ML13024A360
| ML13024A360 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 12/17/2012 |
| From: | NRC Region 4 |
| To: | Florida Power & Light Energy Point Beach |
| Zoia, Charles | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML11354A208 | List: |
| References | |
| Download: ML13024A360 (9) | |
Text
JPM comments with answers RO Admin 1:
- Why is there a tolerance of + 38MWD/MT?
o To account for an error of + one day. If a candidate was off by 1 MWD/MT they could fail the JPM with calculating the SDM correctly.
One day is essentially the units used here thus why it was picked.
- Why is there a tolerance of + 1% in step 4?
o To account for the + 38MWD/MT in step 1 and rounding. Changing to +
0.25% would adequately span the tolerance in step1.
- Ensure the end numbers in the JPM take into account all the tolerances on the high and low side.
o Calculations based on tolerances are good on both ends.
- Changed the JPM Standard tolerance to match the performance steps.
RO Admin 2:
- Add in the turnover notes to not re-align equipment, take it out of the notes. Also add in the turnover to discuss any TS implications, take out of notes/cues.
o Added do not reposition any equipment in turnover notes. Added a note that follow up may be needed prior to ending the JPM for the RO's to discuss if the equipment has technical specification implications if not done during logs.
RO Admin 3:
- What exactly is critical in steps 5 and 6?
o Step 5 timing valve shut within acceptance criteria is critical and step 6 we need the valve back open to exit TSAC 3.4.15.b. Updated step 5 to clarify what is critical with regards to the valve testing.
- What time is expected in step 7 and what is critical?
o Within acceptance criteria of Attachment D. Operating the valve to determine timing is within acceptance criteria is critical. Also noting that the indicating light is malfunctioning (not meeting acceptance criteria) is also critical.
- What is critical in steps 8-10?
o Step 9 timing valve shut within acceptance criteria is critical and step 8 and 10 we need the valve back open to exit TSAC 3.4.15.b.
- How is step 13 actions documented? What actions are taken?
o Documentation is Attachment D that they say the valve is good or bad by signing. If they say the valve is good with the bad indicating lights then the examinee is stating that a containment isolation valve is acceptable when it is not. The examinee should circle an UNSAT and sign as such.
We added this to the step standard.
RO Admin 5:
- Is this an admin or in-plant?
o We have used this as an Admin JPM on NRC exams in the past. This task, as well as others, are contained in the Emergency Plan Procedures and generally only done during an Alert or Higher. This particular JPM was used on an NRC exam 2000 and 2005. TSC align alternate power (similar in nature) during an event was used in 2002 and 2009.
- Why are steps 1 and 2 not critical?
o Step 1 should not be critical because the candidates are only checking.
Step 2 should be critical for radiological reasons and has been changed to critical. If step 1 isnt done properly by the candidate they will miss step 2 of the JPM which would be missing a critical step.
SRO Admin 1:
- Why is there a tolerance of + 38MWD/MT o To account for an error of + one day. If a candidate was off by 1 MWD/MT they could fail the JPM with calculating the SDM correctly.
One day is essentially the units used here thus why it was picked.
- Is there any tolerance for Step 4?
o To account for the + 38MWD/MT in step 1 and rounding. Changing to +
0.3% would span the tolerance in step1.
SRO Admin 2:
- Step 1 data Chuck would like to take actual data in sim, but if doing in classroom wants a photo. Doesnt want to just tell them numbers have to determine or earn them.
o JPM was changed to have the shift management review done instead of doing an IV, this is what an SRO would do. We do not need to take pictures of the NI meters. This may be difficult with the mirrored background behind the needle.
- Step 3 what should value be?
o Added value from answer key at end.
- Step 4 what should value be?
o Added value from answer key at end.
- Step 5 how should this be documented?
o We added a cue that the form will be corrected by the SRO. Step 7 of JPM then tells SRO to continue with new values that were calculated.
- Step 8 reference AOP-6H? Chuck was unsure what he meant, supposed to look at it.
o Cue for step 7 is clear and modified cue in step 8 to make clearer.
SRO Admin 3:
- For step 2, is it expected the correct value will be calculated?
o The expectation would be for the new values to be calculated and corrected The JPM step has been revised to state that.
- For step 4 why isnt it critical a CR is generated?
o The critical action is in NOT exiting the TSAC, but instead identifying safety related equipment is still inoperable. The step was modified to add a cue the 4th License will write the CR. (now step 6)
- We also changed the JPM during validation week to not sign off that the TSAC was exited. Also broke up the last procedure step into 3 JPM steps and clarified what would be required for CR's.
SRO Admin 4:
- Steps 5 and 6 require the same thing, cant get credit for 2 steps with doing 1 action.
o Combined these 2 steps into one within the JPM, it is one step on the PBF.
The rest of JPM steps were re-numbered.
- Explain why only specific notifications are critical.
o Chemistry is required due to the 1-hr sampling requirements. If for some reason the other groups are not immediately notified, there are no serious implications. For example Licensing has 30 days to do a report.
o Previous exam, 2009, the notifications were done the same way with a different RMS monitor.
SRO Admin 5:
- Why is the notification omitted? We should also do the NARS form.
o Recent exams the classification and notification have been 2 separate JPMs. These are 2 different tasks and have different K/As. Leave JPM as is with classification and PARS recommendation.
- During validation week we made the task PAR's only. Candidate makes a PAR and then the NARS form is handed to him to document the recommendation.
In-Plant I:
- Title mis-spelled o Fixed.
- What did we revise in the cue for this JPM?
o Cue changed to give the examiner the proper indications to the examinee depending on which way the turn the handwheel to gag open the valve.
In-Plant J:
- Step 8 checking something is not critical, have to do something.
o Revised JPM to make this step not critical.
Wants consistency so candidates dont wonder whats up with one being different.
o Fixed.
In-Plant K:
- Step 2 with ensuring isnt critical, have to take action.
o Step 2 is taking G05 to local vice leaving in remote, action is taken and needed to complete task so step will remain critical.
- During validation week we clarified the cue where the alarm comes in.
Sim A:
o Turnover notes and step 14, completed.
- Step 3 if critical, what are expected values.
o Step is critical as the dropped rod needs to be restored to its previous position and this is done by recording these values.
- Step 8, checking is not critical.
o Step changed to be not critical.
Sim B:
- Change terminating cue to match other JPMs.
o Done
o Examinees may know the actions that have to be taken and can take them without taking the Alarm Response Procedure out prior to. The ARB should be referenced after taking action and if not, a comment may be warranted. ARB is spelled out in previous sentence.
- How much time would it add to have the examinees calculate out the settings and have to change the controllers? If it takes too long or if the settings have to be quadruple checked then dont bother.
o Revised JPM to have RMUW Controller set wrong. This would require a change to the JPM and re-snapping the simulator, about a couple minutes.
Sim C:
- Step 15 ensuring is not critical.
o Made step not critical but referenced earlier step where valve is expected to be opened and vice versa.
- Step 16 issues with how notes are set up between this step and step 2. If expected to be done in step 2 then make step 16 not critical and make notes cross-reference.
o Made step not critical but referenced earlier step where valve is expected to be opened and vice versa.
- Step 23 why is opening only MOV critical when the EOP set states both should be opened. He thinks this is a big issue, not following an EOP set procedure. I tried explaining to him flowpaths, maybe we need a print. I think hell land on it being a procedural compliance issue (similar to spray JPM). Is there something in the CSP basis that will allow him to say it is OK to only open 1 valve?
o Include a drawing and show parallel flowpath and reference calculation from EPU that states with the low flowrates the head loss is considered insignificant. There would be an expected comment regarding the lack of following the procedure if only 1 valve is opened.
Sim D:
- Why start at step 18? He wants to explore starting JPM at an earlier point to see the examinees make a decision under pressure to trip the RCP and determine the need to go to step 18. The reactor trip part of the JPM doesnt have to be critical.
o Having the RO perform an AOP by himself plus determining RCP trip criteria isn't their job, this is really an SRO function. During this situation the SRO briefs the RO and BOP with the RO tripping the unit and the BOP performing Step 18 of AOP-1B. The RO would perform the reactor trip and immediate actions of EOP-0. The SRO would then hand off Step 18 to secure the affected RCP and direct the BOP to perform this after immediate actions are complete and verified.
Sim E:
- Step 2, can we do this without a cue? Shouldnt they know what normal level is or can we provide a copy of the shift log. He would prefer if the examinees all asked for the information and tell him where to find it.
o Modified JPM to have examinees identify where they can find spray add tank level in logs and then provide said level.
- Step 4 states open all valves and we say only 1. Why deviate from an EOP and say it is OK, same as comment above. Explain flowpath and provide a basis document.
o Changed the step to require 2 valves associated with the started spray pump be open for the critical action. There would be an expected comment regarding the lack of following the procedure if not all 4 valves are opened. Power Uprate and Alternate Source Term modifications require that BOTH discharge valves are required to be open for the started spray train.
Sim F:
- What conditions arent met in the sim? OE about from a past exam where an auditor watching had to stop the exam because conditions were not right per the initial conditions. Document in the JPM we looked at this ahead of time and determined that the control and indications for the examinee are not affected by the simulator set up.
o Updated JPM with note regarding validation with initial conditions not met.
- Step 15 make sure frequency has to be adjusted or it isnt critical.
o Frequency has to be adjusted so the step is considered critical.
- Step 16 make sure voltage has to be adjusted or it isnt critical.
o Voltage has to be adjusted so the step is considered critical.
Sim G:
- Step 4, verifying the response from switch manipulation is also critical, not just re-positioning switch.
o While checking the alarms clear is signed off in the step, the task of returning the instrument to service would be completed whether the alarms were checked or not. JPM was changed to have a cue from the board operator checking alarms.
Sim H:
- Why is step 8 considered critical?
o Changed to not critical, switch spring returns to auto.
Noted for both the Audit and NRC exam the SROs are doing classifications. Looked at the JPMs from both exams to make sure they are different enough.
Noted we have a G04 JPM for the Audit and a G05 JPM for the NRC. Looked at both together to see if they are different enough. G05 is a Gas Turbine and G04 is an Emergency Diesel Generator.
Other Changes From validation week Whatever was revised from the 45-day submittal should be copied to the 'changes during validation' folder for submittal to the Chief Examiner.
Scenario 1
- Added specific TSACs to be addressed.
- Added additional failure for CI path failing to shut for RCS Sample line.
- Added turnover note why we were at 75% power.
- Changed out RT-7 critical task for PZR level to EOP-0-O, isolate CI valve prior to end of scenario.
- Added sim codes and additional wording for additional malfunction.
- Added cues for Attachment A operation at the C-67 panel.
- Added additional field communication for charging pump relief valve checks in AOP-1D.
- Changed scenario end point from starting a cooldown in EOP 1.2. New endpoint is addressing Step 16 in EOP-1 if all critical tasks are met or after transition to ECA 1.2 if containment isolation path is still in need of isolation.
Scenario 2
- Added specific TSACs to be addressed.
- Changed out RT-7 critical task for PZR level to tripping the reactor prior to automatic rod motion stopping. At the point auto rod motion stops the unit is outside the acceptable operating band for AFD and RIL's. Both of these are outside design bases and places us in an unanalyzed condition.
- Added cues for Attachment A operation at the C-67 panel.
Scenario 3
- Added specific TSACs to be addressed.
- Added cues for Attachment A operation at the C-67 panel.
- Added control room steps for starting second feed train.
- Added malfunctions so SI fails to automatically actuate and changed critical task.
- Added note that the RO may isolate the MSIV's instead of the BOP depending on the movement of the scenario.
Simulator JPMs
- a. Recover dropped Rod (RO only) o Added values the candidate is recording in step 3 o Added note in step 4 on how to reset step counter
- b. Makeup to the VCT.
o Updated JPM to allow examinee to leave RMUW set for 50 gpm and adjust the boric acid controller instead.
- c. Respond to a Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.
o Broke step 5 into 3 different steps o Clarified what is two Steam Dump operations.
o Added one more step to JPM and clarified last 2 steps for cooldown and termination criteria.
- d. RCP Malfunction o Made Rev 4 and removed verbal cues that are not needed based on sim indications.
- e. Adjust Containment Sump pH o Shortened initiation cue on pg 3 and 10 to perform the given step; removed redundant instructions o Added information to step 6 evaluator notes that failing power to the controller opens the valve.
- f. Island EDG per 1-SOP-4KV-001 o Removed first 2 bullets off turnover sheets.
- g. Return NI to Service.
o Added cue to step 4 so examinee doesn't have to come back around in front of boards.
o Added cue to step 5 to state Attachment B is completed/signed off.
o Added cue from step 4 to step 8.
o Bolded cues In-Plant Systems JPMs
- i. Locally Operate the Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve o Changed turnover and cues to remove confusion with AOP-10C note.
- j. Start IA Compressor to Depressurized Receiver.
o Adjusted the standard for step 4 documenting required rotation of valve.
- k. Locally start G05.
o Added caution to step 3 to not have examinees remove keyboard and mouse for plant safety reasons.
o Added picture of overview screen to use during JPM.
o Clarified cue to give for the initiating alarm.
o Clarified cues for G05 start.
- Perform Shutdown Margin Calculation o Changed tolerance of power defect, removed tolerances from rod worth input to table, and changed final value to a range appropriate to the power defect values that can be used o Made answer key reflect the same values as in the body of the JPM
- Conduct a Control Board Walk-down for Shift Turnover o Changed turnover notes on pp 3 and 9 to perform logs vice certain pages.
o Added cues to acknowledge found equipment issues and tell the RO to continue.
o Added Step 5 to JPM for a cue to give the RO equipment alignment on the back of the control boards.
- Perform Containment Isolation Valve test o Added note to document multiple valve timings.
o Made step 12 critical.
o Made step 14 not critical.
- Operate Technical Support Center Ventilation System o Added cue to step 7 to 'hear' compressor start.
- Verify Shutdown Margin Calculation o Changed power defect tolerance and final answer from +/- 50 to +/- 25, and removed 0 tolerance from several steps o Added evaluator note to direct the candidate to evaluate the entire SDM if they attempt to stop after finding one mistake.
- Review Quadrant Power Tilt Calculations o Updated cue to have SRO make corrections on form so step 5 can be completed in AOP-6H.
- Review Completed Surveillance.
o Revised initial conditions to not have exited TSAC with step 5.7.8 not signed off.
o Broke up step 4 in JPM into 3 steps o Added what is required to be put in the AR o Need to write AR post exam to address potential procedure deficiency on the situation where TSAC was exited and equipment may still be OOS.
- Remove RMS channel o Updated step 7 standard wording, grammar only-rearranged words.