ML13156A033
| ML13156A033 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 06/05/2013 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-II |
| To: | Florida Power & Light Co |
| References | |
| Download: ML13156A033 (178) | |
Text
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Facility: Turkey Point Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)
(RO)
(BOP)
Initial Conditions: The plant is at 75% power (MOL). Online risk is green. A train is protected on both units. Maintain 75% as directed by the System Engineer who is monitoring the 3B SGFP after bearing replacement. The SGFP was returned to service 2 days ago.
Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: 3B RHR Pump due to motor bearing replacement. B AFW Pump out of service due to high vibration.
Event Maif. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 TFB1LS3 C-RO 3C Charging Pump fails to SLOW SPEED C-SRO 2 TVF1M3AD 1-BOP 3A SG NR Level fails HIGH I (TS)-SRO 3 TFN1P4AH l-RO N44 Power Ranger Channel fails HIGH l(TS)-SRO 4 NA R-RO Rapid Downpower N-BOP N-SRO 5 TVFBP1B C-BOP B SGFP high vibrations/failure to trip on Motor Overload TFF1ZC14 C-SRO 6 TVSBVL15 M-RO Steam Line Break M-BOP M-SRO 7 TFFXCGVC NA C AFW Governor failure/Loss of AFW (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor f_\ rt Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Turkey Point 2013 NRC Scenario #1 The plant is at 75% power (MOL). Online risk is green. A train is protected on both units.
Maintain 75% as directed by the System Engineer who is monitoring the 3B SGFP after bearing replacement. The SGFP was returned to service 2 days ago.
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: 3B RHR Pump due to motor bearing replacement.
B AFW Pump out of service due to high vibration.
Shortly after taking the watch, the 3C Charging Pump will fail to SLOW SPEED. The crew will respond using Gill, CHARGING PUMP LO SPEED, and enter 3-ONOP-041.6, Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction. The crew will start the 3A or 3C Charging Pump, and stop the 3B Charging Pump using 3-OP-047, CVCS Charging Letdown.
Following this, the 3A SG NR level will drift HIGH. The crew will respond using C611, SG A LEVEL DEVIATION, or equivalent, by taking manual control of level and returning the 3A SG NR level to normal. The crew will enter 3-ONOP-049.1, Deviation or Failure of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channels. The US will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip Instrumentation and Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation.
Next, Power Range N-44 channel upper detector will fail HIGH. The crew will perform the Immediate Actions of either 3-ONOP-059.8, Power Range Nuclear Instrument Malfunction, or 3-ONOP-028, Rod Control System Malfunction, and place the control rods in MANUAL. The crew will restore Tavg-Tref using deviation using 3-ONOP-028, and remove the drawer from service in accordance with 3-ONOP-059.8. The US will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip Instrumentation.
Subsequently, the Shift Manager will direct the crew to remove the 3B SGFP from service within 15 minutes due to high vibration on the pump. The crew will implement 3-GOP-i 00, Fast Load Reduction.
During the load reduction the high vibrations of the 3B SGFP will degrade and a high amperage condition will develop. The crew will trip the 3B SGFP using D612, SGFP LO FLOW, and the turbine will runback. The crew will enter 0-ONOP-089, Turbine Runback, and stabilize the plant at < 50% power.
Finally, a Steam Line Leak upstream of the 3C MSIV inside containment begins and will gradually degrade. The crew will enter 3-EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. During the response Safety Injection, Phase A Containment Isolation and Phase B Containment Isolation are expected to occur.
Upon entry into 3-EOP-E-0, the C AFW governor fails leaving only the A AFW Pump available, and this pump is receiving steam from the Faulted Steam Generator. Because of this, the A AFW Pump will eventually stop pumping water, and no AFW flow will be available. The crew will transition to 3-EOP-FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, and will initiate Bleed and Feed cooling.
The scenario will terminate at Step 19 of 3-EOP-FR-H.1, after the crew has initiated Bleed and Feed cooling.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Critical Tasks:
CT1: Isolate feedwater flow into the faulted Steam Generator within 10 minutes of the initiation of the steam leak.
Safety Significance: Failure to isolate a Faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to the Critical Safety Functions that may not otherwise occur. Failure to isolate flow could result in an unwarranted Orange or Red Path condition on NC Integrity and/or Subcriticality (if cooldown is allowed to continue uncontrollably). Specifically, Termination of AFW flow to faulted SG is necessary to limit mass and energy releases into containment to prevent exceeding design pressure.
CT2: Initiate bleed and feed before all Steam Generator Wide Range Levels reach 0%, and the RCS temperature and/or pressure increases.
Safety Significance: Failure to establish RCS Bleed and Feed before automatic opening of the PORV5 (due to plant heatup) reduces the probability of success to establish a heat sink for the core. This constitutes a Significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario. Establishing feedwater flow into the Steam Generators offers the most effective recovery action to restore the heat sink. If all attempts to initiate feedwater flow fail, the crew must establish bleed and feed to cool the core. This is accomplished by manually initiating SI, and then manually opening the PORVs. The lower RCS pressure allows a greater ECCS flow to recover RCS inventory and force flow through the core. If this action is to be successful, it must be started before SG dryout. SG dryout would cause RCS temperature to increase, increasing RCS Pressure and forcing open the PORVs automatically. If RCS pressure is at the PORV setpoint due to RCS heatup, the operator action of opening the PORVs manually may not be successful in lowering RCS pressure and increasing ECCS flow.
Ultimately, the core could uncover.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Q Reset to IC-16.
Q Place Simulator in RUN Q Open and Execute T = 0 Malfunctions:
ILC28: NRC\L-13-1
NRC Scen 1
Q Additional Simulator
- Place ECO Information Tag on B AFW Set-up Pump Control Switch
. Remove Aligned to Train 2 Placard from the B AFW Pump Tachometer Q Additional Simulator
- Ensure that LT-3-476 is the controlling Set-up Channel for 3A SG NR Level (Addressed in Turnover).
. Ensure that LT-3-496 is the controlling Channel for 3C SG NR Level (Addressed in Turnover).
Q Perform Simulator Operator Checklist Q Place Simulator in FREEZE Q If required, Initiate Simulator Data Collection Instruction TD_-005-09 Q Crew Briefing
- 1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements
- 2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.
Q Place Simulator in RUN Q Crew Briefing
- 1. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Q At direction of Event 1 3C Charging Pump fails to SLOW SPEED examiner Inse TFB1LS3 TRUE Q At direction of Event 2 3A SG NR Level fails HIGH examiner Insert TVF1 M3AD=1 Q At direction of Event 3 N44 Power Ranger Channel fails HIGH examiner Insert TFN1 P4AH TRUE Q At direction of Event 4 Rapid Downpower examiner Q At direction of Event 5 B SGFP high vibrations/failure to trip on Motor examiner Overload Insert TVFBP1 B=1 Ramp =120 seconds Insert TFF1ZC14 TRUE Q At direction of Event 6 Steam Line Break examiner Insert TVSVL15=1, Ramp = 300 seconds Q Post-Rx Trip Event 7 C AFW Governor failure/Loss of AFW Insert TFFXCGVC NOTE: The event is conditioned on TVSVL15=1 TRUE Delay 60 (SLB) seconds Q Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 7 of 42 Event
Description:
3B Charging Pump fails to SLOW SPEED Shortly after taking the watch, the 3C Charging Pump will fail to SLOW SPEED. The crew will respond using Gi/l, CHARGING PUMP LO SPEED, and enter 3-ONOP-046.l, Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction. The crew will start the 3A or 3C Charging Pump, and stop the 3B Charging Pump using 3-OP-047, CVCS Charging Letdown.
Booth Operator Instructions: Insert TFB1 LS3 TRUE Indications Available:
- SC-3-153 (Charging Pump 3C Controller) fails to 0% output.
- Gi/l, CHARGING PUMP LO SPEED, alarms.
- Charqinq flow lowers.
Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments ARP Gill, CHARGING PUMP LO SPEED RO (Step 1) IF a failure of the master charging NOTE: This condition is NOT pump controller met (The Master Charging Pump Controller has NOT failed).
RO (Step 2) IF a failure of the individual charging NOTE: The RO will take pump controller has occurred in automatic, MANUAL control of the 3C THEN PLACE the individual controller in Charging Pump controller.
manual AND MAINTAIN pressurizer level on program.
NOTE: The RO may call the SN P0/TO to address the failed Charging Pump.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as SNPO/TO, and respond as appropriate.
US (Step 2.A) GO TO 3-ONOP-041 .6, Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction NOTE: The US will transition to 3-ONOP-041 .6.
3-ONOP-04l .6, PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL MALUNCTION
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 8 of 42 Event
Description:
3B Charging Pump fails to SLOW SPEED Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 5.1) Check pressurizer level indicators NOTE: This condition is NOT LI-3-459A, LI-3-460 AND LI-3-461. met (All Pzr Level Channels IF one level indicator deviates significantly are consistent with each from the others other).
RO (Step 5.2) IF pressurizer level does not follow NOTE: The RO may place programmed level, THEN place MASTER Charging flow controller LC CHARGING PUMP CONTROLLER, 459G in MANUAL.
LC-3-459G in MANUAL AND maintain programmed level per Enclosure 1.
NOTE: The RO may place the (Step 5.2.1) IF individual charging pump 3C Charging Speed controller controllers are not following LC-3-459G, in MANUAL.
THEN place individual CHARGING PUMP CONTROLLERS in MANUAL AND maintain programmed level per Enclosure 1.
RO (Step 5.3) IF affected charging pump is not able to maintain programmed level per Enclosure 1, THEN start additional pumps as necessary to restore programmed level per Enclosure 1.
(Step 5.3.1) After programmed level has NOTE: The RO will start either been restored, if troubleshooting of affected the 3A or 3B Charging Pump charging pump is desired, then refer to using the NOP.
3-OP-047, CVCS- Charging and Letdown, Troubleshooting Guide.
(Step 5.3.2) IF affected charging pump is not NOTE: The RO will shut down required, then shut down the affected the 3C Charging Pump using charging pump using 3-OP-047, CVCS the NOP.
CHARGING AND LETDOWN.
RO (Step 5.4) IF LR-3-459 is selected to a NOTE: This condition is NOT defective channel, THEN met (There is NO defective channel).
RO (Step 5.5) IF control malfunction caused NOTE: This condition is NOT letdown isolation met (Letdown did NOT isolate).
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 9 of 42 Event
Description:
3B Charging Pump fails to SLOW SPEED Time Pos. .nnn+nø4 An+nnaIflnI..n.,n..
RO (Step 5.6) IF normal letdown can NOT be re NOTE: This condition is NOT established met (Letdown did NOT isolate).
RO (Step 5.7) IF control malfunction caused NOTE: This condition is NOT pressurizer heaters to deenergize met (The Pzr Heaters did not de-energize).
RO (Step 5.8) Maintain pressurizer level to be NOTE: The RO will attempt to consistent with programmed level as manually control Pzr Level indicated in Enclosure 1. with the 3A or 3B Charging Pump.
US (Step 5.9) Perform actions required by NOTE: The US will recognize 3-ONOP-049.1, DEVIATION OR FAILURE that this ONOP will not OF SAFETY RELATED OR REACTOR mitigate the event, and will PROTECTION CHANNELS. NOT go to this ONOP.
3-OP-047, CVCS CHARGING AND LETDOWN Examiner NOTE: The US/RO may use Section 5.2 to swap the running Charging Pump.
In this case the 3A or 3B Charging Pump will be started and the 3C Charging Pump will be stopped.
OR The US/RO may use Section 7.10 and start the 3A or 3B Charging Pump, and place the 3C Charging Pump on recirculation for troubleshooting.
NOTE: The RO may call the SNPO to address the failed Charging Pump, and the start of the 3A or 3B Charging Pump.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as SNPO, and respond as appropriate.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No: L-13-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 10 of 42 Event
Description:
3B Charging Pump fails to SLOW SPEED Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 5.2.2.1) Determine the CVCS charging NOTE: With 45 gpm Orifice in and letdown requirements for the plant mode service, only one operating and condition. Charging Pump is needed.
AC (Step 5.2.2.2) Refer to Engineering guidance NOTE: A Charging Pump was to determine preferred pump to operate. started per 3-ONCP-046.1.
RO (Step 5.2.2.3) Start a standby charging pump NOTE: A Charging Pump was using Subsection 5.1 started per 3-ONOP-046.1.
RO (Step 5.2.2.4) Slowly decrease the charging NOTE: The 3B Charging pump speed on the pump being removed Pumps is already operating at from service while increasing the speed of slow speed.
the pump started in Substep 5.2.2.3 AC (Step 5.2.2.5) WHEN minimum demand on NOTE: The RC will stop the the Demand Meter (20-25 percent) for the 3C Charging Pump.
pump to be shutdown has been established, THEN turn the pump control switch to OFF.
RO (Step 5.2.2.6) Increase the speed control on the running pump to the amount required to balance charging and letdown flowrates.
RO (Step 5.2.2.7) WHEN charging and letdown NOTE: The RO will place the flows are balanced, THEN place charging running Charging Pump in pump control(s) in AUTO. AUTO.
NOTE: If in MANUAL, the RC will place the Charging flow controller LC-3-459G in AUTO.
AC (Step 5.2.2.8) Verify that VCT level is being maintained between 17 and 37 percent.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 11 of 42 Event
Description:
3B Charging Pump fails to SLOW SPEED Tr
- I *IWISø. - I, Comments RD (Step 5.2.2.9) Verify CVCS Letdown pressure is being maintained at the desired pressure by automatic operation of Low Pressure LTDN Controller, PCV-3145.
RD (Step 5.2.2.10) Verify all log entries specified in Subsection 2.2 have been recorded.
NOTE: The US may call WCC/Maintenance to address the failed Charging Pump.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.
NOTE: The US will likely conduct a Crew Brief.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 12 of 42 Event
Description:
3A SG NR Level fails HIGH Following this, the 3A SG NR level will drift HIGH. The crew will respond using 06/1, SG A LEVEL DEVIATION, or equivalent, by taking manual control of level and returning the 3A SG NR level to normal. The crew will enter 3-ONOP-049.1, Deviation or Failure of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channels. The US will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip Instrumentation and Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation.
Booth Operator Instructions: Insert TVF1 M3AD=1 Indications Available:
. FR-3-476, 3A SG NR Level starts to rise.
- 06/1, SG A LEVEL DEVIATION (20%), alarms.
- C2/1, SG A NARROW RANGE HI LEVEL, alarms.
Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments ARP C6!1, SG A LEVEL DEVIATION BOP IF malfunctioning SG level control, THEN: NOTE: The BOP will take the TAKE manual control of level Prompt Actions without RETURN SG levels to normal reference to procedure.
BOP CHECK Ll-3-476 or LI-3-478, A STM GEN NOTE: The BOP will recognize LEVEL controlling channel vs. LI-3-446 or that this occurred due to an P1-3-447, TURBINE INLET PRESSURE instrument failure.
level control program on VPA.
BOP IF alarm is due to instrument failure, THEN REFER TO 3-ONOP-049.1 Deviation or Failure of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channels.
NOTE: The US will transition to 3-ONOP-049.1.
3-ONOP-049.1, DEVIATION OR FAILURE OF SAFET RELATED OR REACTOR PROTECTION CHANNELS
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 13 of 42 Event
Description:
3A SG NR Level tails HIGH Comments BOP (Step 5.1) Verify instrument loop failure by comparison to adjacent loops and known plant parameters and conditions BOP (Step 5.2) Verify no off-normal conditions exist on the adjacent channels which are to remain in service.
BOP (Step 5.3) Verify applicable control transfer NOTE: The BOP will shift the switches are in the position which eliminates Steam and Feed Flow control the failed loop. to the operable (WHITE)
Channels.
BOP (Step 5.4) IF a control function was placed NOTE: The BOP will stabilize in manual control due to the failure, THEN the 3A Narrow Range Level verify the control function is returned to and return control to AUTO.
automatic.
US (Step 5.5) IF the failed channel is NOT NOTE: The US will recognize related to Technical Specifications.... that this instrument is related toTS.
US (Step 5.6) Refer to Technical Specifications 3/4.3, Instrumentation AND verify the minimum channels operable.
Take appropriate actions as specified in Technical Specifications US (Step 5.7) IF a 4KV bus/480V load center NOTE: This condition is NOT undervoltage channel has failed met.
US (Step 5.8) IF a turbine stop valve closure NOTE: This condition is NOT channel has failed met.
US (Step 5.9) IF a turbine emergency trip NOTE: This condition is NOT header channel has failed met.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 14 of 42 Event
Description:
3A SG NR Level fails HIGH Time Pos Expected Actions/Behavior Comments US (Step 5.10) IF l&C determines a Test NOTE: This condition is NOT Sequence Processor on an Eagle-21 met.
Channel has failed.
Us (Step 5.11) IF a containment pressure NOTE: This condition is NOT channel has failed met.
Us (Step 5.12) IF any other channel has failed, NOTE: The US will refer to THEN perform the following to trip Bistables Technical Specifications and for the failed channel conclude that Bistables need IF plant conditions are such that all required to be tripped.
Bistables associated with the failed channel may be tripped without an undesired RPS or ESF actuation, THEN perform the following:
Place all bistable switches for the affected loop in test position using Attachment 4.
Verify Bistables tripped by observing corresponding status light (VPB) lit.
NOTE: The US may call WCC/l&C to address the failed instrument.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/l&C, and respond as appropriate.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO 3.3.1, REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION US LCO 3.3.1 As a minimum, the Reactor Trip System instrumentation channels and interlocks of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE.
US APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-1.
US ACTIONS: As shown in Table 3.3-1. NOTE: The US will review Table 3.3-1 and determine that Functional Unit 1 1 is NOT met.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 15 of 42 Event
Description:
3A SG NR Level fails HIGH Tinø Comments ACTION 6 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed until performance of the next required ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO 3.3.2, ESFAS INSTRUMENTATION US 3.3.2 The Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) instrumentation channels and interlocks shown in Table 3.3-2 shall be OPERABLE with their Trip Setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3-3.
US APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-2.
US ACTIONS With an ESFAS instrumentation NOTE: The US will review channel or interlock inoperable, take the Table 3.3-1 and determine that ACTION shown in Functional Unit 5.c is NOT Table 3.3-2. met.
ACTION 15- With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed until performance of the next required ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST or TRIP ACTUATING DEVISE OPERATIONAL TEST provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
NOTE: The US will likely conduct a Crew Brief prior to restarting the downpower.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 16 of 42 Event
Description:
N44 Power Ranger Channel fails HIGH Next, Power Range N-44 channel upper detector wHI fail HIGH. The crew will perform the Immediate Actions of either 3-ONOP-059.8, Power Range Nuclear Instrument Malfunction, or 3-ONOP-028, Rod Control System Malfunction, and place the control rods in MANUAL. The crew will restore Tavg-Tref using deviation using 3-ONOP-028, and remove the drawer from service in accordance with 3-ONOP-059.8. The US will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip Instrumentation.
Booth Operator Instructions: Insert TFN1P4AH TRUE Indications Available:
- Control Rods moving inward in AUTO.
. Tavg-Tref mismatch 0°F.
. No change in Turbine load (MWe).
. N-3-44 indication off-scale HIGH.
- B6/4 Power Ranqe Channel Deviation (and others), alarms.
Time Pose Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The US may enter either 3-ONOP-28 or 3-ONOP-059.8 first.
If the US enters 3-ONOP-059.8, move forward to Page 18.
3-ONO P-028, REACTOR CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION RO (Step 4.3) Continuous Insertion of an RCC NOTE: The RO will verify that Control Bank a Runback is NOT is progress, Place the Rod Motion Control Selector switch and that Tavg-Tref deviation is to the MAN position. 0, and then place the rods in IF RCC control cannot be maintained MANUAL; or recognize the failure directly, and place the manually rods in MANUAL.
RO (Step 5.3) Continuous Insertion of an RCC NOTE: The RO will not be Control Bank able to move rods outward Adjust rods or reduce turbine load as with the Rod Stop active. The determined by the Shift manager to restore BOP may reduce Turbine Tavg equal to Tref. Load.
RO (Step 5.3.2) IF PT-3-446 or PT-3-447 has NOTE: This condition is NOT failed met (PT-3-446 or PT-3-447 has NOT failed).
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 17 of 42 Event
Description:
N44 Power Ranger Channel fails HIGH Time Pos. Expected Actions/Beh Comments RO (Step 5.3.3) Compare rod position to control rod insertion limits using the Rod Position Bank Recorders (VPA) or using the Plant Curve Book, Section Vii, Figure 3.
RO (Step 5.3.4) IF the control banks insertion NOTE: This condition is NOT limits are exceeded met (The control banks insertion limits are NOT exceeded).
RO (Step 5.3.5) IF Power Range Channel 4 has NOTE: The US will transition failed, THEN perform to 3-ONOP-059.8, to 3-ONOP-059.8.
POWER RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION MALFUNCTION.
RO (Step 5.3.6) IF PT-3-446 or PT-3-447 has NOTE: This condition is NOT failed met (PT-3-446 or PT-3-447 has NOT failed).
RO (Step 5.3.7) Check Tl-3-412D, 422D, 432D NOTE: This condition is NOT for possible indication of a failure of TM-408, met (A temperature instrument Medium Signal Selector. IF a failure is has NOT failed).
indicated RO (Step 5.3.8) Place a caution tag on the Rod Control Selector switch stating that placing rods in auto may result in undesired rod motion until the system is restored to normal.
(N/A if rods were restored to AUTO.)
RO (Step 5.3.9) Notify I&C of the problem with NOTE: The US may call the Rod Control System. WCC!l&C to address the failed instrument.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/I&C, and respond as appropriate.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 18 of 42 Event
Description:
N44 Power Ranger Channel tails HIGH Time Pos. j Expected Actions/Behavior Comments 3-ONOP-059.8, POWER RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION MALFUNCTION RO Mode 1- Power Operation Malfunction of ONE channel:
IF failed channel is PR 4, THEN transfer ROD MOTION CONTROL SELECTOR to MAN position.
BOP (Step 4.1.1) Malfunction of ONE channel:
BOP (Step 5.1.1 .1) Place the DROPPED ROD NOTE: The US will work with MODE switch for the failed channel in the the BOP to remove the Power BYPASS position. Range Channel from service.
BOP (Step 5.1.1.2) Place the applicable ROD STOP BYPASS switch to the failed channel BYPASS position.
BOP (Step 5.1.1.3) Transfer the UPPER SECTION comparator defeat switch to the failed channel.
BOP (Step 5.1.1.4) Transfer the LOWER SECTION comparator defeat switch to the failed channel.
BOP (Step 5.1.1.5) Transfer applicable POWER MISMATCH BYPASS switch to BYPASS the failed channel.
BOP (Step 5.1.1.6) Transfer the COMPARATOR CHANNEL DEFEAT switch to the failed channel.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-131 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 19 of 42 Event
Description:
N44 Power Ranger Channel fails HIGH Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 5.1.1.7) IF rod control is in manual due to failed Power Range N-44 channel AND automatic operation is desired, THEN transfer Rod Motion Control Selector switch to AUTO.
US (Step 5.1.1.8) Perform the following within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> of the failure determination:
US (Step 5.1.1 .8.a). Trip the Power Range bistables by removing the INSTRUMENT POWER fuses from drawer B of the failed channel.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO 3.3.1, REACTOR TRIP INSTRUMENTATION US LCO 3.3.1 As a minimum, the Reactor Trip System instrumentation channels and interlocks of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE.
US APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-1.
US ACTIONS: As shown in Table 3.3-1. NOTE: The US will review Table 3.3-1 and determine that Functional Unit 2 is NOT met.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 20 of 42 Event
Description:
N44 Power Ranger Channel fails HIGH Comments ACTION 2- With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
- b. The Minimum Channels OPERABEL requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1, and
- c. Either, THERMAL POWER is restricted to less than or equal to 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER and the Power Range Neutron Flux Trip Setpoint is reduced to less than or equal to 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />; or, the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is monitored per Specification 4.2.4.2.
NOTE: The US will likely conduct a Crew Brief.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1-13-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 21 of 42 Event
Description:
Rapid Downpower Subsequently, the Shift Manager will direct the crew to remove the 38 SGFP from service within 15 minutes due to high vibration on the pump. The crew will implement 3-GOP-i 00, Fast Load Reduction.
Booth Operator Instructions: Call as the Shift Manager and direct the crew to remove the 3B SGFP from service within 15 minutes due to high vibration on the pump.
Indications Available: NA Time Pos Expected ActionslBehavior Comments 3-GOP-i 00, FAST LOAD REDUCTION
. NOTE: The US will refer to the Foldout Page.
AO/ 1. 3-EOP-E-0 Transition Criteria BOP IF RCS Tavg- GREATER THAN Tref by 6°F, THEN trip the Reactor and Turbine AND go to 3-EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.
RO/ 2. Notify Chemistry Department BOP WHEN reactor power has changed by greater than or equal to 15 percent, THEN notify the Chemistry Department that RCS sampling is required according to Tech Spec Table 4.4-4.
AOl 3. Turbine Load Within 10% if Target Power BOP Level WHEN turbine load is within 10% of taget load, THEN stop boration by performing the following:
Place the Reactor Makeup Selector Switch to AUTO Set FC-3-1 13A, Boric Acid Flow Controller pot setting as desired Place the RCS Makeup Control Switch to START
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 22 of 42 Event
Description:
Rapid Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO/ 4. Restore Blender to AUTO BOP WHEN boration is complete, THEN restore the Blender to AUTO as follows:
Place the Reactor Makeup Selector Switch to AUTO.
Set FC-3-1 1 3A, Boric Acid Flow Controller pot setting as desired.
Place the RCS Makeup Control Switch to START.
US (Step 1) Complete ATTACHMENT 3, Fast NOTE: The US will complete Load Reduction Maneuvering Plan Attachment 3.
Examiner NOTE: Each crew could arrive at highly varying results based on the assumptions made during the completion of Attachment 3.
US (Step 2) Brief Control Room Personnel Using NOTE: The US will conduct a ATTACHMENT 4 Crew Brief in accordance with Attachment 4.
Crew (Step 3) Notify the following of Fast Load NOTE: The BOP will contact Reduction System Dispatch.
- System Dispatcher Booth instructor: as System
. Plant personnel using the Page Boost Dispatch, acknowledge.
Chemistry Department if reactor power is NOTE: The RO/BOP will make expected to change by at least 15 percent to a Page Announcement.
start RCS sampling is required according to NOTE: The US will contact Tech Spec Table 4.4-4 Chemistry.
Booth instructor: as Chemistry, acknowledge.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario 4 1 Event # 4 Page 23 of 42 Event
Description:
Rapid Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 4) Begin Boration for Initial Tavg Effect NOTE: The RO will commence
- a. Set the Boric Acid Totalizer to total boric an RCS boration.
acid volume value determined on ATTACHMENT 3
- b. Place the Reactor Makeup Selector Switch to BORATE.
- c. Place the RCS Makeup Selector Switch to START.
- d. Adjust FC-3-1 1 3A, Boric Acid Flow Controller to achieve 40 gpm boric acid flow as indicated on FR-3-113
- e. WHEN Tavg begins to lower from the boration, THEN, adjust FC-3-113A, Boric Acid Flow Controller to load reduction value from ATTACHMENT 3.
- f. Continue with this procedure while awaiting the lowering of Tavg.
BOP (Step 5) Determine Turbine Load Reduction NOTE: The Turbine is in MW Control CNTRL.
- a. IF turbine load reduction in MW CNTRL is desired, THEN continue with Step 6.
BOP (Step 6) Initiate Turbine Load Reduction in NOTE: The BOP will MW CNTRL commence a Turbine load
- a. Select MW CNTRL reduction.
- b. Set TARGET power level- MW VALUE FROM ATTACHMENT 3
- c. Set RAMP RATE-MW/M VALUE FROM ATTACHMENT 3
- d. Check Tavg 1°F to 2°F lower than Tref
- e. Depress GO
- f. Ensure FC-3-1 1 3A, Boric Acid Flow Controller, has been adjusted to the load reduction boration rate from ATTACHMENT 3.
- g. Go to Step 10
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1-13-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 24 of 42 Event
Description:
Rapid Downpower Time POS RO/ (Step 10) Monitor Load Reduction BOP a. Monitor turbine load reduction and inform crew at each 50 MWe increment of power reduction.
- b. Maintain Tavg/Tref within +/-3°F AT Adjust boration rate as needed Take manual control of rod control if necessary to control Tavg Adjust power reduction rate as needed
- c. Monitor SG level control to ensure feed reg valves properly maintain level control in automatic
- d. Maintain pressurizer level to ensure than automatic pressurizer level control maintains level on program.
RO! (Step 11) Monitor Boration Rate During BOP Downpower
- a. Monitor for excessive rod movement by monitoring TR-3-409D, Rod Position Bank D
- b. Determine if Insertion Limit and Bank D position are converging at a rate that will cause rod insertion limit alarms.
- Adjust power reduction rate as needed to control rod insertion Increase boration rate and/or total amount as necessary to limit control rod insertion.
RO (Step 12) Monitor Annunciator B 8/1, ROD BANK LO LIMIT-CLEAR RO (Step 13) Monitor B 8/2 ROD BANK A/B/C/D EXTRA LO LIMIT-CLEAR US (Step 14) Notify the Shift Manager to Refer to NOTE: The US may call the the Following Procedures SM to address these
- 0-EPIP-20101, DUTUES OF procedures.
EMERGENCY COORDINATOR If so, Booth Instructor
- 0-ADM-1 15, NOTIFICATION OF PLANT acknowledge as SM.
EVENTS
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # I Event # 4 Page 25 of 42 Event
Description:
Rapid Downpower Time Pos Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 15) Energize Pressurizer Backup Heaters BOP (Step 16) Verify Turbine Load Less Than 675 MWE WHEN turbine load is LESS THAN 674 MWe, THEN perform Step 17 BOP (Step 17) Check Condensate Pump Operation
- a. Check three condensate pumps running US (Step 17 RNO) a. go to Step 18.
US (Step 18) Check Desired Final Power Target-LESS THAN 475 Mwe BOP (Step 19) Check Station Service Loads Supplied from the Startup Transformer BOP (Step 19 RNO) WHEN directed by the Unit Supervisor, THEN transfer station service from the Auxiliary Transformers to the Startup Transformer using ATTACHMENT 2.
BOP (Step 20) Check for MSR Cooldown Requirements
- a. Check load reduction in effect will take the Unit LESS THAN 35% power US (Step 20 RNO) IF the load reduction will NOT be LESS THAN 35% power, THEN continue with Step 21.
BOP (Step 21) Check Auxiliary Steam Supplied from Another Unit
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 26 of 42 Event
Description:
Rapid Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments US (Step 22) Continue Load Reduction NOTE: The US will wait here
- a. Verify Turbine load less than- 400 MWe until the plant is < 400 MWe.
At 65% or at the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #5.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 27 of 42 Event
Description:
B SGFP high vibrations/failure to trip on Motor Overload During the load reduction the high vibrations of the 3B SGFP will degrade and a high amperage condition will develop. The crew will trip the 3B SGFP using ARP D612, SGFP LO FLOW, and the turbine will runback. The crew will enter 0-ONOP-089, Turbine Runback, and stabilize the plant at < 50% power.
Booth Operator Instructions: Insert TVFBP1B=1 Ramp =120 seconds Insert TFF1ZC14 TRUE Indications Available:
. 3B SGFP Amps start to rise.
- CV-3-1417 and 1418 auto open.
. D6/2, SGFP B LO FLOW, alarms.
- D7/5, SGFP NB MOTOR/STATOR HI TEMP, alarms.
- Various SG NR Level-related alarms occur.
Comments ARP D6/2, SGFP B LO FLOW BOP (Step 1) IF SGFP flow is less than 3000 gpm, THEN PLACE feed pump recirculation valves CV-3-1417 and CV-3-1 418 control switch in EMERGENCY OPEN.
BOP (Step 2) IF SGFP flow remains below 3000 gpm THEN OPEN recirculation valve to pump suction, CV-3-1 41 4, using DCS MANUAL control AND RESTORE SGFP flow to >3000 gpm.
BOP (Step 3) IF SGFP flow is <2000 gpm, THEN NOTE: The BOP will stop the immediately REMOVE SGFP B from service 3B SGFP. When this occurs as follows: the Turbine will automatically A. IF Reactor Power is greater than 75% runback to 45%.
B. IF Reactor Power is between 60% and 75%, THEN STOP SGFP B AND MONITOR Turbine RUNBACK to 50% power.
C. IF Reactor Power is <60%, THEN ENSURE SGFP A is in service AND STOP SGFP B.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 28 of 42 Event
Description:
B SGFP high vibrations/failure to trip on Motor Overload Time Pos Expected Actions/Behavior Comments (Step 4) IF SGFP flow is >3000 gpm but
<6500 gpm NOTE: The US will transition to 3-ONOP-089.
3-ONOP-089, TURBINE RUNBACK US (IA Step 1) IF above 85% reactor power.... NOTE: This condition is NOT met (The plant is < 85%
power).
RO/ (IA Step 2) CHECK for proper operation of BOP the following:
- Steam Dumps
. Turbine
. Auto Rod Insertion to match Tavg with Tref.
. Main Feedwater Valves
. Pressurizer BOP (SA Step 1) CHECK Steam Generator levels stabilized and on program RO (Step 2) Check Tavg is maintained within +/-
3°F of Tref.
RO (Step 2 RNO) IF Auto Rod insertion is NOT NOTE: The Control Rods may in progress THEN: or may not be in AUTO based PLACE Control Rods in Manual. on crew response during the Power Range Channel failure.
MAINTAIN TavglTref AT within +/- 3°F.
BOP (Step 3) CHECK Steam Generator pressures stabilizing.
RO (Step 4) CHECK Pressurizer Level stabilizing and trending to Program Level.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 29 of 42 Event
Description:
B SGFP high vibrations/failure to trip on Motor Overload Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 5) CHECK Pressurizer Pressure stabilizing and trending to 2235 psig.
RO! (Step 6) CHECK following for proper BOP operation:
Steam Gen Feed Pump Recirc Condensate Pump Recirc Heater Drain Pumps Heater Drain Tank Level Controls Secondary Heater Level Controls RO (Step 7) MONITOR Annunciator G 5/1, AXIAL FLUX T.S. LIMIT EXCEEDED-CLEAR RO (Step 8) MONITOR Annunciator B 9/2, Axial Flux Tilt-CLEAR RO Perform the following as necessary after the NOTE: The Control Rods may run back: be in MANUAL from a WHEN turbine runback is complete, THEN previous Malfunction. The RO PLACE control rods in Manual. will initiate a boration to clear the alarm.
SET boric acid totalizer to 50 gallons DETERMINE boric acid flow rate as determined by the Unit Supervisor PLACE the Reactor Makeup Selector Switch to BORATE.
PLACE the RCS Makeup control switch to START.
ADJUST the setpoint on the Boric Acid Controller FC-3-1 1 3A to the desired flow rate as indicated on FR-3-1 13.
WITHDRAW Control Rods to establish Tavg/Tret AT up to + 3°F Tavg GREATER THAN Tret until B 9/2 is CLEAR.
REPEAT Section 3.2 Step 8 RNO steps until Annunciator B 9/2 is CLEAR.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Events #6-7.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 30 of 42 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break/ Turbine fails to AUTO Trip IC AFW Governor failure/Loss of AFW Finally, a Steam Line Leak upstream of the 3C MSIV inside containment begins and will gradually degrade. The crew will enter 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
During the response Safety Injection, Phase A Containment Isolation and Phase B Containment Isolation are expected to occur. Upon entry into 3-EOP-E-O, the C AFW governor fails leaving only the A AFW Pump available, and this pump is receiving steam from the Faulted Steam Generator. Because of this, the A AFW Pump will eventually stop pumping water, and no AFW flow will be available. The crew will transition to 3-EOP-FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, and will initiate Bleed and Feed cooling. The scenario will terminate at Step 19 of 3-EOP-FR-H.1, after the crew has initiated Bleed and Feed cooling.
Booth Operator Instructions: Insert TVSVL15=1 (Ramp = 300)
Indications Available:
- Automatic Rx trip
- Automatic SI/Phase A/Phase B actuation.
. E2/6, HI-HI SG LVL TURB TRIP/FEEDWATER LEVEL, alarms.
Time Pos Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Examiner NOTE: Record time of start of 10 minute period to isolate AFW flow to Faulted Steam Generator (CT 1):
Time isolated will be recorded on Page 40.
3-EOP-E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO (Step 1) Verify Reactor Trip NOTE: This Step is an
. Rod bottom lights-ON Immediate Action.
. Reactor trip and bypass breakers- OPEN
. Rod position indicators- AT ZERO
. Neutron flux- DECREASING
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 31 of 42 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break! Turbine fails to AUTO Trip IC AFW Governor failure/Loss of AFW Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 2) Verify Turbine Trip NOTE: This Step is an
- a. All Turbine stop or associated control Immediate Action.
valves- CLOSED
- b. Verify Moisture Separator Reheater Steam Valves- CLOSED
- 1) MSR Main Steam Supply Stop MOVs
- 2) Reheater Timing Valves
- 3) MSR Purge Steam Valves
- c. Check Mid and East GCBs-OPEN (Normally 30 second delay)
BOP (Step 3) Verify Power to Emergency 4 KV NOTE: This Step is an Buses Immediate Action.
- a. Check the 3A and 3B 4KV buses-MAINTAIN AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED
- b. Check the 3A and 3B 4KV buses-MAINTAIN BOTH ENERGIZED
- c. Maintain the 3D 4KV bus energized-ALIGNED TO AN ENERGIZED 4KV BUS RO/ (Step 4) Check if SI is Actuated NOTE: This Step is an BOP
- SI Annunciators-ANY ONE Immediate Action.
OR Safeguards equipment-AUTO STARTED NOTE: The US will refer to the Foldout Page.
RO/ 1. ADVERSE CONTAINMENT CONDITIONS NOTE: Adverse Containment BOP conditions will exist.
RO! 2. RCP TRIP CRITERIA NOTE: RCP Trip Criteria will BOP a. IF both conditions listed below occur, be met.
THEN trip all RCPs:
- 2) RCS subcooling- LESS THAN 1 9°F[41 °F]
RO! 3. FAULTED S/G ISOLATION CRITERIA NOTE: Faulted SG Isolation BOP Criteria will be met.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 32 of 42 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break! Turbine fails to AUTO Trip IC AFW Governor failure/Loss of AFW Time Pos Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RO! 4. RUPTURED S/G ISOLATION CRITERIA NOTE: Ruptured SG Isolation BOP IF any SIG level increases in an uncontrolled Criteria will NOT be met.
manner OR any SIG has abnormal radiation, AND narrow range level in affected S/G(s) is greater than 7%[27%], THEN feed flow may be stopped to affected SIG (s).
RO/ 5. AFW SYSTEM OPERATION CRITERIA NOTE: The A and C AFW BOP Pumps will be running RO/ 6. CST MAKEUP WATER CRITERIA NOTE: CST makeup Criteria BOP will NOT be met.
RO! 7. RHR SYSTEM OPERATION CRITERIA NOTE: The RHR Pumps are BOP IF RHR flow is less than 1100 gpm, THEN expected to start, or be started the RHR pumps shall be shut down within 44 and a Timer will be set.
minutes of the initial start signal.
US (Step 5) Continue with ATTACHMENT 3 to NOTE: The US will assign the Complete the Prompt Action Verifications BOP to perform Attachment 3.
While Performing this Procedure BOP Examiner follow actions of Attachment 3 actions below.
Other Examiners follow E-O Actions, Step 6, on Page 37.
3-EOP-E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ATTACHMENT 3 BOP (Step 1) Check the Load Centers Associated with the Energized 4KV Buses- ENERGIZED BOP (Step 2) Check if Main Steamlines should be NOTE: The MSIVs are OPEN.
Isolated Check main steam line isolation and bypass valves- ANY OPEN Check if either main steam isolation signal has actuated High steam flow with either low SIG pressure 614 psig OR low Tavg 543 F Hi-Hi containment pressure 20 PSIG
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 33 of 42 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break! Turbine fails to AUTO Trip IC AFW Governor failure/Loss of AFW Time Pos Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 2 RNO) Go to Step 3 BOP (Step 3) Verify Feedwater Isolation NOTE: The BOP will Call Unit
- a. Place main Feedwater pump switches in 4 and request status of the STOP Standby SG Feedwater Pumps.
- b. Feedwater control valves-CLOSED Booth Instructor
. FCV-3-478 acknowledge as U4 RCO, and
. FCV-3-488 report that no Standby SG
. FCV-3-498 Feedwater Pumps are running.
- c. Feedwater bypass valves- CLOSED
. FCV-3-479
. FCV-3-489
. FCV-3-499
. MOV-3-1 407
. MOV-3-1 408
. MOV-3-1409
- e. Close Feedwater bypass isolation valves
. POV-3-477
- POC-3-487
. POV-3-497
- f. Verify standby Feedwater pumps-OFF BOP (Step 4) Verify Proper ICW System NOTE: The 3A and 3C ICW Operation Pumps are running.
- a. Verity ICW pumps- AT LEAST TWO RUNNING
- b. Verify ICW to TPCW Heat Exchanger ISOLATED
. POV-3-4882- CLOSED
. POV-3-4883- CLOSED
- c. Check ICW headers- TIED TOGETHER
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 34 of 42 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break! Turbine fails to AUTO Trip IC AFW Governor failurelLoss of AFW iavior Comments BOP (Step 5) Verify Proper CCW System Operation CCW Heat Exchangers- THREE IN SERVICE CCW pumps- ONLY TWO RUNNING CCW headers- TIED TOGETHER RCP Thermal Barrier CCW Outlet, MOV 626- OPEN BOP (Step 6) Verify Containment Cooling Check emergency containment coolers-ONLY TWO RUNNING BOP (Step 7) Verify Pump Operation At least two high head SI pumps running.
Both RHR pumps running BOP (Step 8) Verify SI Flow RCS pressure-LESS THAN 1625 PSIG
[1950 PSIG]
High-head SI pump flow indicator- CHECK FOR FLOW RCS pressure- LESS THAN 275 PSIG [575 PSIG]
BOP (Step 8.c) Goto Step 9.
BOP (Step 9) Realign SI System Verify Unit 3 high-head SI pumps- TWO RUNNING BOP (Step 9.c) Direct Unit 4 Reactor Operator to NOTE: The BOP will Call Unit align Unit 4 high-head SI pump suction to 4 and request Unit 4 to make Unit 3 RWST using ATTACHMENT 1 of this this alignment.
procedure. Booth Instructor:
acknowledge as U4 RCO.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 35 of 42 Event
Description:
Steam Line Breakl Turbine fails to AUTO Trip IC AFW Governor failure/Loss of AFW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 10) Verify Containment Isolation Phase A Valve White Lights on VPB- ALL BRIGHT BOP (Step 11) Verify SI Valve Amber Lights on VPB- ALL BRIGHT BOP (Step 12) Verify SI- RESET NOTE: The BOP will Reset SI.
BOP (Step 13) verify Containment Isolation Phase NOTE: The BOP will Reset A- RESET Phase A Containment Isolation.
BOP (Step 14) Reestablish RCP Cooling NOTE: All RCP5 are expected
- a. Check RCPs-AT LEAST ONE RUNNING to be running.
- b. Open CCW to normal containment cooler valves MOV-3-1 417 MOV-31 418
- c. Reset and start normal containment coolers BOP (Step 15) Monitor Containment Pressure to NOTE: Containment pressure Verify Containment Spray NOT Required is expected to have remained
- a. Containment pressure- HAS REMAINED < 20 psig.
LESS THAN 20 PSIG.
. PR-3-6306A AND
. PR-3-6306B
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 36 of 42 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break! Turbine fails to AUTO Trip IC AFW Governor failure/Loss of AFW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior .,VIIIIlIIIL BOP (Step 16) Verify Containment Ventilation Isolation Unit 3 containment purge exhaust and supply fans- OFF Containment Purge Supply and Exhaust Isolation valves-CLOSED
. POV-3-2600
. POV-3-2601
- POV-3-2602
. POV-3-2603 Containment Instrument Air Bleed Isolation valves-CLOSED
- CV-3-281 9
- CV-3-2826 BOP (Step 17) Verify Control Room Ventilation Isolation Emergency Air Supply Fan SF-i B-ON Emergency Air Supply Fan SF-i A-OFF Control Room Ventilation Dam pers ALIGNED FOR RECIRC.
BOP (Step 18) Place Hydrogen Monitors in NOTE: The BOP will call the Service Using 3-NOP-094, CONTAINMENT SNPO and direct that this POST ACCIDENT MONITORING SYSTEM action be performed.
Booth Instructor:
acknowledge as SNPO.
After 10 minutes insert:
TAC2VO2A 1.0 TAC2VO2B 1.0 TAAAV21 1.0 TAAAV22 1.0 TACAOO5 0.0 And report that the H2 Monitors are in service.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 37 of 42 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break! Turbine fails to AUTO Trip IC AFW Governor failure/Loss of AFW BOP (Step 19) Verify All Four EDGs- RUNNING NOTE: The BOP will Call Unit 4 and request Unit 4 verify that the U4 EDGs are running.
Booth Instructor:
acknowledge as U4 RCO, and report that the 4A and 4B EDGs are running.
BOP (Step 20) Verify Power to Emergency 4KV Buses and Load Centers Check the 3A, 3B and 3D 4KV buses- ALL ENERGIZED BOP (Step 21) Notify the Unit Supervisor that the PROMPT ACTION VERIFICATIONS Attachment is Complete and discuss any safeguards equipment that is not in the required condition.
3-EOP-E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/RO continue HERE.
RO (Step 6) Check AFW Pumps- AT LEAST NOTE: NO AFW Pumps are TWO RUNNING running.
RO (Step 7) Verify AFW Valve Alignment PROPER EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT RO (Step 8) Verify Proper AFW Flow Check narrow range level in at least one S!G-GREATER THAN 7% [27%]
RO (Step 8a RNO) Perform the following: NOTE: Only C AFW Pump is verify AFW flow greater than 400 gpm running. AFW flow is 400 IF AFW flow less than 400 gpm gpm.
IF total feed flow from all sources greater than 400 gpm can NOT be established
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 38 of 42 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break! Turbine fails to AUTO Trip IC AFW Governor failure/Loss of AFW RO (Step 8.b) Maintain feed flow to S/G until NOTE: The crew may narrow range levels between 21% [27%] and transition to 3-EOP-FR-H.1 50% based on a Red Path on Heat Sink, when steam is no longer available to supply the A AFW Pump.
RD (Step 9) Check RCP Seal Cooling
- a. Check all RCP thermal alarmsO OFF
- A 1/1, RCP THERMAL BARR COOLING WATER HI FLOW
. A 1/2, RCP THERMAL BARR COOLING WATER HI TEMP A 1/3, RCP THERMAL BARR COOLING WATER LO FLOW
- b. Go to Step 10.
RO (Step 10) Maintain RCS Cold Leg Temperature
- a. STABLE BETWEEN 545°F and 547°F OR TRENDING DOWN TO 547°F
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 3 of 42 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break! Turbine fails to AUTO Trip IC AFW Governor failure/Loss of AFW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 10.b) Check IF Boration for RCS Cooldown Required:
Any RCS Tcold between 545°F and 547°F OR Any RCS Tcold between 537°F and 547°F AND fuel burnup Less than 16000 MWD/MTU OR Any RCS Tcold between 525°F and 537°F AND All rods inserted and fuel burnup Less than 16000 MWD/MTU No boration is required.
RO (Step 11) Check PRZ PORVs, Spray Valves and Excess Letdown Isolated PORVs- CLOSED Normal PRX spray valves- CLOSED Auxiliary Spray Valve, CV-3-31 1 -CLOSED Excess letdown isolation valves- CLOSED
. CV-3-387, Excess Letdown Isolation Valve from Cold Leg to Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger
. HCV-3-137, Excess Letdown Flow Controller RO (Step 12) Check if RCPs should be stopped NOTE: All RCPs will be
- a. Check RCPs- ANY RUNNING running.
- b. Check RCS subcooling LESS THAN 19°F[41°F]
US (Step 12.b RNO) Go to step 13
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 40 of 42 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break! Turbine fails to AUTO Trip IC AFW Governor failurelLoss of AFW Comments iiiii r. CXLLU MLLIU11SIDeI1VIO[
RO (Step 13) Check if S/Gs are Faulted Check pressures in all SGs ANY SG PRESSURE DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER OR ANY SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED CT1: Isolate feedwater flow into the faulted Steam Generator within 10 minutes of the initiation of the steam leak.
Safety Significance: Failure to isolate a Faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to the Critical Safety Functions that may not otherwise occur. Failure to isolate flow could result in an unwarranted Orange or Red Path condition on NC Integrity and/or Subcriticality (if cooldown is allowed to continue uncontrollably). Specifically, Termination of AFW flow to faulted SG is necessary to limit mass and energy releases into containment to prevent exceeding design pressure.
Record Time AFW Isolated to 3A SG:
Record Time SLB occurred (Page 30):
Total Time between SLB and AFW Isolation: minutes US Perform the following:
- 1. Monitor Critical Safety Functions using 3-EOP-F-O, CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES
- 2. Go to 3-EOP-E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE, Step 1.
NOTE: The US will transition to 3-EOP-FR-H.1, based on the Red Path on Heat Sink.
3-EOP-FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 41 of 42 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break/ Turbine fails to AUTO Trip IC AFW Governor failure/Loss of AFW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO/ (Step 1) Check If Secondary Heat Sink is BOP Required
- a. RCS pressure- GREATER THAN ANY NON-FAULTED S/G PRESSURE
- b. RCS average temperature- GREATER THAN 450°F US CAUTION NOTE: The crew will meet the If wide range level in any S/G is less than Bleed and Feed criteria.
33% [narrow range level in all S/Gs less than 27%] or PRZ pressure is greater than or equal to 2335 psig due to loss of secondary heat sink, Steps 11 through 19 should be initiated immediately for bleed and feed.
RO (Step 11) Verify RCP5- ALL STOPPED RO (Step 12) Actuate SI AND Containment Isolation Phase A RO (Step 13) Verify RCS Feed Path
- a. Check high-head SI pumps-TWO RUNNING
- a. Verify power to PRZ PORV block valves-AVAILABLE
- b. Verify PRZ PORV block valves- BOTH OPEN
- a. Verify Instrument Air Containment Isolation, CV-3-2803- OPEN
- b. Verify instrument air pressure- P1-3-i 444-GREATER THAN 95 PSIG
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 42 of 42 Event
Description:
Steam Line Break/ Turbine fails to AUTO Trip IC AFW Governor failure/Loss of AFW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 16) Verify Adequate RCS Bleed Path
- PRZ PORVs- BOTH OPEN
. PRZ PORV block valves- BOTH OPEN RO (Step 17) Reset SI RO (Step 18) Reset Containment Isolation Phase A and Phase B RO (Step 19) Realign SI System
- a. Verify Unit 3 high-head SI pumps- TWO RUNNING
- b. Stop both Unit 4 high-head SI pumps AND place in strandby.
CT2: Initiate bleed and feed before all Steam Generator Wide Range Levels reach 0%, and the RCS temperature and/or pressure increases.
Safety Significance: Failure to establish RCS Bleed and Feed before automatic opening of the PORVs (due to plant heatup) reduces the probability of success to establish a heat sink for the core. This constitutes a Significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario. Establishing feedwater flow into the Steam Generators offers the most effective recovery action to restore the heat sink. If all attempts to initiate feedwater flow fail, the crew must establish bleed and feed to cool the core. This is accomplished by manually initiating SI, and then manually opening the PORVs. The lower RCS pressure allows a greater ECCS flow to recover RCS inventory and force flow through the core. If this action is to be successful, it must be started before SG dryout. SG dryout would cause RCS temperature to increase, increasing RCS Pressure and forcing open the PORVs automatically. If RCS pressure is at the PORV setpoint due to RCS heatup, the operator action of opening the PORVs manually may not be successful in lowering RCS pressure and increasing ECCS flow. Ultimately, the core could uncover.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Facility: Turkey Point Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)
(RO)
(BOP)
Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% power (MOL). Online risk is green. A train is protected on both units.
Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: B AFW Pump out of service due to high vibration.
Event MaIf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 TFH1TU44 1-RO Pressurizer Pressure Instrument fails HIGH I (TS)-SRO 2 TFF1X13E R-RO LP Heater Bypass Valve Opens/Turbine Runback/Rods fail TFL1 0101 C-BP to move in AUTO TAFK244 C-SRO 3 TVHHSGA C-RO Steam Generator Tube Leak/Rapid Downpower N-BOP C(TS)-SRO 4 TVF1M97D I-BOP Feed Flow Instrument fails AS-IS I(TS)-SRO 5 TVHHSGA M-RO Steam Generator Tube Rupture M-BOP M-SRO 6 TFQ634AF NA Train A Sequencer Failure (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Turkey Point 2013 NRC Scenario #2 The plant is at 100% power (MOL). Online risk is green. A train is protected on both units.
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: B AFW Pump out of service due to high vibration.
Shortly after taking the watch, Pressurizer Pressure Control Channel, PT-3-444 will fail HIGH.
The crew will use A4/1, PORV/SAFETY VALVE OPEN and enter 3-ONOP-041 .5, Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunction. The US will address Technical Specification LCO 3.2.5, DNB Parameters.
Following this, the LP Heater Bypass Valve will inadvertently open causing a Turbine Runback to 85% power. Simultaneously, the control rods will not move in AUTO. The crew will enter 3-ONOP-089, Turbine Runback, and stabilize the plant at 85% power. Once stabilized, the crew will enter 3-ONOP-028, Rod Control System Malfunction, to address the failure of the rods to move in AUTO.
Afterwards, a 30 gpm tube leak will slowly develop on the 3A S/G. The crew will respond using H1/4, PRMS HIGH RADIATION, and enter 3-ONOP-071.2 Steam Generator Tube Leakage.
The US will address Technical Specification LCO 3.4.6.2, Operational Leakage. The crew will be expected to control Pzr pressure in MANUAL, and conduct the downpower without using control rods.
During the load reduction, the controlling Feed Flow instrument for the 30 Steam Generator will fail AS-IS. The crew will respond using C4/3, SG C FEED > STEAM, and enter 3-ONOP-049.1, Deviation of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channels. The US will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation.
Subsequently, the Steam Generator Tube Leak will degrade to a 450 gpm Steam Generator Tube Rupture. The crew will enter 3-EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. However, during the response the Train A Sequencer failure will result in Train A of Safety Injection failing to actuate automatically. The operator will need to start Train A SI equipment manually.
Upon completion of 3-EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to 3-EOP-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. The crew will isolate the 3A Steam Generator, conduct a cooldown of the RCS, and then depressurize the RCS using normal spray.
The scenario will terminate at Step 28 of 3-EOP-E-3, after the crew has stopped the HHSI Pumps.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Critical Tasks:
CT1: Isolate feedwater flow into and steam flow from the ruptured SG before a transition to ECA-3.1 occurs.
Safety Significance: Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of AP between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs. Upon a loss of z\P, the crew must transition to a contingency procedure that constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy. If the crew fails to isolate steam from the SG, or feed flow into the SG the ruptured SG pressure will tend to decrease to the same pressures as the intact SGs, requiring a transition to a contingency procedure, and delaying the stopping of RCS leakage into the SG.
CT2: Establish/maintain an RCS temperature so that transition from E-3 does not occur because RCS temperature is either too high to maintain minimum required subcooling, or too low causing an Orange path on Subcriticality or Integrity.
Safety Significance: Failure to establish and maintain the correct RCS temperature during a SGTR leads to a transition from E-3 to a contingency procedure which constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy. If the RCS temperature is too high when RCS depressurization is started, a loss of subcooling will occur when the RCS depressurization is started. On the other hand, if RCS temperature is allowed to continue to decrease after the initial cooldown, the operator may be required to transition to the Subcriticality or Integrity response FRP, and delay the RCS depressurization.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Q Reset to IC-i.
Q Place Simulator in RUN Q Perform Simulator Operator Checklist Q Open and Execute T = 0 Malfunctions:
lLC28: NRCL-13-1 NRC Scen 2
Q Additional Simulator
- Place ECO Information Tag on B AFW Set-up Pump Control Switch
- Remove Aligned to Train 2 Placard from the B AFW Pump Tachometer Q Place Simulator in FREEZE Q If required, Initiate Simulator Data Collection Instruction TD_-005-09 Q Crew Briefing
- 1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements
- 2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.
Q Place Simulator in RUN Q Crew Briefing
- 1. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.
Q At direction of Event 1 Pressurizer Pressure Instrument fails HIGH examiner lnse TFH1TU44 TRUE Q At direction of Event 2 LP Heater Bypass Valve Opens/Turbine examiner Runback/Rods fail to move in AUTO Insert TFF1X13E TRUE Insert TFL1 01 01 TRUE NOTE: Once executed Insert TFF1 Xl 3D FALSE. This will enable the closure of the valve.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Q At direction of Event 3 Steam Generator Tube Leak/Rapid Downpower examiner Insert TVHHSGA=.05, NOTE: When directed by crew Insert Ramp = 300 seconds TCF5MB28 FALSE and TFFXCO3 TRUE, to isolate Steam from the 3A SG to the AFW Pumps.
Q At direction of Event 4 Feed Flow Instrument fails AS-IS examiner Insert TVF1 M97D 0 Q At direction of Event 5 Steam Generator Tube Rupture examiner Insert TVHHSGA=.45 Q Post-Rx Trip Event 6 Train A Sequencer Failure Insert TFO634AF TRUE Q Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 7 of 50 Event
Description:
Pressurizer Pressure Instrument tails HIGH Shortly after taking the watch, Pressurizer Pressure Control Channel, PT-3-444 will fail HIGH. The crew will use A4/1, PORV/SAFETY VALVE OPEN and enter 3-ONOP-041 .5, Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunction. The US will address Technical Specification LCO 3.2.5, DNB Parameters.
Booth Operator Instructions: Insert TFH1TU44 TRUE Indications Available:
- A9/5, PZR PRESSURE CONTROLLER HI OUTPUT, alarms.
- A4/1, PORV/SAFETY VALVE OPEN, alarms.
- Pzr PORV PCV-3-455C Red status light LIT.
- Pressurizer Pressure Master, PC-3-444J, output 100%.
- Pzr Spray Valve, PCV-3-455A, controller output 100%.
- Pzr Spray Valve, PCV-3-455B, controller output 100%.
- Pzr Pressure recorder shows Pzr Press less than 2200 psig within 5 seconds.
- PORV Acoustic Monitor Red status IiQhts LIT.
Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments ARP A411, PORV/SAFETY VALVE OPEN RO (Prompt Actions) IF PZR pressure is less NOTE: This event will create than 2235 psig and the Pressurizer an immediate DNB concern on Pressure Control System has RCS pressure.
malfunctioned, THEN:
- CLOSE any open PORV valve or the associated block valve by using manual control.
- CLOSE any open PZR spray valve by_using manual control.
US (Step 1) IF a PORV is OPEN, THEN REFER TO 3-ONOP-041 .5, PZR Press Control Malfunction.
NOTE: The US will transition to 3-ONOP-041 .5.
3-ONOP-041.5, PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTROL MALFUNCTION
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 8 of 50 Event
Description:
Pressurizer Pressure Instrument fails HIGH Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RO (Step 1 .a) Check PZR Pressure Control NOTE: The RO will identify Instrument Loop Not Failed that PT-444 has failed HIGH.
- a. Check PT-3-444-NOT FAILED by comparison with adjacent pressure channels and known plant parameters.
RO (Step 1 .a RNO) Perform the following: NOTE: The RO will take
- 1) Verify PCV-3-455C OR MOV-3-536 manual control of PC-3-444J, CLOSED. and this will be effective at stabilizing Pzr Pressure.
- 2) Take manual control of PC-3-444J, PZR PRESS CONTROL
- 3) IF manual control of PC-3-444J is NOT effective RO (Step 1 .b) Check PT-3 445-NOT FAILED by comparison with adjacent pressure channels and known plant parameters.
RO (Step 2) Check PORVs Closed
- PCV-3-455C- CLOSED
- PCV-3-456- CLOSED RO (Step 3) Check PZR Spray Valves Closed NOTE: It is expected that Pzr PZR pressure normal or trending to normal pressure will be trending up.
RO (Step 4) Check PZR Safety Valves Closed
- a. PZR PORV/Safety acoustic monitor LEDs NOT LIT
- b. PZR safety line temperatures at or near normal
. PZR safety line temperature, TI-3-465
. PZR safety line temperature, TI-3-467
. PZR safety line temperature, Tl-3-469
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 9 of 50 Event
Description:
Pressurizer Pressure Instrument fails HIGH Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RO (Step 5) Check PZR Pressure Stable or NOTE: It is expected that Pzr Increasing pressure will be trending up.
RO (Step 6) Check Pressurizer Pressure Above NOTE: It is expected that Pzr Normal Value pressure will be BELOW the normal value.
US (Step 6 RNO) Go to Step 10.
RO (Step 10) Check Pressurizer Pressure Low or Decreasing RO (Step 1 1) Maintain PZR Pressure Greater than 2000 PSIG
- Check PZR pressure greater than 2000 psig
. Maintain PZR pressure greater than 2000 psig.
RO (Step 12) Check PZR Heaters Operable NOTE: The Pzr Heaters will be
- a. Check PZR Heaters ON energized and capable of maintaining pressure.
- b. Check PZR Htrs capable of maintaining pressure RO (Step 13) Check IF A PORV is Leaking NOTE: No PORVs will be PZR relief line temperature, Tl-3-463- leaking.
INCREASING or at the saturation temperature associated with the PZR relief tank pressure according to Attachment 2.
PZR relief tank level, Ll-3-470-INCREASING PZR relief tank temperature, Tl-3-471-INCREASING OR above ambient tern perature for containment conditions.
PZR relief tank pressure P1-3-472-INCREASING PZR PORV/Safety Acoustic Monitor- LEDs LIT
Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 10 of 50 Event
Description:
Pressurizer Pressure Instrument fails HIGH Time Pos Expected ActionslBehavior Comments US (Step 13 RNO) Go to Step 15.
RO (Step 15) Determine if a Leaking PZR Safety NOTE: A leaking PZR Safety is Causing Pressure to Decrease is NOT causing Pressure to
- a. Check if a PZR Safety is leaking. Decrease.
PZR safety line temperature, TI-3-465-INCREASING or at saturation temperature associated with the PZR relief tank pressure per Attachment 2.
PZR safety line temperature, Tl-3-467-INCREASING or at saturation temperature associated with the PZR relief tank pressure per Attachment 2.
PZR safety line temperature, TI-3-469-INCREASING or at saturation temperature associated with the PAR relief tank pressure per Attachment 2.
PZR relief tank level LI-3-4700 INCREASING PZR relief tank temperature, TI-3-471-INCREASING PZR relief tank pressure- P1-3-472-INCREASING PZR PORV/Safety Acoustic Monitor- LEDs LIT US (Step 1 5.a RNO) Go to Step 16.
US (Step 16) Determine if RCS Leakage is NOTE: The US may direct the Causing Pressure to Decrease BOP, or another operator to Monitor RCS Leakage using 3-OSP-041 .1, calculate RCS Leakrate.
RCS LEAK RATE CALCULATION If called, Booth Instructor, acknowledge as WCC/Spare operator.
RO (Step 17). Check Pressurizer Pressure NOTE: Pzr pressure is Decreasing expected to be rising.
Aooendix D ODerator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 11 of 50 Event
Description:
Pressurizer Pressure Instrument fails HIGH Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments US (Step 17 RNO) Go to Step 20.
RO (Step 20) Check RCS Pressure Stable RO (Step 21) Check if Automatic Pressure NOTE: The RO is expected to Control can be Established leave PC-3-444J in MANUAL.
. Pressurizer Pressure Control Channel Operable US (Step 21 RNO) Perform the following: NOTE: The US will contact the
- 1. Notify the Instrument and Controls WCC/l&C.
Department. Booth Instructor: as
- 2. Continue efforts to establish Automatic WCC/I&C, acknowledge.
Pressure Control.
- 3. Return to Step 20.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO 3.2.5, DNB PARAMETERS US LCO 3.2.5 The following DNB-related NOTE: The US will determine parameters shall be maintained within the that during the transient the following limits: plant entered and exited
- b. Pressurizer Pressure is greater than or Technical Specification 3.2.5 equal to the limit specified in the COLR* based on Pzr Pressure.
US APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 US ACTIONS: With any of the above parameters exceeding its limit, restore the parameter to within its limit within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 12 of 50 Event
Description:
LP Heater Bypass Valve Opens!Turbine Runback/Rods fail to move in AUTO Following this, the LP Heater Bypass Valve will inadvertently open causing a Turbine Runback to 85% power. Simultaneously, the control rods will not move in AUTO. The crew will enter 3-ONOP-089, Turbine Runback, and stabilize the plant at 85% power.
Once stabilized, the crew will enter 3-ONOP-028, Rod Control System Malfunction, to address the failure of the rods to move in AUTO.
Booth Operator Instructions: Insert TFF1X13E TRUE Insert TFL1 01 01 TRUE NOTE: Once executed Insert TFF1 Xl 3D FALSE. This will enable the manual closure of the valve.
Indications Available:
- CV-3-201 1 Red status light LIT.
. Turbine MWe is lowering.
. Tavg-Tref deviation is rising.
. D714, LP HEATER BYPASS OPEN, alarms.
. E215, TURBINE RUNBACK, alarms.
Time Pos Expected Actions/Behavior Comments 3-ONOP-089, TURBINE RUNBACK AOl (IA Step 1) IF above 85% reactor power NOTE: This condition is NOT BOP AND a SGFP was lost met (SGFP did not trip).
RO (Step 2) CHECK for proper operation of the NOTE: The RO will recognize following: that the Control Rods are NOT Steam Dumps operating in AUTO.
Turbine Auto Rod Insertion to match Tavg with Tref.
Main Feedwater Valves Pressurizer
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 13 of 50 Event
Description:
LP Heater Bypass Valve Opens/Turbine RunbacklRods fail to move in AUTO Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RO (Step 2 RNO) PERFORM the following: NOTE: The RO will take A. TAKE manual actions as required to Control Rods to MANUAL.
stabilize the plant.
B. IF plant parameters can NOT be stabilized, THEN BOP (SA Step 1) CHECK Steam Generator levels stabilized and on program.
RO (Step 2) CHECK Tavg is maintained within +/- NOTE: The RO will insert the 3°F of Tref Control Rods in MANUAL.
RO (Step 2 RNO) IF Auto Rod insertion is NOT NOTE: This action is in in progress, THEN: progress.
PLACE Control Rods in Manual.
MAINTAIN TavglTretAT within +/- 3°F.
BOP (Step 3) CHECK Steam Generator pressures stabilizing.
RO (Step 4) CHECK Pressurizer Level stabilizing and trending to Program Level.
RO (Step 5) CHECK Pressurizer Pressure stabilizing and trending to 2235 psig.
BOP (Step 6) CHECK following for proper operation:
. Steam Gen Feed Pump Recirc.
- Condensate Pump Recirc.
. Heater Drain Pumps
. Heater Drain Tank Level Controls
- Secondary Heater Level Controls
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 14 of 50 Event
Description:
LP Heater Bypass Valve OpensiTurbine Runback/Rods tail to move in AUTO Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 7) MONITOR Annunciator G 5/1, AXIAL FLUX T.S. LIMIT EXCEEDED-CLEAR RO (Step 8) MONITOR Annunciator B9/2, Axial NOTE: This Annunciator is Flux Tilt- CLEAR expected to be LIT.
NOTE: The US will be directed to go to 3-ONOP-059.4 if the crew addresses the ARP.
RO (Step 8 RNO) PERFORM the following as NOTE: The initiation of necessary after the runback: boration will result in clearing WHEN turbine runback is complete, THEN this alarm.
PLACE control rods in Manual.
SET boric acid totalizer to 50 gallons DETERMINE boric acid flow rate as determined by the Unit Supervisor.
PLACE the Reactor Makeup Selector Switch to BORATE.
PLACE the RCS Makeup control switch to START.
ADJUST the setpoint on the Boric Acid Controller.
FC-3-1 1 3A to the desired flow rate as indicated on FR-3-1 13.
WITHDRAW Control Rods to establish Tavg/Tref AT to +3°F Tavg GREATER THAN Tret until B 9/2 is CLEAR.
REPEAT Section 3.2 Step 8 RNO steps until Annunciator B 9/2 is CLEAR.
RO (Step 9) MONITOR Annunciator B 8/1, ROD NOTE: This Annunciator is BANK LO LIMIT- CLEAR expected to be DARK. If not the boration in the previous step should clear this alarm.
RO (Step 10) MONITOR Annunciator B 8/2 ROD NOTE: This Annunciator is BANK A/B/C/D EXTRA LO LIMIT- CLEAR expected to be DARK.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 15 of 50 Event
Description:
LP Heater Bypass Valve OpenslTurbine RunbacklRods fail to move in AUTO Time Pose Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 11 A) PERFORM the following upon completion of Turbine Runback.
A. MATCH Control Switch Flag for any following pumps that tripped:
- STEAM GEN FEED PUMP 3A
- STEAM GEN FEED PUMP 3B
- CONDENSATE PUMP 3A
- CONDENSATE PUMP 3B
- CONDENSATE PUMP 3C
. HEATER DRAIN PUMP 3A
. HEATER DRAIN PUMP 3B BOP (Step 11 B) CHECK CV-3-201 1, LP HTR NOTE: The BOP will observe BYP CLOSED. that this valve is OPEN.
NOTE: The BOP may call WCC!l&C to address the failure of CV-3-201 1.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/l&C.
As I&C was working on the control circuit CV-3-201 1 inadvertently opened.
BOP (Step 11 B RNO) PERFORM the following: NOTE: The BOP will Close PERFORM Reactivity Brief per 0-ADM-200, CV3201 1.
Conduct of Operations.
PLACE TCS in Turbine Manual control.
CLOSE CV-3-201 1, LP HTR GYP.
GOP (Step 11 C) NOTIFY Load Dispatcher of load NOTE: The GOP will contact restrictions. System Dispatch.
Booth Instructor: as System Dispatch, acknowledge.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenano # 2 Event # 2 Page 16 of 50 Event
Description:
LP Heater Bypass Valve OpensiTurbine Runback/Rods tail to move in AUTO Time Pos, Expected Actions/Behavior Comments US (Step 11 D) PERFORM Plant Management NOTE: The US will contact the and NRC Resident notifications per O-ADM SM to assist with the 1 15, Notifications of Plant Events. performance of these actions.
Booth Instructor: as SM, acknowledge.
RO (Step 12) CHECK boration used during the NOTE: It is expected that performance of this procedure. boration will be used within this A. WHEN plant conditions are stable, THEN procedure.
STOP boration.
B. RESTORE AUTO Makeup ADJUST Boric Acid Flow Controller, FC 11 3A to the desired flow rate.
ADJUST Primary Water HIC-3-1 14 to the desired flow rate.
PLACE Reactor Makeup Selector Switch in AUTO.
PLACE RCS Makeup Control Switch to START.
RO (Step 13) CHECK Rod Control in MANUAL NOTE: The RO will NOT place A. CHECK Tavg within +/-1.5°F of Tref Control Rods to AUTO because of the failure of B. PLACE Rod Control in AUTO.
Control Rods to move in AUTO during the Turbine Runback.
NOTE: The US will enter 3-ONOP-28 based on the Auto failure of the Control Rods.
3-ONOP-028, ROD CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION RO 4.2 Failure of an RCC Control Bank to Insert NOTE: This action was taken with Reactor Control in Automatic during the Turbine Runback.
4.2.1 Place the Rod Motion Control Selector switch to the MAN position
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 17 of 50 Event
Description:
LP Heater Bypass Valve OpenslTurbine Runback/Rods tail to move in AUTO Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments ROt 5.2 Failure of an RCC Control Bank to Insert NOTE: The US may call US with Reactor Control in Automatic WCC/I&C to address the 5.2.1 DO NOT increase reactor power failure of the Auto Control Rod without permission from the Reactor circuit.
Engineering Supervisor and the Shift If so, Booth Instructor Manager. acknowledge as WCC/I&C.
5.2.2 Manually position the RCC control bank to restore steady state conditions.
IF the RCC control bank will still not move, 5.2.3 Notify the following:
- 1. Reactor Engineering Supervisor or designee.
5.2.4 Take actions required by Subsection 5.1, Immovable RCC.
5.2.5 IF unit shutdown is required NOTE: The US will likely conduct a Crew Brief.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 18 of 50 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Leak/Rapid Downpower Afterwards, a 30 gpm tube leak will slowly develop on the 3A S/G. The crew will respond using H1/4, PRMS HIGH RADIATION, and enter 3-ONOP-071.2 Steam Generator Tube Leakage. The US will address Technical Specification LCO 3.4.6.2, Operational Leakage. The crew will be expected to control Pzr pressure in MANUAL, and conduct the downpower without using control rods.
Booth Operator Instructions: Insert TVHHSGA=0.05, Ramp =
300 seconds Indications Available:
H114, PRMS HI RADIATION, alarms.
R-15, SJAE Exhaust Monitor, is rising.
RCO I/O Flow Balance is rising.
Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments NOTE: The US may go to 3-ONOP-067. If so, this procedure will direct entry into 3-ONOP-071 .2.
3-ONOP-071 .2, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAKAGE NOTE: The US will refer to the Foldout Page.
RO! 1. 3-EQ P-E-O Transition Criteria NOTE: E-0 Transition Criteria BOP a) IF RCS Tavg GREATER THAN Tref by 6 will NOT be met.
°F, THEN trip the Reactor and Turbine AND go to 3-EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.
b) IF any of the following limits are reached, THEN trip the Reactor and Turbine, initiate Safety Injection and Phase A, AND go to 3-EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.
- 1) RCS Leakage greater than Charging Pump capacity AND letdown isolated
- 2) PZR Level can NOT be maintained within 10% of program RO/ 2. Turbine Load Within 10% Of Target NOTE: Turbine Criteria will BOP Power Level NOT be met.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 19 of 50 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Leak/Rapid Downpower Time Pos. Exøected Actions/Behavior frrirvi,r.*r.
d$ I HI II IL RO/ 3. BLOWDOWN RELEASE PATH NOTE: The Blowdown BOP ISOLATION Release Path Isolation Criteria IF PRMS R-1 9 Count Rate is increasing OR will be met, and the crew will High Alarm is present, THEN verify the take this action.
following:
a) Steam Generator Blowdown Flow Control Valves are Closed
- FCV-3-6278A
- FCV-3-6278B
- FCV-3-6278C b) Blowdown Tank to Canal Level Control Valve, LCV-3-6265B is closed c) WHEN R-19 High Alarm is present, THEN verify NO FLOW on S/G Sample Flow Indicators at the Cold Chem Lab. (Ensures Sample Valves SV-3-2800, SV-3-2801, SV 3-2802 are closed.)
ROI AFW STEAM SUPPLY RELEASE PATH NOTE: The AFW Steam BOP ISOLATION Supply Release Path Isolation WHEN the affected Steam Generator is Criteria will be met, and the identified, THEN perform the following: crew will take this action.
a) Verify Steam Supply aligned to both trains of AFW from the Intact Steam Generators b) Verify closed AND de-energize the Booth Instructor: When affected Steam Generator AFW Steam directed by crew Insert Supply MOV using Attachment 4. TCF5MB28 FALSE and TFFXCO3 TRUE, to isolate Steam from the 3A SG to the AFW Pumps.
RO (Step 1) Monitor Affected Plant Parameters NOTE: The RO will observe a
- a. Check PRZ level- STABLE OR Pzr level decrease.
INCREASING RO (Step 1 .a) Perform the following: The RO will likely start a
- 1) Start additional charging pumps as second Charging Pump, but required. NOT isolate Letdown.
- 2) Reduce letdown flow as necessary.
RO (Step 1.b) Maintain PRZ level- MAINTAIN STABLE OR INCREASING
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 20 of 50 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Leak/Rapid Downpower r: ,----
iiiiie rv ,JIIflhIeuL BOP (Step 2) Check High Alarm ON for the NOTE: R-15 will be in ALARM.
Following PRMS Channels
- a. Check R-15 High Alarm light-ON
- b. Go to Step 3.
BOP (Step 3) Check PRMS Channel R-15 Alarm Valid as follows:
- a. Check readout on affected channel-GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO ALARM SETPOINT
- b. Check R-1 5 operability as follows:
- 1) RDU green OPERATE LED- ON
- 2) Plus sign (+)- ROTATING BOP (Step 4) Check PRMS Channels R-i 9 for NOTE: R-i 9 is slower acting Proper Operation than R-15. It is expected to be
- a. Check R-19 High Alarm light- ON rising, but NOT in alarm.
US (Step 4.a) Go to Step 5.
RO (Step 5) Check the following Radiation Monitors:
. RAD-3-64i7 (SJAE SPING)- ALARM CLEAR
- RAD-6426 (DAM-i Mon itor)-ALAR M CLEAR BOP (Step 6) Check PRMS Channel Counts-INCREASING or STABLE AT HIGHER VALUE
. R-3-15
. R-3-i9 BOP (Step 7) Check R-3-19 HI ALARM-CLEAR
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 21 of 50 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Leak/Rapid Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments US (Step 8) Direct the Shift Technical Advisor to NOTE: The US will contact the Approximate Tube Leakage using all of the STA to address these following: procedures.
Booth Instructor: as STA, acknowledge.
- 3-OSP-041.1, RCS LEAK RATE CALCULATION
. Unit 3 SJAE SPING Primary to Secondary Leak Rate Graph in the Plant Curve Book (Section 5, Figure 14) AND record on ATTACHMENT 7.
. Unit 3 R-15 Primary to Secondary Leak Rate Graph in the Plant Curve Book (section 5, Figure 15) AND record on ATTACHMENT 7.
Crew (Step 9) Identify Leaking SIG
- a. Monitor the following for SIG tube leak indications Unexplained increase in any S/G level
- High radiation detected on a S/G sample High radiation detected on a main steam line
- High radiation detected on AFW steam supply line (if running)
- High radiation detected from a S/G Blowdown line Unexplained difference between steam flow and Feedwater flow Increasing radiation levels indicated on R 15, R-19, SPING AND DAM-i
ADDendix D Ooerator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 22 of 50 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Leak/Rapid Downpower Time Pos, Expected Actions/Behavior Comments US b. Direct Radiation Protection to perform the NOTE: The US will contact following: RP.
- Monitor radiation levels on Main Steam Booth Instructor: as RP, Lines acknowledge.
- Monitor radiation levels on AFW steam supply line (if running)
. Monitor radiation levels on SIG Blowdown lines
. Monitor airborne activity at Steam Jet Air Ejectors US c. Direct Nuclear Chemistry to perform the NOTE: The US will contact following: Chemistry.
. Perform 0-NCAP-i 04, PRIMARY TO Booth Instructor: as SECONDARY LEAK RATE Chemistry, acknowledge.
CALCULATION
. Increase S/G sampling frequency as determined by Nuclear Chemistry Monitor DAM-i and SJAE SPING readings US (Step iO.a) SIG Tube Leakage LESS THAN Values required by ATTACHMENT 3
- a. Perform the following: NOTE: The US will determine
- 1) Actions recommended by ATTACHMENT that the Unit must be in Mode
- 3. 3 within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
- 2) IF a Unit load reduction is required, THEN go to Step 1 1.
US (Step ii) Notify the Shift Manager to Review NOTE: The US will contact the the Following Procedures AND Make any SM to address these Required Notifications procedures.
. O-EPIP-20101, Duties of Emergency Booth Instructor: as STA, Coordinator acknowledge.
- O-ADM-i 15, Notification of Plant Events Verify NRC Resident notified of Fast Load Reduction and SIG Tube Leakage
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 23 of 50 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Leak/Rapid Downpower Time Pos Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Examiner NOTE: The US may address the Technical Specifications here, however the event in progress may require that the US focus on plant control. If the Technical Specifications are not addressed here, evaluate the implementation of the Technical Specifications at the end of the scenario.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO 3.4.6.2, OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE US LCO 3.4.6.2 Reactor Coolant System operational leakage shall be limited to:
- a. No PRESSURE BOUDARY LEAKAGE
- b. 1 GPM UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE,
- c. 150 gallons per day primary-to-secondary leakage through any one steam generator (SG),
- d. 10 GPM INDENTIFIED LEAKAGE from the Reactor Coolant System, and
- e. Leakage as specified in Table 3.4-1 up to a maximum of 5 GPM at a Reactor Coolant System pressure of 2235 +/- 20 psig from any Reactor Coolant System Pressure isolation Valve specified in Table 3.4-1
- US APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.
US a. With any PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, or with primary-to-secondary leakage not within limit, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following hours.
3-ONOP-071.2, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAKAGE US (Step 12) Complete ATTACHMENT 1, Fast NOTE: The US will complete Load Reduction Maneuvering Sheet Attachment 1.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 24 of 50 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Leak/Rapid Downpower lime Pos.. Expected Actions/Behavor Comments Examiner NOTE: Each crew could arrive at highly varying results based on the assumptions made during the completion of Attachment 3.
US (Step 13) Brief Control Room Personnel NOTE: The US will conduct a Using ATTACHMENT 2 Crew Brief in accordance with Attachment 2.
US (Step 14) Notify the Following: NOTE: The BOP will contact
. System Dispatcher System Dispatch.
. Plant personnel using the Page Boost of Booth Instructor: as System the following: Dispatch, acknowledge.
Potential hazardous effluent release from NOTE: The RO/BOP will make steam lines and turbine building. a Page Announcement.
All personnel to stand clear of the SJAE and Blowdown piping.
Non-essential personnel to stay clear of the Power Block. NOTE: The US will contact Chemistry Department if reactor power is Chemistry.
expected to change by at least 15 percent to Booth Instructor: as start RCS sampling is required according to Chemistry, acknowledge.
Tech Spec Section 3 Figure 3.1-2.
RO (Step 15) Begin Boration for Initial Tavg NOTE: The RO will commence Effect an RCS boration.
- a. Set the Boric Acid Totalizer to total boric acid volume value determined on ATTACHMENT 1.
- b. Place the Reactor Makeup Selector Switch to BORATE.
- c. Place the RCS Makeup Control Switch to START.
- d. Adjust FC-3-1 1 3A, Boric Acid Flow Controller to achieve 40 gpm boric acid flow as indicated on FR-3-1 13.
- e. WHEN Tavg begins to lower from the boration, THEN, adjust FC-3-1 1 3A, Boric Acid Flow Controller to the boration rate of ATTACHMENT 1.
- f. Continue with this procedure while awaiting the lowering of Tavg.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 25 of 50 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Leak/Rapid Downpower Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 16) Determine Turbine Load Reduction NOTE: The Turbine is in MW Control CNTRL.
- a. IF turbine load reduction in MW CNTRL is desired, THEN continue with Step 17.
BOP (Step 17) Initiate Turbine Reduction in MW NOTE: The BOP will CNTRL commence a Turbine load
- a. Select MW CNTRL reduction.
- b. Set TARGET power level- MW VALUE FROM ATTACHMENT 1.
- c. Set RAMP RATE- MW/M VALUE FROM ATTACHMENT 1.
- d. Check Tavg 1°F to 2°F lower than Tref
- e. Depress GO
- f. Ensure FC-3-1 1 3A, Boric Acid Flow Controller has been adjusted to the load reduction boration rate from ATTACHMENT 1.
- g. Go to Step 21 RO/ (Step 21) Monitor Load Reduction:
BOP a. Monitor turbine load reduction and inform crew at each 50 MWe increment of power reduction
- b. Maintain TavglTref within +/-3°F z\T Adjust boration rate as needed Take manual control of rod control of necessary to control Tavg Adjust power reduction rate as needed
- c. Monitor SG level control to ensure feed reg valves properly maintain level control in automatic.
- d. Monitor pressurizer level to ensure that automatic pressurizer level control maintains level on program.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 26 of 50 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Leak/Rapid Downpower Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments Crew (Step 22) Isolate Miscellaneous Flowpaths from Leaking SIG(s)
- a. Verify Blowdown Isolation valve(s) from leaking S/G(s)-CLOSED
- CV-3-6275A for SIG A
- b. Check Aux Steam- SUPPLIED FROM OTHER UNIT
- c. Locally open Main Steam Line Warm-up Valve, SLWU-3-001
- d. Locally close Main Steam to Aux Steam Header Isolation Valve, 3-10-007 When the BOP diagnoses a failed Feed Flow Channel move to Event #4.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1-13-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 27 of 50 Event
Description:
Feed Flow Instrument fails AS-IS During the load reduction, the controlling Feed Flow instrument for the 3C Steam Generator will fail AS-IS. The crew will respond using 04/3, SG C FEED > STEAM, and enter 3-ONOP-049.1, Deviation of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channels. The US will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation.
Booth Operator Instructions: Insert TVF1M97D 0 (As-Is)
Indications Available:
- 04/3, SG C FEED > STEAM, alarms.
- 3C SG Steam Flow indication is lowering.
. 30 SG Feed Flow remains steady at previous indication.
Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments ARP C413, SG C FEED > STEAM BOP (Prompt Actions) IF malfunctioning SG level NOTE: The BOP may take the controls, THEN: Prompt Actions without
. TAKE manual control of level. reference to procedure.
. RETURN SG levels to normal.
BOP (Step 1) IF condition is NOT due to faulty NOTE: The BOP will indication... recognize that this occurred due to an instrument failure.
BOP (Step 2) IF alarm is due to instrument failure, THEN REFER TO 3-ONOP-049.1, Deviation or Failure of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channels.
NOTE: The US will transition to 3-ONOP-049.1.
3-ONOP-049.1, DEVIATION OR FAILURE OF SAFETY RELATED OR REACTOR PROTECTION CHANNELS NOTE: The Crew will stabilize the plant.
BOP (Step 5.1) Verify instrument loop failure by NOTE: The BOP will verify comparison to adjacent loops and known that FT-3-497 has failed As-Is.
plant parameters and conditions
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 28 of 50 Event
Description:
Feed Flow Instrument fails AS-IS Time Pos Expected ActionslBehavior . Comments BOP (Step 5.2) Verify no off-normal conditions exist on the adjacent channels which are to remain in service.
BOP (Step 5.3) Verify applicable control transfer NOTE: The BOP will shift the switches are in the position which eliminates Steam and Feed Flow control the failed loop. to the YELLOW Channels.
BOP (Step 5.4) IF a control function was placed NOTE: The BOP will stabilize in manual control due to the failure, THEN the 3C Narrow Range Level verify the control function is returned to and return control to AUTO.
automatic.
US (Step 5.5) IF the failed channel is NOT NOTE: The US will recognize related to Technical Specifications.... that this instrument is related toTS.
US (Step 5.6) Refer to Technical Specifications 3/4.3, Instrumentation AND verify the minimum channels operable.
Take appropriate actions as specified in Technical Specifications US (Step 5.7) IF a 4KV bus/480V load center NOTE: This condition is NOT undervoltage channel has failed met.
US (Step 5.8) IF a turbine stop valve closure NOTE: This condition is NOT channel has failed met.
US (Step 5.9) IF a turbine emergency trip NOTE: This condition is NOT header channel has failed met.
US (Step 5.10) IF I&C determines a Test NOTE: This condition is NOT Sequence Processor on an Eagle-21 met.
Channel has failed.
US (Step 5.11) IF a containment pressure NOTE: This condition is NOT channel has failed met.
Arijendix D Orerator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 29 of 50 Event
Description:
Feed Flow Instrument fails AS-IS Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments US (Step 5.12) IF any other channel has failed, NOTE: The US will refer to THEN perform the following to trip Bistables Technical Specifications and for the failed channel conclude that Bistables need IF plant conditions are such that all required to be tripped.
Bistables associated with the failed channel may be tripped without an undesired RPS or ESF actuation, THEN perform the following:
Place all bistable switches for the affected loop in test position using Attachment 4.
Verify Bistables tripped by observing corresponding status light (VPB) lit.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO 3.3.1, REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION US LCO 3.3.1 3.3.1 As a minimum, the Reactor Trip System instrumentation channels and interlocks of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE.
US APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-1.
US ACTIONS: As shown in Table 3.3-1. NOTE: The US will review Table 3.3-1 and determine that Functional Unit 12 is NOT met.
ACTION 6- With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed until performance of the next required ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
NOTE: The US may call WCC/I&C to address the failed instrument.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/I&C.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1-13-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 30 of 50 Event
Description:
Feed Flow Instrument fails AS-IS lime Pos Expected Adilons/Behavior Comments NOTE: The US will likely conduct a Crew Brief.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Events #5-6.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5&6 Page 31 of 50 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture!rrain A Sequencer Failure Subsequently, the Steam Generator Tube Leak will degrade to a 450 gpm Steam Generator Tube Rupture. The crew will enter 3-EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. However, during the response the Train A Sequencer failure will result in Train A of Safety Injection failing to actuate automatically. The operator will need to start Train A SI equipment manually. Upon completion of 3-EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to 3-EOP-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. The crew will isolate the 3A Steam Generator, conduct a cooldown of the RCS, and then depressurize the RCS using normal spray. The scenario will terminate at Step 28 of 3-EOP-E-3, after the crew has storned the HHSI Pumps.
Booth Operator Instructions: Insert TVHHSGA=.45 Insert TFQ634AF TRUE Indications Available:
. Pzr level starts to drop.
. Pzr pressure starts to drop.
. 3A SG Narrow Range level starts to rise.
. 3A Feed Flow starts to lower.
. A9/2, PZR CONTROL HI/LO PRESS, alarms.
. A913, PZR CONTROL HI/LO LEVEL, alarms.
Time pos. F Expected Actions/Behavior Comments 3-ONOP-071.2, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAKAGE FOLDOUT PAGE RO/ 1. 3-EOP-E-O Transition Criteria NOTE: Based on changing BOP b) IF any of the following limits are reached, plant conditions, the E-0 THEN trip the Reactor and Turbine, initiate Transition Criteria will be met, Safety Injection and Phase A, AND go to and the RO will trip the 3-EOP-E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY reactor.
INJECTION.
- 1) RCS Leakage greater than Charging Pump capacity AND letdown isolated
- 2) PZR Level can NOT be maintained within 10% of program 3-EOP-E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5&6 Page 32 of 50 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Train A Sequencer Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 1) Verify Reactor Trip NOTE: This Step is an
. Rod bottom lights-ON Immediate Action.
. Reactor trip and bypass breakers- OPEN
. Rod position indicators- AT ZERO
. Neutron flux- DECREASING BOP (Step 2) Verify Turbine Trip NOTE: This Step is an
- a. All Turbine stop or associated control Immediate Action.
valves- CLOSED
- b. Verify Moisture Separator Reheater Steam Valves- CLOSED
- 1) MSR Main Steam Supply Stop MOVs
- 2) Reheater Timing Valves
- 3) MSR Purge Steam Valves
- c. Check Mid and East GCBs-OPEN (Normally 30 second delay)
BOP (Step 3) Verify Power to Emergency 4 KV NOTE: This Step is an Buses Immediate Action.
- a. Check the 3A and 3B 4KV buses-MAINTAIN AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED
- b. Check the 3A and 3B 4KV buses MAINTAIN BOTH ENERGIZED
- c. Maintain the 3D 4KV bus energized ALIGNED TO AN ENERGIZED 4KV BUS ROI (Step 4) Check if SI is Actuated NOTE: This Step is an BOP
- SI Annunciators-ANY ONE Immediate Action.
OR Safeguards equipment-AUTO STARTED NOTE: The US will refer to the Foldout Page.
RO/ 1. ADVERSE CONTAINMENT CONDITIONS NOTE: Adverse Containment BOP conditions will NOT exist.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 &6 Page 33 of 50 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Train A Sequencer Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO/ 2. RCP TRIP CRITERIA NOTE: RCP Trip Criteria may BOP a. IF both conditions listed below occur, be met.
THEN trip all RCPs:
- 2) RCS subcooling- LESS THAN 19°F[41°F]
RO/ 3. FAULTED S/G ISOLATION CRITERIA NOTE: Faulted SG Isolation BOP Criteria will NOT be met.
RO/ 4. RUPTURED S/G ISOLATION CRITERIA NOTE: Ruptured SG Isolation BOP IF any S/G level increases in an uncontrolled Criteria will be met. The BOP manner OR any S/G has abnormal radiation, will stop AFW flow to the 3A AND narrow Sg when Narrow Range level range level in affected S/G(s) is greater than 5 >
7%[27%], THEN feed flow may be stopped to affected SIG(s).
RO/ 5. AFW SYSTEM OPERATION CRITERIA NOTE: AFW System BOP Operation Criteria will NOT be met.
AOl 6. CST MAKEUP WATER CRITERIA NOTE: CST makeup Criteria BOP willNOTbemet.
AOl 7. RHR SYSTEM OPERATION CRITERIA NOTE: The RHR Pumps are BOP IF RHR flow is less than 1100 gpm, THEN expected to start, or be started the RHR pumps shall be shut down within 44 and a Timer will be set.
minutes of the initial start signal.
US (Step 5) Continue with ATTACHMENT 3 to NOTE: The US will assign the Complete the Prompt Action Verifications BOP to perform Attachment 3.
While Performing this Procedure BOP Examiner follow actions of Attachment 3 actions below.
Other Examiners follow E-O Actions, Step 6, on Page 39.
3-EOP-E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ATTACHMENT 3 BOP (Step 1) Check the Load Centers Associated with the Energized 4KV Buses- ENERGIZED
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 &6 Page 34 of 50 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Train A Sequencer Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 2) Check if Main Steam lines should be NOTE: The MSIVs are OPEN.
Isolated Check main steamline isolation and bypass valves- ANY OPEN Check if either main steam isolation signal has actuated High steam flow with either low S/G pressure 614 psig OR low Tavg 543 F Hi-Hi containment pressure 20 PSIG BOP (Step 2 RNO) Go to Step 3 BOP (Step 3) Verify Feedwater Isolation NOTE: The BOP will Call Unit
- a. Place main Feedwater pump switches in 4 and request status of the STOP Standby SG Feedwater Pumps.
- b. Feedwater control valves-CLOSED Booth Instructor FCV-3-478 acknowledge as U4 RCO, and
. FCV-3-488 report that no Standby SG
. FCV-3-498 Feedwater Pumps are running.
- c. Feedwater bypass valves- CLOSED
. FCV-3-479
- FCV-3-489
- FCV-3-499
. MOV-3-1 407
. MOV-3-1408
. MOV-3-1 409
- e. Close Feedwater bypass isolation valves
. POV-3-477
- POC-3-487
. POV-3-497
- f. Verify standby Feedwater pumps-OFF
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5&6 Page 35 of 50 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube RuptureiTrain A Sequencer Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 4) Verify Proper ICW System NOTE: The 3A and 3C ICW Operation Pumps are running.
- a. Verify lOW pumps- AT LEAST TWO RUNNING
- b. Verify ICW to TPCW Heat Exchanger ISOLATED
- POV-3-4882- CLOSED
. POV-3-4883- CLOSED
- c. Check ICW headers- TIED TOGETHER BOP (Step 5) Verify Proper CCW System NOTE: The 3B CCW Pump is Operation the ONLY pump running.
CCW Heat Exchangers- THREE IN SERVICE CCW pumps- ONLY TWO RUNNING CCW headers- TIED TOGETHER RCP Thermal Barrier CCW Outlet, MOV 626- OPEN BOP (Step 5.b RNO) Start or stop CCW Pumps as NOTE: The BOP will start a necessary to establish ONLY TWO 2 pump.
RUNNING COW PUMPS BOP (Step 6) Verify Containment Cooling Check emergency containment coolers ONLY TWO RUNNING BOP (Step 7) Verify Pump Operation NOTE: The 3B, 4A and 4B At least two high head SI pumps running. HHSI Pumps are running, and the 3B RHR Pump is running.
Both RHR pumps running The BOP will manually starts the A RHR Pump.
Aixendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5&6 Page 36 of 50 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube RupturelTrain A Sequencer Failure lime Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 8) Verify SI Flow NOTE: RCS pressure is RCS pressure-LESS THAN 1625 PSIG between 275 and 1675 psig.
[1950 PSIG]
High-head SI pump flow indicator- CHECK FOR FLOW RCS pressure- LESS THAN 275 PSIG [575 PSIG]
BOP (Step 8.c) Go to Step 9.
BOP (Step 9) Realign SI System NOTE: The BOP will observe Verify Unit 3 high-head SI pumps- TWO that the 3A HHSI Pump did RUNNING NOT auto start.
BOP (Step 9a RNO) Perform the following: NOTE: The BOP will start the Operate Unit 3 and Unit 4 high-head SI 3A HHSI Pump and stop the pumps to establish injection to Unit 3 from 4A/B HHSI Pumps.
two high-head SI pumps.
Go to Step 9c.
BOP (Step 9.c) Direct Unit 4 Reactor Operator to NOTE: The BOP will Call Unit align Unit 4 high-head SI pump suction to 4 and request Unit 4 to make Unit 3 RWST using ATTACHMENT 1 of this this alignment.
procedure. Booth Instructor:
acknowledge as U4 RCO.
BOP (Step 10) Verify Containment Isolation Phase A Valve White Lights on VPB- ALL BRIGHT BOP (Step 11) Verify SI Valve Amber Lights on VPB- ALL BRIGHT BOP (Step 12) Verify SI- RESET NOTE: The BOP will Reset SI.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5&6 Page 37 of 50 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube RupturelTrain A Sequencer Failure lime Pos Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 13) verify Containment Isolation Phase NOTE: The BOP will Reset A- RESET Phase A Containment Isolation.
BOP (Step 14) Reestablish RCP Cooling NOTE: All RCPs are expected
- a. Check RCPs-AT LEAST ONE RUNNING to be running.
- b. Open CCW to normal containment cooler valves MOV-3-1 417 MOV-31 418
- c. Reset and start normal containment coolers BOP (Step 15) Monitor Containment Pressure to NOTE: Containment pressure Verify Containment Spray NOT Required is expected to have remained
- a. Containment pressure- HAS REMAINED < 20 psig.
LESS THAN 20 PSIG.
. PR-3-6306A AND PR-3-6306B BOP (Step 16) Verify Containment Ventilation Isolation Unit 3 containment purge exhaust and supply fans- OFF Containment Purge Supply and Exhaust Isolation valves-CLOSED
- POV-3-2600
. POV-3-2601
- POV-3-2602
- POV-3-2603 Containment Instrument Air Bleed Isolation valves-CLOSED
- CV-3-281 9
- CV-3-2826
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5&6 Page 38 of 50 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Train A Sequencer Failure Tifli& Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 17) Verify Control Room Ventilation Isolation Emergency Air Supply Fan SF-i B-ON Emergency Air Supply Fan SF-lA-OFF Control Room Ventilation Dam pers ALIGNED FOR RECIRC.
BOP (Step 18) Place Hydrogen Monitors in NOTE: The BOP will call the Service Using 3-NOP-094, CONTAINMENT SNPO and direct that this POST ACCIDENT MONITORING SYSTEM action be performed.
Booth Instructor:
acknowledge as SNPO.
After 10 minutes insert:
TAC2VO2A 1.0 TAC2VO2B 1.0 TAAAV21 1.0 TAAAV22 1.0 TACAOO5 0.0 And report that the H2 Monitors are in service.
BOP (Step 19) Verify All Four EDGs- RUNNING NOTE: The BOP will Call Unit 4 and request Unit 4 verify that the U4 EDGs are running.
Booth Instructor:
acknowledge as U4 RCO, and report that the 4A and 4B EDGs are running.
BOP (Step 20) Verify Power to Emergency 4KV Buses and Load Centers Check the 3A, 3B and 3D 4KV buses- ALL ENERGIZED BOP (Step 21) Notify the Unit Supervisor that the PROMPT ACTION VERIFICATIONS Attachment is Complete and discuss any safeguards equipment that is not in the required condition.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 &6 Page 39 of 50 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Train A Sequencer Failure Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments 3-EOP-E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/RO continue HERE.
RO (Step 6) Check AFW Pumps- AT LEAST NOTE: The A and C AFW TWO RUNNING Pumps are running.
RO (Step 7) Verify AFW Valve Alignment-PROPER EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT RO (Step 8) Verify Proper AFW Flow Check narrow range level in at least one S/G-GREATER THAN 7% [27%]
RO (Step 8a RNO) Perform the following: NOTE: AFW flow is > 400 verify AFW flow greater than 400 gpm gpm.
IF AFW flow less than 400 gpm IF total feed flow from all sources greater than 400 gpm can NOT be established RO (Step 8.b) Maintain feed flow to S/G until narrow range levels between 21% [27%] and 50%
RO (Step 9) Check RCP Seal Cooling
- a. Check all RCP thermal alarm sO OFF
- A 1/1, RCP THERMAL BARR COOLING WATER HI FLOW
. A 1/2, RCP THERMAL BARR COOLING WATER HI TEMP A 1/3, RCP THERMAL BARR COOLING WATER LO FLOW
- b. Go to Step 10.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5&6 Page 40 of 50 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube RupturelTrain A Sequencer Failure lime Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RO (Step 10) Maintain RCS Cold Leg Temperature
- a. STABLE BETWEEN 545°F and 547°F OR TRENDING DOWN TO 547°F RO (Step 10.b) Check IF Boration for RCS Cooldown Required:
Any RCS Tcold between 545°F and 547°F OR Any RCS Tcold between 537°F and 547°F AND fuel burn up Less than 16000 MWD/MTU OR Any RCS Tcold between 525°F and 537°F AND All rods inserted and fuel burnup Less than 16000 MWD/MTU No boration is required.
RO (Step 11) Check PRZ PORVs, Spray Valves and Excess Letdown Isolated PORVs- CLOSED Normal PRX spray valves- CLOSED Auxiliary Spray Valve, CV-3-31 1 -CLOSED Excess letdown isolation valves- CLOSED
- CV-3-387, Excess Letdown Isolation Valve from Cold Leg to Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger
. HCV-3-137, Excess Letdown Flow Controller RO (Step 12) Check if RCPs should be stopped NOTE: All RCPs will be
- a. Check RCP5- ANY RUNNING running.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 &6 Page 41 of 50 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Train A Sequencer Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- b. Check RCS subcooling LESS THAN 1 9°F[41 °F]
US (Step 12.b RNO) Go to step 13 RO (Step 13) Check if S/Gs are Faulted Check pressures in all SGs ANY SG PRESSURE DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER OR ANY SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED US a. Go to Step 14 RO (Step 14) Check if S/G Tubes are Ruptured NOTE: A SGTR exists on the Check levels in all S/Gs and secondary 3A SG.
radiation levels:
ANY SG LEVEL INCREASING IN AN INCONTROLLED MANNER OR
- Condenser air ejector radiation, R-1 5-HIGHER THAN NORMAL OR
- SG blowdown radiation, R-19 HIGHER THAN NORMAL OR
- Local steamline radiation- HIGHER THAN NORMAL
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5&6 Page 42 of 50 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Train A Sequencer Failure Time Pos. Expected ActIons/Behavior Comments US Perform the following:
- 1. Monitor Critical Safety Functions using 3-EOP-F-0, CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES
- 2. Go to 3-EQ P-E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE, Step 1.
NOTE: The US will transition to 3-EOP-E-3.
3-EOP-E-3, STEAM GENERTATOR TUBE RUPTURE NOTE: The US will refer to the Foldout Page.
RO/ 1. ADVERSE CONTAINMENT CONDITIONS NOTE: Adverse Containment BOP conditions will NOT be met.
RO/ 2. RCP TRIP CRITERIA NOTE: The RCP Trip will likely BOP NOT be met.
RO/ 3. 51 REINITIATIQN CRITERIA NOTE: SI Reinitiation Criteria BOP will NOT be met.
RO/ 4. SECONDARY INTEGRETY CRITERIA NOTE: Secondary Integrity BOP Criteria will NOT be met.
RO/ 5. MULTIPLE TUBE RUPTURE CRITERIA NOTE: The Multiple SGTR BOP Criteria will NOT be met.
RO/ 6. COLD LEG RECIRCLJLATION NOTE: CL Switchover Criteria SWITCHOVER CRITERIA will NOT be met.
BOP RO/ 7. CST MAKEUP WATER CRITERIA NOTE: CST Makeup Criteria BOP will NOT be met.
ROt 8. LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER OR SI ON NOTE: The Loss of Offsite OTHER UNIT Power or SI on other Unit BOP Criteria will NOT be met.
ROt 9. RHR SYSTEM OPERATION CRITERIA NOTE: The RHR Pumps are BOP on a Timer set when the pumps were started.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 &6 Page 43 of 50 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube RupturelTrain A Sequencer Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 1) Monitor Conditions to Determine if NOTE: The RCP Trip will likely RCPs Should be Stopped NOT be met.
- a. RCPs-ANY RUNNING
- b. High-head SI pumps-AT LEAST ONE RUNNING
- c. RCS subcooling- LESS THAN 19°F[41°F]
US (Step 1.c) Go to Step 2.
RO/ (Step 2) Identify Ruptured S/G(s) NOTE: The Crew will identify SOP a. Direct Radiation Protection to take that the 3A SG is ruptured radiation readings on main steam lines AND based on an unexpected blowdown lines increase in Narrow Range Level.
- b. Direct Chemistry to sample the steam lines for activity.
- c. Determine which S/G(s) is ruptured Unexpected mismatch between steamflow and feedf low OR Unexpected increase in any S/G narrow range level OR High radiation from any S/G steam line sample OR High radiation from any S/G blowdown line sample OR High radiation on RP local readings of main steamlines OR blowdown lines BOP (Step 3) Control Ruptured SIG(s) Steam NOTE: The 3A SG SDTA Dump to Atmosphere Valve Valve controller is in MANUAL
- a. Adjust ruptured S/G(s) steam dump to due to a previous malfunction.
atmosphere controller setpointto 1060 psig.
- b. Check ruptured S/G(s) steam dump to atmosphere-CLOSED
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5&6 Page 44 of 50 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube RupturelTrain A Sequencer Failure lime Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RO/ (Step 4) Isolate Steam From Ruptured NOTE: If not already done the BOP S/G(s) to AFW Pumps crew will dispatch an operator
- b. Verify AMSAC-RESET
- c. Verify steam supply aligned to both trains of AFW pumps from intact SIG(s) If so, Booth Instructor: When directed by crew Insert
TFFXCO3 TRUE, and report
- e. Dispatch an operator to perform the actions taken.
following:
- 2) Verify AFW pump steam supply MOV on ruptured S/G(s)-CLOSED RO/ (Step 5) Isolate Miscellaneous Flowpaths BOP from Ruptured S/G(s)
- a. Verify blowdown isolation valve(s) from ruptured S/G(s)-CLOSED
- b. Check auxiliary steam- SUPPLIED FROM ANOTHER UNIT BOP (Step 6) Close Ruptured S/G(s) Main Steamline Isolation AND Bypass Valves BOP (Step 7) Verify S/G Blowdown Sample Stop Valves- CLOSED
- MOV-3-1427
- MOV-3-1426
. MOV-3-1425 BOP (Step 8) Control Ruptured SIG(s) Level
- a. Narrow range level- GREATER THAN 7%[27%]
- b. Stop feed flow to ruptured SIG(s)
Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5&6 Page 45 of 50 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube RupturelTrain A Sequencer Failure lime Posj Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CT1: Isolate feedwater flow into and steam flow from the ruptured SG before a transition to ECA-3.1 occurs.
Safety Significance: Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of AP between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs. Upon a loss of AP, the crew must transition to a contingency procedure that constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy. If the crew fails to isolate steam from the SG, or feed flow into the SG the ruptured SG pressure will tend to decrease to the same pressures as the intact SGs, requiring a transition to a contingency procedure, and delaying the stopping of RCS leakage into the SG.
RO/ (Step 9) Verify Ruptured S/G(s)- ISOLATED BOP FROM INTACT S/Gs Ruptured S/G(s) Main Steamline Isolation and Bypass Valves-CLOSED Ruptured SIG(s) AFW Steam Supply MOV(s)-CLOSED RO/ (Step 10) Check Ruptured S/G(s) Pressure BOP GREATER THAN 450 PSIG RO/ (Step 11) Initiate RCS Cooldown NOTE: The BOP will use the BOP a. Determine required core exit temperature Table to determine the required CET temperature (If SG pressure is between 950-999 psig required CET Temperature will be 509°F).
BOP (Step 11 .b) Dump steam to condenser from intact S/G(s) at maximum rate NOT to exceed 350,000 Ibm/hr per S/G (Bottom of green band)
- c. Core exit TCs-LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5&6 Page 46 of 50 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube RuptureiTrain A Sequencer Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments US (Step 11 .c) WHEN core exit TCs less than NOTE: While the BOP is required, THEN do Steps 1 ld and 1 le. conducting the RCS cooldown, Continue with Step 12. the US/RO will continue in 3-EOP-E-3.
BOP (Step 12) Check Intact S/G Levels
- a. Narrow range level- GREATER THAN 7%[27%1
- b. Maintain narrow range level between 21%[27%j and 50%
- c. Narrow range level- LESS THAN 50%
RO (Step 13) Monitor PRZ PORVs AND BLOCK Valves
- a. Power to block valves-AVAILABLE
- b. PORVs-CLOSED
- c. Block valves- AT LEAST ONE OPEN RO (Step 14) Verify SI-RESET RO (Step 15) Reset Containment Isolation Phase A and Phase B RO (Step 16) Verify Instrument Air to Containment
- a. Verify Instrument Air Containment Isolation, CV-3-2803-OPEN
- b. Verify Instrument air pressure, P1-3-1444-GREATER THAN 95 PSIG RO (Step 17) Monitor RCS Pressure to Check if NOTE: The RO will stop the RHR Pumps should be stopped RHR Pumps.
- a. RCS pressure-GREATER THAN 275 PSIG[575 PSIG]
- b. Check RHR flow- LESS THAN 1100 gpm
- c. Stop RHR pumps AND place in standby
Appendix D Operator Action Form ESD-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 &6 Page 47 of 50 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube RupturelTrain A Sequencer Failure Time Pos.
- Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 18) Establish Charging Flow NOTE: No Charging Pumps
- a. Charging pumps-AT LEAST ONE are running.
RUNNING US (Step 1 8.a RNO) Perform the following:
IF CCW flow to the RCP Thermal Barrier is lost, THEN go to Step 19.
Go to Step 18.b.
RO b. Check offsite power available
- c. Start one charging pump
- d. Place RCS Makeup Control Switch in STOP
- e. Adjust speed controller as necessary to establish maximum charging flow from the running charging pump(s).
- f. Adjust Charging Flow to Regen Heat Exchanger, HCV-3-121, to maintain proper seal injection flow
- g. Verify charging pump suction auto transfers to RWST.
BOP (Step 19) Check if RCS Cooldown should be stopped
- a. Check core exit TCs- LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE FROM STEP 11
- b. Stop RCS cooldown
- c. Maintain core exit TCs- LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE FROM STEP 11.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5&6 Page 48 of 50 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Train A Sequencer Failure Time Pos Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CT2: Establish/maintain an RCS temperature so that transition from E-3 does not occur because RCS temperature is either too high to maintain minimum required subcooling, or too low causing an Orange path on Subcriticality or Integrity.
Safety Significance: Failure to establish and maintain the correct RCS temperature during a SGTR leads to a transition from E-3 to a contingency procedure which constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy. If the RCS temperature is too high when RCS depressurization is started, a loss of subcooling will occur when the RCS depressurization is started. On the other hand, if RCS temperature is allowed to continue to decrease after the initial cooldown, the operator may be required to transition to the Subcriticality or Integrity response FRP, and delay the RCS depressurization.
ROI (Step 20) Check Ruptured SIG(s) Pressure BOP STABLE OR INCREASING RO (Step 21) Check RCS Subcooling Based on Core Exit TCs- GREATER THAN 39°F[93°F]
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 &6 Page 49 of 50 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube RupturelTrain A Sequencer Failure Time Pos. expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 22) Depressurization RCS to Minimize NOTE: The RO will Break Flow and Refill PRZ depressurize the RCS using
- a. Normal PRZ spray- AVAILABLE the Pzr Spray Valves.
- b. Spray PRZ with maximum available spray until any of the following conditions satisfied-Use ATTACHMENT 6 as reference.
Both of the following:
- 1) RCS pressure- LESS THAN RUPTURED SIG(s) PRESSURE
- 2) PRZ level-GREATER THAN 7%[48%]
OR PRZ level- GREATER THAN 73%[50%]
OR RCS subcooling based on core exit TCs LESS THAN 19°F[73°F]
- c. Stop depressurization by closing spray valve(s):
Close normal spray valves OR Close Auxiliary Spray valve, CV-3-31 1
- d. Observe CAUTION prior to Step 25 AND go to Step 25 RO (Step 25) Check if SI Flow Should be NOTE: The SI Termination Terminated-Use ATTACHMENT 6 as criteria is expected to be met.
reference.
- b. Secondary heat sink Total feed flow to S/G(s)-GREATER THAN 400 GPM AVAILABLE OR Narrow range level in at least one intact S/G-GREATER THAN 7%[27%]
- d. PRZ level- GREATER THAN 7%[48%]
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5&6 Page 50 of 50 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Train A Sequencer Failure Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RD (Step 26) Stop the Following Pumps AND NOTE: The RD will stop the Place in Standby HHSI Pumps and place them RHR pumps in Standby.
High-head SI pumps RD (Step 27) Establish Charging Flow NOTE: One Charging Pump
- a. Charging Pumps- AT LEAST ONE will be running.
RUNNING RD (Step 28) Check if SI Flow is Required
- b. PRZ level-LESS THAN 7%[48%j
- 1) Control charging flow to maintain PRZ level.
US (Step 28.a RNO) Go to Step 28b.
RD (Step 28.b) PRZ level LESS THAN 7%[48%]
Control charging flow to maintain PRZ level.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Facility: Turkey Point Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)
(RO)
(BOP)
Initial Conditions: The plant is at 60% power (MOL). Online risk is green. B train protected both units. The 30 Condensate Pump tripped two days ago. Plant power was stabilized at 60%. The maintenance on the Condensate Pump is nearing completion. The SM has directed that power be raised to 72% in preparation for 3C Condensate Pump restart.
Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: 3C Condensate Pump out of service due to motor bearing replacement.
Event MaIf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 NA R-RO Raise Power N-BOP N-SRO 2 TVBMBFL C-RO Charging Pump 3A Trip C-SRO 3 TFS1M3EL 1-BOP Steam Flow instrument fails LOW I (TS)-SRO 4 TFK2A19T C-BOP 3A lOW Pump Trip lC(TS)-SRO 5 TFLIC81 0-RO Auxiliary Building Exhaust Fan Trips C-SRO 6 TFLID11 M-RO Sequentially Dropped Rods/ATWS TFLID41 TFL2XASE -
TFL2XBSE M-SRO ML2CR)C1 TFL4AF 7 TFBVC63 NA Emergency Borate Valve fails to open 8 TvHPBOTL NA Pzr Surge Line Break (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Turkey Point 2013 NRC Scenario #4 The plant is at 60% power (MOL). Online risk is green. B train protected both units. The 3C Condensate Pump tripped two days ago. Plant power was stabilized at 60%. The maintenance on the Condensate Pump is nearing completion. The SM has directed that power be raised to 72% in preparation for 3C Condensate Pump restart.
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: 3C Condensate Pump out of service due to motor bearing replacement.
Shortly after taking the watch, the crew will raise power from the current power level to 72% in preparation of the restart of the 3C Condensate Pump. The crew will use 3-GOP-301, Hot Standby to Power Operation. The RO will use Alternate Dilute in accordance with 0-OP-046, CVCS Boron Concentration Control. The BOP will use 3-NOP-089, Main Turbine, to raise Turbine load.
During the load increase, the 3A Charging Pump will trip. The crew will stop the load increase, and use A5/1, CHARGING PUMP A TRIP, to start the 3B Charging Pump to stabilize Pzr Level.
Following this, the 3B Steam Flow transmitter FT-3-484 will fail LOW. The crew will use 04/2, SG B FEED > STEAM, and enter 3-ONOP-049.1, Deviation or Failure of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channels. The US will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip Instrumentation and Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation.
Subsequently, the 3A ICW Pump will trip. The crew will use 1414, ICW HEADER A/B LO PRESS, and start the 3B lOW Pump in accordance with 3-NOP-019, Intake Cooling Water System. The US will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.3, Intake Cooling Water System.
After this, the operating Auxiliary Building Exhaust Fan will trip. The operator will use X4/3, AUX/RADWASTE BUIDLING EXHAUST FAN TRIPPED, to start the standby train fans.
Finally, Control Rod D8 will drop into the core. The US will enter 3-ONOP-028.3, Dropped RCC. Several minutes after this, Control Rod H8 will drop into the core. The crew will manually trip the reactor and enter 3-EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. However, the reactor will fail to trip from both Reactor, trip Switches. The crew will enter 3-EOP-FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS, and drive rods in manually. During the perlormance of 3-EOP-FR-S.1, when the crew attempts to emergency borate, the emergency boration valve will fail to open, and an alternative means of emergency boration must be implemented.
Upon transition back to 3-EOP-E-0, a Pressurizer Surge Line Break will occur. During the course of the plant response an orange/red path will occur on the Integrity Critical Safety Function, and an orange path will occur on the Containment Critical Safety Function. The crew will enter 3-EOP-FR-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition, and 3-EOP-FR-Z.1, Response to High Containment Pressure; and then transition back to 3-EOP-E-0.
Upon completion of 3-EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to 3-EOP-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
The scenario will terminate upon transition to 3-EOP-E-1.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Critical Tasks:
CT1: Manually attempt to trip the reactor upon recognition of the 2 dropped rod.
Safety Significance: Multiple dropped control rods are a significant reactivity transient that can have a serious effect on plant parameters under certain operating conditions, and may result in power distribution limits being exceeded, potentially adversely affecting the Fuel Cladding Barrier. A failure to act to trip the reactor under the postulated conditions constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect reactivity control.
CT2: Manually drive rods or emergency borate to make the reactor subcritical in FR-S.1.
Safety Significance: failure to insert negative reactivity, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor power remains higher than it otherwise would if the action is not taken. Performance of the critical task would move the reactor power lower to prevent a subsequent an unnecessary challenge to reactor core operational limits. A failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect reactivity control.
CT3: Trip Reactor Coolant Pumps prior to Step 12 of E-O.
Safety Significance: Failure to trip all RCPs on a loss of subcooled margin can lead to core uncovery and to fuel temperatures in excess of 2200°F. Failure to take this action represents mis-operation by the operator which leads to degradation of the fuel cladding fission produce barrier, and a violation of a license condition.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Q Reset to IC-24.
Q Place Simulator in RUN Q Perform Simulator Operator Checklist Q Open and Execute T = 0 Malfunctions:
1LC28: NRC\L-13-1 TFL2XASE TRUE (ATWS)
NRC Scen TFL2XBSE TRUE (ATWS)
IML2CRXT FALSE (ATWS)
TFL4AF TRUE (ATWS)
Insert TFBVC63 TRUE (MOV-3-350 tails to OPEN)
Q Additional Simulator
- Start the 3A ICW Pump.
Set-up
- Place the 3B Pump in Standby.
. Open the Breaker for the 3C Condensate (Insert TAF1 D6CP RACKOUT) Pump and place ECO Information Tag.
- Start 3A Charging Pump and place in AUTO.
- Open Letdown Orifice Valve CV-3-200B.
Q If required, Initiate Simulator Data Collection Instruction TD_-005-09 Q Place Simulator in FREEZE Q Crew Briefing
- 1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements
- 2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.
- 3. Provide copy of 3-GOP-301 marked up for load increase from 60-72%.
- 4. Provide copy of 3-NOP-073 marked up for the 3C Condensate Pump startup.
- 5. Provide copy of 0-OP-046 marked up for load increase from 60-72%.
- 6. Provide a blank copy of 3-NOP-089.
Q Place Simulator in RUN Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Q Crew Briefing
- 1. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.
Q At direction of Event 1 Raise Power examiner Q At direction of Event 2 Charging Pump 3A Trip examiner Insert TVBMBFL 0.7 Q At direction of Event 3 Steam Flow instrument fails LOW examiner Insert TFS1M3EL TRUE (Ramp = 30 Seconds)
Q At direction of Event 4 3A ICW Pump Trip examiner Insert TFK2A19T TRUE Q At direction of Event 5 Auxiliary Building Exhaust Fan Trips examiner Insert TFLIC81 TRUE Q At direction of Event 6 Sequentially Dropped Rods/ATWS examiner Insert TFLID11 TRUE NOTE: 2 Dropped Rod will occur after TFLID41 TRUE crew has initiated Step 6 of 3-ONOP-028.
TFL2XASE TRUE NOTE: These Malfunctions will be inserted TFL2XBSE TRUE IML2CRXT FALSE I TFL4AF TRUE TFL2XBUD TRUE NOTE: This ACTION will be inserted after TFL2XAUD TRUE an operator is dispatched to locally trip TCE6DQ7C FALSE the Reactor.
TCE6DQ8C FALSE Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Q Post-Rx Trip Event 7 Emergency Borate Valve fails to open InsertTFBVC63TRUE NOTE: This Malfunction will be inserted at T =0.
Insert TABM356 1.00 NOTE: This ACTION will be inserted after an operator is dispatched to OPEN 3-356.
Q Step 17 of FR- Event 8 Pzr Purge Line Break Si Insert TVHPBOTL 0.25, NOTE: This Malfunction will be inserted at Ramp = 25 Step 17 of FR-S.1.
Q Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ESD-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 8 of 46 Event
Description:
Raise Power Shortly after taking the watch, the crew will raise power from the current power level to 72% in preparation of the restart of the 3C Condensate Pump. The crew will use 3-GOP-301, Hot Standby to Power Operation. The RO will use Alternate Dilute in accordance with O-OP-046, CVCS Boron Concentration Control. The BOP will use 3-NOP-089, Main Turbine, to raise Turbine load.
Booth Operator Instructions: NA Indications Available: NA Time Pos., Expected Actions/Behavior Comments 3-GOP-301, HOT STANDBY TO POWER OPERATION BOP (Step 5.77.2) As reactor power rises, NOTE: The BOP will increase turbine load to maintain Tref within coordinate with the RO to raise 3°F of Tavg. load on the Turbine.
The BOP will use the TCS or the Turbine Speed/Power Lower Raise Switch to load the Turbine Generator.
O-OP-046, CVCS BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL RO (Step 5.3.2.1) The determination of primary water quantity may be made by using the results of the day to day activities associated with minor temperature adjustments due to changes in reactivity (ie., xenon transient after load change), OR by use of Section Ill of the Plant Curve Book for larger changes (i.e. load changes).
RO a. Determine the approximate quantity of primary water required to change reactivity by the desired amount.
RO b. IF less than 1% power, THEN NOTE: This condition is NOT met (60%).
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 9 of 46 Event
Description:
Raise Power Time Pos. . Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO c. Set the Primary Water Totalizer to the determined amount of water by performing the following:
(1) Press LIMIT 1.
(2) IF desired to change the amount entered in the Primary Water Totalizer, THEN:
(a) Press CLR.
(b) Enter desired amount using numeric keypad (c) Press ENT.
(3) Press COUNT A.
(4) Press LIMIT 1 AND verify desired amount was properly entered.
(5) Press COUNT A.
RO d. Record initial VCT level, Ll*1 15 RO (Step 5.3.2.2) Adjust the setpoint on the Primary Water Flow Controller, FC*1 1 4A to the desired flow rate.
RO (Step 5.3.2.3) Place the Reactor Makeup NOTE: The RO will use Selector Switch to DILUTE or ALT DILUTE. Alternate Dilute.
RO (Step 5.3.2.4) Perform the following:
- a. Turn the RCS Makeup Control Switch to START.
- b. Verify Red START light is energized.
- d. IF the Reactor Makeup Selector Switch is in ALT DILUTE AND FCV.*1 14B OR FCV*1 1 3B closes due to flow deviation, THEN place FCV*114B switch or FCV*113B switch to OPEN.
RO (Step 5.3.2.5) Verify expected primary water flow rate by observing FR*1 13 AND ensuring that flow rate is consistent with the flow rate determined in Substep 5.3.2.2.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 10 of 46 Event
Description:
Raise Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 5.3.2.6) IF the desired boron concentration OR Tavg is achieved before the setting on the batch totalizer automatically stops, THEN place the RCS Makeup Control Switch to STOP.
RO (Step 5.3.2.7) WHEN dilution has stopped, THEN verify the following switches are in AUTO AND the valves are closed:
- a. Boric Acid to Blender, FCV*1 1 3A
- b. Primary Water to Blender, FCV*1 14A
- c. Blender to Charging Pump Suction, FCV*1 13B
- d. Blender to VCT, FCV*l14B RO (Step 5.3.2.8) IF consecutive dilutions are NOTE: Depending on the desired AND with Shift Manager approval, length of the evolution, the RO THEN mark N/A Substeps 5.3.2.9 through may need to perform this 5.3.2.13 AND return to Substep 5.3.2.1. action more than once.
3-NOP-089, MAIN TURBINE BOP (Step 4.2.2.1) Raise/Lower Turbine Load with ramp feature with MW CNTRL IN as follows:
BOP SELECT IN on MW CNTRL on LOAD CONTROL screen.
BOP REPEAT the following steps until desired load is reached:
SELECT MW TARGET on LOAD CONTROL screen.
SELECT ME RAMP RATE on LOAD CONTROL screen.
SELECT GO.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 11 of 46 Event
Description:
Raise Power Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP (Step 4.2.2.2) If desired after reaching target, THEN SELECT OUT on MW CNTRL on LOAD CONTROL screen.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 12 of 46 Event
Description:
Charging Pump 3A Trip During the load increase, the 3A Charging Pump will trip. The crew will stop the load increase, and use A5/i, CHARGING PUMP A TRIP, to start the 38 Charging Pump to stabilize Pzr Level.
Booth Operator Instructions: Insert TVBMBFL = 0.7 Indications Available:
- 3A Charging Pump Green Breaker Status light is LIT.
- Fl-i 22 indicates a step drop in charging flow.
- RCS I/O Flow Balance step change negative.
- A5/i, CHARGING PUMP A TRIP, alarms.
- A6/i, CHARGING PUMP A MOTOR OVERLOAD.
- Pzr Level starts to lower.
Time Post Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The Crew will stabilize the plant.
ARP A511, CHARGING PUMP A TRIP NOTE: The BOP may call SNPO to address the failed 3A Charging Pump.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as SNPO.
Report 3A Charging Pump is OFF, 3B is ready to start or running properly depending on status.
NOTE: The BOP may call the TO to address the failed 3A Charging Pump Breaker.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as TO.
Report 3A Charging Pump breaker is tripped.
RO (Step 1) CHECK Ll-3-115, VCT LEVEL is greater than 4% and LCV-3-i 1 5C, VCT OUTLET ISOLATION VALVE is OPEN.
RO (Step 2) IF VCT level is less the 4% NOTE: VCT level is > 4%.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 13 of 46 Event
Description:
Charging Pump 3A Trip Time Pos. Expected Actionsl8ehavior Comments RO (Step 3) START any available charging NOTE: The RO will start the pump to re-establish charging flow AND seal 3B Charging Pump.
injection.
RO (Step 4) PLACE 3A charging pump handswitch to STOP and do NOT restart.
US (Step 5) REFER TO Tech Spec 3.1.2.1; NOTE: The US will determine 3.1.2.2, 3.1.2.3. that all Technical Specification LCOs are met.
RO (Step 6) REFER to 3-ONOP-047.1, Loss Of NOTE: This event should be Charging Flow in Modes 1 Through 4. handled entirely by the ARP.
The ARP will Refer the operator to 3-ONOP-047.1, but does NOT require the operator to go there.
NOTE: The US may call WCC/Maintenance to address the failed 3A Charging Pump.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.
NOTE: The US will likely conduct a Crew Brief prior to re-initiating the load increase.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 14 of 46 Event
Description:
Steam Flow instrument fails LOW Following this, the 3B Steam Flow transmitter FT-3-484 will fail LOW. The crew will use 04/2, SG B FEED > STEAM, and enter 3-ONOP-049.1, Deviation or Failure of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channels. The US will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip Instrumentation and Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation.
Booth Operator Instructions: Insert TFS1M3EL = TRUE (Ramp
= 30 Seconds)
Indications Available:
- C4/2, SG B FEED > STEAM, alarms.
- 04/3, SG B STEAM> FEED, alarms.
- FCV-3-488 controller indicates 0% output (Full shut).
- 3B SG Steam Flow indication off-scale high.
- 3B SG Feed Flow is lowering.
- 3B SG Narrow ranqe level is lowerin.
Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments ARP C412, SG B FEED > STEAM BOP (Prompt Actions) IF malfunctioning SG level NOTE: The BOP will take the controls, THEN: Prompt Actions without
- TAKE manual control of level, reference to procedure.
- RETURN SG levels to normal.
BOP (Step 1) IF condition is NOT due to faulty NOTE: The BOP will indication recognize that this occurred due to an instrument failure.
BOP (Step 2) IF alarm is due to instrument failure, THEN REFER TO 3-ONOP-049.1, Deviation or Failure of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channels.
NOTE: The US will transition to 3-ONOP-049.1.
3-ONOP-049.1, DEVIATION OR FAILURE OF SAFETY RELATED OR REACTOR PROTECTION CHANNELS
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 15 of 46 Event
Description:
Steam Flow instrument fails LOW Time Pos Expected D,iTIflfl1
- i-IDflUIflr Comments NOTE: The Crew will stabilize the plant.
BOP (Step 5.1) Verify instrument ioop failure by NOTE: The BOP will verify comparison to adjacent loops and known that FT-3-484 has failed LOW.
plant parameters and conditions BOP (Step 5.2) Verify no off-normal conditions exist on the adjacent channels which are to remain in service.
BOP (Step 5.3) Verify applicable control transfer NOTE: The BOP will shift the switches are in the position which eliminates Steam and Feed Flow control the failed loop. to the YELLOW Channels.
BOP (Step 5.4) IF a control function was placed NOTE: The BOP will stabilize in manual control due to the failure, THEN the 3A Narrow Range Level verify the control function is returned to and return control to AUTO.
automatic.
US (Step 5.5) IF the failed channel is NOT NOTE: The US will recognize related to Technical Specifications.... that this instrument is related toTS.
US (Step 5.6) Refer to Technical Specifications 3/4.3, Instrumentation AND verify the minimum channels operable.
Take appropriate actions as specified in Technical Specifications US (Step 5.7) IF a 4KV bus/480V load center NOTE: This condition is NOT undervoltage channel has failed met.
US (Step 5.8) IF a turbine stop valve closure NOTE: This condition is NOT channel has failed met.
US (Step 5.9) IF a turbine emergency trip NOTE: This condition is NOT header channel has failed met.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 16 of 46 Event
Description:
Steam Flow instrument fails LOW Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments US (Step 5.10) IF l&C determines a Test NOTE: This condition is NOT Sequence Processor on an Eagle-21 met.
Channel has failed.
US (Step 5.1 1) IF a containment pressure NOTE: This condition is NOT channel has failed met.
US (Step 5.12) IF any other channel has failed, NOTE: The US will refer to THEN perform the following to trip Bistables Technical Specifications and for the failed channel conclude that Bistables need IF plant conditions are such that all required to be tripped.
Bistables associated with the failed channel may be tripped without an undesired RPS or ESF actuation, THEN perform the following:
Place all bistable switches for the affected ioop in test position using Attachment 4.
Verify Bistables tripped by observing corresponding status light (VPB) lit.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO 3.3.1, REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION US LCO 3.3.1 3.3.1 As a minimum, the Reactor Trip System instrumentation channels and interlocks of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE.
US APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-1.
US ACTIONS: As shown in Table 3.3-1. NOTE: The US will review Table 3.3-1 and determine that Functional Unit 12 is NOT met.
ACTION 6- With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed until performance of the next required ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 17 of 46 Event
Description:
Steam Flow instrument fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO 33.2, ESFAS INSTRUMENTATION US 3.3.2 The Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) instrumentation channels and interlocks shown in Table 3.3-2 shall be OPERABLE with their Trip Setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3-3.
US APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-2.
US ACTIONS With an ESFAS instrumentation NOTE: The US will review channel or interlock inoperable, take the Table 3.3-1 and determine that ACTION shown in Functional Units 1 .f and 4.d Table 3.3-2. are NOT met.
ACTION 15- With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed until performance of the next required ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST or TRIP ACTUATING DEVISE OPERATIONAL TEST provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
NOTE: The RO/BOP may call the TO to reset AMSAC.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as TO and insert TCL4RST TRUE.
Then report that AMSAC has been reset.
NOTE: The US may call WCC/I&C to address the failed instrument.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/I&C.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 18 of 46 Event
Description:
Steam Flow instrument fails LOW Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments NOTE: The US will likely conduct a Crew Brief.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 19 of 46 Event
Description:
3A ICW Pump Trip Subsequently, the 3A lOW Pump will trip. The crew will use 14/4, lOW HEADER A/B LO PRESS, and start the 3B ICW Pump in accordance with 3-NOP-019, Intake Cooling Water System. The US will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.3, Intake Cooling Water System.
Booth Operator Instructions: Insert TFK2A19T = TRUE Indications Available:
. 3A lOW Pump Breaker Green status light is LIT.
. 3A ICW Pump motor amps indicates 0 amps.
. 14/4, 1GW HEADER NB LO PRESS. alarms.
Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: If the load increase was re-initiated, the Crew will stabilize the plant.
ARP 1414, ICW HEADER NB LO PRESS NOTE: The BOP may start the 3B ICW Pump prior to addressing the procedure.
BOP (Step 1) START standby ICW pump using NOTE: The BOP will refer to 3-NOP-019, Intake Cooling Water System. Section 4.1.2 of 3-NOP-019.
BOP (Step 2) Locally CHECK ICW piping AND heat exchangers for leaks.
US (Step 3) REFER TO 3-ONOP-Ol 9, Intake NOTE: This event should be Cooling Water Malfunction, handled entirely by the ARP.
The ARP will Refer the operator to 3-ONOP-Ol 9, but does NOT require the operator to go there.
NOTE: The BOP may contact the TO to check out the 3A ICW Pump.
Booth Instructor: as TO, acknowledge and report that the 3A ICW Pump breaker is OPEN.
3-NOP-019, INTAKE COOLING WATER SYSTEM
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: .13-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 20 of 46 Event
Description:
3A ICW Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The BOP may refer to Section 4.1.2 of 3-NOP-019.
BOP (Step 4.1.2.4) IF starting 3A ICW PUMP.... NOTE: The 3A ICW has just tripped.
BOP (Step 4.1.2.5) IF starting 3B ICW PUMP, NOTE: The BOP will contact THEN: the ANPO for assistance when A. ENSURE 3-50-322, 3B ICW PP DISCH starting the 3B lOW Pump.
ISOL is OPEN. Booth instructor: as ANPO, B. START 3B lOW PUMP from VPA. acknowledge and report local C. CHECK 3B lOW PUMP Motor Amps at dicCations needed to start the VPA stabilizes to less than 40 amps.
D. CHECK P1-3-1451, PRESS IND FOR INTAKE COOLING WTR PUMP B indicates between 1 1 and 35 psig.
BOP (Step 4.1.2.6) IF starting 3C ICW PUMP NOTE: The 3C ICW Pump is already running.
BOP (Step 4.1.2.7) IF packing leak-off is less than NOTE: The BOP will contact 20 dpm on started pump THEN: the ANPO for assistance when A. CHECK packing gland temperature is less starting the 3B lOW Pump.
than 115F using an IR temperature detector. Booth Instructor: as ANPO, B. IF continued operation of the OW PUMP acknowledge and report local is required, THEN NOTIFY System Engineer indications needed to start the to determine any additional operating 3B ICW Pump.
limitations for continued operation of ICW PUMP without adequate packing leak-off. NOTE: The BOP may contact the System Engineer.
If so, Booth Instructor:
Acknowledge as System Engineer.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO 3.7.3, INTAKE COOLING WATER SYSTEM US LCD 3.7.3 The Intake Cooling Water System (ICW) shall be OPERABLE with:
- a. Three ICW pumps, and
- b. Two lOW headers.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1-13-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 21 of 46 Event
Description:
3A ICW Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments US APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 US b. With only one ICW pump OPERABLE or with two ICW pumps OPERABLE but not from Independent power supplies, restore two pumps from independent power supplies to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
NOTE: The US may call WCC/Maintenance to address the failed 3A ICW Pump.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.
If crew requests that the breaker for the 3A ICW Pump be racked out, Insert TAK2A19P RACKOUT.
NOTE: The US will likely conduct a Crew Brief prior to re-initiating the load increase.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #5.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 22 of 46 Event
Description:
Auxiliary Building Exhaust Fan Trips After this, the operating Auxiliary Building Exhaust Fan will trip. The operator will use X413, AUX/RADWASTE BUIDLING EXHAUST FAN TRIPPED, to start the standby train fans.
Booth Operator Instructions: Insert TFLIC81 TRUE Indications Available:
. X413, AUX/RADWASTE BUIDLING EXHAUST FAN TRIPPED, alarms.
. X412, AUX/RADWASTE BUIDLING SUPPLY FAN TRIPPED, alarms.
Time Pos Expected ActionslBehavior Comments ARP X413, AUX/RADWASTE BUIDLING EXHAUST FAN TRIPPED RO (Step 1) ENSURE at least one Aux Building NOTE: The RO will start the Exhaust Fan running. standby AB Exhaust Fan.
BOP (Step 2) ENSURE smoke alarm reset.
RO (Step 3) START standby Aux Building Supply NOTE: The RO will start the Fan. standby AB Supply Fan.
AO/ (Step 4) DISPATCH an operator to NOTE: The RO/BOP may call BOP investigate cause of trip. the SNPO to address the failed Exhaust Fan.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as SNPO.
After 2 Minutes report that the Exhaust Fan breaker tripped on overload.
RO (Step 5) IF running supply fan tripped on NOTE: The US may call overload, THEN NOTIFY Electrical WCC/Electrical to address the Department. failed Exhaust Fan.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/Electrical.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 23 of 46 Event
Description:
Auxiliary Building Exhaust Fan Trips Time Pos Expected Actions/Behavior Comments us (Step 6) IF smoke detector relay tripped NOTE: The condition is NOT running supply fan met (Smoke Detector did NOT trip the Exhaust Fan).
NOTE: The US will likely conduct a Crew Brief prior to re-initiating the load increase.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Events #6-7.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 24 of 46 Event
Description:
Sequentially Dropped Rods/ATWS/Emergency Borate Valve fails to open Finally, Control Rod D8 will drop into the core. The US will enter 3-ONOP-028.3, Dropped RCC. Several minutes after this, Control Rod H8 will drop into the core. The crew will manually trip the reactor and enter 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
However, the reactor will fail to trip from both Reactor trip Switches. The crew will enter 3-EOP-FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS, and drive rods in manually. During the performance of 3-EOP-FR-S.1, when the crew attempts to emergency borate, the emergency boration valve will fail to open, and an alternative means of emergency boration must be implemented.
Booth Operator Instructions: Insert TFLID11 = TRUE, Delay =60 seconds Insert TFL2XASE = TRUE (T =0)
Insert TFL2XBSE = TRUE (T=0)
Insert IML2CRXT = FALSE (T=0)
InsertTFL4AF = TRUE (T=0)
Insert TFBVC63 = TRUE (T=0)
Indications Available:
- Control Rod D8 Rod Bottom light is LIT.
. B7/1, NIS/RPI ROD DROP ROD STOP, alarms.
. B9/3, SHUTDOWN ROD OFF TOP/DEVIATION, alarms.
. B4/4, TAVGiTAVG-TREF DEVIATION, alarms.
Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments 3-ONOP-028.3, DROPPED ROD RO (Step 1) Check Number of RCCs NOTE: The RO will recognize DROPPED- More Than One that ONLY Control Rod D8 has Check the following dropped.
More than one rod bottom light-ON OR More than one rod position indicator- AT ZERO US (Step 1 RNO) Go to Step 2.
RO (Step 2) Check Reactor in Mode 1.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 25 of 46 Event
Description:
Sequentially Dropped Rods/ATWS/Emergency Borate Valve fails to open Time Pos Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RO (Step 3) Place Rod Motion Control Selector NOTE: The Control Rods are Switch to MANUAL already in MANUAL.
RO (Step 4) Verify Automatic Controls are NOTE: The Tavg-Tref Functioning to Stabilize the Unit AND No deviation will need to be Transient is in Progress adjusted.
Tavg/Tref within 3°F PZR level/pressure trending to program SIG level trending to program.
BOP Reduce turbine load to control temperature. NOTE: The BOP will adjust Turbine load to match Tavg Tref.
RO (Step 5) Check AFD within RAOC G 5/1, AXIAL FLUX T.S. LIMIT EXCEEDED OFF At least 3 channels of AFD indicating within the RAOC limit as defined in the Plant Curve Book, Section 5, Figure 1 US Initiate Hourly QPTR Determination Using 3-OSP-059.i0, DETERMINATION OF QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO Until Either QPTR Results are Satisfactory OR Reactor Power is Less than 50%
Booth Operator Instructions: TFLID41 = TRUE Indications:
Control Rod H8 Rod Bottom light is LlT NOTE: Based on changing plant conditions the US will start at Step-i of 3-ONOP-028.3.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1-13-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 26 of 46 Event
Description:
Sequentially Dropped Rods/ATWS/Emergency Borate Valve fails to open Time Pos Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 1) Check Number of RCCs NOTE: The RO will recognize DROPPED- More Than One that Control Rods D8 and H8 Check the following have dropped.
More than one rod bottom light-ON OR More than one rod position indicator- AT ZERO RO Manually trip the Reactor. NOTE: The RO will attempt to manually trip the Reactor, however the Reactor will NOT trip.
CT1: Manually attempt to trip the reactor upon recognition of the 2 dropped rod.
Safety Significance: Multiple dropped control rods are a significant reactivity transient that can have a serious effect on plant parameters under certain operating conditions, and may result in power distribution limits being exceeded, potentially adversely affecting the Fuel Cladding Barrier.
A failure to act to trip the reactor under the postulated conditions constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect reactivity control.
US Go to 3-EOP-E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION 3-EOP-E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO (Step 1) Verify Reactor Trip NOTE: The Reactor will NOT
. Rod bottom lights-ON trip from the Control Room.
. Reactor trip and bypass breakers- OPEN
. Rod position indicators- AT ZERO
. Neutron flux- DECREASING RO (Step 1 RNO) Manually trip reactor. IF reactor power is greater than 5% OR intermediate range power is NOT stable or decreasing, THEN perform the following:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 &7 Page 27 of 46 Event
Description:
Sequentially Dropped Rods/ATWS/Emergency Borate Valve fails to open Time Pos, Expected ActionsiBehavior Comments RO a. Monitor Critical Safety Functions using 3-EOP-F-O, CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUSTREES.
- b. Go to 3-EOP-FR-S.1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION/ATWS, Step 1.
NOTE: The US will transition to 3-EOP-FR-S.1.
3-EOP-FR-S.1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION/ATWS RO (Step 1) Verify Reactor Trip NOTE: The Reactor will NOT
- Rod bottom lights-ON trip from the Control Room.
. Reactor trip and bypass breakers- OPEN
. Rod position indicators- AT ZERO
- a. Manually trip the reactor. manually drive Control Rods inward.
- b. IF reactor will NOT trip, THEN ensure control rod insertion in Auto or Manual.
BOP (Step 2) Verify Turbine Trip
- a. All turbine stop valves-CLOSED
- b. Verify Moisture Separator Steam Valves CLOSED
- MSR Main Steam Supply Stop MOVs
. Reheater Timing Valves
. MSR Purge Steam Valves BOP (Step 3) Check AFW Pumps- ALL RUNNING NOTE: Depending on plant conditions the BOP may need to start the AFW Pumps manually.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-131 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 28 of 46 Event
Description:
Sequentially Dropped Rods/ATWS/Emergency Borate Valve fails to open Time Pos. Expected ActronslBehavior Comments ROt (Step 4) Initiate Emergency Boration of RCS NOTE: This action may be BOP a. Verify SI Reset accomplished by the BOP, or
- b. Verify charging pumps- AT LEAST ONE RO, RUNNING IN MANUAL p e task
- c. Stop makeup system
- d. Manually start Boric Acid Pump 3A or 3B NOTE: MOV-3-350 will NOT
- e. Open Emergency Boration Valve, open.
MOV-3-350 AO/ (Step 4.e. RNO) Perform the following:
BOP 1) Open Boric Acid to Blender, FCV-3-1 1 3A.
- 2) Open Blender Flow to Charging Pump, FCV-3-1 1 3B
- 3) Locally Open Manual Emergency Boration Valve, 3-356
- 4) WHEN Manual Emergency Boration Valve, 3-356, is open, THEN Close Blender When the operator calls the To Charging Pump FCV-3-113B. SNPO, Booth Instructor Insert:
- 5. Continue with Step 4.f.
TABM356 1.0
- h. Start additional charging pumps AND align valves as necessary to establish emergency (Open 3-356) boration flow. Report actions taken (3-356 is OPEN).
RO/ (Step 4.f) Open Charging Flow to Regen NOTE: Because of the BOP Heat Exchanger, HCV-3-121 abnormal lineup, flow will not
- g. Verify Loop A Charging Isolation, CV be indicated on Fl-3-11O.
31 OA-OPEN
- h. Establish emergency boration flow
. Fl-3-1 10- GREATER THAN 60 GPM
. Fl-3-122A- GREATER THAN 45 GPM
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6& 7 Page 29 of 46 Event
Description:
Sequentially Dropped Rods/ATWS/Emergency Borate Valve fails to open Time Pos Expected ActionslBehavaor Comments CT2: Manually drive rods or emergency borate to make the reactor critical in FR Si.
Safety Significance: failure to insert negative reactivity, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor power remains higher than it otherwise would if the action is not taken. Performance of the critical task would move the reactor power lower to prevent a subsequent an unnecessary challenge to reactor core operational limits. A failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect reactivity control.
RO/ (Step 5) Check PRZ Pressure- LESS TI-IAN BOP 2335 PSIG BOP (Step 6) Verify Containment Ventilation-ISOLATED
- a. Verify Unit 3 containment purge exhaust and supply fans-OFF
- b. Verify Containment Purge Supply and Exhaust Isolation valves- CLOSED
- POV-3-2600
- POV-3-2601
- POV-3-2602
- POV-3-2603
- c. Verify Containment Instrument Air Bleed Isolation valves- CLOSED
- CV-3-2819
- CV-3-2826 RO (Step 7) Check if the Following Trips have Occurred
- a. Reactor trip
Aixendix D Ooerator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 30 of 46 Event
Description:
Sequentially Dropped Rods/ATWS/Emergency Borate Valve fails to open Tune Pos, Expected Actions/Behavior Comments us (Step 7.a RNO) In 3B MCC room, locally trip NOTE: If not already done, the reactor as follows: US will dispatch an operator
. Open 3A and 3B Reactor Trip Breakers (TO) to trip the Reactor locally.
. Open 3A and 3B Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers. 2 minutes after the crew
. Open A/B MG set generator output dispatches the local operator, breakers Booth Instructor Insert:
. Open A/B MG set motor input breakers TFL2XBUD TRUE TFL2XAUD TRUE TCE6DO7C FALSE TCE6DQ8C FALSE Report RTBs open, and MG Set input and output breakers OPEN.
BOP (Step 7.b) Turbine trip
- c. Mid and East GCBs- OPEN (Normally 30 seconds delay)
RO (Step 8) Monitor Reactor Subcritical NOTE: When the reactor is
- a. Power range channels- LESS THAN 5% tripped locally, the reactor will
- b. Intermediate range channels- NEGATIVE be subcritical.
STARTUP RATE
- c. Observe Caution prior to Step 17 and go to Step 17.
us (Step 17). Return to Procedure and step in NOTE: The US will transition Effect. to 3-EOP-E-0.
At Step 17 of 3-EOP-FR-Si move to Event #8.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 8 Page 31 of 46 Event
Description:
Pzr Surge Line Break Upon transition back to 3-EOP-E-0, a Pressurizer Surge Line Break will occur. During the course of the plant response an orange/red path will occur on the Integrity Critical Safety Function, and an orange path will occur on the Containment Critical Safety Function. The crew will enter 3-EOP-FR-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition, and 3-EOP-FR-Z.1, Response to High Containment Pressure; and then transition back to 3-EOP-E-0. Upon completion of 3-EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to 3-EOP-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. The scenario will terminate upon transition to 3-EOP-E-1.
Booth Operator Instructions: Insert TVHPBOTL = .25, Ramp =25 Indications Available:
. Pzr Pressure starts to lower.
. Pzr Level starts to lower.
. H4/6, CNTMT PRESSURE > 0.7 PSIG, alarms.
- 14/6, CNTMT SUMP HI LEVEL, alarms.
- G9/5, CNTMT SUMP HI LEVEL, alarms.
. G5/3, CNTMT LEVEL INCREASING> 1 GPM, alarms.
Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Examiner NOTE: during the performance of 3-EOP-E-O, it is expected that a Red or Orange Path on the RCS Integrity CSF and an Orange Path on Containment will occur.
If so, it is expected that the crew will go to 3-EOP-FRP.1, and 3-EOP-FR-Z.1.
If so proceed to actions starting on Page 43.
3-EOP-E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO (Step 1) Verify Reactor Trip NOTE: This Step is an
. Rod bottom lights-ON Immediate Action.
. Reactor trip and bypass breakers- OPEN
. Rod position indicators- AT ZERO
. Neutron flux- DECREASING
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 8 Page 32 of 46 Event
Description:
Pzr Surge Line Break Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 2) Verify Turbine Trip NOTE: This Step is an
- a. All Turbine stop or associated control Immediate Action.
valves- CLOSED
- b. Verify Moisture Separator Reheater Steam Valves- CLOSED
- 1) MSR Main Steam Supply Stop MOVs
- 2) Reheater Timing Valves
- 3) MSR Purge Steam Valves
- c. Check Mid and East GCBs-OPEN (Normally 30 second delay)
BOP (Step 3) Verify Power to Emergency 4 KV NOTE: This Step is an Buses Immediate Action.
- a. Check the 3A and 3B 4KV buses-MAINTAIN AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED
- b. Check the 3A and 3B 4KV buses-MAINTAIN BOTH ENERGIZED
- c. Maintain the 3D 4KV bus energized-ALIGNED TO AN ENERGIZED 4KV BUS RO/ (Step 4) Check if SI is Actuated NOTE: This Step is an BOP SI Annunciators-ANY ONE Immediate Action.
OR Safeguards equipment-AUTO STARTED RO! (Step 4 RNO) Perform the following: NOTE: This Step is an BOP a. Check if SI is required: Immediate Action.
Low pressurizer pressure- 1730 psig OR NOTE: SI will be required and High containment pressure- 4 psig actuated.
OR High steam line differential pressure- 100 psid OR High steam flow with low S/G pressure-614 psig OR low Tavg (543°F)
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 8 Page 33 of 46 Event
Description:
Pzr Surge Line Break Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The US will refer to the Foldout Page.
RO! 1. ADVERSE CONTAINMENT CONDITIONS NOTE: Adverse Containment BOP IF either of the conditions listed below occur, conditions will exist due to THEN use adverse containment setpoints: Containment temperature.
Containment atmosphere temperature 180°F OR Containment radiation levels 1.3 x i0 5 R/hr WHEN containment parameters drop below the above values, THEN normal setpoints can again be used IF the TSC determines that containment integrated dose rate has not exceeded io 5 Rads.
RO/ 2. RCP TRIP CRITERIA NOTE: RCP Trip Criteria is BOP a. IF both conditions listed below occur, expected to be met.
THEN trip all RCPs:
- 2) RCS subcooling- LESS THAN 19°F[41°F]
RID! 3. FAULTED S/G ISOLATION CRITERIA NOTE: Faulted SG Isolation BOP Criteria will NOT be met.
AOl 4. RUPTURED SIG ISOLATION CRITERIA NOTE: Ruptured SG Isolation BOP Criteria will NOT be met.
ROl 5. AFW SYSTEM OPERATION CRITERIA NOTE: AFW System BOP Operation Criteria will NOT be met.
ROI 6. CST MAKEUP WATER CRITERIA NOTE: CST makeup Criteria BOP will NOT be met.
RO/ 7. RHR SYSTEM OPERATION CRITERIA NOTE: The RHR Pumps are BOP IF RHR flow is less than 1100 gpm, THEN expected to start and a Timer the RHR pumps shall be shut down within 44 will be set.
minutes of the initial start signal.
US (Step 5) Continue with ATTACHMENT 3 to NOTE: The US will assign the Complete the Prompt Action Verifications BOP to perform Attachment 3.
While Performing this Procedure
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-131 Scenario # 4 Event # 8 Page of 46 Event
Description:
Pzr Surge Line Break Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP Examiner follow actions of Attachment 3 actions below.
Other Examiners follow E-O Actions, Step 6, on Page 39.
3-EOP-E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ATTACHMENT 3 BOP (Step 1) Check the Load Centers Associated with the Energized 4KV Buses- ENERGIZED BOP (Step 2) Check if Main Steamlines should be Isolated Check main steamline isolation and bypass valves- ANY OPEN Check if either main steam isolation signal has actuated High steam flow with either low S/G pressure 614 psig OR low Tavg 543 F Hi-Hi containment pressure 20 PSIG BOP (Step 2 RNO) Go to Step 3
Arnendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 8 Page 35 of 46 Event
Description:
Pzr Surge Line Break Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 3) Verify Feedwater Isolation NOTE: The BOP will Call Unit
- a. Place main Feedwater pump switches in 4 and request status of the STOP Standby SG Feedwater Pumps.
- b. Feedwater control valves-CLOSED Booth Instructor
. FCV-3-478 acknowledge as U4 RCO, and
. FCV-3-488 report that no Standby SG
. FCV-3-498 Feedwater Pumps are running.
- c. Feedwater bypass valves- CLOSED
. FCV-3-479
. FCV-3-489
. FCV-3-499
. MOV-3-1407
. MOV-3-1 408
. MOV-3-1409
- e. Close Feedwater bypass isolation valves
. POV-3-477
. POC-3-487
. POV-3-497
- f. Verify standby Feedwater pumps-OFF BOP (Step 4) Verify Proper ICW System NOTE: The 3A and 3C ICW Operation Pumps are running.
- a. Verify ICW pumps- AT LEAST TWO RUNNING
- b. Verify ICW to TPCW Heat Exchanger ISOLATED
- POV-3-4882- CLOSED
. POV-3-4883- CLOSED
- c. Check ICW headers- TIED TOGETHER
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 8 Page 36 of 46 Event
Description:
Pzr Surge Line Break Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior BOP (Step 5) Verify Proper CCW System NOTE: The 3A and 3B ICW Operation Pumps are running.
CCW Heat Exchangers- THREE IN SERVICE CCW pumps- ONLY TWO RUNNING CCW headers- TIED TOGETHER NOTE: MOV-3626 is Closed RCP Thermal Barrier CCW Outlet, MOV due to the actuation of Phase 626 OPEN
- B.
BOP (Step 6) Verify Containment Cooling Check emergency containment coolers-ONLY TWO RUNNING BOP (Step 7) Verify Pump Operation NOTE: The 3A, 3B, 4A and 4B At least two high head SI pumps running. HHSI Pumps are running.
Both RHR pumps running BOP (Step 8) Verify SI Flow NOTE: The 3A and 3B RHR RCS pressure-LESS THAN 1625 PSIG Pumps are running.
[1950 PSIG]
High-head SI pump flow indicator- CHECK NOTE: RCS pressure is FOR FLOW lowering to the point of the RCS pressure- LESS THAN 275 PSIG [575 RHR Pumps injecting.
PSIG] NOTE: Adverse Containment conditions will exist due to Containment temperature.
BOP (Step 9) Realign SI System NOTE: The BOP will stop both Verify Unit 3 high-head SI pumps- TWO the 4A and 4B HHSI Pumps.
RUNNING Stop both Unit 4 high-head SI pumps AND place in standby BOP (Step 9.c) Direct Unit 4 Reactor Operator to NOTE: The BOP will Call Unit align Unit 4 high-head SI pump suction to 4 and request Unit 4 to make Unit 3 RWST using ATTACHMENT 1 of this this alignment.
procedure. Booth Instructor:
acknowledge as U4 RCO.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-1 3-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 8 Page 37 of 46 Event
Description:
Pzr Surge Line Break Time Pos Expected Actions/Behavior BOP (Step 10) Verify Containment Isolation Phase A Valve White Lights on VPB- ALL BRIGHT BOP (Step 1 1) Verify S Valve Amber Lights on VPB- ALL BRIGHT BOP (Step 12) Verify SI- RESET NOTE: The BOP will Reset SI.
BOP (Step 13) verify Containment Isolation Phase NOTE: The BOP will Reset A- RESET Phase A Containment Isolation.
BOP (Step 14) Reestablish RCP Cooling NOTE: All RCPs will be OFF.
BOP (Step 15) Monitor Containment Pressure to NOTE: Containment pressure Verify Containment Spray NOT Required is expected to have risen to>
- a. Containment pressure- HAS REMAINED 20 psig.
LESS THAN 20 PSIG.
- PR-3-6306A AND PR-3-6306B BOP (Step 15 RNO) Perform the following:
IF containment spray NOT initiated NOTE: Containment Spray is running.
Verify Containment Isolation Phase B
- ACTUATED.
Verify Containment Isolation Phase B valve white lights on VPB ALL BRIGHT.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 8 Page 38 of 46 Event
Description:
Pzr Surge Line Break Time Pos Expected ActionslBehavior Comments BOP IF any Containment Isolation Phase B NOTE: All Phase B Valves valve did NOT close have closed.
Stop all RCPs NOTE: All RCPs will be OFF.
BOP (Step 16) Verify Containment Ventilation Isolation Unit 3 containment purge exhaust and supply fans- OFF Containment Purge Supply and Exhaust Isolation valves-CLOSED
. POV-3-2600
. POV-3-2601
. POV-3-2602
. POV-3-2603 Containment Instrument Air Bleed Isolation valves-CLOSED
. CV-3-281 9
. CV-3-2826 BOP (Step 17) Verify Control Room Ventilation Isolation Emergency Air Supply Fan SF-i B-ON Emergency Air Supply Fan SF-i A-OFF Control Room Ventilation Dam pers AIJGNED FOR RECIRC.
BOP (Step 18) Place Hydrogen Monitors in NOTE: The BOP will call the Service Using 3-NOP-094, CONTAINMENT SNPO and direct that this POST ACCIDENT MONITORING SYSTEM action be performed.
Booth Instructor:
acknowledge as SNPO.
After 10 minutes insert:
TAC2VO2A 1.0 TAC2VO2B 1.0 TAAAV21 1.0 TAAAV22 1.0 TACAOO5 0.0 And report that the H2 Monitors are in service.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 8 Page 9 of 46 Event
Description:
Pzr Surge Line Break Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 19) Verify All Four EDGs- RUNNING NOTE: The BOP will Call Unit 4 and request Unit 4 verify that the U4 EDGs are running.
Booth Instructor:
acknowledge as U4 RCO, and report that the 4A and 4B EDGs are running.
BOP (Step 20) Verify Power to Emergency 4KV Buses and Load Centers Check the 3A, 3B and 3D 4KV buses- ALL ENERGIZED BOP (Step 21) Notify the Unit Supervisor that the PROMPT ACTION VERIFICATIONS Attachment is Complete and discuss any safeguards equipment that is not in the required condition.
3-EOP-E-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/RO continue HERE.
RO (Step 6) Check AFW Pumps- AT LEAST NOTE: All three AFW Pumps TWO RUNNING are running.
RO (Step 7) Verify AFW Valve Alignment PROPER EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT RO (Step 8) Verify Proper AFW Flow NOTE: Adverse Containment Check narrow range level in at least one numbers must be used.
S/G-GREATER THAN 7% [27%]
RO (Step 8a RNO) Perform the following: NOTE: AFW flow is > 400 verify AFW flow greater than 400 gpm. gpm.
IF AFW flow less than 400 gpm IF total feed flow from all sources greater than 400 gpm can NOT be established
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 8 Page 40 of 46 Event
Description:
Pzr Surge Line Break Thfle Pos Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 8.b) Maintain feed flow to S/G until NOTE: Adverse Containment narrow range levels between 21% [27%] and numbers must be used.
50%
RO/ (Step 9) Check RCP Seal Cooling US a. Check all RCP thermal alarms0 OFF
. A 1/1, RCP THERMAL BARR COOLING WATER HI FLOW
. A 1/2, RCP THERMAL BARR COOLING WATER HI TEMP A 1/3, RCP THERMAL BARR COOLING WATER LO FLOW
- b. Goto Step 10.
RO (Step 10) Maintain RCS Cold Leg NOTE: RCS break flow will Tern perature cause RCS temperature to
- a. STABLE BETWEEN 545°F and 547°F lower beyond this level.
OR TRENDING DOWN TO 547°F RO (Step 1 0.a RNO) Perform the following: NOTE: The operator will take actions to limit the cooldown, IF temperature is decreasing, THEN perform however, RCS break flow is the following: controlling the cooldown.
- Stop dumping steam NOTE: Adverse Containment Reduce total feed flow to 400 gpm until conditions will exist due to narrow range level greater than 7% [27%]in Containment temperature.
at least one S/G IF cooldown is due to excessive steam flow IF temperature greater than 547°F IF high-head SI pumps have NOT injected...
RO (Step 10.b) Check IF Boration for RCS NOTE: RCS temperatures are Cooldown Required: well below this value, but HHSI Any RCS Tcold between 545°F and 547°F Pumps are injecting.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 8 Page 41 of 46 Event
Description:
Pzr Surge Line Break Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 11) Check PAZ PORVs, Spray Valves and Excess Letdown Isolated PORVs- CLOSED Normal PRX spray valves- CLOSED Auxiliary Spray Valve, CV-3-31 1 -CLOSED Excess letdown isolation valves- CLOSED
. CV-3-387, Excess Letdown Isolation Valve from Cold Leg to Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger
. HCV-3-1 37, Excess Letdown Flow Controller RO (Step 12) Check if RCPs should be stopped NOTE: All RCPs will be OFF.
- a. Check RCPs- ANY RUNNING CT3: Trip Reactor Coolant Pumps prior to Step 12 of E-O.
Safety Significance: Failure to trip all RCPs on a loss of subcooled margin can lead to core uncovery and to fuel temperatures in excess of 2200°F. Failure to take this action represents mis-operation by the operator which leads to degradation of the fuel cladding fission produce barrier, and a violation of a license condition.
US (Step 1 2.a RNO) Go to step 13 RO (Step 13) Check if S/Gs are Faulted NOTE: All SG pressures are Check pressures in all SGs- decreasing however they are
- decreasing in a controlled ANY SG PRESSURE DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER manner consistent with plant cooldown.
OR ANY SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED US a.GotoStepl4
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 8 Page 42 of 46 Event
Description:
Pzr Surge Line Break Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 14) Check if SIG Tubes are Ruptured NOTE: There is no indication Check levels in all S/Os and secondary of a SGTR.
radiation levels:
ANY SG LEVEL INCREASING IN AN INCONTROLLED MANNER OR
- Condenser air ejector radiation, R-1 5-HIGHER THAN NORMAL OR
- SG blowdown radiation, R-19 HIGHER THAN NORMAL OR
- Local steamline radiation- HIGHER THAN NORMAL US a. Goto Step 15.
RO 15. Check if RCS is Intact NOTE: The RCS is NOT Containment radiation-NORMAL intact.
Containment pressure-NORMAL Containment sump level-NORMAL US Perform the following:
- 1. Monitor Critical Safety Functions using 3-EOP-F-O, CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES
- 2. Go to 3-EOP-E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 1.
NOTE: The US will transition to 3-EOP-E-1.
Examiner NOTE: If both 3-EOP-FR-P.1 and Z.1 have been addressed, the Exam should be terminated.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 8 Page 3 of 46 Event
Description:
Pzr Surge Line Break Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments 3-EOP-FR-P.1, RESPONSE TO IMMINENT PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK CONDITION (Step 1) Check RCS Pressure- GREATER NOTE: Adverse Containment THAN 275 PSIG [575 PSIG] numbers must be used.
NOTE: The RCS pressure is expected to be less than 575 psig.
IF RHR Flow greater than 1100 gpm, THEN NOTE: The RHR Pump flow is return to procedure AND step in effect. expected to be greater than 1100 gpm, and the US will exit this procedure. If an Orange Path exists on Containment CSF, it is expected that the US will enter 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 3-EOP-FR-Z.1, RESPONSE TO HIGH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE RO (Step 1) Check Status of RCPs NOTE: All RCPs will be OFF.
- a. All RCPs-OFF
- b. All Normal Containment Coolers-OFF RO (Step 2) Verify Containment Isolation Phase A Valve White Lights on VPB-ALL BRIGHT RO (Step 3) Verify Containment Isolation Phase B Valve White Lights on VPB- ALL BRIGHT RO (Step 4) Verify Containment AND Control Room Ventilation Isolation
- a. Unit 3 Containment Purge Exhaust and Supply Fans-OFF
- b. Verify Control Room ventilation status panel-PROPER EMERGENCY RECIRCULATION ALIGNMENT
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 8 Page of 46 Event
Description:
Pzr Surge Line Break Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior :nmmpnq; RO (Step 5) Check Cold Leg Recirculation Capability-AVAILABLE
. RHR pump suction- CAPABLE OF BEING ISOLATED FROM RWST
. At least one flow path from a containment recirc sump to an RHR pump-AVAILABLE
. At least one RHR pump-AVAILABLE At least one flow path from an available RHR pump to the RCS-ESTABLISHED ROI (Step 6) Verify Adequate Containment Spray US Pump Suction During Injection Phase
- a. RWST level- GREATER THAN 1 55,000 GALLONS
- b. Verify both RWST Outlet Isolation valves-OPEN
. MOV-3-864A
- MOV-3-864B
- c. Go to Step 8 RO (Step 8) Verify Proper Containment Spray Pump Alignment
- a. Locally verify Containment Spray Pump NOTE: The BOP will call the suction and discharge isolation valves- SNPO and direct that this OPEN action be performed.
- 3-844A for CSP A Booth Instructor:
- 3-891A for CSP A acknowledge as SNPO and report actions taken.
- 3-844B for CSP B
- 3-891 B for CSP B
- b. Verify Containment Spray Pumps- AT LEAST ONE RUNNING.
RO c. Check if second Containment Spray Pump NOTE: Both Containment should be running. Spray Pumps will be running.
- 1) RWST level- GREATER THAN 155,000 GALLONS NOTE: Depending on
- 2) Containment pressure- GREATER THAN Containment pressure, the RO 17 PSIG may stop one of the running
- 3) Verify second Containment Spray Pump- CSPs.
RUNNING
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 8 Page 5 of 46 Event
Description:
Pzr Surge Line Break Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO d. Verify Containment Spray Isolation valve on running Containment Spray Pump(s)
OPEN
. MOV-3-880A for CSP A
. MOV-3-880B for CSP B RO (Step 9) Verify Proper CCW System Operation
- a. COW Heat Exchangers-THREE IN SERVICE
- b. COW pumps- ONLY TWO RUNNING RO (Step 10) Verify Containment Cooling
- a. Verify emergency containment coolers-ONLY TWO RUNNING
- CV-3-2814 for ECC A
- CV-3-2812 for ECC C
- CV-3-2905 for ECC A
- CV-3-2903 for ECC B
- CV-3-2904 for ECC C
- CV-3-2908 for ECC A
- CV-3-2906 for ECC B
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 8 Page 46 of 46 Event
Description:
Pzr Surge Line Break Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 12) Check if Feed Flow should be isolated to any SIG
- a. Check pressure in all SIGs ANY S/G PRESSURE DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER OR ANY S/G COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED US (Step 12 RNO) a. Go to Step 13.
US (Step 13) Return to procedure AND step in NOTE: The US will return to 3-effect. EOP-E-O, at the Step in Effect when the transition was made out of 3-EOP-E-O to either 3-EOP-FR-P.1 or 3-EOP-FR-Z.1.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 Facility: Turkey Point Scenario No.: 5 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)
(RO)
(BOP)
Initial Conditions: The plant is at 108 amps (BOL). Online risk is green. B train is protected on both units. The crew will be directed to raise power to 2-3% and perform AFW Operability Testing; then, latch the Turbine and raise power to 30%.
Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: 3C Condensate Pump out of service due to motor bearing replacement, and the 3B Steam Generator Feedwater Pump is out of service for shaft balancing.
Event MaIf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 NA R-RO Raise Power/AFW Operability Test N-BOP N-SRO 2 TFK1P611 C-RO 3B CCW Pump Trip/Standby fails to Start TFK1B13T C(TS)-SRO 3 TFH1TU59 1-RO Pzr Level Instrument fails HIGH I (TS)-SRO 4 TVKALTBB 1-BOP Steam Pressure instrument fails HIGH/ADV Opens I (TS)-SRO 5 TVFABP1A C-BOP Steam Generator Feed Pump Trip C-SRO 6 TFP1S38S M-RO SUT Lockout/3A EDG Lockout/38 EDG Breaker fails to TFQ5GAS M-BOP CLOSE TFQ5B2OA M-SRO 7 TFHN12 NA #1 Seal LOCA on all RCPs TFHN23 TRHN34 (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 Turkey Point 2013 NRC Scenario #5 The plant is at 108 amps (BOL). Online risk is green. B train is protected on both units. The crew will be directed to raise power to 2-3% and perform AFW Operability Testing; then, latch the Turbine and raise power to 30%.
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: 3C Condensate Pump out of service due to motor bearing replacement, and the 3B Steam Generator Feedwater Pump is out of service for shaft balancing.
Shortly after taking the watch, the crew will commence raising reactor power in accordance with 3-GOP-301, Hot Standby to Power Operations, starting at step 5.24. The crew will perform AFW System operability testing in accordance with 3-OSP-075.1, Auxiliary Feedwater Train 1 Operability Verification.
During the test, the 3B COW Pump will trip, and the standby Pumps will fail to start. The crew will respond using 0-ADM-21 1, Emergency and Off-Normal Operating Procedure Usage, and/or enter 0-ONOP-030, Component Cooling Water Malfunction. The US will address Technical Specification LCD 3.7.2, Component Cooling Water System.
Afterwards, Pressurizer level instrument LT-3-459 will fail HIGH. The crew will enter 3-ONOP-041 .6, Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction, and then 3-ONOP-049.1 Deviation of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channels. The US will address Technical Specification LCD 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation.
Next, the Steam Pressure transmitter for the 3B SG Atmospheric Dump Valve will fail HIGH causing the valve to fail OPEN. The crew will diagnose the open Atmospheric Dump Valve and take manual action to close the valve, and maintain power less or equal to than 5%.
Subsequently, the operating Steam Generator Feed Pump will trip. The crew will recognize that AFW has automatically initiated, and address 3-NOP-075, Auxiliary Feedwater System, to shutdown the AFW System. The crew will start the standby Steam Generator Feed Pump in accordance with 0-NOP-074.01, Standby Steam Generator Feedwater System.
Finally, an electrical ground will cause the loss of the Startup Transformer, which will cause the reactor to trip. On the loss of off-site power the 3A EDG will lock out and the 3B EDG starts but doesnt automatically energize the bus. The crew will enter 3-EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 3-EOP-ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power, upon determining that both the 3A and the 3B 4KV Busses are de-energized.
While in 3-EOP-ECA-0.0, the crew will restore power from the SBO Tie using 3-ONOP-004.3, Loss of 3B 4KV Bus. Simultaneously a Seal LOCA will occur on all three RCPs.
After power is restored the crew will proceed to step 32 of 3-EOP-ECA-0.0, Loss of all AC, and start essential loads. Upon completion of this, the crew will transition to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2, Loss of all AC Power Recovery with SI Required.
The scenario will terminate at Step 8 of 3-EOP-ECA-0.2, after one train of ECCS equipment has been loaded onto the 3B 4KV Bus.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 Critical Tasks:
CT1: Restore Power via the SBO Tie within 10 minutes from the time it is determined that neither off-site Power nor the EDG can be placed on the 3B Bus (Step 9 of 3-ONOP-004.3).
Safety Significance: Failure to energize an AC Emergency Bus constitutes mis-operation or incorrect performance which leads to degraded emergency power capacity. Failure to perform the Critical Task results in a needless challenge and/or degradation of a fission product barrier at the point of the RCP Seals. Additionally, failure to perform the Critical task resutts in the unnecessary continuation of a situation in which RCS inventory is being lost and cannot be replaced. This situation could potentially be equivalent to a situation in which a Small Break LOCA was to exist without the ability to add inventory through the ECCS. See O-ADM-232, Attachmentl p22; Rev 0).
CT2: Start one train of ECCS equipment prior to the completion of Step 8 of 3-EOP-ECA-0.2, Loss of ALL AC Recovery With SI Required.
Safety Significance: Failure to start at least one train of ECCS equipment under the postulated conditions when it is possible to do so, constitutes mis-operation leading to degradation of the RCS Barrier. Since ECCS equipment can be initiated manually from the Control Room, failure to do so demonstrates an inability by the crew to recognize a need for, and to take action that would prevent an unnecessary challenge to a CSF.
NOTE: This scenario will require the assignment of a Surrogate Licensed Operator to monitor/control Steam Generator level during events 1-3. This is based on Attachment 8 of ODI-26, Major Evolution Pre-Briefs, which requires the assignment of this operator during reactor startup. The surrogate must be released prior event 4.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Q Reset to IC-37.
- Ensure that Key #83, has been removed from 3AD07 (From previous run on this scenario).
- Ensure that the Control Room clocks are reset to correct time (From previous run on this scenario).
Q Place Simulator in RUN Q Open and Execute T = 0 Malfunctions:
1LC28: NRCL-l3-i NRC Scen 5
- TAF1 DSCP RACKOUT, (3B Condensate Pump OOS)
Q Perform Simulator Operator Checklist Q Additional Simulator
- Open the Breaker for the 3C Condensate Set-up Pump and place ECO Information Tag.
. Open the Breaker for the 3B SGFP and place ECO Information Tag.
- Start the Turbine Aux Oil Pump
- Stop Turbine Turning Oil Pump
- Place Flagging Dots on the following:
- B414
- C611, C612, C613
- Di/l, D112, 01/3, D114, D115, Di16
- 02/1, D212, D213, 02/4, 02/5, D2/6
- D916
- E2/3
- E3/2
- E4/i
- E812
- E912 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION D Additional Simulator Perform Step 7.1.2.16 of 3-OSP-075.1.
Set-up Ensure Simulator Operator Checklist is complete Place the following cold shutdown placards on VPB
- 3-MOV-865 A, B, & C to yellow
- 3-MOV-862 A and B to white
- 3-MOV-750 and 751 to white
- 3-MOV-843 A and B to yellow
- 3-MOV-869 to yellow
- 3-MOV-866 A and B to yellow Place Simulator in FREEZE If required, Initiate Simulator Data Collection Instruction TD_-005-09 Crew Briefing
- 1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements
- 2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.
- 3. Handout 3-GOP-301, marked up for this evolution.
- 4. Handout 3-OSP-075.1, marked up for this evolution.
- 5. Handout Reactivity Maneuver Plan Transmittal Q Place Simulator in RUN Q Crew Briefing
- 1. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.
Q At direction of Event 1 Raise Power/AFW Operability Test examiner Q At direction of Event 2 3B CCW Pump Trip/Standby fails to Start examiner Insert TFK1P611 TRUE Insert TFK1B13T TRUE Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 Bench Mark ACTIVLTY* DESCRIPTION i: At direction of Event 3 Pzr Level Instrument fails HIGH examiner Insert TFH1TU59 TRUE Q At direction of Event 4 Steam Pressure instrument fails HIGH/ADV examiner Opens Insert:
TFS1MR2H TRUE Q At direction of Event 5 Steam Generator Feed Pump Trip examiner Insert TVFABP1A=1.0, NOTE: Use TAFAO12 = 1.0 (Ramp=2) to open Ramp = 10 seconds DWDS-3-012 during the course of this event.
Q At direction of Event 6 SUT Lockout/3A EDG Lockoutl3B EDG Breaker examiner fails to CLOSE Insert TFP1S38S TRUE Insert TFQ5GAS TRUE NOTE: Insert TCE2E33C when U4 is directed to Insert TFQ5B2OA TRUE close 4AD07.
NOTE: Insert:
TAHN97A=0 TAHN97B=0 TAH N97C=0 TFBVC6O TRUE TFK626A FALSE TFK626C TRUE DELAY=2 When asked to Locally close valves to Isolate the RCP Seals D At direction of Event 7 #1 Seal LOCA on all RCPs examiner Insert:
TFHN12B TRUE NOTE: This is conditioned upon TFP1S38S TFHN23B TRUE (SUT Failure)
(Delayl 5 sec)
TFHN34B TRUE (Delay 30 sec)
TFHN12 TRUE TFHN12C TRUE TFHN23 TRUE TFHN23C TRUE TFHN34 TRUE TFHN34C TRUE Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Q Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page 9 of 44 Event
Description:
Raise Power/AFW Operability Test Shortly after taking the watch, the crew will commence raising reactor power in accordance with 3-GOP-301, Hot Standby to Power Operations, starting at step 5.24.
The crew will perform AFW System operability testing in accordance with 3-OSP-075.1, Auxiliary Feedwater Train 1 Operability Verification.
Booth Operator Instructions: NA Indications Available: NA Time Pose Expected Actions/Behavior Comments 3-GOP-301, HOT STANDBY TO POWER OPERATION RO (Step 5.24) IF testing of the Auxiliary NOTE: The RO will withdrawal Feedwater pumps is required, THEN control rods to raise power.
increase Reactor Power as necessary (approximately 2 to 3 percent) to allow testing of the Auxiliary Feedwater pumps AND to maintain Tavg at approximately 547°F to 549°F.
US (Step 5.25) IF required, THEN test the Auxiliary Feedwater pumps using the following: (N/A if tests are current AND NOT returning from a cold shutdown of greater than 30 days, AND no maintenance was Derformed).
US (Step 5.25.1) 3-OSP-075.1, Auxiliary NOTE: The BOP will perform Feedwater Train 1 Operability Verification, 3-OSP-075.1.
OR 3-OSP-075.6, Auxiliary Feedwater Train 1 Backup Nitrogen Test, as determined by the Shift Manager.
3-OSP-075.l, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER TRAIN 1 OPERABILITY VERIFICATION NOTE: The BOP may contact TO to coordinate starting the A AFW Pump.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as TO.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page 10 of 44 Event
Description:
Raise Power/AFW Operability Test lime Pos Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 7.1 .2.17.a) Start AFW Pump A using NOTE: The BOP will perform S/G 3C or 3B steam supply: start the AFW Pump A.
IF using SIG 3C supply, THEN simultaneously start the stopwatch AND open S/G 3C Supply to AFW Pumps, MOV 3-1405.
BOP (Step 7.1.2.18) Record AFW Pump A start time on Attachment 1 (Section I).
BOP (Step 7.1.2.19) Verify the open light for the steam suilv MOV opened is ON.
BOP (Step 7.1.2.20) Record time for AFW flow to reach 405 qpm on Attachment 1 (Section I).
BOP (Step 7.1.2.22) Check Lube Oil Cooler Discharge Pressure Indicating Transmitter, P IT-6735A:
IF the Lube Oil Cooler Discharge Pressure does NOT increase when the pump shaft starts to roll, THEN manually trip the AFW turbine AND notify the Unit Supervisor.
IF the Lube Oil Cooler Discharge Pressure is less than 10 psig when the pump is at 5,900 rpm, THEN manually trip the AFW turbine AND notify the Unit Supervisor.
IF the AFW Auxiliary Oil Pump was started by ice immersion of the temperature probe, THEN remove the bucket of water from the temperature probe AND verify the AFW Auxiliary Oil Pump stops. NOTE: The TO may call TO to address these steps.
Operator at AFW Pump will need to make If so, Booth Instructor field reports. CV-3-2831, 2832, and 2833 acknowledge as TO that these open and closed, valves go OPEN and CLOSED.
After starting the A AFW Pump, and at the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 2 Page 11 of 44 Event
Description:
3B CCW Pump Trip/Standby fails to Start Following this, the 3B CCW Pump will trip, and the standby Pumps will fail to start. The crew will respond using O-ADM-21 1, Emergency and Off-Normal Operating Procedure Usage, and/or enter O-ONOP-030, Component Cooling Water Malfunction. The US will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.2, Component Cooling Water System.
Booth Operator Instructions: Insert TFK1 P611 TRUE Insert TFK1B13T TRUE Indications Available:
. 3B CCW pump Breaker Green status light is LIT.
. 3B CCW Pump Motor Amps reading 0 amps.
. H9/5, RCP MOTOR BRG COOLING WATER LO FLOW, alarms.
. H7/3, RHR PP A COOLING WATER LO FLOW, alarms.
. H7/4, RHR PP B COOLING WATER LO FLOW, alarms.
. H7/5, CSP A/B COOLING WATER LO FLOW, alarms.
. Al/i, RCP THERMAL BARRIER COOLING WATER LO FLOW, alarms.
. X3/6, SI PUMP COOLING WATER LO FLOW, alarms.
Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments NOTE: The test in progress will be stopped.
NOTE: The Crew will have a success path either by taking the actions allowed by 0-ADM-211, or by entering 3-ONOP-030.
O-ADM-211, EMERGENCY AND OFF-NORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURE USAGE RD (Step 5.7.3.2) Prudent operator actions shall NOTE: Based on the failure of be limited to the following: the 3B CCW Pump, and its Auto Start feature the RD may take manual action to start the standby CCW Pump.
- a. If the setpoint for an automatic actuation signal is reached and the actuation fails OR if a condition will cause an automatic action to occur, the operator should manually initiate the signal.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 2 Page 12 of 44 Event
Description:
3B CCW Pump Trip/Standby fails to Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- b. Taking manual action to control plant NOTE: The RO/BOP may call parameters if an automatic control system is SNPO to address the failed out of service or malfunctioning. CCW Pump.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as SNPO, and report 38 Pump is off.
3-ONOP-030, COMPONENT COOLING WATER MALFUNCTION NOTE: The US will refer to the Foldout Page.
AO/ TOTAL LOSS OF CCW FLOW NOTE: The Total Loss of CCW BOP Flow Criteria will NOT be met.
RO/ LOSS OF CCW TO ANY COMPONENT NOTE: The Loss of CCW to BOP any component Criteria will NOT be met.
RO/ CHARGING PUMP EMERGENCY NOTE: The Charging Pump BOP COOLING CRITERIA Emergency Cooling Criteria will NOT be met.
RO/ CCW PUMP STOPPING CRITERIA NOTE: The CCW Pump BOP Stopping Criteria will NOT be met.
RO/ REACTOR TRIP CRITERIA NOTE: The RCP Trip Criteria BOP will NOT be met.
RO/ RCP STOPPING CRITERIA NOTE: The RCP Stopping BOP Criteria will NOT be met.
RO/ CCW PUMPS, HEAT EXCHANGERS, AND NOTE: The CCW Flow/Loads BOP FLOW/LOADS Criteria will NOT be met.
RO (Step 1) CHECK 4KV Bus 3D energized and aligned to an energized 4KV Bus.
RO (Step 2) CHECK Component Cooling Water Pumps operating.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 2 Page 13 of 44 Event
Description:
38 CCW Pump Trip/Standby fails to Start I I Time [ Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 2 RNO) IF starting an idle CCW pump NOTE: The AC will start either will NOT overload and EDG, THEN START the 3A or 3C COW Pump.
CCW Pump(s) to establish flow in both headers.
AC (Step 3) CHECK flow normal in both Component Cooling Water headers
. Fl-3-613B, FLOW IND FOR CCW LOOP B NOTE: The US may call WOO/Maintenance to address the failed CCW Pump.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.
NOTE: The US will likely conduct a Crew Brief.
Examiner NOTE: The US may continue in the ONOP with little added value, or believing that the event has been mitigated, may address the Technical Specifications.
If the US continues in the CNOP, may want to continue to next event, and check the TS at the end of the scenario.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO 3.7.2, COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM US LCO 3.2.5 The Component Cooling Water System (CCW) shall be OPERABLE with:
- a. Three CCW pumps, and
- b. Two CCW heat exchangers US APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
US ACTIONS
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 2 Page 14 of 44 Event
Description:
3B CCW Pump Trip/Standby fails to Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- b. With only one COW pump OPERABLE or with two COW pumps OPERABLE but not from independent power supplies, restore two pumps from independent power supplies to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 3 Page 15 of 44 Event
Description:
Pzr Level Instrument fails HIGH Afterwards, Pressurizer level instrument LT-3-459 will fail HIGH. The crew will enter 3-ONOP-041 .6, Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction, and then 3-ONOP-049.1 Deviation of Safety Related or Reactor Protection Channels. The US will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation.
Booth Operator Instructions: Insert TFH1TU59 TRUE Indications Available:
. Pzr level instrument Ll-3-459A indicates off-scale HIGH.
. Pzr level recorder LR-3-459 Red pen indicates off-scale HIGH.
- A914, PZR CONTROL HI/LO LEVEL, alarms.
. A814, PZR PROTECTION HI LEVEL, alarms.
- Gill, CHARGING PUMP LO SPEED, alarms.
. A5/4, CVCSCVCS HP LTDN HI TEMP, alarms.
Time j Pos Expected ActionslBehavior Comments NOTE: The US will transition to 3-ONOP-041 .6.
3-ONOP-041 .6, PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL MALFUNCTION RO (Step 5.1) Check pressurizer level indicators NOTE: The RO will recognize LI-3-459A, Ll-3-460, AND Ll-3-461, that LI-3-459 is off-scale 5.1.1 IF one level indicator deviates HIGH, and selects Position 3 significantly from the others, THEN place on the Channel Select CHANNEL SELECT PRESSURIZER LEVEL Pressurizer level Control.
CONTROL switch in a position that will NOT include the defective channel RO (Step 5.2) IF pressurizer level does not follow NOTE: This condition is NOT programmed level, THEN met (Pzr Level is following programmed level).
RO (Step 5.3) IF affected charging pump is not NOTE: This condition is NOT able to maintain programmed level per met (Charging Pump is able to Enclosure 1 maintain Pzr level).
RO (Step 5.4) IF LR-3-459 is selected to a defective channel, THEN place CHANNEL SELECT PRESSURIZER LEVEL RECORDER in another position.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 3 Page 16 of 44 Event
Description:
Pzr Level Instrument fails HIGH Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 5.5) IF control malfunction caused NOTE: This condition is NOT letdown isolation met (Letdown has NOT isolated).
RO (Step 5.6) IF normal letdown can NOT be re NOTE: This condition is NOT established met (Letdown has NOT isolated).
RO (Step 5.7) IF control malfunction caused NOTE: This condition is NOT pressurizer heaters to de-energize met (Pzr Heaters are energized).
RO (Step 5.8) Maintain pressurizer level to be NOTE: The RO may need to consistent with programmed level as take manual control of Pzr indicated in Enclosure 1. Level to restore to programmed level.
US (Step 5.9) Perform actions required by 3- NOTE: The US will transition ONOP-049.1, DEVIATION OR FAILURE OF to 3-ONOP-049.1.
SAFETY RELATED OR REACTOR PROTECTION CHANNELS.
3-ONOP-049.1, DEVIATION OR FAILURE OF SAFETY RELATED OR REACTOR PROTECTION CHANNELS NOTE: The Crew will stabilize the plant.
RO (Step 5.1) Verify instrument loop failure by comparison to adjacent loops and known plant parameters and conditions RO (Step 5.2) Verify no off-normal conditions exist on the adjacent channels which are to remain in service.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 3 Page 17 of 44 Event
Description:
Pzr Level Instrument fails HIGH Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior -- Comments BOP (Step 5.3) Verify applicable control transfer NOTE: If not already done, the switches are in the position which eliminates RO will recognize that Ll-3-459 the failed ioop. is off-scale HIGH, and selects Position 3 on the Channel Select Pressurizer level Control.
RO (Step 5.4) IF a control function was placed NOTE: The RO may need to in manual control due to the failure, THEN take manual control of Pzr verify the control function is returned to Level to restore to automatic. programmed level.
US (Step 5.5) IF the failed channel is NOT NOTE: The US will recognize related to Technical Specifications.... that this instrument is related toTS.
US (Step 5.6) Refer to Technical Specifications 3/4.3, Instrumentation AND verify the minimum channels operable.
Take appropriate actions as specified in Technical Specifications US (Step 5.7) IF a 4KV bus/480V load center NOTE: This condition is NOT undervoltage channel has failed met.
US (Step 5.8) IF a turbine stop valve closure NOTE: This condition is NOT channel has failed met.
US (Step 5.9) IF a turbine emergency trip NOTE: This condition is NOT header channel has failed met.
US (Step 5.10) IF I&C determines a Test NOTE: This condition is NOT Sequence Processor on an Eagle-21 met.
Channel has failed.
US (Step 5.11) IF a containment pressure NOTE: This condition is NOT channel has failed met.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 3 Page 18 of 44 Event
Description:
Pzr Level Instrument fails HIGH Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments US (Step 5.12) IF any other channel has failed, NOTE: The US will refer to THEN perform the following to trip Bistables Technical Specifications and for the failed channel conclude that Bistables need IF plant conditions are such that all required to be tripped.
Bistables associated with the failed channel may be tripped without an undesired RPS or ESF actuation, THEN perform the following:
Place all bistable switches for the affected loop in test position using Attachment 4.
Verify Bistables tripped by observing corresponding status light (VPB) lit.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO 3.3.1, REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION US LCO 3.3.1 As a minimum, the Reactor Trip Functional Unit 9 is NOT in System instrumentation channels and compliance.
interlocks of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE.
US APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-1.
US ACTIONS: As shown in Table 3.3-1.
Action 13- With the number of OPERABLE Examiner NOTE: The channels one less than the Total number of Technical Specification does channels, STARTUP and/or POWER not apply when the plant is OPERATION may proceed provided the below P-7. However, the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped direction has been given to the condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. For subsequent crew to take the plant above required DIGITAL CHANNEL P-7. The examiner can make OPERATIONAL TESTS the inoperable a determination on operator channel may be placed in bypass status for competency by identifying the up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. operator recognizes that this Technical Specification will prevent power ascension above P-7.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4 (Ensure has been removed from the Feed station)
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1-13-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 4 Page 19 of 44 Event
Description:
Steam Pressure instrument fails HIGH/ADV Opens Subsequently, the Steam Pressure transmitter for the 3B SG Atmospheric Dump Valve will fail HIGH causing the valve to fail OPEN. The crew will diagnose the open Atmospheric Dump Valve and take manual action to close the valve, and maintain power less or equal to than 5%.
Booth Operator Instructions: Insert TFS1 MR2H TRUE Indications Available:
. CV-3-1 607 controller output fails to 100% (Yellow LED Hi Alarm)
. 3B SG Steam Flow starts to rise.
- 3B SG Narrow Range Level starts to rise.
. C5/2, SG B STEAM> FEED, alarms.
- 04/2, SG B FEED > STEAM. alarms.
Time Pos Expected Actions/Behavior Comments O-ADM-200, CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS BOP (Step 4.4.3.7) Increasing Reactor Power from unplanned transients which would cause the DCS Calorimetric 1 Hour Average to exceed 100.00% or instantaneous power level to exceed 102%, caused by plant secondary transients (i.e., CV-201 1 opening, large steam leak, turbine control problem, AFW actuation, etc.) shall be turned and reduced below 100 percent by a reduction in steam demand/turbine load.
O-ADM-211, EMERGENCY AND OFF-NORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURE USAGE BOP (Step 5.7.3.2.b) Prudent operator actions NOTE: Based on the failure of shall be limited to the following: the Automatic control of this valve the BOP will take Manual control and close the valve.
Taking manual action to control plant parameters if an automatic control system is out of service or malfunctioning.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1-13-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 4 Page 20 of 44 Event
Description:
Steam Pressure instrument fails HIGH/ADV Opens Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The US may call WCC/Maintenance to address the failed SDTA Valve.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.
NOTE: The US will likely conduct a Crew Brief.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #5.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 21 of 44 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Feed Pump Trip Next, the operating Steam Generator Feed Pump will trip. The crew will recognize that AFW has automatically initiated, and address 3-NOP-075, Auxiliary Feedwater System, to shutdown the AFW System. The crew will start the standby Steam Generator Feed Pump in accordance with O-NOP-074.O1, Standby Steam Generator Feedwater System.
Booth Operator Instructions: Insert TVFABP1A=1.0, Ramp = 10 seconds Indications Available:
. 3A SGFP Motor Amps start to rise above red line.
. X3/4, SU XFMR 3 PANEL TROUBLE, alarms.
. 3A SGFP Recirc valves open.
Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments NOTE: The US will recognize that AFW has auto initiated and must be shutdown; and proceed to the AFW System NOP.
3-NOP-075, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM US! (Step 4.3.1) CHECK the AFW System BOP requires shutdown and restoration to its normal standby mode.
US! (Step 4.3.2) CHECK the AFW System is NO NOTE: Since both SGFPs are BOP longer required or auto start has been unavailable, AFW is required determined to have been inadvertent, until another source of feedwater can be established.
The US will recognize that the AFW System is used in an emergency ONLY, and establish a feedwater source from the Standby Steam Generator Feedwater System, since this system is normally used for startup situations.
Based on this, the US will go to 3-NOP-074.1 and place the Standby SG Feedwater System in service.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 22 of 44 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Feed Pump Trip Time Pos Expected Actions/Behavior I Comments 3-NOP-074.1, STANDBY STEAM GENERATOR FEEDWATER SYSTEM BOP (Step 4.1.1) ENSURE Feedwater Isolation NOTE: The BOP will Signal is RESET. coordinate with the FS1O to complete the local actions associated with Steps 4.1.2 through 4.1.11.B.
Booth Instructor: Call as TO and request reading on P1 1616, THEN use TAFAO12 =
1.0 (Ramp=2) to simulate opening DWDS-3-012 three turns on Unit 3.
Afterwards report that 3-NOP-074.1 Section 4.1 has been completed through Step liE.
BOP (Step 4.1.11 .C) START SSGFP A NOTE: The BOP will start the A SSGFP.
BOP (Step 4.1.11 .D) ENSURE motor operating amperage lower than 115 amps.
BOP (Step 4.1.11.E) OPEN DWDS-3(4)-012, NOTE: The BOP will direct the SSGFP DISCH TO UNIT 3(4) ISOL. TO to fully open DWDS-3(4)-
012.
Booth Instructor: report that this action has been taken.
BOP (Step 4.1.11 .F) ENSURE motor operating amperage lower than 115 amps.
BOP (Step 4.1.11 .G) NOTIFY Reactor Control NOTE: The BOP will re Operator that feedwater is available up to the establish feedwater to the S/G Feedwater Bypass Valves. SGs, and throttle down AFW flow.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-1 3-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 23 of 44 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Feed Pump Trip Time Pos Expected ActionslBehavior Comments NOTE: The US may cal WCC!Maintenance to address the failed 3A SGFP.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.
NOTE: The US will likely conduct a Crew Brief.
Examiner NOTE: The AFW Pumps will still be running at this point. If the scenario is continued the US will go back into 3-NOP-075 and continue with Section 4.3 to shut down the AFW System.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Events #6-7.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 24 of 44 Event
Description:
SUT Lockoutl3A EDG LockoutJ3B EDG Breaker fails to CLOSE/#1 Seal LOCA on all RCPs Finally, an electrical ground will cause the loss of the Startup Transformer, which will cause the reactor to trip. On the loss of off-site power the 3A EDG will lock out and the 3B EDG starts but doesnt automatically energize the bus. The crew will enter 3-EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 3-EOP-ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power, upon determining that both the 3A and the 3B 4KV Busses are de-energized.
While in 3-EOP-ECA-0.0, the crew will restore power from the SBO Tie using 3-ONOP-004.3, Loss of 3B 4KV Bus. Simultaneously a Seal LOCA occurs on all three RCPs.
After power is restored the crew will proceed to step 32 of 3-EOP-ECA-0.0, Loss of all AC, and start essential loads. Upon completion of this, the crew will transition to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2, Loss of all AC Power Recovery with SI Required. The scenario will terminate at Step 8 of 3-EOP-ECA-0.2, after one train of ECCS equipment has been loaded onto the 3B 4KV Bus.
Booth Operator Instructions: Insert TFP1S38S TRUE Insert TFQ5GAS TRUE Insert TFQ5B2OA TRUE Insert:
TFHN12B TRUE TFHN23B TRUE (Delayl5 sec)
TFHN34B TRUE (Delay 30 sec)
TFHN12 TRUE TFHN12C TRUE TFHN23 TRUE TFHN23C TRUE TFHN34 TRUE TFHN34C TRUE Indications Available:
- Control Room lights go out.
- When the Rod Drive MG sets are done coasting down, the Controls Rods will drop into the core.
- Unit 3 Start Up XFRMR White status light is DARK.
- 3A 4KV Bus volts indicates 0 volts.
- 3B 4KV Bus volts indicates 0 volts.
- 3A EDG is NOT running.
- 3B EDG is running.
Time Pos Expected Actions/Behavior Comments 3-EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 25 of 44 Event
Description:
SUT Lockout/3A EDG Lockoutl3B EDG Breaker fails to CLOSE/#1 Seal LOCA on all RCPs Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 1) Verify Reactor Trip NOTE: This Step is an
. Rod bottom lights-ON Immediate Action.
. Reactor trip and bypass breakers- OPEN
. Rod position indicators- AT ZERO
. Neutron flux- DECREASING BOP (Step 2) Verify Turbine Trip NOTE: This Step is an
- a. All Turbine stop or associated control Immediate Action.
valves- CLOSED
- b. Verify Moisture Separator Reheater Steam Valves- CLOSED
- 1) MSR Main Steam Supply Stop MOVs
- 2) Reheater Timing Valves
- 3) MSR Purge Steam Valves
- c. Check Mid and East GCBs-OPEN (Normally 30 second delay)
BOP (Step 3) Verify Power to Emergency 4 KV NOTE: This Step is an Buses Immediate Action.
- a. Check the 3A and 3B 4KV buses-MAINTAIN AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED
- b. Check the 3A and 3B 4KV buses-MAINTAIN BOTH ENERGIZED
- c. Maintain the 3D 4KV bus energized-ALIGNED TO AN ENERGIZED 4KV BUS BOP! Perform the following: NOTE: This Step is an u 1) Attempt to emergency start any Unit 3 Immediate Action.
available diesel generator.
NOTE: The 3A EDG is NOT
- 2) IF neither 3A nor 3B 4 KV bus is running and cannot be started.
energized, THEN go to 3EOPECAO.0, The 3B EDG is running LOSS ALL AC POWER, Step 1. however, its output breaker cannot be closed.
NOTE: The US will transition to 3-EOP-ECA-0.0.
3-EOP-ECA-O.O, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 26 of 44 Event
Description:
SUT Lockout/3A EDG Lockoutl3B EDG Breaker fails to CLOSEI#1 Seal LOCA on all RCPs Time Pos Expected ActionslBehavaor Comments RO (Step 1) Verify Reactor trip
- Rod bottom lights-ON
- Reactor trip and bypass breakers-OPEN
. Rod position indicators-AT ZERO
. Neutron flux-DECREASING BOP (Step 2) Verify Turbine Trip
- a. All turbine stop or associated control valves- CLOSED
- b. Verify Moisture Separator Reheater Steam Valves-CLOSED
. MSR Main Steam Supply Stop MOVs
- Reheater Timing Valves
. MSR Purge Steam Valves
- c. Check Mid and East GCBs-OPEN (Normally 30-second delay)
RO (Step 3) Check if RCS is Isolated
- a. PRZ PORVs-CLOSED
- b. Letdown isolation valves-CLOSED
- c. Excess letdown isolation valves- CLOSED
- CV-3-387, Excess Letdown Isolation Valve from Cold Leg to Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger
- HCV-3-137, Excess Letdown Flow Controller BOP (Step 4) Verify Proper AFW Flow NOTE: Under the current
- b. Verify total AFW flow-GREATER THAN 400 GPM
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 27 of 44 Event
Description:
SUT Lockout/3A EDG Lockoutl3B EDG Breaker fails to CLOSE/#1 Seal LOCA on all RCPs Tin: : xpectedActions/Behavior BOP (Step 4.b RNO) Perform the following: NOTE: If needed the AFW
- 2) Verify proper alignment of AFW valves. IF alignment NOT proper
- 3) IF AFW can NOT be established RO/ (Step 5) Verify 4KV Bus Stripping NOTE: The US may assign BOP a. Verify 4KV bus stripping using the BOP to perform this action.
ATTACHMENTS 1 and 2 If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Attachment 2.
Other Examiners follow ECA 0.0 Actions, Step 5.b, on Page 28.
3-EOP-ECA-O.O, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER ATTACHMENT 2 BOP (Step 1) IF 3B 4KV Bus is de-energized AND NOTE: The BOP will Call Unit 3D 4KV Bus is aligned to 3B 4KV Bus, THEN 4 and request status of the verify the Station Blackout Tie Permissive 4AD07.
Blue light is ON AND 4AD07 OPEN. Booth Instructor acknowledge as U4 RCO, and report 4AD07 is OPEN.
BOP (Step 2) IF 3B 4KV Bus is de-energized AND NOTE: This condition is NOT 3D 4KV Bus is NOT aligned to 3B 4KV met (3B is de-energized and Bus 3D is aligned to 3B).
BOP (Step 3) IF Supply from 4KV Bus 3B, 3AD06, NOTE: This condition is NOT is open met (3AD06 is CLOSED).
BOP (Step 4) IF Supply from 4KV 3B 3AD07, is closed, THEN perform the following:
- a. IF Station Blackout Breaker, 3AD07, is NOTE: This condition is NOT closed met (3AD07 is OPEN).
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 28 of 44 Event
Description:
SUT Lockoutl3A EDG LockoutI3B EDG Breaker tails to CLOSEI#1 Seal LOCA on all RCPs Time Pos Expected ActionslBehavior Comments
- b. Verify breaker for Intake Cooling Water Pump 3C, 3AD05, is open.
- c. Verify breaker for Component Cooling Water Pump 3C, 3AD04, is open.
- d. IF breaker for Intake Cooling Water Pump NOTE: This condition is NOT 3C, 3AD05, OR breaker for Component met (Both breakers are Cooling Water Pump 3C, 3AD05, can NOT OPEN).
be opened....
BOP (Step 5) Notify Unit 3 Reactor Operator that 3B 4KV bus stripping is complete.
3-EOP-ECA-O.O, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the US/RO continue HERE.
RO (Step 5.b) Verify SI-RESET RO (step 5.c) Check the A and B 4KV buses- AT NOTE: Neither Bus will be LEAST ONE ENERGIZED energized.
US c. Go to Step 6 RO (Step 6) verify the A And B 4KV Bus Lockout Relays-RESET RO (Step 7) Verify 3A and 3B Emergency Diesel NOTE: The 3A 4KV Bus is Generator Lockout Relays-RESET Locked Out.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13.1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 29 of 44 Event
Description:
SUT Lockoutl3A EDG Lockout/3B EDG Breaker fails to CLOSE/#1 Seal LOCA on all RCPs Time PS., Expected Actions/Behavior Comments US (Step 7 RNO) Perform the following: NOTE: The US/BOP will BOP a. Locally reset affected emergency diesel contact the ANPO and direct start failure relay by depressing the alarm that they reset the 3A EDG reset pushbutton. Lockout Relay.
- b. Reset affected emergency diesel lockout Booth Instructor: as ANPO, relay. acknowledge, and report that
- c. IF neither lockout relay can be reset this relay cannot be reset (5 Minutes).
BOP (Step 8) Try to Reenergize the A 4KV Bus NOTE: The 3A EDG cannot be from 3A Emergency Diesel Generator started from the Control Room.
- a. Manually start 3A emergency diesel generator from Control Room US (Step 8.a RNO) Go to Step 9.
BOP (Step 9) Try to Reenergize the B 4KV Bus NOTE: The 3B EDG is from 3B Emergency Diesel Generator running.
- a. Manually start 3B emergency diesel generator from Control Room Emergency start OR Rapid start Normal Start
- b. verify 3B 4KV bus stripping from ATTACHMENT 2-COMPLETED
- c. Verify SI-RESET
- d. Manually synchronize 3B emergency NOTE: The 3B EDG output diesel generator to 3B 4KV bus. breaker cannot be closed from the Control Room.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenano # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 30 of 44 Event
Description:
SUT Lockout!3A EDG Lockoutl3B EDG Breaker fails to CLOSE/#1 Seal LOCA on all RCPs Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments (Step 9.d) Locally synchronize 3B NOTE: The US/BOP will emergency diesel generator to 3B 4KV bus contact the ANPO and direct using 3-ONOP-023.2, EMERGENCY that they locally synchronize DIESEL GENERATOR FAILURE, while the 3B EDG to the 3B 4KV continuing with Step 10. Bus Booth Instructor: as ANPO, acknowledge, and report that this cannot be accomplished (10 minutes).
BOP (Step 10) Check if AC Power has been NOTE: Neither the 3A nor the Restored 38 Bus is energized.
- a. Check the 3A and 3B 4KV buses- AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED US (Step 1 0.a RNO) Perform the following:
- 1) Restore AC power using the following procedures:
3-ONOP-044.3, LOSS OF 3B 4KV BUS NOTE: The US may assign the BOP to perform this action.
If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of 3-ONOP-004.3 Other Examiners follow ECA 0.0 Actions, Step 10.a.2, on Page 36.
3-ONOP-004.3, LOSS OF 3B 4KV BUS BOP (Step 1) DETERMINE if 0-ONOP-105, Control Room Evacuation, is in effect.
BOP (Step 1 RNO) GO TO section 3.2 Step 3.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 &7 Page 31 of 44 Event
Description:
SUT LockoutJ3A EDG Lockoutl3B EDG Breaker fails to CLOSE/#1 Seal LOCA on all RCPs Time Pos Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 3) CONFIRM bus stripping on 3B 4KV NOTE: The BOP has Bus. previously corn pleted A. CHECK if 3B 4KV Bus stripping was Attachment 2 of 3-EOP-ECA-verified per 3-EOP-ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC 0.0.
Power B. CHECK 3B 4KV bus automatically RE-ENERGIZED.
BOP (Step 3 RNO) OBSERVE Caution prior to Section 3.2 Step 4 and GO TO section 3.2 Step 4.
BOP (Step 4) CHECK 3B 4KV Bus Lockout Relay NOTE: The 3B 4KV Lockout RESET Relay is reset.
BOP (Step 5) ENSURE SI RESET BOP (Step 6) CHECK 3B Emergency Diesel Lockout Relay RESET.
BOP (Step 7) ENERGIZE 3B 4KV Bus from 3B NOTE: The 3B EDG is Emergency Diesel Generator. already running.
A. Manually START 3B Emergency Diesel Generator from Control Room by any of the following methods:
Emergency start Rapid start Normal start BOP (Step 7.B) ENSURE 3B 4KV Bus stripping NOTE: The BOP will perform from Attachment 1, 3B 4KV Bus Stripping Attachment 1 of 3-ONOP-COMPLETE 004.3.
3-ONOP-004.3, LOSS OF 3B 4KV BUS ATTACHMENT 1
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 32 of 44 Event
Description:
SUT Lockouti3A EDG Lockoutl3B EDG Breaker fails to CLOSE/#1 Seal LOCA on all RCPs Time Pos Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 1) IF 3B 4KV Bus is DEENERGIZED NOTE: The BOP will Call Unit AND 3D 4KV Bus is aligned to 3B 4KV Bus, 4 and request status of the THEN: 4AD07.
A. CHECK Station Blackout Tie Permissive Blue light is ON Booth Instructor B. ENSURE 4AD07, STATION BLACKOUT acknowledge as U4 RCO, and BREAKER, OPEN. report 4AD07 is OPEN.
BOP (Step 2) IF any of the following conditions NOTE: This condition is NOT exist: met (3B is de-energized and 3B 4KV Bus is DEENERGIZED and 3D 3D is aligned to 3B).
4KV Bus is NOT aligned to 3B 4KV Bus Station Blackout Tie Permissive Blue light is OFF.
BOP (Step 3) IF 3AD06, SUPPLY FROM 4KV NOTE: This condition is NOT BUS 3B, is OPEN met (3AD06 is CLOSED).
BOP (Step 4) IF 3AD06, SUPPLY FROM 4KV BUS 3B, is CLOSED, THEN:
A. IF 3AD07, STATION BLACKOUT NOTE: This condition is NOT BREAKER, is CLOSED met (3AD07 is OPEN).
B. ENSURE breaker 3AD05, INTAKE COOLING WATER PUMP 3C, OPEN.
C. ENSURE breaker 3AD04, COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP 3C, OPEN.
D. IF any of the following breakers can NOT NOTE: This condition is NOT be OPENED met (Both breakers are OPEN).
BOP (Step 5) NOTIFY Unit 3 RO that 3B 4KV Bus strippinq is COMPLETE.
3-ONOP-004.3, LOSS OF 3B 4KV BUS
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-1 31 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 33 of 44 Event
Description:
SUT Lockoutl3A EDG Lockoutl3B EDG Breaker tails to CLOSE/#1 Seal LOCA on all RCPs Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 7.C) CHECK 3B Sequencer OPERABLE BOP (Step 7.D) Manually SYNCHRONIZE 3B Emergency Diesel Generator to 3B 4KV Bus.
BOP (Step 7D RNO) Locally SYNCHRONIZE 3B NOTE: This action is progress Emergency Diesel Generator to 3B 4KV Bus from previous direction, or per 3-ONOP-023.2, Emergency Diesel attempted an unsuccessful.
Generator Failure.
BOP (Step 7.E) CHECK 3B 4KV Bus ENERGIZED NOTE: The 3B 4KV Bus is de energized.
BOP (Step 7.E RNO) PERFORM the following: NOTE: The US will likely not
- 1. SHUTDOWN 3B Emergency Diesel shut down this EDG unless Generator per 3-OP-023, Emergency Diesel they are convinced that this Generator. strategy will NOT work.
- 2. OBSERVE Note prior to Section 3.2 Step 8 and GO TO Section 3.2 Step 8.
BOP (Step 8) ENERGIZE 3B 4KV Bus from Unit 3 NOTE: Offsite Power is NOT Startup Transformer available.
A. CHECK Unit 3 Startup Transformer Potential White Light is ON.
BOP (Step 8 A RNO) OBSERVE Caution and Note prior to Section 3.2 Step 9 AND GO TO Section 3.2 Step 9.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 34 of 44 Event
Description:
SUT Lockoutl3A EDG Lockoutl3B EDG Breaker fails to CLOSEI#1 Seal LOCA on all RCPs Time: Ps. Expected Actionsf8ehavior Comments BOP (Step 9) DETERMINE if Station Blackout Tie NOTE: The BOP will observe Line is available. SUT White status light and/or
. CHECK 3A 4KV Bus DEENERGIZED call Unit 4 and request status
. CHECK at least one of the following of the 4A14B Busses.
ENERGIZED: Booth Instructor:
acknowledge as U4 RCO, and 4A 4KV Bus report both are available.
4B 4KV Bus Examiner NOTE: The time clock for the completion of CT1 starts at Step 9 of 3-ONOP-004.3.
RECORD START TIME:_____
BOP (step 10) CHECK 3D 4KV Bus Lockout Relay NOTE: The 3D 4KV Bus RESET. Lockout Relay is reset.
BOP (Step 11) CHECK 3D 4KV Bus aligned to 3B NOTE: The 3D 4KV Bus is 4KV Bus. aligned to the 3B 4KV Bus.
. 3AD06, SUPPLY FROM 4KV BUS 3B, CLOSED
. 3AB19, FEEDER TO 4KV BUS 3D, CLOSED BOP (Step 12) CHECK Station Blackout permissive blue light for 3AD07, STATION BLACKOUT BREAKER, ON.
BOP (Step 13) CHECK 4D 4KV Bus ENERGIZED. NOTE: The BOP will call Unit 4 and request status of the 4D Bus.
Booth Instructor:
acknowledge as U4 RCO, and report 4D 4KV Bus is energized.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 35 of 44 Event
Description:
SUT Lockoutl3A EDG Lockoutl3B EDG Breaker tails to CLOSE/#1 Seal LOCA on all RCPs Ti me Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 14) CHECK 4KV Bus supplying power NOTE: The BOP will call Unit to 40 4KV Bus ENERGIZED by offsite 4 and request status of the power. 4KV busses at U4.
Booth Instructor:
acknowledge as U4 RCO, and report 4KV Busses are energized from offsite power.
BOP (Step 15) ENERGIZE 38 4KV Bus from NOTE: The BOP will close Station Blackout Tie Line. 3AD07 and then call Unit 4 A. CLOSE 3AD07, STATION BLACKOUT and request that they close BREAKER, using keylock switch (Key 4AD07.
Number 82). Booth Instructor:
B. DIRECT Unit 4 RO to CLOSE 4AD07, acknowledge as U4 RCO, and STATION BLACKOUT BREAKER, using Insert TCE2E33C, then report keylock switch (Key Number 82). that 4AD07 is closed.
BOP (Step 16) CHECK 3B 4KV Bus ENERGIZED NOTE: The 3B 4KKV Bus is now energized.
CT1: Restore Power via the SBO Tie within 10 minutes from the time it is determined that neither off-site Power nor the EDG can be placed on the 3B Bus (Step 9 of 3-ONOP-004.3).
Safety Significance: Failure to energize an AC Emergency Bus constitutes mis-operation or incorrect performance which leads to degraded emergency power capacity. Failure to perform the Critical Task results in a needless challenge and/or degradation of a fission product barrier at the point of the RCP Seals. Additionally, failure to perform the Critical task results in the unnecessary continuation of a situation in which RCS inventory is being lost and cannot be replaced. This situation could potentially be equivalent to a situation in which a Small Break LOCA were to exist without the ability to add inventory through the ECCS. See O-ADM-232, Attachmentl p22; Rev 0).
RECORD STOP TIME:
RECORD START TIME (From Page 34):
Total Time between Step 9 and Bus 3B re-energized: minutes BOP (Step 17) ENSURE SI RESET.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-1 3-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 &7 Page 36 of 44 Event
Description:
SUT Lockoutl3A EDG Lockoutl3B EDG Breaker falls to CLOSEI#1 Seal LOCA on all RCPs Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 18) CHECK 3A 4KV Bus ENERGIZED.
BOP (Step 18 RNO) CONTINUE with procedure NOTE: The BOP will report and step in effect to ENERGIZE Load that the 3B13D 4KV busses are Centers: energized.
3-EOP-ECA-O.O, Loss of All AC Power 3-EOP-ECA-Q.0, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the US/RO continue HERE.
RO (Step 1O.a.2) WHEN power is restored to the NOTE: This is a Continuous 3A or 3B 4KV bus, THEN observe the Action. The US will make both CAUTIONS prior to Step 32 and go to Step board operators aware.
32 to perform the recovery actions.
- 3) Observe CAUTION prior to step 11 AND continue to Step 11.
Examiner NOTE: When power is restored to the 3B 4KV Bus proceed to Step 32 on Page 40.
RO (Step 11) Place Non-Running Equipment Switches in PULL-TO-LOCK or STOP as follows
- Unit 3 high-head SI pumps-PTL
. Containment spray pumps-PTL
. Emergency containment coolers-STOP
. RHR pumps-PTL CCW pumps-PTL RO (Step 12) Check Status of Unit 4 High Head SI pumps
- a. Check at least one Unit 4 4KV bus ENERGIZED FROM OFFSITE POWER
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 37 of 44 Event
Description:
SUT Lockoutl3A EDG Lockoutl3B EDG Breaker fails to CLOSE/#1 Seal LOCA on all RCPs Tiniø Pos Expected ActionsIBehavor Comments RO (Step 13) Locally Close Valves To Isolated NOTE: The RO will call the RCP Seals SN P0, and direct these
. 3-297A, RCP A Seal Injection Manual actions.
Isolation Valve Booth Instructor
. 3-297B, RCP B Seal Injection Manual acknowledge as SNPO and Isolation Valve Insert:
. 3-297C, RCP C Seal Injection Manual TAHN97A=O Isolation Valve TAHN97B=O
. MOV-3-381, RCP Seal Water Return and TAHN97C=O Excess Letdown Isolation Valve TFBVC6O TRUE
. MOV-3-626, RCP Seal Cooling Water TFK626A FALSE Outlet Valve TFK626C TRUE DELAY=2 Then report actions taken RO (Step 14) Check S/G Status NOTE: The MSIVs are OPEN.
- a. Main steamline isolation and bypass valves-CLOSED
- b. Main feedwater control and bypass valves-CLOSED
- c. S!G blowdown isolation valves-CLOSED RO (Step 14 RNO) Manually close valves, IF NOTE: The RO will close the valves can NOT be manually closed MSIVs.
RO (Step 15) Check if S/Gs are NOT faulted
- a. Check pressures in all S/Gs
. NO S/G PRESSURE DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER NO S/G COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED RO (Step 16) Maintain Intact SIG Levels NOTE: The RO will able to
- a. Narrow range level- GREATER THAN maintain Steam Generator 7%[27%] levels.
- b. Control AFW flow to maintain narrow range level between 21%[27%] and 50%
- c. Narrow range level- LESS THAN 50%
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 38 of 44 Event
Description:
SUT Lockoutl3A EDG Lockoutl3B EDG Breaker fails to CLOSEI#1 Seal LOCA on all RCPs Time Pos. Expected ActionsIBehavor Comments RO (Step 16.c RNO) Stop feed flow to any SIG NOTE: Because of the initially with narrow range level greater than 50%. low power level, SG levels may be high.
RO (Step 17) Check if S!G Tubes are NOT Ruptured
. Condenser air ejector radiation, R NORMAL.
. S/G blowdown radiation, R-19-NORMAL
. DCS or local DAM1 monitor readings-NORMAL Local steam line radiation readings-NORMAL US (Step 18) Observe CAUTION Prior to Step 24 and go to Step 24 RO (Step24) Check DC Bus Loads NOTE: The RO will hand off
- a. Direct operator to reduce DC bus loading the performance of Attachment as necessary using ATTACHMENT 3 3totheTO.
- b. Dispatch personnel to periodically monitor DC power supply voltage.
RO (Step 25) Check CST Level- GREATER THAN 12%
RO (Step 26) Depressurize All Intact S!Gs to 170 NOTE: The RO will initiate an psig RCS cooldown with the SDTA
- a. Check S/G narrow range levels- Valves.
GREATER THAN 7%[27%] IN AT LEAST ONE S/G.
- b. Manually dump steam at maximum rate using S/G steam dump to atmosphere valves.
- c. Check RCS cold leg temperatures GREATER THAN 31 0°F
- d. Check S/G pressures- LESS THAN 170-PSIG
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 39 of 44 Event
Description:
SUT Lockoutl3A EDG Lockoutl3B EDG Breaker falls to CLOSE/#1 Seal LOCA on all RCPs I I21 Dr I-i.w+ca4 sthi,i,r f----.&.
RO (Step 26.d RNO) WHEN SIG pressures NOTE: The RO will initiate an decreased to less than 170 psig, THEN RCS cooldown with the SDTA manually control S/G steam dump to Valves.
atmosphere to maintain S/G pressures at 170 psig. Continue with Step 27.
RO (Step 27) Check Reactor Subcritical
. Intermediate range channels-ZERO OR NEGATIVE STARTUP RATE
. Source range channels- ZERO OR NEGATIVE STARTUP RATE RO (Step 28) Check SI Signal Status
- a. SI-HAS BEEN ACTUATED
- b. Verify SI-RESET RO (Step 29) Verify Containment Isolation Phase NOTE: Not all status lights will A Valve White Lights on VPB-ALL BRIGHT be bright because they could not close without power.
RO (Step 29 RNO) Perform the following: NOTE: Some valves do NOT
- a. Manually actuate containment isolation have power available, and phase A. must be closed manually.
- b. IF any containment isolation phase A valve is NOT closed, THEN manually close valve. NOTE: The RO may call IF valve(s) can NOT be manually closed FS/SNPO to manually close these valves.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as FS/SNPO.
RO (Step 30) Verify Containment and Control NOTE: Some components do Room Ventilation Isolation NOT have power available,
- a. Unit 3 containment purge exhaust and and must be closed manually.
supply fans-OFF
- b. Verify Control Room ventilation status panel- PROPER EMERGENCY RECIRCULATION ALIGNMENT
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 40 of 44 Event
Description:
SUT Lockout/3A EDG Lockoutl3B EDG Breaker fails to CLOSE/#1 Seal LOCA on all RCPs Time Pos Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 30.b RNO) Manually align equipment NOTE: The RO may call for Control Room emergency recirculation. ES/TO to manually close these valves.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as ES/TO.
RD (Step 31) Check Containment Pressure- NOTE: Containment pressure HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 20 SIG may be rising, but has
. PR-3-6306A remained less than 20 psig.
- PR-3-6306B RD (Step 32) Check Core Exit TCs-LESS THAN Examiner NOTE: Continue 1200°F from HERE when the 3B 4KV Bus is energized.
RD (Step 33) Check if 4KV Bus Power is NOTE: The 3B 4KV bus is re Restored energized from the SBO Tie.
- a. Check 3A and 3B 4KV buses- AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED FROM THE 3A or 3B EDG RD (Step 33.a RNO) IF the energized Unit 3 4KV NOTE: This condition is NOT bus is being fed from the Station Blackout met (The 4N4B 4KV busses Tie AND ONLY ONE Unit 4 4KV Bus is are energized).
energized RD (Step 33.b) Check 3A and 3B 4KV buses- AT NOTE: The 3B 4KV bus is re LEAST ONE ENERGIZED energized from the SBO Tie.
RD (Step 34) Stabilize S/G Pressures NOTE: The RO will adjust
- a. Set S/G steam dump to atmosphere valve SDTA Valve controllers as controllers to maintain S/G pressures- needed to stabilize SG STABLE pressures.
Aooendix D Ocerator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 41 of 44 Event
Description:
SUT Lockoutl3A EDG Lockout!3B EDG Breaker fails to CLOSE/#1 Seal LOCA on all RCPs Ti m 1 pt .-
1 nn. n.n n+e.
RO (Step 35) Verify the Following Equipment Loaded on Energized 4KV Buses
- a. 480 volt load centers
- b. Battery chargers
- c. Instrumentation and control
- d. Communications
- e. HVAC Equipment
- Computer Room Chiller
. Battery Room Air Conditioners E16E (30609)
E16F (40625)
- f. One Auxiliary Building Exhaust Fan
- g. Spent Fuel Pit Exhaust Fan
- h. Spent Fuel Pit Cooling Water Pump
- i. Radiation Monitors
- Unit 3 SEP SPING
. Plant Vent SPING SJAE SPING RO (Step 35.a RNO) Manually close load control NOTE: The RO may call center breakers to energize 480 volt load FSJTO to manually close the centers. load center breakers.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as FSITO.
US (Step 36) Select Recovery Procedure NOTE: Subcooling and Pzr
- a. Verify SI NOT required Level requirements will NOT
GREATER THAN 19°F[73°Fj
- Check PRZ level-GREATER THAN 7%[48%J Check SI- HAS NOT ACTUATED US (Step 36.a RNO)Go to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2, NOTE: The US will transition LOSS OF ALL AC POWER RECOVERY to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2.
WITH SI REQUIRED, Step 1.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 42 of 44 Event
Description:
SUT Lockout/3A EDG Lockoutl3B EDG Breaker fails to CLOSE/#1 Seal LOCA on all RCPs Time Poe. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments 3-EOP-ECA-O.2, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER RECOVERY WITH SI REQUIRED RD (Step 1) Verify SI- RESET RD (Step 2) Check RWST Level-GREATER THAN 155,000 GALLONS RD (Step 3) Check SI Valve Amber Lights on NOTE: NOT all SI status VPB-ALL BRIGHT lights will be bright.
RD (Step 3 RND) Manually align valves to NOTE: The RD may call establish proper SI alignment. FS/TD to manually align valves as needed.
If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as FS/TD.
RD (Step 4) Check RCP Thermal Barrier CCW Isolation Status
- a. CCW pumps- ALL STOPPED
- b. RCP Thermal Barrier CCW Outlet, MOV 626-CLOSED BOP/ (Step 5) Manually Load Intake Cooling Water NOTE: The BOP will start the RD Pumps on Energized Buses 3B and 3C ICW Pumps.
- a. Start two intake cooling water pumps
- b. Verify ICW to TPCW Heat Exchanger ISOLATED
. PDV-3-4882
- POV-3-4883
- c. Check intake cooling water headers-TIED TOGETHER
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 43 of 44 Event
Description:
SUT Lockoutl3A EDG Lockoutl3B EDG Breaker fails to CLOSE!#1 Seal LOCA on all RCPs Time Pos. Expected ActionslBehavior Comments RO (Step 6) Manually Load Component Cooling Water Pumps on Energized Buses
- a. CCW Heat Exchangers- THREE IN SERVICE
- b. CCW Pumps-ONLY TWO RUNNING RO (Step 6.b RNO) Start or stop CCW pumps as NOTE: The 3C CCW Pump is necessary to establish ONLY TWO the only available CCW Pump.
RUNNING CCW PUMPS.
RO (Step 6.c) Check CCW headers- TIED TOGETHER AC (Step 7) Realign SI System NOTE: The4A/4BHHSI
- a. Verify Unit 3 high-head SI pumps-AT Pumps are running.
LEAST ONE RUNNING RO (Step 7.a RNO) Perform the following: NOTE: The AC may elect not
pumps to establish injection to Unit 3 from at least one high-head SI pump.
- 2) IF Unit 3 High-Head SI Pumps are required, THEN direct Unit 4 RCO to align Unit 4 high-head SI pump suction to Unit 3 RWST using ATTACHMENT 1 of this procedure.
- 3) Goto Step 8.
RO (Step 8) Manually Load the Following NOTE: The AC will start the Equipment on Energized Buses 3B RHR Pump and the 3B13C
- b. Start two emergency containment cooler fans.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: L-13-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 44 of 44 Event
Description:
SUT Lockoutl3A EDG Lockoutl3B EDG Breaker fails to CLOSE/#1 Seal LOCA on all RCPs Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CT2: Start one train of ECCS equipment prior to the completion of Step 8 of 3-EOP-ECA-O2, Loss of ALL AC Recovery With SI Required.
Safety Significance: Failure to start at least one train of ECCS equipment under the postulated conditions when it is possible to do so, constitutes mis-operation leading to degradation of the RCS Barrier. Since ECCS equipment can be initiated manually from the Control Room, failure to do so demonstrates an inability by the crew to recognize a need for, and to take action that would prevent an unnecessary challenge to a CSF.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the Exam.