser gallery does not impact the results of the flooding analysis performed in adjacent areas. The existing flooding analyses envelope the condition of draining the fire suppression water from the 50' and 30' elevation risers into the 9' elevation riser area.

This modification does not modify the function of an existing safety related equipment. Therefore, the probability of an accident or-malfunction previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be increased as a result of this change, nor will the consequences of an accident or malfunction be increased. This modification will not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously analyzed in the UFSAR.

This modification does not impact the safety function of plant equipment and does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.

Section 7.0 of the UFHA will be revised to reflect these modifications.

Installation of the floor drains from the 50' and 30' risers to the 9' elevation riser does not impact the functioning of the fire barrier to prevent the spread of fire, smoke and hot gases. Counter weighted caps have been added to the drain piping. This will preclude open communication between the rooms. Therefore, these modifications do not violate the UFHA.

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Facility Change:

2/3-84-221, Revision 2 Title Installation of a Unit 3 Refueling Machine Auxiliary Hoist Description During refuelings this modification provides capability of moving Control Element Assemblies (CEAs) without also moving fuel assemblies. The Refueling Machine Auxiliary Hoist (RMAH) will also be used to perform and verify coupling/uncoupling of CEA extensions, and for the lifting and manipulating refueling tools. The RMAH is an electrically powered hoist which is attached to the existing Unit 3 refueling machine.

Safety Evaluation This change concerns the addition of Quality Class III Seismic Category II/I equipment that fs operated only during refueling activities. Although this modification requires revision to UFSAR Section 6.2.5 to reflect 14 additional pounds of aluminum, none of the UFSAR design bases have been changed. The exposed surfaces of the aluminum are epoxy coated. The RMAH has been evaluated under the same accident scenarios and design criteria as the main refueling machine. Furthermore, the hoist has been designed to meet single active failure requirements where practicable and in accordance with NUREG-0612 guidelines, such that the probability of either the hoist or any of its components becoming detached or in any way impacting safety related equipment or nuclear fuel will be extremely low. The design basis fuel handling accident is the dropping of a spent fuel assembly in the Fuel Handling Building. Present analyses demonstrate the Keff remains less than 0.95 for a postulated drop of a single (1500 pound) spent fuel assembly.

The RMAH maximum service load is 1000 pounds. The RMAH is equipped with both mechanical and electric brakes; either of which alone is capable of restraining 150% of the rated load. Both the mechanical and electric brakes are fully engaged automatically on loss of electric power thus preventing "load creep". Therefore, any postulated fuel damage and resulting consequences that could be incurred due to a failure of the RMAH are bounded by existing analyses. Based on the above, neither the consequences nor the probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR will be increased.

The UFHA will require revision to reflect the additional cable routing resulting from this modification. The additional fire loading will not exceed the permissible limits previously analyzed, therefore, this modification neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System/Program nor violates the UFHA.

The RMAH was incorporated into Technical Specification 3/4.9.6 by Amendment 37 for Unit 3. This specification requires that the RMAH be demonstrated OPERABLE within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> prior to the start of CEA movement within the reactor pressure vessel.

Therefore, the margin of safety as presently defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced by this change.

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Facility Change: 2/3-85-6161.8. Revision 3 Title Remodeling of Auxiliary Building (Control Area) Elevation 70' Description The modification will provide for better utilization of the existing space available in the Auxiliary Building so that efficient plant operation can be maintained. The following work will be performed in this modification:

1. The architectural work covers the demolition and remodeling of the Auxiliary Building (Control Area) at the 70'-0" elevation. The change includes modifying existing and adding new metal stud walls, plastering, floor finishes, acoustical tile ceilings, doors, door frames, windows and hardware, laboratory cabinets, fixtures and furniture, movable office partitions, folding partitions, elastomeric roofing, and painting of existing and new walls, floors and ceilings. The change also includes the renaming and renumbering of the existing rooms and areas.

2. The fire protection work covers the: a) redistribution and addition of portable fire extinguishers; b) redistribution and addition of ionization detectors; c) expansion of the fire sprinkler system; d) installation of a Halon 1301 fire suppression system in Counting Room No. 1; and e) revision of drawings to reflect changes made to the Fire Barrier Penetration Seal locations.

3. The HVAC work covers the: a) addition of a new HVAC system to serve the Radio Chemistry Lab area, b) modification of the existing supply and exhaust systems through reconfigured ductwork to serve the balance of the areas at the 70' floor elevation, c) modification of the fume hood exhaust ducting system to accommodate new equipment, d) modification of the area exhaust system to accommodate new zone configuration.

4. The electrical work covers the addition of new loads to the bus, including the addition of new power cables and new panel circuit breakers.

5. Other remodel related work are as follows:

a.

Removal, modification and/or addition of plumbing fixtures and accessories, cold water lines, hot water lines, drain lines and vent lines;

b.

Addition of liquid nitrogen (LN2) lines to serve three (3)

Geli detectors -in the Radio Chemistry Counting Room No. 2 and addition of LN2 lines to serve two (2)

Geli detectors in the MCA Laboratory. A pressure regulator will be installed to provide 15 psi pressure at the end of the line with a delivery rate of 25 lbs. of LN2 in 30 minutes per tank; 46 -

Facility Change:

2/3-85-6161.8. Revision 3 (Continued)

Description (Continued)

c.

Addition of service lines in the Radio Chemistry Instrument Laboratory, to be connected to the existing gas lines serving the Radio Chem Laboratory for instrument air, N2, C2H2, NO2, Argon, He, H2 and 02;

d.

Addition of deionized water supply to the laboratory sinks in the Radio Chemistry Instrument Laboratory;

e.

Upgrade the telecommunication system to provide additional phone outlets and data capacity;

f.

Upgrade the public address system;

g.

Addition and/or modification of convenience electrical outlets, 125 VDC power bus, 120/208V four wire power source and test panel, light fixtures, grounding and ground-fault protection;

h.

Installation of "spike-free" 240 VAC/60 Hz and 120 VAC/60 Hz for the Radio Chem Counting Room No. 2 Laboratory and test equipment;

j.

Installation of concrete curbs to contain firewater within the areas being served by the fire sprinkler system.

Safety Evaluation This modification, which will be included in a revision to the UFSAR, will provide for better utilization of the existing space available in the Auxiliary Building. In addition, the HVAC System, the Fire Protection System, the Fire Detection System, the P.A. System and the Telecommunication System will all be upgraded to provide a safer, more efficient operation.

As such, this change does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR, nor does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

A revision is required to the UFHA to revise the floor plan layout and the amount of combustible loading, as well as the addition to and modification of the existing fire protection systems. The overall combustible loading for the fire area, located within the remodeling area, is well below its maximum permissible, and all changes, additions and removals of active fire protection system components within this area neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System/Program nor violates the UFHA.

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Facility Change: 2/3-85-6161.8. Revision 3 (Continued)

Safety Evaluation (Continued)

The systems affected by this change are governed by Technical Specification Sections 3.3.3.7, 3.7.8.2, 3.7.8.3, and 3.7.9, but the modification does not adversely affect them. This modification does not modify existing Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements; however, Technical Specification Proposed Change No. 226 has been submitted to remove the Fire Protection System from the Technical Specifications. Therefore, the margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced by this change.

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Facility Change: 2/3-87-6313 Title Oily Waste Water System Description This modification includes the structure and piping connections to the existing East Make Up Demineralizer (MUD) Neutralization Sump and piping connections to the existing West MUD sump. The East MUD sump will be converted into a gravity type oil/water separator with the additional capability to separate oil received in the oily water waste streams from Units 1, 2 or 3 and provide a water quality acceptable for discharge. The West MUD sump is to be used for storage of waste water in its present structural configuration.

A new Submersible Sump Pump, will be installed inside the Unit 1 Oil Separator and operate in automatic, controlled by a level switch, or manual, as selected by a local switch position. Pump on/off indication is provided.

Power will be fed from 1B0331P1 to the oil separator sump pump by a new cable. A new conduit is installed between MCC-3 to local control panel (C112).

The existing water line 002-8"-RLL1 from the neutralization sumps located between the Unit 2 outfall and the two existing oily water sumps will be interconnected to the existing Unit 2&3 oily water sump pumps discharge and to the Unit 1 oil/water separator.

The modification provides flexibility.for transferring waste water to/from Unit 1 oil/water separator and MUD sumps, and between Unit 2&3 oily/waste sumps and MUD sumps.

Safety Evaluation This modification converts the existing east 86,000 gallon neutralization sump in the existing Make Up Demineralizer (MUD) System into a gravity type oil/water separator. The modification will provide a passive Corrugated Plate Installation (CPI) oil separator unit to separate the water from the oil which will then be disposed of by truck. The water will be monitored by batch sampling to assure compliance with applicable environmental regulations and then discharged to the storm drain. If the effluent exceeds EPA limits it will be redirected to the West Sump or to the untreated water sump using a portable pump.

This modification will provide for oil/water separation of 1-1/2 to 2 days volume from Units 2&3 (based on 65,000 gallons per day from Units 2&3).

The existing Unit 2&3 oil/water-sump pumps and Unit 1 oil/water separator pump and interconnecting piping will permit the transfer of oily waste from any of Units 1, 2 or 3 to be modified MUD sump. This will assure that discharge requirements will be met during all potential operating conditions including those times-when the existing oil separators may-be inoperative or their capacity exceeded.

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Facility Change: 213-87-6313 (Continued)

Safety Evaluation (Continued)

The oily water waste stream is directed to the MUD sumps, and area outside the fire areas of the plant. Here the oil is separated from water and accumulated for disposal by truck. Therefore, there is negligible impact on the fire danger and no impact on the fire areas of the plant. This change neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System/Program nor violates the UFHA.

Although this modification requires a revision to the UFSAR, the functional design basis described in the applicable sections are not affected. All potential accidents and consequences are bounded by existing analysis. As such, this change does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

The margin safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced by this change. This change has no impact on the original design objectives and system functions. Thus, this change has no impact on any Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements of any existing Technical Specifications. Hence, no Technical Specification basis or associated margin of safety is affected.

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Facility Change: 2/3-87-6554.02 Title Install 8 Hour Emergency Lights for Appendix R Compliance Description This design change will install 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> emergency lighting units with.self contained batteries, battery chargers and circuitry to automatically energize the lighting fixtures from the battery on loss of AC charging power. These emergency lighting units will provide illumination at safe shutdown equipment and the access/egress routes to these components, 120 VAC power will be provided to each lighting unit for the nearest light panel or tapped off existing 120 VAC circuits to emergency lighting units.

Safety Evaluation The Appendix R Compliance Assessment identified areas in the plant where operator actions would be required to be performed; additionally, in order to achieve safe shutdown in the event of a loss of AC power concurrent with a fire, 8-hour emergency lighting units must be installed at these identified locations per Appendix R Section III.J.

The probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be increased as a result of this change. UFSAR Table 9.5-6 which identifies areas requiring 8-hour emergency lighting for safe reactor shutdown will be revised. No design bases have been changed. The emergency lights and associated AC circuits are separate and independent of any safety related circuit. The change,.however, requires emergency light supports to be anchored off structural columns and cable tray supports which are safety related. The additional weights are very insignificant and it has been verified by calculation that the safety related supports will not be overloaded beyond their design limit. This design change will therefore not adversely impact safety related equipment or systems. All potential accidents and consequences are bounded.

The work covered by this design change adds 8-hour emergency lighting units.

Installation of this equipment is similar to existing plant installations.

Accordingly, the consequences of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety are not impacted and are bounded by existing analysis. No new hazards or unacceptable interactions with existing systems are created. Hence, all potential accident scenarios remain bounded by existing analysis.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced. The design change augments the emergency lighting system and will not impact any Technical Specification Limiting Conditions of Operation,-Parameters, or Surveillance Requirements.

The change does not adversely impact the Fire Protection System. The UFHA requires a revision-to reflect the additional combustible material in fire areas. The additional loading will not exceed the permissible limits previously analyzed.

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Facility Change: 2/3-87-6554.05 Title Exposure Fire Barriers on Electrical Raceways Description This modification provides for the following:

1. The addition of one hour rated exposure fire barriers for identified raceways;

2. The removal of existing exposure fire barriers on raceways which are no longer credited for Appendix R requirements;

3. The replacement of existing nonqualified exposure fire barriers on conduits less than 2" in size with one hour rated exposure fire barriers; and

4. The addition of type 3 (or other) barriers as required by Regulatory Guide 1.75 on raceways identified in Item 2 above.

Safety Evaluation Although this modification requires a revision to UFSAR Section 8.3.3.3.1, no design basis are affected by this change. This modification is being made only to increase fire protection of safe shutdown cables. No rewiring, addition of cables or cable splicing is involved. This modification will not adversely affect the function or operability of other components and devices. Therefore, neither the consequences nor the probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR will be increased. In addition, this modification will not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced by this change. This change will not affect any existing Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operating or Surveillance Requirements.

The UFHA will require revision to reflect the addition and/or deletion of the fire barriers which affect the amount of combustible loading. However, permissible fire loading limits previously analyzed will not be exceeded, and thus this modification neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System Program nor violates the UFHA.

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Facility Change: 2/3-87-6554.21 Title To Provide Train 'A' Backup Power Source to The Control Room Emergency Lights Description This modification will provide Train 'A' power as backup to existing Train

'B' emergency lighting power for the Unit 2 and 3 main control panel areas in the event of a fire. Unit 2 and Unit 3 Train 'A' diesel backed power will be provided as an alternate source of power to the essential lighting panel 2LP-35 and 3LP-35, respectively. Existing motor starter cubicles in Train 'A' MCCs 2BY and 3BY will be modified. The control circuit for these starters will receive a SIAS trip signal similar to the existing scheme for the Train 'B' lighting controls. New manual transfer switches (2LD101 and 3LD101) will be installed upstream of the existing lighting transformers (2TLP35 and 3TLP35) to select either Train 'A' or Train 'B' as the 480V power source to essential lighting panel LP35.

The Train 'B' control circuitry will be modified by removing the Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signals (EFAS) #1 and #2 trip contacts from the contactor circuit. The existing trip contacts for EFAS1 and EFAS2 are not a required safety function. Eliminating these contacts will decrease performing unnecessary control operation.

New cabling and retagged cabling will be installed from MCCs 2BZ, 2BY, 3BZ and 3BY to transfer switches 2LD101/3LD1O1 panels 2LO34/3LO34 and transformers 2TLP35/3TLP35. New conduits will also be installed for routing of the new circuits.

The existing loss of 480V AC alarm will be revised to indicate loss of power to LP35. Loss of the 480V AC power to panel LP35 from Train 'A' power source will be added to the existing Main Control Room alarm to annunciate "Essential Lighting On DC Power".

Safety Evaluation The Appendix R Compliance Assessment identified areas in the plant where Control Room lighting could be lost due to failure of Train 'X' and Train 'B' power cables. Because Control Room evacuation would not be required for such fires, operator actions are required in the Control Room.

Presently, 90 minute battery backed (essential) lighting is provided in the Control Room with a Train 'B' diesel backed AC supply. This modification will add a Train 'A' diesel backed power supply to each essential lighting panel (2LP35 and 3LP35). The 90 minute battery backed (essential) lighting with a redundant (Train A/B) power supply will be used per the deviation request "Emergency Lighting Required for Cold Shutdown".

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Facility Change: 2/3-87-6554.21 (Continued Safety Evaluation (Continued)

This modification will require a change to the UFSAR to revise the Lighting System description for Essential Lighting power to the Control Room lights.

The revised essential lighting system for the Control Room will be used to satisfy the emergency lighting requirements. A UFSAR change is also required to reflect the addition of diesel generator loading for the MSLB column in Table 8.3-1. The increase in the diesel.generator loading is.

very insignificant and the new diesel generator loading remains well within its rated capability. Therefore, it is expected that this load will have an insignificant effect on diesel fuel oil requirements.

The increase in loading of safety related MCCs 2BY and 3BY is also insignificant and these MCC loads remain within their design limits.

The components will be installed to Quality Class II Seismic, Category I requirements as required by the UFSAR design basis. This modification decreases the probability of loss of essential lighting for the Control Room with the addition of the Train 'A' backup power. The transfer scheme is designed and installed to the same quality requirements as other components in the existing control circuits.

No design bases have been changed. Procedures utilized in installation of cables/components, and rewiring are similar to those used for existing design. The adequacy of safety related supports for the conduits and trays associated with the cable routing in this modification have been verified by calculation. The additional weight is very insignificant and safety related supports will not be loaded beyond their design limit. This design change will not adversely impact safety related equipment or systems.

Therefore, all potential accidents and consequences are bounded by existing analysis. As such, this change does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR, nor does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced by this change. This modification is not specifically addressed in the Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements.

The UFHA will require revision to reflect the additional fire loading resulting from this modification and the addition of Train 'A' Backup Power to Train 'B' Control Room Emergency Lighting Power. However, this modification neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System/Program nor violates the UFHA.

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Facility Change: 2/3-87-6554.24 Title Sound Powered Telephone System Installation Description Description This change resulted from the Appendix R Compliance Assessment Project which identified specific areas of the plant where existing PAX and UHF radio communications could be lost in the event of a fire. As a backup, this design change will provide a dedicated Sound Powered Telephone System for plant safe shutdown operations.

The Sound Powered Telephone System will provide communications capability between key operator locations throughout Units 2 and 3. In addition, a new telephone cable will be installed from the elevation 50' control building Evacuation Shutdown Room (EVSD) to the elevation 70' Communications Room.

This new cable will ensure PAX telephone communications capability from the EVSD Room to onsite and offsite locations including fire brigade staging areas. In the event of a fire which causes evacuation of the Control Room and loss of the PAX telephone cable from the EVSD Room to the elevation 9' Communications Room, communications via PAX from the EVSD through the 70' Communications Room will remain available.

Safety Evaluation The probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be increased as a result of this change. The addition of a sound powered phone system increases the availability of-communications for plant safe shutdown operations by adding a backup communication system to the PAX and UHF radio systems. Therefore, all potential accidents and consequences are bounded by existing analysis. As such, this change does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR, nor does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

The UFHA will require revision to reflect the addition of the sound powered phones. The additional fire loading will not exceed the permissible limits previously analyzed; therefore, this modification neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System/Program nor violates the UFHA.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced by this change. This change will not affect any existing Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements.

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Facility Change: 2/3-87-6695 Title Auxiliary Building Control Area Kitchen Remodeling Description This modification affects the conversion of the existing kitchen area located in the auxiliary building control room area into additional work space for Operations personnel. In addition, the existing shower and locker room located in the same area will be converted into a kitchen area and lunch room, respectively. The physical work includes removal of a wall separating two rooms, removal of doors and frames, removal of existing shower and lockers, installation of new kitchen facilities, lunch room tables and floor coverings.

Associated electrical and plumbing changes are also part of the physical work.

Safety Evaluation This modification is intended to create a more efficient work environment in the control room by reducing the Control Room traffic, congestion, noise and distractions. Interface between Control Operations personnel and other work groups can occur outside of the Control Room.

This modification affects the office area around the Control Room, not the Control Room itself. Work practice controls in place during installation ensure that installation of the modification does not adversely affect operation in the Control Room.

The removal of the separating wall, doors and door frames, and adjacent stub walls has no structural impact since these items are considered to be non load bearing. The electrical and plumbing changes have no impact or interface with existing plant safety systems.

The probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be increased, and all accident scenarios, consequences and probabilities remain bounded by existing analyses. The consequences of an accident or malfunction of any equipment previously evaluate in the UFSAR will not be increased as a result of this modification. This modification will not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced.

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Facility Change: 2/3-87-6695 (Continued)

Safety Evaluation (Continued)

Removal of the wall separating the existing kitchen and an adjacent room will not impact the UFHA for this area since the wall is not a fire area boundary nor is it a technical specification wall.

Fire detection equipment consisting of a single heat detector will be relocated to the new kitchen area and will provide fire detection ability equal to the pre-modification arrangement. Revised combustible loadings will be reflected in the UFHA.

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Facility Change: 3-85-6238. Revision 1 Title Modification to Improve Flow Through the Boronometer and Process Radiation Monitor Description This modification revises and improves the characteristics and control of flow through the boronometer and process radiation monitor. This modification improves flow characteristics and control by the following means:

1. Provides an optimum filtered flow of 8 and 5 gpm respectively, for the boronometer and process radiation monitor;

2. Replaces the existing flow indicator downstream of the boronometer and process radiation monitor with a venturi flow element and a flow indicating transmitter;

3. A control valve, isolation valves, a bypass valve, and a spring loaded check valve are being added to the main letdown line to the boronometer and process radiation monitor. Throttle valves downstream of the boronometer and process radiation monitor are also being added to permit flow control through each instrument; and

4. High/Low flow annunciation at the main control panel and flow indication on the Critical Function Monitoring System (CFMS) for the flow through the boronometer and process radiation monitor are being added.

Safety Evaluation Although this modification requires a revision to UFSAR Section 9.3.4, the deign basis for the Chemical and Volume Control System will not be affected by this change. The existing seismic analysis (UFSAR 5.4.3.1), high energy line break analysis (UFSAR 3.6.2) and the fatigue analysis (UFSAR 3.9.1.1),

are not affected by this design change. The system function remains as originally intended and design bases are unaffected. Therefore, neither the consequences nor the probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR will be increased.

The UFHA will require revision to reflect the additional cable routing resulting from this modification. The additional fire loading will not exceed the permissible limits previously analyzed, therefore, this modification neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System/Program nor violates the UFHA.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced by this change. The change has no effect on existing limiting conditions of operation or surveillance requirements governed by the'existing Technical Specifications. As such, no Technical Specification basis or associated margin of safety are affected.

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Facility Change: 3-85-6574, Revision 1 Title Emergency Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Control Modification Description This modification resulted from plant changes which would be required should the design basis in the UFHA be revised to include a Loss of Offsite Power (LOP) coincident with a fire.

The Emergency Diesel Generators are designed to provide power needed to shutdown and maintain the plant in a safe condition in the event of a total loss of offsite power. However, the control circuitry for the two fuel oil transfer pumps associated with each Diesel Generator are located in the Control Room. In the event of a fire requiring Control Room evacuation or resulting in failure of the Control Room circuits, operation of the Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps is prevented.

This modification provides for the following corrective action:

1. A local control panel for each Emergency Diesel Generator with local control handswitches for each of the two Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps associated with each Diesel Generator;

2. Isolation switches on the local panel that simultaneously disconnect all circuits to the Main Control Board;

3. Conduit and cable to connect the local panel to the existing Motor Control Center for each Diesel Generator; and

4. An alarm at the main plant annunciator in Panel 2/3CR-63 if the local isolation switches are placed in the "local position."

The alarm annunciations for "Diesel Generator 3G003 Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps on Local Control" and "Diesel Generator 3G002 Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps on Local Control" are located at Windows 63E21 and 63E22. The alarm annunciation for "480V non-ESF Bus 3B18 Supply FDR OC/Undervoltage" is relocated to Window 63E15 from Window 63E22.

Safety Evaluation This modification is necessary to ensure that the Emergency Diesel Generators can provide power to shutdown and maintain the plant in a safe condition in the event that a design basis fire, concurrent with a loss of offsite power, were to occur. Hot shorts (line to line faults), open circuits, or faults to ground caused by an exposure fire in the Control Room will not prevent operation of the Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps.

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Facility Change: 3-85-6574, Revision 1 (Continued)

Safety Evaluation (Continued)

Although this modification requires a revision to the UFSAR Section 9.5.4, it does not affect the Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System operability requirements or its design basis. The safety function of the Diesel Generator will be enhanced to provide power in the event of a design basis fire simultaneous with a loss of offsite power. Therefore, neither the consequences nor the probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR will be increased. In addition, this modification will not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR and UFHA.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced by this change. This change will not affect any existing Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements.

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Facility Change: 3-86-6637 O Title Scaffolding and Lead Blanket Storage in Containment Description This-modification provides storage racks and containers to store scaffolding and lead blankets inside the containment during plant operation to reduce handling and decontamination costs. There will be two racks to store scaffolding and three containers to store Lead blankets and scaffolding fittings. The size of each rack will be 6'-0" wide, 8'-0" high and 14'-6" long and the size of each container will be 4'-6" wide, 2'-6" high and 6'-6" long.

The racks and the containers will be made of carbon steel and painted with decontaminable paint and will be securely attached to the containment base mat with Maxi-Bolts. The racks and the containers will be designed so that no scaffolding, fittings, lead blankets or structural component will impair any safety related item during seismic event. The containers will have lockable covers.

Safety Evaluation This modification will provide racks and containers for.storing scaffolding and lead blankets inside the containment during plant operation. The storage racks will provide enough storage space to accommodate the normal scaffolding needs during a refueling outage. During plant operation scaffolding materials will be stored in the racks in bundles tied with metal straps. The racks will have vertical structural members at 3'-6" on centers to prevent the scaffolding bundles from moving laterally during a seismic event. Also, the racks will be enclosed with 3/16 inch removable plates at each end to prevent the movement of the bundles longitudinally. One of the containers will be used to store scaffolding fittings. This container will have internal partitions for segregating different types of fittings. The remaining two proposed containers will be used to store approximately 27,000 lbs of Lead blankets. The storing of the lead blankets inside the containment during plant operation will not impact adversely any safety related system.

All containers will be securely attached to the containment floor with 1/2 inch diameter Maxi-Bolts and will have lockable covers which will be kept locked during plant operation. The covers will prevent water ingress, and prevent the lead blankets from blocking emergency sumps during a LOCA.

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Facility Change: 3-86-6637 (Continued)

Safety Evaluation (Continued)

The total amount of scaffolding and fittings to be stored inside the containment is.approximately 40,000 ]bs with a surface area of 13,200 sq.

ft. The impact on the post LOCA Hydrogen generation inside the containment due to this modification was evaluated assuming that all the scaffolding would be galvanized steel.

UFSAR Section 6.1.2.1 and Table 6.2-38 will be revised to indicate the increase in the amount of Zinc in the galvanized steel to be stored inside the containment as a result of this modification.

The result of the increased Hydrogen generation rate was determined not to impact the Hydrogen removal capability of the Hydrogen recombiners.

Therefore, this change does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR, nor does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced by this change. This change has no impact on the original design objectives and system functions. Thus, this change has no impact on any Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements of any existing Technical Specifications. Hence, no Technical Specification bases or associated margin of safety is affected.

This change neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System/Program nor violates the UFHA.

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Facility Change: 3-86-6640 Title Deletion of Part Length Group Select Switch and Disabling of the Auto Sequential Mode of CEDMCS Operation Description This modification provides for the following changes:

1. Removal of the Part Length Group Select Switch from the CEDMCS control panel UI-9134 at CR-51;

2. Disabling of the Automatic Sequential (AS) Mode of CEA Operation; and

3. Modification of the CEDMCS logic voltage supply low voltage detector (LVD) circuitry to allow adjustment on the LVD detector setpoint to a level which is compatible with the voltage requirements of the new ACTM cards.

Each CEA is assigned to one of three control groups:

Shutdown, regulating or part length. The part length groups are used for Axial Shape Index (ASI) dampening. There are two part length groups identified as P1 and P2.

Currently, the part length group select switch allows selection of either or both part length groups for movement. Selection of P1 or P2 individually is administratively prohibited to eliminate the possibility of CPC generated trips due to a deviation between P1 and P2 of 7" or greater. Removal of the part length group select switch will make it physically impossible to select groups P1 or P2 independently for motion thereby eliminating this potential trip scenario. A part length group motion demand will result in both part length groups moving in unison.

The AS mode of operation is provided to allow the Reactor Regulating System (RRS) to control the rate and direction of CEA motion. The AS mode of operation is not normally used. The reason for this operating practice is based upon industry operating experience. Previously, plants operated with CEAs inserted a slight amount from the All Rods Out (ARO) configuration to provide what was called "Control Rod Bite" (i.e., as soon as the CEAs start to fall, the CEAs turn power). This practice was subsequently stopped when it was found that many fuel pins experienced clad damage near the top end of the fuel pin. The damage analysis theorized that the fuel was not burned up around the slightly inserted CEA (over long periods) and whenever the RRS caused CEAs to withdraw in high speed, localized power peaks could occur and possibly cause cladding damage. Additionally, the automatic RRS response to minor parameter changes caused the ASI to fluctuate unnecessarily.

Consequently, in order to comply with fuel operating guidelines, the plant is operated in the ARO and Manual Sequential mode.

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Facility Change: 3-86-6640 (Continued)

Safety Evaluation These modifications will provide the following benefits:

1. Increased unit availability due to eliminating potential trips resulting from inadvertent misalignment of part length CEA groups;

2. Increased Unit availability due to eliminating potential trips resulting from ACTM misoperation as a result of improper logic voltage levels;

3. A substantial reduction in the amount of.operator training required for the RRS, SBCS and CEDMCS Systems;

4. Elimination of administrative controls prohibiting selection of individual part length groups and the AS mode; and

5. Deletion of unnecessary Annunciator Windows and CEDMCS controls from the Control Room.

The changes do not affect any safety-related system or equipment. Normal CEDM control is not adversely affected, nor is the reactor trip system affected in any way. UFSAR Section 7.7.1.1 will be revised to reflect these changes; however, the design basis of the RRS will not be affected by this change.

Therefore, neither the consequences nor the probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR will be increased. In addition, this modification will not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR and UFHA.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced by this change. This change will not affect any existing Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements.

Facility Change: 3-87-6554.01 Title Charging Pumps and Control Room Fan Fusing Description This modification provides for isolation of Train 'X' cables from the (Chemical Volume and Control System) CVCS Charging Pumps control circuitry and, the Toxic Gas Isolation Signal (TGIS) cable to the Train 'A' Control Room Emergency Cooling Unit E-418 control circuitry for compliance with Appendix R. Isolation of these cables will ensure operability of the pumps and HVAC unit in the event of an electrical failure on these cables due to a plant fire.

In addition, the Charging Pump control circuitry is being modified for alternative shutdown capability. Cables to the Charging Pumps which route through or terminate in alternative shutdown areas will be isolated by rewiring the existing fire isolation switch. Control of the Charging Pumps will then be available at the respective 480V Load Centers in the event of a fire in the alternative shutdown fire areas.

Safety Evaluation This modification provides isolation of Train 'X'.cables from the charging pump suction trip and the pressurizer level interlocks by rewiring the circuits to include a ten amp fuse and two interposing relays. In order to isolate the TGIS auto start control cable from the Train 'A' Control Room Emergency Cooling Unit E-418 control scheme, a similar ten amp fuse and dual interposing relay arrangement is used. Additionally, the charging pump control circuitry is being modified for alternate shutdown capability.

By isolating the charging pumps and modifying the pumps alternate shutdown, the modification ensures the inventory and pressure control of the reactor coolant system during a fire scenario. In addition, isolation of the Control Room Emergency Cooling Unit ensures Control Room habitability and equipment cooling requirements. Therefore, the design basis of any safety related systems will not be affected and all potential accidents and consequences are bounded by existing analyses. As such, this change does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident evaluated in the UFSAR, nor does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type then any previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

This change has no effect on the existing Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements governed by the existing Technical Specifications. The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specifications is not reduced by this modification.

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Facility Change: 3-87-6554.01 (Continued)

The UFHA will require revision to reflect the addition of combustible material in cable trays and to document Charging Pump and Cooling Unit control circuitry fusing. The additional fire loading will not exceed the maximum permissible limits. Therefore, this modification neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System/Program nor violates the UFHA.

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Facility Change: 3-87-6554.03 Title Installation of Level Indicators, Damper Motor Replacement Description This modification provides for the installation of local mechanical indicators by which the level of the Component Cooling Water (CCW) Surge Tank, the Condensate Storage Tanks (CST), and the Boric Acid Makeup (BAMU)

Tanks can be determined. In addition, the existing motor actuator for the damper for the Control Room Cabinet Area Emergency Air-Conditioning Unit will be replaced with a spring-return type actuator.

Safety Evaluation This modification provides for the installation of various local pressure and level indicators and a mechanical damper actuator for the Control Room Cabinet Air-Conditioning Unit to achieve compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R. The new pressure and level instruments are mechanical and local with no interconnection to the existing instrumentation and therefore do not affect the existing instrumentation in the Control Room. This modification will increase the efficiency and reliability of safe shutdown in the event of a fire resulting in loss of indications in the Control Room. Therefore, although this modification requires a revision to the UFSAR, the functional design basis described in the applicable sections are not effected. All potential accidents and consequences are bounded by existing analysis. As such, this change does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR, nor does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced by this change. This change has no impact on the original design objectives and system functions. Thus, this change has no impact on any Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements of any existing Technical Specifications. Hence, no Technical Specification basis or associated margin of safety is affected.

This change neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System/Program nor violates the UFHA.

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Facility Change: 3-87-6554.08 Title Engineering Safety Features (ESF) HVAC Separation Barrier Description This modification provides a-new partial height partition between ESF HVAC Units 2E-255 and 2E-257, located in the control area of the Auxiliary Building, Elevation 50'-0".

The function of the partition is to provide a radiant energy shield between these HVAC units. The partition will also provide support to an existing electrical conduit. A light fixture will be relocated and an additional fixture added above the partition. In addition, a one-hour rated fire barrier will be installed on three cable trays. The partition is designed for isolation and protection of the HVAC units to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R.

Safety Evaluation This modification provides additional assurance that one ESF HVAC unit will remain available for post fire shutdown by the addition of a partial height wall which will act as a radiant energy shield to prevent the heat from fire in one unit from affecting the adjacent unit. This modification acts only to provide additional separation between the ESF HVAC units and does not adversely impact equipment access to the units.

The partition will be constructed of one-hour fire rated materials, however, the partition will be non-rated. The partition will not significantly impact sprinkler coverage since the existing sprinkler heads are located symmetrically on both sides of the partition.

This modification has no impact on the original design basis or function of any system or component. All potential accidents and consequences are bounded by existing analysis. As such, this change does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR, nor does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced by this change. This change has no effect on any of the Limiting Conditions of Operation or Surveillance Requirements of any existing Technical Specification.

The partition constitutes an exposure fire barrier as part of a possible fire protection system. The UFHA will require revision to reflect the partition and additional fire barriers. This modification neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection-System/Program nor violates the UFHA.

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Facility Change: 3-87-6554.10 Title Saltwater Cooling Pump Logic Bypass Description This modification will change the Salt Water Cooling (SWC) pump 3P114 start interlock circuitry such that the pump can be started by bypassing the SWCP discharge valve 3HV-6203, CCW heat exchanger outlet valve 3HV-6495 and Pump Bearing Seal Water Valve 3HV-6379 limit switch interlock contacts by activating a fire isolation switch in panel 3L413. A new ten conductor control cable is required to be routed between the 4 kV switchgear 3A06 cubicle 11 and fire isolation switch panel 3L413. The routing is exclusively in existing trays in the 4kV 3A06 switchgear room (Fire Area 3-AC-50-34).

Internal wiring modifications are required in switchgear 3AO6 cubicle 11 and in panel 3L413.

The purpose for modifying the Saltwater Cooling Pump Start Interlock Circuitry is to ensure cooling water supply to the component cooling water system heat exchangers during an Appendix R fire scenario.

Safety Evaluation This modification will change the SWC pump 3P114 start interlock circuitry so that interlocks to various associated valves can be bypassed by actuating a fire isolation switch.at panel 3L413. A new ten conductor control cable is required to be routed between the 4 kV switchgear 3A06 cubicle 11 and the fire isolation switch panel 3L413. The routing is exclusively in existing trays in the 4 kV 3AO6 Switchgear Room. Internal wiring modifications are required in switchgear 3A06 cubicle 11 and in panel 3L413.

All materials used are QCII and installation methods are similar to those used for existing installation. The design change will have no adverse impact in operation of salt water cooling system during normal or emergency safe shutdown of the plant or during design basis LOCA. The design change will also not have any adverse impact whatsoever on any other safety equipment, structure, or system. All potential accidents and consequences are bound by existing analysis.

As such, this change'does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR, nor does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

This modification does not affect existing Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements; therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification will not be reduced.

The UFHA will require revision to reflect the additional fire loading resulting from this-modification. However, this modification neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System/Program nor violates the UFHA.

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Facility Change: 3-87-6554.15 Title Tendon Access Hatches Description This modification provides two removable steel hatches at the tendon access openings, elevation 63.5 feet, Unit 3 penetration area. The hatches and supporting framing will be constructed with 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> fire rated material.

This hatch is removable in order to accommodate Tendon Surveillance inspections and is designed to meet security barrier requirements when the containment security boundary area is expanded to include the penetration area.

The addition of hatches for the tendon access openings of the penetration area are required to provide separation for redundant trains of safe shutdown cables. To provide an adequate level of protection, the hatches are to have a minimum 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> equivalent fire rating.

Safety Evaluation This modification provides two new removable hatches to provide a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> equivalent fire rated barrier for Appendix R Compliance, while maintaining necessary access for the Containment Structure Inservice Tendon Surveillance. The removable hatches are supported by permanent steel angle members which are attached to the Auxili.ary Building floor slab with Hilti HDI expansion anchors. The expansion anchors are tack welded to the supporting angles to meet security requirements. All of the support members are also covered with the fire rated panels. The attachment does not impact the structural integrity of the containment or Penetration Building floor slab. The hatches are designed for a 100 pound per square foot live load which is consistent with the floor design requirements of the Auxiliary Building. The load limit will be posted. The support members are also designed to carry a two ton load for supporting the hydraulic ram weight used in the tendon surveillance.

This modification does not change any existing safety related equipment. In addition, the new hatches have been evaluated per Seismic Category I and no potential missiles are created. Therefore, this change does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR, nor does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

The proposed change will not modify or affect any existing Technical Specification, Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements. As such, no Technical Specification bases or associated margin of safety will be affected.

This change will not adversely impact the Fire Protection System/Program or violate the UFHA. However, a UFHA change is required to document this modification.

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Facility Change: 3-87-6554.17 O Title Provide Alternate Power Source (Train A) to Excore Flux Monitoring System Description This modification provides for the addition of an alternate power source (120 VAC - Train 'A') for the Train 'B' flux-monitor preamp, signal processor and sigma indicator. The Train 'A' flux monitor signal processor and indicator are located in the Control Room and therefore would be lost due to a fire in the Control Room. The Train 'B' monitor signal flux processor is located in the EVSD room. For alternative shutdown, only Train

'A' is credited, therefore, Train 'A' 120 VAC power will be required to be supplied to the Train 'B' flux monitor preamp, signal processor and indicator. This modification is being accomplished using isolation and transfer switches and affects fire areas 2-AC-50-35, 2-AC-50-29, 2-AC-50-42 and 2-AC-50-60.

Safety Evaluation This modification provides for the addition of an alternate power source (120 VAC - Train 'A') for the Train 'B' flux monitor preamp, signal processor and sigma indicator. Source range flux indication is required for alternative shutdown capability.

The Train 'A' feed from panel Q039 will not result in overloading of MCC 2BY because this power feed is normally not supplying a load and has a 20A circuit breaker to isolate any electrical faults. Power would be supplied from Train 'A' only during'an Appendix R fire scenario and the panel has sufficient load capability. Actuation of the swithes will be annunciated in the Control Room.

The rearrangement of power feeds to the Train 'B' Source Range flux monitor will not adversely impact any loads being supplied from panel Q041 or MCC 2BZ. During normal plant operation and for design basis accidents other than an Appendix R scenario the Source Range power is aligned through Train

'B' panel Q041. A 20A breaker provides isolation from electrical faults.

Source Range Flux monitors are addressed by UFSAR Section 7.5 under Safety Related Display Instrumentation. This change does not affect the required safety related operation of this monitor during a design basis accident as both the power transfer switch and the power isolation switch are designed and installed to the same quality requirements as other components in the existing circuitry.

Splicing of cables inside 120 VAC panel Q041 does not violate any regulatory requirements or commitments in the UFSAR. The splicing materials, design

.and procedures controlled through construction specification will be similar to those used for exisiting installations.

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Facility Change: 3-87-6554.17 (Continued)

Safety Evaluation (Continued)

Therefore, although this modification requires a revision to the UFSAR, the functional design basis described in the applicable sections are not affected. All potential accidents and consequences are bounded by existing analysis. As such, this change does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced by this change. This change has no impact on the original design objectives and system functions. Thus, this change has no impact on any Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance.

Requirements of any existing Technical Specifications. Hence, no Technical Specification basis or associated margin of safety is affected.

This change neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System/Program nor violates the UFHA.

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Facility Change: 3-87-6554.22 Title Install Penetration Seals in Heavy Concrete Walls Description This modification provides for the installation or replacement of approximately 120 penetration seals in unsealed and non fire-rated seal penetrations which are located in 10 fire area boundaries that are heavy concrete walls in the Safety Equipment Building at elevation (-)15'-6" and 8'-0".

Safety Evaluation The proposed modification, when implemented will provide separation between redundant trains of Safe Shutdown equipment in the fire areas specified.

The modification has no effect on the operability of systems which perform safety related functions or the operability of safety related structures.

This modification enhances the fire protection system since it adds penetration seals and correspondingly requires changes to the UFHA.

However, this modification does not adversely impact the Fire Protection System Program or violate the UFHA.

In addition, all potential accidents and consequences are bounded by existing analysis. As such, this change does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR, nor does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced by this change. This modification is not specifically addressed in the Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements.

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Facility Change:

3-87-6570, Revision 1 Title One Ton Jib Crane Inside Containment Description This modification will install a wall mounted one ton jib crane on the secondary shield wall inside the Unit 3 containment building next to the equipment hatch. The approximate boom centerline elevation will be at elevation 79' 6". A support frame off the secondary shield wall is provided to straddle the existing cable trays.

Safety Evaluation Although a change is required to Section 9.1.4 of the USFAR to include a description of the jib crane and its design requirements as well as a change to the amount of Hydrogen producing materials, the probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be increased as a result of this change.

The design requirements for the jib crane are similar to the polar crane and cask handling crane and as such do not provide a change to the design basis analysis of the UFSAR. In addition, the jib crane has been evaluated for Seismic Interaction II/I and no potential missiles are created.

Since the function of any existing equipment important to safety is not modified, the consequences of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be increased.

In addition, no new equipment is added other than the jib crane and it has been designed per Seismic Interaction II/I requirements. Therefore, this change will not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously analyzed in the UFSAR.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Section is not reduced. These changes do not impact the safety function of any other plant equipment and are designed per the criteria established in SONGS 2 and 3 Design Criteria Manual, the UFSAR, NUREG-0612 Evaluation, and the UFHA.

This alteration does not adversely impact the Fire Protection System/Program or violate the UFHA. A revision will be made to the UFHA which provides for the addition of approximately 5 lbs. of exposed cable insulation.

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Facility Change: 3-87-6592.0 Title Removal of Boric Acid Heat Trace from Service and Heat Trace Panel Alarm Modification Description This modification will remove boric acid heat trace circuits from service, modify heat trace panel alarms, revise Boric Acid Makeup (BAMU) tank temperature control and alarm setpoints, revise the BAMU tanks low level alarm setpoint and defeat Makeup Demineralizer (MUD) heat trace panel 2/3L273 alarm input to the main control room. Components of boric acid heat trace circuits removed from service that interfere with the maintenance of or access to other components will be removed. The remaining boric acid heat trace components for the circuits affected by this change will be abandoned in place.

Safety Evaluation The requirements for boric acid heat trace have been deleted from the Technical Specifications. Removal of boric acid heat trace form service has no adverse impact on the operation of the BAMU system. Modifying the heat trace panel alarm logic will not decrease the capability of detecting malfunctions of remaining heat trace circuits. All panel alarms will continue to operate in the present manner.

The decrease in the BAMU tank temperature and low level alarm are consistent with operation with a reduced boric acid concentration. The low level alarm setpoint is to be set at the minimum level required in one BAMU tank with the BAMU boric acid concentration at 3 wt. % and Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) concentration at 2300 ppm per Technical Specification Fig. 3.1-1 for Modes 1-4 operation. The low level alarm setpoint corresponds to a value on Technical Specification Fig. 3.1-1 that can be determined without requiring interpolation between curves. The BAMU tanks and RWSTs are expected to be normally operated at boric acid concentrations greater than the above values.

Therefore, although this modification does require revision to the UFSAR for the reduction in loads supplied by the Class 1E AC system and deletion of reference to heat trace and insulation in the BAMU pumps, it will not affect the design bases of any safety related system. All potential accidents and consequences are bounded by existing analysis. As such, this change does not increase the consequences or probability.of occurrence of an accident evaluated in the UFSAR, nor does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type then any previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced. The change has no impact on the existing Technical Specifications, Limiting Conditions of Operation or Surveillance Requirements.

Therefore, no-technical-basis or-associated margins of safety are affected as a result of this change.

The UFHA will require revision to reflect the deletion of heat trace circuits. However, this alteration neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System/Program nor violates the UFHA.

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Facility Change: 3-87-6599 Title Main Control Room Panel Modifications Description This change modifies and relocates instruments and controls in the Main Control Room on the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) panel 3CR-56, Engineered Safety Features System (ESFS) panel 3CR-57, and Chemical Volume and Control Systems (CVCS) panels 2CR-58, 50 and 51, and the Unit 3 Heating Ventilating Common panel 3CR-60.

NUREG-0700 provided guidelines for Human Factors criteria pertaining to Control Room design. A Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) was conducted based on criteria that satisfied NUREG-0700. The review resulted in the generation of numerous Human Engineering Discrepancies (HEDs) which identified the areas relating to improvement with respect to human factors layout of the main control panels.

The purpose of this change is to revise the CVS control panel in order to improve operator performance and eliminate errors caused by deficiencies in human factors design.

The modifications contained in this change meet the guidelines set forth in NUREG-0700. The DCRDR was reviewed and approved by the NRC.

Safety Evaluation The probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be increased.

This design change affects sections 7.3, 7.4, 7.5 and 9.5 of the UFSAR which relocates and deletes existing controls and adds some new controllers, for the purpose of consolidation of controls in the Reactor Coolant System, Chemical Volume and Control System, and Shutdown Cooling System. The controls arrangement presented in this change provide the operator a better arrangement by system than the original design. This change does not adversely affect any safety function as previously reviewed in the UFSAR.

Therefore, no design change bases have been changed, and any potential accident scenarios, consequences, and probabilities remain bounded by existing analysis.

The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be created. As stated above, this change simply relocates and deletes existing controls and adds some new controllers. All potential accident scenarios remain bounded by existing analyses.

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Facility Change: 3-87-6599 (Continued)

Safety Evaluation (Continued)

This modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification. This change has no effect on any of the Limiting Conditions of Operations or Surveillance Requirements of any existing Technical Specification. As such, no technical basis or associated margin of safety is affected.

This alteration does not adversely impact the Fire Protection System/Program or violate the UFHA. However, the UFHA will require revision to reflect the additional combustible and fire loading in five fire zones resulting from the modifications of the Unit 3 Control Room and the Unit 2 Heating Ventilating Common panel.

Permissible fire loading limits previously analyzed will not be exceeded.

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Facility Change: 3-87-6692 Title Drain Modifications for 50' and 30' Elevation Cable Riser Gallery Hall Description Actuation of the deluge fire suppression system in the 50' and 30' elevation cable riser gallery rooms will cause water accumdlation in these rooms due to the absence of floor drains. As a result, water can migrate from these areas into the adjacent Engineered Safety Features Switchgear Rooms (at 50' elevation) and the Control Room (at 30' elevation). The presence of water in the Switchgear and Control Rooms potentially creates human factor consideration concerns regarding manual operator actions that may be required following a fire. This modification includes installation of floor drains and other water containment modifications in the 50' and 30' cable riser gallery areas. The modifications will preclude migration of water form the 50' and 30' riser gallery areas into the adjacent Switchgear and Control Rooms if the fire suppression spray water systems are activated.

Safety Evaluation The installation of raised door sills that prevent the migration of water into the 50' elevation cable riser gallery does not impact the results of the flooding analysis performed in adjacent areas. The existing flooding analyses envelope the condition of draining the fire suppression water from the 50' and 30' elevation risers into the 9' elevation riser area.

This modification does not modify the function of an existing safety related equipment. Therefore, the probability of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be increased as a result of this change, nor will the consequences of an accident or malfunction be increased. This modification will not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously analyzed in the UFSAR.

This modification does not impact the safety function of plant equipment and does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.

Section 7.0 of the UFHA will be revised to reflect these modifications.

Installation of the floor drains from the 50' and 30' risers to the 9' elevation riser does not impact the functioning of the fire barrier to prevent the spread of fire, smoke and hot gases. Counter weighted caps have been added to the drain piping. This will preclude open communication between the rooms. Therefore, these modifications do not violate the.UFHA.

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Facility Change: CF-85-9173, Revision 1 Title Installation of 800 MHz UHF Radio Consoles Description UHF radio requirements have expanded beyond the channel capabilities of the existing 450 MHz. radio system. To meet the additional requirements, an 800 MHz. system will be installed in Units 1, 2 and 3. This change covers the upgrading and replacement of existing equipment that is common to all three units:

channel controllers for the UHF radio system, the addition of channel controllers at existing channel control locations, and the addition of 800 MHz. radio control stations. Installation of unit-specific components will be covered by separate change numbers.

Safety Evaluation All changes covered by this modification are related to telecommunications systems and related electrical feeders. This modification results in the upgrading or replacement of existing telecommunications equipment to increase the capabilities of the radio system. The modifications do not result in a change to the UFSAR and neither the consequences nor the probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously analyzed in the UFSAR will be increased.

This modification will not create the probability of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced. These modifications do not impact any Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements.

The UFHA will require revision to reflect the installation of fire retardant plywood in three fire zones. The new combustibles do not result in an increase above the maximum permissible. Four penetration seals are affected, which will require resealing. The modification neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System/Program nor violates the UFHA.

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ENCLOSURE II SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATION STATION UNITS 1, 2 AND 3 1987 PROCEDURE CHANGES, TEST AND EXPERIMENTS All procedure changes, tests and experiments, in 1987, applicable to San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2 and 3, received a safety evaluation pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59. The safety evaluation concluded that none of the procedure changes, tests or experiments, involved an unreviewed safety question. The safety evaluations were reviewed and approved by the appropriate personnel as required by the Technical Specifications. For each change, the respective review concluded that the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report was not increased, the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis reports was not increased, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification was not reduced.

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