Text

Initial Exam 2012-301 Draft SRO Written Exam
	ML12214A317
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	07/23/2012
From:	; NRC/RGN-II
To:	; Southern Nuclear Operating Co
Shared Package
ML12214A278	List: ML12214A258; ML12214A297; ML12214A317; ML12214A335; ML12214A347; ML12214A358; ML12214A458; ML12214A461; ML12214A470; ML12214A480; ML12214A487;
References
	Download: ML12214A317 (136)
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25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 1 of 25

76. 003AG2.2.22 076/NEW//C/A 4.0/4.7/003AG2.2.22/TS 3.1.4//I Unit 1 is at 70% power with the following conditions:

The OATC pulls Control Rods out 2 steps and noles the following indications:

Control Bank D rod P8 drops to 174 steps.

All Control Bank D group step counters indicate 188 steps.

All Control Bank D DRPI, except rod P8, indicate 186 steps.

An investigation has determined that there is a problem in the Rod Control Power Cabinet for Control Rod P8.

Which one of the followingREQUIRED ACTiONS, if any, are applicable per Tech Spec 3.1.4, Rod Group Alignment Limits?

REFERENCE PROVIDED A. CONDITION A only B CONDITION B only C. Both CONDITION A and CONDITION B D. Neither CONDITION A or CONDITION B Page 1 of 25

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 1 of 30

76. 003AG2.2.22 076/NEW//C/A 4.0/4.7/003AG2.2.22/TS 3.1.4//I When a control rod drops out of alignment with the other rods in its bank, an evaluation had to be made as to why the rod is where it is. The rod can drop due to a problem with the grippers during mVnent. It may drop to the bottom of the core, or it may be caught again by the grippers. There is CE from our plant where the rod did not fully insert. The rod dropped partially into the core and was stuck in that position (previous CE on rod drop testing when coming up out of an outage as a result of control rod tip swelling. We had to cool back down and replace some of the older control rods).

For the conditions given, a candidate has to evaluate:

1) do I have a stuck rod Management interpretation of the application of Tech Specs is that if a rod drops partially, we docall it a stuck rod until an investigation is completed to determine if ft is a problem with rod control, oraprobiemwftharodthatis not moveable (stuck). The it is proven that it is inoperkThititi[ssment is that the rod is still operable, but at some point later it will be moved to validate this assessment. With this question, the candidate has to apply TS bases and management expectations for an initial assessment of the TS requirements of 3.1.4.

A. Incorrect Plausible because it has been identified that there is a problem with that rod in the associated Power cabinet, and a candidateyssume that the rod is not trippable as a result. TS 3.1.4 Bases states Mechanical or electrical failures may cause a control rod to beme inoperable or to become misaligned from its group. A candidate may incorrectly interpret that to mean that an electrical failure may make the rod inoperable (untrippable). Also, the candidate may assume that the rod has to be considered stuck (untrippable), until proven otherwise. In addition, the LCO states that All shutdown and control rods shall be OPERABLE and in alignment. The candidate may determine that since the rod wont move properly, it is INOPERABLE and CONDITION A is required.

B. Correct Rod P8 DRPI must be aligned within 12 steps of the group step counter indication, and is currently aligned within 14 steps. It is aligned w/i 12 steps of the DRPI indications. CONDITION B applies.

C. Incorrect See A for CONDITION A plausibility. CONDITION B is correct, but CONDITION A is not correct.

D. Incorrect A candidate may properly assess that CONDITION A is not required. He may also determine that CONDITION B is not required because the difference between DRPI for the dropped rod and DRPI for other rods in the bank is within 12 steps. TS 3.1.4 requires the DRPI indication be within 12 steps of the group step counters, not DRPI of the dropped rod within 12 steps of the other rods DRPI.

Each answer choice above may or may not be correct with a minor adjustment of plant conditions. For example, if the rod was placed at <12 steps then no LCO would be in Page 1 of 30

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 2 of 30 effect. If the investigation revealed that the problem was a rod that would not move then Condition A and B would be correct. If the rod was placed at <12 steps and the investigation revealed that the problem was a rod that would not move, then Condition A only would be correct.

Page 2 of 30

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 1 of 51

76. 003AG2.2.22 076/NEW//C/A 4.0/4.7/003AG2.2.22/TS 3.1.4///

003AG2.2.22 Dropped Control Rod 2.2.22 Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.2 I 45.2)

IMPORTANCE RO 4.0 SRO 4.7 Importance Rating:

4.0 4.7 Technical

Reference:

Tech Specs, v186 Tech Specs Bases, v53 References provided:

Tech Spec 3.1.4 page 3.1.4-1 and 3.1.4-2 Learning Objective:

RECALL AND APPLY the information from the LCO BASES sections: BACKGROUND, APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSIS, ACTIONS, SURVEILLENCE REQUIREMENTS, for any Technical Specifications or TRM requirements associated with Rod Control System, and attendant equipment, to include the following: (OPS-62201 EQ 1):

10CFR55.43 (b) 2 3.1.4, Rod Group Alignment Limits 3.1.5, Shutdown Bank Insertion Limits 3.1.6, Control Bank Insertion Limits 3.1.7, Rod Position Indication 3.1.8, PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions Question origin:

New question.

Basis for meeting K/A:

Question tests the knowledge and application of LCOs and Bases for a partially dropped (which is also misaligned)

Control Rod.

SRO justification:

10 CFR 55.43(b)(2):

Application of Required Actions (Section 3) and Surveillance Requirements (SR) (Section 4) in accordance with rules of application requirements (Section 1).

2012 NRC exam From the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev I dated 03/11/2010 flowchart for 10 CFR 55.43(b)(2)

1) can NOT be answered by knowing less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Tech Specs.

2) can NOT be answered by knowing information listed above-the-line.

3) can NOT be answered by knowing the TS Safety Limits or their bases.

4) Does involve one or more of the following for TS, TRM or ODCM:

Page 1 of 51

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 2 of 51 Application of Required Actions (Section 3) and Surveillance Requirements (SR)

(Section 4) in accordance with rules of application requirements (Section 1) and knowledge of Tech Spec bases and management expectations regarding ROD operability.

Page 2 of 51

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 2 of 25

77. 005G2.4.30 077/NEW/IC/A 2.7/4.1 /005G2.4.30/EIP-8 SECTION/NRC NOTIFY/I The following conditions exist on Unit 1:

At 10:00:

RCS temperature is 250°F.

1 B RHR pump is in service for the RCS cooldown.

All RCS to RHR loop suction isolation MOVs are open.

At 10:05:

1 B RHR pump trips due to overcurrent.

At 10:15:

1A RHR pump is started and core cooling is restored.

Which one of the following completes the statements below?

(1)

INOPERABLE per Tech Spec 3.5.3, ECCS Shutdown.

An 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months notification to the NRC Operations Center (NRCOC)

(2) required per EIP-8.0, Non-Emergency Notifications.

REFERENCE PROVIDED (1)

(2)

A.

Only I B RHR pump is IS B.

Only 1 B RHR pump is is NOT C

Both IA and lB RHR pumps are IS D.

Both 1A jjç 1 B RHR pumps are is NOT Page2of25

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 3 of 30

77. 005G2.4.30 077/NEW//C/A 2.7/4.1 /005G2.4.30/EIP-8 SECTION/NRC NOTIFY/I Step 324 of SOP-7.0:

Operation of a train of RHR aligned in cooldown operation when RCS temperature is >225°F will result in the associated train of ECCS being declared inoperable. One train of ECCS must be operable in Mode 4 (TS 3.5.3).

(RER 0101206101)

A. Incorrect 1) Incorrect, 1A RHR pump is also considered inoperable. TS Bases information has to be evaluated in addition to SOP-7.0 (step 3.24) information on RHR operability issues. TS Bases states that RHR can be considered operable for the ECCS function if it is capable of being manually reali ned-totheECG&nic of operation and is not otherwise inoperable. A ineering evaluatio )has shown that when an RHR pump is in the cooldown alignmen

, with its suction water temp > 225°F, if the suction is realigned to the lower pressure RWST, flashing and voiding may occur in the suction line. The RHR pump has to be considered INOPERABLE if the pump is running in a cooldown alignment with its suction temp > 225° F. Plausible because IA RHR pump can operate with no issues in the cooldown alignment, and is considered operable per TS 3.4.6, RCS Loops

- Mode 4, but is not operable for TS 3.5.3, ECCS Shutdown, because of the the suction temperature issue.

2) Correct, EIP-8.0, step 13.4, requires a NRC notification within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months for any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (2) Remove residual heat, or (4) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.

ECCS function while in Mode 4, so this event requires a report to the NR000 within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

A loss of shutdown cooling has occurred for 10 minutes. It is plausible that a candidate could determine that NRC notification is required due to the loss of shutdown cooling and consider that only one RHR pump is inoperable.

B. Incorrect

1) Incorrect, seeA.1.

2) Incorrect, See A.2. It is plausible that a candidate would state that NRC notification is not required with only one RHR pump inoperable.

C.

Correct

1) Correct, see A.1.

2) Correct, see A.2.

D. Incorrect

1) Correct, see A.1.

2) Incorrect, see A.2. It is plausible that a candidate would state that NRC notification is not required with both RHR pumps inoperable because core cooling was re-established and is being maintained by the running pump.

Page3of3o

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 3 of 51

77. 005G2.4.30 077/NEW//C/A 2.7/4.1 1005G2.4.3OIEIP-8 SECTION/NRC NOTIFY/I 005G2.4.30 Residual Heat Removal System 2.4.30 Knowledge of events related to system operation/status that must be reported to internal organizations or external agencies, such as the State, the NRC, or the transmission system operator.

(CFR: 41.10 /43.5 /45.11)

IMPORTANCE RD 2.7 SRO 4.1 Importance Rating:

2.7 4.1 Technical

Reference:

Tech Specs Bases, v53 FNP-1-SOP-7.0, vlOO FNP-0-EIP-8.0, V108 References provided:

EJP-8.O section 13.0 page 9and 10. (reference provided is that the SRO consult 4 and 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months report guidance when making notification decisions)

Learning Objective:

RECALL AND APPLY the information from the LCD BASES sections: BACKGROUND, APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSIS, ACTIONS, SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS, for any Technical Specifications or TRM requirements associated with the Residual Heat Removal System components and attendant equipment alignment, to include the following (OPS-62101K01): 10CFR55.43 (b) 2 3.5.3, ECCS Shutdown Given a set of plant conditions, EVALUATE those conditions and DETERMINE the emergency responses actions the SM/ED should take to mitigate the consequences of the event. (OPS-63002A01).

Question origin:

New question.

Basis for meeting K/A:

Question tests the knowledge of required NRC notification due to loss of Residual Heat Removal I Accident mitigation equipment. An 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months Non-emergency report is required.

SRO justification:

10 CFR 55.43(b)(2):

Knowledge of TS bases that is required to analyze TS required actions and terminology. (where amplifying instruction is found within the PROCEDURES; Knowledge of recently identified design/operational flaws)

Although TS allows an RHR train to be considered operable when it is aligned in a cooldown alignment, additional Page3of5l

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 4 of 51 information is required to properly assess the operability of the train of RHR.

The SRO is solely responsible for evaluating Emergency classifications and Non-Emergency evaluations for notification per EIP-8.0.

2012 NRC exam From the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev I dated 03/11/2010 flowchart for 10 CFR 55.43(b)(2)

1) can NOT be answered by knowing less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Tech Specs.

2) can NOT be answered by knowing information listed above-the-line.

3) can NOT be answered by knowing the TS Safety Limits or their bases.

4) Does involve one or more of the following for TS, TRM or ODCM:

Knowledge of TS bases that is required to analyze TS required actions and terminology. (where amplifying instruction is found within the PROCEDURES.)

Bases knowledge of other conditions that can make the RHR system inoperable.

Page4of5l

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 3 of 25

78. 006A2.02 078/NEW/IC/A 3.9/4.3/006A2.02/N///

A Large Break LOCA has occurred on Unit 1 and Cold leg recirculation has been established per ESP-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation.

Several hours after the return to EEP-1.0, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, a LOSP occurs and B Train emergency busses remain de-energized.

Subsequently, the Control Room team is performing ESP-1.4, Transfer to Simultaneous Cold and Hot Leg Recirculation.

Which one of the following completes the statements below?

Simultaneous cold and hot leg recirculation (1) be established per ESP-1.4.

At the step to Check simultaneous cold and hot leg recirculation in progress, the Control Room team is required to (2)

(1)

(2)

A CAN return to EEP-1.0 B.

can NOT returntoEEP-1.0 C.

CAN remain in ESP-1.4 D.

can NOT remain in ESP-1.4 Page3of25

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 4 of 30

78. 006A2.02 078/NEW//C/A 3.9/4.3/006A2.02/N///

For Hot Leg Recirc to be established, at least one train of HHSI is aligned to the Hot Legs and at least one train of LHSI aligned to the Cold Legs Q at least one train of HHSI aligned to the Cold Legs and at least one train of LHSI aligned to the Hot Legs.

In this event with no B Tm power available, MOV-8889 will not have power since it is powered from FV-B2, a B Tm MCC. MOV-8889 is required for placing either Train of LHSI on recirc to the Hot Legs, therefore LHSI cannot be aligned to the Hot Legs. LHSI will have to be aligned to the Cold Legs.

For HHSI to bjJ ned to the Hot Legs, MOV 88848886 has to be powered up and opened. Both OV 888 and 8886 are normally closd, and puly. M

- 886 has an A Tm power supply so it can be opened. Also MOVs 8803A and B must be closed (to prevent runout of the HHSI pumps) since they are in parallel alignment. MOV-8803A can be closed and 8803B has a B Train power supply.

However, it can also be aligned to A Train power for this particular case. (MOV-8803A can NOT be aligned to B Train power).

ESP-1.4 procedure flowpath can be performed, and will control the alignment to ensure LHSI is aligned to the Cold Leg recirculation and HHSI is aligned to the Hot Leg recirc.

This is the only way that the Simultaneous Cold and Hot Leg injection can be aligned.

At step 4 to Check simultaneous cold and hot leg recirculation in progress by one of the following: The RNO column says if it is not established, then consult TSC and return to step 1. Step 6 says to return to procedure and step in affect. The stem shows the user is in EEP-1.0 when the event started so the return would be back here.

A. Correct

1) HOT LEG Recirculation can be established since the LHSI system can be aligned.

2) Correct, Since hot and cold leg recirc is aligned a return to EEP-1.0 is required per ESP-1.4.

B. Incorrect

1) Incorrect, see A.1 Plausibility:

Several issues have to be resolved. One is power available to place RHR to the hot legs, Since the answer is no, is power available or required to place RHR on the cold legs. The answer is that RHR can be aligned to the cold legs with A Train power available. Next, is power available to place HHSI on the hot legs.

MOV-8886 has power available but MOV-8884 does not. ONLY one of these valves is required to place HHSI on the hot legs. Then the next question asks

- is power available to remove HHSI from going to the cold legs. Since MOV-8803A has only one power supply and it is A Train, then it can be closed, MOV-8803B has two power supplies and has to be be aligned to the alternate A Train power supply to enable closing this valve. Therefore HHSI can be placed on the hot leg. Minute detailed system and/or procedure knowledge is required to figure out the status of the ECCS system.

Page4of3o

25 SRO QUESTIONS VerS Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 5 of 30

2) Correct, See A.2.

C. Incorrect

1) Correct, seeA.1.

2) Incorrect, ESP-1.4 would require one to remain in this procedure if hot and cold leg recirc was not established.

Plausibility:

If hot and cold leg recirc were established, a candidate may believe that remaining in this procedure is warranted. Both this procedure and EEP-1.0 turn over control to the TSC but for different reasons.

ESP-1.4 turns over control to the TSC and remains in this procedure if HL/CL recirc cannot be established and in EEP-1.0 control is returned to the TSC since there are no other procedural actions.

D. Incorrect

1) Incorrect, see B.1.

2) Incorrect, see C.2.

Page5of3o

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 5 of 51

78. 006A2.02 078/NEW//C/A 3.9/4.3/006A2.02/N///

006A2.02 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ECCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

A2.02 Loss of flow path 3.9 4.3 Importance Rating:

3.9 4.3 Technical

Reference:

FNP-1-ESP-1.4, v15 FNP-1-EEP-1.0, v30 References provided:

None Learning Objective:

ASSESS the facility conditions associated with the (1)

ESP-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation; (2) ESP-1.4, Transfer to Simultaneous Cold Leg and Hot Leg Recirculation, and based on that assessment:

(OPS-62531 GOl)

SELECT the appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal and emergency situations. 1 0CFR55.43 (b) 5

DETERMINE if transition to another section of the procedure or to another procedure is required Question origin:

New question.

Basis for meeting K/A:

Question tests the ability of a candidate to predict the effects of the loss of B Train emergency power and therefore a loss of one train of ECCS flowpath (LHSI hot leg recirc is not possible), and based on that prediction, either remain in ESP-1.4 or transition to EEP-1.

SRO justification:

10 CFR 55.43(b)(5)

Assessing plant conditions (normal, abnormal, or emergency) and then selecting a procedure or section of a procedure to mitigate, recover, or with which to proceed.

2012 NRC exam From the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev 1 dated 03/11/2010 flowchart for 10 CFR 55.43(b)(5):

Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations [10 CFR 55.43(b)(5)], involving BOTH:

1) assessing plant conditions and then 2) selecting a procedure or section of a procedure to mitigate, recover, or with Page5of5l

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 6 of 51 which to proceed.

Using the flowchart, this question can:

NOT be answered solely by knowing systems knowledge, i.e., how the system works, flowpath, logic, component location.

NOT be answered solely by knowing immediate operator actions.

NOT be answered solely by knowing entry conditions for AOPs or plant parameters that require direct entry to major EOPs.

NOT be answered solely by knowing the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigative strategy of a procedure.

be answered with knowledge of ONE or MORE of the following:

Assessing plant conditions (normal, abnormal, or emergency) and then selecting a procedure or section of a procedure to mitigate, recover, or with which to proceed.

Knowledge of diagnostic steps and decision points in the EOPs that involve transitions to event specific sub procedures or emergency contingency procedures.

Page6of5l

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 5 of 51

78. 006A2.02 078/NEW//C/A 3.9/4.3/006A2.02/N///

006A2.02 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ECCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

A2.02 Loss of flow path 3.9 4.3 Importance Rating:

3.9 4.3 Technical

Reference:

FNP-1-ESP-1.4, v15 FNP-1-EEP-1.0, v30 References provided:

None Learning Objective:

ASSESS the facility conditions associated with the (1)

ESP-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation; (2) ESP-1.4, Transfer to Simultaneous Cold Leg and Hot Leg Recirculation, and based on that assessment:

(OPS-62531 GOl)

SELECT the appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal and emergency situations. 10CFR55.43 (b) 5

DETERMINE if transition to another section of the procedure or to another procedure is required Question origin:

New question.

Basis for meeting K/A:

Question tests the ability of a candidate to predict the effects of the loss of B Train emergency power and therefore a loss of one train of ECCS flowpath (LHSI hot leg recirc is not possible), and based on that prediction, either remain in ESP-1.4 or transition to EEP-1.

SRO justification:

10 CFR 55.43(b)(5)

Assessing plant conditions (normal, abnormal, or emergency) and then selecting a procedure or section of a procedure to mitigate, recover, or with which to proceed.

2012 NRC exam From the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev I dated 03/11/2010 flowchart for 10 CFR 5543(b)(5):

Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations [10 CFR 55.43(b)(5)], involving BOTH:

1) assessing plant conditions and then 2) selecting a procedure or section of a procedure to mitigate, recover, or with Page5of5l

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 6 of 51 which to proceed.

Using the flowchart, this question can:

NOT be answered solely by knowing systems knowledge, i.e., how the system works, flowpath, logic, component location.

NOT be answered solely by knowing immediate operator actions.

NOT be answered solely by knowing entry conditions for AOPs or plant parameters that require direct entry to major EOPs.

NOT be answered solely by knowing the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigative strategy of a procedure.

be answered with knowledge of ONE or MORE of the following:

Assessing plant conditions (normal, abnormal, or emergency) and then selecting a procedure or section of a procedure to mitigate, recover, or with which to proceed.

Knowledge of diagnostic steps and decision points in the EOPs that involve transitions to event specific sub procedures or emergency contingency procedures.

Page 6 of 51

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 4 of 25

79. 008A2.01 079/NEW//C/A 3.313.6/008A2.O1/TS 3.7.7//I Unit I is in Mode 3, preparing for Reactor start up, with the following conditions:

At 10:00:

Both trains of CCW are in operation.

B Train of COW is the ON-SERVICE Train.

During a review of STP-23.3, 10 Component Cooling Water Pump Quarterly Inservice Test, it was discovered that the 10 COW pump failed the STP due to high vibrations.

Repairs to 10 COW pump are expected to take 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months .

At 11:00:

ON-SERVICE Trains have been swapped and now A Train of COW is the ON-SERVICE Train.

At 11:30:

DFO4, 10 COW PUMP, breaker is racked out.

Which one of the following provides the earliest time that Mode 2 can be entered, while still ensuring compliance with Tech Specs?

Mode 2 entry is allowed REFERENCE PROVIDED A. at 10:00 B. at 11:00 C at 11:30 D. only afterrepair are-oGrnp anci the IC COW pump is returned

o. OPERABLE tatus Page 4 of 25

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 6 of 30

79. 008A2.01 079/NEW//C/A 3.3/3.6/008A2.01/TS 3.7.7//I The CCW system has two trains and 3 pumps. The 1A COW pump is always B train, the 1 C CCW pump is always A train, and the 1 B COW pump can be A train or B train, but will always be aligned to the on service train. Initially, B train is the on service train (lB pump is the backup to 1A pump), so when IC pump (on A train) becomes inoperable, there is one train of CCW inoperable. At 11:00 when the train swap is completed, lB COW pump is on the same train as the inoperable IC COW pump and can provide a backup function. The A train of COW is still inoperable untHtheker foi1COcW. pump is r d out, to ensure that the lB pump will start in place of the I C pump.

A. Incorrect A Train COW is inoperable at this time, per SR 3.0.1, since it is discovered that the pump failed its Surveillance Test. The SRO is required to call the pump inoperable at that time.

Plausible that a candidate may consider the pump operable since it is still running. LCO 3.0.4 prevents a Mode change while one train of COW is inoperable, so Mode 2 entry is not allowed. In addition, since repairs can be completed within the COMPLETION TIME allowed by the REQUIRED ACTIONS (48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months for repair vs 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months for COMPLETION TIME), the candidate may think that actions may continue to make a mode change.

B. Incorrect A Train COW is inoperable at this time since the pump that will be started automatically on an Sl/LOSP is the 10 COW pump. Per SOP-23.0, P&L 2.4, the A train of COW is still inoperable. Either a) 10 COW pump breaker must be racked out, or b) the cell switch should be jumpered and a link opened to prevent 10 pump from starting. Either of these actions will restore the train to OPERABLE.

Plausible that a candidate may consider the A Train CCW operable at this point since the train swap is completed. The 1 B pump will start automatically if IC pump trips, so it is plausible that a candidate would consider that train OPERABLE.

LCO 3.0.4 prevents a Mode change while one train of COW is inoperable, so Mode 2 entry is not allowed.

C. Correct Once the on service train has been swapped, and the IC COW pump breaker racked out, both trains of COW are operable. I B COW pump will be running on A train and will auto start as required on an Sl/LOSP signal.

See SOP-23.0, P&L 2.3.

D. Incorrect Both A train and B train are operable at 11:30. Tech Specs provides no limitations on Mode changes with both COW trains operable. 10 COW pump is still inoperable, so it is plausible that a candidate may determine that an LCO still exists and LCO 3.0.4 will prevent any Mode change until after repairs are complete.

Plausible since an ADMIN LCO is required to be written by plant procedures. The ADMIN LCO is for tracking purposes but could be mistaken as a reason to not change modes until the Admin LCO is clear.

Page 6 of 30

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 7 of 51

79. 008A201 079/NEW//C/A 3.3/3.6/008A2.O1/TS 3.7.7//I 008A2.0 1 Component Cooling Water System (CCWS)

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the COWS, and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

A2.O1 Loss of COW pump 3.3 3.6 Importance Rating:

3.3 3.6 Technical

Reference:

FNP-1 -SOP-23.0, v91.1 FNP-1-STP-23.3, v43.1 Tech Specs, v186 References provided:

Tech Spec 3.7.7 page 3.7.7-1 Learning Objective:

RECALL AND APPLY the information from the LOO BASES sections: BACKGROUND, APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSIS, ACTIONS, SURVEILLENOE REQUIREMENTS, for any Technical Specifications or TRM requirements associated with the COW System components and attendant equipment alignment, to include the following (OPS-621 02G0 1): 1 00FR55.43 (b) 2 3.7.7 Component Cooling Water System Question origin:

New question.

Basis for meeting K/A:

For the COW system, this question tests the ability of a candidate to predict the impact of the loss of a COW pump (impact related to TS and Mode changes), and based on that prediction, use the guidance of TS to determine when a Mode change can be performed.

SRO justification:

10 CFR 55.43(b)(2) meeting all of the following:

Application of generic LCO requirements (3.0.4)

Knowledge of TS bases that is required to analyze TS required actions and terminology (where amplifying instruction is found within the PROCEDURES.)

2012 NRC exam 10 CFR 55.43(b)(2)

Facility operating limitations in the TS and their bases.

From the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev 1 dated 03/11/2010 flowchart:

Page 7 of 51

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 8 of 51

1) can NOT be answered by knowing less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Tech Specs.

2) can NOT be answered solely by knowing information listed11 above-the-line.

3) can NOT be answered by knowing the TS Safety Limits or their bases.

4) Does involve one or more of the following for TS, TRM or ODCM:

Application of Required Actions (Section 3) and Surveillance Requirements (Section 4) in accordance with rules of application requirements (Section 1).

Application of generic LCO requirements (LCO 3.0.1 thru 3.0.7 and SR 40.1 thru 4.0.4)

Requires assessment of TS 3.0.4 mode change allowance TS.

Page 8 of 51

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 5 of 25

80. 01 0G2.4.45 080/MOD/SURRY 2009/C/A 4.1/4.3/01 0G2.4.45/N///

Unit I has performed a rapid ramp down from 85% to 55% power With the following conditions:

A malfunction occurs resulting in PCV-444B, PRZR PORV, going open.

PCV-444B handswitch has been taken to CLOSE, the GREEN light is LIT.

PRT parameters are stable.

RCS pressure is 1875 psig and slowly t.

Multiple alarnisare in, with the following annunciators being evaluated:

GB2, PRZRLO PRESS RX TRIP HCI, PRZR PRESS HI-LO HC2, PRZR HI-LO PRESS ALERT Which one of the following completes the statements below?

AReactorTrip (1) required.

PCV-444B (2)

OPERABLE per Tech Spec 3.4.11, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs).

(1)

(2)

A IS IS B.

IS is NOT C.

is NOT IS D.

isNOT isNOT Page 5of25

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 8 of 30

80. 01 0G2.4.45 080/MOD/STJRRY 2009/C/A 4.1/4.3/01 0G2.4.45/N///

EEP-0, contains the following information:

The following are symptoms of a reactor trip:

a. Any reactor trip annunciator lit.

b. Rapid decrease in neutron level indicated by nuclear instrumentation.

c. All shutdown and control rods are fully inserted. Rod bottom lights are lit.

A.

Correct 1) Correct, A reactor trip is required per EEP-0 based on having an annunciator in alarm requiring a reactor trip. This alarm is on the G Annunciator panel (First Out Panel), and is a symptom that a Reactor trip has occurred or is called for. This annunciator will only come in when the 2 out of 3 transmitters Pressurizer low pressure coincidence is met. The alarm is fed from the Solid State Protection System (SSPS).

2) Correct, knowledge of TS Bases information is required to evaluate the PORV operability with the handswitch in the closed position and a failure that will cause the PORV to NOT function automatically.

B. Incorrect

1) Correct, see A.1.

2) Incorrect, the PORV is operable. Plausible because the handswitch is in the CLOSE position and the PORV can no longer operate automatically. TS Bases knowledge is required to determine operability status of the PORV.

C. Incorrect

1) Incorrect, with annunciator GB2 in alarm, a reactor trip should have occurred. It is plausible that a candidate would say a reactor trip is not required since the actual Pressurizer pressure is above the reactor trip setpoint of 1865 psig, put the reactor trip signal is rate compensated and a trip may be demanded when pressure is higher than the actual setpoint.

In addition, some annunciators will illuminate when I out of 3 transmitters indicate that trip criteria is met.

2) Correct, see A.2.

D. Incorrect

1) Incorrect, see C.1.

2) Incorrect, see B.2.

Page8of3o

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 9 of 51

80. 010G2.4.45 080/MOD/SURRY 2009/C/A 4.1/4.3/010G2.4.45/N///

01 0G2.4.45 Pressurizer Pressure Control System (PZR PCS) 2.4.45 Ability to prioritize and interpret the significance of each annunciator or alarm.

(CFR: 41.10/43.5/45.3/45.12)

IMPORTANCE RO 4.1 SRO 4.3 Importance Rating:

4.1 4.3 Technical

Reference:

Tech Specs Bases, v53 FNP-1-EEP-0 v43 FNP-1-ARP-1.7 v33 References provided:

None Learning Objective:

EVALUATE plant conditions and DETERMINE if entry into (1) EEP-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and/or (2)

ESP-0.0, Rediagnosis is required. (OPS-52530A02).

RECALL AND APPLY the information from the LCO BASES sections: BACKGROUND, APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSIS, ACTIONS, SURVEILLENCE REQUIREMENTS, for any Technical Specifications or TRM requirements associated with the Pressurizer System components and attendant equipment alignment, to include the following (OPS-62101E01): IOCFR55.43 (b) 2 3.4.9, Pressurizer 3.4.10, Pressurizer Safety Valves 3.4.11, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves 13.4.2, Pressurizer 13.4.4, Safety Valves

- Shutdown Question origin:

Modified from Surry 2009 NRC SRO Exam question #13.

Basis for meeting K/A:

Question tests the ability of the candidate to evaluate alarms and determine if a reactor trip is required. Although the Pressurizer pressure is not indicating it is at the setpoint for a reactor trip (the signal is rate compensated), an annunciator is indicating that a reactor trip is required.

Candidate has to prioritize and interpret the significance of the alarm for Pressurizer pressure control.

SRO justification:

10 CFR 55.43(b)(2):

Knowledge of TS bases that is required to analyze TS required actions and terminology.

Knowledge of TS Bases is required to evaluate operability of the PORV with the handswitch in the CLOSE position. Even Page9of5l

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 10 of 51 with no Auto capability, the PORV is considered operable.

2012 NRC exam From the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev I dated 03/11/2010 flowchart for 10 CFR 55.43(b)(2)

1) can NOT be answered by knowing less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Tech Specs.

2) can NOT be answered by knowing information listed above-the-line.

3) can NOT be answered by knowing the TS Safety Limits or their bases.

4) Does involve one or more of the following for TS, TRM or ODCM:

Knowledge of TS bases that is required to analyze TS required actions and terminology.

Page 10 of 51

SRO Portion of Exam

13. Unit 1 initial conditions:

Time = 1000 Reactor power = 100%

1 -RC-PORV-1 455C (Pressurizer Pressure PORV) indicates open Both Pzr Spray valves indicate open RCS Pressure = 2200 psig decreasing 1 -AP-31.00 (Increasing or Decreasing RCS Pressure) initiated Current conditions:

Time = 1001 Reactor Power = 97%

RCS Pressure = 2100 psig increasing Spray valve in MANUAL and closed 1-RC-PORV-1455C in MANUAL and closed Based on the above conditions, which ONE of the following correctly states: (1) the component that failed high and (2) the status of 1 -RC-PORV-1 4550 operability per Technical Specifications?

A.

(1) 1-RC-PT-1 444 (Pressurizer Pressure Control)

(2) PORV is considered OPERABLE B.

(1) 1-RC-PT-1444 (Pressurizer Pressure Control)

(2) PORV is INOPERABLE C. (1) 1-RC-PT-1445 (Pressurizer Pressure Control)

(2) PORV is considered OPERABLE D. (1) 1-RC-PT-1445 (Pressurizer Pressure Control)

(2) PORV is INOPERABLE 13

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 6 of 25

81. 01 1EA2.02 08 I/NEW//C/A 3.3/3.7/011 EA2.02/N///

Unit 1 has experienced a LOCA with the following conditions:

EEP-1.O, Loss of Reactor or-Secondary-Coolant;isinprogress.

The following annunciators are in alarm:

- CH2, RWST LVL A TRN LO

- CH3, RWST LVL B TRN LO The Safety Injection signal can NOT be reset.

Which one of the following completes the statements below?

Transition to (1) is required for these conditions.

Once the procedure transition is made, if a Red or Orange path CSF occurs, Functional Restoration Procedures are required to be implemented (2)

A 1) ESP-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation

2) when directed by ESP-1.3 B.

1) ESP-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation

2) immediately C. 1) ECP-1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation

2) when directed by ECP-1.1 D. 1) ECP-1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation

2) immediately Page 6 of 25

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 9 of 30

81. 01 1EA2.02 081/NEW//C/A 3.3/3.7/0 1 1EA2.02/N///

SI reset is normally performed in most of the ERG procedures. Reset of SI allows an operator to regain control of equipment that actuated due to the SI signal. Most of the time, reset of SI is required to reposition a valve (to place it in other than its SI required position), and pumps can be started or stopped regardless of the SI signal. fçjjj RHR systern,pumps are started by the SI signa butvalvesarealready inthir required position for Safety Injection If the candidate thinks that some of the valves receive an SI signal, he will assume that they cannot be repositioned for ESP-1.3, and may choose to go to ECP-1.1 for loss of recirculation capability.

A.

Correct 1) Correct, an SI signal does not affect any of the valves required to establish Cold Leg recirculation.

2) Correct, FRPs will be implemented after step 7 of ESP-1.3, as directed by a note in ESP-1.3. This is acceptable per SOP-O.8, Transient Response Procedure Users Guide, but is contrary to the normal implementation of FRPs. Detailed procedure knowledge of ESP-1.3 is required.

B. Incorrect

1) Correct, see A.1.

2) Incorrect, for most procedures, a red or orange path FRP will be implemented immediately when it occurs. ESP-1.3 has a note that states FRPs will not be implemented until after step 7 of the procedure.

C. Incorrect

1) Incorrect, Plausible if candidate believes that failure to reset SI will affect the operation of MOVs required to be repositioned for Cold Leg recirculation.

2) Incorrect, ECP-1.1 is not the appropriate procedure, but plausible because some procedures delay implementation of FRPs upon entry.

D. Incorrect

1) Incorrect, see C.1.

2) Correct, if the candidate chose ECP-1.1, the FRPs would be implemented immediately.

Page9of3o

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 11 of 51

81. 01 1EA2.02 08 1/NEW//C/A 3.3/3.7/011 EA2.02/N///

O1IEA2.02 Large Break LOCA Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a Large Break LOCA:

(CFR 43.5 /45.13)

EA2.02 Consequences to RHR of not resetting safety injection 33* 37*

Importance Rating:

3.3 3.7 Technical

Reference:

FNP-1-ESP-1.3, v22 FNP-1-ARP-1.3, v28.1 FNP-0-SOP-0.8, v20 References provided:

None Learning Objective:

ASSESS the facility conditions associated with the (1)

ESP-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation; (2) ESP-1.4, Transfer to Simultaneous Cold Leg and Hot Leg Recirculation, and based on that assessment:

(OPS-62531 GOl)

SELECT the appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal and emergency situations. 10CFR55.43 (b) 5

DETERMINE if transition to another section of the procedure or to another procedure is required Explain and apply the foldout page requirements during employment of the Emergency Response Procedures (ERPs) (OPS52301 B06).

Question origin:

New question.

Basis for meeting K/A:

Question tests the candidates knowledge of the effects of not being able to reset an SI signal during a Large Break LOCA. Candidate has to determine how the failure to reset SI affects the operation of RHR valves required for establishing Cold Leg recirculation.

SRO justification:

10 CFR 55.43(b)(5) Knowledge of administrative procedures that specify hierarchy, implementation, and/or coordination of plant normal, abnormal, and emergency procedures.

- Knowledge of how Functional Restoration Procedures are implemented using the guidance of Administrative procedure

- SOP-0.8, Transient Response Procedure Users Guide is an SRO function. Normally an FRP would be implemented immediately during an ESP or ECP, but detailed procedure knowledge is required to know that Page 11 of 51

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 12 of 51 FRPs are not implemented until after directed in ESP-1.3.

This is allowed per the guidance of SOP-0.8.

2012 NRC exam From the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev I dated 03/11/2010 flowchart for 10 CFR 55.43(b)(5):

Knowledge of administrative procedures that specify hierarchy, implementation, and/or coordination of plant normal, abnormal, and emergency procedures.

This question tests knowledge of when to implement Functional Restoration Procedures.

Using the flowchart, this question can:

NOT be answered solely by knowing systems knowledge, i.e., how the system works, flowpath, logic, component location.

NOT be answered solely by knowing immediate operator actions.

NOT be answered solely by knowing entry conditions for AOPs or plant parameters that require direct entry to major EOPs.

NOT be answered solely by knowing the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigative strategy of a procedure.

be answered with knowledge of ONE or MORE of the following:

Knowledge of administrative procedures that specify hierarchy, implementation, and/or coordination of plant normal, abnormal, and emergency procedures.

Page 12 of 51

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 7 of 25

82. 024AG2.4.46 082/NEW//C/A 4.2/4.2/024AG2.4.46/COLR FIG I//I Unit I is stable at 55% power, after a rapid ramp down, with the following conditions:

Control Bank D is at 115 steps.

Control Bank D Rod K1O is stuck at 144 steps.

Control Rods have been placed in Manual.

STP-29.5, Shutdown Margin Calculation in Modes I and 2 (TAVG 547°F),

shows current Shutdown Margin is 1.67% deltaKlK.

An Emergency Boration is in progress.

Which one of the following completes the statements below?

FF2, CONT ROD BANK POSITION LO-LO, (1) in alarm.

Per the Bases of TRM 13.1.1, Shutdown Margin (SDM)

- Modes 1 and 2, the most limiting accident for Shutdown Margin requirements is based on (2)

REFERENCE PROVIDED A 1) is NOT

2) an EOLTaLnoioad temperature, Steam Line Break accident B. 1)is NOT

2) a BOL, 100% power, Control Rod Ejection accident C. 1)IS

2) an EOL, Tavg at no load temperatureSteam Line Break accident D. 1)IS

2) a BOL, 100% power, Control Rod Ejection accident Page 7 of 25

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 10 of 30

82. 024AG2.4.46 082/NEW//C/A 4.2/4.2/024AG2.4.46/COLR FIG 1//I EEl, CONT ROD BANK POSITION LO, alarm comes in at 10 steps> than the LO LO alarm. FE2, CONT ROD BANK POSITION LO LO alarm comes in based on the RIL computer which corresponds to the COLR.

A.

Correct 1) Correct, Control Rods are still above their Rod Insertion Limit per the COLR.

2) Correct, per TRM 13.1.1 Bases

- SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements vary throughout core life as a function of fuel depletion, RCS boron concentration, and RCS Tavg. The most restrictive condition occurs at EOL, with Tavg at no load operating temperature, and is associated with a postulated steam line break accident and resulting uncontrolled RCS cooldown.

B. Incorrect

1) Correct, see A.1.

Plausible since there are 2 alarms with different setpoints and the candidate has to know how to use the graph, correlate the reading to one of 2 alarm setpoints to make the decision.

2) Incorrect, plausible because Bases of TS 3.1.1 talks about both the steam line break accident and the rod ejection accident, but the steam line break is the most limiting.

C. Incorrect

1) Incorrect, Control Rods are still above their Rod Insertion Limit per the COLR.

2) Correct, see A.2.

D. Incorrect

1) Incorrect, see C.1.

2) Incorrect, see B.2.

Page lOof3O

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 13 of 51

82. 024AG2.4.46 082/NEW//C/A 4.2/4.2/024AG2.4.46/COLR FIG 1//I 024AG2.4.46 Emergency Boration 2.4.46 Ability to verify that the alarms are consistent with the plant conditions.

I(CFR:41.1O/43.5/45.3/45.12)

IMPORTANCE RO 4.2 SRO 4.2 Importance Rating:

4.2 4.2 Technical

Reference:

FNP-1 -STP-29.5, v5 Technical Requirements Manual, v24 Technical Requirements Manual Bases, v9 COLR, v24-1 References provided:

Figure 1, Rod Bank Insertion Limits versus Rated Thermal Power from the COLR (Curve for RIL)

Learning Objective:

DETERMINE AND APPLY the information from the LCO BASES sections: BACKGROUND, APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSIS, ACTIONS, SURVEILLENCE REQUIREMENTS, for any Technical Specifications or TRM requirements associated with AOP-19, Malfunction of Rod Control System, components and attendant equipment.

(OPS-62520S01) 10CFR55.43 (b) 2 Question origin:

New question.

Basis for meeting K/A:

An Emergency Boration is in progress due to inadequate Shutdown Margin. This question tests the candidates ability to determine if the annunciator for Control Rods being inserted below the Rod Insertion Limit (RIL) should be in at this time. An emergency boration is required for either inadequate Shutdown Margin or Rods inserted below the RIL.

SRO justification:

10 CFR 55.43(b)(2):

Knowledge of TS bases that is required to analyze TS required actions and terminology.

Same items listed above for the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) and Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM).

- The second part of the question tests the candidates knowledge of TRM 13.1.1 Bases for why an emergency boration is required to restore Shutdown Margin.

2012 NRC exam Page 13of51

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page l4of 51 10 CFR 55.43(b)(2)

Facility operating limitations in the TS and their bases.

From the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev 1 dated 03/11/2010 flowchart:

1) can NOT be answered by knowing less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Tech Specs.

2) can NOT be answered solely by knowing information listed above-the-line.

3) can NOT be answered by knowing the TS Safety Limits or their bases.

4) Does involve one or more of the following for TS, TRM or ODCM:

Knowledge of TS bases that is required to analyze TS required actions and terminology.

Page 14 of 51

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 8 of 25

83. 025AA2.05 083/NEW//C/A 3.1/3.5/025AA2.05/N///

Unit I is shutdown with the following conditions:

The RCS level is 1 foot below the flange.

Reactor Head stud detensioning is in progress.

1A RHR pump begins to cavitate and is shutdown.

Actions to restore RHR are in progress.

Which one of the following states the RHR minimum flow requirement tobe and the basis for that requirement per TS 3 9 5, Residual heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation

-- Low Water Level?

RHR flow is required to be restored to a minimum of (1) in order to (2)

(1)

(2)

A.

1750 gpm prevent thermal and boron stratification in the core B

3000 gpm prevent thermal and boron stratification in the core C.

3000 gpm prevent exceeding 110% of RHR design discharge pressure during an RCS over pressurization event D.

1750 gpm prevent exceeding 110% of RHR design discharge pressure during an RCS over pressurization event Page8of25

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 11 of 30

83. 025AA2.05 083/NEW//C/A 3.1/3.5/025AA2.05/N///

TS SR 3.9.5.1 requires 3000 gpm minimum RHR flow during Mode 6 for sufficient decay heat removal capability and to prevent thermal and boron stratification in the core. There is no TS minimum RHR flow requirement in Mode 5, but there are other minimum flow requirements per SOP-7.0 Precaution & Limitations.

P&L 3.17 states

- In order to prevent exceeding 110% of RHR design discharge pressure during an RCS over pressurization event; the minimum allowable flowrate, for Unit 1, is 1750 gpm when the RHR loop is aligned to the RCS. This limitation would not be applicable when RCS over pressurization is not feasible (i.e., with the reactor vessel head removed, midloop, Reactor Vessel Cover installed, etc.

Reference:

Westinghouse letter ALA-95-580).

A. Incorrect 1) Incorrect, 1750 gpm is a minimum RHR flow requirement to prevent exceeding 110% of the design discharge pressure during an RCS overpressurization event

- SOP-7.0, P&L 3.17.

2) Correct, TS 3.9.5, SR 3.9.5.1 Bases states that this flow is required to provide sufficient decay heat removal capability and to prevent thermal and boron stratification in the core.

B.

Correct

1) Correct, Tech Specs SR 3.9.5.1 requires > 3000 gpm RHR flow while in Mode 6.

2) Correct, See A.2.

C. Incorrect

1) Correct. see B.1.

2) Incorrect, plausible because this is a RHR requirement for Mode 5, along with the 1750 gpm. The plant is currently in Mode 6. See P&L 3.17 of SOP-7.0.

D. Incorrect

1) Incorrect, see A.1.

2) Incorrect, see C.2.

This combination would be a correct answer for a minimum flowrate while in Mode 5, although not a TS minimum flow rate.

Page 11 of 30

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 15 of 51

83. 025AA2.05 083/NEW//C/A 3.1/3.5/025AA2.05/N///

025AA2.05 Loss of Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS)

Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System:

(CFR: 43.5 I 45.13)

AA2.05 Limitations on LPI flow and temperature rates of change 3.1* 35*

Importance Rating:

3.1 3.5 Technical

Reference:

Tech Specs, v186 FNP-1-SOP-7.0 vlOO References provided:

None Learning Objective:

RECALL AND APPLY the information from the LCO BASES sections: BACKGROUND, APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSIS, ACTIONS, SURVEILLENCE REQUIREMENTS, for any Technical Specifications or TRM requirements associated with the Residual Heat Removal System components and attendant equipment alignment, to include the following (OPS-62101K01):

3.9.5, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation

- Low Water Level Question origin:

New question.

Basis for meeting K/A:

A loss of RHR has occurred and the candidate is questioned on the Tech Spec requirements and limitations for restoration of RHR flow. In addition, the candidate is questioned on the bases for the RHR minimum flow while in Mode 6. When RCS level is low, TS limits require a minimum amount of flow for core cooling and maintaining a homogenous mixture to prevent thermal and boron stratification.

SRO justification:

10 CFR 55.43(b)(2):

Application of Required Actions (Section 3) and Surveillance Requirements (SR) (Section 4) in accordance with rules of application requirements (Section 1).

2012 NRC exam 10 CFR 55.43(b)(2)

Facility operating limitations in the TS and their bases.

Page 15of51

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 16of51 From the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev 1 dated 03/11/2010 flowchart:

1) can NOT be answered by knowing less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Tech Specs.

2) can NOT be answered solely by knowing information listed above-the-line.

3) can NOT be answered by knowing the TS Safety Limits or their bases.

4) Does involve one or more of the following for TS, TRM or ODCM:

Application of Required Actions (Section 3) and Surveillance Requirements (Section 4) in accordance with rules of application requirements (Section 1)

Page 16of51

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 9 of 25

84. 026A2.03 084/BANK/WATTS BAR 2009/C/A 4.1/4.4/026A2.03/N///

Unit I is at 100% power with the following conditions:

PT-950, CTMT PRESS (Channel 1), failed and is out of service with the channel bistables positioned as required by Tech Specs The Surveillance Test for PT-953, CTMT PRESS (Channel 4), is now due.

Which one of the following completes the statements below for performing the Surveillance Test on PT-953?

PT-950 bistables are required to be placed in the (1) position.

Subsequent testing of PT-953 will (2)

(1)

(2)

A.

trip still allow a valid automatic Containment Spray actuation to occur.

B bypass still allow a valid automatic Containment Spray actuation to occur.

C.

trip prevent a valid automatic Containment Spray actuation from occurring.

D.

bypass prevent a valid automatic Containment Spray actuation from occurring.

Page 9 of 25

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 12 of 30

84. 026A2.03 084/BANK/WATTS BAR 2009/C/A 4.1/4.4/026A2.031N///

PT-950 only has one function associated with the PT and that is Hi-3. PT-951, 952 and 953 have Hi-I, 2 and 3 associated with the PTs and this can be confusing. Hi-I and 2 are placed in the trip condition and if 2 PTs were placed in the trip condition, Hi-l and 2 conditions would result. Since PT-950 has no Hi-I and 2 bistables, these functions are not affected. Also these PTs have a Hi-3 bistable which is bypasses vs. tripped.

Bases B page 3.3.2-14 This Function requires the bistable output to energize to perform its required action. It is not desirable to have a loss of power actuate containment spray, since the consequences of an inadvertent actuation of containment spray could be serious. Note that this Function also has the inoperable channel placed in bypass (disabled) rather thanrip to decrease thejpbabjUty indiitnt actuation The Containment Pressure High 3 instrument Function consists of a two-out-of-four logic configuration. Since containment pressure is not used for control, this arrangement exceeds the minimum redundancy requirements. Additional redundancy is warranted because this Function is energize to trip. Containment Pressure

High 3 must be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 when there is sufficient energy in the primary and secondary sides to pressurize the containment following a pipe break.

Condition E

- page 3.3.2-36 The Required Actions are modified by a Note that allows one additional channel to be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for surveillance testing. Placing a second channel in the bypass condition for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for testing purposes is acceptable based on the results of Reference 11.

A. Incorrect

1) Incorrect, bistables are required to be placed in bypass for the Hi-3 function. Plausible because most of the time bistables are placed in trip for a PT failure, and in fact normally they are placed in trip for the Hi-I or Hi-2 functions of a Containment Pressure channel.

2) Correct, For the Hi-3 function of Containment pressure, PT-950 and PT-953 will both be bypassed, but PT-951 and PT-952 will still be available to initiate a CS and Phase B actuation on a 2 out of 4 signal.

B.

Correct

1) Correct, Tech Specs requires going to bypass within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months on the failed channel for the Hi-3 function, TS 3.3.2, Cond E. In addition, a note in Cond E allows one additional channel to be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for surveillance testing.

2) Correct, see A.2.

C. Incorrect l)Incorrect, seeA.I.

2) Incorrect, a CS and Phase B actuation can still occur. Plausible if a candidate does not know that the Hi-3 actuation occurs on 2 out of 4 transmitters, as most actuations are on a 2 out of 3 transmitters.

D. Incorrect

1) Correct, see B.1.

2) Incorrect, see C.2.

Page 12 of 30

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 17 of 51

84. 026A2.03 084/BANK/WATTS BAR 2009/C/A 4.1/4.4/026A2.03/N///

026A2.03 Containment Spray System (CSS)

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CSS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

(CFR: 41.5 /43.5 /45.3/45.13)

A2.03 Failure of ESF 4.1 4.4 Importance Rating:

4.1 4.4 Technical

Reference:

Tech Specs, v186 References provided:

None Learning Objective:

RECALL AND APPLY the information from the LCO BASES sections: BACKGROUND, APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSIS, ACTIONS, SURVEILLENCE REQUIREMENTS, for any Technical Specifications or TRM requirements associated with Reactor Protection System (RPS), and attendant equipment, to include the following:

(OPS-62201 101): 1 OCFR55.43 (b) 2 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation Question origin:

Same as Watts Bar 2009 NRC Exam question #88 Basis for meeting K/A:

Applicant must determine how the bistables will be concurrently configured on a failed Containment Spray System actuation ESF transmitter and an ESF transmitter which is required to be tested. Candidate has to be able to determine the impact of the failure and how the function is maintained as identified in the Technical Specification bases.

SRO justification:

10 CFR 55.43(b)(2)

Knowledge of TS bases and notes that is required to analyze TS required actions and terminology.

2012 NRC exam 10 CFR 55.43(b)(2)

Facility operating limitations in the TS and their bases.

From the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev I dated 03/11/2010 flowchart:

Page 17of51

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 18 of 51

1) can NOT be answered by knowing less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Tech Specs.

2) can NOT be answered solely by knowing information listed above-the-line.

3) can NOT be answered by knowing the TS Safety Limits or their bases.

4) Does involve one or more of the following for TS, TRM or ODCM:

Knowledge of TS bases that is required to analyze TS required actions and terminology.

Page 18 of 51

I Watts Bar 2009 Friday, January 20, 2012 Page 1 of 3

1. 026 A2.03 088/NEW//HIGHERJ/SRO/WATTS BAR/i 1/2009/NO Given the following:

Unit 1 at 100% power.

Containment Pressure Transmitter 1-PDT-30-43 (Channel 1W) failed and is out of service with the channel bistables positioned as required by Technical Specifications.

The Surveillance Instruction for 1-PDT-30-44 (Channel II) is now due.

Which ONE of the following describes the required action for performing the Surveillance Instruction on 1-PDT-30-44, and what is the impact on Containment Spray actuation?

A. 1-PDT-30-43 is required to be placed in the TRIPPED position; subsequent testing of 1 -PDT-30-44 11 will still allow a valid automatic Containment Spray actuation to occur.

B. 1-PDT-30-43 is required to be placed in the TRIPPED position; subsequent testing of 1 -PDT-30-44 will prevent a valid automatic Containment Spray actuation from occurring.

C 1-PDT-30-43 is required to be placed in the BYPASS position; subsequent testing of 1 -PDT-30-44 will still allow a valid automatic Containment Spray actuation to occur.

D. 1-PDT-30-43 is required to be placed in the BYPASS position; subsequent testing of 1-PDT-30-44 will prevent a valid automatic Containment Spray actuation from occurring.

Page 1 of 3

I Watts Bar 2009 Friday, January 20, 2012 Page 2 of 3 DISTRACTOR ANAL YSIS:

A.

Incorrect, 1-PDT-30-43 will not be placed to thef position and subsequent testing of 1-PDT-30-44 will still allow vaild automatic actuation of the containment spray during the surveillance test because the other 2 channels still provide for the protection of the function. Plausible because the positioning of bistables to the trip position is a normal process performed to meet Tech Spec requirements to ensure a function can be met and in this COT the Hi containment pressure SI bistable for this instrument would be placed in the Trip position unless another channel ws to be tested.

B.

Incorrect, 1-PD T-30-43 will not be placed to the position and subsequent testing of 1-PDT-30-44 will not prevent a valid automatic actuation of the containment spray during the surveillance test because the other 2 channels still provide for the protection of the function. Plausible because the positioning of bistables to the trip position is a normal process performed to meet Tech Spec requirements to ensure a function can be met (and in this COT the Hi containment pressure SI bistable for this instrument would be placed in the Trip position unless testing of another channel was required.

C.

Correct, 1-PD T-30-43 would be placed in the bypass position as identified in the Tech Spec 3.3.2 Bases. The Required Action for LCO 3.3.2 Condition E has a Note that allows a channel to be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for surveillance testing.

This Note is explained in the Tech Spec Bases. There are 4 channels provided for the Hi-Hi containment function to actuate and it takes 2 of the 4 to generate the signal (and 2 channels remain in service.

D.

Incorrect, 1-PD T-30-43 would be placed in the bypass position but the testing of 1-PD T-30-44 will not prevent a valid containment spray actuation from occurring even though the HI-HI bistables would be tested in the bypass position.

Page 2 of 3

I Watts Bar 2009 Friday, January 20, 2012 Page 3 of 3 Question Number:

88 Tier:

2 Group 1

K/A:

026 A2.03 Containment Spray System (CSS)

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CSS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Failure of ESF Importance Rating:

4.1 /4.4 10 CFR Part 55:

41.5! 43.5/45.3 / 45.13 IOCFR55.43.b:

2,5 KIA Match:

Applicant must determine how the bistables will be concurrently configured on a failed Containment Spray System actuation ESF transmitter and an ESF transmitter which is required to be tested in order to run the surveillance instruction and how the function is maintained as identified in the Technical Specification bases.

SRO because the question requires knowledge of Tech Spec bases that is required to analyze Tech Spec required actions and terminology.

Technical

Reference:

Tech Spec LCO 3.3.2, ESFAS lnstrumentation(Amendment 68) and Bases (Revision 90) 1-47W611-88-1, R23 Proposed references None to be provided:

Learning Objective:

3-OT-5Y5072A

20. Explain Tech Spec bases for Containment Spray components and parameters governed by Tech Specs.

Question Source:

New X

Modified Bank Bank Question History:

New Question Comments:

Page 3of3

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 10 of 25

85. 026AG2.2.25 085/MOD/FNP-NO NRC/C/A 3.2/4.2/026AG2.2.251N///

Unit I is in Mode 3 with the following conditions:

A train is the ON-SERVICE Train.

HV-3096A, CCW TO/FROM EVAP PKGS & H2 RECOMB, is stuck open and will NOT close.

HV-3096B, CCW TO/FROM EVAP PKGS & H2 RECOMB, is functioning properly.

Which one of the following completes the statements below?

HV-3096A & B are required to isolate upon receipt of an (1)

The A Train COW system is (2)

A. 1)Sl signal ONLY

2) OPERABLE; Either HV3096A OR B must close to maintain operability.

B. I) SI signal ONLY

2) NOT OPERABLE; BOTH HV3096A AND B must close to maintain operability.

0.

1) SI signal OR LO LO Surge Tank level

2) OPERABLE; Either HV3096A OR B must close to maintain operability.

D I) SI signal OR LO LO Surge Tank level

2) NOT OPERABLE; BOTH HV3096A AND B must close to maintain operability.

Page 100f25

25 SRO QUESTIONS VerS Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 13 of 30

85. 026AG2.2.25 085/MOD/FNP-NO NRC/C/A 3.2/4.2/026AG2.2.25/N///

The FSD (Functional System Description) documents are manuals that were created and are maintained by the Engineering Department. They provide a component by component description of most of the major systems for the plant. It lists the equipment required for the system to perform its safety function in one section, and non safety equipment in another section. It is a document that the SRO can use to help him determine operability of a system when there is a component malfunction, and it is unclear if it affects operability of the system.

The FSD requires that HV3096A & B must both close to isolate the seismic rated piping from the non-seismic rated pipTh of theCCW system to prevent a loss of COW due to a pipe break in the non-seismic portion of the system. HY3096A& B allow COW flow to the Waste Gas Hydrogen Recombiners, Waste Evaporator, Recycle Evaporator, and Waste Gas compressors.

These are all non-safety reted components. HV3096B isolates the inlet line to these components and HV3096A isolates the outlet from these components. If there were a leak on any of these non-seismic components,both valves would have to close to completely isolate the leak. This is different from the normal convention in that normally there are two valves in series that will provide isolation if either one closes.

HV3096A & B are in the COW system as part of the Miscellaneous Header. The train that supplies the Miscellaneous Header is the On-service train. For this question, A Train is the on service train, and since HV3096A can not be closed, then A train must be declared INOPERABLE until HV3096A is closed.

TS Basis for 3.7.7 states:

1.

A CCW train is considered OPERABLE when:

a. The pump and associatecLsurge tank section are OPERABLE; and

b. The associated piping,alv> heat exchanger, and instrumentation and controls reqirecto perform the saftrreiated funclion are OPERABLE 2.

The isolation of COW from other components or systems not required for safety may render those components or systems inoperable but does not affect the OPERABILITY of the CCW System.

These bases comments may seem to be opposing, but are actually talking about two different things. The first one (1.b) is saying that (among other equipment) the safety related isolation valves have to be operable

- HV3096A & B have to be able to close.

The second bases statement is saying that the Isolation of CCW from other systems does not make the CCW system inoperable, BUT for our question we are looking at a Failure to Isolate.

A failure to isolate falls under the first statement and not the second statement. For example, the second statement is saying that if COW is isolated to a Letdown Heat Exchanger, it may make the Letdown Heat Exchanger inoperable, but it does not make the COW system inoperable.

The Isolation of components does not make the COW system inoperable, but a Failure to Isolate will make the COW system inoperable.

A181000, COW FSD 3.13.1 Basic Functions The nonessential user isolation valves shall provide positive automatic isolation of the hydrogen recombiners, waste gas compressors, waste evaporator package, and recycle evaporator package on low-low surge tank level, safety injection actuation signal (SIAS),

Page 13 of 30

25 SRO QUESTIONS VerS Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 14 of 30 section 3.13.2.3 continues to state:

The valves shall fail closed to isolate the Seismic Category I portion of the CCWS from the non-seismic portion (Reference 6.7.05).

FSAR 9.2.2 states that All portions of the component cooling system that are safety related are Seismic Category I design. Valves in the supply and return lines for non-safety-related equipment will be automatically closed.

A. Incorrect

1) Incorrect, an SI signal will close the valves, but since the area isolated by the HV3096 valves is non-seismic, the HV3096 valves will also go closed on a LO LO Surge tank level.

2) Incorrect, OPERABLE is incorrect because the seismic portion can not be isolated from the non-seismic portion of the system, this SAFETY FUNCTION is not satisfied, therefore the system is INOPERABLE until HV3096A is closed. Plausible because normally there are two valves in series and only one is required to close to provide isolation.

B. Incorrect 1)lncorrect,seeA.1.

2) Correct, the A train is not operable since it is the on-service train and HV3096A is failed.

C. Incorrect

1) Correct, HV3096 A & B will isolate on either an SI or LO LO Surge tank level.

2) Incorrect, see A.2.

D.

Correct

1) Correct, see C.1.

2) Correct, see B.2.

Page 14 of 30

25 SRO QUESTIONS VerS Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 19 of 51

85. 026AG2.2.25 085/MOD/FNP-NO NRC/C/A 3.2/4.2/026AG2.2.25/N///

026AG2.2.25 Loss of Component Cooling Water (COW) 2.2.25 Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.

(CFR: 41.5/41.7/43.2)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.2 SRO 4.2 Importance Rating:

3.2 4.2 Technical

Reference:

Tech Spec Bases, v53 A181000, Functional System Description v24 FSAR 9.2.2 v24 References provided:

None Learning Objective:

RECALL AND APPLY the information from the LCD BASES sections: BACKGROUND, APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSIS, ACTIONS, SURVEILLENCE REQUIREMENTS, for any Technical Specifications or TRM requirements associated with the CCW System components and attendant equipment alignment, to include the following (OPS-62102G01): 10CFR55.43 (b) 2 3.7.7 Component Cooling Water System Question origin:

Modified FNP Bank CCW-62102G02 01 Basis for meeting K/A:

This question requires a knowledge of TS Bases as it relates to a piping break in a non-Seismic portion of the COW system. A piping break, with a failure of the isolation valves to close would cause a loss of the COW system, and a resultant loss of support of its associated ESF equipment.

This question requires assessing system operability (LOSS THEREOF); Systems level knowledge is required regarding the signal which isolates this non-seismic, non-essential portion of the system as well as SRO level knowledge of the TS Basis to assess operability.

SRO justification:

10 CFR 55.43(b)(2):

Knowledge of TS bases that is required to analyze TS required actions and terminology.

2012 NRC exam From the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev I dated 03/11/2010 flowchart for 10 CFR 55.43(b)(2)

1) can NOT be answered by knowing less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Tech Specs.

Page 19 of 51

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 20 of 51

2) can NOT be answered by knowing information listed above-the-lin&.

3) can NOT be answered by knowing the TS Safety Limits or their bases.

4) Does involve one or more of the following for TS, TRM or ODCM:

Knowledge of TS bases that is required to analyze TS required actions and terminology. (where amplifying instruction is found within the PROCEDURES.)

Page200f5l

026AA2.03 Thursday, March 01, 2012 Page 1 of 1

1. CCW-62 1 02G02 001 /HLT!LOCT/SRO/C/A 2.6/2.9/APEO26AA2.03/3.7.7//!

Unit 1 is in Mode 3, and A train is in service. The following conditions are discovered:

HV-3096A, CCW from the Waste and Recycle Evaporator Packages and Waste Gas System Components, is stuck open and will not close.

HV-3096B, CCW to the Waste and Recycle Evaporator Packages and Waste Gas System Components, operates properly.

No other valve manipulations are made.

Which one of the following describes required operation of HV-3096A and states the operability of A train CCW?

HV-3096A is required to close after a (1) signal.

The A train CCW system is (2)

(1)

(2)

A.

Phase A Operable; Either HV3096A OR B must close to maintain operability.

B.

Phase A NOT operable; BOTH HV3096A AND B must close to maintain operability.

C.

Safety Injection Operable; Either HV3096A OR B must close to maintain operability.

D Safety Injection NOT operable; BOTH HV3096A AND B must close to maintain operability.

Page 1 of 1

25 SRO QUESTIONS VerS Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 11 of 25

86. 034K4.01 086/MOD/ROBINSON 2007/C/A 2.6/3.4/034K4.01/N///

Unit 1 is in a refueling outage with the following conditions:

Due to a problem with the Gripper Engaged Limit Switch on the Manipulator Crane, TS-2, HOIST INTERLOCKS BY-PASS switch, has been taken to ON.

A fuel assembly is being lowered into the Reactor vessel.

The Manipulator Crane operator releases the HOIST JOG lever and the bottom of the fuel assembly is 2 from the lower core plate.

Which one of the following completes the statements below?

Per FHP-7.O, Limitations and Precautions for Handling Fuel Assemblies, the (1) is REQUIRED to give permission to place the HOIST INTERLOCKS BY-PASS switch to ON.

When the GRIPPER switch is 1aken to the DISENG position, the gripper (2) disengage from the fuel assembly.

(1)

(2)

A.

Fuel Handling Supervisor WILL B Fuel Handling Supervisor will NOT C.

Shift Manager WILL D.

Shift Manager will NOT Page 11 of 25

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 15 of 30

86. 034K4.0 1 086/MOD/ROBINSON 2007/C/A 2.6/3.4/034K4.0 1/N//I When transferring fuel, for the gripper to unlatch, two things have to happen.

I )The Slack Cable interlock has to be made up to indicate that the fuel assembly is full down. This enables an air supply solenoid to operate to supply air to the gripper to disengage it.

2) About 300 pounds of mechanical force has to be applied to the top of the fuel assembly to disengage a mechanical interlock on the gripper.

For the Slack Cable interlock to function properly, the Underload interlock is automatically disabled in the last two inches of travel when lowering a fuel assembly.

This lends plausibility to the gripper operating when the fuel assembly is two inches from the lower core plate. In addition, the Hoist Interlocks By-Pass bypasses the underload circuit. The underload circijtwW stop hoist downwthnacJjJjflan underload is sensed.tThE candidate may thikJhf cetfieUnderload interlock is V

inches of travel or by the Hoist Interlocks By-Pass, the fuel assembly can be unlatchedJ A. Incorrect

1) Correct, per FNP-0-FHP-7.0

- No electrical bypass switch operation of the manipulator crane shall be allowed without the permission of the Fuel Handling Supervisor.

2) Incorrect, the gripper will not disengage until the fuel assembly is fully seated, due to the mechanical latch that prevents releasing a fuel assembly until sufficient downward force is exerted on the latch by the Manipulator Crane mast.

B. Correct I) Correct, Fuel Handling Supervisor permission must be obtained prior to going to bypass in every situation.

2) Correct, the Manipulator Crane gripper will not disengage, see A.2.

C. Incorrect

1) Incorrect, Shift Manager may give permission, but Fuel Handling Supervisor permission is still required with or without Shift Manager approval.

2) Incorrect, see A.2.

D. Incorrect I) Incorrect. See C.I.

2) Correct. See B.2.

Page 15of30

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 21 of 51

86. 034K4M 1 086/MOD/ROBINSON 2007/C/A 2.6/3.4/034K4.0 1 IN//I 034K4.01 Fuel Handling Equipment System (FHES)

Knowledge of design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

(CFR: 41.7)

K4.O1 Fuel protection from binding and dropping 2.6 3.4 Importance Rating:

2.6 3.4 Technical

Reference:

FNP-0-FHP-7.0, v23 FNP-1-FHP-5.13, v22 References provided:

None Learning Objective:

RECALL AND DISCUSS the Precautions and Limitations (P&L), Notes and Cautions (applicable to the Reactor Operator) found in the following procedures (OPS-521 08D05):

FHP-1.0 Refueling Operations FHP-3.0 Receipt and Storage of New Fuel FHP-4.0 Transfer of New Fuel to Spent Fuel Pit FHP-7.0 Limitations And Precautions For Handling Fuel Assemblies Question origin:

Modified from Robinson 2007 NRC Exam Question #97 Basis for meeting K/A:

This question requires knowledge of the mechanical interlock on the Refueling Manipulator Crane that will prevent dropping a fuel assembly when the gripper is latched and the fuel assembly is suspended. The interlock will prevent dropping an assembly due to a loss of air, loss of power, or inadvertent operation of the incorrect handswitch.

SRO justification:

10 CFR 55.43(b)(7):

Refuel floor SRO responsibilities.

2012 NRC exam Fuel handling facilities and procedures. [10 CFR 55.43(b)(7)]

Some examples of SRO exam items for this topic include:

Refuel floor SRO responsibilities.

Assessment of fuel handling equipment surveillance requirement acceptance criteria.

Prerequisites for vessel disassembly and reassembly.

Page 21 of 51

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 22 of 51

Decay heat assessment.

Assessment of surveillance requirements for the refueling mode.

Reporting requirements.

Emergency classifications.

Page 22 of 51

HLC-06 NRC Replacement Exam 97.

Who, by title, has approval authority for bypassing interlocks on Refueling equipment in accordance with OMM-OO1 -1 8, Outages?

A. Operations Outage Coordinator (OOC)

B. Operations Shift Manager (OSM)

C. Superintendent - Shift Operations (SSO)

D. Refueling SRO 97

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 12 of 25

87. 056AG2.1.7 087/BANK/WATTS BAR 2009/M 4.4/4.7/056AG2.1.7/N///

The foNowing conditions exist on Unit 1:

ECP-0.0, Loss of AN AC Power, is in progress.

Depressurization of ALL intact Steam Generators has been initiated.

Which one of the following completes the statements below?

The Steam Generator depressurization is required to be stopped if (1)

When transitioning from ECP-0.0, a parameter that will be monitored to determine the correct recovery procedure is (2)

A.

1) Pressurizer level falls to 12%, to prevent Reactor Vessel Head voiding

2) RCS Pressure B.

1) all intact SG narrow range levels fall to 30%, to prevent a loss of adequate heat transfer capability

2) RCS Pressure C. 1) Pressurizer level falls to 12%, to prevent Reactor Vessel Head voiding

2) RCS Subcooling D 1) all intact SG narrow range levels fall to 30%, to prevent a loss of adequate heat transfer capability

2) RCS Subcooling Page 12 of 25

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 16 of 30

87. 056AG2. 1.7 087/BANK/WATTS BAR 2009/M 4.414.71056AG2. 1.7/N//I A. Incorrect

1) Incorrect, Plausible because Pressurizer level is monitored frequently in the ERGs and alternate actions are taken as a result of Pressurizer level getting too low (see step 31 of ESP-O.O). Preventing Reactor Vessel Head voiding is a concern, especially in the ECP-O series procedures.

There is a note prior to step 17 of ECP-O.O, that discusses Pressurizer level and vessel upper head voiding.

2) Incorrect, Plausible because RCS pressure is monitored frequently in the ERGs and alternate actions are taken if RCS pressure is not kept within limits.

B. Incorrect

1) Correct, per ECP-O.O Bases. Natural circulation may be interrupted if SG levels are not maintained high enough to keep the SG tubes fully covered.

2) Incorrect, see A.2.

C. Incorrect

1) Incorrect, seeA.1.

2) Correct, per ECP-O.O. RCS subcooling provides transition criteria at step 31 of ECP-O.O.

D.

Correct

1) Correct, see B.1.

2) Correct, see C.2.

Page 16 of 30

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012

87. 056AG2. 1.7 O87JBANKJWATTS BAR 20091M 4.4/4.7!056AG2. 1.7/NI/I 56AG2.1.7 Loss of Offsite Power Page 23 of 51 2.1.7 Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.

(CFR: 41.5/43.5/45.12/45.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 4.4 SRO 4.7 Importance Rating:

4.4 Technical

Reference:

ECP-0.0, v25 References provided:

None Learning Objective:

Question origin:

Basis for meeting K/A:

SRO justification:

ASSESS the facility conditions associated with the (1)

ECP-0.0, Loss of All AC Power; (2) ECP-0.1, Loss of All AC Power Recovery, Without SI Required; (3) ECP-0.2, Loss of All AC Power Recovery, With SI Required, and based on that assessment: (OPS-62532A01)

SELECT the appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal and emergency situations. 10CFR55.43 (b) 5

DETERMINE if transition to another section of the procedure or to another procedure is required

DETERMINE if the critical safety functions are satisfied Same as Watts Bar December 2009 NRC Exam, Question

99 A Loss of Offsite Power has occurred and the candidate has to evaluate conditions and determine (by instrument interpretation) when stopping the SG depressurization would be required. In addition, the candidate has to has to be able to evaluate instrumentation required to transition to the apppriaterecoveryprocedure.

10 CFR 55.43(b)(5)

Assessing plant conditions (normal, abnormal, or emergency) and then selecting a procedure or section of a procedure to mitigate, recover, or with which to proceed.

The applicants knowledge can be evaluated at the level of 10 CFR55.43(b)(5) by ensuring that the additional knowledge of the procedures content is required to correctly answer the written test item, for example:

Knowledge of diagnostic steps and decision points in the emergency operating procedures (EOP) that involve transitions to event specific subprocedures or emergency 4.7 Page 23 of 51

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 24 of 51 contingency procedures.

2012 NRC exam From the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev I dated 03/11/2010 flowchart for 10 CFR 55.43(b)(5):

Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations [10 CFR 55.43(b)(5)], involving BOTH:

1) assessing plant conditions and then 2) selecting a procedure or section of a procedure to mitigate, rcover, or with which to proceed.

Using the flowchart, this question can:

NOT be answered solely by knowing systems knowledge, i.e., how the system works, flowpath, logic, component location.

NOT be answered solely by knowing immediate operator actions.

NOT be answered solely by knowing entry conditions for AOPs or plant parameters that require direct entry to major EOPs.

NOT be answered solely by knowing the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigative strategy of a procedure.

be answered with knowledge of ONE or MORE of the following:

Knowledge of diagnostic steps and decision points in the emergency operating procedures (EOP) that involve transitions to event specific subprocedures or emergency contingency procedures.

Page 24 of 51

11/2009 Watts Bar SRO NRC Exam

- As submitted 10/2/2009

99. G 2.4.18 099 Given the following Unit I plant conditions:

ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power is in effect.

Depressurization of all intact SGs at the maximum rate is in progress.

Which ONE of the following identifies...

(1) the parameter used to determine the maximum rate and its basis and (2) a parameter used to determine which recovery procedure will be implemented when ECA-0.0 is completed?

A. (1) Ability to maintain pressurizer level above 10% to prevent loss of pressure control resulting in reactor vessel head voiding.

(2) RCS pressure trend B. (1) Ability to maintain pressurizer level above 10% to prevent loss of pressure control resulting in reactor vessel head voiding.

(2) RCS Subcooling value C. (1) Ability to maintain at least one SG narrow range level above 29% to prevent loss of sufficient heat transfer capability from the RCS.

(2) RCS pressure trend D (1) Ability to maintain at least one SG narrow range level above 29% to prevent loss of sufficient heat transfer capability from the RCS.

(2) RCS Subcooling value Page 71

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 13 of 25

88. 067AA2.08 088/NEW//C/A 2.9/3.6/067AA2.08/N/EMERG CLASS!!

Unit 1 is at 100% power with the following conditions:

The 1A Control Room Air Conditioning (CRACS) system is Tagged Out.

At 10:00:

The Rover reports a fire in the lB CRACS system.

At 10:14:

The fire is extinguished.

The 1 B CRACS system is damaged and cannot be restarted.

Which one of the following completes the statements below?

An emergency classification declaration (1) required per NMP-EP-1 10, Emergency Classification Determination and Initial Action.

The FSAR design limit maximum temperature for the Control Room equipment is (2)

(1)

(2)

A.

IS 104°F B.

is NOT 104°F C

IS 120°F D.

is NOT 120°F Page 13 of 25

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 17 of 30

88. 067AA2.08 088/NEW//C/A 2.9/3.6/067AA2.08/N/EMERG CLASS/I Per NMP-EP-1 10

- the criteria for ALERT is:

HA2

- FIRE OR EXPLOSION Affecting the Operability of Plant Safety Systems Required to Establish or Maintain Safe Shutdown (pg. 69)

1. FIRE OR EXPLOSION AND affected system parameter indications show degraded performance OR plant personnel report VISIBLE DAMAGE to permanent structures OR safety related equipment in any of the following VITAL AREAs:

Containment I Auxiliary Building I Control Room Storage Pond dike and dam

- Service Water Pond Condensate Storage Tank (CST)

Service Water Intake Structure (SWIS)

Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST)

Diesel Generator Building / Pond Spillway Structure The criteria for a NOUE is:

HU2

- FIRE Within PROTECTED AREA Boundary Not Extinguished Within 15 Minutes of Detection (pg. 77).

1. FIRE in buildings OR areas contiguous to any of the following areas NOT extinguished within 15 minutes of control room notification OR verification of a control room alarm unless disproved by personnel observation within 15 minutes of the alarm:

Containment I Auxiliary Building Condensate Storage Tank (CST)

Service Water Intake Structure (SWIS)

Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST)

Diesel Generator Building Control Room Per FSAR 9.4.1.1 Two separate and redundant air conditioning systems are provided to maintain the temperature in the control room at approximately 78°F (db). Safety-related components in the control room are designed to withstand a maximum environmental temperature of 120°F.

A. Incorrect

1) Correct, An emergency classification declaration is required by NMP-EP-1 10. An ALERT is required for a fire in a vital area that causes damage to safety related equipment.

2) Incorrect, Plausible because STP-63.3, EQ Area Temperature Monitoring, acceptance criteria is for area temperatures to be < 104°F.

B. Incorrect

1) Incorrect, plausible because for a fire that has been extinguished within 15 minutes, with no equipment damage, no classification is required.

2) Incorrect, see A.2.

C.

Correct

1) Correct, see A.1.

2) Correct, per the FSAR, 120°F is the design limit for equipment operability in the Control Room.

D. Incorrect

1) Incorrect, see B.1.

Page 17 of 30

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 18 of 30

2) Correct, see 0.2.

Page 18of30

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 25 of 51

88. 067AA2.08 088/NEW//C/A 2.9/3.6/067AA2.08/N/EMERG CLASS/I 067AA2.08 Plant Fire On Site Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Plant Fire on Site:

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

AA2.08 Limits of affected area 2.9 3.6 Importance Rating:

2.9 3.6 Technical

Reference:

NMP-EP-110-GLOI, v2 FSAR, v24 References provided:

None Learning Objective:

Using plant procedures/references, ANALYZE a set of plant conditions and DETERMINE the proper classification of the emergency condition as being a NOUE, Alert, Site Area, or General Emergency. (OPS-63002C01).

Using plant procedures/references, DETERMINE the appropriate actions that are to be performed by the SM/ED during a NOUE, Alert, Site Area, or General Emergency including developing PARs, and the consequences of inadequate actions. (OPS-63002C02).

Question origin:

New question.

Basis for meeting K/A:

A fire has occurred in the Auxiliary Building. Candidate has to display ability to determine and interpret the limits for application of the Emergency Plan (is an emergency classification required). In addition, candidate has to have knowledge of the Control Room temperature limit associated with the loss of Control Room HVAC, an area affected by the fire.

SRO justification:

III. Justification for Plant Specific Exemptions UNIQUE to the SRO position:

Justification: A question that is not tied to one of the 10 CFR 55.43(b) items can still be classified as SRO-only provided the licensee has documented evidence to prove that the knowledge/ability is unique to the SRO position at the site. An example of documented evidence includes:

The question is linked to a learning objective that is specifically labeled in the lesson plan as being SRO-only Page 25 of 51

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 26 of 51 (e.g., some licensee lesson plans have columns in the margin that differentiate AC, RO, and SRO learning objectives) [NUREG 1021, ES-401, Section D.2.d}

AND/OR

A question is linked to a task that is labeled as an SRO-only task, and the task is NOT listed in the RO task list.

The SRO is solely responsible for determining Classifications at FNP, both objectives listed above are SRO only objectives.

2012 NRC exam HI. Justification for Plant Specific Exemptions UNIQUE to the SRO position:

DOES NOT MATCH one of the 10 CFR 55.43(b) items but FNP has classified the knowledge/ability as unique to the SRO position as documented within SAT process as ties the knowledge/ability to the licensees SRO job position duties.

Page 26 of 51

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 14 of 25

89. 07202.2.36 089/MOD/FARLEY 2011/M 3.1 /4.2/07202.2.36/N//I Maintenance is preparing to de-energize R-5, SEP RM, for troubleshooting and repair on Unit 1.

At 10:00:

An electrical lead is lifted that disables the alarm function of R-5.

At 10:30:

The power supply to R-5 is de-energized and Tagged Out.

Which one of the following completes the statements below?

Per TRM 13.3.4, Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation, R-5 becomes nonfunctional at (1)

De-energizing R-5 (2) cause the Penetration Room Filtration System to automatically start.

(1)

(2)

A.

10:00 WILL B

10:00 will NOT C.

10:30 WILL D.

10:30 will NOT Page 14 of 25

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 19 of 30

89. 072G2.2.36 089/MOD/FARLEY 2011 /M 3. l/4.2/072G2.2.36/N///

Bases of TR 13.3.4 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation The FUNCTIONALITY of the radiation monitoring channels ensures that:

1) the radiation levels are continually measured in the areas served by the individual channels and

2) the alarm is initiated when the radiation level trip setpoint is exceeded.

A. Incorrect

1) Correct, the alarm function is required for R-5 to be FUNCTIONAL per TRM 13.3.4.

2) Incorrect, PRF will j auto start on a High Rad signal on R-5, SFP room monitor, but plausible because it will autostart on R-25, SPENT FUEL BLDG EXH. Both monitors are providing radiation level information of the Spent Fuel Pool area.

B.

Correct

1) Correct, see A.1.

2) Correct, PRF will not auto start on a High Rad signal on R-5, SFP room monitor.

C. Incorrect

1) Incorrect, the alarm function is required for R-5 to be FUNCTIONAL per TRM 13.3.4, so the rad monitor was non FUNCTIONAL at 10:00.

2) Incorrect, see A.2 D. Incorrect

1) Incorrect, see C.1.

2) Correct, see B.2.

Page 19 of 30

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 27 of 51

89. 072G2.2.36 089/MOD/FARLEY 201 1/M 3.l/4.2/072G2.2.36/N///

072G2.2.36 Area Radiation Monitoring (ARM) System 2.2.36 Ability to analyze the effect of maintenance activities, such as degraded power sources, on the status of limiting conditions for operations.

(CFR: 41.10 /43.2 /45.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.1 SRO 4.2 Importance Rating:

3.1 4.2 Technical

Reference:

Technical Requirements Manual, v24 Technical Requirements Manual Bases, v9 References provided:

None Learning Objective:

RECALL AND APPLY the information from the LCO BASES sections: BACKGROUND, APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSIS, ACTIONS, SURVEILLENCE REQUIREMENTS, for any Technical Specifications or TRM requirements associated with Radiation Monitoring System components and attendant equipment alignment, to include the following (OPS-62106D01): IOCFR55.43 (b) 2 3.3.3, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation 3.3.6, Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.7, Control Room Emergency Filtration/Pressurization System (CREFS) Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.8, Penetration Room Filtration (PRF) System Actuation Instrumentation 3.4.15, RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation 13.3.4, Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation Question origin:

Modified from Farley 2011 NRC Exam Question #86 Basis for meeting K/A:

This question tests the ability of the candidate to evaluate the effects of Maintenance personnel activities on an Area Rad Monitor. Maintenance sometimes lifts leads to disable the alarm function to prevent it being a nuisance while work is in progress in an area. Using TRM bases information, candidate has to determine the FUNCTIONALITY of the rad monitor per TRM 13.3.4, at different points in the maintenance process.

SRO justification:

10 CFR 55.43(b)(2):

Knowledge of TS bases that is required to analyze TS required actions and terminology.

Page 27 of 51

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 28 of 51 Knowledge of TRM Bases is required to evaluate functionality of R-5.

2012 NRC exam From the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev 1 dated 03/11/2010 flowchart for 10 CFR 55.43(b)(2)

1) can NOT be answered by knowing less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Tech Specs.

2) can NOT be answered by knowing information listed above-the-line.

3) can NOT be answered by knowing the TS Safety Limits or their bases.

4) Does involve one or more of the following for TS, TRM or ODCM:

Knowledge of TS bases that is required to analyze TS required actions and terminology.

Page28of5l

2011 HLT-34 Question Thursday, March01, 2012 Page 1 of 1

1. 061 AA2.04 086/NEW/SRO/MEM 3.5/4.2/061 AA2.04/N/3/HF REVIEW-WHY/UNSAT Which one of the following completes the statements below?

The alarm function(s) of R-5, SEP RM, (1) required for FUNCTIONALITY per TR 13.3.4, Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation.

R-5 (2) automatically trip the Fuel Handling Area Supply and Exhaust Fans on a HIGH radiation condition.

(1)

(2)

A.

IsNOT willNOT B.

is NOT WILL C

IS will NOT D.

IS WILL Page 1 of I

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 15 of 25

90. 086A2.02 090/MOD/FAR 2010/VOGT 2011/C/A 3.0/3.3/086A2.02/N///

FNP-0-FSP-203.1, Motor Driven Fire Pump Functional Test, has been completed with the following conditions:

The Motor Driven Fire pump (MDFP) started automatically at its required low Fire Protection System header setpoint.

The MDFP could NOT maintain header pressure as required by FSP-203.1.

The #1 Diesel Driven Fire Pump is Tagged Out.

Which one of the following completes the statements below?

The MDFP low pressure auto start setpoint is (1) psig.

The Fire Suppression Water System (2)

OPERABLE per FSAR section 9B.

(1)

(2)

A.

70 is NOT 90 is NOT C.

70 IS D.

90 IS Page 15of25

25 SRO QUESTIONS VerS Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 20 of 30

90. 086A2.02 090/MOD/FAR 2010/VOGT 2011/C/A 3.0/3.3/086A2.02/N///

FSP-203.1 is a test to verify operability of the Motor Driven Fire Pump. The FSP checks that the pump autostarts at 90 psig and maintains Fire Protection Header pressure > 70 psig. Normally, there are two back up Diesel Driven Fire Pumps that autostart at 80 psig and 70 psig respectively In this situation the #1 DDFP is Tagged Out Per the FSAR, section 9B, if any two of the three Fire Pumps are operable, the Fire Suppression Water System is operable If less than two pumps are operable, the Fire Suppression Water System is inoperable, and actions are required.

A. Incorrect

1) Incorrect, the MDFP autostart setpoint is 90 psig. FPS header pressure is required to be maintained > 70 psig.

2) Correct, the Fire Water Suppression system is inoperable with two inoperable Fire Pumps.

B. Correct

1) Correct, autostart setpoint is 90 psig.

2) Correct, see A.2.

C. Incorrect

1) Incorrect, see A.1.

2) Incorrect, the Fire Water Suppression system is inoperable with two inoperable Fire Pumps.

D. Incorrect

1) Correct, see B.1.

2) Incorrect, see 0.2.

Page 20 of 30

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 29 of 51

90. 086A2.02 090/MOD/FAR 2O10IVOGT 2011/C/A 3.0/3.3/086A2.02/N///

086A2.02 Fire Protection System (FPS)

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Fire Protection System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

(CFR: 41.5 /43.5/45.3 /45.13)

A2.02 Low FPS header pressure 3.0 3.3 Importance Rating:

3.0 3.3 Technical

Reference:

FNP-0-FSP-203.1 vS FSAR 9B.C-2, ver 24 FNP-0-SOP-0.4 v83.2 References provided:

None Learning Objective:

OPS-62108K01 Recall and Apply the information from the [...] T.S.-Fire Protection Program: Renewed License No.

NPF-2-Amendment No.175-Fire Protection Program as described in FSAR which implements fire protection requirements of 100FR5O.48, 10CFR5O, and Appendix R.

Question origin:

Modified from Vogtle 2011 NRC Exam, question #93 and Farley 2010 NRC Exam #90 Basis for meeting K/A:

The K/A calls for the ability to predict the impacts of the Low FPS header pressure. In this question, the low FPS header pressure causes this pump to be inoperable per the FSP and the candidate has to evaluate the remaining pumps available and determine if the Fire Suppression Water System is operable per the FSAR.

SRO justification:

Conditions and limitations in the facility license.

10 CFR 55.43(b)(1)

Administration of fire protection program requirements such as compensatory actions associated with inoperable sprinkler systems, fire doors, etc.

Requires knowledge of limitations within the Facility License (FSAR 9B) required to analyze OPERABILITY of the Fire Suppression Water system.

In addition, SOP-0.4, Fire Protection Program Administration Procedure, is used to provide guidance on LCO requirements for a Fire Protection LCO as it applies to the FSAR section 9B.

Page 29 of 51

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 30 of 51 2012 NRC exam A. Conditions and limitations in the facility license. [10 CFR 55.43(b)(1)}

Some examples of SRO exam items for this topic include:

Administration of fire protection program requirements such as compensatory actions associated with inoperable sprinkler systems, fire doors, etc.

Page3Oof5l

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 16 of 25

91. G2.1.8 091/BANK/WATTS BAR 20101M 3.4/4.1/G2.1.8/N///

Unit I has tripped from 100% power with the following conditions:

FRP-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, is in progress.

A Site Area Emergency has been declared by the Emergency Director.

TheJScJs fully staffed and has been declared OPERATIONAL.

A radioactive release is in progress.

ARe-entry is planned to reset the TDAFW trip/throttle valve.

In accordance with EIP-14.0, Personnel Movement, Relocation, Re-entry, and Site Evacuation, which one of the following identifies the actions required to coordinate and dispatch a team to reset the TDAFW trip/throttle valve?

A. A team, will be dispatched from the assembly area in the Main Control Room.

The TSC/OSC will be notified that the team has been dispatched and the teams intended location and action.

B. A team will be dispatched from the assembly area in the Main Control Room.

The TSC/OSC notification is NOT required because the Re-entry is being tracked by the Shift Manager.

C After being notified of the task to be performed, the TSC/OSC staff will assign a team to perform the task. The team will be briefed, dispatched, and tracked by the TSC/OSC.

D. After being notified of the task to be performed, the TSC/OSC staff will dispatch a team to the Main Control Room to be briefed prior to being sent to perform the task.

The team will be tracked by the TSC/OSC.

Page 16 of 25

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 21 of 30

91. G2.l.8 091/BANK/WATTS BAR 2010/M 3.4/4.1/G2.1.8/N//I A. Incorrect Plausible because the Shift Manager can dispatch someone from the Control Room for a Relocation after the TSC is staffed, but not a Re-entry. This answer could be correct for a Relocation.

B. Incorrect Plausible because the Shift Manager can dispatch someone from the Control Room for a Relocation after the TSC is staffed, but not a Re-entry. This answer could be correct for a Relocation.

C.

Correct Per the guidance of FNP-O-EIP-14.O, the Re-entry team will be established, briefed, approved, dispatched, and tracked by the OSC/TSC.

The ED can give verbal approval for the Re-entry and all other actions are performed by the OSC Mgr./ HP Supervisor I Maintenance Supervisor.

D. Incorrect Per the guidance of FNP-O-EIP-14.O, the Re-entry team will be established, briefed, approved, dispatched, and tracked by the OSCITSC.

The individual does not have to report to the Control Room to be briefed.

The ED can give verbal approval for the Re-entry and all other actions are performed by the OSC Mgr.I HP Supervisor I Maintenance Supervisor.

Page 21 of 30

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 31 of 51

91. G2.l.8 091/BANK/WATTS BAR 2010/M 3.4/4.1/G2.1.8/N/I!

G2.1.8 Ability to coordinate personnel activities outside the control room.

(CFR: 41.10/45.5/45.12/45.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.4 SRO 4.1 Importance Rating:

3.4 4.1 Technical

Reference:

FNP-0-EIP-14.0, v26 References provided:

None Learning Objective:

Given a set of plant conditions, EVALUATE those conditions and DETERMINE the emergency responses actions the SM/ED should take to mitigate the consequences of the event. (OPS-63002A01).

Given an emergency scenario, EVALUATE plant conditions and DETERMINE if a reentry, relocation or movement is required. EVALUATE the conditions and DETERMINE dose limits for personnel involved. (OPS-63002D01).

Question origin:

Same as Watts Bar 2010 NRC Exam question #95 Basis for meeting KJA:

Ability to coordinate personnel activities outside the control room is displayed by knowledge of EIP-14.0 and the requirements for performing a Re-Entry after the TSC is fully staffed and OPERATIONAL.

SRO justification:

Ill. Justification for Plant Specific Exemptions UNIQUE to the SRO position:

Justification: A question that is not tied to one of the 10 CFR 55.43(b) items can still be classified as SRO-only provided the licensee has documented evidence to prove that the knowledge/ability is unique to the SRO position at the site.

An example of documented evidence includes:

The question is linked to a learning objective that is specifically labeled in the lesson plan as being SRO-only (e.g., some licensee lesson plans have columns in the margin that differentiate AO, RO, and SRO learning objectives) [NUREG 1021, ES-401, Section D.2.d}

AND/OR

A question is linked to a task that is labeled as an SRO-only task, and the task is NOT listed in the RO task list.

Page 31 of 51

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 32 of 51 The SRO is solely responsible for direction and implementation of the Emergency Plan at FNP, both objectives listed above are SRO only objectives.

2012 NRC exam Ill. Justification for Plant Specific Exemrtions UNIQUE to the SRO position:

DOES NOT MATCH one of the 10 CFR 55.43(b) items but FNP has classified the knowledge/ability as unique to the SRO position as documented within SAT process as ties the knowledge/ability to the licensees SRO job position duties.

Page32ofSl

Laska Question Watts Bar 2010 Thursday, March 01,2012 Page 1 of 1 I. G 2.1.8 195/NEW//LOWER!/SRO/WATTS BAR!08!20 10/NO Given the following:

An ALERT has been declared on Unit 1.

All emergency centers are activated.

Conditions require AUO action to manually isolate 1-ISV-70-700, RCP OIL COOLER CCS RETURN ISOLATION [A4N EL. 710 U-I Penetration room] in accordance with E-0, Reactor Trip Safety Injection, Attachment B3.

In accordance with EPIP-7, Activation and Operation of the Operations Support Center (OSC), which ONE of the following identifies the actions to coordinate and dispatch a team to isolate the valve?

A. OSC Team A stationed in the MCR will be sent to perform the task. The TSC/OSC will be notified that the team has been dispatched and the teams intended location and action.

B. OSC Team A stationed in the MCR will be sent to perform the task.

TSC/OSC notification is not required because the OSC Team A is being tracked as assigned to the MCR.

C After being notified of the task to be performed, the OSC staff will assign a team to perform the task. The team will be briefed, dispatched, and tracked by the OSC.

D. After being notified of the task to be performed, the OSC staff will dispatch a team to the MCR to be briefed prior to being sent to perform the task. The team will be tracked by the OSC.

Page 1 of 1

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 17 of 25

92. G2.2. 1 O92JBANKJFARLEY 2008/C/A 4.5/4.4/G2.2. I /N///

Unit 1 is in MODE 3 preparing to do an initial startup after a core reload lAW UOP-1.2, Startup of Unit from Hot Standby to Minimum Load.

The following conditions exist:

The current RCS boron sample is 1540 ppm.

Both Shutdown banks have been withdrawn.

All RCPs are running and the RCS is at normal operating pressure and temperature.

An Infrequently Performed Test or Evolution (IPTE) brief will be performed for the startup.

FT-I 68, TOTAL MAKEUP FLOW TO CHG/VCT, has FAILED LOW.

The crew is at the step in UOP-I.2 to dilute the RCS to the Hot Shutdown boron concentration.

(1) Which one of the following is the correct method used for diluting per SOP-2.3, Chemical and Volume Control System Reactor Makeup Control System, and (2) Which one of the following is the correct person to conduct the IPTE brief lAW NM P-AD-006, Infrequently Performed Tests and Evolutions?

A.

1) Perform a Manual Makeup to the charging pump suction.

Verify the dilution AUTOMATICALLY stops when batch integrator setpoint is reached.

2) Shift Supervisor B.

1) Perform a Manual Makeup to the charging pump suction.

Verify the dilution AUTOMATICALLY stops when batch integrator setpoint is reached.

2) Engineering Director C. 1) Verify a RMW pump running Open FCVI 14B, RMW to Blender Open FCVI I3B, MKUP TO CHG PUMP SUCTION Manually secure dilution when complete

2) Shift Supervisor D (1)Verifya RMW pump running Open FCV1 14B, RMW to Blender Open FCV1 13B, MKUP TO CHG PUMP SUCTION Manually secure dilution when complete (2) Engineering Director Page 17of25

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 22 of 30

92. G2.2. I 092/BANK/FARLEY 2008/C/A 4.5/4.4/G2.2. 1 /N///

A. Incorrect

1) Incorrect, Plausible because the MANUAL method of Makeup is used for a variety of boration/dilution/blended flow evolutions.

In the situation given, FT-I 68 which is inoperable, would not provide the actual flow to the Flow Indicating Switch FIS-168. FIS-168 would thus not indicate total gallons properly or automatically secure the dilution as required by this method.

2) Incorrect, Plausible, since the SS normally conducts the pre-job briefs.

The SS is required to conduct a PJB after the IPTE brief to fill in the coordination details and additional instructions lAW NMP-AD-006.

Also the Affected Shift Supervisor signs Attachment 1 of NMP-006 giving permission to start the test which ensures that the signatures above for the Senior line manager brief and the test/coordinator brief are correct and conducted lAW with the NMP and are the proper people.

B. Incorrect

1) Incorrect, see A.I

2) Correct, A Senior Line Manager is required to conduct the IPTE brief.

The personnel listed in step 4.2 of NMP-AD-006, qualify:

4.2 Senior Line Manager - The functions of the Senior Line Manager will be performed by one of the following:

Site Vice President

Plant Manager

Engineering Director

Site Support Manager

Department head / line manager - preferred

Operations Superintendent

Maintenance Assistant Manager C. Incorrect

1) Correct, SOP-2.3, App. D, Operation of the Chemical and Volume Control System Reactor Makeup Control System with FIS 168 Total Flow Batch Integrator Unreliable provides procedure guidance for this situation.

It is unique, since all other dilution evolutions utilize the FIS 168 flow integrator. The applicant must realize that if the Flow transmitter is out of commission, so the Flow Indicating Switch will not work either.

2) Incorrect, see A.2.

D.

Correct

1) Correct, see Ci.

2) Correct, see B.2.

Page 22 of 30

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 33 of 51

92. G2.2. 1 092/BANK!FARLEY 2008/C/A 4.5/4.4/G2.2. 1/N/I!

G2.2.1 Ability tofo

-strt cedu for the facility, including operating those controls associated with plant equipment that could affect reactivity.

(CFR:41.5141.10143.5143.6145.l)

IMPORTANCE RD 4.5 SRO 4.4 Importance Rating:

4.5 4.4 Technical

Reference:

FNP-1-SOP-2.3, v58 FNP-1-UOP-1.2, V102 NMP-AD--006, VI 1 References provided:

None Learning Objective:

Define an infrequently performed test or evolution (0PS40502C09).

RELATE AND IDENTIFY the operational characteristics including design features, capacities and protective interlocks for the components associated with the Reactor Makeup Control and Chemical Addition System, to include the following (OPS-40301 G02):

Boric Acid Transfer Pumps Reactor Makeup Water Pumps Makeup to Charging Pump Suction Header, FCV-l I 3B Makeup to VCT, FCV-1 14A Reactor Makeup Water to Boric Acid Blender, FCV-1 14B Boric Acid to Blender, FCV-1 I 3A Emergency Borate Valve, MOV-8104 Manual Emergency Boration valve, V-8439 Chemical Addition System Chemical Mixing Tank and Orifice Boric Acid Blender Reactor Makeup Water Storage Tank Reactor Makeup Water Storage Tank Boric Acid Storage Tanks Inter connections with other systems Emergency Boration flow paths Makeup Mode Selector and Control Switches Boric Acid Batch Integrator, FIS-1 13 Total Flow Batch Integrator, FIS-168 Boric Acid Makeup Flow Controller, FK-113 Primary Water Makeup Flow Controller, FK-1 68 Question origin:

Same as Farley 2008 NRC Exam question #95, FNP Bank question PLT COMM-40502C09 02 Page33of5l

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 34 of 51 Basis for meeting K/A:

UOP-1.2 directs a dilution prior to the Reactor startup which will affect reactivity, and SOP-2.3 gives guidance for this task. This question requires knowledge of the dilution procedure and manipulation of specific controls which will affect reactivity for a condition in which the normal method of dilution does not work.

In addition, UOP-1.2 (a pre-startup procedure) states that This procedure has been identified as involving an infrequently performed test or evolution (IPTE) requiring Senior Line Manager oversight. The question requires knowledge of NMP-AD-006 to decide who will give the IPTE briefing. This is an SRO function and knowledge to make sure the proper administrative requirements are met.

SRO justification:

10 CFR 55.43(b)(5)

Knowledge of administrative procedures that specify hierarchy, implementation, and/or coordination of plant normal, abnormal, and emergency procedures.

NMP-AD-006 provides guidance on performing IPTE briefs.

UOP-1.2 states that an IPTE brief is required. SRO knowledge is required to implement and coordinate the requirements of NMP-AD-006, while performing UOP-1.2 for a Reactor startup. Conducting an IPTE brief, when an IPTE brief is required, and qualifications for conducting an IPTE brief are all part of NMP-AD-006 and are SRO knowledge.

2012 NRC exam From the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev I dated 03/11/2010 flowchart for 10 CFR 55.43(b)(5):

Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations [10 CFR 55.43(b)(5)], involving BOTH:

1) assessing plant conditions and then 2) selecting a procedure or section of a procedure to mitigate, recover, or with which to proceed.

Using the flowchart, this question can:

NOT be answered solely by knowing systems knowledge, i.e., how the system works, flowpath, logic, component location.

NOT be answered solely by knowing immediate operator actions.

NOT be answered solely by knowing entry conditions for AOPs or plant parameters that require direct entry to major EOPs.

NOT be answered solely by knowing the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigative strategy of a procedure.

be answered with knowledge of ONE or MORE of the following:

Knowledge of administrative procedures that specify hierarchy, implementation, Page 34 of 51

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 35 of 51 and/or coordination of plant normal, abnormal, and emergency procedures.

Page 35 of 51

Original Bank 2008 Farley NRC Question Thursday, March 01, 2012 Page 1 of 1

1. PLT COMM-40502C09 002!HLT!SRO/C/A 4.5!4.4/G2.2. 11//l Unit 1 is in MODE 3 preparing to do an initial startup after a core reload lAW UOP-1.2, Startup of Unit from Hot Standby to Minimum Load, and STP-1 01, Zero Power Reactor Physics Testing.

The following conditions exist:

The current RCS boron sample is 1540 ppm.

Both Shutdown banks have been withdrawn.

All RCPs are running and the RCS is at normal operating pressure and temperature.

FT-i 68, TOTAL MAKEUP FLOW TO CHG/VCT, has failed LOW.

The crew is at the step in UOP-i.2 to dilute the RCS to the Hot Shutdown boron concentration.

The crew is also preparing to conduct a brief for an infrequently performed test or evolution (IPTE).

Which one of the following is the correct method used for diluting per SOP-2.3, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System, and which one of the following is the correct person to conduct the IPTE brief lAW NMP-AD-006, Infrequently Performed Tests and Evolutions?

A.

Perform a Manual Makeup to the charging pump suction. Verify the dilution automatically stops when batch integrator setpoint is reached.

Shift Supervisor.

B.

Perform a Manual Makeup to the charging pump suction. Verify the dilution automatically stops when batch integrator setpoint is reached.

Engineering Director C.

Verify a RMW pump running; open RMW to Blender, FCV1 14B; Open MKUP TO CHG PUMP SUCTION, FCVI i3B; estimate the flow by VCT level rise; and calculate time for dilution, manually secure dilution when complete.

Shift Supervisor.

Verify a RMW pump running; open RMW to Blender, FCV1 14B; Open MKUP TO CHG PUMP SUCTION, FCV1 1 3B; estimate the flow by VCT level rise; and calculate time for dilution, manually secure dilution when complete.

Engineering Director Page 1 of 1

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 18 of 25

93. G2.2. 15 0931M0D/FAP 1

LEY 2008/M 3.9/4.3/G2.2. 15/N//I During a system 2ragout, a Motor-Operated Valve (MOV) was manually closed (locally at the valve) and its breaker was turned OFF. (Both the handwheel and the breaker were included on the Tagout.)

The MOV is a normally closed valve, whose function is to automatically open on a Safety Injection signal.

The maintenance was completed and the Tagout was subsequently cleared.

The following conditions currently exist:

The MOV is closed.

No work was performed on the MOV.

The MOV power supply is on and the GREEN valve position light is illuminated.

Which one of the following identifies the status of the MOV and the post maintenance testing requirements in accordance with SOP-O.O, General Instructions to Operations Personnel?

A The MOV is NOT OPERABLE. The MOV must be electrically stroked one full cycle.

B. The MOV is OPERABLE. Remote observation of valve stroking is allowed.

C. The MOV is OPERABLE. Local observation of valve stroking is required.

D. The MOV is NOT OPERABLE. A system flow test is required.

Page 18of25

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 23 of 30

93. G2.2. 15 093/MOD/FARLEY 2008/M 3.9/4.3/G2.2. 15/N/I!

A. Correct The valve is inoperable until electrically cycling the valve one full cycle, and that will allow clearing the LCO per FNP-O-SOP-O.O, Step 15.5.7.

B. Incorrect Plausible since during refueling outages, the MOV team performs stroke tests on many MOVs. If no adjustments are made to the valve, it is operable after power is restored. The Post Maintenance test requirement is to remotely observe the proper valve stroke.

C. Incorrect Plausible, because this would be true for some maintenance or preventive maintenance activities. During refueling outages, all valve strokes are observed locally for the appropriate Surveillance Test. If the valve was not manually stroked, and no work was performed on the valve or operator, it would be considered operable when power was restored. De-energizing and then re-energizing a MOV in and of itself, does not make the valve inoperable.

D. Incorrect Plausible because the valve is not operable, and some Surveillance tests for MOVs do require a system flow test. Under these conditions a system flow test is not required.

Page23of3O

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Thursday, March 01, 2012 Page 1 of 2

93. G2.2.15 093/MOD/PARLEY 2008/M 3.9/4.3/G2.2.15/N///

G2.2.15 2.2.15 Ability to determine the expected plant configuration using design and configuration control documentation, such as (CFR: 41.10/43.3/45.13)

IMPORTANCE RD 3.9 SRO 4.3 Importance Rating:

3.9 4.3 Technical

Reference:

FNP-0-SOP-0.0 Version 149.1 References provided:

None Learning Objective:

Given a set of Plant Conditions ASSESS those conditions and DETERMINE the ability of plant equipment and structures to meet their intended, designated function (OPS-52302A06)

Question origin:

Modified from Farley 2008 NRC Exam question #96, FNP Bank question INTRO TS-52302A06 04 Basis for meeting K/A:

This question tests an SROs ability to determine the configuration (operability) of a valve from actions taken on a configuration control document (Tagout), as it relates to the valve performing its design safety function.

SRO justification:

10 CFR 55.43(b) (5)

Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

Knowledge of administrative procedures that specify hierarchy, implementation, and/or coordination of plant normal, abnormal, and emergency procedures.

This question tests the SRO knowledge of the administrative requirements (from SOP-0.0) that assist an SRO in determining operability of a component, and whether additional Post Maintenance Testing actions are required to establish operability. A TS evaluation has to be performed to determine operability of the component, but an in depth knowledge of SOP-0.0 is required since it is not information that is provided by the TS Bases. Manually stroking an MOV makes the MOV inoperable, and the SRO has to determine the actions required to clear the LCD and return the MOV to OPERABLE status. This is an SRO only function, since it requires an OPERABILITY determination.

Page 1 of 2

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Thursday, March01, 2012 Page 2 of 2 2012 NRC exam From the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev 1 dated 03/11/2010 flowchart for 10 CFR 55.43(b)(5):

Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations [10 CFR 55.43(b)(5)], involving BOTH:

1) assessing plant conditions and then 2) selecting a procedure or section of a procedure to mitigate, recover, or with which to proceed.

Using the flowchart, this question can:

NOT be answered solely by knowing systems knowledge, i.e., how the system works, flowpath, logic, component location.

NOT be answered solely by knowing immediate operator actions.

NOT be answered solely by knowing entry conditions for AOPs or plant parameters that require direct entry to major EOPs.

NOT be answered solely by knowing the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigative strategy of a procedure.

be answered with knowledge of ONE or MORE of the following:

Knowledge of administrative procedures that specify hierarchy, implementation, and/or coordination of plant normal, abnormal, and emergency procedures.

Page 2of2

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 19 of 25

94. G2.3. 11 094/NEW/fM 3.8/4.3/G2.3.1 1/N//I Unit I is at 100% power with the following conditions:

At 10:00:

R-14, PLANT VENT, radiation monitor is INOPERABLE.

4 Waste Gas Decay Tank (WGDT) release is in progress.

8 WGDT has high activity and is at 60 psig.

At 10:15:

8 WGDT relief valve fails open.

The crew closes RCV-14.

Which one of the following completes the statements below?

For release of #4 WGDT with R-14 INOPERABLE, the ODCM requires sampling by analyzing (1)

The #8 WGDT relief discharge (2) isolated when RCV-14, GDT DISCH TO PLANT VENT, is closed.

A.

1) an initial sample prior to the release and then a grab sample once every 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months when a release is in progress

2) IS B.

1) an initial sample prior to the release and then a grab sample once every 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months when a release is in progress

2) is NOT C. 1) two independent samples prior to release

2) IS ED 1) two independent samples prior to release

2) is NOT Page 19of25

25 SRO QUESTIONS VerS Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 24 of 30

94. G2.3. 11 094/NEW/!M 3.814.3/G2.3. 11/N//I Per the ODCM, Table 3-1, Condition 2a, either R-14 or R-22 has to be operable for a Continuous release from the Plant Vent Stack. That is met by R-22 being operable, so Action 37 is not required ACTION 37

- Wfth the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, effluent releases via this pathway may continue provided grab samples are taken at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months and these samples are analyzed for gross activity within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

ODCM, Table 3-1, Condition 3 is not met due to R-14 being out of service, so Action 35 is required when releasing a WGDT ACTION 35

- With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, the contents of the tank(s) may be released to the environment provided that prior to initiating the release:

a. At least two independent samples of the tanks contents are analyzed, and

b. At least two technically qualified members of the Facility Staff independently verify the discharge line valving, and (1) Verify the manual portion of the computer input for the release rate calculations performed on the computer, or (2) Verify the entire release rate calculations if such calculations are performed manually.

Otherwise, suspend release of radioactive effluents via this pathway.

This question targets the sampling requirements per the ODCM for releasing a WGDT, along with systems knowledge of the relief flowpath.

A. Incorrect

1) Incorrect, this describes requirements similar to the ODCM for actions of R-14 AND R-22 inoperable, and a continuous release from the Plant Vent Stack.

2) Incorrect, the relief on the #8 WGDT goes directly to the Plant Vent Stack. There are no isolation valves in the line. If a relief lifts, it will not be isolated by RCV-14. Plausible since #1-6 WGDTs have a relief that discharges to the #8 WGDT. This relief is then routed to just downstream of RCV-14 isolation valve.

B. Incorrect

1) Incorrect, seeA.1.

2) Correct, the release from #8 WGDT will not be stopped.

C. Incorrect

1) Correct, the ODCM Action 35 requires At least two independent samples of the tanks contents are analyzed.

2) Incorrect, see A.2.

D.

Correct

1) Correct, See C.1.

2) Correct, See B.2.

Page 24 of 30

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 38 of 51

94. G2.3. 11 O94JNEW//M 3.8/4.3/G2.3. 11/N//I G2.3.1 I 2.3.11 Ability to control radiation releases.

(CFR: 41.11 /43.4 /45.10)

IMPORTANCE RD 3.8 SRO 4.3 Importance Rating:

3.8 4.3 Technical

Reference:

ODCM, Version 24 Drawing D175042 sh. 6 v33 References provided:

None Learning Objective:

RECALL AND APPLY the information from the LCD BASES sections: BACKGROUND, APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSIS, ACTIONS, SURVEILLENCE REQUIREMENTS, for any Technical Specifications or TRM requirements associated with Waste Gas System components and attendant equipment alignment, to include the following (OPS-62106B01): 10CFR55.43 (b) 2 13.12.1, Waste Gas Monitoring Instrumentation 13.12.3, Waste Gas Monitoring 13.12.4, Gas Storage Tanks Question origin:

New question.

Basis for meeting K/A:

The SRO must display knowledge of effective actions required to terminate a release when a high radiation condition occurs during a release. In addition, SRO knowledge is required for actions to initiate a release when a rad monitor is inoperable. The ODCM provides actions required to perform a release when a radiation monitor becomes inoperable. This question provides a scenario in which the release cannot be continued until ODCM actions are accomplished as determined by the SRO. The applicant must display ability to perform actions for a radioactive release.

SRO justification:

10 CFR 55.43(b)(2):

Application of Required Actions (Section 3) and Surveillance Requirements (SR) (Section 4) in accordance with rules of application requirements (Section 1).

Same items listed above for the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) and Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM).

Page 38 of 51

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 39 of 51 Requires application of REQUIRED ACTIONS of the ODCM.

2012 NRC exam From the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev 1 dated 03/11/2010 flowchart for 10 CFR 55.43(b)(2)

1) can NOT be answered by knowing less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Tech Specs.

2) can NOT be answered by knowing information listed above-the-line.

3) can NOT be answered by knowing the TS Safety Limits or their bases.

4) Does involve one or more of the following for TS, TRM or ODCM:

Application of Required Actions (Section 3) and Surveillance Requirements (SR)

(Section 4) in accordance with rules of application requirements (Section 1)..

Page 39 of 51

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 20 of 25

95. 02.3.4 095/BANKJHAkRIS 2009/M 3.2/3.7/02.3.4/N//I A General Emergency has been declared for the Plant Site.

Which one of the following completes the statements below?

The MAXI MUM exposure th adiation--worker--can-be-required-to receive for a life saving mission during a declared emergency is (1)

REM TEDE.

The-LOWEST level of-author1ty---thatcan-authori-ze--this-dose is the (2)

(1)

(2)

A.

10 HP Supervisor B.

25 HP Supervisor C

25 Emergency Director (ED)

D.

10 Emergency Director (ED) 0 Page 20 of 25

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 25 of 30

95. G2.3.4 095/BANK/HARRIS 2009/M 3.2/3.7/G2.3.4/N///

A. Incorrect

1) Incorrect, 10 REM TEDE is plausible because this is the limit for Protecting Valuable Property, but for saving a life, 25 REM can be required.

2) Incorrect, Plausible because the HP Supervisor can give approval to exceed plant administrative dose limits, but not IOCFR2O limits.

B. Incorrect

1) Correct, per EIP-14.

2) Incorrect, see A.2.

C.

Correct

1) Correct, see B.1.

2) Correct, per EIP-14, the ED has to approve exceeding 10CFR2O limits.

D. Incorrect

1) Incorrect, seeA.1.

2) Correct, see C.2.

Page 25 of 30

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 40 of 51

95. G2.3.4 095/BANKIHARRIS 2009/M 3.2/3.71G2.3.4/NI/I G2.3.4 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions.

(CFR: 41.12/43.4/45.10)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.2 SRO 3.7 Importance Rating:

3.2 3.7 Technical

Reference:

FNP-0-EIP-14.0, v26 References provided:

None Learning Objective:

Given an emergency scenario, EVALUATE plant conditions and DETERMINE if a reentry, relocation or movement is required. EVALUATE the conditions and DETERMINE dose limits for personnel involved. (OPS-63002D01).

Question origin:

Same as Harris December 2009 NRC Exam question #97 Basis for meeting K/A:

Knowledge of Emergency radiation exposure limits per EIP-14.0 is demonstrated by this question.

SRO justification:

III. Justification for Plant Specific Exemptions UNIQUE to the SRO position:

Justification: A question that is not tied to one of the 10 CFR 55.43(b) items can still be classified as SRO-only provided the licensee has documented evidence to prove that the knowledge/ability is unique to the SRO position at the site.

An example of documented evidence includes:

The question is linked to a learning objective that is specifically labeled in the lesson plan as being SRO-only (e.g., some licensee lesson plans have columns in the margin that differentiate AO, RO, and SRO learning objectives) [NUREG 1021, ES-401, Section D.2.d}

AND/OR

A question is linked to a task that is labeled as an SRO-only task, and the task is NOT listed in the RO task list.

The SRO is solely responsible for direction and implementation of the Emergency Plan at FNP, including approving emergency dose limits. The objective listed above is an SRO only objective.

2012 NRC exam Page 40 of 51

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 41 of 51 Ill. Justification for Plant Specific Exemptions UNIQUE to the SRO position:

DOES NOT MATCH one of the 10 CFR 55.43(b) items but FNP has classified the knowledge/ability as unique to the SRO position as documented within SAT process as ties the knowledge/ability to the licensees SRO job position duties.

Page 41 of 51

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 21 of 25

96. G2.4.18 096/BANKIVOGTLE 201 1IM 3.3/4.0/G2.4.18/N///

FRP-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, is in progress on Unit 1 with the following conditions:

The operators are initiating RCS Bleed and Feed.

PCV-444B, PRZR PORV, and its associated Block Valve are OPEN.

PCV-445A, PRZR PORV, will NOT open.

Restoration of SG feed capability is imminent.

Which one of the following completes the statements below?

Per FRP-H.1, opening ONLY one PORV (1) provide sufficient RCS bleed flow to permit adequate RCS heat removal.

After SG feed flow is restored (2)

(1)

(2)

A.

WILL immediately go to EEP-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant B.

will NOT immediately go to EEP-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant C.

WILL remain in FRP-H.1 until at least one SG narrow range level is >31%

D will NOT remain in FRP-H.1 until at least one SG narrow range level is >31%

Page 21 of 25

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 26 of 30

96. G2.4.18 096/BANK!VOGTLE 201 1IM 3.3/4.01G2.4.181N!//

A. Incorrect

1) Incorrect, FRP-H.1 requires opening Rx Head Vents if only one PORV is opened. Per the background document for H.1, opening two PORVs ensures that sufficient depressurization of the RCS can occur for High Head Injection flow to provide core cooling.

2) Incorrect, Plausible because once SG feed flow is restored, the candidate has to take actions to stop the depressurization. There is effectively a LOCA in progress, so EEP-1 would be a logical transition. In addition, in FRP-H1, EEP-1 is one of the transitions out of H.1 if RCS pressure is not restored after closing PORVs and Head Vents.

B. Incorrect

1) Correct, per FRP-H.1 Bases. Opening two PORVs is required to ensure adequate Core cooling is maintained.

2) Incorrect, see A.2.

C. Incorrect

1) Incorrect, seeA.1.

2) Correct, per FRP-H.1 the operator is required to stay in Hi until at least one SG level is above 31%. This is to ensure that conditions for entering H.1 are not met as soon as it is exited.

D.

Correct

1) Correct, see Bi.

2) Correct, see C.2.

Page 26 of 30

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 42 of 51

96. G2.4.18 096/BANKIVOGTLE 201 1IM 3.3/4.0/G2.4.18!N!//

G2.4.18 Knowledge of the specific bases for EOPs.

(CFR: 41.10 /43.1 / 45.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.3 SRO 4.0 Importance Rating:

3.3 4.0 Technical

Reference:

FNP-1-FRP-H.1, v27 FNP-0-FRB-H.1, v3 References provided:

None Learning Objective:

ASSESS the facility conditions associated with the (1)

FRP-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink; (2)

FRP-H.2, Response to SG Overpressure; (3) FRP-H.3, Response to SG High Level; (4) FRP-H.4, Response to Loss of Normal Steam Release Capabilities; (5) FRP-H.5, Response to SG Low Level, and based on that assessment:

(OPS-62533F01)

SELECT the appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal and emergency situations. 10CFR55.43 (b) 5

DETERMINE if transition to another section of the procedure or to another procedure is required

DETERMINE if the critical safety functions are satisfied Question origin:

Same as Vogtle 2011 NRC Exam, Question #99 Basis for meeting K/A:

The candidate is presented with a scenario where RCS Bleed and Feed is required with the inability to open one PORV. Background knowledge of FRP-H.1 is required to know that opening one PORV does not provide sufficient RCS depressurization to ensure that adequate core cooling can be maintained. Per the WOG Background documents, both PORVs must be open to ensure adequate heat removal is provided.

SRO justification:

10 CFR 55.43(b)(5)

Assessing plant conditions (normal, abnormal, or emergency) and then selecting a procedure or section of a procedure to mitigate, recover, or with which to proceed.

The applicants knowledge can be evaluated at the level of 10 CFR55.43(b)(5) by ensuring that the additional knowledge of the procedures content is required to correctly answer the written test item, for example:

Knowledge of diagnostic steps and decision points in the Page 42 of 51

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 43 of 51 emergency operating procedures (EOP) that involve transitions to event specific subprocedures or emergency contingency procedures.

2012 NRC exam From the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev 1 dated 03/11/2010 flowchart for 10 CFR 55.43(b)(5):

Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations [10 CFR 55.43(b)(5)], involving BOTH:

1) assessing plant conditions and then 2) selecting a procedure or section of a procedure to mitigate, recover, or with which to proceed.

Using the flowchart, this question can:

NOT be answered solely by knowing systems knowledge, i.e., how the system works, flowpath, logic, component location.

NOT be answered solely by knowing immediate operator actions.

NOT be answered solely by knowing entry conditions for AOPs or plant parameters that require direct entry to major EOPs.

NOT be answered solely by knowing the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigative strategy of a procedure.

be answered with knowledge of ONE or MORE of the following:

Knowledge of diagnostic steps and decision points in the emergency operating procedures (EOP) that involve transitions to event specific subprocedures or emergency contingency procedures.

Page 43 of 51

99. G2.4. 18 003/31N/AIEOP BASISJ4.O CIAJNEWIINRCIGCW 19231-C, FR-Hi, Response To Loss of Secondary Heat Sink is in effect.

- All SG WR levels are - 8%.

- PORV 455 and associated Block Valve are open.

- PORV 456 Block Valve is shut and cannot be opened.

- All Reactor Vessel Head Vent valves are open.

- All CCPs and SIPs are running.

- CETs are 562°F and stable.

- Restoration of feed capability is imminent.

Which ONE of the following is CORRECT regarding:

1) the current RCS bleed path, and

2) the proper procedural action to take when feed flow is restored?

RCS Bleed Path Feed Restoration A. adequate remain in 19231-C until at least one SG NR level >10%

B. adequate immediately exit to 19010-C, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant C not adequate remain in 19231-C until at least one SG NR level> 10%

D. not adequate immediately exit to 19010-C, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant Page: 196 of 199 4/13/2011

2.4 Emergency Procedures I Plan 2.4.18 Knowledge of the specific bases for EOPs.

(CFR: 41.101 431 l 4513>

KIA MATCH ANALYSIS The candidate is presented with a scenario where RCS feed and bleed is required with the inability to open one PORV and RCS Head Vents are in open. In addition, when feed capability is restored with Hot Dry SGs he must determine how many SGs to feed.

The information regarding this is found in the WOG Background Documents for FR-Hi Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.

SRQ 10CFR55.43 (b5)

ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Incorrect. Per WOG BG documents, both PORVs must be open for adequate heat removal. Crew must remain in 19231 until feed and bleed is terminated.

8. Incorrect. Per WOG BG documents, both PORVs must be open for adequate heat removal. Crew must remain in 19231 until feed, and bleed is terminated.

C. Correct. Per WOG BG documents, both PORVs must be open for adequate heat removal. Crew must remain in 19231 until feed and bleed is terminated and SG NR level is> 10%.

D. Incorrect. Bleed path is inadequate and Crew must remain in 19231 until feed and bleed is terminated.

REFERENCES FR-Hi, WOG Background Documents for Loss of Secondary Heat Sink V-LO-HO-37051, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink VEGP learning objectives:

LO-LP-37051 -05, State th precautions which should be taken in feeding a hot, dry steam following recovery from a loss of heat sink accident.

LO-LP-37051-08, Using EOP 19231 as a guide, briefly describe how each major step is accomplished. Describe the bases for each. (commitment).

Page: 197 of 199 4/13/2011

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 22 of 25

97. G2.4.32 097/MOD/TURKEY PT 2010/C/A 3.6/4.0/G2.4.32/N/EMERG CLASS//

Unit 2 is at 100% power with the following conditions:

A problem in the Cable Spreading Room has caused an unplanned loss of ALL Main Control Board Annunciators AOP-35.0, Loss of Main Control Board Annunciators, is in progress.

An Emergency declaration is being evaluated per NMP-EP-110, Emergency Classification Determination and n itial Action.

Which one of the following completes the statements below?

A NOUE classification is required when there is an unplanned loss of jJ, MOB Annunciators for a MINIMUM of (1) minutes.

Upon a loss of annunciator MHI, FIRE, AOP-35.0 requires establishing (2) within one hour.

(1)

(2)

A.

15 hourly fire watches in all affected zones B

15 a Pyrotronics panel firewatch C.

30 hourly fire watches in all affected zones D.

30 a Pyrotronics panel firewatch Page 22 of 25

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 27 of 30

97. G2.4.32 097/MOD/TURKEY PT 2010/CIA 3.6/4.0/G2.4.32/N/EMERG CLASS//

NOUE classification is required for the following:

UNPLANNED loss of most OR all (approximately 75% of the MCB annunciators) OR indicators associated with safety systems for greater than 15 minutes.

AOP-35.0, Loss of Main Control Board Annunciators 8.0 IF FIRE annunciator MH1 is inoperable, THEN establish pyrotronics panel firewatch within one hour.

A. Incorrect

1) Correct, a loss of all Annunciators for> 15 minutes would be a NOUE.

2) Incorrect, plausible because this is similar to the requirement for the Pyrotronics panel being out of service. If the Pyrotronics panel is removed from service, hourly and continuous fire watches have to be established in the zones covered by the Pyrotronics panel.

B. Correct

1) Correct, see A.1.

2) Correct, a Pyrotronics panel firewatch is required within one hour per AOP-35, step 8.0.

C. Incorrect

1) Incorrect, a loss of all Annunciators for> 15 minutes would be a NOUE.

Plausible because there is no transient in progress and some classifications do have a 30 minute requirement

- HA4 #2 from the hot matrix, CGI #2 from the cold matrix, etc.

2) Incorrect, see A.2.

D. Incorrect

1) Incorrect, see C.1.

2) Correct, see B.2.

Page 27 of 30

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 44 of 51

97. G2.4.32 097/MOD/TURKEY PT 2010/C/A 3.6/4.0/G2.4.32/N/EMERG CLASS//

G2.4.32 Knowledge of operator response to lossof 1

ii)nnunciators.

(CFR:41.10/43.5/45.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.6 SRO 4.0 Importance Rating:

3.6 4.0 Technical

Reference:

NMP-EP-110-GLO1, v2 FNP-0-SOP-0.4, v83.2 FNP-2-AOP-35.0 v8 References provided:

None Learning Objective:

Using plant procedures/references, ANALYZE a set of plant conditions and DETERMINE the proper classification of the emergency condition as being a NOUE, Alert, Site Area, or General Emergency. (OPS-63002C01).

ANALYZE plant conditions and DETERMINE the successful completion of any step in AOP-35.0, Loss of MCB Annunciators. (OPS-52521 M07)

Question origin:

Modified from Turkey Point 2010 NRC Exam, Question #99.

Basis for meeting K/A:

Question tests the knowledge of the SRO response to a loss of all annunciators. A loss of annunciators is criteria for an Emergency classification and the SRO is tested on his knowledge of when NOUE conditions are met. In addition, the candidate is tested on the specific actions of a loss of annunciator MH1, FIRE, per AOP-35.0.

SRO justification:

III. Justification for Plant Specific Exemptions UNIQUE to the SRO position:

Justification: A question that is not tied to one of the 10 CFR 55.43(b) items can still be classified as SRO-only provided the licensee has documented evidence to prove that the knowledge/ability is unique to the SRO position at the site. An example of documented evidence includes:

The question is linked to a learning objective that is specifically labeled in the lesson plan as being SRO-only (e.g., some licensee lesson plans have columns in the margin that differentiate AO, RO, and SRO learning objectives) [NUREG 1021, ES-401, Section D.2.d]

AND/OR

A question is linked to a task that is labeled as an Page 44 of 51

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 45 of 51 SRO-only task, and the task is NOT listed in the RO task list.

The SRO is solely responsible for determining Classifications at FNP, the first objective listed above is an SRO only objectives.

In addition, 10 CFR 55.43(b)(1)

Conditions and limitations in the facility license.

Administration of fire protection program requirements such as compensatory actions associated with inoperable sprinkler systems, fire doors, etc.

There are compensatory administrative actions required within one hour for the inoperable annunciator MH1, FIRE.

2012 NRC exam III. Justification for Plant Specific Exemptions UNIQUE to the SRO position:

DOES NOT MATCH one of the 10 CFR 55.43(b) items but FNP has classified the knowledge/ability as unique to the SRO position as documented within SAT process as ties the knowledge/ability to the licensees SRO job position duties.

10 CFR 55.43(b)(1)

Conditions and limitations in the facility license.

Administration of fire protection program requirements such as compensatory actions associated with inoperable sprinkler systems, firedoors, etc.

Page 45 of 51

TURKEY POINT 2010 NRC EXAM (I)

A.

15 minutes B.

15 minutes C.

30 minutes D.

30 minutes (2)

Hot Ring Down Emergency Notification System Hot Ring Down Emergency Notification System Question 99 Which ONE of the following completes both of the following statements?

An Unusual Event is an unplanned loss of Safety System Annunciation or Indication in the Control Room for at least (1) or longer.

If an Unusual Event is declared, the Communicator will use the (2)

Phone to contact the State Warning Point.

TURKEY POINT 2010 NRC EXAM Question 99 K/A G2.4.32 Knowledge of operator response to loss of all annunciators CFR/IR 43.5 3.6/4.0

Reference:

1. Turkey Point EAL Classification Tables Hot Conditions p. 2 rev.

07/09/10

2. 0-EPIP-20134 section 4.0 rev. 11/10/08 Classification required by 1230 and should be made as soon as determined the loss of annunciators will exceed 15 minutes. The HRD is used to notify the SWP; the ENS is used to notify the NRC.

Question history:

New Correct answer: C A.

Incorrect AW above discussion. Plausible PTN implemented the new classifications this year. Before that, the expectation was the SM would wait the required times before making a classification.

B.

Incorrect lAW above discussion. Plausible PTN implemented the new classifications this year. Before that, the expectation was the SM would wait the required times before making a classification. The HRD and ENS are listed in EPIP-20134.

C.

Correct lAW above discussion.

D.

Incorrect lAW above discussion. Plausible The HRD and ENS are listed in EPIP-20134.

Cog / LOD: Comprehension or Analysis / 2 Lesson and objective: 6900041 E04

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 23 of 25

98. WEO4EG2A.9 098/NEW//C/A 3.8/4.2/WIEO4EG2.4.9/TS 3.4.6//I The following conditions exist on Unit 1:

At 10:00:

lB RHR pump is running in a cooldown alignment.

1A RHR pump is in standby.

RCS temperature is 300°F.

All Reactor Coolant Pumps have been Tagged Out.

At 10:10:

Water is leaking into the 1 B RHR pump room.

NE2, lB RHR PUMP RM SUMP LVL HI-HI OR TRBL, is in alarm on the BOP Panel.

RCS pressure is going down.

Pressurizer level is going down.

Which one of the following completes the statements below?

The leak will be terminated by performing the actions of (1)

Actions required by Tech Spec 3.4.6, RCS Loops

- Mode 4, after procedural actions are complete, are to be in Mode 5 in a maximum of (2)

REFERENCE PROVIDED (1)

(2)

A. ECP-1.2, LOCA Outside Containment 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months B AOP-12.0, Residual Heat Removal 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months System Malfunction C. ECP-1.2, LOCA Outside Containment 26 hours3.009259e-4 days 0.00722 hours 4.298942e-5 weeks 9.893e-6 months D. AOP-12.0, Residual Heat Removal 26 hours3.009259e-4 days 0.00722 hours 4.298942e-5 weeks 9.893e-6 months System Malfunction Page 23 of 25

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 28 of 30

98. WEO4EG2.4.9 098/NEW//C/A 3.8/4.2/W/EO4EG2.4.9/TS 3.4.6//I TS 3.4.6 note:

NOTES

1. All reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) and RHR pumps may not be in operation for = 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months per 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months period provided:

a. No operations are permitted that would cause reduction of the RCS boron concentration; and

b. Core outlet temperature is maintained at least 10°F below saturation temperature.

A. Incorrect

1) Incorrect, per SOP-0.8, EEP-0 is not applicable in Mode 4. Plausible because EEP-0 does not specify applicable modes and is normally the entry point when a major RCS leak is encountered. In addition, TS 3.3.2, ESF Actuation System Instrumentation, requires Manual initiation of SI to be available until Mode 5 (<200°F) is entered. SI is available for the current conditions.

2) Correct, TS 3.4.6 requires being in Mode 5 within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

B. Correct

1) Correct, AOP-1 2 actions are applicable for an RCS leak or RHR pump trip in Mode 4.

2) Correct, see A.2.

C. Incorrect

1) Incorrect, see A.1.

2) Incorrect, Plausible because TS 3.4.6 has a Note that allows all RHR and RCPs to be secured for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months per 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months period. A candidate could determine that Mode 5 is required in 26 hours3.009259e-4 days 0.00722 hours 4.298942e-5 weeks 9.893e-6 months instead of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

TS Bases knowledge is required to know that the note specifically applies to performance of Surveillance tests.

D. Incorrect

1) Correct, see B.1.

2) Incorrect, see C.2.

Page 28 of 30

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 46 of 51

98. WEO4EG2.4.9 098/NEW//C/A 3.8/4.21W/EO4EG2.4.9/TS 3.4.6//I WEO4EG2.4.9 LOCA Outside Containment 2.4.9 Knowledge of low power/shutdown implications in accident (e.g., loss of coolant accident or loss of residual heat removal) mitigation strategies.

(CFR: 41.10/43.5/45.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.8 SRO 4.2 Importance Rating:

3.8 4.2 Technical

Reference:

FNP-1 -AOP-1 2.0, v24 FNP-1-EEP-0.0, v43 FNP-0-SOP-0.8, v20 Tech Specs, v186 Tech Spec Bases, v53 References provided:

Tech Spec 3.4.6 page 3.4.6-1 and 3.4.6-2 Learning Objective:

RECALL AND APPLY the information from the LCO BASES sections: BACKGROUND, APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSIS, ACTIONS, SURVEILLENCE REQUIREMENTS, for any Technical Specifications or TRM requirements associated with the Residual Heat Removal System components and attendant equipment alignment, to include the following (OPS-62101K01): 10CFR55.43 (b) 2 3.4.3, RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits 3.4.6, RCS Loops MODE 4 3.4.7, RCS Loops

- MODE 5, Loops Filled 3.4.8, RCS Loops

- MODE 5, Loops Not Filled 3.4.12, Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP)

System 3.4.14, RCS Pressure Isolation Valve (PIV) Leakage 3.5.2, ECCS Operating 3.5.3, ECCS Shutdown 3.9.4, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation

- High Water Level 3.9.5, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation

- Low Water Level 13.5.1, Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

Question origin:

New question.

Basis for meeting K/A:

For this question, a LOCA outside Containment has occurred. The candidate has to determine the proper procedure application for the current conditions, which is different than the procedural flowpath for normal, 100%

power applications

- knowledge of accident mitigation Page 46 of 51

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 47 of 51 strategies during low power/shutdown conditions. Accident mitigation strategies change when changing from Mode 3 to Mode 4.

SRO justification:

10 CFR 55.43(b)(2)

Knowedge of TS bases that is required to analyze TS required actions and terminology.

TS 3.4.6 has a Note that allows all RHR and RCPs to be secured for < 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months per 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months period. A candidate could determine that Mode 5 is required in 26 hours3.009259e-4 days 0.00722 hours 4.298942e-5 weeks 9.893e-6 months instead of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . TS Bases knowledge is required to know that the note specifically applies to performance of Surveillance Tests.

2012 NRC exam 10 CFR 55.43(b)(2)

Facility operating limitations in the TS and their bases.

From the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev I dated 03/11/2010 flowchart:

1) can NOT be answered by knowing less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Tech Specs.

2) can NOT be answered solely by knowing information listed above-the-line.

3) can NOT be answered by knowing the TS Safety Limits or their bases.

4) Does involve one or more of the following for TS, TRM or ODCM:

Knowledge of TS bases that is required to analyze TS required actions and terminology.

Page 47 of 51

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 24 of 25

99. WE 1 OEA2.2 099/BANK/FARLEY 2010/C/A 3.4/3.9/W/E 1 OEA2.2/ESP-0.2 ATTACH3///

Unit I is performing a natural circulation cooldown in accordance with ESP-0.2, Natural Circulation Cooldown to Prevent Reactor Vessel Head Steam Voiding. The following conditions exist:

RCS cold leg temperatures are 525°F.

RCS pressure is 1900 psig.

1A and lB CRDM fans are running.

RCPs 1A, IB, and IC are tripped and can NOT be restarted.

CST level is 10.0 ft.

AFW flow is 350 gpm RCS cooldown rate is 5°F/hr.

PZieveLisstableat25%.

RVLIS is NOT available Which one of the following is the correct response lAW ESP-0.2 and the MAXIMUM permitted cooldown rate to lower TcoLD to 500°F?

Procedure names are as follows:

ESP-0.2, Natural Circulation Cooldown to Prevent Reactor Vessel Head Steam Voiding ESP-0.4, Natural Circulation Cooldown With Allowance For Reactor Vessel Head Steam Voiding(Without RVLIS)

\\

REFERENCE PROVIDED A.

Continue with ESP-0.2.

The maximum cooldown rate is < 50°F/hr.

B.

Continue with ESP-0.2.

The maximum cooldown rate is 100°F in any 60 minute period.

C

Transition to ESP-0.4.

The maximum cooldown rate is < 50°F/hr.

D.

Transition to ESP-0.4.

The maximum cooldown rate is 100°F in any 60 minute period.

Page24of25

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 29 of 30

99. WE1OEA2.2 099/BANK/FARLEY 2010/C/A 3.4/3.9/W/E1OEA2.2/ESP-0i ATTACH3///

A. Incorrect

1) Incorrect, ESP-0.2 maximum allowed CID rate is 25°F/hr and with an RCS temp of 525°F, a minimum of 1 7ft of CST inventory is required to remain in ESP-0.2. An accelerated cooldown is required therefore ESP-0.3 or ESP-0.4 must be used. Plausible because the reference provided demonstrates that an increased cooldown is required due to CST inventory concerns. Without knowledge of the C/D limit of ESP-0.2, remaining in ESP-0.2 might be thought the preferred procedure, when no indication of a void is present (STABLE PZR level).

2) Correct, since there is insufficient CST inventory, and RVLIS is unavailable ESP-0.4 must be used. Plausible because in ESP-0.4, while RCS temperature is being reduced to 500°F the maximum allowed cooldown rate is 50°F/hr.

B. Incorrect

1) Incorrect, see A.1.

2) Incorrect, plausible since 100 °F in any 60 minute period is the normal limit for RCS cooldown and would also be correct if ESP-0.4 were implemented at any Tcojd <500°F, OR if ESP-0.3 were the procedure implemented (RVLIS available).

C. Correct

1) Correct, 25°F/hr cooldown is allowed by ESP0.2 but in this case the reduced CST volume requires a cooldown rate of greater than 25°F/hr (in this case 75°F/hr) ESP-0.2 limits cooldown to 25°F/hr therefore step 10 RNO must be implemented to go to ESP-0.3 or ESP-0.4, and with RVLIS unavailable, ESP-0.4 is required.

2) Correct, this is the correct C/D limit until RCS temp is reduced to 500°F in ESP-0.4.

D. Incorrect

1) Correct, see C.1

2) Incorrect, see B.2. Plausible: A faster cooldown rate of <100°F in any 60 minute period is permitted by ESP-0.4 when RCS temp is <500°F and RCS pressure is 1850 psig.

Page 29 of 30

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 48 of 51

99. WE1OEA2.2 099/BANK/FARLEY 2010/C/A 3.4/3.9/W/E1OEA2.2/ESP-0.2 ATTACH3///

WE1OEA2.2 Natural Circulation with Steam Void in Vessel with/without RVLIS EA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Natural Circulation with Steam Void in Vessel with/without RVLIS) (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

EA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility*s license and amendments.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.4 SRO 3.9 Importance Rating:

3.4 3.9 Technical

Reference:

FNP-1-ESP-0.4, v21 FNP-1-ESP-0.2, v19 References provided: of ESP-0.2 Learning Objective:

ASSESS the facility conditions associated with the (1)

ESP-0.2, Nat Circ CID to Prevent Reactor Vessel Head Steam Voiding; (2) ESP-0.3, Nat Circ C/D with Allowance for Reactor Vessel Head Steam Voiding (with RVLIS); (3)

ESP-0.4, Nat Circ CID with Allowance for Reactor Vessel Head Steam Voiding (without RVLIS), and based on that assessment: (OPS-62531 COl)

SELECT the appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal and emergency situations. I 0CFR55.43 (b) 5

DETERMINE if transition to another section of the procedure or to another procedure is required

DETERMINE if the critical safety functions are satisfied Question origin:

Same as Farley 2010 NRC Exam Question #98 Basis for meeting K/A:

1) ESP-0.4 and the mitigation strategy is chosen to address WE1O portion of the K/A; this procedure is only applicable in Natural Circ cooldown without RVLIS when conditions require a faster cooldown than allowed by ESP-0.4. Some voiding in the Head is expected in ESP-0.4.

2) Procedural adherence: is satisfied by knowledge of the appropriate procedure for the given conditions.

3) Operation within the limitations of the Facility license is demonstrated by challenging the knowledge of actions for low CST inventory and cooldown rate limitations.

SRO justification:

10 CFR 55.43(b)(5)

Assessing plant conditions (normal, abnormal, or emergency) and then selecting a procedure or section of a procedure to mitigate, recover, or with which to proceed.

Page 48 of 51

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 49 of 51 2012 NRC exam From the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev 1 dated 03/11/2010 flowchart for 10 CFR 55.43(b)(5):

Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations [10 CFR 55.43(b)(5)], involving BOTH:

1) assessing plant conditions and then 2) selecting a procedure or section of a procedure to mitigate, recover, or with which to proceed.

Using the flowchart, this question can:

NOT be answered solely by knowing systems knowledge, i.e., how the system works, flowpath, logic, component location.

NOT be answered solely by knowing immediate operator actions.

NOT be answered solely by knowing entry conditions for AOPs or plant parameters that require direct entry to major EOPs.

NOT be answered solely by knowing the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigative strategy of a procedure.

be answered with knowledge of ONE or MORE of the following:

Assessing plant conditions (normal, abnormal, or emergency) and then selecting a procedure or section of a procedure to mitigate, recover, or with which to proceed.

Page49of5l

98. Unit us performing a natural circulation cooldown in accordance with ESP-0.2, Natural Circulation Cooldown to Prevent Reactor Vessel Head Steam Voiding. The following conditions exist:

RCS cold leg is 525°F.

RCS pressure is 1900 psig.

IA and lB CRDM fans are running.

RCPs 1A, IB, and 1C are tripped and cannot be restarted.

CST level is 10.0 ft.

AFW flow is 350 gpm RCS cooldown rate is 5°F/hr.

PZR level is stable at 25%.

RVLIS is not available.

Which one of the following is the correct response lAW ESP-0.2 and the maximum permitted cooldown rate to lower TCOLD to 500° F?

REFERENCE PROVIDED Procedure names are as follows:

ESP-0.2, Natural Circulation Cooldown to Prevent Reactor Vessel Head Steam Voiding ESP-0.4, Natural Circulation Cooldown With Allowance For Reactor Vessel Head Steam Voiding (Without RVLIS)

A.

Continue with ESP-0.2.

The maximum cooldown rate is <50°F/hr.

B.

Continue with ESP-0.2.

The maximum cooldown rate is 100°F in any 60 minute period.

C.

Transition to ESP-0.4.

The maximum cooldown rate is <50°F/hr.

D.

Transition to ESP-0.4.

The maximum cooldown rate is 100°F in any 60 minute period.

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 25 of 25 100. WEI 1EA2. 1100/NEW//C/A 3.4/4.2/WE 11 EA2. 1/N//I Unit I has experienced a Large Break LOCA and Cold Leg Recirculation has been established. The following conditions exist:

At 10:0O IA RHR pump is Tagged Out.

ECP-1.3, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Caused by Sump Blockage, is entered.

At 10:30:

CETCs are 705°F and rising.

At 10:45:

IA RHR pump Tag Out has been cleared.

1A RHR pump has been started with stable amps and flow.

CETCs are 695°F and trending down.

Which one of the following completes the statements below?

At 10:30, FRP-C.2, Response to Degraded Core Cooling, (1) be performed.

/1-V4 Atter core cooling is restored, (2)

(1)

(2)

A.

WILL remain in ECP1.3 B

will NOT remain in ECP-I.3 C.

WILL transition to EEP-1.0, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant D.

will NOT transition to EEP-I.0, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant Page 25 of 25

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 30 of 30 100. WE1 1 EA2. 1100/NEW//C/A 3.4/4.2/WE 1 1EA2. 1/N//I A. Incorrect

1) Incorrect, plausible because normally this is the correct action to take.

If the transition was made to FRP-C.2, and core cooling was restored, step 8.3 would exit to procedure and step in effect. Detailed knowledge of ECP-1.3 is required to know that there is a note at the beginning of ECP-1.3 that states CSF Status Trees should be monitored for information only. FRPs should not be implemented.

2) Correct, ECP-1.3 states There is no return to the ERP network once this procedure is entered.. The operator will remain in ECP-1.3 once it is entered.

B. Correct

1) Correct, FRPs are not implemented during the performance of ECP-1.3. SeeA.1.

2) Correct, see A.2.

C. Incorrect

1) Incorrect, see A.1.

2) Incorrect, plausible because many procedures will be exited once they have completed their goal. FRP-C.2 could be exited at step 8.3. A candidate may infer that if core cooling is re-established and the RHR pump was operating with no problems, ECP-1.3 would no longer be required and transition to EEP-1.0 would be appropriate. In this instance, core cooling was restored by starting an unaffected RHR pump. EEP-1.0 is the normal controlling procedure during a Large Break LOFA.

D. Incorrect

1) Correct, see B.1.

2) Incorrect, see C.2.

Page 30 of 30

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 50 of 51 100. WE1 1EA2. 1 100/NEW/IC/A 3.4/4.2/WE 1 1EA2. 1/N//I WEI 1EA2.1 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation EA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation) (CFR: 43.5 /45.13)

EA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.4 SRO 4.2 Importance Rating:

3.4 4.2 Technical

Reference:

FNP-1-ECP-1.3, v4 FNP-1-FRP-C.2, v17 FNP-1-CSF-0, v17 References provided:

None Learning Objective:

ASSESS the facility conditions associated with the (1)

ECP-1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation; (2)

ECP-1.3, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation, Caused by Sump Blockage, and based on that assessment:

(OPS-62532D01)

SELECT the appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal and emergency situations. IOCFR55.43 (b) 5

DETERMINE if transition to another section of the procedure or to another procedure is required

DETERMINE if the critical safety functions are satisfied Question origin:

New question.

Basis for meeting K/A:

A loss of Emergency Recirculation has occurred and actions are being performed in ECP-1.3, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Caused by Sump Blockage.

Conditions have been met for implementation of Functional Restoration Procedure FRP-C-2, for an Orange CSF.

Candidate is questioned on the selection of the appropriate procedural flowpath under these conditions. In addition, candidate is questioned on the proper procedural actions to take when core cooling is restored.

SRO justification:

10 CFR 55.43(b)(5)

Assessing plant conditions (normal, abnormal, or emergency) and then selecting a procedure or section of a procedure to mitigate, recover, or with which to proceed.

Conditions are evaluated (Core cooling is restored) and candidate is questioned on the proper procedure with which Page 50 of 51

25 SRO QUESTIONS Ver5 Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Page 51 of 51 to proceed. Most of the time a transition is made back to the normal Emergency Event procedure when conditions are restored in an ECP.

10 CFR 55.43(b)(5)

Knowledge of administrative procedures that specify hierarchy, implementation, and/or coordination of plant normal, abnormal, and emergency procedures.

- Knowledge of how Functional Restoration Procedures are implemented using the guidance of Administrative procedure

- SOP-0.8, Transient Response Procedure Users Guide is an SRO function. Normally an FRP would be implemented immediately during an ESP or ECP, but detailed procedure knowledge is required to know that FRPs are not implemented in ECP-1.3. This is allowed per the guidance of SOP-0.8.

2012 NRC exam From the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev I dated 03/11/2010 flowchart for 10 CFR 55.43(b)(5):

Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations [10 CFR 55.43(b)(5)], involving BOTH:

1) assessing plant conditions and then 2) selecting a procedure or section of a procedure to mitigate, recover, or with which to proceed.

Using the flowchart, this question can:

NOT be answered solely by knowing systems knowledge, i.e., how the system works, flowpath, logic, component location.

NOT be answered solely by knowing immediate operator actions.

NOT be answered solely by knowing entry conditions for AOPs or plant parameters that require direct entry to major EOPs.

NOT be answered solely by knowing the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigative strategy of a procedure.

be answered with knowledge of ONE or MORE of the following:

Assessing plant conditions (normal, abnormal, or emergency) and then selecting a procedure or section of a procedure to mitigate, recover, or with which to proceed.

Knowledge of administrative procedures that specify hierarchy, implementation, and/or coordination of plant normal, abnormal, and emergency procedures.

Page 51 of 51

Re4Q, 1

cc

- F(2O h (i

1icry DOCUMENT ID PAGES FNP-0-AOP-29.0, v40.0 Table I PARTIAL-Pg 1 of 4 & pg 3 of 4 2 Pages FNP-1-EEP-3.0, v26 PARTIAL-Pg 39 of 54 1 Page FNP-0-EIP-8.0, v108 PARTIAL 2 Pages FNP-1-ESP-0.2, v19 Attachment 3 COMPLETE 1 Page COLR UNIT I Cycle 24 Figure 1, Aug 2010 COMPLETE

- Pg 9 of 12 I Page TS 3.1.4 v186 PARTIAL 2 Pages TS 3.4.6 v186 COMPLETE 2 Pages TS 3.7.7 v186 PARTIAL I Pages D-175009 Sheet I of I Page NOTE: LARGER drawing available upon request (tablet 1 1X17)

FNP-0-AOP-29.0 PLANT FIRE Revision 40 TABLE 1

ACTIONS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN AT LEAST ONE TRAIN OF SAFE SHUTDOWN CAUTION:

Cables/components can fail in the event of a fire causing a loss of reactor coolant inventory.

The rooms containing these cables/components are designated with an asterisk (*)*

NOTE:

This table lists various rooms/locations that contain redundant safe shutdown equipment or could potentially result in loss of reactor coolant inventory. Appendix R safe shutdown analysis documents the basis of safe shutdown for each fire area.

For each location listed, an appropriate attachment is cross

- referenced.

1 For a fire in an area listed in Table 1, implement the actions required by the associated attachment.

NOTE:

A fire that is outside an area listed in Table 1 will not affect both trains of a safe shutdown function.

2 IF a fire IS NOT in an area listed in Table 1, THEN use other plant procedures for any actions that may be required.

-END-Page 1 of 4

FNP-O-AOP-29.0 PLANT FIRE Revision 40 Table 1

Unit 1 Fire Areas Fire Area Location Attachment 1-001 UNIT 1 AUXILIARY BUILDING RAD SIDE 121 AND 100 4

PENETRATION ROOMS, 83 ELEVATION AND 77 ELEVATION 1-004 Zone 1

UNIT 1 AUXILIARY BUILDING 100 RAD SIDE EXCEPT 5

PENETRATION ROOM AND CHARGING PUMP AREA 1-004 Zone 2

UNIT 1

AUXILIARY BUiLDING 121 AND 127 RAD SIDE 6

EXCEPT THE 121 PENETRATION ROOM 1-004 Zone 3

UNIT 1

AUXILIARY BUILDING 139 RAD SIDE EXCEPT PRF 6

ROOM AND THE ELECTRICAL PENETRATION ROOMS 1-004 Zone 4

UNIT 1

AUXILIARY BUILDING 155 ELEVATION AND SFP 7

HVAC ROOM 1-005 CHARGING PUMP ROOMS AND HALLWAY AND STORAGE ROOMS 8

1-006 UNIT 1

NON RAD AUXILIARY BUILDING 100 ELEVATION 9

1-006 UNIT 1

MAIN STEAM AND FEEDWATER VALVE ROOM 10 1-008 UNIT 1

TRAIN A VERTICAL CABLE CHASE 11

1009 UNIT 1

TRAIN B VERTICAL CABLE CHASE 12 1-0 2

IIT 1

HOT SHUTDOWN PANEL ROOM 1-014 UNIT I

COMPUTER ROOM 20 1-015 UNIT 1

COIThfflNIATIONS ROOM 1-016 UNIT 1

B TRAIN AUX BLDG BATTERY ROOM 6

1-017 UNIT 1

A TRAIN AUX BLDG BATTERY ROOM 1018 UNIT 1

TRAIN A DC SWITCHGEAR ROOM AUX BUiLDING 5

1-019 UNIT 1

TRAIN B DC SWGR ROOM 1-021 UNIT 1

AUX BLDG SWGR ROOM B TRN 12 1-023 UNIT 1

AUX BLDG CRDM SWGR RM 12 1-030 UNIT I AUX BLDG B TRAIN CABLE CHASE 12 1-031 UNITI AUX BLDG A CABLE TUNNEL

1034 B TRAIN ELECTRICAL PENE ROOM AND PENETRATION ROOM 16 FILTRATION ROOM

1035 A TRAIN ELECTRICAL PENE ROOM 17 1-041 UNIT 1

139 4160V SWGR AND CRDM MG SET ROOM 11 (RM 335,343 AND 346) 1-042 UNIT 1

139 HALLWAY (RM 319,

339, AND 345) 15 1-075 UNIT I AUX BLDG TO DIESEL BLDG A TRN CABLE TUNNEL 11 1-076 UNiT I AUX BLDG TO DIESEL BLDG B TRN CABLE TUNNEL 18 1-081 UNIT I

TURBINE BUILDING BATTERY ROOM 38 1-094 COMBUSTIBLE STORAGE ROOM 167 39 1-SOl UNIT I NON RAD STAIRWELL 21 1-Sb UNIT I RAD STAIRWELL EASTSIDE TO 130 EL 37 1-SVB2 SERVICE WATER VALVE BOX 2

19 1-SVB4 SERVICE WATER VALVE BOX 1-TB UNIT 1

TURBINE BUILDING 20 1-020 UNIT 1 NON-RAD HALLWAY 121 FT.

FT 11 4

19 Page 3 of 4

FNP-1-EEP-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Revision 26 Step Action/Expected Response Response NOT Obtained I

I I

CAUTION:

To prevent release of radioactivity to the environment.

RCS and ruptured SG(s) pressures must be maintained less than the ruptured SG(s) atmospheric relief valve setpoint (1035 psig) 31

[CAJ Control RCS parameters to minimize RCS to secondary leakage.

31.1 Perform appropriate action(s) from table.

RUPTURED SG(s)

LEVEL Rising Falling Offscale high

. Raise

Raise

Raise charging flow, charging flow, charging flow.

Less than 25%(50%}

Reduce

Maintain RCS RCS pressure.

and ruptured SG(s) pressures equal.

P R

Between

Reduce

Turn on

Maintain RCS Z

25%{50%}

RCS pressure.

PRZR and ruptured R

and 60%t60%}

heaters.

SG(s) pressures equal.

L E

Reduce

Turn on

Maintain RCS V

Between RCS pressure.

PRZR and ruptured E

60%t60%)

and heaters.

SG(s) pressures L

73%f66%}

Reduce equal.

charging flow.

Greater than

Reduce

Turn on

Maintain RCS 73%t66%}

charging flow.

PRZR and ruptured heaters.

SG(s) pressures equal.

Step 31 continued on next page.

Page Completed Page 39 of 54

10/10/11 12:16:08 FNP-0-EIP-8.0 12.0 Four Hour Independent Storage of Spent Fuel Reports 10CFR72.75(b)(1).

11 NOT reported as a Declaration of an Emergency class or as a one hour non emergency report, THEN the NRCOC and Corporate Duty Manager SHALL be notified by the Shift Manager or the FNP Duty Manager as soon as practical and in ALL cases within four hours of the occurrence of ANY of the following: (Figure 1 will be used):

Notify the NRC resident in coniunction with this notification.

12.1 An action taken in an emergency that departs from a condition or a Technical Specification contained in a license or certificate of compliance issued under this part, WHEN the action is immediately needed to protect the public health and safety, AND NO action consistent with license or certificate of compliance conditions or Technical Specifications that can provide adequate or equivalent protection is immediately apparent.

13.0 Eight-Hour Reports 10CFR5O.72(b)(3).

IF not reported as a Declaration of an Emergency class or as a one hour or four hour non emergency report, THEN the NRCOC and Corporate Duty Manager SHALL be notified by the Shift Manager or the FNP Duty Manager as soon as practical and in JJ cases within eight hours of the occurrence of ANY of the following (Figure 1 will be used):

Notify the NRC resident in coniunction with this notification.

13.1 ANY event or condition that results in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers being seriously degraded.

1 OCFR5O.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) 13.2 ANY event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.

1 OCFR5O.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) Version 108

10/10/11 12:16:08 FNP-0-EIP-8.0 13.3 ANY event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed below EXCEPT when the actuation results from and is part of a pre planned sequence during testing or reactor operation. (10CFR5O.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A)

(1) Reactor Protection System (RPS) including reactor trip. Actuation of the RPS when the reactor is critical is reportable under section 10 as a four hour report.

(2) General containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system OR multiple main steam isolation valves (MSIV5).

(3) Emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) including: high-head and low-head injection systems.

(4) Auxiliary feedwater system.

(5) Containment heat removal and depressurization systems, including containment spray NQ fan cooler systems.

(6) Emergency AC electrical power systems, including emergency diesel generators (EDG5).

13.4 ANY event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: 10CFR5O.72(b)(3)(v)

(1) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.

(2) Remove residual heat.

(3) Control the release of radioactive material.

(4) Mitigate the conseguences of an accident.

Events covered in this step may include:

1 One or more procedural errors.

2.

Equipment failures.

3 Discovery of design, analysis, fabrication, construction, and/or procedural inadequacies.

However, individual component failures need NOT be reported pursuant to this step IF redundant equipment in the same system was operable AND available to perform the required safety function. Version 108

1/6/2012 13:451 NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLDOT TO PREVENT REACTOR Revision 19 FNP-1-ESP-O.2 I

VESSEL HEAD STEAM VOIDING ATTACHMENT 3

CALCULATION FOR ADEQUATE AVAILABLE CST INVENTORY RCS Cooldown Rate vs Minimum Required CST Level 10°F/hr 2rFIhr 50°F/hr 75°F/hr I

NOTE: These plots are based O4 an AFW flowrate of 350 gpm. An accurate assessment of required CST inventory can be made using the following calculation and that result used to make a determinahon if a transihon to ESP-0..3 or 0.4 is required.

FP ici-350i 1x AFW flowrate x6(÷ 125061 + 5.3 = Required csr Level Cooldwn Rate

)

J Basis:

a Current Cooldown Rate is in Degrees F per hour.

Current AFW flowrate is in Gallons per minute.

35OF = Temperature required to place RHR on-service.

12500 = Gallons per foot of CST Level.

a 60 = Minutes per hour.

a 5,3 = Minimum CST level in feet before having to shift AFW suction to SW.

3&)

375 40.)

425 46) 475

&X) 525 5)

RCS TCOLD

CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT, FNP UNIT 1 CYCLE 24 AUGUST 2010 Figure 1 Rod Bank Insertion Limits versus Rated Thermal Power Fully Withdrawn 225 to 231 steps, inclusive 225 rrmr

(.552, 225) 200 (1,187).

175 BankC 150 1

125 (0,114) 100 o

liii BankD 75 50 25

(.070, 0) 0 11111 I

0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 Fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER Fully Withdrawn shall be the condition where control rods are at a position within the interval 225 and 231 steps withdrawn.

Note: The Rod Bank Insertion Limits are based on the control bank withdrawal sequence A, B, C, D and a control bank tip-to-tip distance of 128 steps.

Page 9 of 12

Rod Group Alignment Limits 3.1.4 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3.1.4 Rod Group Alignment Limits LCO 3.1.4 All shutdown and control rods shall be OPERABLE, with all individual indicated rod positions within 12 steps of their group step counter demand position.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES I and 2.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One or more rod(s)

A.1.1 Verify SDM to be within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months untrippable.

the limits provided in the COLR.

DR A.1.2 Initiate boration to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months restore SDM to within limit.

AN A.2 Be in MODE 3.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months B.

One rod not within B.1 Restore rod to within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months alignment limits, alignment limits.

oa B.2.1.1 Verify SDM to be within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months the limits provided in the COLR.

DR (continued)

Farley Units I and 2 3.1.4-1 Amendment No. 146 (Unit 1)

Amendment No. 137 (Unit 2)

Rod Group Alignment Limits ACTIONS 3.1.4 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B.

(continued)

B.2.1.2 Initiate boration to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months restore SDM to within limit.

ANI2 B.2.2 Reduce THERMAL 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months POWER to RTP.

AN B.2.3 Verify SDM to be within Once per the limits provided in the 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months COLR.

AN B.2.4 Perform SR 3.2.1.1.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months AN B.2.5 Perform SR 3.2.2.1.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months AND B.2.6 Re-evaluate safety 5 days analyses and confirm results remain valid for duration of operation under these conditions.

C.

Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition B not met.

Farley Units 1 and 2 3.1.4-2 Amendment No. 146 (Unit 1)

Amendment No. 137 (Unit 2)

RCS LoopsMODE 4 3.4.6 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.6 RCS LoopsMODE 4 LCO 3.4.6 Two loops consisting of any combination of RCS loops and residual heat removal (RHR) loops shall be OPERABLE, and one loop shall be in operation.

NOTES 1.

All reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) and RHR pumps may not be in operation for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months per 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months period provided:

a.

No operations are permitted that would cause reduction of the RCS boron concentration; and b.

Core outlet temperature is maintained at least 10°F below saturation temperature.

2.

No RCP shall be started with any RCS cold leg temperature 325°F unless:

a.

The secondary side water temperature of each steam generator (SG) is <50°F above each of the RCS cold leg temperatures; or b.

The pressurizer water volume is less than 770 cubic feet (24%

of wide range, cold, pressurizer level indication).

APPLICABILITY:

MODE 4.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One required RCS loop A.1 Initiate action to restore a Immediately inoperable, second loop to OPERABLE status.

AN Two RHR loops inoperable.

Farley Units 1 and 2 3.4.6-1 Amendment No. 146 (Unit 1)

Amendment No. 137 (Unit 2)

RCS LoopsMODE 4 ACTIONS Farley Units 1 and 2 3.4.6-2 3.4.6 Amendment No. 147 (Unit 1)

Amendment No. 138 (Unit 2)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B.

One required RHR loop B.1 Be in MODE 5.

24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months inoperable.

AND Two required RCS loops inoperable.

C.

Required RCS or RHR C.1 Suspend all operations Immediately loops inoperable, involving a reduction of RCS boron concentration.

OR AND No RCS or RHR loop in operation.

C.2 Initiate action to restore Immediately one loop to OPERABLE status and operation.

SURVEILLANCE_REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.6.1 Verify one RHR or RCS loop is in operation.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months SR 3.4.6.2 Verify SG secondary side water levels are 75%

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months (wide range) for required RCS loops.

SR 3.46.3 Verify correct breaker alignment and indicated power 7 days are available to the required pump that is not in operation.

3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.7 Component Cooling Water (CCW) System CCW System 3.7.7 LCO 3.7.7 Two CCW trains shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One CCW train A.1 NOTE inoperable.

Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.6, RCS LoopsMODE 4, for residual heat removal loops made inoperable by CCW.

Restore CCW train to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OPERABLE status.

B.

Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A not ANfl met.

B.2 Be in MODE 5.

36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months Farley Units 1 and 2 3.7.7-1 Amendment No. 146 (Unit 1)

Amendment No. 137 (Unit 2)

1LT35 NRC EXAM STUDENT REFERENCE

- FQR TRAINING USE ONLY**

1LT35 NRC EXAM STUDENT REFERENCE.

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ILT35 NRC EXAM STUDENT REFERENCE.

ML12214A317

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