ML12214A458
| ML12214A458 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 07/23/2012 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-II |
| To: | Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| Shared Package | |
| ML12214A278 | List: |
| References | |
| Download: ML12214A458 (113) | |
Text
v1 ft)flrQ_Qlrnl _fi1vl_fnrmQ_mQ drr ES-201 Examination Preparation Checklist Form ES-201-1 Facility:
R C Date of Examination:
Developed by: Written
- Facility NRC D ii Operating - Facility Target Chief Date*
Task Description (Reference)
Examiners Initials
-180 1.
Examination administration date confirmed (Cia; C.2.a and b)
-120 2.
NRC examiners and facility contact assigned (C.1.d; C.2.e) lO/
1 4/t(
-120 3.
Facility contact briefed on security and other requirements (C.2.c) %4/
-120 4.
Corporate notification letter sent (C.2.d) lC)/lc/i
[-90]
[5.
Reference material due (C.1.e; C.3.c; Attachment 3)]
i/
1
{-75}
6.
Integrated examination outline(s) due, including Forms ES-201-2, ES-201-3, ES-301-1, ES-301-2, ES-301-5, ES-D-ls, ES-401-i12, ES-491-3 and ES-401-4, as applicable (C.1.e and f; C.3.d)
{-70}
{7.
Examination outline(s) reviewed by NRC and feedback provided to facility licensee (C.2.h; C.3.e)}
{-45}
8.
Proposed examinations (including written, walk-through JPMs, and YL2/
scenarios, as applicable), supporting documentation (including Forms
ES-301-3, ES-301-4, ES-301-5, ES-301-6, and ES-401-6, and any Form ES-201-3 updates), and reference materials due (C.1.e, f, g and h; C.3.d)
-30 9.
Preliminary license applications (NRC Form 398s) du (C.1.1; C.2.g; ES-202)
) / a.
-14 10.
Final license applications due and Form ES-201-4 prepred (CII; C.2.i; ES-202)
-14 11.
Examination approved by NRC supervisor fpr facility licensee review (C.2.h;C.3.f)
&/I3/(
-14 12.
Examinations reviewed with facility licensee (C.1.j;
-7 13.
Written examinations and operating tests approved by NRC supervisor (C.2.i; C.3.h)
-7 14.
Final applications reviewed; 1 or 2 (if >10) applications audited to confirm qualifications I eligibility; and examination approval and waive letters sent (C.2.i; Attachment 5; ES-202, C.2.e; ES-204)
-7 15.
Proctoring/written exam administration guidelines reviewed J
with facility licensee (C.3.k)
-7 16.
Approved scenarios, job performance measures, and questions / /
distributed to NRC examiners (C.3.i)
/l//i.._
/C.
- Target dates are generally based on facility-prepared examinations and are keyed to the examination date identified in the corporate notification letter. They are for planning purposes and may be adjusted on a case-by case basis in coordination with the facility licensee.
[Applies only] {Does not apply} to examinations prepared by the NRC.
FACILITY: Farley EXAMINATION PROJECT SCHEDULE CHIEF EXAMINER: Bruno Caballero Exam Start Date (from annual letter to licensees):
Written Exam Date (from Corporate Notification Letter)
Operating Test Start Date (from Corporate Notification Letter)
Exam End Date:
See NUREG-1021 fora detailed discussion of examination schedule milestones.
Notes
-1#11 (-l4days) xamination Comments Note 1:
t,J,i7TEAJ x/fiV1 S4fY)p
/4,J JL.Y ES-201 Examination Outline Quality Checklist Form ES-201-2 Facility:
Date of Examination:
F1)fhJ E 7 O/c Initials Item Task Description 1.
a.
Verify that the outline(s) fit(s) the appropriate model, in accordance with ES-401.
R b.
Assess whether the outline was systematically and randomly prepared in accordance with I
Section D.1 of ES-401 and whether all K/A categories are appropriately sampled.
14 T
-r-T c.
Assess whether the outline over-emphasizes any systems, evolutions, or generic topics.
L 14 d.
Assess whether the justifications for deselected or rejected K/A statements are appropriate.
1 2.
a.
Using Form ES-301-5, verify that the proposed scenario sets cover the required number of normal evolutions, instrument and component failures, technical specifications, S
and major transients.
M b.
Assess whether there are enough scenario sets (and spares) to test the projected number U
and mix of applicants in accordance with the expected crew composition and rotation schedule L
without compromising exam integrity, and ensure that each applicant can be tested using A
at least one new or significantly modified scenario, that no scenarios are duplicated T
from the applicants audit test(s), and that scenarios will not be repeated on subsequent days.
c.
To the extent possible, assess whether the outline(s) conform(s) with the qualitative and quantitative criteria specified on Form ES-301 -4 and described in Appendix D.
3.
a.
Verify that the systems walk-through outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301 -2:
(1) the outline(s) contain(s) the required number of control room and in-plant tasks W
distributed among the safety functions as specified on the form I
(2) task repetition from the last two NRC examinations is within the limits specified on the form T
(3) no tasks are duplicated from the applicants audit test(s)
(4) the number of new or modified tasks meets or exceeds the minimums specified on the form (5) the number of alternate path, low-power, emergency, and RCA tasks meet the criteria on the form.
b.
Verify that the administrative outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301-1:
(1) the tasks are distributed among the topics as specified on the form (2) at least one task is new or significantly modified (3) no more than one task is repeated from the last two NRC licensing examinations
c.
Determine if there are enough different outlines to test the projected number and mix of applicants and ensure that no items are duplicated on subsequent days.
4.
a.
Assess whether plant-specific priorities (including PRA and IPE insights) are covered Ag in the appropriate exam sections.
7ff 14 G
/
E b.
Assess whether the 10 CFR 55.41/43 and 55.45 sampling is appropriate.
V7 N
c.
Ensure that K/A importance ratings (except for plant-specific priorities) are at least 2.5.
E R
d.
Check for duplication and overlap among exam sections.
L e.
Check the entire exam for balance of coverage.
)7 /i f.
Assess whether the exam fits the appropriate job level (RO or SRO).
t7 T
- a. Author
/f
- b. Facility Reviewer AI/
4
- c. NRC Chief Examiner (#)
13R-UO Cf
(
2 o
- d. NRC Supervisor A4L 1 I
/ /
to -!Y-i Note:
- Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column c; chief examiner concurrence required.
Not applicable for NRC-prepared examination outlines
ES-201-2 Examination Outline Quality Checklist Facility:
Farley Nuclear Plant Date of Examination:
June 18, 2012 Operating Test Number: FA2012-301 Initials Item Task Description
1.
a.
Verify that the outline(s) fit(s) the appropriate model, in accordance with ES-401.
R b.
Assess whether the outline was systematically and randomly prepared in accordance with I
Section D.1 of ES-401 and whether all K/A categories are appropriately sampled.
Iv T
T c.
Assess whether the outline over-emphasizes any systems, evolutions, or generic topics.
i PL d.
Assess whether the justifications for deselected or rejected K/A statements are appropriate.
2.
a.
Using Form ES-301-5, verify that the proposed scenario sets cover the required number of normal evolutions, instrument and component failures, technical specifications, S
and major transients.
M b.
Assess whether there are enough scenario sets (and spares) to test the projected number U
and mix of applicants in accordance with the expected crew composition and rotation schedule L
without compromising exam integrity, and ensure that each applicant can be tested using ftQ)
A at least one new or significantly modified scenario, that no scenarios are duplicated T
from the applicants audit test(s), and that scenarios will not be repeated on subsequent days.
c.
To the extent possible, assess whether the outline(s) conform(s) with the qualitative and quantitative criteria specified on Form ES-301-4 and described in Appendix D.
19 3.
a.
Verifythatthe systems walk-through outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301-2:
(1) the outline(s) contain(s) the required number of control room and in-plant tasks W
distributed among the safety functions as specified on the form
/
(2) task repetition from the last two NRC examinations is within the limits specified on the form T
(3) no tasks are duplicated from the applicants audit test(s)
(4) the number of new or modified tasks meets or exceeds the minimums specified on the form (5) the number of alternate path, low-power, emergency, and RCA tasks meet the criteria on the form.
b.
Verify that the administrative outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301-1:
(1) the tasks are distributed among the topics as specified on the form (2) at least one task is new or significantly modified k
(3) no more than one task is repeated from the last two NRC licensing examinations
c.
Determine if there are enough different outlines to test the projected number and mix of applicants and ensure that no items are duplicated on subsequent days.
,C1
4.
a.
Assess whether plant-specific priorities (including PRA and IPE insights) are covered in the appropriate exam sections.
b.
Assess whether the 10 CFR 55.41/43 and 55.45 sampling is appropriate.
,kD Wf E
c.
Ensure that K/A importance ratings (except for plant-specific priorities) are at least 2.5.
R d.
Check for duplication and overlap among exam sections.
L e.
Check the entire exam for balance of coverage.
/23 f.
Assess whether the exam fits the appropriate job level (RO or SRO).
j rinted Name/Signature Date
- a. Author Billy Thornton /
kf.Ah 05/31/12
- b. Facility Reviewer (*)
Gary Ohmstede /
05/31112
- c. NRC Chief Examiner (#)
IWNO
,4ii.%PD/
I
- d. NRCSupeMsor
/(/
(
Note:
- Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column c; chief examiner concurrence required.
Not applicable for NRC-prepared examination outlines
ES-201 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201 -3 1.
Pro-Examination I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of as of the date of my signature.
I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner.
I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensees procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee.
I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised.
2.
Post-ExaminatIon PRINTED NAME 1
iptd
- 2. 4%,/
1-3.
ki-jo42 4.
v d jd bratdL.
- 5. ostt Sc 1L 6C
. çi
- 7. fr+
f,t,(e 1
-7
- 8. T&..tey 9.
t 9
c-
- 10. Av,J. -ct+t 11.,4c.e eiJ
- 12. 3rt JLtJ 13.bog 14.Zcj 1V1%?s,,,6L47 15.
Thwes,,k s PG?
&O-V,.1 bc ZL5T s1 fQ 5k)f (DC1lI. ILj To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of
. From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.
JOB TITLE I RESPONSIBILITY t4 C-C/
14,FL ic.c.
,4NATlJRE (1)7)
DATE SIGNATURE (2)
DATE NOTE A
.cj (jit4_.._
1 eo
./ y.
NOTES:
ticS
/--
r fr4.-/
/4i.t y_t.,,
2-2i 2..,/J, i (2...
/ 2 12, A-
-a-1,z.
1-1\\
7/6I/.
ES-201,P 27 of 28
f4A9ei p1 ES-201 Eination security Agreement Fonn ES-2014 1.
acknowledge that I heve acquWed specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examWiations scheduled for the week(s) of as of the date of my slgnature I agree that I wJ not knowingly divulge any information about these examinions to any persona who have not been authodzed by the NRC chiefexaminer. I understand that I am not to uct, evaluate, or provide pedumiance feedback to those epplicards scheduled to be administered these ceasing examinedons from this date untli completion of examination adn*ilatmtion, exce as spedlically noted balow and aulhbezed by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator m aoceple the individual does not salad th training content or provide dial or indirect feedback). Fu1hermom, I era aware of the physical sec.sity meesuwe end requiremente (as documented lii the facility licensees procedures) and understand that violation ofthe conditions of lie agreement may remit irs canceliabon ofthe examinations andlor an enfomement action agalnat me or the facility licensee. I will lnwnedlal&y report to facily management or the NRC diM examiner any Irdeabons or su one that examination security may have been compronised.
2.
PoetEwalnatlon To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any Irifonnatlon concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of
. From the date that I entered into INs security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those plicants who wei admkulsred these licensing examinations, except as specitically noted below and authorized by the NRC.
4-
);c4.J_
-r ;44yr 7
adp 5.
<,n
. 0 74c.i /Xri Z.
6Ci.... (,j -
£ ci
,.O.
/
4S
.sJ6z
- 7. P14*i-f(e 4
- 8. T-I r
. Ck 1
- 10. AviS 4f-11.
Cp.ej 12.j3vs 13jsi. Ohi,c*g.i.
NOTES:
O*4fl f 4
Jaa4k/
4 34 1 G., ice.-
PRINTED NAME JOB 11TLE I RESPONSIBILITY 1-/2D,S S1GtTURE(
DATE NOTE 7//
P0 Pi.øi,.
PItb4t 5tq-,z..
U
-/
I
- t?*
4k41I 5
ea%l i%J h_
/-
ES-201, P 27 of 28
ES-201-3 Examination Security Agreement I
Pre-Examinataon I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the weeks June 18 July 3 2012 as of the date of my signature I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner.
I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants schedulé:to be administered these licensng examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select thetraining content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented inthe facility licensees procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee.
I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised.
2.
Post-Examination To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of J Te..t2 ojt-From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, orprovide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.
PRINTED NAME 1.
Howard Fitzwater
- 2. Billy Thornton
- 3. Gary Ohmstede
- 4. Darryl Stevenson
- 5. Michael GaNe
- 6. Kevin Riley
- 7. Cand ice Wright 8.74f/iZ 1.
14.
15.JE(L
. A/Jfr 1
c JOB TITLE I RESPONSIBILITY OPS TRN INST/ Facility Author Control Technician Simulator Coordinator Nuclear Specialist I Engineer II SIGNATURE (1) i
),Z,7
/
OPS TRN INST/ Facility Author Lead Instr Exam Dev
&i ifiia,-f
- 9. :jr., 0 Vk 535 4flk.
5J..s
- 11. At1/4 7&4)(PiLt,
12.p 1
J 1
13.
J f,,j44 k-o 2-i 1
DATE
...&tGATURE(2)
DATE NOTE
(ø-tI-zq
%_2_
z.z Io-pzoii Caqzta j /)1j ac-h-lu 62
/o/?
1
,SJy/i /
-2ct-4)
/ii it1f.i s_55
I1T ss Q r
/
4*
p
-2o-l2 AJO E4 1 T
/-I4 9ee
,rkr.s 44
,.4/oV ZLz 7-34L NOTES:
r Ja fd1 tJz w, / 4vt
+ -rit 4 L
f-i-c,iuJ -L 1
L
-L /..u/ cLMJc i
JaQi
&7° 41.M <7
.-, JL &I iu
- J -k A.z- &).PJ(
ES-201-3 Examination Security Agreement 1.
Pre-Examination I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the weeks June 18 July 3, 2012 as of the date of my signature.
I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner.
I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensees procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee.
I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised.
2.
Post-Examination To the best of my knowledge, I did jot divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of
\\JAQ. /3-SL 21 77-From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the compietion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.
PRINTED NAME
- 1. RR 1
oa.. %Jk 2.
6 ca i-f4
- 4. Iip )A%J 5.
6.
7.
8.
JOB TITLE I RESPONSIBILITY oes tcs
íS Q4o SIGNAT RE (1)
DATE K.)1ATUR (2)
DATE NOTE
.J244.
9.PD..
12 9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
NOTES:
No tv;s ut /vff sA 4 into at Pt
.4Ji i, j...r 4
L,..
.4.
.+,
g
ES-301-1 Administrative Topics Outline Facility:
Farley Nuclear Plant Date of Examination: June 18, 2012 Examination Level:
RO X Operating Test Number:
FA2012-301 Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (see Note)
Code*
a.
A.1.a
Title:
Determine maximum RHR flowrate and time to Conduct of Operations N, R saturation for a loss of RHR event while at midloop.
G2.1.25 3.9/4.2 b.
A.1.b
Title:
Identify the On-Shift Manning Requirements for the Conduct of Operations D, R Conditions Provided.
G2.1.5 2.9*! 3.9 c.
A.2
Title:
Perform STP-9.0, RCS Leakage Test, and evaluate Equipment Control M, R Acceptance Criteria.
G2.2.12 3.7/4.1 c.
A.3
Title:
Determine the Correct RWP, Total Projected Dose Radiation Control M, R And Determine if an Oil Addition and venting can be Performed to the 2A RHR pump without exceeding limits
- defined, G2.3.14 3.4/ 3.8 NOTE:
All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.
- Type Codes & Criteria:
(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for RO5; 4 for SROs & RO retakes)
I (N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1) 3 (P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected) 0
ES-301 -1 Administrative Topics Outline Facility:
Farley Nuclear Plant Date of Examination: June 18, 2012 Examination Level: SRO X
Operating Test Number:
FA2012-301 Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (see Note)
Code*
a.
A.1.a
Title:
Determine maximum RHR flowrate and time to Conduct of Operations N, R saturation for a loss of RHR event while at midloop.
G2.1.25 3.9/4.2 b.
A. 1.b
Title:
Identify the On-Shift Manning Requirements for the Conduct of Operations D, R Conditions Provided.
G2.1.5 2.9*! 39 c.
A.2
Title:
Perform STP-9.0, RCS Leakage Test, evaluate Equipment Control M, R Acceptance Criteria and evaluate Tech Specs.
G2.2.12 4.1 d.
A.3
Title:
Determine Emergency Exposure limits for a task and Radiation Control M, R determine if the task can be performed.
G2.3.14 3.8 e.
A.4
Title:
Classify an Emergency Event per NMP-EP-1 10, Emergency Procedures/Plan N, R Emergency Classification Determination and Initial Action, and complete Checklist 1, Classification Determination.
G2.4.41 4.6 NOTE:
All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.
- Type Codes & Criteria:
(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes)
I (N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1) 4 (P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected) 0
ES-301 -2 Control Roomlln-Plant Systems Outline Facility:
Farley Nuclear Plant Date of Examination: June 18, 2012 Exam Level: RO SRO-l Operating Test No.: FA2012-301 Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-l)
System / JPM Title Type Code*
Safety Function a.
CRO-33-NEW-Perform step 4.2 of STP-5.O, Full Length A
N Control Rod Operability Test.
001A4.03 4.0/3.7 001A2.Il 4.4/4.7 003AA2.03 3.6/3.8 007EA2.02 4.3/4.6 b.
CR0-NEW 1-Re-establish HHSI flow due to a SGTR per N, L, S 2 of ESP-I.1, SI Termination.
006A4.01 4.1/3.9 006A4.02 4.0/3.8 006A4.07 4.4/4.4 c.
CR0-NEW 2-Transfer Feed Water control from the Main Feed A, N, S 4P Regulating Bypass Valves to the Main Feed Regulating Valves.
003A1.07 3.4/3.4 003A2.02 3.7/3.9 APEO15/O17AA1.08 3.0/2.9 APEO15/O17AA1.09 3.1/3.2 d.
CR0-NEW 3-Start Containment Spray in accordance with A, N, L, S 5
EEP-0 step 6 RNO actions.
026A2.03 4.1/4.4 026A2.04 3.9/4.2 e.
CRO-258 modified
- Start the 1 B DG and energize the 1 G A, M, S 6
4160V Bus using ECP-0.0 step 5.2.2 RNO.
064A3.06 3.3/3.4 064A4.06 3.9/3.9 EPEO55EA1.06 4.1/4.5 EPEO55EA2.03 3.9/4.7 f.
CRO-127A
- Perform actions of AOP-100 for a NI-42 failure.
D, S 7
015A2.01 3.5/3.9 015A3.02 3.7/3.9 015A4.03 3.8/3.9 O15G2.24O SRO 4.7
g.
CRO-091A-Place the IC CCW Hx in service and remove lB D, S 8
CCW Hx from service.
008A4.01 3.3/3.1 008A4.09 3.0/2.9 h.
CR0 only) CRO-333A, Perform The Required Actions For Cold D
3 Leg Recirculation (RO only)
EPEO11EA1.13 4.1/4.2 EPEO11EG2.1.20 4.6/4.6 EPEO11EG2.1.31 4.6/4.3 In-Plant Systems© (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-l) i.
SO-430B and C (combined)
- Mechanically align the I C SW D
4S pump to the B Train and select the 1C SW Pump for B Train autostart.
076A2.01 3.5/3.7 076A2.02 2.7/3.1 j.
S0-351 (mod)
- Perform a Manual Emergency Start for a 4075 MD, E 6
KW DG In Mode 4 064A2.05 3.1/3.2 APEO56AA2.21 3.6/3.8 EPEO55EA1.02 4.3/4.4 k.
SO-372B modified
- Initiate a #2 WMT RELEASE PER SOP-A, M, E, R 9
50.1, APP. 2.
068A2.04 3.3/3.3 068A3.02 3.6/3.6 All RO and SRO-l control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
- Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-l ACTUAL (A)lternate path 4-6 I 4-6 (515)
(C)ontrol room (010)
(D)irect from bank 9 I 8
(5/4)
(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1 I 1
(2/2)
(EN)gineered safety feature
- /
(L)ow-Power I Shutdown I I 1
(2/2)
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2 I 2
(717)
(P)revious 2 exams 3 I 3 (randomly selected) 0 (R)CA 1/1 (I/l)
(S)imulator (8/7)
ES-301-3 Operating Test Quality Checklist Facility:
Farley Nuclear Plant Date of Examination:
June 18, 2012 Operating Test Number: FA2012-301 Initials
- 1. General Criteria a
b*
c#
a.
The operating test conforms with the previously approved outline; changes are consistent with fr sampling requirements (e.g., 10 CFR 55.45, operational importance, safety function distribution).
b.
There is no day-to-day repetition between this and other operating tests to be administered during this examination.
c.
The operating test shall not duplicate items from the applicants audit test(s). (see Section D.1.a.)
d.
Overlap with the written examination and between different parts of the operating test is within acceptable limits.
e.
It appears that the operating test will differentiate between competent and less-than-competent applicants at the designated license level.
D Po ath.
- 2. WalkThrough Criteria a.
Each JPM includes the following, as applicable:
initial conditions initiating cues references and tools, including associated procedures reasonable and validated time limits (average time allowed for completion) and specific designation if deemed to be time-critical by the facility licensee operationally important specific performance criteria that include:
detailed expected actions with exact criteria and nomenclature
system response and other examiner cues
statements describing important observations to be made by the applicant
criteria for successful completion of the task
identification of critical steps and their associated performance standards
restrictions on the sequence of steps, if applicable b.
Ensure that any changes from the previously approved systems and administrative walk-through outlines (Forms ES-301 -1 and 2) have not caused the test to deviate from any of the acceptance P
$7t criteria (e.g., item distribution, bank use, repetition from the last 2 NRC examinations) specified on those forms and Form ES-201-2.
- 3. Simulator Criteria The associated simulator operating tests (scenario sets) have been reviewed in accordance with
,4 Form ES-301-4 and a copy is attached.
Printed Name /
i ature Date a.
Author:
Billy Thornton
/
05/31/12 b.
Facility Reviewer(*)
Gary Ohmstede I
05/31/12 c
NRC Chief Examiner (#) ft1O d.
NRCSupervisor (1
NOTE:
The facility signature is not applicable for NRC-developed tests.
Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column c; chief examiner concurrence required.
Fo6 rs-3o-4 wlI i-t 1-ke ie..-.
1kS wl e ai--
4i
+et+
+t*t ecIaas
ES-301-4 Simulator Scenario Quality Checklist Facilty: Farley Date of Exam: June 18, 2012 Scenario Numbers: 2/4/5/6 Operating Test No.: FA2012-301 QUALITATIVE ATTRIBUTES Initials
a b*
1.
The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrumentation may be out k?.
of service, but it does not cue the operators into expected events.
l
)
2.
The scenarios consist mostly of related events.
,A.
3.
Each event description consists of the point in the scenario when it is to be initiated the malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event fr
(
the symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew the expected operator actions (by shift position) the event termination point (if applicable) 4.
No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated into the scenario without a credible preceding incident such as a seismic event.
5.
The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics.
J[_.+/-. 2&-
6.
Sequencing and timing of events is reasonable, and allows the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives.
7.
If time compression techniques are used, the scenario summary clearly so indicates.
Operators have sufficient time to carry out expected activities without undue time constraints.
jg Cues are given.
8.
The simulator modeling is not altered.
(71<)
9.
The scenarios have been validated. Pursuant to 10 CFR 55.46(d), any open simulator performance deficiencies or deviations from the referenced plant have been evaluated
,Q to ensure that functional fidelity is maintained while running the planned scenarios.
10.
Every operator will be evaluated using at least one new or significantly modified scenario.
All other scenarios have been altered in accordance with Section D.5 of ES-301.
IO 11.
All individual operator competencies can be evaluated, as verified using Form ES-301-6 (submit the form along with the simulator scenarios).
12.
Each applicant will be significantly involved in the minimum number of transients and events specified on Form ES-301 -5 (submit the form with the simulator scenarios).
13.
The level of difficulty is appropriate to support licensing decisions for each crew position.
5C Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5d)
Actual Attributes Scenario Numbers:
214/5/6 1.
Total malfunctions (58) 10 / 9 / 7 / 9 it__
2.
Malfunctions after EOP entry (12) 4 / 2 / 1 / 3 IL? 2 3.
Abnormal events (24) 4 / 6 / 5 / 6 4.
Major transients (12) 2 / 2 / 2 / 1
/Y17 J3JU 5.
EOP5 entered/requiring substantive actions (12) 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 6.
EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (02) 1 / 0 / 1 / 1 7.
Critical tasks (23) 3 / 4 /4 / 3 Page 1 of 1
ES-301-4 Simulator Scenario Quality Checklist Facilty: Farley Date of Exam: June 18, 2012 Scenario Number: 3 Onerating Test No.: FA2012-301 QUALITATIVE ATTRIBUTES Initials 1.
The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue the operators into expected events.
3
2.
The scenarios consist mostly of related events.
j,_
3.
Each event description consists of the point in the scenario when it is to be initiated the malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event the symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew the expected operator actions (by shift position) the event termination point (if applicable)
4.
No more than one nonmechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated into the scenario without a credible preceding incident such as a seismic event, 5.
The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics.
6.
Sequencing and timing of events is reasonable, and allows the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives.
yG 7.
If time compression techniques are used, the scenario summary clearly so indicates.
Operators have sufficient time to carry out expected activities without undue time constraints.
Cues are given.
8.
The simulator modeling is not altered.
(
9.
The scenarios have been validated. Pursuant to 10 CFR 55.46(d), any open simulator performance deficiencies or deviations from the referenced plant have been evaluated to ensure that functional fidelity is maintained while running the planned scenarios.
10.
Every operator will be evaluated using at least one new or significantly modified scenario.
1.
All other scenarios have been altered in accordance with Section D.5 of ES-301.
11.
All individual operator competencies can be evaluated, as verified using Form ES-301-6 (submit the form along with the simulator scenarios).
12.
Each applicant will be significantly involved in the minimum number of transients and events 4,
specified on Form ES-301-5 (submit the form with the simulator scenarios).
13.
The level of difficulty is appropriate to support licensing decisions for each crew position.
r%
Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d)
Actual Attributes Scenario Numbers:
3 1.
Total malfunctions (58) 9 ij!L.
2.
Malfunctions after EOP entry (12) 3
,j, nc 3.
Abnormal events (24) 5 4.
Major transients (12) 2 5.
EOP5 entered/requiring substantive actions (12) 1 6.
EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (02) 2*
a 7.
Critical tasks (23) 4 it it Scn 3, Possible FRP-Z.1 entry Page 1 of 1
Transient and Event Checklist Facility: Farley Nuclear Plant Date of Exam: June 18, 2012 Operating Test No.: FA2012-301 A
Scenarios P
V 2
4 6
M P
E T
I L
N CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION 0
N I
T T
I C
A M
A T
S A
B S
A B
S A
B S
A B
L U
N Y
R T
0 R
T 0
R T
0 R
T 0
M(*)
T P
0 C
P 0
C P
0 C
P 0
C P
E R
IU RX 1
5 1
10 M
A NOR 1
45 1
1 11 S
I/C 234 247 357 123 1 3 267 234 246 357
4 4
2 T
57 8
567 8
567 78 8
E 8
R MAJ 68 68 68 89 89 89 7
7 7
2 2
1 TS 25 25 35 0
2 2
RX 5
1 1
10 T.
PhHHps NOR 0
1 1
1 I/C 234 13 234 14 4
4 2
SRO-l 57 567
-p--
MAJ 68 89 7
5 221 TS 25 35 4
022 RX 1
1 1
10 J.
Martin NOR 1
1 1
1 1
I/C 247 123 357 13 4
4 2
SRO-I 567 8
MAJ 68 89 7
5 2
2 1
TS 25 2
022 RX 0
1 10 J.
Grice NOR 1
45 3
1 1
1 I/C 357 267 246 12 4
4 2
RO 8
8 78 MAJ 68 89 7
5 2
2 1
TS J
022 Instructions:
I.
Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
2.
Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-I basis.
3.
Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right hand columns.
ES-301 Form ES-301-5 NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 1 of 1 Farley Facsimile Rev. 0
ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: Farley Nuclear Plant Date of Exam: June 18. 2012 Operating Test No.: FA2012-301 A
E Scenarios P
V 2
4 6
M P
E T
I L
N CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION 0
N I
T T
I C
A M
A T
S A
B S
A B
S A
B S
A B
L U
N R
T 0
R T
0 R
T 0
R T
0 M(*)
T P
0 C
P 0
C P
0 C
P 0
C P
E RI U
RX 1
5 1
10 M
A NOR 1
45 1
111 S
I/C 2 34 T 1 2 3 13 7T 234 246 3 5 7
4 4
2 T
57 8
567 8
567 78 8
E 8
R MAJ 68 68 68 89 89 89 7
7 7
2 2
1 TS 25 25 35 0
2 2
RX 5
1 1
10 J.
Davison NOR 0
1 1
1 I/C 234 13 234 14 4
4 2
SRO-I 57 567 8
MAJ 68 89 7
5 221 TS 25 35 4
022 RX 1
1 1
10 P.
Bethea NOR 1
1 1
1 1
I/C 247 123 357 13 4
4 2
SRO-I 567 8
fJ MAJ 68 89 7
5 2
2 1
TS 25 2
022 RX 0
1 1
0 K.
Folmar NOR 1
4 5 3
1 1
1 I/C 357 267 246 13 4
4 2
RO 8
8 78 j
MAJ 68 89 7
5 2
2 1
TS 0
022 Instructions 1.
Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-i event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at the-controls (ATCy and balance of plant (BOP) positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position 2.
Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per section C.2.a of Appendix D. () Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-i basis.
3.
Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right hand columns.
NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 1 of 1 Farley Facsimile Rev. 0
ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: Farley Nuclear Plant Date of Exam: June 18. 2012 Operating Test No.: FP2012401 A
E Scenarios P
V 2
4 6
5
M P
E T
L N
CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION 0
N I
T T
I C
A M
A T
S A
B S
A B
S A
B S
A B
L U
N R
T 0
R T
0 R
T 0
R T
o M()
T P
0 C
P 0
C P
0 C
P 0
C P
E RI U
RX 1
5 5
1 10 M
A NOR 1
45 1
5 1
11 I/C 234 247 357 123 TT T 234 357 1 23 TT E
T 57 8
567 8
567 78 8
478 8
E 8
R MAJ 68 68 68 89 89 89 7
7 7
67 67 67 2
2 1
TS 25 25 35 13 0
2 2
RX 5
1 1
10 B.
Williams NOR 0
1 1
1 I/C 234 13 234 14 4
4 2
SRO-I 57 567 8
MAJ 68 89 7
5 221 TS 25 35 4
022 RX 1
1 1
10 W.
Sorrell NOR 0
1 1
1 I/C 247 123 123 15 4
4 2
SRO-l 567 478 J1 MAJ 68 89 67 6
2 2
1 TS 25 13 4
022 RX 0
1 10 L.
Spencer NOR 1
1 1
1 1
I/C 357 246 9
4 4
2 RO 8
78 MAJ 68 7
3 2
2 1
TS 022 Instructions.
1.
Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type, TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
2.
Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per section C.2.a of Appendix D. () Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-I basis.
3.
Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right hand columns.
NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 1 of 1 Farley Facsimile Rev. 0
ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: Farley Nuclear Plant Date of Exam: June 18, 2012 Operating Test No.: FA2012-301 A
E Scenarios P
V 2
4 6
5 M
P E
T I
L N
CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION 0
N I
T T
I C
A M
A T
S A
B S
A B
S A
B S
A B
L U
N R
T 0
R T
0 R
T 0
R T
0 M(*)
T P
o c
p 0
C P
0 C
P 0
C P
E RI U
RX 1
5 5
1 10 M
A NOR 1
45 1
5 1
11 S
I/C 234 247 357 123 13 267 234 246 357 123 137 24 4
4 2
T 57 8
567 8
567 78 8
478 8
E 8
R MAJ 68 68 68 89 89 89 8
8 8
67 67 67 2
2 1
TS 25 25 35 13 0
2 2
RX 5
1 1
10 D.
Barber NOR 45 2
1 1
1 RO I/C 267 137 7
4 4
2 MAJ 89 67
4 2
2 1
TS 0
022 RX 1
1 0
NOR I
I I
I/C 4
4 2
MAJ 2
2 1
TS 0
2 2
RX 1
1 0
NOR 1
1 1
I/C 4
4 2
MAJ 2
2 1
TS 0
2 2
Instructions.
1 Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance of plant (BOP) positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
2.
Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5 d) but must be significant per section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-i basis.
3.
Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right hand columns.
NUREG-1021, Revision 9 Supplement 1 Page 1 of 1 Farley Facsimile Rev. 0
ES-301-6 Competencies Checklist Facility: Farley Nuclear Plant Date of Examination: June 18, 2012 Operatine Test No.: FA2012-301 APPLICANTS
T. Phillips J. Martin J. Grice Competencies SRO-I SR04 X
RO X
SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 246 2
4 6
2 4
6 Interpret/Diagnose Events 2 3 1 3 2 3 2 4 1 2 3 5 3 5 2 5 6 2 4 6 andConditions 45 89 45 67 35 78 67 789 78 67 67 867 8
8 8
89 Comply With and 2 3 1 3 2 3 1 2 1 2 1 3 1 3 2 4 5 2 4 6 UseProcedures(1) 45 57 45 46 35 57 56 678 78 67 89 67 78 67 8
78 9
8 8
89 Operate Control 1 3 1 2 1 3 1 3 2 4 5 2 4 6 Boards(2) 57 46 57 56 678 78 89 78 8
78 9
Communicate 1 2 1 3 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 3 1 3 2 4 5 2 4 6 andlnteract 34 57 34 46 34 57 56 678 78 56 89 56 78 56 8
78 9
78 78 78 9
Demonstrate Supervisory 1 2 2 3 1 2 Ability(3) 34 45 36 56 67 78 78 8
9 Comply With and 2 5 2 5 3 5 2 5 2 5 3 5 Use Tech. Specs. (3)
Notes: (1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.
(2)
Optional for an SRO-U.
(3) Only applicable to SROs.
Instructions:
Check the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competencyfor every applicant.
ES-301-6 Competencies Checklist Facility: Farley Nuclear Plant Date of Examination: June 18, 2012 Operating Test No.: FA2012-301 APPLICANTS B. Williams W. Sorrell L. Spencer Competencies SRO4 SRO-I X
RO X
SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 246 2
4 5
2 6
Interpret/Diagnose Events 2 3 1 3 2 3 2 4 1 2 1 2 2 4 2 4 6 andConditions 45 89 45 67 35 34 67 78 67 67 8
67 56 8
8 8
89 7
Comply With and 23 13 23 12 12 12 12 246 UseProcedures(1) 45 57 45 46 35 34 46 78 67 89 67 78 67 56 78 8
8 89 78 Operate Control 1 3 1 2 1 2 2 4 6 Boards (2) 5 7 4 6 4 6 7 8 89 78 78 Communicate 1 2 1 3 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 4 6 and Interact 3 4 5 7 3 4 4 6 3 4 3 4 4 6 7 8 56 89 56 78 56 56 78 78 78 78 78 9
Demonstrate Supervisory 1 2 2 3 1 2 1 2 Ability (3) 3 4 4 5 3 6 3 4 56 67 78 56 78 8
9 78 ComplyWithand 25 25 35 25 25 13 Use Tech. Specs. (3)
Notes:
(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.
(2)
Optional for an SRO-U.
(3) Only applicable to SROs.
Instructions.
C7ieck the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competencyfor every applicant.
ES-301-6 Competencies Checklist Facility: Fancy Nuclear Plant Date of Examination: June 18, 2012 Operating Test No.: FA2012-301 APPLICANTS
J. Davison P. Bethea K. Folmar Competencies SRO4 SRO-I X
RO X
SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 246 2
4 6
2 4
6 Interpret/Diagnose Events 2 3 1 3 2 3 2 4 1 2 3 5 3 5 2 5 6 2 4 6 andConditions 45 89 45 67 35 78 67 789 78 67 67 867 8
8 8
89 ComplyWithand 23 13 23 12 12 13 13 245 246 UseProcedures(1) 45 57 45 46 35 57 56 678 78 67 89 67 78 67 8
78 9
8 8
89 Operate Control 1 3 1 2 1 3 1 3 2 4 5 2 4 6 Boards(2) 57 46 57 56 678 78 89 78 8
78 9
Communicate 12 13 12 12 12 13 13 245 246 andlnteract 34 57 34 46 34 57 56 678 78 56 89 56 78 56 8
78 9
78 78 78 9
Demonstrate Supervisory 1 2 2 3 1 2 Ability (3) 3 4 4 5 3 6 56 67 78 78 8
9 ComplyWithand 25 25 35 25 25 35 Use Tech. Specs. (3)
Notes:
(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.
(2)
Optional for an SRO-U.
(3) Only applicable to SROs.
Instructions:
Check the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competencyfor every applicant.
ES-301-6 Competencies Checklist Facility: Farley Nuclear Plant Date of Examination: June 18, 2012 Operating Test No.: FA2012-301 APPLICANTS
D. Barber Competencies RO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 45 Interpret/Diagnose Events 2 5 1 3 and Conditions 6 7 5 6 89 7
Comply With and 2 4 1 3 Use Procedures (1) 5 6 5 6 78 7
9 Operate Control 2 4 1 3 Boards (2) 5 6 5 6 78 7
9 Communicate 2 4 1 3 and Interact 5 6 5 6 78 7
9 Demonstrate Supervisory Ability (3)
Comply With and Use Tech. Specs. (3)
Notes:
(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.
(2)
Optional for an SRO-U.
(3) Only applicable to SROs.
Instructions:
Check the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competencyfor every applicant.
ES-401 PWR Examination Outline FORM ES-401-2 Facility Name:Farley Date of Exam:July 03, 2012 RO KJA Category Points SRO-Only Points Tier Group K
K K
K K
K A
A I
1 4
5 6
1 2
Total A 2 G
Total
- 1. Emergency 1
3 3
3 3
3 3
18 3
3 6
Abnormal 2
1 1
2 N/A 2
1 N/A 2
9 2
2 4
Plant
Evolutions Tier Totals 4
4 5
5 4
5 27 5
5 10 1
33332322322 28 3
2 5
Plant Systems 2
1 1
1 1
1 1
0 1
1 1
1 10 1
1 1
3 TierTotals44443423433 38 5
3 8
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
- 3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities 1
7 Categories 2
2 3
3 1
2 2
2 Note:
1 Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the Tier Totals in each K/A category shall not be less than two).
2.
The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table.
The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The fina RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.
3.
Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.
4.
Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.
5.
Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected.
Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.
6.
Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.
7*
The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable K/As.
8.
On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.
9.
For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.
ES-401, 21 of 33
ES-401 2
Form ES-401-2 00007 Reactor Trip
- Stabilization Recovery/i 00009 Small Break LOCA / 3 00011 Large Break LOCA / 3 00015 RCP Malfunctions / 4 00017 RCP Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow) / 4 l00029 AtINS / 1 ES-401 E/APE # / Name / Safety Function PWR Examination Outline rand Abnormal Plant Evolutions
- Tier 1/Group 1 (RO) 100008 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident / 3 Form ES-4O1-KIA Topic(s)
IR 100022 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup / 2 100025 Loss of RHR System /4 Conditions necessary for recovery when accident reaches stable phase 00026 Loss of Component Cooling Water? 8 00027 Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction / 3 Ability to interpret and esecute procedure steps.
4.6 1
RCP tripping requirements 4.2 1
3.0 1
3.4 1
0 Knowledge of RO tasks performed outside the main control room 4 2 1
during an emergency and the resultant operational effects.
Isolation of RHR low-pressure piping prior to pressure increase 3 3 above specified level 0
Expansion of liquids as temperature increases 2.8 1
Effects of boron on reactivity 3.6 1
Ability to diagnose and recognize trends in an accurate and timely 4 2 1
manner utilizing the appropriate control room reference material.
MFW System 3.2 100038 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture /3 100040 Steam Line Rupture
- Excessive Heat 4
VE12 Uncontrolled Depressurization of all Steam Generators / 4 00054 (CE/E06) Loss of Main Feedwater / 4 100055 Station Blackout? 6 100056 Loss of Off-site Power? 6 100057 Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus / 6 100058 Loss of DC Power / 6 100062 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water /4 100065 Loss of Instrument Air /8 WEO4 LOCA Outside Containment /3 Conditions and reasons for AFW pump startup 4.1 1
RCS core cooling through natural circulation cooling to Sf0 4.4 1
0 Manual inverter swapping 3.7 1
Battery charger equipment and instrumentation 2.8 1
Flow rates to the components and systems that are serviced by 2 9 1
the SWS; interactions among the components Knowing effects on plant operation of isolating certain equipment 2 9 1
from instrument air o heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and 3 8 1
relations between the proper operation of these systems to the V/El 1 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirc. ? 4 BW?E04: W?E05 Inadequate Heat Transfer
- Loss of Secondary Heat Sink / 4 100077 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances / 6 K/A Category Totals:
omponents, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and 3.7 automatic and manual features 0
0 3
Group Point Total:
18 ES-401 22 of 33
ES-401 3
Form ES-401-2 PWR Examination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions
- Tier 1/Group 2 (RO) 07 06 lie-core and ex-core instrumentation ES-401 Form ES-401-3 E/APE # / Name I Safety Function 300001 Continuous Rod Withdrawal / 1 00003 Dropped Control Rod? 1 300005 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod I 1 02 300024 Emergency Boralion / 1 300028 Pressurizer Level Malfunction? 2 300032 Loss of Source Range NI /7 300033 Loss of Intermediate Range NI / 7 01 300036 Fuel Handling Accident / 8 300037 Steam Generator Tube Leak I 3 300051 Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 300059 Accidental Liquid RadWaste Rel, / 9 300060 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Rel. / 9 300061 ARM System Alarms 17 01 300067 Plant Fire On-site / 8 300068 Control Room Evac. / 8 300069 Loss of CTMT Integrity / 5 V/E 14 High Containment Pressure / 5 300074 mad. Core Cooling / 4 V/E06 Degraded Core Cooling / 4 V/E07 Saturated Core Cooling / 4 300076 High Reactor Coolant Activity / 9 V/E01 Rediagnosis / 3 V/E02 SI Termination / 3 KIA Topic(s)
IR 0
3.8 1
Breakers, relays, disconnects, and control room switches 2.5 1
I BWST temperature 3.2 1
0 Nature of abnormality, from rapid survey of control room data 2.9 1
I Termination of startup following loss of intermediate-range 3.2 1
0 0
0 0
0 I
Detector limitations 2.5 1
Knowledge of how abnormal operating procedures are used in 3 8 1
n with EOPs.
0 0
RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated 0
0 0
1
.snowledge of the operational implications of EOP warnings, Icautions, and notes.
1 0
0 0
V/E13 Steam Generator Over-pressure / 4 04 0
V/E 15 Containment Flooding /5 V/E16 High Containment Radiation / 9 V/E03 LOCA Cooldown
- Depress. / 4 VV/E09 Natural Circulation Operations / 4 VV/E10 Natural Circulation with Steam Voide in
(easel with/without RVLIS. / 4 V/E08 RCS Overcooling
- PTS / 4 3.1 1
1K/A Category Totals:
1 1
2 2
1 2 IGroup Point Total:
3.8 9
ES-401, 23 of 33
ES-401 4
Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems
- Tier 2/Group 1 (RO)
KKKKKKA AA System # / Name 1
2 3
4 5
6 1
3 4
KJA Topic(s)
IR RCP seals and seal water supply; Ability to perform 2 7 003 Reactor Coolant Pump 02 specific system and integrated plant procedures during all
2 modes of plant operation.
43 004 Chemical and Volume Control Reactor power 3.7 1
005 Residual Heat Removal 0
Need for adequate subcooling; Pressure transient 3.4; 2
2 protection during cold shutdown 3.5 006 Emergency Core Cooling Reset of SIS 3.9 1
007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank Method of forming a Steam bubble in the PZR 3.1 1
008 Component Cooling Water 0
0 RcP; Typical ccw pump operating conditions, including 4.1; 2
3 6
vibration and sound levels and motor current 2.5 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control PORVand block valves 4.0 1
012 Reactor Protection 0
0 T/G; Sensors and detectors 2
013 Engineered Safety Features 0
ESFAS/safeguards equipment control 3.6 1
Actuation I
022 Containment Cooling containment instrumentation readings 3.0 1
025 Ice Condenser 026 Containment Spray 0
ECiDS 4.2 1
0 Utilization of T-ave. program control when Steam dumping 039 Main and Reheat Steam 2
through atmospheric relief/dump valves, including T-ave.
3.1 1
059 Main Feedwater Programmed levels of the S/G 2.9 1
061 Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater Pumps 26 1
062 AC Electrical Distribution 0
0 EO/G; Effect on instrumentation and controls of Switching 4.1; 2
2 3
power supplies 2.5 Ability to interpret control room indications to verity the 063 DC Electrical Distribution status and operation of a system, and understand how 4.2 1
operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions.
064 Emergency Diesel Generator DC distribution system; Overload ratings 2
073 Process Radiation Monitoring Erratic or failed power supply 2.5 1
076 ServIce Water ESF actuated MOVs 3 1 1
078 Instrument Air Instrument air compressor Pressure gauges 2
103 Containment containment isolation 3 9 1
0 K/A CategoryTotals:
3 3
3 3
2 3 212 3
2 2 I(3roup Point Total:
28 ES-401, Page 24 of 33
27 Containment Iodine Removal 28 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge ontrol 29 Containment Purge 33 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling 34 Fuel Handling Equipment 35 Steam Generator 41 Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Control 45 Main Turbine Generator 55 Condenser Air Removal 56 Condensate ES-401, Page 25 of 33
- I 7I 01 Control Rod Drive ES-401 5
Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems
- Tier 2/Group 2 (RO)
System # / Name K/A Topic(s)
IR 02 Reactor Coolant 11 Pressurizer Level Control 14 Rod Position Indication 15 Nuclear Instrumentation Sensors and detectors 16 Non-nuclear Instrumentation 17 In-core Temperature Monitor 0
2.5 1
.narging pumps 3.1 1
3.4 1
0 0
Saturation and subcooling of water 3.7 1
0 0
<nowledge of less than or equal to one hour Technical 3 9 1
Specification action statements for systems.
Spent fuel leak or rupture 2.9 1
2.5 1
4.4 1
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
68 Liquid Radwaste 71 Waste Gas Disposal 72 Area Radiation Monitoring 75 Circulating Water
\\utomatic isolation 79 Station Air 3.8 86 Fire Protection
<IA Category Totals:
Cross-connect with lAS 2.9 10
ES-401 2
Form ES-401-2 PWR Examination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions
- Tier 1/Group I (SRO)
ES-401 Form ES-401-2 E/APE # / Name / Safety Function 00007 Reactor Trip
- Stabilization
- Recovery / 1 00008 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident! 3 00009 Small Break LOCA /3 00011 Large Break LOCA / 3 00015 RCP Malfunctions / 4 00017 RCP Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow) / 4
00022 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup I 2 00025 Loss of RHR System / 4 00026 Loss of Component Cooling Water / 8 00027 Pressurizer Pressure Control System sfalfunction /3 00029 ATWS / 1 00038 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture / 3 00040 Steam Line Rupture
- Excessive Heat Transfer 4
!E12 Uncontrolled Depressurization of all Steam 4enerators / 4 00054 (CE/E06) Loss of Main Feedwater / 4 00055 Station Blackout / 6 00056 Loss of Off-site Power / 6 00057 Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus / 6 00058 Loss of DC Power / 6 00062 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water / 4 00065 Loss of Instrument Air / 8 K/A Topic(s)
IR 0
0 0
consequences to RHR of not resetting safety injection 3.7 1
0 0
imitations on LPI flow and temperature rates of change 3.5 1
Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting 4 2 1
conditions for operations and safety limits.
0 0
0
0 0
0 Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments bused on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, 4.7 1
M interpretation.
0 0
0 0
Knowledge of low power/shutdown implications in accident (e.g.,
loss of coolant accident or loss of residual heat removal) 4.2 1
strategies.
Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during 4 2 1
abnormal and emergency operations 0
0 V/E04 LOCA Outside Containment / 3 V/Eli Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirc. / 4 3W/E04; W/E05 Inadequate Heat Transfer
- Loss of 3econdary Heat Sink /4 00077 Generator Voltage and Electric 3rid Disturbances / 6
</A Category Totals:
0 0
0 0
3 3 IGr0P Po)nt Total:
6 ES-401, 22 of 33
ES-401 3
Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions
- Tier 1/Group 2 (SRO) 100001 Continuous Rod Withdrawal / 1 100003 Dropped Control Rod /1 100005 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod/i 100024 Emergency Boration / 1 100028 Pressurizer Level Malfunction / 2 100032 Loss of Source Range NI / 7 100033 Loss of Intermediate Range NI / 7 100036 Fuel Handling Accident / 8 100037 Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 100051 Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 0
Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits, 4.7 1
0 ty to verify that the alarms are consistent with the plant 42 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
3.6 1
0 of affected area 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facilitys license and amendments 0
E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K/A Topic(s)
IR 100059 Accidental Liquid RadWaste Rel. 19 100060 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Rel. / 9 100061 ARM System Alarms / 7 100067 Plant Fire On-site / 8 100068 Control Room Evac. / 8 100069 Loss of CTMT Integrity / 5
//Ei4 High Containment Pressure / 5 100074 Inad. Core Cooling / 4 f//E06 Degraded Core Cooling / 4
(/1607 Saturated Core Cooling / 4 00076 High Reactor Coolant Activity / 9
/1601 Rediagnosis / 3
//E02 SI Termination / 3
//E13 Steam Generator Over-pressure / 4
//El 5 Containment Flooding / 5
//616 High Containment Radiation /9
//E03 LOCA Cooldown
- Depress. / 4
//E09 Natural Circulation Operations / 4
/1610 Natural Circulation with Steam Voide in essel with/without RVLIS. / 4
//608 RCS Overcooling
- PTS / 4 (lA Category Totals:
ES-401 23 of 33 2
2 It3roup Point Total:
4
ES-401 4
Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems
- Tier 2/Group 1 (SRO)
System #/Name K/A Topic(s) lR 003 Reactor Coolant Pump 0
004 Chemical and Volume Control 0
Knowledge of events related to system operation/status 005 Residual Heat Removal that must be reported to internal organizations or external 4.1 1
agencies, such as the State, the NRC, or the transmission
wstem operator.
006 Emergency Core Cooling Loss of flow path 4.3 1
007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank 0
008 Component Cooling Water Loss of CCW pump 3.6 1
010 Pressurizer Pressure Control Ability to prioritize and interpret the significance of each annunciator or alarm.
012 Reactor Protection 0
013 Engineered Safety Features 0
Actuation 022 Containment Cooling 0
025 Ice Condenser 0
026 Containment Spray Failure of 5SF 4.4 1
039 Main and Reheat Steam 0
059 Main Feedwater 0
061 Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater 0
062 AC Electrical Distribution 0
063 DC Electrical Distribution 0
064 Emergency Diesel Generator 0
073 Process Radiation Monitoring 0
076 Servtce Water 0
078 Instrument AIr 0
103 Containment 0
0 K/ACategoryTotals:
I I ES-401, Page 24 of 33
/
5 Form ES-401-2 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems
- Tier 2/Group 2 (SRO)
ES-401 Page 25 of 33 K/A Topic(s) frti ES-401 ES-401 System # / Name 101 Control Rod Drive 102 Reactor Coolant lii Pressurizer Level Control 114 Rod Position Indication 115 Nuclear Instrumentation 116 Non-nuclear Instrumentation 117 In-core Temperature Monitor 127 Containment Iodine Removal 128 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge ontrol 129 Containment Purge 133 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling 34 Fuel Handling Equipment 135 Steam Generator 141 Steam DumpfTurbine Bypass Control 145 Main Turbine Generator IFuel protection from binding and dropping 155 Condenser Air Removal 156 Condensate 168 Liquid Radwaste 171 Waste Gas Disposal 172 Area Radiation Monitoring 175 Circulating Water 179 Station Air 186 Fire Protection to analyze the effect of maintenance activities, such as jdegraded power sources, on the Status of limiting conditions KIA Category Totals:
0 1 1t3r0u Point Total:
ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3)
Form ES-401-3 Facility Name:Farley Date of Exam July 03, 2012 Category K/A #
Topic o-Qn!y 2.1
. 01 Knowledge of conduct of operations requirements.
3.8 1
2 1
flA Knowledge of individual licensed operator responsibilities related to shift staffing, such as medical requirements, no-solo operation, maintenance of active license status, 10CFR55, etc.
1.
2.1
- 08 Ability to coordinate personnel activities outside the control room.
4.1 1
Conduct of
Operations 2.1.
2.1.
2.1.
Subtotal 2
1 2.2. 40 Ability to apply Technical Specifications for a system.
3.4 1
2.2. 41 Ability to obtain and interpret station electrical and mechanical drawings.
3.5 1
n I Ability to perform pre-startup procedures for the facility, including operating those controls associated 2.
with plant equipment that could affect reactivity.
Equipment 2 2 15 Ability to determine the expected plant configuration using design and configuration control 4 3 i
Control documentation, such as drawings, tine-ups, tag-outs. etc.
2.2.
2.2.
Subtotal 2
2 Knowledge of radiological safety principtes pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as containment
2.3. 12 entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning 3.2 1
filters, etc.
n5 Ability to use radiation monitoring systems, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable 2
survey instruments, personnel monitoring equipment, etc.
2.3. 07 Ability to comply with radiation work permit requirements during normal or abnormal conditions.
3.5 1
Radiation Control 2.3.
1 1 Ability to control radiation releases.
4.3 1
2.3. 04 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions.
3.7 1
2.3.
Subtota 3
2 2.4.
14 Knowledge of general guidelines for flOP usage.
3.8 1
2.4. 43 Knowledge of emergency communications systems and techniques.
3.2 1
4.
2.4. 50 Ability to verity system alarm setpoints and operate controls identified in the alarm response manual.
4.2 1
Emergency Procedures / 2.4. 18 Knowledge of the specific bases for SOPs.
4.0 1
Plan 2.4. 32 Knowledge of operator responsetoloss of sit annunciators.
40 1
2.4.
Subtotat 3
2 Tier3PointTotal 10 ES-401, Page 26 of 33
ES-401-4 Record of Rejected KIAs Page 1 of 2 K/A listed in column 2 is the rejected K/A Tier /
Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected K/A 7cGx ORIGINAL K1 1?eaon for repiacememt SRO/RO Examiner (NRC) randomly selected ncw K I as the replacement KA.
T2G2 033A3.Ol Facility was unable to generate an acceptable discriminatory level RO question because FNP does not have TCVs that can be monitored from the MCB.
Examiner (NRC) randomly selected 033A 3.02 as the replacement.
T2GI 026A2.01 Facility was unable to generate an acceptable discriminatory level SRO question because there is no connection between reflux boiling and Containment Spray.
Examiner (NRC) randomly selected 026A 2.03 as the replacement.
T1G1 O11EA2.02 Facility was unable to generate an acceptable discriminatory level SRO question because there is no consequence to RHR of not resetting safety injection. RHR will operate as required regardless of the status of the safety injection signal reset.
Examiner (NRC) randomly selected 01 1 EA 2.04 as the replacement.
T1G1 01 1EA2.04 Facility was unable to generate an acceptable discriminatory level SRO question because during a Large Break LOCA the Pressurizer is empty and there are no Pressurizer pressure or level implications.
Significance of PZR readings has no discriminatory value.
Examiner (NRC) randomly selected 01 1 EA 2.14 as the replacement.
T2G2 086A2.02 Facility was unable to generate an acceptable discriminatory level SRO question at the SRO level for this K/A.
Examiner (NRC) randomly selected 01 6A 2.01 as the replacement. A different plant system was randomly chosen to prevent oversampling questions related to Plant Fire and Fire Protection.
1v I
ES-401 -4 Record of Rejected K/As Page 2 of 2 Tier I Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected K/A TIG1 WEO4EG2.4.9 Facility was unable to generate an acceptable discriminatory level SRO question for this K/A because the category requires testing Westinghouse FOPs for LOCA Outside Containment (ECP-1.2) while the Generic component of the K/A requires testing Abnormal Operations (AOP-12).
Examiner (NRC) randomly selected WE12EG2.4.6 as the replacement. A different Westinghouse EOP category was randomly chosen to prevent oversampling questions related to LOCA Outside Containment.
ES-401-6 Written Examination Quality Checklist Facility:
FA2012-301 Date of Exam:
June 18, 2012 Exam Level:
RO x SRO x Initial Item Description a
b*
c#
1.
Questions and answers are technically accurate and applicable to the facility.
jZ 2.
a.
NRC K/As are referenced for all questions.
b.
Facility learning objectives are referenced as available.
3.
SRO questions are appropriate in accordance with Section D.2.d of ES-401 A° 4.
The sampling process was random and systematic (If more than 4 RO or 2 SRO questions were repeated from the last 2 NRC licensing exams, consult the NRR CL program office).
5.
Question duplication from the license screening/audit exam was controlled as indicated below (check the item that applies) and appears appropriate:
the audit exam was systematically and randomly developed; or X
the audit exam was completed before the license exam was started; or
?
t
the examinations were developed independently; or the licensee certifies that there is no duplication; or other (explain) 6.
Bank use meets limits (no more than 75 percent Bank Modified New from the bank, at least 10 percent new, and the rest new or modified); enter the actual RO / SRO-only 11 /5 26/7 38/ 13 l
2L.
question_distribution(s)_at_right.
7.
Between 50 and 60 percent of the questions on the RO Memory C/A exam are written at the comprehension/ analysis level; the SRO exam may exceed 60 percent if the randomly 33 / 8 42 / 17 4
selected K/As support the higher cognitive levels; enter the_actual_RO_I_SRO_question_distribution(s)_at_right.
8.
References/handouts provided do not give away answers or aid in the elimination of distractors.
C) 9.
Question content conforms with specific K/A statements in the previously approved examination outline and is appropriate for the tier to which they are assigned; 43 deviations are justified.
10.
Question psychometric quality and format meet the guidelines in ES Appendix B.
iF 1 1.
The exam contains the required number of one-point, multiple choice items;
/
%t4.
the total is correct and agrees with the value on the cover sheet.
Printed Nam Signature Date
- a. Author Billy Thornton /
t 05/31/2012
- b. Facility Reviewer (*)
Gary Ohmstede I 05/31/2012
- c. NRC Chief Examiner (#)
3RUNO AuR-Q // L4-ttM2
/44,tyz
- d. NRC Regional Supervisor Note:
- The facility reviewers initials/signature are not applicable for NRC-developed examinations.
- Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column c; chief examiner concurrence required.
ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401 9 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Q#
LOK LOD (F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues T/F Cred.
Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist.
Link units ward K/A Only SRO SRO and RO Exam Submittal was easy to understand and contained supporting information, including a brief discussion of the authors intent. This was a good submittal.
SRO SRO-only portion of the exam was PRELIMINARILY determined to meet the quality guidelines contained in NUREG-1021 based on only 4/25 (16%) questions being unacceptable. [ES-401, Section E.3 and ES-SQl, Section E.3] The four questions were preliminarily determined to be unacceptable based on the following reasons:
Cred Distracters:
1 SRO Only:
1 K/A:
1 Level of Difficulty:
1 SRO SRO Question Breakdown:
7 questions (28%) from the Bank 11 new questions (44%)
7 modified bank questions (28%)
RO RO portion of the exam was PRELIMINARILY determined to (borderline) meet the quality guidelines contained in NUREG-1021 based on 15/75(20%) questions being unacceptable. [ES-401, Section E.3 and ES-501 Section E.3J The 15 questions were preliminarily determined to be unacceptable based on the following reasons:
Cred Distracters: 7 K/A: 5 Level of Difficulty: 3 RO RD Question Breakdown:
21 questions from the Bank (28%)
27 new questions (36%)
27 modified bank questions (36%)
35 lower cog questions (46.6%)
40 higher cog questions (53.3%)
1.
2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Q#
LOK LOD (F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues T/F Cred.
Partial Job-Minutia I
- 1 Back-Q SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist.
Link fnts ward K/A Only Ge Several test items could be answered solely using generic n
fundamentals knowledge (no plant specific knowledge required).
[#2, #5, #25, #30]. This appears to be due to a misinterpretation of the excerpt in NUREG 1021, Appendix B, Section C.1.d speaking about high percentages of fundamental knowledge level questions.
This excerpt is not referring to generic fundamental topics; it is referring to lower cognitive (memory level) questions. Refer to in Appendix B, Section A (Levels of Knowledge) for clarification. Each proposed test item must test some site-specific item.
It may be acceptable to have one part of a two part question that can be answered using generic fundamentals knowledge; however, at least one part of the question must test some site specific knowledge associated with Farley.
Instructions
[Refer to Section D of ES-401 and Appendix B for additional information regarding each of the following concepts.]
1.
Enter the level of knowledge (LOK) of each question as either (F)undamental or (H)igher cognitive level.
2.
Enter the level of difficulty (LOD) of each question using a 1 5 (easy difficult) rating scale (questions in the 2 4 range are acceptable).
3.
Check the appropriate box if a psychometric flaw is identified:
The stem lacks sufficient focus to elicit the correct answer (e.g., unclear intent, more information is needed, or too much needless information).
The stem or distractors contain cues (i.e., clues, specific determiners, phrasing, length, etc).
The answer choices are a collection of unrelated true/false statements.
The distractors are not credible; single implausible distractors should be repaired, more than one is unacceptable.
One or more distractors is (are) partially correct (e.g., if the applicant can make unstated assumptions that are not contradicted by stem).
4.
Check the appropriate box if a job content error is identified:
The question is not linked to the job requirements (i.e., the question has a valid K/A but, as written, is not operational in content).
The question requires the recall of knowledge that is too specific for the closed reference test mode (i.e., it is not required to be known from memory).
The question contains data with an unrealistic level of accuracy or inconsistent units (e.g., panel meter in percent with question in gallons).
The question requires reverse logic or application compared to the job requirements.
5.
Check questions that are samoled for conformance with the approved K/A and those that are designated SRO-only (K/A and license level mismatches are unacceptable).
6.
Enter question source: (B)ank, (M)odified, or (N)ew. Check that (M)odifled questions meet criteria of ES-401 Section D.2.f.
7.
Based on the reviewers judgment, is the question as written (U)nsatisfactory (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)ditorial enhancement, or (S)atisfactory?
8.
At a minimum, explain any U ratings (e.g., how the Appendix B psychometric attributes are not being met).
ES-401 2
Form ES-401-9 1.
2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Q#
LOK LOD F
(F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues T/F Cred. IPartial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focusj Dist.
Link units ward KJA Only F
2 x
B E
002 K6.06 (Bank Farley RCS 40301A02 005)
Note to NRC: The K/A statement in the catalog appears to have a typographical error. The K6 statement reads Knowledge of the effect or a loss or malfunction on the following RCS components:
Sensors and Detectors. The word or can be interpreted as of Ensure the question tests the applicants knowledge of the effect of losing a sensor or detector.
- 1. Partial: The question tests the applicants knowledge of the RCS flow transmitter Qjgn, in other words, what is supposed to happen after a guillotine-type shear. This could make the question have no
/ \\J) correct answer if an applicant appeals that an low/high
(
)/
pressure tap break mayor may not mimic the design theory.
,. /
Does the simulator have a malfunction that demonstrates the differences between a low vs high pressure instrument tap break?
(not just a flow transmitter malfunction.) The instrument taps are equipped with a flow restrictor orifice device that limits the flow. Will these flow restrictors preclude a reactor trip?
To minimize the chances of an appeal, re-focus the stem on a loss of FT-424, re-word as follows:
Unit I is operating at 95% power.
WOOTF completes both statements regarding the FT-424, RCS Loop B flow transmitter?
IF one low pressure tap to FT-624 ruptures a reactor trip IF one high pressure tap to FT-624 ruptures, a reactor trip Assume each case separately and that each rupture is 100%.
2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Q#
LOK LOD (F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues T/F Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO BIM/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Link units ward K/A Only 2
F 1
M U
003 AA1.07 (Modified Farley Bank CR31301 E07 001) 1.
LOD=1: The proposed question can be answered solely using generic fundamentals knowledge (for any PWR) and does not test plant specific knowledge at Farley. PWR K/A Catalog Section 6 (Theory), Section 192005 (Control rods) lists K/A statements associated with how QPTR and AFD are affected by full and/or part length control rods. ction 192008 (Reactor Operational Physics) lists K/A statements associated the effect of control rod insertion on reactor power. Even though Rod K4 (SOB) is specific to Farley, the location of this rod is provided in the stem, so no plant specific knowledge is being tested. This portion of the NRC exam is the site-specific written exam (vs the generic fundamentals exam section). See enhancement below:
The excerpt in NUREG 1021, Appendix B, Section C.1.d speaks to high percentages of fundamental knowledge level questions; however, this is not referring to generic fundamental topics.
Instead, it is referring to lower cognitive (memory level) questions. Refer to Attachment 2 in Appendix B, Section A (Levels of Knowledge) for clarification. The proposed test item must test some site-specific item.
2.
Cred Dist: The 1 part of Choices C and D are not plausible (assuming the author intended the rod to be all the way on the bottom) because if the rod was fully inserted then axial flux is tk never affected.
3.
Partial: The stem does not tell the applicants whether the rod fell all the way to the bottom, therefore, the axial flux choices MAY be correct. As written, there is no completely correct answer.
Suggest re-working one of the two fill-in-the-blank statementst
\\ test some plant specific aspect of monitoring (or operating) the ex-core instrumentation at Farley.
4.
Ensure no overlap with Q# 7 (005 AK2.02), Q#76 (003 AG2.2.22), or Q#82 (024 AG2.4.46)
Cred.
Dist.
(c 4ct 4e eç i,
1 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Q#
LOK LOD
(F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues T/F Cred.
Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist.
Link units ward K/A Only 3
F 2
x x
x M
E 003 02.1.23 (Modified Farley BankAOP-10 52520J06 001) 1.
Q=KJA: The 1 st fill-in-the-blank statement only tests the applicants systems knowledge (B Train SW supplies RCP motor air coolers) and doesnt test the K/A statement.
2.
Q=KIA: This is a Tier 2 (Plant Systems) K/A statement. The proposed question tests the applicants knowledge of AOP-10.0 (Loss of Service Water) reactor trip criteria (emergency/abnormal), which is an integrated plant procedure.
However,,,
abe.more appropriate to test the Tier 2 topic by testing th&applicants owledge of SOP-i.1, Precaution and Limitation 3.3.
3.
Cue: The last part of the 2 fill-in-the-blank statement which will require a RY Trip is_ is not necessary to eIicitihe correct response if the applicant is being testing on 4.
Stem Focus: The 3 rd and 4 th bullets are not necessary to elicit the correct response. Avoid using the A arrow since this is subject to interpretation; use the word rise.
To more appropriately target this Tier 2 K/A topic (RCP System Ability to perform SPECIFIC and INTEGRATED plant procedures during all modes of operation), suggest the 2
,J following:
WOOTF completes both statements in accordance with 1-SOP-1.1, Reactor Coolant System?
/
IF CCW flow to the RCP motor bearing oil coolers is lost THEN pump operation may be continued until_________ temperature!
\\first reaches
/
IA.
Motor upper or lower bearing; 225F
/ B.
Motor upper or lower bearing; 195°F
)
C.
Lower seal water bearing; 225 F
/
D.
Lower seal water bearing; 195°F
/
//
1 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Q#
LOK LOD (F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues T/E Cred.
Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO B/M/N U/EIS Explanation Focus Dist.
Link units ward K/A Only 4
F 2
x B
E 003 K6.02 (Bank
- Vogtle 2011 NRC Exam) 1.
Stem Focus: Include the phrase in accordance with FNP-O ECB-O. O Loss of All AC Power Plant Specific Background Information.
Suggest the following enhancement to closely align with the background document wording:
A Loss of all A C Power has occurred on Unit I and the crew is performing Attachment 3 of ECP-O.O, Loss of All AC Power.
WOOTF completes both statements in accordance with FNP-O ECB-O. Q Loss ofAll AC Power Plant Specific Background Information?
(
1 The reason that the seal injection line isolation valves are required to be manually closed is to (The reason that the RCP thermal barrier return isolation valves /
are required to be manually closed is to A.
protect the RCP seals and shaft; protect the CCW system from steam formation B.
prevent filling the VCT and a potential radioactive release within the auxiliary building; protect the CCW system from steam formation C.
protect the RCP seals and shaft; prevent filling the VCT enc potential radioactive release within the auxiliary building D.
prevent fililng the VCT and a p.vtiaLradiqpctive release within the auxiliary building; erotecttheRCFp.P1sandshJ 2.
Ensure no overlap with Q# 14 (008 K3.03)
004 A1.10 LOD1: The correct answer can be determined solely using knowledge of generic fundamentals (See PWR K/A Catalog Section 6, Reactor Theory (192004, Reactivity Coefficients, Kill; 192007 Fuel Depletion and Burnable Poisons, K1.05; 193007, Heat Transfer, K1.06 and K1.08). For example, their knowledge of how boron varies from BOL to EOL and how the thermal heat balance is computed can be used to answer the question (no plant specific information being tested). See suggestion below to test plant specific information.
2.
Cue: The bolded word (ineffective) in the jSt fill-in-the-blank statement cues the applicant instead of testing their knowledge of what ineffective means.
The question should be re-worked to test targeted, i.e., test the applicants ability to PREDICT a change while OPERATING CVCS controls. Suggest the following:
The crew is placing excess letdown in seivice on Unit I in accordance with FNP-I-SOP-2. 7 Chemical and Volume Control System Excess Letdown.
WOOTF completes both statements in accordance with FNP-I SOP-2. 7?
Approximately one gallon of the excess letdown piping cannot be flushed to the RCDT; therefore, the reactivity affects associated with directing excess letdown to the VCT/Charging pump suction must be considered and contingencies established for mitigating the consequences.
-prcing Excess Letdown in service will cause calculated reactor
\\thermal power on IPC to read lower than actual power.
jYoggle choices on the underlined portions. Develop plausible distracters.]
V
/
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other Job-Link Minutia
- 1 units 6.
B/M/N Back-0=
ward K/A 7.
U/E/S SRO Only N
8.
Explanation U
a
E 005 AK2.02 (Bank Farley HLT-34 & North Anna 2009 NRC Exam) 1 Stem Focus: Add Attachment 2, Misaligned Rod Recovery or Maintenance Testing to the last part of the 2 bullet.
2.
Stem Focus and/or Cue: The l bullet has slang (mis-aligned LOW). Reword to include the CBD actual rod positions.
3.
Stem Focus: The last part of the l fill-in-the-blank statement (except for Rod H2) can be eliminated by re-wording the fill-in-the-blank as follows:
The crew is required to open the lift coil disconnect switches for Control Bank 0 non-affected 4.
Ensure no overlap with Q# 2 (003 AA1.07), Q#76 (003 AG2.2.22), or Q#82 (024 AG2.4.46) 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Q#
LOK LOD (F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues T/F Cred.
Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO B/MIN U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist.
Link units ward KIA Only 6
H 2
x x
N E
005A2.02 Note to NRC:
It seems necessary that the 2 parts are all unique because the 2 nd part plausibility depends on which way the RHR Suction Relief Valves respond.
1.
Partial: To avoid any questions to the proctors during the exam, re-word the air supply sentence as: The pneumatic supply to I
HCV-142 actuator was subsequently lost angjalehajyl repositioned to its failed position.
2.
Stem Focus: The 3 d and 6ll bullets should have the phrase in 3.
Stem Focus: Does the stem need to include another bullet statingthatPCV-l45isinAtJTO 7
H 2
x x
B
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Explanation 005 K5.02 (Modified Farley Bank ECP-2.1 52532F07 001)
Q=K/A: This is a Tier 2 K/A statement (RHR system K/A); it requires testing the applicants knowledge of the RHR function (not the SI function) and the implications of needing adequate
RCS subcooling. The proposed question tests the Tier 1 aspect (safety injection) and does not test the applicants knowledge of adequate subcooling.
Suggest re-working the question to test the OE associated with the operational implication of placing in service too early (if a LOCA subsequently occurs, voiding of the suction line from the RWST may occur).
For example, Suggest the following two fill-in-the-blank statements:
Due to the physical layout of the RHR suction piping between the RCS loop isolation valves and the point where the RHR mini-flow line enters the RHR pump suction piping, there is80-100 foot ofpiping that is unable to be cooled down after RHR operations at >250 °F.
This section of piping maybe susceptible to flashing if an ECCS actuation were to occur with fluid temperature >250 °F.
fToggle choices on the underlined portions. Develop plausible distracters.J
)6 K4.11 Partial: Choice D can also be argued as correct because part of the reset logic requires P4. Additionally, the part of Choices C and D need to specify the status of the P4 Interlock to preclude a mis-interpretation of these choices.
2.
Stem focus: Add the phrase In accordance with the SI actuation circuitry logic diagram.. to the stem question.
3.
Stem focus: The l two sentelces can be streamlined as A valid automatic safety injection signal has actuated on Unit I and the conditions that caused the signal are now clear.
T/F Cred.
Partial Dist.
Job-Minutia
- /
Back-Q=
SRO B/M/N U/E/S Link units ward K/A Only x
M U
V 8
9 F
2
\\
8.
Explanation 007 EG2.1.20 (Modified Farley Bank AOP-3.0 52520C03 001) 1.
Stem Focus: Change the 1 bullet to Tue operator dsp,eesed the MANUAL turbine trip bittn-vt/f rd 2.
.Cue.L..The capitalized word in the 3 bullet (OPEN) is different than the 2 bullet...make both consistent, either caps or no caps.
3.
Stem Focus: Re-word the l fill-in-the-blank statement as follows:
In accordance with.Itifof ESP-O. 1, Rx Trip Response, the main generator rb required to be opened_______
4.
Re-word the 2 fill-in-the-blank statement as follows:
The reason that the Response Not Obtained (RNO) column of
&e-directs placing the REVERSE POWER switch to the BYPASS position is to 5.
Cred Dist: For Choices A and C, change the first word from disable to Bypass. Also clarify that this is a Fast DEAD Bus Transfer in both of these choices.
Focus: The 1 St sentence should specify that the thrust
/
béring issue is associated with the main turbine.
o 10 H
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
B/M/N U/E/S Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q SRO Link units ward K/A Only E
A V
8.
Explanation 007 K5.02 (BankFar1ey2007 NRC Exam, UOP-1.2/1.362510B01 009 Q=K/A: The K/A statement requires testing the applicants knowledge of an operational implication to the PRT as a steam bubble is being formed. As written, there is no implication to the PRT (level, pressure, and temperature will remain constant).
This K/A may need to be replaced. (Tough K/A) 2.
Cred Dist: The 1 part of Choices A and D (lowering letdown flow is indicative of saturation) is not plausible because the stem says that the pressurizer heaters are QN. The distracter analysis defends the plausibility of lowering letdown flow IF the applicants dont know the positions of PCV-145, FCV-122, and HCV-i4gjln order for Iffen the stem must include some aspect associated with PCV 145, FCV-122, or HCV-142 that would make lowering letdown /
flow plausible.
Cred Dist: The 2 d part of Choices C and D is not plausible because the stem doesnt include any abnormal conditions; therefore, once the pressurizer is saturated and the bubble is formed, PRT level will remain constant.
If everything works the way its supposed to work, the RHR suction reliefs wont lift.
There is nothing in the stem to indicate that pressure will 7/
suddenly rise.
- 4. Job Content Flaws 0%
/
Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
008 A3.06 Note to NRC: Two sample questions were previously presented (before the draft submittal) associated with this KIA. The licensee had concerns with writing a question to hit the K/A. The CE proposed that a question could be written to test the applicants knowledge of the kW loading for a CCW pump. Alternatively, the Chief Examiner randomly selected 008 A3.08 to replace this K/A:
008 CCW, A3.08 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the CCWS, including automatic actions associated with the CCWS that occur as a result of a safety injection signal. The licensee chose not to replace the K/A and submitted a question to test the A3.06 K/A statement.
Stem Focus: The 2 nd bullet is not precise, i.e., which Farley
busses are de-energized? Is the switchyard intact? Try to come up with an enhancement that makes it more clear what a LOS P on the A Train is.
Stem Focus: The 1 st sentence states that a spurious SI has occurred. Is it necessary to be spurious? Why not have a valid SI signal. Spurious_add_cpfusion and/or ambiguity to the question.
Cred Dist: The 2 part of Choices A and B are not plausible because the SFPC pump is a 480 volt piece of equipment whereas the CCW pump is a 4160 volt piece of equipment.
Suggest the following enhancement:
In accordance with FNP-1-ECP-O.O, Attachment 6, Estimated Power Requirements, the kW loading of a CCW pump will be approximately_________
[Toggle the 2 fill-in-the-blank choices between 282 kW (correct) vs 81 kW (incorrect).]
12 H
Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Minutia
- /
Back-Q=
SRO Link units ward K/A Only B/M/N U/E/S N
E/U Explanation
( p I
I
/
/
/7 frJ//I/
3
\\
9J v) t...
s.,.
1.
2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Q#
LOK LOD
r r
(F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues TIF Cred.
Partial Job-I Minutia
- 1 I Back-Q=
SRO B/M/N U/EIS Explanation Focus Dist.
Link unitsj ward KJA Only 13 F
2 x
x M
E 008 AK3.04 (Modified Farley Bank EEP-1 52530B03 018) 1.
Cred Dist: Because Choices B and C both deal with RCP5, an applicant could (correctly) eliminate them both. See suggested enhancement below.
(,c 2.
Stem focus: The stem question should include the phrase in LI accordance with Suggest the following:
A vapor space LOCA has occurred on Unit 2 and the crew is AI implementing EEP-1.O, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
-icordance withit7 which ONE of the following identifies the reaso7rWli5rthRCPs are required to be stopped if the EEP-1.O Foldout Page RCP Trip Criteria is met?
/
A.
Because the additional RCP heat input may exceed the fl capacity of one ESF train if a loss of offsite power subsequently occurs.
B.
To protect the RCP seal package C.
To maximize the high pressure safety injection flow rate D.
Because RCP trips within different time frames produce different effects on final peak clad temperature.
1.
2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Q#
LOK LOD
r
(F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues T/F Cred.
Partial Job-I Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO BIM/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist.
Linkj units ward K/A Only 14 F
2 x
x x
M E
008 K3.03 (Modified Farley Bank CCW 52102G05 005)
Note to NRC: The impact of the auto-closure of HV-3184 on the RCP is that the normal CCW cooling has been lost, thus putting the plant closer to a loss of all seal cooling condition. As such, this meets the intent of the K/A (even though the answer is no effect) 1.
Ensure no overlap with Q# 4 (003 K6.02) 1 2.
Stem focus: Specify the power level in the stem.
3.
Cues: The capitalized word DESIGN in the 2 fill-in-the-blank statement is not necessary to elicit the correct response.
4.
Partial: An applicant can (successfully) argue that Choice A is C /_
also correct because the 1 st fill-in-the-blank statement wording
(),
doesnt completely eliminate this choice. Suggest the following:
The HV-3184, CCW DISCH RCP TRM BARR ISO, auto-closure setpoinf is (modify 160 psig to 160 gpm) 5.
Stem focus: Modify the 2 fill-in-the-blank statement and 2 nd part of each choice as follows:
/iri accordance with the RCP THRM-BARR4SQ+/-JV-3184 AIR
(
PRESS LO annunciator (LB), continuous operal7f the IA
, RCP_________
A.
160 gpm;is still B.
160 gpm;is NOT C.
75 psig; is still D.
75 psig; is NOT
.4 U
)
/4i 4
2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Q#
LOK LOD
(F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues T/F Cred.
Partial B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist.
15 H
2 x
009 EK2.03 (Bank.- Fanny ESP-1.2 52531F07 006 and Crystal 2007 NRC Exam)
Note: The exam writers intent is that the K/A is being hit because the component being used to transfer heat (during the SBLOCA) is the steam generators (to the steam dumps).
Job-Link: Verify that 150 gpm meets the_.deffnitiçrn of a SBLOCA at Farley. (What is charging capacity atEarly2Y Suggest making the leak size bigger to add plausil5ifity to the 2l part of Choices A and C.
Stem Focus: Streamline the 1 5t sentence to include automatic reactor trip and eliminate approximately as follows:
ATi1It I automatic reactor trip occurred as a result ofa19pr U
Stem Focus: Clarify the j!Lfihl-inth-blank statement by adding at 10:00, asfgllows
>.-ecooldownrateat 10 00 is allowable limits 4.
Stem Focus: Stack the fill-in-the-blank statements to ensure two separate thoughts.
- 5. ) Stem focus: Re-word the 2 part of Choices A and C as follows:
The combined effects of HHSI/ and break flow are ALONE
/
\\sufficient to accomplish N
Stem focus: Re-word the part of Choices B and D as follows:
In addition to the Hi-lSl/break cooling, Steam Dumps will be needed to control Minutia Job-
- /
Back-Q SRO Link units ward K/A Only
2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
LOK LOD r
(F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues T/F I Cred.
Partial Job-Minutia Explanation Focus Dist.
Link 16 H
2 s
O1OA43(BankFaey2OO7NR9 This question overlaps with Scenario #1 Event 3.
Stem focus: The word and in the fill-in-the-blank statement interferes with the plausibility of the 2 part of Choices B and C because its not congruent with the wording of the fill-in-the-blank statement). Suggest separating out the two parts of the N
statement nto two different sentpc.esasJol1ows WOOTF completes both statements with respect to how the plant will respond?
Initially, pressurizer PORV_______ will automatically open.
This PORV________ when actual RCS pressure drops below 2000 psig.
A.
PCV-444B; will automatically close B.
PCV-444B; will remain open C.
PCV-445A; will remain open D.
PCV-445A; will automatically close 3.
Ensure no overlap w/ SRO Q#80 (010 02.4.45)
17 2
x
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO Link units ward K/A Only 6.
BIM/N 7.
UIEIS B
8.
Explanation U
011 EA2.08 (Bank Vogtle 2005 Exam)
Note to NRC: Only the 1 st portion of the question is required to hit the K/A statement.
Cred Dist: The 2 part of Choices C and D are not plausible because ESP-1 :3 is already recirculating the sump. Essentially, the 2 nd part of Choices A and B lists boron as the reason whereas the 2 part of Choices C and D lists inventory as the reason. Boron vs inventory. The title of ESP-1.4 is simultaneous RECIRCULATION. This makes the 2 part of Choices C and D not plausible.
2.
Stem Focus: The fill-in-the-blank statement is confusing because of the [bolded] phrase from now..; the bullets dont
..Jnclude,.ac1iims.
ggqst re-working the stem as follows:
A Large Break LOCA has occurred and the crew is implementing 1-EEP-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
The following timeline of events occurred:
09:30 RCS Leak caused a reactor trip 10:00 Containment pressure at XX psig 15:00 Cold Leg Recirc was implemented in accordance with ESP-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation In accordance with EEP-1, Step 20, WOOTF identifies the time that ESP-1.4, Transfer to Simultaneous Cold and Hot Leg_.
Recirculation, is required to be Stem Focus: The 3e bullet is not necessary to elicit the correct response. However, it may be necessary to provide RCS and/or containment parameters instead of saying that conditions are stable.
4.
LOK: The submittal listed this question as higher order evei though it seems to be a memory/recall question. Discuss with the licensee.
3.
5.
Ensure no overlap with SRO Q#78 (006 A2.02) and SRO Q#81 (011 EA2.02)
1.
2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Q#
LOK LOD (F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues T/F Cred.
Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO BIM/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist.
Link units ward K/A Only 18 F
2 x
B S
011 K2.01 (Bank Farley 2008 & 2007 NRC Exam)
Only the l portion of the question is required to hit the K/A statement. At Farley, In MODE 4, only one train of ECCS is required to be operable; an ECCS train consists of a centrifugal charging subsystem and an RHR subsystem. The charging pumps serve as the high head safety injection pumps (HHSI) in the J
emergency core cooling system (ECCS).
1.
Stem Focus: Why is the word ONLY necessary?
- /units: Is 1G Load Shedding somehow equivalent to ECCS
pumps?, Discuss the system arrangement with the licensee.
Question seems okay.
//
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Q=
SRO B/M/N UIE/S Explanation K/A Only N
U 012 K1.06 Note to NRC: The wording of the 2 portions carry implied meanings. For example, the 2 d part of Choice B was written to imply that the turbine tripped because of the low bearing oil pressure condition felt all grbine front, stand hcauses a pif&hoice C was written to imply that TV#3 stuck open even when the turbine tripped, which precludes an RPS coincidence logic of 4/4 throttle valves closed. The 2 part of Choice D was written to imply that a reactor trip does not occur at 38% power because power is still less than P-9.
1)
Cred Dist: The 2 d part of Choices C and D are not plausible because one is a paraphrased version of the other.
Consequently, an applicant can deduce that C and D are incorrect solely based on knowing that two choices cant essentially list the same reason. RPS coincidence of 4 out-of-4 throttle valves is NOT met (2 part of Choice C) is essentially the same reason as a reactor trip is NOT required for these conditions (2 part of Choice D).
2.
Partial: An applicant can argue that there is no correct answer because the 2d part of Choice A may not necessarily be assumed as a consequence of the Qtion. The low oil pressure turbine trip is sensed at the mechanical trip block at the turbine front standard whereas the stem indicatesaJowpressure at the bearing oil header.
/
3; Cred Dist: The 2 part of Choice B is not plausible bec?use only one throttle valve is listed in the stem. (Air izY To clear up the confusion; re-write a two part question to test the applicants knowledge of 1) whether or not an automatic turbine trip has occurred aoct 2) whetjier or no.1 a reactor trip has occurred.cJhis eliminates the cryptic interpretations described N 4.
Job-Link: IF TV#3 is stuck open, how would the crew ever know about it? Are the Throttle Valves (Stop Valves) already full open?
Job Content Flaws
- 1 Back units ward
/
8.
Explanation 012 K6.06 Note to NRC: Scenario #5, Event 1 is PT-447 fails LOW while at 100% power. This is different than the proposed written test item.
Cue: The 3 bullet is not necessary to elicit the correct response since STM PRESS MODE in AUTO is the required (normal) configuration when reactor power is 6% and Tavg is 554 F. Also because Choice C already provides the reminder.
Stem Focus: Choice D should be re-worded as AMSAcyiiIl be enabled C-20 sees turbine load> 40%
Stem Focus: Choice A should be streamlined as only SR LOSS OF DET VOLTAGE (FA3) clears (extinguishes) 013 K2.01 (Modified Farley DG SEQ 40102D04 008) 21 F
2 M
S
2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Q#
LOK LOD
(F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues T/F Cred.
B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist.
22 H
2 x
014 A2.04 (Modified Farley-AOP-19.0 52520S04 006)
Stem Focus: Provide the initial position of the Bank Selector Switch in the stem.
Stem Focus: Instead of the wording in the second sentence, re word as The operator placed the IN-HOLD-OUT Switch to the OUT position for 14 seconds before noting that CBD rod H-2 was not moving (still at 180 steps).
Partial: An applicant could argue that Choice A is also correct based on the wording of the NOTE on Page 7 of 9 of AOP-19 (Before Step #18). The NOTE states that moving the rod(in Step 18.1.3) isnotreq?berformed.
Another way to target the 1 st part of the K/A statement is to test the applicants ability to predict whether or not the COMP ALARM ROD SEQ/DEV OR PR FLUX TILT annunciator (F5) is (or is not) alarming. This would serve to provide a lead-in to testing the applicants knowledge of the required actions listed in F5 (to target the 2 part of the K/A statement in lieu of AOP-19.
Ensure no overlap w/ Q#2 (003 AAI.07), Q#7 (005 AK2.02),
Q#76 (003 AG2.2.22), and Q#82 (024 AG2.4A6).
23 H
2 x
017 K5.02 Cue: The last part of the 2 fill-in-the-blank statement (per the FOLDOUT PAGE of ESP-1.2) is not necessary to elicit the correct response. Suggest re-wording the stem question as follows:
WOOTF completes both statements in accordance with ESP RCS sub-cooling is SI REINITIATION_____ required.
Partial Minutia Job-
- /
Back-Q Link units ward K/A SRO Only N
E
1.
2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Q#
LOK LOD
(F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues TIF Cred.
Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist.
Link units ward K/A Only 24 H
2 x
x N
E 022 AG2.434 Stem Focus: The 2 bullet is not necessary to elicit the correct response. As long as pressurizer level is dropping (3 bullet),
then the question still works.
Cred Dist: The 1t bullet should include how far into AOP-28.2 that the crew has progressed. This can be accomplished by
)
including a point in the remote shutdown process that the
applicants will recognize (Charging Flow has been placed in Local at the HSDP). The plausibility of the 1 part of Choices A and B hinges on knowing that at least some portion of the AOP lineups have been already accomplished.
3.
Stem Focus: Will the applicants question the acronym HSDP?
It may be necessary to spell it out. Up to you.
Stem Focus: The 2parrof-Glpices A and B should be re worded using the word should instead of must.
022 K3.02 (Modified Summer 2006 NRC Exam)\\
Q=K/A: No plant specific [Farley] knowledge is being testing in the l part of the question. The l part can be determined solely using knowledge of generic fundamentals (See PWR K/A Catalog Section 5, Components (191002, Sensors and Detectors, Ki.08, Effects of operating environment (pressure and temperature) on Level instrumentation. Because the l part of the question does not test site specific knowledge and the 2l part of the question does not hit the K/A, the question does not meet the intent of 022 K3.02. See suggestion below to test plant specific information.
The excerpt in NUREG 1021, Appendix B, Section C.1.d speaks to high percentages of fundamental knowledge level questions; however, this is not referring to generic fundamental topics.
Instead, it is referring to lower cognitive (memory level) questions. Refer to Attachment 2 in Appendix B, Section A (Levels of Knowledge) for clarification. The proposed test item must test some site-specific item.
Suggest re-working the 11 part of the question to test a precaution and limitation in 1-FNP-SOP-12.1, for example P&L 3.6 or 3.7 test plant specific knowledge associated with the effects of a malfunction where an inadvertent containment cooler speed reduction occurred and how this affects instrumentation as follows. The 2 nd part of the question could
,.__N5tIII be used.
3.6 Changing containment cooler speeds from fast to slow speed will cause the A cold leg
)-teneretwetomtie a step increase which will cause a reduction of A loop Delta T signal.
3.7 ) Changing containment cooler speeds fromjg5t.to-s may cause.
thuS loop Delta T signal to increase.
CR2007106899 Alternatively, test some aspect of how adverse containment (pressure of 4 psig is equivalent to high temperature in containment) will affect an instrument, etc.
25
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO B/M/N U/E/S Link units ward K/A Only x
M U
8.
Explanation Ii
- --- i2 r.
.)( *i-
\\
8.
Explanation 024 AM.06 (Modified Farley 2007 NRC Exam)
Note to NRC: Temperature Controller for TCV-100 (Installed but no longer used) 1.[ #Iunits: The 2 fill-in-the-blank statement does not include the specific temperature indicator name/number. Is the question referring to TIS-107 (1 09) that causes the alarm in the control room? Is the question referring to TIS-100 that controls the TCV-1 00?
Stem Focus: Re-word the 1 fill-in-the-blank statement to be more precise as follows:
.The MINIMUM temperature that ensures the Boric Acid Storage Tanks remain FUNCTIONAL in accordance with TRM 13.1.6, Borated Water Sources Shutdown, is 025 AK3.02 (Modified Sequoyah 2010 NRC Exam Q#6)
Partial: An applicant can successfully argue that there is no correct answer because FSD-A-181002 states that the interlock is not protect the RHRS from over pressurization (but is to ensure a double isolation barrier exists). The stem does not include the phrase in can
..tatgumnt. Mod ify the header of the 2 column to liiBude in accordance with Tech Spec Bases to eliminate this issue.
Q=KIA: This is a Tier 1, Group 1 K)A statement; however, the question only tests the RHR high pressure interlock at the Tier 2 (plant systems) level. Some aspect of theLs-ofRj...,
(Suggest re-working question to test 1) the reason for ffigh pressure interlock and 2) what action is required in accordance with AOP-12.0 jollowing the loss of RHR (after the sucUonvvesauto-cIosed 6 K1.01 (Modified Farley ECCS 40302C05 012)
Stem Focus: The last phase in the l fill-in-the-blank statement (if not aligned by the operator.) is not necessary to elicit the correct response.
Q#
LOK (F/H) 2.
LCD (1-5)
Stem Cues Focus
- 3. Psychometric Flaws T/E Cred.
Partial Dist.
26 F
- 4. Job Content Flaws 2
x 27 F
2 28 F
2 x
Stem Focus: The fill-in-the-blank statement is missing the word valves (after the word suctions). Slang.
8.
Explanation 029 E).03 (Modified Farley FRP-S 52533 1.
Cred Dist: The 2 part of Choices A and C is not plausible because there is always more uranium at beginning of life as compared to end of life. With more uranium, the reactivity effect of boron is always less than end of life. See suggested
)elow No plant specific [Farley] knowledge is being testing in the 2 st part of the question. The 2s1 part can be determined solely using knowledge of generic fundamentals (See PWR KIA Catalog Section 6, Reactor Theory (192004, Reactivity Coefficients,
)
Ki.11, Explain the change in reactivity addition rate due to
/
boration/dilution over core life.
WOOTF completes both statements in accordance with S. 1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/A TWT?
gallons of emergency boration is required for each control rod not fully inserted.
IF the normal emergency boration flow path is aligned, THEN check emergency boration flow greater than.
- 4. Job Content Flaws 30 F
Job-Link Minutia
- 5. Other 2
- 1 units Back ward 6.
BIM/N K/A 7.
UIEIS SRO N
S 027 M
E/U J
/
1;-
i(i
/
pV) jj 7
)
029 G2.2.39 Stem Focus: The stem bullets should include the specific SOP section that was used to place the CTMT Main Purge in service in High Speed (enhance the 2 r,d bullet).
2.
Stem Focus: The 4 1h bullet should list the valve numbers that did not initially close.
3.
Cue: The capitalized CORE ALTERATIONS is a cue that an immediate action statement is the correct answer. The capitalization (for the sake of Tech Specs replacing
( CORE ALTERATIONS with the words Fuel movement inside
,, containment is in progress. ---
Cred Dist: The 1 part of Choices A and C is not plausible because of the these words witlV TbesuspendéFIthin one 5.
Stem Focus: Replace the capitalized CORE ALTERATIONS in the 1 fill-in-the-blank (see comment #3 above).
U 032 AA2.05 (Bank 2007 Beaver Valley NRC Exam)
Cred Dist: Chojcsnd D are not plausible because the stem states that the reactor trip was due to the SOURCE RANGE instrument. Because Choices C and D list the lR channel instruments, the applicants can (correctly) eliminate these choices.
2.
Cue: The 2 sentence At this time, the Reactor trips on Source Range HI FLUX. is a cue that Choice B is the correct answer because it is the only choice with the word high.
3.
Cue: The 1 bullet lists the words Intermediate Range, which may or may not be a cue for other test items, i.e., the applicant should know that N 1-35 and N 1-36 are intermediate range instruments.
4.
Backward: The stem asks the applicants to go back into time to identify the conditions which would have caused the reactor trip. This is confusing.
It is better to write the question such that the applicants are required to PREDICT how the plant will respond (future).
1.
2.
LOK LOD (F/H)
(1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
B/M/N 7.
U/E/S Q=
SRO K/A Only N
8.
Explanation E
(J B
\\\\\\\\\\
6.
8.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Otherj 7.
B/MIN U/E/S Explanation Note to NRC; There are no automatic features (temperature control or auto pump starts) associated with the Farley fuel pooi cooling system. Automatic (as used in the K/A statement) is typically interpreted to mean an annunciator; however, a passive valve or siphon point, etc. can be interpreted to be an automatic function. The writers intent was that the 1 part of the question tests an automatic feature of the systems design in that the discharge line has a 1/2 hole on the bottom side of a 180 degree bend at elevation I 520, which acts as a siphon breaker. The siphon breakers function would automatically occur on a lowering fuel pool level.
Cred Dist; The 2 part of Choices C and 0 can be eliminated because the spent fuel pool contains borated water.
IF the question was written such that the Farley contingency of adding demineralized water was required [AOP-36 when spent fuel pooi level cannot be raised to153lO using FNP-1 -SOP-54.0, SPENT FUEL PIT COOLING AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM], THEN the RWST choices would be plausible because the RWST is borated. See suggestion below.
Cred DisThe4-part-ofCboes B and 0 are not plausible becauste are no check vaiifi the spent fuel pool cooling lines at Farley. Suggest the following; rit I is operating at 100% power when a fuel pool liner leak develops. WOOTF completes both statements?
Annunciator EH2, SFP LVL HI-LO, will alarm when fuel pool level lowers to
[Choices are 1534 versus another plausible number]
When performing 1-SOP-54. 0, Section 4. 15 SFP Liner Leak Check, the required chemistty sample is for__________
[BOTH activity and boron concentration vs ONLY activity]
1.
2.
LOK LOD (F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues 33 F
2
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO units ward K/A Only T/F I Cred.
Partial Job-Minutia 01st.
Link N
U 033 A3.02
/
1.
2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Q#
LOK LOD
(F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cuesi TIE Cred.
Partial Job-Minutia
- /
Back-Q=
SRO BIMIN U/EIS Explanation Focus j
Dist.
Link units ward K/A Only 34 H
2 x
x M
E 033 AK3.01 (Modified 2007 Diablo Canyon NRC Exam Q=KIA:
It is questionable whether the reason for terminating a startup is being appropriately tested because reactor automatically trips. However, this approach may be acceptable with the following enhancements:
2.
Stem Focus: The stem lude the readings (before the control power is lost or Nl-31, -32 N-35, -36.
3.
Stem Focus: Add a bullet to the stem stating that the crew was initially performing Step 5.15 of 1-UOP-1.2 to verify proper overlap between the IR and SR. (before the N-36 loss of power occurred).
4.
Stem Focus: To mirror action statement J, modify Choice B; to mirror action statement G modify Choice C, and to mirror B.
TS 3.3.1 requires an IMMEDIATE manual trip because two source range channels are-k.epe,aIe.
C.
TS 3.3.1 requires an IMMEDIATE suspension of positive reactivity because thermal power is > P-6 and < P-lU with
-weinteme4&eehenasIs-ipopsrabIe...
)( /d 1 D. TS 3.3.1 requires a plant shutdown to Mode 3 because thermal power is <P-lU, and one intermediate range neutron
- flux channel is inoperable.
5.
Stem Focus: Instead of spelling out the name of TS 3.3.1 in each choice, put the name at the end of the stem and just use TS 3.3.1 in each choice (without the name).
Dy LI 1)
8.
Explanation 035 K1.01 Cred Dist: The plausibility of the 1 part of Choices C and 0 is jeopardized by the wording of the fill-in-the-blank statement to operate at or below Since a fuel bundle weighs about 1500 Ibs, why would Choices C and D ever be correct (because the phrase says at or below.).
2.
Suggest changing and 0t) since this is the minimum required capacity of the manipultr crane.
3.
Cue: The ending phrase on the 2 fill-in-the-blank (
from excessive lifting force.) is not necessary to elicit the correct response.
035 K3.01 Cred Dist: Choice B is not plausible because of the word uncontrollably. Suggest changing to Continuously lower. V Stem Focus: The applicants will ask the proctor what point in time the fill-in-the-blank statement is referring to. Modify the stem question to ask:
L_-1OOTF predicts how the RCS temperature will respond?
Stem Focus: The sentence in between the bullets has the word ALL capitalized. Suggest modifying to say:
soon as all of the MSIVs were opened:
Stem Focus: Add the word manually to the last bullet, i.e., All SG MSIVs are immediately manually closed from the MCB.
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q SRO B/MIN U/E/S Link units ward K/A Only 35 F
2 x
x 36 H
2 x
x V
/
038 G2.4.47 8.
Explanation Note to NRC: Table at EEP-3, Step 31.1 provided to the applicants as a reference. The 2nd bullet implies that containment parameters normal when it says NORMAL charging is in service.
Cue: The 1st sentence in the stem tells the applicant which SG J
is ruptured. Instead, provide discriminating parameters to test the applicants ability to identify the SG:
Cue: This is a borderline direct lookup question. Suggestion listed in Item #1 (above) will make the question better. Ensure that final version of the question is not a direct lookup.
3.
Stem Focus: Provide containment parameters so that the applicants knowledge of adverse condition values is tested.
4.
Stem Focus: Provide values of PZR pressure in the stem.
039 K4.02 Note to NRC: Discuss the logic associated with BYP INTLK position on both A and B Train STEAM DUMP INTERLOCK SWITCHES to verify that at 18% power these switches are not in bypass.
Stem Focus: The 2 fill-in-the-blank statement was not clear whether it was referring to the steam dumps auto-opening now (Tavg low) OR auto-opening later as RCS temoerature rises.
Suggest re-wording the bullet and fill-in-the-blank statement as follows-._.___------
RCS temperatures fell to the llsted values and are all currently rising.
As the RCS temperature rises, the steam dumps automatically re-open.
2.
Stem Focus: The 1 fill-in-the-blank statement should be re worded as:
limiting condition of operation (LCO) value exceeded.
37 H
2
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
Job-Minutia
- /
Back-Q SRO BIMIN UIEIS Link units ward K/A Only 38 H
2 2.
x 1.
[was vs was NOT]
1.
2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Q#
LOK LOD
(F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues TIF Cred.
Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO B/M/N U/EIS Explanation Focus Dist.
Link units ward K/A Only 39 H
2 x
x N
E O4OAAI.11 Note to NRC: This K/A is Tier 1, Group 1,040 AA1.11; however, the sample plan that was provided to the licensee had WIE12 circled.
4ø AAIiI
)
Since there is no1.11 listed in Section W/E12 (Westinghouse Uncontrolled Depressurization of all Steam Generators) this was circled incorrectly. This K/A is correctly written as an abnormal K/a A1.11.
- 1. 7 Cue: The l sentence tells the applicants that the mismatch is S 20%. Suggest roviding the turbine and reactor power ii indications an let the a c n s e uce hat the mismatch is r
/
20% (which is ou e the required 0% for manually tripping and closing MSIV5).
2.
Cue: The capitalize4in the 2 sentence is a cue that the MSIVs were manually losed. Use the phrase all required actions 3.
Partial: The 1 bullet is a bit cryptic to imply that the manual trip switches in the control room didnt work (P-4 malfunction). Can an applicant successfully argue that this doesnt necessarily imply that a P-4 malfunction failed to occur? Suggest re-wording and moving to the 1 sentence as follows:
A steam leak in the turbine building resulted in the following 7 mismatch between turbine and reactor power:
/1 Generator Load: MWe
( Reactor Power:
of the required actions in AOP-14.O, Secondary System Leakage, were completed; however, in order to trip the reacto the crew had to open the CRDM MG set supply breakers because the reactor trip breakers failed to open
/
The foiowing conditions currently exist:
I ESP-O. 1, Reactor Trip Response is in progress RCSTavg SG NR levels are as foiows:
WOOTF predicts the status of the Feed Regulating Valve position and SGFPs?
- 4. Job Content Flaws 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Q#
LOK LOD (F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues TIF Cred.
Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-BIM/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist.
Link units ward 40 F
2 x
054 AA2.03 1.
Stem Focus: The word automatical(V is missing in several places in the fill-in-the-blank statements and the columns above the answer choices. To be precise, re-word as listed below.
2.
Stem Focus: The 2 part of Choices C and D is not precise as to what SG setpoint is being referred to. (low level alarm setpoint? Low level reactor trip setpoint?)
3.
Stem Focus: The stem question should be plural since there are two fill-in-the-blank statements.
7WOOTF completes both statements?
The low condenser vacuum automatic trip setpoint for the IA SGFPis____
Both MDAFW pumps will______
A.
5.9 psia; auto-start immediately when the IA SGFP automatically trips.
B.
10.8 psia; C.
5.9 psia; not immediately auto-start; they will eventually auto-start when at least one SG level drops below 28%.
0.
10.8 psia; Q=
SRO K/A Only E
- 4. Job Content Flaws 055 EA2.02 (Mod Bank: ESP-0.1 52531B06 017)
Note to NRC: Because the K/A is only being hit with the 1St portion of the question (2nd part of where SG Atm relief vlvs are controlled from is related but not hitting the K/A), the 1st part of the question is critical.
- 1. /cK/A and/or Cred Dist: Because SG levels, SG pressures, subcooling values, ajj9 rent listed in the stem, there ino reason to believe that natural circulation isnt occurring (plausibility of the 1 part of Choices A and B is borderline.)
The K/A requires testing the applicants ability to determine or interpret whether natural circ is occurring; however, because 1) the RCS is intact and 2) there are no important parameters provided, this is a borderline K/A match.
The question should be re-worked to require the applicants to evaluate plant conditions to determine if natural circulation exists or not based on plant parameters listed in executive volume section for natural circulation.
2 Cue: The word Adequate in the first fill-in-the-blank statement J
is not necessary to elicit the correct response.
7
LOK (F/H) 2.
LCD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws Stem Cues T/F 41 Partial Cred.
Dist.
x Job-Link Minutia
- 5. Other
- 1 units Back ward 6.
B/M/N Q=
K/A 7.
U/E/S SRO Only M
8.
Explanation E/U 6-
/
Suggest including two SG levels that are below 31% (to test the applicants knowledge of the requirement that at least one SG greater than 31% is required for natural circ.) and the hot-to-cold leg ATs to the stem.
de
8.
Explanation 057 AA1.01 (Bank: 2006 Farley NRC Exam)
Note to NRC:
In this scenario, the associated 1A 120 VAC Vital Instrument Panel will be de-energized. (based on BYPASS SOURCE POWERING LOAD lite being extinguished.) This question overlaps with RO Q#47 (062 Al.03). Q#47 should be testing the AC distribution system.
1.
Cred Dist: Choices B and D are not plausible because they essentially say no action can be taken to re-energize vital loads. Since the stem question specifically asks the applicants to pick a required action to re-energize vital loads, Choices B and D can be eliminated solely based on not satisfying the stem question (vital loads wont be re-energized).
Choices B and D both say that repairs must first be made. An applicant can (correctly) eliminate both of these choices because they: 1) are saying the same thing (repair first), which is essentially do nothing and 2) arent listed in the annunciator procedure, i.e.,
not required actions.
Suggest re-working the question to test the applicants knowledge of which switch is required and what action is required once the associated Vital Instrument Panel has been re-energized.
(WOOTF completes both statements in accordance with the annunciatorprocedure WDI?
In order to re-energize the associated Vital Instrument Panel, the operator must_______________
After the Vital Instrument Panel has been re-energized, one of the required actions is A.
Depress the BYPASS SOURCE TO LOAD pushbutton.
Reset HI FLUX Positive Rate Trip Signal on Nl-41 C.
Place the MANUAL BYPASS switch to the BYPASS SOURCE TO LOAD position.
Reset HI FLUX Positive Rate Trip Signal on NI-41 pushbutton.
D.
Place the MANUAL BYPASS
- 3. Psychometric Flaws TIF H
- 4. Job Content Flaws Cred.
Dist.
2 Partial Job-Link Minutia
- 5. Other 6.
- 1 units Back ward Q=
KIA SRO Only B
U
/
058 AK1.01 (Bank: EC-0.01-1.2: 52532A03 005)
Cred Dist: The 2 part of Choices A and C is not plausible because control room lighting will never affect core cooling.
Since core cooling is the most important objective in a nuclear reactor, the applicant can deduce that the diesel generator is the correct answer to the 2 part of the choices. Also, control room lighting is not listed anywhere in ECP-0.0. See suggested enhancement below.
2.
Stem Focus: The first sentence and bullet are not necessary to elicit the correct response.
Suggest the following:
f5 67F completes the following sentenceThaccordance the caution listed in ECP-O.0?
CAUTION: IF power is not restored to the 125 V DC battery chargers on each train within
, THEN A.
30 minutes; there may not be enough DC capacity to start a DG and sequence needed loads.
B.
90 minutes; the TDAFWP will become unreliable C.
30 minutes; the TDAFWP will become unreliable D.
90 minutes; there may not be enough DC capacity to start a DG and sequence needed loads.
Q#
LOK (F/H) 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws Stem Cues Focus 43 T/F F
2 Cred.
Dist.
- 4. Job Content Flaws Partial x
Job-Link Minutia
- 5. Other x
- 1 Back-units ward 6.
B/M/N 7.
U/E/S 0=
SRO K/A Only B
8.
Explanation EIU
059 A3.02 (Bank Farley 2005 NRC Exam) 1.
Stem Focus: The stem question can be streamlined as follows:
VO0TF predicts the Feedwater Regulating Valve response and panvw range SG Water Level Indication?
2.
Stem Focus: The word initially should be added to both parts of the fill-in-the-blank statement as follows:
Feedwater Regulating Valve position wiIIJil.
Each narrow range SG water level indication willl\\
3.
Stem Focus: The word subsequently is needed in the 3 bullet, i.e., a 200 MW load rejection subsequently occurs.
061 AK1.01 1.
Stem Focus: The l bullet is redundant to the 2nd bullet.
If pressure increases to the high-i setpoint on 2/3 instruments, a safety injection occurs. The 1 bullet is not necessary to answer the question.
2.
Cue: The word available in the 1a fill-in-the-blank statement is a cue that the particulate rad monitor is not available. Suggest re-wording the stem question and the fill-in-the-blank statement as follows:
WOOTF completes the statements for these plant conditions?
/ J The RE-Il, CTMT PARTICULATE (CHI) indication______
[is valid or is not valid]
The ye/low ALERT pushbutton on RE-27A is
[lit or not lit]
7)
//
/
LOK (F/H)
H 44
\\
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
Minutia
- 1 Back-0=
SRO B/M/N U/E/S units ward K/A Only 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws LOD
(1-5)
Stem Cues T/F Cred.
Partial Job-Focus Dist.
Link 2
2 8.
Explanation 45 H
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws 8.
Explanation 061 K6.02 (Mod Bank: Turkey Point 2009 NRC Exam)
Note to NRC: The writers intent was to imply that HV-3228A was initially closed in Choice A, which is different than Choice D.
Cred Dist: Choices WA and D appear to be not plausible because theyre both saying the same thing (valve is at 50%).
It isnt clear that A is implying that HV-3228A was initially closed.
Consequently, Choices A and D are the same thing: 50%
open. The applicant can (correctly) eliminate these two choices.
Backward logic: There is a timing issue with this question. The issue is whether the 10:10 fill-in-the-blank statement is referring to when the auto-start signal was received or after the overspeed trip occurred. (Stem question isnt clear).
062 A1.03 (similar to idea on Turkey point 2010 NRC Exam)
This question overlaps with RO Q#42 (057 AA1.01) by testing the inverters again. The 1A Inverter has already been tested under a K/A specific to the Vital AC Instrument Bus. This question should test an aspect of the AC Electrical Distribution System that is different from the Cred Dist: The 1 part of Choices C and 0 is not plausible because a VITAL power panel will not remain de-energized after an emergency diesel generator ties to the safety bus. (The term VITAL.)
Stem Focus: The wording of the 2 part of Choices B and 0 (ONLY automatic OUTWARD rod motion) is awkward and can be (correctly) eliminated. The 2 part of the question should simply test whether rods can (or cant be) manually withdrawn.
- 4. Job Content Flaws 8.
Explanation i2 AA1.07 (Bank: Farley 2008 NRC Exam)
Cred Dist: To add plausibility to Choices C and 0, add a \\
bullet to the initial conditions stating which CCW heat exchanger(s) is/are in service.
Stem Focus: Re-word the stem question and choices as WOOTF predicts the plant response to the low pond level?
A.
SWDilution Flow on FR4107, SWDILUTION FLOW, will lower and RCV-0238, SGBD Dilution Discharge Valve, will auto-close.
Similarly for Choices B, C, and 0: use of the word indicated is not necessary and add the word auto.
062 K3.02 (Mod Bank: DG 52102104 004 & -006) curs on Unit 1. Instead of telling the applicants, provide information related to the 4kV system that requires the applicants to deduce that a LOSP signal has occurred on Unit 1.
Stem Focus: The SI signal is not necessary for the question (nor for the K/A). Suggest eliminating the SI signal.
3.
Cue: The applicants should know the position of the 1-2A DG Unit Selector Switch when STP-80.6 is in progress.
063 G2.2.44 (Mod Bank: DC 01ST 40204E1 1 004, 40204E07 002) 064 K1.04 (Mod Bank: DO 40102C06 002) 1.
Stem Focus: The 2 part of Choices A and C needs to have the word still included; ie., IS still.
Cue: The 2 fill-in-the-blank statement does not need to include the phrase to 1J 4160V bus..
P
- 3. Psychometric Flaws Stem Focus Cred.
Job Dist.
Link 48 H
2 x
x 1.
2.
6.
7.
LOK LOD
(F/H)
(1-5)
Cues T/F Partial Minutia I
- 1 Back-Q SRO B/M/N U/E/S units ward K/A Only
- 5. Other 2.
51 H
2.
2 x
E V
8.
Explanation 064 K4.04 (Mod Bank: ECP-3.1/ 2.3 52532G06 001)
--Th Stem Focus: Add a lead-in sentence stating that LOS has occurred.
2.Stem Focus: Add the phrase in accordance with ESP-O. 1, Reactor Trip Response to the stem question.
Stem Focus: Re-word the 1 M part of Choices A and B as follows:
7 Group lB heaters will be available for automatic operation after manuaily aligning LC IC to LC IE.
Stem Focus: Re-word the l part of Choices C and D as follows:
4 Group lB heaters will be available for automatic operation with 065 AK3.03 (Mod Bank: AUX BLDG VT 40304B07 008)
Note to NRC: The knowledge of the reasons portion of the K/A statement is being tested because the right answer cant be selected unless the reason is known.
)
Partial: Because of the delayed effects of residual air and the momentary reduction in PZR level after the reactor trip, an applicant could argue more than one correct answer or no correct answer. An alternative is to re-work the question in the following format:
A.
Lower continuously; plausible reason B.
Rise continuously; a wrong reason C.
Lower continuously; plausible reason D.
Rise continuously; the right reason
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 1 Back-units ward tooP 1.
2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws Q#
LOK LOD
(F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues T/F Cred.
Partial Job-Minutia Focus Dist.
Link 52 H
2 x
53 H
2 Verify the PZR level response on the simulator
- 4. Job Content Flaws 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Q#
LOK LOD (F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues T/E Cred.
Partial Job-Minutia 4/
Back-Q SRO BIMIN UIEIS Explanation Focus Dist.
Link units ward K/A Only 54 F
2 x
N E
067 AG2.4.8 1.
The distracter analysis lists the wrong K/A number (lists 068 but should be 067). Question is correctly written to 067 (Plant Fire On-Site).
2.
Stem Focus: Re-word the 1 bullet as follows:
ONLY the immediate Operator Action steps in EEP-O.O,.
Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, have been completed.
3.
Stem focus: Re-word the stem question as follows:
WOOTF describes how AOP-29.Q Plant Fire, is required to be implemented with the remainder of EEP-O.07 4.
Stem Focus: Re-word the 1 fill-in-the-blank statement as follows:
AOP-29.0 is required to be implemented EEP-0.0 is )
L-implemented.
5.
Stem Focus: Re-word the 1 st part of Choices A and C as follows:
at the same time as
, 6.
Stem focus: Re-word the 1 part of Choices B and D as follows:
first; before
8.
Explanation Partial; Choice A can also be correct IF the check source actuates the R-18 automatic trip to occur. Because SOP-50.1 has provisions for this to occur, an applicant can (successfully) argue that Choice A is also performed to test the automatic closure of RCV-18.
)
Cred Dist: Choice B is not plausible because Operations never operates equipment in the LEVEL CAL position Suggest re-working the question to test the applicants knowledge of what to do if the check source does actuate the R 18 trip, and a high background condition persisted, which precludes resetting the R-1 8 trip). [Correct Answer; Increase R-18 pot setting to a setting above background AND depress the reset pushbutton.] [Wrong answer; Backflush R-18 rad monitor per Step 4.6 of Appendix 1.
Still need another knowledge item to test.
073 A2.01 (Mod Bank; CCW 521 02G07 006)
Note to NRC; The phrase in accordance with shouldnt be used on this question because it makes the l part of Choices A and B less plausible since the applicant is cued that the loss of power still actuated the Hi Rad annunciator (where the guidance is found).
Stem Focus; The 3
,d bullet is not specific as to the instrument or control power that has been lost to R-17B. Specify the instrument panel and breaker number in the bullet (to further substantiate incorrect assumption that since drawer fails downscale the vent wont close). The word failed is ambiguous.
Stem focus; Change the l parts of all the choices to will NOT or will (instead of does NOT or DOES); the wording change will ensure the applicants know their ability to predict is being tested.
3 Stem focus; Add the word manually to the 2 part of Choices Aand B.
- 4. Job Content Flaws Job-Link Minutia
- 5. Other 6.
- 1 units Back ward Ilk 1 K/A SRO Only 068 A4.04 1.)
56 H
2 x
1.
Dl-
8.
Explanation 076 K2.08 (Bank: SW 401 01 B06 001, 2006 Farley NRC Exam) 1Atm Focus: Change the stem question to: WOOTF identifies the power supply to Unit I MOV-515, SW TO TURB BLDG ISO A TRN?
078 A4.0l (Mod Bank: 2001, 2004, 2006 Farley NRC Exams)
Cred Dist: The 1 st part of Choices B and C is not plausible because the stem says that the service air header is ruptured and isolated. Pressure on the service air header defies the laws of physics.
Suggest testing the applicants knowledge of the expected instrument air pressure when the instrument airs m is isolated from service air (90-1 05 psig) and t setpoint or KD2 IA PRESS LO (which is another indirect metho of satisfying the K/A to monitor Pl-4004B).
Verify no overlap w/ Q#60 (079 K4.01) 078 K2.01 (Bank: COMP AIR 40204D04 003) 1.
2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws LOK LOD (F/H)
(1-5)
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Minutia 1
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO B/MIN U/EIS Explanation units ward K/A Only B
U 079 K4.01 (Bank: COMP AIR 40204007 005) 1.
Cue and/or LOD=1: The only Choice that is not related to Instrument Air (Choice A) is also the correct answer.
In other words, Service Air is only listed in one of the choices.
Additionally, knowledge of the overall design of the service and instrument air system to shed non-essential service air loads first is not a Farley plant specific knowledge.
7
Suggestthefoiijng;.,.
air header isolation valve (V-901) will close if air header 70
[80 psig vs. the low pressure dlarn setpoint].
Once closecJ the local RESET push button on must be depressed to restore setvice air after header pressure is back above the setpoint.
[the air reset panel located at?? vs. some other local panel that b
has air equipment on it.]
2.
Verify no overlap w/ Q#58 (078 A4.01)
/
1.
2.
Q#
LOK LOD (F/H)
(1-5) 60 F
Stem Cues T/F Cred.
Partial Job Dist.
Link 2
2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
LOK LOD
(F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues TIF Cred.
Partial Job-Minutia Back-Q=
SRO BIMIN UIEIS Explanation Focus Dist.
Link ward K/A Only 61 F
2 x
103 A3.01 Note to NRC: Mini-purge will normally be operated only when there is a need to reduce CTMT pressure or a need to cool CTMT atmosphere. Mini-purge flow path may be used to purge containment when primary system temperature exceeds 200°F. Full purge may be used only when RCS temperature is less than 200°F.
Continuous operation of CTMT Mini-purge was evaluated and deleted to reduce the amount of radioactive gasses released to the environment. [LDCR 2005056 to the ODCM]
1<
Stem Focus: The stem doesnt clearly state that the mini-purge supply and exhaust fans are running or why theyre running.
Add in accordance with procedure )O(X.
Job-Link: The premise of the stem is that an error was made.
Suggest re-wording to test the applicants knowledge of how the components respond following a manual Phase A actuation.
Stem focus: Add the word automatically to the 1t fill-in-the-blank statement (before the word st7
- 1 units x
N E
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Explanation G2.1.1 (Bank: Turkey Point 2010 NRC Exam)
Cred Dist: The 1 part of Choices A and B is not plausible because the l fill-in-the-blank statement has the phrase to generate a Control Room Log entry. Because making log entries is part of the reactor operators job, it isnt plausible that an operator cant use the computer to do his job. Many of the control room systems require the OATC to use a computer.
Suggest:
WOOTF completes both statements in accordance with NMP-/
OS-007-OO1, Conduct of Operations Standards and Expectations?
on-coming watch stander reviews applicable unit operating logs or turnover sheets and temporary orders for at least
[the duration of his absence or 3 days, whichever is less (correct answer) vs. a plausible distracter.]
Due to the physical layout of the FNP control room, it is acceptable for the SS, OATC, and UO to communicate via when shift relief has occurred.
[a 3-way communication (correct answer) vs. a plausible distracter.]
62 F
Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO B/M/N U/E/S Link units ward K/A Oni B
U
- 4. Job Content Flaws G2.1.4 (Mod Bank: PLTOPER4O25O2HO4 001)
Stem Focus: The phrase proficient and qualified may be subjective. Additionally, the intent of the stem may not be clear, i.e., was the last time the RO was at work December 16, 2011?
OR was the RO assigned to the WCC on December 16, 2011 and remained in the WCC since that time? Suggest re-phrasing rAn RO with an active license was temporarily re-assigned to 1 work in the Work Control Center from December 16, 2011 until
\\
May 10, 2012.
.1
- 2. C?d Dist: Because the stem of the question says that the RO is interested in the FIRST QUARTER, (i.e., while the RO is still assigned to the WCC) it probably cues the applicant that he is MAINTAINING proficiencyactivatin))An applicant could potentially eliminate ChoiceB ri7ib based on their wording of under instruction (associated with activating) instead of eliminating thern based on the time allotment.
Suggest the following straightforward method:
Maintenance of an active license requires that an individual spend_________ shifts in a position that requires the license at least_________
LOK (F/H) 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws Stem Focus Cues 63 T/F F
Cred.
Dist.
2 Partial x
Job-Link Minutia
- 5. Other x
6.
7.
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO units ward K/A Only B/M/N U/E/S M
8.
Explanation E
8.
Explanation 02.2.40 (Bank: AOP-1.0 52520A10 004)
Note to NRC: The applicant is required to apply tech specs for the Reactor Coolant System because of the knowledge associated with the Tech Spec definitions of Unidentified and Identified Leakage Partial: lFfRT level is rising, then this may not be operationIly valid, i.e., no correct answer.
In order for the RCS to be involved, it may b esiS to include PRT temperature, tailpipe temperatures, etc. Discuss W/ licensee. (What RCS leak would onlycause PRT level to rise?)
3.
Stem Focus: The bullet should be re-worded to say:
- 1 Pf6RCS leak rate is 2.5 gpm.
Q=K/A: To better hit the Tech Spec application K/A statement,
,suggest re-wording the 2 fill-in-the-blank statement as:
Entry to a required action statement_______ required.
(is or is not)
G2.2.41 Note to NRC: The sample question was previously submitted and the Part 2 of the question changed based on courtesy review by CE.
1.
Stem Focus: The 1 fill-in-the-blank question does not identify which version is being referred to (Current or Latest).
2.
Job-Link: Discuss W/ the licensee whether it is acceptable to use EITHER version. (NMP-AP-001, Section 4.3.2 is confusing.)
Suggest changing the 1 part of the question to test the applicants knowledge of which version is allowed to be used for work in the plant.
F 2
- 4. Job Content Flaws Job-Minutia
- /
Back-Link units ward
- 5. Other x
6.
B/M/N Q=
SRO K/A Only 7.
U/E/S 64 65 F
2.
2.
LCD (1-5)
G2.3.12 (Mod Bank: Sequoyah 2010 NRC Exam)
Note to NRC: Request a full copy of RCP-0.2, Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Maintenance Sump Entry (not included on the reference disc).
Cred Dist: The 2d part of Choices A and B is borderline plausible for activities associated with potential over-exposures.
See suggested enhancement below.
Stem Focus: The 3 and bullets are not necessary to answer the question. (The l two bullets are necessary; a prerequisite to using Appendix B of RCP-0.2) 3.
Cue: The word normally in the stem is a cue that the contrl room panel verification is allowed; however, since the procedure uses this word, suggest the following re-write of the
{wooTF completes both statements in accordance with RCP 0.2, Unit I Reactor Vessel Maintenance Sump Entry, Appendix B?
Storage locations of the MIDS detectors Before any containment entry; the minimum requirement is on the Main Control Panel A.
are normally allowed to be determined at the Incore controlPanel in1he control room; aLHRA padlock OR Danger Tag>
B.
must be determined locally at the MID drive box in containment; a LHRA padlock OR Danger Tag C.
are normally allowed to be determined at the Incore Control Panel in the control room; a LHRA padlock AND Danger Tag D.
must be determined locally at the MID drive box in containment; a LHRA padlock AND Danger Tag LOK (F/H)
Stem Focus Cues T/F
- 3. Psychometric Flaws Cred.
Partial Dist.
66 F
- 4. Job Content Flaws 2
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Explanation
- 4. Job Content Flaws G2.3.5 (Mod Bank: Sequoyah 2010 NRC Exam, RMS 40305A02 018)
Partial: An applicant can successfully argue that Choice A is also correct based on the following Step 11.3. (Identify the affect SG(s)), in AOP-2.0, specifically:
11.3.2 Check any SG radiation indication
- HIGH. (BOP)
[1 R-70A IA SG TUBE LEAK DET\\
[]R-70B 18 SG TUBE LEAK DET
[]R-70C ICSG TUBELEAKDET/
4u R-60A MS ATMOS REL\\
(JR-6OBMSATMOSREL
[1 R-60C MS ATMOS REL j
Explanation
1.
2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Q#
LOK (F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues T/F Cred.
Partial Job-Minutia
- /
Back-Q=
SRO B/M/N U/EIS Explanation Focus Dist.
Link units ward K/A Only 68 F
1.9 x
x x
N E
G2.3.7 (tough K/A) 1.
Cred Dist: Choice C (do nothing) is not plausible because of the way the fill-in-the-blank statements are worded and because there stem doesnt state that the operator has dosimetry and is signed on the RWP.
2.
LOD: As presented, the question may not have discriminatory
)
-, 3)
Cue: The info inside the parenthesis is a strong cue.
/
(
4.
Stem Focus: Enhance the 2 d bullet:
/<
The operator will be required to uncap V464, LCV-1 15D Outlet Line Vent Valve, attach a drain hose, and open V464, which is above the boron injection tank.
5.
Stem Focus: Add another bullet stating that the operator has signetlie..Rj/yP, has the required dosimetry, and has met IlIdress out requirements--_.
Suggest the following:
WOOTF identifies the MINIMUM requirements for this activity?
Before the operator connects the drain hose, an initial HP survey of the area near V464 is requfred; Continuous HP coverage is also required while the operator vents the system.
B.
An initial survey of the area near V464 is NOT required before the operator connects the drain hose; however, continuous HP coverage is required while the operator is venting the system.
C.
Before the operator connects the drain hose, an initial HP survey of the area near V464 is required; however
/continuous HP coverage while the operator is venting the (system is tQi required.
D.
An initial HP survey of the area near V464 is tQi required before the operator connects the drain hose. Continuous HP coverage while the operator is venting the system is NOTrequired.
8.
Explanation G2.4.14 (Bank: Vogtle 2011 NRC Exam)
Partial: An applicant can (successfully) argue that Choice A is correct because of the way that SOP-0.8, Section 4.2.8.2 is worded, i.e., The Shift Supervisor should be informed as soon as possible after initiating the manual action. (It appears that Shift Supervisor PERMISSION isnt required.)
69 H
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO B/M/N U/E/S Link units ward K/A Only
1.
2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws LOK LOD
(F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues TIF Cred. jPartial Focus Dist.
70 H
2 x
x x
0 8.
Explanation G2.4.43 (Mod Bank: Vogtle 2009 NRC Exam, EPIP CLASS 53002C03 015)
Note to NRC: NMP-EP-1 11, Table 1 lists the agencies required to be notified both during the initial roll call and for all emergency notification messages. At the top of Table 1, the primary notification system is listed as ENN-S0LINC and the backup communication systems are listed as (1) Comlabs, (2) Commercial Telephone, (3)
Radio, and (4) Satellite phone. Checklist 2 (Emergency Notifications Electronic Method) Continuing Actions section, Step 2 (page 4 of
- 4) states: If an individual agency cannot be reached via the ENt4 use an alternate method (e.g., commercial telephone line and the numberprovided in the emergency response telephone directory) to contact the individual station directly.
Cred Dist and/or Cue: The 2 part of Choices A and C (Emergency Notification System phone set) is not plausible because of the way the 2 d fill-in-the-blank statement is worded, i.e., A BACKUP communication systern_
Because the 2 part of Choices A and C is worded as Emergency Notification System phone sel and because the 2 fill-in-the-blank has the strong cue word backup, an applicant can (correctly) eliminate Choices A and C solely based on common sense that the emergency phone is never a backup.
- 2.,/tem Focus: The stem should state that the designated ENN
/
Communicator is performing Checklist 2
- Emergency Notifications
- Electronic Method, (instead of using the word you., because this makes the question less likely to be appealed)
Partial: Because Comlabs is the first listed (priority?) backup communication system at the top of Table 1, an applicant may be able to appeal that there is no correct answer. (Comlabs not listed in the 2 part of the Choices.) Checklist 2 (Emergency Notifications Electronic Method), Continuing Actions section, Step 2 (page 4 of 4) uses an example = commercial telephone.
There may be some intended priority listed at the top of Table 1.
4)/ Stem Focus: The 2 nd stem sentence should include the word
have, i.e., During ROLL CALL, ONLYthe following organizations answered:
5,,/ Stem Focus: The l part of Choices A and B should be worded as is still (versus IS).
- 4. Job Content Flaws Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
Link units ward K/A
- 5. Other SRO Only
8.
Explanation G2.4.5Q
-j)
Q=K/A: The applicants ability to verify an ARP alarm setpoint associated with the EOPs or E-plan is not being tested.
Furthermore, the 2° fill-in-the-blank statement and the 2 part of the choices dont require the applicant to know or verify the HF3, TAVGITREF DEV alarm setpoint (+/- 5°F). To select the correct answer, the applicants need to know 1) Tavg is low because a boron release has occurred and 2) the Reactivity Management procedure (NMP-OS-OO1) states that adding positive reactivity (withdrawing rods) is never an appropriate way to address unstable plant conditions (non-conservative to withdraw control rods).
2.
Cred Dist: The 2 nd part of Choices B and D is not plausible because driving rods INWARD will not raise Tavg. These (incorrect) choices should be listed as WITHDRAW rods (which would be a plausible distracter). Generic fundamentals knowledge associated with demineralizers and boron make driving rods IN not plausible. IF the intent was to test the applicants knowledge of the reactivity management restriction, THEN the 2 d part of these choices should be WITHDRAW rods.
Suggest re-working the question to test theapplicants knowledge of whether a containment Hi-i or Hi-3 annunciator should (or should not) be alarming (based on--containment parameters provided in the stem) and the minimum required manual actions to initiate containment spray in the event it fails to automatically start. (verify no overlap w/ scenarios)
/
/
Job-Link Minutia
- 1 units Back ward
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
BIM/N U/EIS N
U Q=
K/A SRO Only x
V Vt)
,,1
)
/.:
d4-& 7
2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Q#
LOK LOD (F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues T/F Cred.
Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist.
Link units ward K/A Only 72 F
2 x
x B
E/U WEO4 EK2.2 (Bank: Vogtle 2010 NRC Exam, ECP-1.2 52532E07 004) 1.
Cred Dist: The 1 part of Choices C and 0 is not plausible
N because this is not one of the systems listed in ECP-1.2....The j/
)
rnqesonaoLthe.ElRSLsystemtobe iscated. The 1st 7
) V
I part of Choices C and D should be one of thher systems listed in ECP-1.2 (Letdown or Cnmt Sump Isol Vlvs) to be
/
pbly 2.
Cred Dist: The 2 part of Choices B and 0 should be PZR
level because this would be the first parameter that would V
change when the leak was isolated (not RVLIS).
3.
Stem Focus: The l sentence and bullet is not necessaryto elicit the correct response.
73 H
3 N
S WEO5 EK2.1
Partial: An applicant could (successfully) argue that Choice A is also correct if the phrase satisfying support conditions were interpreted to be equivalent to a status evaluation. Suggest re working the mi part of the question to test the applicants knowledge of whether the RCP can be restarted without evaluating its status or ONLY if its status 2.
Cred Dist: The l part of Choices A and B are not plausible because the l bullet in the stem does not include the ECP-O.O, Step Number that the crew progressed to. ECP-O.O Attachment 3 isolates RCP seals for the overall Loss of All AC Power mitigative strategy. IF the step number were included, then it would be plausible that the RCP may be immediately restarted since Attachment 3 may not already have been completed.
Stem Focus: Re-word the 2 fill-in-the-blank statement as:
IF an SI actuation were to subsequently occur, EEP-O.O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection to be re-entered.
_(is required vs is NOT required)
Q#
LOK (F/H) 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws Stem Cues Focus 74 T/F H
- 4. Job Content Flaws Cred.
Dist.
2 Partial x
- 5. Other 6.
Job-Minutia
- /
Back-Q=
SRO Link units ward KIA Only 7.
U/E/S B/M/N 8.
Explanation WEO9 EG2.4.20 Suggest testing the applicants knowledge of whatthe implication of an RCP status evaluation entails. (Is it documented anywhere?)
2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
LOK LOD
(F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues TIF Cred.
Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q SRO BIMIN UIEIS Explanation Focus Dist.
Link units ward K/A Only 75 2
x B
E WE13 EK3.4 (Bank: Farley 2004 NRC Exam, FRP-H 52533F06 009) 1.
QKIA: The part of Choices C and 0 list to drop pressure as the reason for releasing steam.
In order to more effectively test the reason portion of the K/A, suggest the following enhancements to the choices:
/
Releasing steam A.
is NOT permitted from only the IC SG because water may be in its steamline.
B.
Is NOT permitted from ANY SG because the main steam piping is interconnected and water may be in the steamlines.
C.
will FIRST be attempted using the IC atmospheric relief valve because IC SG has the highest pressure.
\\,
D.
will FIRST be attempted using the TDAFW Pump in order to draw steam from multiple SG5.
/
)
DiscUss le-classifying this qUestibh as a Iowercog.
(fundamental) test item.
II
1.
2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Q#
LOK LOD
(F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues TIF Cred.
Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO BIM/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist.
Link units ward K/A Only 76 H
2 x
x x
N E
003 AG2.2.22 Note to NRC: It appears that the intent of the proposed question is to test the SRO applicants knowledge of a management interpretation (document not provided with reference material) which allows NOT calling the rod stuck (i.e., inoperable) when it has only partially dropped. The management interpretation is an operability determination for the control rod. [Request a copy of the management interpretation document and see suggested 1
enhancement below.]
3.
SRO-only and/or Cues: The stem cues the applicants with the word drops (implying that the rod is still trippable) and also provides information that the followup investigation results are that a problem in the Rod Control Power Cabinet exists. These two items essentially cue the applicants to the correct answer without testing the SRO applicants knowledge of the management interpretation document for operability determination, i.e., rod operability = trippability. See suggested enhancement below.
4.
Stem Focus: The initial conditions should list the initial position of CBD (186 steps) and any alarm(s) as a result of the Power Cabinet issue with rod P8 (Rod Control Non-Urgent or Urgent Failure).
5.
Stem Focus: The word identifies is missing from the stem question.
Suggest re-working the question to more directly test the SRO applicants knowledge of whether the rod is OPERABLE OR INOPERABLE lAW the (title/number) of the management interpretation document. This will allow testing the applicants TS bases knowledge of a Farley OPERABILITY determination in accordance with the definition of OPERABLE in the TS 3.1.4 bases.
Provide Farley reference that delineates management expectation on operability of a dropped rod.
6.
Ensure no overlap with Q# 2 (003 AA1.07), Q# 7 (005 AK2.02),
or Q#82 (024 AG2.4.46) 671 7/:
1.
2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Q#
LOK LOD
(F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues T/F Cred.
Partial Job-Minutia
- /
Back-Q=
SRO B/M/N U/EIS Explanation Focus Dist.
Link units ward K/A Only 77 H
2 x
x N
E 005 G2.4.30 1.
Stem Focus: The definition of Modes (in Tech specs) lists Tavg.
The 1 st bullet should provide the indicator number (unid#) that is being used to define RCS temperature. Also suggest listing the current RCS pressure.
2.
Cue: The 3 bullet is not necessary to elicit the correct 7
response if the decay heat removal system was placed in service in accordance with the procedure.
References:
Provide the entire copy of EIP-8.0 to the applicanis (not just the specific pages). (reference may already provided for Q#94 enhancement suggestions) 4.
Cue: The 2 fill-in-the-blank statement cues the applicants that an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> notification is where to look. Suggest re-wording the 2 fill-in-the-blank statement to test the applicants knowledge of the earliest required notification time to the NRC. Explore plausibility of listing a (incorrect) 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> notification in Choices
2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
LOK LOD
(F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues T/F Cred.
Partial Job-B/MIN U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist.
Link 78 H
2 x
x x
006A2.02 Note to NRC: The proposed question meets the intent of the K/A (loss of ECCS flowpath) because flowpaths were lost as a result of MOV-8889 and MOV-8884 not having power.
Cred7 oi D is not plausible because remaining in
)
ESP:t4-afterit1as been determined that that simultaneous cold/hot leg recirc cant be accomplished can be eliminated using common sense, i.e., the 1 part of the question says it cant be accomplished, therefore, remaining in the procedure is futile.
Stem Focus: The stem should be more precise as to which busses remain de-energized.
Cue: The paragraph provides an unnecessary cue that EEP-1.O was re-entered after ESP-1.3 was initially performed.
Suggest the following stem re-wording:
A LOCA occurred on Unit I and the crew established cold leg recirculation per ESP-I.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation.
Subsequently, a LOSP occurred and the B Train emergency busses (specify which ones) remain de-energized.
After several hours, the crew entered ESP-I.4, Transfer to Simultaneous Cold and Hot Leg Recirculation. The crew is currently assessing whether simultaneous cold and hot leg recirculation can be established given the loss of electrical power.
(This suggestion doesnt remedy the cred distracter issue with Choice D. One alternative is to test the applicants knowledge of the E-plan classification associated with the event.)
Minutia
2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Q#
LOK LOD
(F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues T/F Cred.
Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO B/M/N U/EIS Explanation Focus Dist.
Link units ward K/A Only 79 H
2 N
E 008A2.O1 1.
Stem Focus: For ASME pump & valve testing, usually the alert vibration status does not require declaring the pump inoperable. Clrify..the2_bu1ieLthaLthe..1C-CCW..piimp Step 4.2 of STP-23.3 says: If the measured test parameter values fall within the Required Action Range, the component is inoperable until corrective action is performed or the test results are invaildated in accordance with Step 4.3. Verify that high vibration = Tech Spec inoperable.
2.
Job-Link: Verify with the licensee that it is operationally valid to be reviewing a copy of STP-23.3 while the plant is in Mode 3 preparing for a startup. (Is this a shutdown STP?)
3.
Stem Focus: The stem question can be streamlined as follows:
WOOTF identifies the earilest time that Mode 2 was aiowed to be entered in accordance with Tech Specs?
4.
Stem Focus: Choice D can be made symmetrical with the other choices IF another point in time is added to the stem, i.e.,
At 16:00: DFO4, 1C CCW Pump is declared operable.
x x
2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
8.
LOK LOD
(F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues T/F Cred.
Partial Minutia B/MIN U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist.
80 H
2 x
010 G2.4.45 (Modified from Surry 2009 Q# 13)
Cred Dist: Choices C and D are not plausible because a first out alarm is illuminated on G82. Even though the question is testing the applicants ability to recognize the significance of the
/
alarm, it is not plausible because there are no first out alarms 7 /
that arent indicative of a reactor trip. IF there are examples of a first-out annunciator alarming that is not indicative of a reactor trip, THEN Choices C and D may be plausible. See enhancement below.
2.
Stem Focus and/or Cred Dist: The stem does not specify the lowest RCS pressure during the transient. (1875 psig was the lowest?)
3.
Cue: The 5 bullet states that multiple alarms are in.., which is a cue that the reactor has tripped.
4.
Stem Focus: The ls fill-in-the-blank statement is not specific with respect to a manual or automatic reactor trip is required.
Consequently, the question may (incorrectly) imply that an ATWS has occurred.
1 5.
Stem Focus: The 1 bullet uses slang, i.e., going open.
Suggest re-working the first part of the question to test the applicants knowledge of the setpoint for HC2, PRZR HI-LO PRESS ALERT (1865 psig). This is operationally valid and is not minutia since 1865 psig is a reactor trip setpoint.
6.
Ensure no overlap w/ RO Q#14 (010 A4.03)
Job-
- /
Back-Q=
SRO Link units ward K/A Only 7.
x x
.1 M
E
)
\\
1-I
1 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Q#
LOK LOD
(F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues T/F Cred.
Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO BIM/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist.
Link units ward K/A Only 81 H
2 x
N E/U 011 EA2.02 QK/A: The 2 part of the question is the SRO piece of the question (because RO knowledge can be used to answer the 1 part). However, the 2 d part of the question is not testing the K/A; therefore, the question only tests the K/A at the RO level.
The question must test the consequence to RHR of not resetting safety injection during a LB LOCA at the level of a SRO. The 1 part of the question can be deduced by knowing the standby lineup for RHR and the required lineup for cold leg recirc (RO knowledge). The 2 part of the question is at the SRO level; however, it doesnt hit the K/A at that level. This is subtle; hence the grade of E/U.
Suggest re-working the 2 part of the question to test the applicants knowledge of the procedural guidance/implication when SI cannot be reset (SRO piece). For example, Step 9.4.2 of EEP-1.0 states..
IF a failure exists in SSPucbJhaLSI-annotbe-resetm THEN reset SI usingIiP-1-SOP-4O.O, RESPONSE TO I
tlNAD7EPTffTAND INABILITY TO RESET OR J
Suggest testing the applicants ability to select the correct procedure (FNP-1 -SOP-40,ppen.Z).y&pme other
.E!bIp!ocedu!elfiFis is not possible, then consulttffThe for K/A replacement.
7 2
frL AZo4 AL Cw W(t4-L$Cvq a$L L4 141
1.
2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Q#
LOK LOD
(F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues T/F I Cred.
Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q I SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist.
Link units ward K/A jOnly 82 H
2 x
N E
024 AG2.4.46 Note to NRC: This is a borderline K/A match (okay) because the 2 (SRO) piece of the question doesnt directly deal with the ability to verify alarms are consistent with plant conditions. The l part directly hits the K/A at the RO level. However, a periphery knowledge associated with the FE2, CONT ROD BANK POSITION LO-LO annunciator is shutdown margin; hence the basis for shutdown margin is indirectly related to the alarm.
1.
Stem Focus: The 2 nd fill-in-the-blank statement refers to the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM 13.1.1) even though there is also a Tech Spec associated with Shutdown Margin, It seems more appropriate to cite the Tech Spec 3.1.1 bases instead of the TRM Bases in this fill-in-the-blank statement. Re word the 2 fill-in-the-blank statement as:
(The most limiting accident for the Tech Spec 3.1.1 Shutdown Margin requirement is based on a in accordance with Tech Spec Bases 3.1.1.
- 2. Sm Focus: Add the word annunciator to the 1 fill-in-the-blank statement, i.e., The FE2, CONT ROD BANK POSITION LO-LO anenciator_______ currently alarming.
Stem Focus: The 2 part of all four choices can be streamlined to either a Control Rod Ejection vs Steam Line Break. The point in core life is not necessary to elicit the correct response.
4.
Ensure no overlap with Q#2 (003 AA1.07), Q# 7 (005 AK2.02),
or Q#76 (003 AG2.2.22).
2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
LOK LOD (F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues T/F Cred.
Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO BIM/N U/EIS Explanation Focus Dist.
Link units ward K/A Only 83 F
2 x
N E
025AA2.05 Note to NRC: The question meets the intent of a Loss of RHR (even though it only tests a TS 3.9.5 flow requirement) because IF flow is less than the requirement, THEN one RHR loop is technically not in operation.
1.
Stem Focus: Re-word the stem question and fill-in-the-blank statement as follows:
WOOTF completes both statements?
In accordance with Tech Spec 3.9.5, RHR and Coolant Circulation Low Water Leve4 Surveillance Requirement (Sf) 3.9.5.1, one RHR loop must be in operation and circulating reactor coolant at a flow rate of________
The basis for the SR 3.9.5.1 flow requirement is that this is the minimum flow to 2.
Discuss whether this question should be listed as a fundamental item versus comprehension/analysis.
- 4. Job Content Flaws 7.
8.
Explanation 026 A2.03 (Bank-Watts Bar 2009 Q#88)
Job-Link: The Channel Operational Test (COT) listed in Tech Spec SR 3.3.2.4 would normally include sequential testing of all four I-li-3 transmitters at the same time, every 184 days. The stem seems to imply that the surveillance test on PT-953 was not originally performed at the same time as the other three transmitters. This does not seem operationally valid. Why would the test on PT-953 be due at a different date than when the test on PT-950 was performed? IF the COT discovered that PT-950 was inoperable, they would first repair PT-950 before going on to test another transmitter.
Research the Farley COT that fulfills this surveillance requirement to see if an allowance is provided to test the transmitters on some sort of staggered basis. The stem of the question may be modified to list the exact title/number of the Farley COT used to test these transmitters.
2.
Stem Focus: Re-word the ff1-in-the-blank statements as follows:
In order to accomplish the su,velllance test on PT-953, the PT-950 bistable position (Choices would be mustbe changed,fmmtripto bypass vs tan remain in-.tba.sazne.posiVon)
During the time that the suivelliance test is being performed on PT-953, a valid automatic CS actuation (Choices would be cannot occur vs can still occur) t}
7 kij.,1 U/E/S E
7*
1.
2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Q#
LOK LOD
(F/H)
(1 -5)
Stem Cues T/F Cred.
Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q SRO B/MIN U/EIS Explanation Focus Dist.
Link units ward K/AjOnly 85 H
2 x
x M
E 026 G2.2.25 (Modified from Farley Bank item CCW-62102G0201)
Partial: Need to be sure that Farley FSD requirements = Tech Spec requirements. (may not be a correct answer if not equal).
Verify that HV-3096A & B are required for the CCW train to be operable in the acceptance criteria for the Farley surveillance test used to fulfill SR 3.7.7.2. Alternatively, provide document that says FSD requirements are required to meet Tech Spec operability.
Ij,/1 2.
Stem Focus: Modify the stem question as follows:
WOOTF completes the following statements in accordance with Tech.Spec 3.7.7 Bases and the CCW Functionyem Description A-181000?
(1 fill-in-the-blank statement okay)
The A Train CCW is currently_______
Each of the choices can be streamlined to only include the word OPERABLE (or INOPERABLE). The second part of each of the second portions of the choices is not necessary.
1.
2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Q#
LOK LOD
(F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues TIF Cred.
Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO BIM/N U/EIS Explanation Focus j Dist.
Link junits ward K/A Only 86 H
I x
M U
034 K4.01 (Modified from Robinson 2007 NRC Q#97)
Note to NRC: This Tier 2 Group 2 SRO question is not an A2 or G, which is allowed by ES-401 because it is a fuel handling K/A statement.
)
1 LOD = 1 or Cred 01st: The 2 part of Choices A and C is not plausible because fuel transfer systems are never engineered to drop a fuel bundle (defensein-depth), even when hoist interlocks are bypassed per procedures. The 1 part of Choices C and D is not plausible because the fuel handling supervisor ALWAYS oversees fuel handling activities.
The correct answer (B) can be selected using RO systems knowledge (fuel transfer systems are not ever designed to drop a bundle, defense-in-depth concept) and RO administrative knowledge (Fuel Handling Supervisor is an SRO license). This question will not discriminate at the SRO level.
The proposed question DOES hit the K/A (equipment design feature or interlock associated with protecting the fuel binding or dropping); however, it is LOD = 1 based on the comments above.
2.
Stem Focus: The wording of the 2 fill-in-the-blank statement does not clarify that the applicants are being asked what will happen if the gripper switch is placed to the DISENG position with the fuel assembly 2 from the lower core plate. The phrase with the fuel assembly 2 from the lower core plate is missing from the fill-in-the-blank statement. This will cause the applicants to ask the proctor whether the fuel bundle has been completely lowered or not.
1.
2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Q#
LOK LOD (F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues TIF Cred.
Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-0=
SRO BIM/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist.
Link units ward K/A Only 87 F
2 x
B E
056 AG2.1.7 (Bank Watts Bar 2009 Q#99)
Note to NRC: One way to target 10CFR55.43(b)(5) is to cresent procedure choices, to test the SRO applicants ability to select procedures based on assessment of plant conditions. Instead, the proposed question tests the content of a contingency procedure. For ECP-0.0, the RO knowledge of the overall mitigative strategy is the Major Action Categories:
/1
)
- 1. Perform immediate actions.
(
(
- 2. Restore AC power.
- 3. Maintain plant conditions for optimal recovery.
- 4. Evaluate energized AC emergency bus.
- 5. Select recovery procedure after AC power restoration.
Maintaining plant conditions for optimal recovery entails minimizing RCS inventory loss by depressurizing the secondary system, to reduce RCS temperature to minimize RCP seal degradation, and reducing RCS pressure to reduce RCP seal leakage, which permits injection of SI accumulator water to partially replace the RCS inventory lost through the RCP seals. Secondary heat sink is maintained by controlling the TDAFW pump and the rate of SG steam release to maintain narrow range level in at least one intact SG. Th proc dqqetiqpJçs beyond this overall mitigative strategy because it tests the appflcantsrk
[eUjéif diiostic 1.
Stem Focus: There are two items being tested in the 1 part of each of the choices (parameter and reason). The question can be streamlined to only the parameter.
2.
Stem Focus: the phrase in accordance with ECP-O.O should be added to the WOOTF stem question.
S Other 6.
7.
8.
Back-Q=
SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation ward K/A Only N
E 067 AA2.08 1.
LOD = 5: An applicant can successfully appeal this question because NMP-EP-ll0-GLO1, FNP EALs, was not provided as a reference. Re-work the question such that the applicants are provided the classification tables (no bases) and the question is not a direct lookup.
2.
Stem Focus: To better tie to the K/A, add a 3 bullet to the stem at time 10:14, Due to the loss of HVAC, the [pick a control room area listed in FNP-1-STP-63.3] temperature reached 105F.
Re-word the 2 fill-in-the-blank statement as The FSAR design limit maximum temperature for [the control room area you choose]
. (Choices are was exceeded or was not exceeded).
3.
Job-link: Verify that a control room area is listed in FNP-1-STP-63.3.
4.
Discuss whether this question is comprehension/analysis versus fundamental recall.
M E
072 G2.2.36 (Modified Bank Farley 2011 NRC Q#86)
Note to NRC: The proposed question tests 10CFR55.43(b)(2),
Knowledge of TS bases since knowledge of the TRM bases (equivalent) is necessary to choose the correct response, i.e.,
definition of the TRM term FUNCTIONAL.
1.
Partial: The term nonfunctional is not listed in the Definitions section of TRM 11.1 and is subject to interpretation, i.e., no correct answer. Suggest re-wording the ls fill-in-the-blank statement as follows:
The first time that R-5 rad monitor was no longer FUNCTIONAL, in accordance with TRM 13.3.4 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation, was at 2.
Stem Focus:
In order to clarify and ensure plausibility of the l part of Choices C and D, re-word the 1 st bullet at 10:00 as follows:
- 4. Job Content Flaws Job-Link Minutia
- 1 units I
88 F
5 89 H
2 x
/c )
An electrical lead is lifted that disables the alarm function of R-5; however, the rad monitor indication at Panel XXX is still valid.
086 A2.02 (Modified Bank Vogtle 2011 Q#90)
SRO-only: ROs are expected to know the minimum number of fire pumps required for the fire suppression system to be operable. This is similar to knowing how many ECCS pumps are required to be operable in any given mode. Precaution and Limitation 3.11 in FNP-0-SOP-61.0 states:
Prior to removing a fire pump from service, ensure the other two fire pumps are OPERABLE. (CR2009111627) Non-licensed operators also are required to know how many operable fire pumps are required during their rounds, etc.
The proposed question does not involve administering compensatory actions associated with not having the required fire pumps operable (similar to prescribing LCO action statements). (See SRO clarification guidance example in Section l.A.)
Suggest testing the SRO applicants ability to identify the required action when less than the minimum number of operable fire pumps are available. Alternatively, test the applicants ability to determine the required notifications when the minimum number of fire pumps are not operable.
L
,tteA 6j rA1L 5-.. 2
. -cd:
Aiitt j
L 90 F
2 1.
2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Q#
LOK LOD
1
(F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues T/F I Cred.
Partial Job-Minutia I
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist.
Link junits ward K/A Only b
x M
U I
I 0/
o1p
/3 1
8.
Explanation G2.l.8 (BankWatts Bar 2010 Q#95)
SRO-only or LOD=1: The licensees submittal indicated that the basis for this question being SRO only was that Farley classified the knowledge/ability of re-entry & relocation as unique to the SRO position, and that this classification is documented within the SAT process. However, there are (RO) learning objectives associated with the overall knowledge of the OSCs purpose and function (once the TSC is staffed). The correct answer can be deduced using RO knowledge of the OSCs purpose and function, once the TSC is staffed. See explanation.
The 1 part of Choices A and B can be eliminated solely using RO knowledge that the OSC (as described in OPS 53002A 40501 A, FNP Emergency Plan Overview, is an area north of the TSC where re-entry teams for maintenance, sampling, and activities necessa,y to support emergency operations are staged and coordinated.
It is RO knowledge to know that once the TSC is staffed, all emergency operations teams are dispatched via the TSC/OSC (not the control room).
Typically, the purpose and function of the OSC is GET knowledge since all operations personnel (licensed and non-licensed) are normally required to know their assembly points before and after the TSC is staffed are different. limination of Choices A and B (using RO knowledge) only leaves only Choices C and D available to test at the SRO level.
Choice D can be eliminated solely using RO knowledge that the OSC is the area where activities necessary to support emergency operations are staged and coordinated, which is generally GET knowledge. Furthermore, an applicant can reason that retuming to the main control room (after being dispatched by the OSC) for a pre-job-brief is not applicable during a site emergency because of dose and time considerations.
Because Choices A, B, and D can be eliminated solely using RO knowledge, the applicant is not actually being tested on the content of EIP-14.0, Personnel Movement, Relocation, Re-entry, and Site Evacuation, at the SRO level. That is, the difference between re-entnd r&ocation guemensis not bng tested.
91 F
Job-Link Minutia
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
SRO B/M/N U/E/S Only
- 1 units Back ward K/A x
B
-v fF.
0 6L I
//
6.
Cred.
Dist.
G2.2.1 (Bank-Farley 2008 Q#95)
Q=KIA: The 2 part of the proposed question (which is the only SRO portion of the item) is actually testing K/A G2.2.7:
Knowledge of the process for conducting special or infrequent tests. (CFR: 41.1Ol43.3l4513)
In order to directly hit the required K/A (G2.2.1) at the SRO level, re-word the 2 part of the stem question as follows:
(1)
WOOTF identifies whether UOP-1.2 is required to be classified as an IPTE in accordance with NMP-AD-006?
/
stem buetmustbeeminate G2.2.15 (Modified Bank-Farley 2008 Q#96)
Job-Link: The 2 paragraph in the stem says that the MOV is a normally closed valve; however, the 1 paragraph says that the MOV Was manually closed Why did the operator have to engage the clutch and close the valve if it was already closed?
Did he/she only engage the clutch to verify it was closed?
Verify this is the required action for a normally closed valve. IF so, then re-word the stem to state that the valve was nually v1ejQ1sd IF the valve was only manually VERIFIED closed, are the post maintenance stroking requirements still required? Provide reference stating this.
- 2. / Cue: The 2 paragraph in the stem is a strong cue that the v
valve is not operable. Suggest replacing the description with the UN ID/name of an actual MOV that is a normally closed valve whose function is to automatically open on a Safety Injection signal.
Stem Focus: Provide the plant mode in the stem so that the applicants know that the MOV is required to be operable.
SRO-only: Since the 2 part of each choice is unique, the applicants do not have to know the first part of the question (which is the SRO pait). Re-work the 2 part of the choices so that the question becomes a 2 x 2 question.
LOK (F/H) 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws Stem Cues Focus 92 T/F H
- 4. Job Content Flaws 2
Partial Job-Link
- 5. Other Minutia
- /
units Back I ward 7
K/A SRO Only B/M/N U/E/S 8.
Explanation 1.
93 F
2 x
C
- 2
8.
Explanation G2.3.1 1 1.
LOD = 5: An applicant can successfully appeal this question because the ODCM was not provided as a reference. That is, Tech Spec required action statements 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> are not typically expected to be recalled without a reference, unless there is a learning objective associated with knowing ODCM action statements from memory.
Suggest keeping 2 part of the question but re-working the 1 part to test the applicants ability to determination the required notifications for a(n) (un-monitored?) release in accordance with FNP-0-EIP-8.0. (reference may already provided for Q#77 enhancement suggestions).
G2.3.4 (Bank Harris 2009 Q#97) 1.
Stem focus: Add the phrase in accordance with FNP-0-EIP-14.0 to the last part of the WOOTF stem question.
2.
Stern focus: Re-word the fill-in-the-blank statements as follows (to closely align with the words in the procedure to preclude partially correct and/or no correct appeals):
The emergency exposure limit for a life-saving activity during a declared emergency is REM TEDE.
Emergency exposure limits shall only be authorized by the 3.
Stem focus: The 1 sentence in the stem is not necessary to elicit the correct response.
- 4. Job Content Flaws Job-Link Minutia
- 5. Other 6.
- 1 units Back ward K/A SRO Only 94 F
5 95 F
2 x
N E
B E
G2.4.18 (BankVogtle 2011 Q#99) 1.
Cue:
In the l fill-in-the-blank statement, the capitalized and underlined word (ONLY) isa strong cue that the l part of A and C are incorrect.
2.
Partial: An applicant can successfully argue that there is no correct answer because the basis document (FNP-0-FRB-H.1, Plant Specific Background Information for FR-H.1)states that with only one PORV open adequate RCS bleed flow f4 not be adequate. (proposed question says WILL NOT) 3.
Stem focus: The l part of the fill-in-the-blank statement lists FRP-H.1 even though the item is testing FNP-0-FRB-H.1.
Re-work the 1 fill-in-the-blank statement and the 1 portion of all 4 choices as follows:
L/In accordance with FNP-O-FRB-H. 1, opening one PORV provide sufficient RCS bleed flow for RCS heat removal.
(Choices are WILL (incorrect) vs may NOT (correct))
G2.4.32 (Modified Bank Turkey Point 2010 Q#99) 1.
LOD = 5: An applicant can successfully appeal this question because NMP-EP-110-GLOI, FNP EALs, was not provided as a reference unless there is a learning objective associated with knowing emergency classifications from memory.
Re-work the question such that the applicants are provided the classification tables (no bases) and the question is not a direct lookup. Alternatively, write a question that tests the applicants ability to use tech specs after the loss of an annunciator panel that serves a tech spec required surveillance (alarm) function.
96 F
2 x
x 1.
2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
8.
Q#
LOK LOD (F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues T/F Cred.
Partial Job-Minutia
- 1 Back-Q=
SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist.
Link units ward K/A Only B
E x
(
97 F
5 M
(1 E
ep&
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other 6.
7.
F 8.
Ai Af Q#
LOK LOD
iA Le
/
(F/H)
(1-5)
Stem Cues T/F Cred. IPartial Job-Minutia
- /
Back-Q° SRO B/M/N U/E/S
/
Explanation Focus Dist.
Link units ward K/A Only
/
/
98H27 v
1.
Q=K/A: The root portion of the K/A requires testing some
/ /44 aspect of the Westinghouse LOCA outside of containment
,,7 _.
)
)
)1j/StI procedure ECP-1.2. AjjtnJ1guestion does not test any l, z 2)
/4 7 iA o4 RHR System Malfunction. It appears that the generic portion of
/.. -
the K/A statement may be too difficult to hit when coupled with
C/1 the LOCA outside of containment event. Consult with Chief tAJI. (Z Examiner to reselect another K/A.
99 H
2 x
x B
E WE1O EA2 2 (Bank Farley 2010 Q#98)
- 1. Cu.TheItbulletinthe stem (RVLIS is NOT available) is a
/
/
cue that ESP-0.4 is the required procedure. Suggest adding the
/
tJ
control board RVLIS indications instead of telling the applicant I
lhat RVLIS isnt available. Let them figure it out.
2.
Partial: There may be no correct answer because the 2 nd part of Choice C says < 50°F/hr but the right answer is supposed to be 75 °F/hr.
100 x
N E
WEll EA2.1
1.
Stem Focus:
It appears as if the 1A RHR pump is tagged out
./
\\
during a large break LOCA when the actual intent is to say that 7
ft
)
1A RHR pump was already tagged out before the LOCA i
(T I(___, /
occurred. Clarify in the stem that 1A RHR pump was already
/
t
\\J
/v tagged out before the LOCA happened.
2.
Stem Focus: Could not find F-0 (Core Cooling Status Tree) in the reference material to verify that subcooling was (or wasnt) used to determine that FRP-C.2 entry is required. IsCET5 the only parameter used in the status tree decision branches? IF another parameter is used in the status tree, then include the parameter and a value at 10:30.
3.
Stem focus: For the 2 d fill-in-the-blank statement, change After core cooling is restored to At 10:45.
4.
Stem Focus: For the 1° part of Choices A and C, change WILL to is required to.
(_
/
,wf -2 c:
ES-403 Written Examination Grading Form ES-403-1 Quality Checklist Facility:
Date of Exam:
Exam Level: RO.l SRO Initials Item Description a
b c
1.
Clean answer sheets copied before grading (9fr 2 2.
Answer key changes and question deletions justified and documented (5
3.
Applicants scores checked for addition errors (reviewers spot check> 25% of examinations)
4.
Grading for all borderline cases (80 +/-2% overall and 70 or 80, as applicable, +/-4% on the SRQ-only) reviewed in detail LY7
5.
All other failing examinations checked to ensure that grades are_justified 6.
Performance on missed questions checked for training deficiencies and wording problems; evaluate validity
(%-
A of_questions_missed_by_half or more of the_applicants Printed Name/Signature Date
- a. Grader
/
- b. Facility Reviewer(*)
& / P ri/A
- c. NRC Chief Examiner(*)
rijt d
NRC Supeisor (*)
a/k-k 1 ki 1/
/
(*)
The facility reviewers signature is not applicable for examinations graded by the NRC; two independent NRC reviews are required.
ES-403 Written Examination Grading Form ES-403-1 Quality Checklist Facility:
Date of Exam:
Exam Level: RO SRO Initials Item Description a
b c
1.
Clean answer sheets copied before grading d$
1IlIr f5 2.
Answer key changes and question deletions justified and documented
3.
Applicants scores checked for addition errors I),
(reviewers spot check> 25% of examinations)
4.
Grading for all borderline cases (80 +/-2% overall and 70 or 80, as_applicable,_+/-4%_on_the_SRO-only)_reviewed_in_detail 5.
All other failing examinations checked to ensure that grades I
are justified LW)
?
6.
Performance on missed questions checked for training deficiencies and wording problems; evaluate validity of_questions_missed_by_half_or more of the_applicants Printed Name/Signature Date
- a. Grader D Co /
07/o3)IL
- b. Facility Reviewer(*)
- r7_,
1(
- c. NRC Chief Examiner (*)
CA1Ai2V
- d. NRC Supervisor (*)
(*)
The facility reviewers signature is not applicable for examinations graded by the NRC; two independent NRC reviews are required.