Text

Initial Exam 2011-302 Final Simulator Scenarios
	ML12166A487
Person / Time
Site:	Turkey Point
Issue date:	06/14/2012
From:	; Division of Reactor Safety II
To:	; Florida Power & Light Co
References
	50-250/11-302, 50-251/11-302
	Download: ML12166A487 (173)
	v • d • e

ILC-27 NRC Scenario #1 Event Description F Facility: Turkey Point Scenario: 1 Op Test.: 2011-302 Examiners: Candidates: US ATC BOP Initial Conditions: Mode 1 75% power at MOL.

Turnover: Equipment OOS: Breaker 3AB1 8 for 3B2 Circ water pump is racked out due to breaker failure.

Holding at 75% power, the crew next shift will continue with power increase.

. Online Risk Green with B Train protected on both units.

Event Event Type Event Description LT-3-460 fails low which isolates letdown. The crew responds using the I ATC TFH1TV6O ARP and 3-ONOP-49.i to remove LT-3-460 from service. The SRO will (ITS) SRO address LCO 3.3.1. The crew restores normal letdown and PZR heaters following LT-3-460 failure using 3-ONOP-041 .6.

V8CI29ON (C) BOP Circ Water Pump 3B1 Motor Bearing high temperature from increased 2 bearing friction. The crew will lower reactor power to < 60% & secure TVKKB1 (C) SRO SJAE suction before securing the 3B1 CW pump using 3-NOP-OlO.

(N) BOP 3 N/A (R) ATC The crew initiates a boration and reduces Turbine load to 60% using 3-GOP-i 00.

(R) SRO (I) ATC 1) PT-3-445 fails high, the crew responds using the ARP and 3-ONOP-TFH1TU45 41 .5 to attempt to manually close PORV-456. 2) During the instrument 4 (C) ATC failure, PORV-456 develops leakage. The contingent action will be to TVHV456 close the block valve to stop the leakage. The SRO will address LCO (l,C,TS) SR 3.4.4 due to excessive leakage on the PORV.

B Condensate Pump Motor Shaft slowly seizes causing a failure of the TVFABP6B (C) BOP pump. The automatic start of the C Condensate Pump is blocked. The 5 BOP can manually start the C Condensate Pump or stop one Main Feed TFF1 D6CM (C) SRO Pump to initiate a Runback to equalize Turbine load with available Feedwater flow.

TVHV456 During plant stabilization, Block Valve MOV-3-535 develops leakage with 6 (M) ALL PORV 456 leaking. The crew responds using 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions TVHV535 to 3-EOP-E-1. RCPs are tripped with the loss of Subcooling Margin.

TAFK339 AFW flow to the 3C S/G is blocked. Also, B TDAFWP mechanically trips 7 TFFXCGVC (M) ALL and the C TDAFWP Governor Valve Fails closed. During the performance of 3-EOP-E-0, the crew uses A TDAFWP to establish greater than 345 TCF5MTB gpm total to the 3A and 3B S/G.

(C) BOP The 3C ECC fails to Auto Start, the BOP manually starts the 3C ECC 8 TFQ6A4AF (C) SRO during Attachment 3 of 3-EOP-E-0.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1

ILC-27 NRC Scenario #1 Event Description SIMULATOR SETUP INSTRUCTIONS

1. Reset to IC-16 (75% BOL) or other IC with correct setup conditions.

2. Place Simulator in RUN

3. Open and Execute ILC27SCNIN.lsn.

4. Place 3B2 CWP Handswitch to stop.

5. Trigger lesson step:

SETUP 3B2 CIRC WATER PUMP OOS insert TAK4DP RACKOUT deIay0 ramp=0 on=0 off=0

6. Once the pump is stopped and discharge valve is closed, place a clearance tag on 3B2 CWP Handswitch.

7. Store IC with initial conditions setup if desired.

8. Trigger lesson step:

SETUP 3C ECC FAIL TO AUTO START insert TFQ6A4AF true delay0 ramp=0 on=0 off0

9. Place Simulator in freeze.

10. Provide Shift Turnover Checklists

11. Perform Simulator Operator Checklist

12. When ready to begin, place Simulator in RUN.

2

ILC-27 NRC Scenario #1 Event Description FACILITY OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS EVENT I LT-3-460 fails low which isolates letdown. The crew responds using the ARP and 3-ONOP-49. 1 to remove LT-3-460 from service. The SRO will address LCO 3.3.1. The crew restores normal letdown and PZR heaters following LT-3-460 failure using 3-ONOP-041 .6.

When directed, Trigger EVENT I LT-3-460 FAILS LOW.

insert TFH1TV6O TRUE delay0 ramp0 on=0 off=0 SM - If directed, respond and acknowledge the failure of LT-3-460.

WCC - If directed, respond and acknowledge the failure of LT-3-460 and to write a PWO for troubleshooting and notify l&C.

U3TOIFS - When called, respond and acknowledge the failure of LT-3-460 and provide when asked: 1) The SCR cabinet door is CLOSED.

2) All SCR cabinet fans are operating.

EVENT 2 Circ Water Pump 3B1 Motor Bearing high temperature from increased bearing friction. The crew will lower reactor power to <60% & secure SJAE suction before securing the 3B1 CW pump using 3-NOP-Ol 0.

When directed, Trigger EVENT 2 3B1 CW PUMP HIGH TEMP.

insert V8CI29ON TRUE delay0 ramp=0 on=0 off=0

insert TVKKB1 0.5 delay=0 ramp=4800 on=0 off=0 SM - If directed, respond and acknowledge the failure of Circ Water Pump 381.

WCC - If directed, respond and acknowledge the failure of Circ Water Pump 381 and to write a PWO for troubleshooting and notify maintenance.

ANPOIFS - When called, respond and acknowledge the 381 CW Pump High Temp:

1) The 381 CW Pump High Bearing temperature is 238°F and rising at 10°F/hr.

2) When called again and about 15 minutes later, add 3°F to raise temperature to 241°F. (Provide additional updates as necessary)

When directed, Trigger EVENT 2 CLOSE 3-30-003 AND 3-30-005.

insert TAFBOO3 0.0 delay=60 ramp0 on=0 off=0

insert TAFBOO5 0.0 delay=120 ramp=0 on=0 off=0 When directed, Trigger EVENT 2 SECURE PRIMING JETS AND VENT WTRBX VACUUM TKS.

insert TAKKV66 0.000000 delay=0 ramp=0 on=0 off=0

insert TAKKV81 0.000000 delay=60 ramp=0 on=0 off=0

insert TAKKV78 1.000000 delay=1 80 ramp=0 on=0 off=0

insert TAKKV63 1.000000 delay=1 20 ramp=0 on=0 off=0 When directed, Trigger EVENT 2 RACKOUT 3BI CW PUMP.

insert TAK4CP RACKOUT delay=0 ramp=0 on=0 off=0 3

ILC-27 NRC Scenario #1 Event Description EVENT 3 The crew initiates a boration and reduces Turbine load to 60% using 3-GOP-i 00.

SM If directed, acknowledge power reduction.

WCC - If directed, acknowledge power reduction for the removal of 3B1 CWP.

SYSTEM DISPATCH - If directed, acknowledge power reduction to 60% for the removal of 3B1 cwP.

ENGINEERING - If directed, acknowledge power reduction to 60% for the removal of 3B1 CWP.

CHEMISTRY - If directed, acknowledge power reduction to 60% for the removal of 3B1 CWP and to sample the RCS for the power change.

EVENT 4 PT-3-445 fails high, the crew responds using the ARP and 3-ONOP-41 .5 to attempt to manually close PORV-456. During the instrument failure, PORV-456 develops leakage. The contingent action will be to close the block valve to stop the leakage. The SRO will address LCO 3.4.4 due to excessive leakage on the PORV.

When directed, Trigger EVENT 4 PT-3-445 FAILS HIGH

- - PORV 456 DEVELOPING LEAKAGE.

insert TFH1TU45 -1 delay=0 ramp=0 on=0 off=0

insert TVHV456 0.1 delay0 ramp=0 onO off0 SM - If directed, respond and acknowledge the failure of PT-3-445.

WCC - If directed, respond and acknowledge the failure of PT-3-445 and to write a PWO for troubleshooting.

EVENT 5 B Condensate Pump Motor Shaft slowly seizes causing a failure of the pump. The automatic start of the C Condensate Pump is blocked. The BOP can manually start the C Condensate Pump or stop one Main Feed Pump to initiate a Runback to equalize Turbine load with available Feedwater flow.

When directed, Trigger EVENT 5 LOSS OF 3B CONDENSATE PUMP.

insert TVFABP6B 0.4 delay=0 ramp=60 on=0 off=0

insert TFF1 D6CM TRUE delay=0 ramp=0 on=0 offO

insert TFF1 D6CM FALSE cd=imfl p6cs delay=0 ramp=0 on=0 off0 SM If directed, respond and acknowledge the failure of the 3B CONDENSATE PUMP.

WCC If directed, respond and acknowledge the failure of the 3B CONDENSATE PUMP and to write a PWO for troubleshooting.

4

ILC-27 NRC Scenario #1 Event Description EVENT 6 During plant stabilization, Block Valve MOV-3-535 develops leakage with PORV 456 leaking. The crew responds using 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions to 3EOP-E-1. RCPs are tripped with the loss of Subcooling Margin.

When directed, Trigger EVENT 6 PORV 456 AND BLOCK VALVE 535 LEAKAGE INCREASES

insert TVHV456 1.000000 delay=0 ramp=60 on=0 off0 o insert TVHV535 1.000000 delay=0 ramp=60 on=0 off=0 SM If directed, respond and acknowledge the failure of Block Valve MOV-3-535 develops leaking with PORV 456 leakage.

WCC If directed, respond and acknowledge the failure of Block Valve MOV-3-535 developing leakage with PORV 456 leakage and to write a PWO for troubleshooting.

SNPO When directed, respond and acknowledge to place PAHMS in service. Report back in 10 minutes with field actions complete in accordance with 3-NOP-094.

When directed, Trigger EVENT 6 ALIGN PAHMS FOR SERVICE.

insert TAC2VO2A 1.000000 delay=0 ramp=0 on=0 off=0

insert TAC2VO2B 1.000000 delay=0 ramp0 on=0 off=0 o insert TAAAV21 1.000000 delay=0 ramp=0 on=0 off=0 o insert TAAAV22 1.000000 delay=0 ramp=0 on=0 off=0

insert TACAOO5 .000000 delay=0 ramp=0 on=0 off=0 EVENT 7 AFW flow to the 3C SIG is blocked. Also, B TDAFWP mechanically trips and the C TDAFWP Governor Valve Fails closed. During the performance of 3-EOP-E-0, the crew uses A TDAFWP to establish greater than 345 gpm total to the 3A and 3B SIG.

Auto Trigger EVENT 7 AFW MALFUNCTIONS

insert TAFK339 0.0 delay=0 ramp=0 on=0 off=0

insert TFFXCGVC true delay=60 ramp=0 on=0 off=0 o insert TCF5MTB true delay60 ramp=0 onO off=0 EVENT 8 The 3C ECC fails to Auto Start, the BOP manually starts the 3C ECC during Attachment 3 of 3-EOP-E-0.

ADDITIONAL COMMUNICATIONS U3 TOIFS If directed, respond and acknowledge to investigate loss of B and C AFW Pumps.

- Perform actions of 3-ONOP-075 (unsuccessful).

- B AFW Pump is mechanically tripped and cannot be reset.

- C AFW Pump problems are still under investigation.

U4 RO - If asked, respond with Unit 4 is at 100% and does not require AFW.

CHEM When directed, respond and acknowledge to sample all Unit 3 SIGs.

HP When directed, respond and acknowledge to survey Main Steam lines.

5

ILC-27 NRC Scenario #1 Event_Description SCENARIO QUANTITATIVE ATTRIBUTES Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario, See Section 0 5 d) #

1. Total malfunctions (58) 5

2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (12) 3

3. Abnormal events (24) 4

4. Major transients (12) 1

5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (12) 1

6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (02) 0

7. Critical tasks (23) 3 CRITICAL TASKS

1. Establish minimum AFW flow of 345 gpm prior to transitioning out of 3-EOP-E-O. [EVENT 7]

OR If crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H1 to correct loss of AFW, then establish minimum AFW flow of 345 gpm prior to completing Step 2 of 3-EOP-FR-H1.

2. Trip RCPs due to a loss of subcooling during a SBLOCA prior to completing Step I of 3-EOP-E-I.

3. With RHR Flow less than 1000 gpm, stop the RHR Pumps within 44 minutes of their start signal.

6

OPERATIONS SHiFT TURNOVER REPORT

V ONCOMING CREW ASSIGNMENTS Shift Mgr: Inside SNPO:

Field Supv.: Outside SNPO:

AdminRCO: ANPO:

Unit 3 Unit 4 Unit Supv.: Unit Supv.:

RCO: RCO:

NPO: NPO:

Plant Status Unit 3 Unit 4 Mode: 1 Mode:

Power: 75 % Power: 100 %

MWe: 545 MWe: 758 Gross Leakrate: 0.03 gpm Gross Leakrate: 0.03 gpm RCS Boron Conc: 755 ppm RCS Boron Conc: 268 ppm Operational Concerns: I

. Breaker 3AB1 8 for 3B2 Circ water pump is racked out due to breaker failure.

. Holding at 75% power, the crew next shift will continue with power increase.

U3 Anticipated LCO Actions:

U4 Anticipated LCO Actions:

Results of Offgoing Focus Area:

Unit 3 Status Reactor Operator Mode:

Power: %

I 75 Gross:

RCS Leakrate O.O3gpm I I Accumulator Ref Levels A 6615 gal MWe: 545 Unidentified O.O2gpm B 6635 gal Tavg: *F 566 Charging Pps: O.Olgpm I 6624 gal RCS Pressure: psig 2235 RCS Boron Conc: 755 ppm Abnormal Anpunciators:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Current Tech Spec Action Statements: (Does Not Include For Tracking Only Items T.S.A.S / Component:

Reason:

Entry Date:

T.S.A.S / Component:

Reason:

Entry Date:

T.S.A.S / Component:

Reason:

Entry Date:

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Reason:

Entry Date:

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Entry Date:

T.S.A.S / Component:

Reason:

I Entry Date:

Unit 3 Status Changes to Risk Significant Equipment:

B train protected both units

Online risk green Upcoming Reactivity Management Activities:

Upcoming Major POD Activities:

Upcoming ECOs to Hang and br Release:

Evolutions or Compensatory Actions in Progress:

General Information, Remarks, and Operator Work Around Status:

Unit 3 supplying Auxiliary steam.

o Condenser air inleakage 0 scfm.

Severe thunderstorm warning in South Dade County expires in 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

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j Appendix D equired Operator Actons Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 3 Circ Water Pump 3B1 Motor Bearing high temperature from increased bearing friction. The crew will lower reactor power to <60% & secure SJAE suction before securing the 3B1 OW pump using 3-OP-OlO.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Direct Facility Operator to trigger lesson step, EVENT 2 3B1 CW PUMP HIGH TEMP.

(insert V8C1290N TRUE delay=0 ramp=0 on=0 off=0, insert TVKKB1 0.5 delay=0 ramp=4800 on=0 off=0)

SROIATC Observes Alarm 1-214.

CAUSES: 1. Motorfature

2. Pump failure

3. Low bearing oil level SROIATC CWPBI MOTOR BRG HI TEMP OPERATOR ACTIONS

1. CHECK the following at 381 CWP:

. TS-3-41 13, -4114, and -4115 equal to or cireater than 235°F.

SROIATC

Bearing oil level.

Pump/motor vibrationlnoise

2. IF bearing temperature exceeds 248F. THEN STOP 381 CWP using 3-OP-OlD, Circulatinci Water System.

NOTE If called, the operator reports:

FACILITY OPERATOR The 3B1 OW Pump High Bearing temperature is 238°F and rising at 1 0°F/hr. Additional reports may be given not to exceed 248°F.

SRO Directs response using 3-NOP-OlO, Circulating Water System to secure 3B1 CW Pump.

2.2 Limitations SROIATC

1. If the unit is operating, a maximum of two Circulating Water Pumps may be removed from service at the same time.

4.3.2 Circulating Water Pumps 381 and 382 Shutdown SROIATC 1. IF shifting to only two circulating Water Pumps in operation, THEN ENSURE Main Turbine is less than 60% load.

6

Appendix D Required Operator ActIons orm ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 2 Page 2 of 3 Circ Water Pump 3B1 Motor Bearing high temperature from increased bearing friction. The crew will lower reactor power to <60% & secure SJAE suction before securing the 3B1 OW pump using 3-OP-OlO.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER NOTE: The SRO determines the need to reduce power to <60% and secure SJAE (due to CWP 3B2 not available) in order to stop the pump and not loose Main Condenser vacuum.

(Go to Event 3 for details on power reduction.)

2. IF all Circulating Water Pumps will be shutdown, THEN ENSURE the following are shutdown:

SRO!BOP

Main Turbine a Condensate System

3. ENSURE Amertap System is shutdown per 3-NOP-015.01, Amertap SROIBOP Condenser Tube Cleaning Operation.

NOTE DCS/P1612X indicates Main Condenser backpressure. To determine vacuum SROIBOP from backpressure:

Main Condenser Vacuum = 30 in Hg - DCS/P1612X_A CAUTION When removing a set of waterboxes from service, Main Condenser vacuum should be monitored using the most conservative indication of the following:

SRO/BOP

p1-3-1612, CONDENSER VACUUM (VPA)

. P1-3-1406, CONDENSER VACUUM (VPA)

DCS/P1G12X_A

4. ENSURE the following are CLOSED:

a 3-30-003, NORTH CNDSR AIR REMOVAL LINE TO SJAE SROIBOP ISOL a 3-30-005, SOUTH CNDSR AIR REMOVAL LINE TO SJAE ISOL

5. IF removing a set of waterboxes from service and condenser air inleakage is greater than 10 SCFM, THEN PLACE the SJAE hogger in service per 3-NOP-SROIBOP 073.01, Steam Jet Air Ejector Operation, prior to removing waterboxes from service.

7

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Appendix 0 Required bperator Actions Form ES-D-2 I Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 Page 2 of 6 Event

Description:

PT-3-445 fails high, the crew responds using the ARP and 3-ONOP-41 .5 to attempt to manually close PORV-456. During the instrument failure PORV-456 develops leakage. The contingent action is to close the block valve to stop the leakage. The SRO will address LCO 3.4.4 due to excessive leakage on the PORV.

Time Position

[ Applicants Actions or Behavior FOLDOUT FOR PROCEDURE 3-ONOP-041.5

1. FAILED INSTRUMENT ISOLATION

a. H arty Pressurizer Pressure contol Instrument Loop fails. THEN place applicable control switches to a position that isolates the tailed instrument.

2. PZR pressure cannot be maintained greater than 2000 poig, jj perform the foiowing:

a. Continue efforts to restore PZR pressure and

b. Trip the reactor and turbine and go to 3-EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY IN.JECTION.

3. POPV ISOLATIflHt[EAKING PORV IDENTIFICATION

a. IF any PORV is OPEN OR Leaking AND pressure is less than 2235 psig, THEN CLOSE the applicable P0EV andlor block valve.

a. The following are indications of leakage toni a PZR POE? and should be used to identify ano isolate a leaking PORV

1) PZR relief line temperature. Tl-3-463, INCREASING.

2) PZR relief tank level, Ll-3-470, INCREASING.

3) PZR relief tank temperature. Tl-3-471, INCREASING.

4) PZR relief tank pressure, P1-3-472. INcREASING.

CREW

5) PZR PORV!SAFETY ACOUSTIC MONITOR. LEDs LIT.

4 OPENILEAKIUG PZR SAFETY VALVE IDENTIFICATION

a. The following are indicafons that a PZR safety is open or leaking:

1) PZR Safety line temperature, Tl-365, 1NCREASING or at salutation temperature associated will, the PZR relief tank pressure per Atlachrnert 2.

2) PAR Safety line temperature, 11-3-467, INCREASING or at saturation temperature associated with the PAR relief tank pressure per Attachment 2.

3) PZR Safety line temperature, Tl-3-469, INCREASING or at saturation temperature associated with the PZR retef tank pressure per Attachment 2.

4) PZR relief tank level, Ll-3-470, INCREASING.

5) PAR relief rank temperature, TI-3-471, INCREASING.

5) PZR relief tank pressure, P1-3472, INCREASING.

7) PAR P0EV/Safety Acoustic Monitor, LEDs LIT.

5. SPURIOUS ACTUAT1ON OF CV 3 311 AUXILIARY SPRAY VALVE due to hre in Containment or 35 4KV Swttchgesr Roam

a. IF pressurizer pressure is decreasing and Auxiliary Spray Valve, CU-3-311, is suspect, reduce charging tc one charging pump on slow speed close charging to RCS Control Valve HCV-3-121.

15

Appendix D Required Operator Actons Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 Page 3 of 6 Event

Description:

PT-3-445 fails high, the crew responds using the ARP and 3-ONOP-41 .5 to attempt to manually close PORV-456. During the instrument failure PORV-456 develops leakage. The contingent action is to close the block valve to stop the leakage. The SRO will address LCD 3.4.4 due to excessive leakage on the PORV.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Potential Additional Tech Spec Call POVVER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3/4.2.5 DNB PARAMETERS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.2.5 The following DNB-related parameters shall be maintained within the following limits:

a. Reactor Coolant System Tavg 581.2°F

b. Pressurizer Pressure 2200 psig*, and

c. Reactor Coolant System Flow 264.000 gpm APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

ACTION:

With any of the above parameters exceeding its limit, restore the parameter to within its limit within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months reduce THERMAL POWER to less then 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

Limit not applicable during either a THERMAL POWER ramp in excess of 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER per minute or a THERMAL POWER step in excess of 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

16

Appendixb Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 I Op-Test No.; 2011-302 Scenario No.; 1 Event No.; 4 Page 4 of 6 Event Description; PT-3-445 fails high, the crew responds using the ARP and 3-ONOP-41 .5 to attempt to manually close PORV-456. During the instrument failure, PORV-456 develops leakage. The contingent action is to close the block valve to stop the leakage. The SRO will address LCO 3.4.4 due to excessive leakage on the PORV.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[

EXAMINER NOTE: Steps annotated with

may have already been SROIATC performed in the ARP.

I Check PZR Pressure Control Instrument Loop Not Failed

a. Check PT-3-444 NOT FAILED by

- a. Perform the following:

comparison with adjacent pressure channels and known plant parameters 1) Verify PCV-3455C CR MOV-3-536 CLOSED.

2) Take manual control of PC-3-444J, PZR PRESS CONTROL.

SRO!ATC

3) IF manual control of PC-3-444J is NOT effective, TI-lEN perform the following Take manual control of PZR spray valves.

Take manual control of PZR healers.

f

b. ChecK PT-3-445 NOT FAILED by

- Perform the following:

S ROIATC comparison ith adjacent pressure ii Verfy PCi-3-456 OR OV-3-535 channels and mown plant pararneter CLOSED.

- Attempts to closes PORV PCV-3-456 (if not already done).

SRO!ATC

- Closes MOV-3-535 to stop leakage.

2 Check PORVs Closed Perform the following:

SRO/ATC . PCV-3-455C CLOSED

-

PZR pressure is less than 2335, THEN manually close PORVs. any

. PCV-3-456 CLOSED PZR FOR! can NOT be closed. THEN manually close its block valve.

CAUTION SRO/ATC A fire in containment or the 35 4KV Switchgear Room may cause spurious actuation of and give false valve position indication for Auxiliary Spray Valve,, CV-3-311.

17

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions orm S-b-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 Page 6 of 6 Event

Description:

PT-3-445 fails high, the crew responds using the ARP and 3-ONOP-41 .5 to attempt to manually close PORV-456. During the instrument failure, PORV-456 develops leakage. The contingent action is to close the block valve to stop the leakage. The SRO will address LCO 3.4.4 due to excessive leakage on the PORV.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Recognizes requirement for LCO 3.2.5 entry.

3.2.5 The following DNB-related parameters shall be maintained within the following limits:

a. Reactor Coolant System T 581 .2F

b. Pressurizer Pressure 2200 psig*, and

c. Reactor Coolant System Flow 264000 gpm SRO APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

ACTION:

With any of the above parameters exceeding its limit, restore the parameter to within its limit within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months or reduce THERMAL POWER to less then 5% of ftTED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

SRO Recognizes requirement for LCO 3.4.4 Action a entry.

3.4.4 Seth power-operated relief valves (POVs> ace their associated block valves shall be OPERASLE.

PPLlCASlLITY: MODES 1, 2. and 3

.CTlON:

SRO

a. With one or both PORVs inoperable because of excessive leakage, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months eithe restore the PO/(s) to OPERASLE status or close the aSsociated block valve(sl with power maintained to the block valve(s); otherwise be in at least HOT .ST,SNDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in OT SHUTDOWFt within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

EXAMINER NOTE: If scenario proceeds without PORV operability addressed, then ask it as a follow-up question. When Pressurizer pressure is stabilized, proceed to Event 5.

19

Appendix equired Operator Actions - Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 1 Event

Description:

B Condensate Pump Motor Shaft slowly seizes causing a failure of the pump. The automatic start of the C Condensate Pump is blocked. The BOP can manually start the C Condensate Pump or stop one Main Feed Pump to initiate a Runback to equalize Turbine load with available Feedwater flow.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Direct Facility Operator to trigger lesson step, EVENT 5 LOSS OF 3B CONDENSATE PUMP. (insert TVFABP6B 0.4 delay=0 ramp=60 on0 off=0, insert TFF1 D6CM TRUE delay=0 ramp=0 on=0 off0, and insert TFF1 D6CM FALSE cd°imflp6cs delay=0 ramp=0 on=0 off=0)

SROIATC Observes annunciator: D 9/1 and D 9/2 Directs response using the ARP and/or 3-ONOP-089, if feed pump is SRO tripped.

CAUSES: 1. Motor malfunction

2. Hi9h system flow D9

2. Low bus voltage COND SROIBOP AIBIC MOTOR OVERLOAD ALARM CONFIRMATION SROIBOP 1. CHECK Condensate pumpçs) ammeter(s)

OPERATOR ACTIONS

1. IONITOR SGFP suction pressure.

2. necessary tc maintain adequ&e suction pessue, THN START 3rd conensaie pump.

SROIBOP 3. CHECK associated reed train components fSr prope operation.

4. REQUEST Operator check con desate pump recircuiation vaves closed anc amps locally.

5. caise orotor overload can NOT be corrected, ThEN MAKE preparabons to stop atected pumps) using 3-CP-073, Condensate Systeit

- Starts 3C Condensate Pump.

SROIBOP - Stops 3B Condensate Pump with high current if not tripped.

20

1 Appendix equired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 2 Event

Description:

B Condensate Pump Motor Shaft slowly seizes causing a failure of the pump. The automatic start of the C Condensate Pump is blocked. The BOP can manually start the C Condensate Pump or stop one Main Feed Pump to initiate a Runback to equalize Turbine load with available Feedwater flow.

Time j Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CAUSES: L Motor 2 Low busmatfunciton vottage D 8 COND PUMP SRO/BOP P.JEIC MOTOR OVRLD TRIP ALARM CONFIRMATION SRO/BOP

1. CHECK condensate pump indications on console.

OPERATOR ACTIONS

1. ENSURE the following automatic actions have occurred:

. Automatic start of idle condensate pump if applicable

. Possible trip of SGFP SROIBOP 2. MONITOR SGFP suction pressure.

3. REQUEST Operator check condensate pump breaker(s) 3Aft21 3A821, or 3AC12 for any targets.

4. REQUEST Operator check condensate pump(s) locally for any abnormal indications.

EXAMINER NOTE: When secondary system parameters stabilize, proceed to Event 6.

If another Condensate Pump is started late after a Main Feed Water Pump trips, then continue below with initial steps of 3-ONOP-089, Turbine Runback.

SRO Directs response using 3-ONOP-089.

I 0 TIMEDTS.TE OPERATOR ACTTONS C REVV 4.1 VetyL\ the aittom tic admits listeil ii Secliumi 30 ate uicttouiue to sralsilmoi aid plant conditions, or ,tssmnmle nmtuntal control.

3.0 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS 5.1 Mum Iutbine Control Valves and the Reheat Intercept Valves modulate closed upon t f a runback smnnal from the Generator Governot Speed Changer 3.2 Steam Dump Valves ann and opeu to relieve excess steam to the condenser due to the load rejection and subsequent TavgTref mismatch 33 .-\utomtmatic Rod Ittsertt,u Control ndtnsts core reactivity to utatch Ttn with Tref C REViI 34 Main Feedwttter Control Valves open or close in progrannned response to steamflowieedflow nimstuatch and level input smuals. to maintain steam generator levels itt program.

3 5 Pressuriawr Level controller and preasnriiter Pressure (ontrcmflet vary cliarpine pumps speed and Heater Spray aomatidmn to nuaitmtain the programmed level itturl pressure, as requsireul fr the chanin vithtes cit Tavg.

3.6 Tuibitie runback upon a SGFP breakec trip with first stage pressure greater titan .15 percent load, Both a eovcnior and a load Itnut ntnback occur unul that stage pressure is at

.15 lrcflt load.

21

I Appendix aequired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Page 2 of 2 Event

Description:

B Condensate Pump Motor Shaft slowly seizes causing a failure of the pump. The automatic start of the C Condensate Pump is blocked. The BOP can manually start the C Condensate Pump or stop one Main Feed Pump to initiate a Runback to equalize Turbine load with available Feedwater flow.

Time Position

] Applicants Actions or Behavior SUBSEQUENT OPER\TOR ACTIONS

5. Detennine the cause of the outback initiation ANI) refer to the appropriate ONOP for specilie recovery Instruct ions.

5.2 Verify the follosvhm conditions.

REN 5 2. I Steam veneratot levels niti preestues ct:Lbtlt2ed.

5 2.2 Sream dmnps closed.

5.2.3 ravg matches Tref.

52.4 Pressurizer levels and pressmes stabilized.

EXAMINER NOTE: When secondary system parameters stabilize, proceed to Event 6.

22

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Appendix D Required Operator Actons Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 2 of 23 Event

Description:

During plant stabilization, Block Valve MOV-3-535 develops leakage with PORV 456 leaking. The crew responds using 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions to 3-EOP-E-1. RCPs are tripped with the loss of Subcooling Margin.

Time Position

[ Applicants Actions or Behavior 3 Verify Power To Emergency 4 KV Buses a Check the 3A and 3B 4 (V buses - a Perform the following:

MAINTAIN AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED

1) Attempt to emergency start any Unit 3 available diesel generator.

2) IF neither 3A nor 364 KV bus is energized, go to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O, LOSS ALL AC POWER, Step 1

b. Check the 3A and 3B 4 KV buses - b. Attempt to emergency start the MAINTAIN BOTH ENERGIZED de-energized Unit 3 bus diesel generator.

c Maintain the 364 Ky bus energized - c Perform the Following:

ALIGNED TO AN ENERGIZED 4 KV BUS

1) IFlockoutof3D4 K? bus NOT present, perform the following:

a) Verify 3C CCW pump -

BREAKER OPEN.

b) Verify 3C ICW pump BREAKER OPEN.

c) Operate bus supply breakers to restore power SROIBOP 24

Appendix D equred operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 3 of 23 Event

Description:

During plant stabilization, Block Valve MOV-3-535 develops leakage with PORV 456 leaking. The crew responds using 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions to 3-EOP-E-1. RCPs are tripped with the loss of Subcooling Margin.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 4 Check If Si Is Actuated Perfom the following:

St Annunciainrs ANY ON

- a. Check if SI is requirec:

OR

Low pressurizer pressure 1730 psig Safeguards equpmeni AUTO OR STARTED High containment pressure 4 psig OR

High steam line different ci pressure 100 psid a

SROIATC High steam flow with low S!G pressure 814 pnig OR tow Tavg (543 F)

b. IF SI is required, THEN manually actuate SI and containment isolation phase A AND go to Step 5.

c. jSI is required, perforni the following:

ii Monitor Critical Safety Functions using 3-EOP-F-0, CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES f

2) Go to 3-EOP-ES-Oi, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE, Step L r-----idT-----

CREW L FOLDOUTPage shall be monito:d forthe remainder of ffiis procedhire -

CREW Monitors 3-EOP-E-0 Foldout page (see next page) 5 Continue With Attachment 3 To Complete SRO/BOP The Prompt Action Verifications While Performing This Procedure Examiner Note: 3-EOP-E-O, Attachment 3 commences at Event No. 6 Page 12 of 24. An additional copy for convenience is at the end of the procedure.

Examiner Note: The SRO and ATC will complete the remaining steps in 3-EOP-E-O, while the BOP performs 3-EOP-E-O Prompt Action Verifications using Attachment 3.

25

I Appendix D Req ured Operator Actions - Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 4 of 24 Event

Description:

During plant stabilization, Block Valve MOV-3-535 develops leakage with PORV 456 leaking. The crew responds using 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions to 3-EOP-E-i. RCPs are tripped with the loss of Subcooling Margin.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior FOLDOUT FOR PROCEDURE E-O

1. ADVERSE CONTAINMENT CONDITIONS IF either of the conditions listed below occur, THEN use adverse containment setpoints:

Containment atmosphere temperature 180°F OR Containment radiation levels 1 .3x1 0 R/hr WHEN containment parameters drop below the above values, THEN normal setpoints can again be used IF the TSC determines that containment integrated dose rate has not exceeded 106 Rads.

2. RCP TRIP CRITERIA

a. IF both conditions listed below occur, THEN trip all RCPs:

1 High-head S pumps AT LEAST O\IE RUNNING AND SI

- LOWPATH VERIFIED.

2) RCS subcooling LESS THAN 2S965F]

c. iF phase B actua:ed. THEN trip all RCPs,

3. FAULTED SIG ISOLATION CRITERIA IF any S/G pressure decreasing in an uncontrolled manner OR any S/G completely depressurized, THEN the following may be performed:

a. Maintain total feedwater flow greater than 345 gpm until narrow range level in at least one SIG is greater than 6%[32%].

b. Isolate AFW flow to faulted S1G(s).

c. Stabilize RCS hot leg temperature using steam dumps when faulted S/G has blown down to less than 10% Hide range.

4. RUPTURED SIG ISOLATION CRITERIA IF any S/G level increases in an uncontrolled manner OR any SIG has abnormal radiation. AND narrow range level in affected S/G(s) is greater than 6%[32%], THEN feed flow may be stopped to affected S/G(s).

5. AFW SYSTEM OPERATION CRITERIA

a. IF two AFW pumps are operating on a single train, THEN one of the pumps shall be shut down within one hour of the initial start signal

b. IF two AFW trains are operating and one of the AFW pumps has been operating at low flow of 60 gpm or less for one hour, THEN that AFW pump shall be shut down

6. CST MAKEUP WATER CRITERIA i.E CST level decreases to less than 10%, THEN add makeup to CST using 3-NOP-018.01, CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK (CST).

7. RHR SYSTEM OPERATION CRITERIA IF RHR flow is less than 1000 gpm, THEN the RHR pumps shall be shut down within 44 minutes of the initial start signal.

26

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Appendix D Required Operator Actons Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 7 of 24 Event

Description:

During plant stabilization, Block Valve MOV-3-535 develops leakage with PORV 456 leaking. The crew responds using 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions to 3-EOP-E-1. RCPs are tripped with the loss of Subcooling Margin.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 9 Check RCP Seal Coohng a Check at RCP thermi barrier alarms ct. j CCW to an RCP thermal barrier is lost.

OFF

A i/l, RCP ThERMAL BARR 1) Trip the affected RCP(s).

COOLING WATER HI FLOW

2) Go to Step 9c.

A 1)2, RCP THERMAL BARR COOLING WATER HI TEM P

A 1)3, RCP THERMAL BARR COOLING WATER LO FLOW

b. GotoSteplO

c. Check all RCP seal return temperatures c. Go to Step 10.

are less than 235 F

d. VerifySI-RESET d. ReselSl.

e. IF offmte sower is HOT available. THEN check diesel capacity adequate to r-Jn one chargtng pump. IF adequate diesel capacity is NOT available. THEN shed nonessential Iods SROIATC Refer to ATTACHMENT 2 for component KW load rating t Start one charging pump at n,icimtjm f. Go to Step 10.

speed for seal inection

g. Adjust Charging Flow To Regen Heat

/ Exchanqer. HCV-3-121, to maintain proper seal injection Sow 29

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 8 of 24 Event

Description:

During plant stabilization, Block Valve MOV-3-535 develops leakage with PORV 456 leaking. The crew responds using 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions to 3-EOP-E-1. RCPs are tripped with the loss of Subcooling Margin.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SROIATC j Maintais RCS Cold Leg Ternperatur& ecnn :re to bwmi STAE_EATTREtiCNGTOE4FlF a. :eperureadecaasrig

.LyRDpur;iNG pfuintie roowro:

OR Slop 2ulp g steom ESS Ft-Alt 7FALDSTA3S F NO Di Eedu_e cIa feed flow to 4S guru 9p ro mu rw ow re-rue teu.er areewrlj,cjr 32f] -i a: least 09C S.C t1 tFcoolciov,r a cJeerceusva s:urun flow. THEN close rein

sam lIne iselattor and case F:an-tpwwo.re ;rea:ethw F AltO ircreooirg. THENp fr tha flu :o,.ira:

Dump seam to er.se CR Dump sw:m atear, dump toatmre.u.c SROIATC Reduces total AFW flow to 345 gpm max for aN SIGs.

II Check PRZ PORVa, Spray Valves And Excess Letdown Isolated w PORVs CLOSED a IF PRZ pressure less than 2335 psig, THEN manually close PORV5. IF any PRZ PORV can jI be closed, manually close its block valve. JE block valve can be closed, THEN perform the following:

1) Monitor Critical Safety Functions using 3-EOP-F-0, CRITICAL SAFETY FUN CTION STATIJS TREES

2) Go to 3-EOP-E- I, LOSS OF SR0 ATC REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT. Step 1 b Normal PRZ spray valves CLOSED b j PRZ pressure less than 2260 psig, THEN manually close valves. j valve(s) can NOT be closed, THEN stop RCP(s) as necessary to stop spray flow.

c Auxiliary Spray Valve, CV-3-3 I I c Manually close aUxiliary spray valve.

CLOSED auxiliary spray valve can 2I be closed.

THEN close Charging Flow to Regen Heat Exchanger, HCV 121 if 30

Appendix D Required Operator Actions - Form ES-D-2 r Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 9 of 24 Event

Description:

During plant stabilization, Block Valve MOV-3-535 develops leakage with PORV 456 leaking. The crew responds using 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions to 3-EOP-E-1. RCPs are tripped with the loss of Subcooling Margin.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 11 Check PRZPORVs, Spray Valves And Excess Letdown Isolated (continued) d Excess letdown isolation valves d Manually close valve(s).

CLOSED SRO/ATC

CV-3-387 Excess Letdown Isolation Valve From Cold Leg To Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger

HCV 137, Excess Letdown Flow Controller Si, 12 Check It RCPs Should Be Stopped a Check RCPs ANY RUNNING

- Go to Step Ii b Check RCS subcocling LESS THAN b. Go to Step 13.

25F[65Fj SROIATC c High-HeadSlPumpATLEASTONE c. GotoStep 3.

RUNNING PLOWPATH VERIFIED

d. Stop all RCPs Stops RCPs if subcooling is less than 25°F (65°F) with HHSI flowpath verified with HHSI pumps running.

SRO!ATC CREW CRITICAL TASK Trip RCPs due to a loss of subcooling during a SBLOCA prior to completing step I of 3-EOP-E-1.

31

[ Appendix 0 equred Operator Actons Form ES-D-2 1 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: I Event No.: 6 Page 10 of 24 Event

Description:

During plant stabilization, Block Valve MOV-3-535 develops leakage with PORV 456 leaking. The crew responds using 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions to 3-EOP-E-1. RCPs are tripped with the loss of Subcooling Margin.

Time

] Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 13 Check If S!Gs Are Faulted

a. Check pressures n all SOs a. Go to Step 1&

ANY SG PRESSURE GECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER OR ANY SO COMPLETELY SRO/ATC DEPRESSURIZED b Perform the following:

I Monitor Critic afety Functions using 3-E -F-C, CRITICAL SAFETY FUN ON STATUS TREES

2) 30 to 3-EOP-E-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION, Step I 14 Check If Sf0 Tubes Are Ruptured

& Check levels in all SIGs and secondary a. Go to Step 15..

radiation levels:

ANY SO LEVEL iNCREASING IN AN UNC ONTROLLED MANNER OR Condenser air eiectcr radiation, R-15 HGHER THAN NORMAL OR SO blowdown radiation, R-t9 HIGHER THAN NORMAL SRO/ATC DCS SG or secondary radiation readinsHlGHER THAN NORMAL OR Local steamline radiation HIGHER THAN NORMAL b Perform the followinu:

1) MonitorCduicalSafet Functions using 3-EOP-F-O, CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES

2) Go to 3-EOP-E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE, Step I 32

Appendix b equired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 11 of 24 Event

Description:

During plant stabilization, Block Valve MOV-3-535 develops leakage with PORV 456 leaking. The crew responds using 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions to 3-EOP-E-1. RCPs are tripped with the loss of Subcooling Margin.

Time Position

{ Applicants Actions or Behavior 15 Check If RCS Is Intact Perfom the foIlowin:

Containment radiaton - NORMAL 1. Monitor CrthcaI Safety Functone using 3-EOP-F-O. CRITICAL SAFETY

Containment pressure - NORMAL FUNCTiON STATUS TREES QDflIA

Containment suntp level - NORMAL 2. Go to 3-EOP-E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR I

OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 1

Ll-3-6308A

LI-3-.63085

\/

CREW Diagnoses the Small Break LOCA.

EXAMINER NOTE: If AFW Flow was NOT restored to the A SIG, then the crew will transition to 3-EOP-FR-H.1. This contingency will be at the back of the scenario.

(Pages 53 & 54)

SRO Transitions to 3-EOP-E-1.

Continues performance of 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3 Prompt Action Verification.

BOP Examiner Note: 3-EOP-E-1 details start on Event No. 6 Page 18 of 24 (Page 40-bottom) 33

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Appendix b equired Operator Actioni Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 16 of 24 Event

Description:

During plant stabilization, Block Valve MOV-3-535 develops leakage with PORV 456 leaking. The crew responds using 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions to 3-EOP-E-1. RCPs are tripped with the loss of Subcooling Margin.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

15. Monitor Containment Pressure To Verify Containment Spray NOT Required

a. Containment pressure HAS REMAINED

- a. Perform the following:

LESS THAN 20 PSIG I) E containment spray initiated.

. PR-3-6306A THEN manually initiate containment spray.

AND

2) Verify Containment Isolation Phase B

PR-3-6306B -ACTUATED.

BOP

3) Verify Containment Isolation Phase B valve white lights on VPB ALL BRIGHT.

4) IF any Containment Isolation Phase B valve did NOT close, THEN manually or locally isolate affected containment penetration.

5) Stop all RCPs.

16. Verify Containment and Control Room Ventilation Isolation

a. Unit 3 containment purge exhaust and a. Manually stop fans.

BOP supply fans OFF

b. Verify Control Room ventilation status b. Manually align equipment for Control panel PROPER EMERGENCY

- Room emergency recirculation.

RECIRCULATION ALIGNMENT NOTE fl BO p Hydrogen Monitors should be in service within 30 minutes of a valid SI signal. They should be available in a timely manner to suppod decision-making related to hydrogen generation in containment.

S S S

17 Place Hydrogen Monitors In Service Using 3-NOP-094, CONTAINMENT POST ACCIDENT MONITORING SYSTEM BOP

/ Verify All Four EOGs RUNNING EMERGENCY START any available EDO NOT running.

BOP 38

Appendix equired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 17 of 24 Event

Description:

During plant stabilization, Block Valve MOV-3-535 develops leakage with PORV 456 leaking. The crew responds using 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions to 3-EOP-E-1. RCPs are tripped with the loss of Subcooling Margin.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

19. Verify Power To Emergency 4 K.!

Buses and Load Centers

a. Check the 3A, 38 and 3D 4 KV buses - a. Perform the following:

ALL ENERGIZED 1> Inform the Unit Supervisor that ATTACHMENT 3 is complete with the exception of the de-energized bus or buses.

2) IF the Unit Supervisor decides not to er,ergize the de-energized bus or buses, THEN go to Step 20.

BOP 3) IF the Unit Supervisor decides to energize 3A, 38, or 3D bus, THEN perform the following:

a) E 3A 4 KV bus de-energized.

THEN restore power to bus using 3-ONOP-004.2, LOSS OF 3A 4KV BUS.

b) IF 3B 4 KV bus de-energized.

Ili restore power to bus using 3-ONOP-004.3, LOSS OF 3B 4KV BUS.

c) IF 3D 4 KV bus cte-energized, THEN restore power to bus using 3-ONOP-004.5, LOSS OF 3D 4KV BUS.

20. Notify The Unit Supervisor That The PROMPT ACTION VERIFICATIONS Attachment Is Complete And Discuss Any B Safeguards Equipment That Is Not In The Required Condition 39

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[Appendix b Required Operator Actions - Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 21 of 24 Event

Description:

During plant stabilization, Block Valve MOV-3-535 develops leakage with PORV 456 leaking. The crew responds using 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions to 3-EOP-E-1. RCPs are tripped with the loss of Subcooling Margin.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior II Check if SI Should be Terminated

a. RCS subcooling based on core exit TCs - a, Go to Step 12.

GREATER THAN 30FIRefer :o Foldout Page Item 3 Adverse Value]

b Secondary heat sink b. IF neither condition satisfied, go :0 Step 12.

Total feed flow to intact S/Gs -

GREATER THAN 345 GPM OR Narrow range level in at least one SROIATC intaci Sf0 GREATER THAN 6%[32%1

c. RCS pressure c. Go to Step 12.

. Pressure t3REATER THAN 1600 PSIG[2000 P510]

Pressure STABLE OR INCREASIN I d. FRZ level - GREATER THAN 17%[50° U. Try to staoieze RCS pressure with normal PRZ spray. Go to Step 2.

e, Goo3-EOP-ES-1.1. SI Tern,in- ti 12 Check If Containment Spray Should Be Stopped

a. Containment spray pumps ANY a, Observe CAUTION prior to Step 13 RUNNING go to Step 13.

b. Check the following b. WHEN containment pressure less then 14 psig, AND containment temperature

Emergency Containment Filter Spray less than 122F. THEN do Steps 12c Valves.- CLOSED through 12e. Observe CAUTION prior to Step 13 AND continue with Step 13.

3A ECF Spray SV-3-2905, 2906

. 3B ECF Spray SV-3-2907, 2908 SROIATC . 3C ECF Spray SV-3-2909, 2910

. Containment temperature

- LESS THAN 122F

. Containment pressure- LESS THAN 14 PSIG

c. Reset containment spray signal

d. Stop both containment spray pumps AND place in standby

a. Close Containment Spray Isolation valves

. MOV-3-880A

MOV-3-880B 43

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[ Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-21 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 23 of 24 Event

Description:

During plant stabilization, Block Valve MOV-3-535 develops leakage with PORV 456 leaking. The crew responds using 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions to 3-EOP-E-1. RCPs are tripped with the loss of Subcooling Margin.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATTACHMENT 4 (Pagelof I)

ESTABLISH CHARGING FLOW Verify CCW Flow Alarms To All RCP j COW flow to RCPs thermal barrier is lost.

Thermal Barriers OFF- perform the following:

A Ill. RCP THERMAL BARR COOLING 0. Verifysealretumteniperaturetoreach WATER HI FLOW RCP to be less than 23o F AND b. seal return temperature for each RCP is less than 236 F. THEN go to Step 2.

A 1.2. RCP THERMAL BARR COOLING WATER HI TEMP c. E seal return temperature is 235 F, THEN locally isolate seal injection to L2. affected RCP(s) before starting charging

A 13, RCP THERMAL BARR COOLING pumps.

WATER LO FLOW 3-297A for RCP A 3-297B for ReP B 3-297C for RCP C ci. WHEN seal injection is isolated to each affected RCP, THEN go to Step 2.

2. Check Offsite Power Available j offsite power is NOT available. THEN check diesel capacity adequate to run one charging pump. j diesel capacity is .

adequate, THEN shed non-essential loads.

Refer to ATTACHMENT 3 for component KW load rating.

3.Start One Charging Pump

4. Place RCS Makeup Control Switch in STOP

5. Establish Desired Charging Flow

a. Stan additional charging pumps if needed a. E offsite power is QI available, and offsice power available check diesel capacity adequate to run additional charging pumps.

c. Adjust Charging Flow To Regen Heat Exchanger, HCV-3-12l, :0 maintain proper seal injection flow

d. Verify charging pump suction auto transfers to RWST

6. Notify The Unit Supervisor That The ESTABLISH CHARGiNG FLOW Attachment Is Complete 45

I Appendix equired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 24 of 24 Event

Description:

During plant stabilization, Block Valve MOV-3-535 develops leakage with PORV 456 leaking. The crew responds using 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions to 3-EOP-E-1. RCPs are tripped with the loss of Subcooling Margin.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior FOLDOUT FOR PROCEDURE E-I

1. ADVERSE CONTAINMENT CONDITIONS IF either of the conditions listed below occurs, THEN use adverse containment setpoircs:

Containment atmosphere temperature l80F OR Containment radiation levels l.3xi0 Rihr WHEN containment parameters drop below the above values, THEN normal setpoints can again be used IO j, containment integrated dose rate has not exceeded Rads.

2. RCP TRIP CRITERIA

a. jf all conditions listed below occur. THEN trip all RCPs:

1) High-head SI pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING Q SI FLOWPATH VERIFIED

2) RCS subcooling LESS THAN 25F[S5F]

3) Controlled RCS cooldown is NOT in progress

b. jphase B actuated, g:rip all RCPs

3. SI TERMINATION CRITERIA IF all condinons listed below occur, go to 3-EOP-ES-i .1, SI TERMINATION, Step 1.

a RCS subcooling based on core exit TCs GREATER THAN 30F[See below Table]

SI TERMINATION ADVERSE SUBCOOLING VALUE RCS PRESSURE (PSIG) ADVERSE SUECOOLING VALUE

< 2485 AND 2000 55 F

< 2000 AND 1000 85 F

<1000 2i0F

b. Total feed flow to intact SOs GREATER THAN 345 GPM 9E narrow range level in at least one intact SG GREATER THAN 6%i32%]

c. RCS pressure GREATER THAN 1600 PSIG[2000 psig].Q STABLE OR INCREASING

d. PRZ level GREATER THAN 17%i50%]

4. SECONDARY INTEGRITY CRITERIA IF any S/G pressure is decreasing in an uncontrollect manner has completely depressurized that SIG has NOT been isolated, go to 3-EOP-E-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION.

Step 1.

5. E-3 TRANSiTION CRITERIA J.E any 5/0 level increases in an uncontrolled manner any S/G has abnormal radiation, manually start SI pumps as necessary and go to 3-EOP-E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Step 1.

S. COLD LEG RECIRCULATION SWITCHOVER CRITERIA j RWST level decreases to less than 155,000 gallons, THEN go to 3-EOP-ES- 1.3, TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION, Step 1.

7. RECIRCULATION SUMP BLOCKAGE -.

IF RHR pump flow AND amps become elTatic abnormally low after recirculation has been established, THEN transition to 3-EOP-ECA-i.i, LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRCULATION, Step 1.

8. CST MAKEUP WATER CRITERIA IF CST level decreases to less than 10%. THEN add makeup to CST using 3-NOP-0 18.01, Condensate Storage Tank (CST).

9. LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER OR SI ON OTHER UNIT j SI has been reset AND either otfsite power is lost Q SI actuates on the other unit, restore safeguards equipment to required configuration. Refer to ATTACHMENT 3 for essential loads.

10. RHR SYSTEM OPERATION CRITERIA j RHR flow is less than 1000 gpm, the RHR pumps shall be shut down within 44 minutes of the initial start signal.

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Appendix b Required Operator Actions - Form ES-Dj Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 3 of 6 NOTE: This is an additional Attachment 3 which is conveniently at the end for evaluator corn ments.

3-EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Attachment 3, Prompt Action Verifications Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

7. Verify Pump Operation

a. At least two high head Si pumps running a. Manually start high-head pump(s).

BOP b. Both RHR pumps running b. Manually start RHR pump(s).

8. verify SI Flow

a. RCS pressure - LESS THAN ieoo PSIG a. Go to Step 9.

12000 PSIG]

b. High-head SI pump flow indicator b. Manually start pumps AND align valves to CHECK FOR FLOW establish an injection flowpath.

c. RCS pressure LESS THAN 250 PSIG

- c. Go to Step 9.

BOP [650 PSIG]

d. RHR pump flow indicator - d. Manually start pumps j(Q align valves to CHECK FOR FLOW establish an injection flowpath.

9. Realign SI System

a. Verify Unit 3 high-head SI pumps TWO

- a. Perform the following RUNNING

1) Operate Unit 3 and Unit 4 high-head SI pumps to establish injection to Unit 3 from two high-head SI pumps.

2) Direct Unit 4 Reactor Operator to align Unit 4 high-head SI pump sucdon to Unit 3 RWST using BOP ATTACHMENT I of this procedure.

3) Go to Step 10 U. Sp both Unit 4 hIgh-head SI pumps AND place in Siafldby f

BOP Places the handswitches for the 4A and 4B HHSI pumps to STOP.

49

Appendix D Required Operator Actions - Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 4 of 6 NOTE: This is an additional Attachment 3 which is conveniently at the end for evaluator corn ments.

3-EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Attachment 3, Prompt Action Verifications Tinie

[ Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

10. Verify Containment Isolation Phase A Valve Perform the following:

White Lights On VPB ALL BRIGHT

a. Manually actuate Containment Isolation Phase A.

h IP any Containment Isolation Phase A BOP valve is NOT closed. THEN manually close value. IF valve(s) can NOT be manually closed, THEN manually or locally isolate affected containment penetration.

11, Verify SI. Valve Amber Lights On VPB - Manually align valves to establish proper SI ALL BRIGHT alignment for an injection flowpatlt BOP

12. Verify SI RESET Reset SI BOP

13. Verify Containment Phase A RESET Rvset Phav A BOP

14. Reestablish RCP Cooling

a. Check RCPs AT LEAST ONE a. Go to Step 15.

RUNNING

b. Open CCW to normal containment cooler b. Stop all RCPs valves BOP

MOV-3-1417

MOV-3-1418

c. Reset and start normal containment c. Stop all RCPs coolers l

50

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I Appendix b Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 6 of 6 NOTE: This is an additional Attachment 3 which is conveniently at the end for evaluator corn ments.

3-EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Attachment 3, Prompt Action Verifications Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

19. Verify Power To Emergency 4 KV Buses and Load Centers

a. Check the 3A, 38 and 3D 4 KV buses - a. Perform the following:

ALL ENERGIZED

1) Inform the Unit Supervisor that ATTACHMENT 3 is complete with the exception of the de-energized bus or buses.

2) IF the Unit Supervisor decides not to energize the de-energized bus or buses. THEN go to Step 20.

BOP 3) IF the Unit Supervisor decides to energize 3A, 3B, or 3D bus, THEN perform the following:

a) j 3A 4 KV bus de-energized.

THEN restore power to bus using 3-ONOP-004.2, LOSS OF 3A 4KV BUS.

b) IF 38 4 KV bus de-energized, THEN restore power to bus using 3-ONOP-004.3. LOSS OF 38 4KV BUS.

c) IF 3D 4 KV bus de-energized, restore power to bus using 3-ONOP-004.5, LOSS OF 3D 4KV BUS.

20. Notify The Unit Supervisor That The PROMPT ACTION VERIFICATIONS Attachment Is Complete And Discuss Any BOP f Safeguards Equipment That Is Not In The Required Condition 52

[ Appendix B Required Operator Actions - Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 7 Page 1 of 2 AFW flow to the 3C SIG is blocked. Also, B TDAFWP mechanically trips and the C TDAFWP Governor Valve Fails closed. During the performance of 3-EOP-E-0, the crew uses A TDAFWP to establish greater than 345 gpm total to the 3A and 3B S!G. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H.1 to restore.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Directs 3-EOP-FR-H. 1 response.

CAUTIONS

. If total feed flow has been reduced to less than 345 gpm due to procedural requirements and 345 gpm total feed flow is available, then this procedure shall SROIATC NOT be performed.

. Feed flow should NOT be reestablished to any faulted S/G if a non-faulted SIG is available.

Check If Secondary Heat Sink Is Required a RCS pressure GREATER THAN ANY a Return to procedure end step in effect NON-PAULTED S/G PRESSURE SROIATC b ROS average temperature GREATER

- b Try to place RHR System in service THAN 350T while continuing in this procedura Refer to 3-OP-050, RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM jf adequate cooling with RHR system established, THEN return to procedure and step in effect.

CAUTIONS

. If wide range level in any S/G is less than 22% (narrow range level in all SIG5 less than 32%) or PRZ pressure is greater than or equal to 2335 psig due to loss SROIATC of secondary heat sink, Steps 11 through 19 should be initiated immediately for bleed and feed.

. If csr level decreases to less than 10%, makeup water sources for CST will be necessary to maintain secondary hear sink.

Try To Establish AEW Flow To At Least One

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53

Appendix Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 7 Page 2 of 2 AFW flow to the 3C SIG is blocked. Also, B TDAFWP mechanically trips and the C TDAFWP Governor Valve Fails closed. During the performance of 3-EOP-E-0, the crew uses A TDAFWP to establish greater than 345 gpm total to the 3A and 3B S/G. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H.1 to restore.

Time Position

[ Applicants Actions or Behavior c y to raatre a teck to:a eec o.v t - GETE ecrn ti oainçj

-iA 45 P1 Feadflozo a: eaat oneS G jerEed. THEN vo nzah tkw to reatore parow range eve o thor % r,2a].

a WHEN range eve a SRO!ATC rea:er thor .5 g3: m etLrn to Dracar..j o-ia a:ea effec:.

2 Feed f:w : a: eact one ried THEI .pat:t ceator :0 Doof a reetye 3 Go Step I a Eaturn to arnoedLre ard a:ep n fec:

CREW Re-establishes AFW flow and returns to procedure and step in effect.

54

ILC-27 NRC Scenario #2 Event Description Facility: Turkey Point Scenario: 2 Op Test.: 2011-302 Examiners: Candidates: US ATC BOP Initial Conditions: Mode 1 100% oower at BOL.

Turnover:

Maintain 100% power with Online Risk Green. B Train is protected on both units.

The 3B Accumulator level is high due to in-leakage. Section 5.2 of 3-NOP-064 is to be performed to lower level back to a normal operating band.

Event MaIf.

Event Type Event Description No. No.

(N) ATC TS LCO 3.5.1 was entered for 3B Accumulator level at greater than 6,820 1 N/A gallons. Use 3-NOP-064, Section 5.2 to lower 38 Accumulator level to the (N SRO normal operating band (6,552 to 6,788 gallons).

VCT Level Transmitter, LT-3-1 15, drifts high over 3 minutes to divert water I ATC TvB1 LCDV to the Hold Up Tanks. This requires manual operator action to reposition 2

(I) SRO 3-LCV-1 15A to the VCT position. The crew responds using the ARP or 3-ONOP-046.4.

(C) BOP 3A Heater Drain Pump trips on high amps which require starting an 3 TVUTPMPA (C) SRO additional Condensate Pump to support this power level.

The Master Charging Pump Controller, LC-3-459G, signal fails high. The I ATC TFH2L9FH RO takes action to control the Charging Pump Speed Controller in manual 4

(I) SRO and maintain program level per Enclosure 1 of 3-ONOP-041 .6, Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction.

Turbine First Stage Pressure Channel, P-3-447 fails low. ATC determines I ATC TFS1 MAML no runback. Rod Control is taken to manual per 3-ONOP-028 or 0-ADM-(ITS) SRO 211. 3-ONOP-049.1 is entered for mitigation. The SRO will address LCO 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. This channel is declared inoperable.

S/G Steam Flow Channel Fl-474 fails as is for A SIG. The A S/G Feed Reg (I) BOP Valve does NOT respond properly during power maneuver. Action is 6 TFS1 MWEA necessary for manual control and/or swap channels. When discovered, the I 1S1 SRO SRO will address LCO 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. This channel is declared inoperable.

(R) ATC Engineering reports 3B S/G Feedwater Pump High Vibration. SM directs a N/A (N) BOP 3-GOP-100 power reduction to remove the 38 S/G Feedwater Pump within (R) SRO the next hour.

TVFAHDR2 (M) ALL A common Main Feed Header break occurs, the crew responds to the 8

TVFALN3 reactor trip using 3-EOP-E-0.

TAFK144 TAFK244 (M) ALL During the loss of Main Feed, a common loss of suction to all AFW pumps.

The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H.1 to initiate Feed and Bleed.

TAFK344 (I) BOP .

The Main Turbine fails to automatically trip. The BOP will take 10 TFLJ100005 (I) SRO compensatory action to trip the Turbine manually.

(I) BOP The ICW to TPCW Heat Exchanger Valve, POV-3-4883, does not TFKC883A automatically isolate on a Safety Injection signal. The BOP takes action I SRO while performing Attachment 3 of 3-EOP-E-0 to manually close the valve.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1

ILC-27 NRC Scenario #2 Event Description SIMULATOR SETUP INSTRUCTIONS

1. Reset to IC-il (100% BOL) or other IC with correct setup conditions.

2. Place Simulator in RUN

3. Open and Execute ILC27SCN2N.Isn.

4. Ensure 3A S/G Steam Flow Channel Control Transfer is selected to FI-3-474.

5. Ensure Channel Select First Stage Pressure Control is selected to CH4 YELLOW.

6. Increase 3B Accumulator level to greater than 6,820 gallons.

7. Store IC with initial conditions setup if desired.

8. Trigger lesson steps:

SETUP LOSS OF AFW PUMP SUCTION SUPPLY insert TAFK144 0.000000 delay0 ramp=0 on0 off=0 insert TAFK244 0.000000 delay=0 ramp=0 on=0 off=0 insert TAFK344 0.000000 delay=0 ramp=0 on0 off=0

SETUP MAIN TURBINE FAILS TO TRIP insert TFU10005 TRUE delay=0 ramp=0 on=0 off0

SETUP FAIL POV-3-4883 AS IS insert TFKC883A TRUE delay=0 ramp=0 on=0 off=0

9. Provide an in progress procedure of 3-NOP-064, Safety Injection Accumulators.

10. Place Simulator in freeze.

11. Provide Shift Turnover Checklists

12. Perform Simulator Operator Checklist

13. When ready to begin, place Simulator in RUN.

2

ILC-27 NRC Scenario #2 Event Description FACILITY OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS EVENT I TS LCD 3.5.1 was entered for 3B Accumulator level at greater than 6,820 gallons. Use 3-NOP-064, Section 5.2 to lower 3B Accumulator level to the normal operating band (6,552 to 6,788 gallons). After reached, the SRO exits the LCD.

EVENT 2 VCT Level Transmitter, LT-3-1 15, drifts high over 3 minutes to divert water to the Hold Up Tanks. This requires manual operator action to reposition 3-LCV-1 1 5A to the VCT position. The crew responds using the ARP or 3-ONOP-046.4.

When directed, Trigger EVENT 2 LT-3-115 DRIFTS HIGH.

insert TVBILCDV 1.000000 delay=0 ramp=180 on=0 off=0 SM - If directed, respond and acknowledge the failure of LT-3-1 15.

WCC/I&C- If directed, respond and acknowledge the failure of LT-3-1 15 and to write a PWO for troubleshooting.

SNPOIFS If directed, respond and acknowledge local level of LI-3-112 (Schema reading).

EVENT 3 3A Heater Drain Pump trips on high amps which require starting an additional Condensate Pump to support this power level.

When directed, Trigger EVENT 3 3A HOP TRIPS ON HIGH AMPS.

insert TVUTPMPA 1.000000 delay=0 ramp=120 on=0 off0 SM - If directed, respond and acknowledge the failure of 3A HDP.

WCC If directed, respond and acknowledge the failure of 3A HDP and to write a PWO for troubleshooting.

ENG If directed, respond and acknowledge the failure of 3A HDP. Recommend maintaining full power operation with an engineering walkdown to monitor secondary performance.

[NOTE: This condition will feed into Event 7 where 3B SIG Feedwater Pump is running with high vibration. If the crew decides to reduce power in accordance with the table, then proceed with Event 6 with SIG Stm Flow Channel FI-474 failed as is.]

EVENT 4 The Master Charging Pump Controller, LC-3-459G, signal fails high. The RD takes action to control the Charging Pump Speed Controller in manual and maintain program level per of 3-ONOP-041 .6, Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction.

When directed, Trigger EVENT 4- MSTR CHARGING CONTROL LC-3-459G FAILS HI.

insert TFH2L9FH TRUE delay=0 ramp=0 on=0 off=0 SM - If directed, respond and acknowledge the failure of LC-3-459G.

WCC - If directed, respond and acknowledge the failure of LC-3-459G and to write a PWO for troubleshooting.

3

ILC-27 NRC Scenario #2 Event Description EVENT 5 Turbine First Stage Pressure Channel, P-3-447 fails low. ATC determines no runback. Rod Control is taken to manual per 3-ONOP-028 or 0-ADM-21 1. 3-ONOP-049.1 is entered for mitigation. The SRO will address LCO 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. This channel is declared inoperable.

When directed, Trigger EVENT 5 PT-3-447 FAILS LOW.

insert TFS1MAML TRUE delay=0 ramp=O on=0 off=O SM - If directed, respond and acknowledge the failure of PT-3-447 WCC - If directed, respond and acknowledge the failure of PT-3-447 and to write a PWO for troubleshooting.

FSITO - If directed, respond and reset AMSAC by Trigger EVENT 5 RESET AMSAC

insert TCL4RST TRUE delay0 ramp=0 on=0 off=0 EVENT 6 SIG Steam Flow Channel F 1-3-474 fails as is for A S/G. The A SIG Feed Reg Valve does respond properly during power maneuver. Action is necessary for manual control and/or swap channels. When discovered, the SRO will address LCO 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. This channel is declared inoperable.

When directed, Trigger EVENT 6 SG FLOW TRANSMITTER SB-FT-474 FAILS AS IS.

insert TFS1MWEA TRUE delay=0 ramp=0 on=0 off=O SM - If directed, respond and acknowledge the failure of Fl-3-474.

WCC - If directed, respond and acknowledge the failure of Fl-3-474 and to write a PWO for troubleshooting.

EVENT 7 Engineering reports 3B SIG Feedwater Pump High Vibration. SM directs a 3-GOP-i 00 power reduction to remove the 3B S/G Feedwater Pump within the next hour.

When directed, call as Shift Manager and report, Engineering has completed a walkdown of the secondary system. They have reported 3B SIG Feedwater Pump has high vibration. I am directing you to reduce Unit 3 power to 50% using 3-GOP-I 00 and remove the 3B SIG Feedwater Pump from service over the next hour.

SM - If directed, acknowledge power reduction.

WCC If directed, acknowledge power reduction for the removal of 3B SIG Feedwater Pump.

SYSTEM DISPATCH - If directed, acknowledge power reduction to 50% for the removal of 3B S/G Feedwater Pump.

ENGINEERING - If directed, acknowledge power reduction to 50% for the removal of 3B SIG Feedwater Pump.

CHEMISTRY If directed, acknowledge power reduction to 50% for the removal of 3B S/G Feedwater Pump and to sample the RCS for the power change.

4

ILC-27 NRC Scenario #2 Event Description EVENT 8 A Main Feed Header break occurs, the crew responds to the reactor trip using 3-EOP-E-0.

When directed, Trigger EVENT 8 - MAIN FEED HEADER BREAK WITH SGFP BKRS TRIPPING.

o insert TVFAHDR2 1 delay=0 ramp=0 on=0 off=0

insert TVFALN3 1.0 delay=0 ramp=0 on=0 off=0

insert TFF1 D1AT TRUE delay=120 ramp=0 on=0 off=0

insert TFF1 Dl BT TRUE delay=1 20 ramp=0 on=0 off=0 When directed, Trigger EVENT 8 PAHMS.-

insert TAC2VO2A 1.000000 delay=0 ramp=0 on=0 off=0

insert TAC2VO2B 1.000000 delay=0 ramp=0 on=O off=O

insert TAAAV2I 1.000000 delay=0 ramp=0 on=0 off=0

insert TAAAV22 1.000000 delay=0 ramp=0 on=0 off=0

insert TACAOO5 .000000 delay=0 ramp=0 on=0 off=0 EVENT 9 During the loss of Main Feed, a common loss of suction to all AFW pumps. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H.1 to initiate Feed and Bleed.

FSITO If dispatched to investigate loss of Auxiliary Feedwater, the operator will respond they cannot enter the Aux. Feedwater Cage Area due to steam in the area.

EVENT 10 The Main Turbine fails to automatically trip. The BOP will take compensatory action to trip the Turbine manually.

Conditional Trigger EVENT 10-MANUALLY TRIP MAIN TURBINE.

Condition: IMU1PR4O insert TFU10005 0 delay=0 ramp=0 on=0 off=0 EVENT 11 The ICW to TPCW Heat Exchanger Valve, POV-3-4883, does not automatically isolate on a Safety Injection signal. The BOP takes action while performing Attachment 3 of 3-EOP-E-0 to manually close the valve.

Conditional Trigger EVENT 11- ALLOWS MANUAL CLOSURE OF POV-3-4883.

Condition: 1MK2883C dellA TFKC883A 2 delay=0 5

ILC-27 NRC Scenario #2 Event Description SCENARIO QUANTITATIVE ATTRIBUTES Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario, See Section 0 5 d) #

1. Total malfunctions (58) 5

2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (12) 2

3. Abnormal events (24) 4

4. Major transients (12) 1

5. FOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (12) 1

6. FOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (02) 1

7. Critical tasks (23) 2 CRITICAL TASKS

1. Manually trip the Main Turbine prior to Step 5 of 3-EOP-E-O as read by the Unit Supervisor.

2. At the CAUTION before Step 2 of 3-EOP-FR-H.1, initiate bleed and feed to depressurize the RCS sufficiently for HHSI injection flow.

6

[

OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT ONCOMING CREW ASSIGNMENTS Shift Mgr: Inside SNPO:

Field Supv.: Outside SNPO:

Admin RCO: ANPO:

Unit 3 Unit 4 Unit Supv.: Unit Supv.:

RCO: RCO:

NPO: NPO:

Plant Status Unit 3 Unit 4 Mode: 1 Mode: 1 Power: 100 % Power: 100 %

MWe: 763 MWe: 758 Gross Leakrate: 0.03 gpm Gross Leakrate: 0.03 gpm RCS Boron Conc: 1205 ppm RCS Boron Conc: 268 ppm Operational Concerns: I

. TS LCO 3.5.1 was entered for 3B Accumulator level at greater than 6,820 gallons.

Use 3-NOP-064, Section 5.2 to lower 3B Accumulator level to the normal operating band.

U3 Anticipated LCO Actions:

U4 Anticipated LCO Actions:

Results of Offgoing Focus Area:

Unit 3 Status Reactor Operator Mode: I RCS Leakrate Accumulator Ref Levels Power: % 100 Gross: 0.03 gpm A 6616 gal MWe: 763 Unidentified 0.02 gpm B 6,823ga1 Tavg: *F 574 Charging Pps: 0.01 gpm [C 6627 gal RCS Pressure: psig 2235 RCS Boron Conc: 1205 ppm Abnormal Annunciators:

Annunciator: H 2/3 Accum B HiILo Press Comp Actions: Use 3-NOP-064, Section 5.2 to lower 3B Accumulator level to the normal operating band.

Annunciator: H 2/4 Accum B Hi/Lo Level Comp Actions: Use 3-NOP-064, Section 5.2 to lower 3B Accumulator level to the normal operating band.

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Annunciator:

Comp Actions:

Current Tech Spec Action Statements: (Does Not Include For Tracking Only Items T.S.A.S / Component: -TS LCO 3.5.1 was entered for 3B Accumulator level at greater than 6,820 gallons.

Reason: - 3B RCS In-leakage Entry Date: - today T.S.A.S / Component:

Reason:

Entry Date:

T.S.A.S / Component:

Reason:

Entry Date:

T.S.A.S / Component:

Reason:

Entry Date:

T.S.A.S / Component:

Reason:

Entry Date:

T.S.A.S / Component:

Reason:

EntryDate:

- - Unit3 Status Changes to Risk Significant Equipment:

B train protected both units

Online risk green Upcoming Reactivity Management Activities:

Upcoming Major POD Activities:

Upcoming ECOs to Hang and br Release:

Evolutions or ComDensatorv Actions in Prociress:

General Information, Remarks, and Operator Work Around Status:

Unit 3 supplying Auxiliary steam.

Condenser air in leakage 0 scfm.

Severe thunderstorm warning in South Dade County expires in 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.; 2011-302 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 4 Event

Description:

TS LCO 3.5.1 was entered for 3B Accumulator level at greater than 6,820 gallons. Use 3-NOP-064, Section 5.2 to lower 3B Accumulator level to the normal operating band (6,552 to 6,788 gallons). After reached, the SRO exits the LCO.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Observes high3BAccumulator levef

. High 3B Accumulator level above Tech Spec [imit

-- SROIATC :--

. Drains 3B Accumulatorlevel by 3 NOP-Q64

Exits Tech Spec limit 5.2 Draining Accumulators NOTE SROIATC This Section allows one or more Accumulators to be drained to reduce level or pressure or for draining in preparation to increase boron concentration.

SRO!ATC 1. CHECK RCDT available to receIve discharge from Accumulators.

N OTE

. MODES 1, 2, or 3 with RCS pressure greater than 1000 psig, Technical Specifications require Accumulator levels between 6520 and 6820 gallons:

SROIATC however, to account for possible instrument inaccuracies, the required range has been administratively established at 6552 to 6788 gallons.

. Technical Specifications require Accumulator pressures to be maintained in the range of 600 psig to 675 psi .

9

2. IF in MODES 1, 2 or 3 with RCS pressure greater than 1000 psig, AND Accumulator will be drained to less than 6520 gallons, THEN ENSURE the remaining two Accumulators are OPERABLE with:

. Water levels between 6552 to 6788 gallons.

. Nitrogen pressure between 625 to 665 psig, S RO/ATC 1

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r Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Page 2 of 3 Event

Description:

VCT Level Transmitter, LT-3-1 15, drifts high over 3 minutes to divert water to the Hold Up Tanks. This requires manual operator action to reposition 3-LCV-115A to the VCT position. The crew responds using the ARP or 3-ONOP-046.4.

Time Position

] Applicants Actions or Behavior -

2. IF \/CT has an actual Hi level, THEN:

SROIATC A. ENSURE LC-3-1 12, \JCT LEVEL CONTROLLER setpoint is between 37% to 40%.

B. CHECK LCV-3-1 15A diverts to the HUT according to VCT level program.

NOTE SROIATC LCV-3-1 I 5A fully resets at 76%

C. ENSURE LCV3-1 1 5A fully diverts at 86%.

SRf,C D. ENSURE proper charging and letdown flow balance.

3. IF VCT has an actual LO level, THEN:

A. WHEN VCT level lowers to 4%, THEN EltSURE charging pump suction swaps to the RWST, with LCV-3..115B, RWSTTO CHARGING PUMP SUCTION, OPEN and SROIATC LCV-3-115C, VCT OUTLET ISOLATION VALVE, CLOSED.

B. ENSURE auto makeup rate is greater than charging flow.

C. ENSURE suction source swaps back to VCT at 11%.

.1 IF LT 3 112 or LT 0 1 1 hae fai ed TEN REFER TO 3 ONOP 0-6 4 Mel unction oT t

SRO Boron Concentration Contiol System E)(AMINER NOTE: The crew may have entered 3-ONOP-0464 directly which is an acceptable flowpath.

SRO/ATC I Check Boric Acid 2E Primary Water Makeup Observe note prior to Step 28 and gotc Flow Rates - ABNORMAL Step 28.

i NOTES I

LT 112 and LT-3-1 15 share a common wet variable leg and a common dry reference I I leg. A false high level will be produced if the common dry reference leg fails. I RO/ATC

. Steps 28 through 38 assume stable charging and letdown flow; therefore, a transient I could mask the symptoms being used to determine which level transmitter has failed. I 6

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AppendixD Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Page 2 of 2 Event

Description:

3A Heater Drain Pump trips on high amps which require starting an additional Condensate Pump to support this power level.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior E)(AMINER NOTE: If Engineering is contacted, they will recommend maintaining full power operation with an engineering walkdown to monitor secondary performance. This condition will feed into Event 7 where 3B SIG Feedwater Pump is running with high vibration. If the crew decides to reduce power in accordance with the table, then proceed with Event 6 with SIG Stm Flow Channel FI-474 failed as is.

4. Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , PERFORM one of the following:

A. ENSURE minimum heater drain pump operation as required by table below using 3-OP-081, Heater Drain Pumps. or 3-OP-081.1 Feedwater Heater Extraction Steam Vents and Drains Valve Alignment.

B, OBTAIN Engineering concurrence to maintain full power operation.

SRO/BOP C. REDUCE power as required by table be.ow using 3-ONOP-100, Fast Load Reduction.

Turbine Load RDPs Required

Above 450 MWe Two 300 to 450 MNe One Below 300 Mwe None

5. CHECK HDP locally for abnormal indications and HDP Breakers 3AA07 or 3AB03 for S RoBp - targets.

E)(AMINER NOTE: After power reduction is addressed or at Lead Examiners discretion, then proceed with Event 4.

9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-]

Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 3 Event

Description:

The Master Charging Pump Controller, LC-3-459G, signal fails high. The RO takes action to control the Charging Pump Speed Controller in manual and maintain program level per Enclosure 1 of 3-ONOP-041 .6, Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Direct Facility Operator to trigger lesson step, EVENT 4 MSTR CHARGING CONTROL -

LC-3-459G FAILS HI (insert TFH2L9FH TRUE delay=O ramp=O on=O off=O)

. : ObsevesthefolIowin:r

Charging Pump Speed ncreasng SROIATC

. Charging flow to RCS rising

Annunciator G 1/2 -

CAUSES: I. Charging pump ccntrofler mallunction

2. Pressurizer levet rrsmatch 3 RCS leakage SRO/ATC CHARGING PUMP HI SPEED NOTE SRO

Breaker must be closed on a given pump for alarm to be functional.

93% demand is equivalent to approx 73 gpm.

ALARM CONFIRMATION SROIATC Check individual charging pump controller and the master charging pump controller.

OPERATOR ACTIONS IF a;faFlure of the master charging pump con&oll& has occurred ih automatic, THEN

. PLACE the atercontroiIer in manual and MAINTAIN pressurizer level on program.

SRO ,a GO TO 3 ONOP Q41 6 Pressurizer Leve[ Coritiol Malfuncton

2. IF a failur&of the individual charging pump controller has occurred in automatic THEN PLACE the mcliviclual controller in manual and MAINTAIN pressurizet level on program

- - A. GO TO 3-ONOP-Q41.6, Pressurizer Level control Malfunction.,

10

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Page 2 of 3 Event

Description:

The Master Charging Pump Controller, LC-3-459G, signal fails high. The RO takes action to control the Charging Pump Speed Controller in manual and maintain program level per Enclosure 1 of 3-ONOP-041 .6, Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction.

Time Position

} Applicants Actions or Behavior

. If Pressurizer Level Mo/function is a result of a failure of the 3.-459CX or 3-4OVCX relays (as indicated by a loss of letdown flow with a loss of Pressurizer Heaters with no concurrent failure of Level Transmitters 3-459k 3-460, 3-461), use 3ONOP--003.6 I Attachment 4. for 3-46OcX failure, OR 3ONOP003.9 Attachment 4, for 3-4590X s RO/ATC failure as guidance for establishing Letdown flow and Pressurizer Heaters.

. If the button on relays 3-459CX or 3-480CX are used to restore Letdown flow and Pressurizer Heaters, comply with Tech Spec Action Statement 3.4.3 Action b.

If the manual conboi of Heaters from the Electrical penetration room is used. comply I .

with Tech Spec Action .Statement 3.4.3 Action a.

L... I 5.0 SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS 5.1 Check pressurizer level indicators LI-3159A. LI.3.460 m LI-3451.

SROIATC *

.1.1 j one level indicator deviates slallllicantly from the others. Ij place CHAhINEL SELECT PRESSURIZER LEVEL CO}ITROL switch in a position that will NOT include the defective channeL IF piasui_z a I.. ...l does n r ci.. o_ si_nc a e 1 a THE\ plac LSTLE CI+/--j?Ll2C \IP CONTROLLR. L( -l°G , t5T,,4j NT aaiuaun los u.amesl Ic si Endo us SROIATC .2 1 II .i,h dual I amos psi onroil i e mt lotion no LI a .1 O( ffW\

pU L,h idual ChAP GLG PUjP LONTPOLLER us \IANC -J D nisinrain prosninied level per Enclosure 1.

EXAMINER NOTE: Enclosure I is on the next page.

11

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Page 3 of 3 Event

Description:

The Master Charging Pump Controller, LC-3-459G, signal fails high. The RO takes action to control the Charging Pump Speed Controller in manual and maintain program level per Enclosure I of 3-ONOP-041 .6, Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ENCLOSURE 1 (Paae 1 of 1)

PRESSURiZER PROGRAMMED LEVEL

% of PRZ Level Spai

l::.::::jjLLfL=

574,2P53.3%*-.

50 45 -,

40 * - -

--- ----p 35 30 ,

F s

A 25

- 547F222 20 15 UI 545 LI Wi LW 550 555 560 565 1 1 LLW 570 575 Tavg °F EXAMINER NOTE: When Pressurizer Level has been stabilized or at the Lead Examiners discretion, then proceed to Event 5.

12

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 3 of 9 Event
Description:
Turbine First Stage Pressure Channel, P-3-447 fails low. ATC determines no runback. Rod Control is taken to manual per 3-ONOP-028 or 0-ADM-21 1. 3-ONOP-049.1 is entered for mitigation. The SRO will address LCO 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. This channel is declared inoperable.
Time Position
[ Applicants Actions or Behavior ATCIBOP[ Restores Tavg ITref mismatch per difection ATC Se[ects PT3-446 on Channel SelectFir Stage Control (LUE) 5.3.4 IF the control banks insertion limits are exceeded. TREN perform the following:
1. Borate at equal to or greater than 16 gpin using O-OP-046, CVCS BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL, until control rods are above the Low Limit.
2. Ensure compliance with Tecinical Specifications by performing one of the following:
s ROIATC a. Restore the control banks to within the limits within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .
OR
b. Reduce thennal power within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months to less than or equal to the fraction of rated thermal power that is allowed by the bank position Plant Curve Book Section VII, Figure 3.
OR
3. Be in Hot Standby within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .
.: :. 5.3.5 Power Range Channel 4 has failed, perform to 3-ONOP-059.8,
. POWER RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRIJMENTATION MALFUNCTION.
- 5.3,6 W PT-3-446 or PT-3-447 has failed. N perform the folloig:
SROIATC ARodfew minutes fleeds to elapse between the be First Stave Presmie is fransfeéd hid I
Control is returned to Automatic: This will preclude the possibility of the power mismatch bircuiti cabsing dndsired frod motion. - :
L_________J I erit, Channel Seleut First Stage Press Control has been placed to an operable channel AND place the Rod Motion Control SeleLtol switch in
.:r
. . .- - AUTO.
-V . V.
SRO 2 Prform 3 ONOP 049 1 DEVTAT1O OR FAILURE OF SAFEPi V - - V.-.- - .
15
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 I Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 4 of 9 Event
Description:
Turbine First Stage Pressure Channel, P-3-447 fails low. ATC determines no runback. Rod Control is taken to manual per 3-ONOP-028 or 0-ADM-21 1. 3-ONOP-049.1 is entered for mitigation. The SRO will address LCO 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. This channel is declared inoperable.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Channels 5.0 SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS 5.1 Verify instrument loop failure by comparison to adjacent loops and known parameters nd conditions.
S RO/ATC 5.2 Verify no ot5-normal conditions exist on the adjacent channels which are to reniam in service.
5.3 Verify applicable control transfer switches are in the position which eliminates the failed lobp.
5.-I IF a control function was placed in manual control due to the failure. fl verift the control fnnctio is returned to automatic.
5.5 IF the failed channel is NOT related to Technical Specifications AND is NOT an input to SROIATC T ReactorProte g otoSte ctiouorSatbg p5J6 uarda 5.6 Refer to Technical Specifications 3/4.3, Instrumentation AN]) verify the rninhnuus
. chane1s operable . . -
5.6.1 Takc appropriate actions as specified in Technical Specifications.
CAUTION The failed channel bistable(s) is required to be placed in the tripped mode within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months of the failure determination, except if other channel bistable(s) are in the SRO/ATC tripped or test position and would result in an undesired Engineered Safety Features actuation or Reactor Trip actuation. The overall effect of a failure of this type is a reduction of instrumentation redundancy and therefore, a possible reduction in plant protection.
, 5.7 IF a 4KV bus/480V load center undervoltage channel has failed, perform N/ A Attachment 1.
S ROIATC 5.8 a turbine stop valve closure channel has failed, perform Attachment 2.
5.9 IF a turbine auto stop oil channel has failed, THEN perform Attachment 3.

fiow------i If I&C determines a Test Sequence Processor for an Eagle-21 Channel has failed, then SROIATC that associated Eagle-.21 Channel may remain in service if Attachment 6 is performed once i

per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . (Reference Safety Fvaluation JPN-PTN-SEIS-95-OO1) 5.10 IF I&C determines a Test Sequence Processor on an Eagle-21 Channel has failed AND no SROIATC off-normal bistables are lit, THEN perform Attachment 6 once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months until the
/ associated Eagle-2 I Channel is removed from service for repair.
16
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 5 of 9 Event
Description:
Turbine First Stage Pressure Channel, P-3-447 fails low. ATC determines no runback. Rod Control is taken to manual per 3-ONOP-028 or 0-ADM-21 1. 3-ONOP-049.1 is entered for mitigation. The SRO will address LCO 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. This channel is declared inoperable.
Time Position
] Applicants Actions or Behavior 5.11 a containment pressure channel has failed, THEN place the failed channel in the tripped si/A condition by performing the following:
SRO1ATC 5.11.1 Remove fuses for failed channel using Attachment?.
/ 5.11.2 Verify channel is in tripped condition by observing corresponding status light V (VPB) lit.
5.12 IF am other channel has ibiled, THEN perform the following to trip bistables for the failed channel.
- 5.12.1 plant conditions are such that all required bistables associated with the failed
. channel may be tripped without an undesired RPS or ESF actuation, THEN
. perform the following:
. 1. Place all bistable switches for the affected loop in test position using Attachment 4.
2. Veriny bistables tripped by observing corresponding status light (VPB) lit.
SROIATC 5.12.2 plant conditions are such that all bistables associated with the failed channel N/A may be tripped due to an undesired RPS or ESF actuation, THEN pertorm
, the following:
- 1. Place only the bistables which will NOT cause an RPS or ESF actuation in
. .. the test/tripped position using Attachment 4.
-: Verify histables tripped by observing corresponding status light (VPB) lit.
2.
3. Follow action of Tech. Spec. 3/4.3 and/or 3.0.3 for those bistahles which were QT placed in the tripped condition.
. 5.13 any of the following channels are failed. THEN place the Bypass Switch(esl for the 2 failed channel to Bypass position at the AMSAC panel using Attachment 5:
513.1 Any Steam Generator Level Channel I (LI-3-474. LI-3-484, orLI-3-494)
- OR 5.13.2 Any Steam Generator Level Channel II (LI-3475, LI-3-4S5, or LI-3-495) soiTc
- OR
.:* - 5.13.3 PT-3-6 Q.
5134 PT3447 EXAMINER NOTE: Technical Specifications are on next two pages.
17
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 6 of 9 Event
Description:
Turbine First Stage Pressure Channel, P-3-447 fails low. ATC determines no runback. Rod Control is taken to manual per 3-ONOP-028 or0-ADM-211. 3-ONOP-049.1 is entered for mitigation. The SRO will address LCO 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. This channel is declared inoperable.
Time Position
[ Applicants Actions or Behavior SROIATC T°iThe following step is to allow automatic operation of the Steam Dump to Condenser System during a turbine trip subsequent to a failure of PT-3-447, First Stage Pressure ChanneL I 5 14 iT Eu t Stage Piessuie Chtnnel PT 417 has tnled 4.ND Stemn Dump to Condensei his S ROIBOP mmcd THE\ plme the Steam Dump to Condensei Mode SeloctoL u itch to RESET and return to AUTO 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.1 As a minimum, the Reactor Trip System instrumentation channels and interlocks of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-1.
ACTION:
As shown in Table 33-1.
TABLE 3.3-I (ContInued)
REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION
17. Reactor Trip System Interlocks
a. Intermediate Range Neutron Flux. P-6 2 1 2# 7
b. Low Power Reactor Trips Block, P-7 P-lOlnput 4 2 3 1 7 or Turbine First 2 1 1 7 Stage Pressure ACTION 7 - With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months determine by observation of the associated permissive annunciator window(s) that the interlock is in its required state for the existing plant condition, or apply Specification 3.0.3.
18
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 7 of 9 Event
Description:
Turbine First Stage Pressure Channel, P-3-447 fails low. ATC determines no runback. Rod Control is taken to manual per 3-ONOP-028 or 0-ADM-21 1. 3-ONOP-049. 1 is entered for mitigation. The SRO will address LCO 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. This channel is declared inoperable.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.32 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUA11ON SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING coNnmoN po OPEPATION 3.3.2 The Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System IESFAS) instrumentation channels and interlocks shown in Table 3.3.2 haIIbe OPERABLE with their Trip Setpoints set consistent with thevalues shown in the Thp Seipoint column of Table 3.3-3.
APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-2.
ACTION:
a. With an ESFAS Instrumentation or tntertccA Trip Setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Trip Setpcint column but more conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Value column of Table 3.3-3, adjustthe Setpoint consistent with the Trip Setaotht value within permissible calibration tolerance.
D. With an ESFAS Instrumentation or Interlock Trip Selpoint less conservative than tire Value shown in the Allowable Value column ot Table 3.3-3, either:
1. Adjust the Setpoint consistent with the Trip Setpaint value of Table 3.3-3 and detemitne within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months that the affected channel is OPERABLE or
2. Oectare the channel inoperable and apply the applicable ACTiON statement reputremerrts at Table 3.3-2 until the channel is restared to OPERABLE status with its sstpoint adjustad consietent with the Trip Setoolirt ,mue.
c. With an ESFAS instrurirentalfon channel or interlock inoperable, take the ACTiON shown in Table 3.3-2.
TABLE 3.3-2 fContinuedl ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES A,CTUATIO1l SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION MiNIMUM TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION L Steam Line dowHigh 2iataam line tisteam line iletearn tine I, 2, 3 IS Coincident with: in any two in any Iwo steam lines steam tines ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATiON SYSTEM INSTRUMENTAIION MINIMUM TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCtiONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION
4. Steam Line Isolation (Continued) it. Steam Line RowHigh 2ititeaw line 1/steam line 1/steam line 1,2,3 15 Coincident with: in any two in any two Steam Genarator ateani lines steam lines PressureLow 1/steam 1/steam listeam 1,2.3 15 generator generator generetor in any two in any two ACTION 15 - With the number of OPERAthLE channels one ieee than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed unttl performanCe of the next required ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST or TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERAT[ONAL TEST provided.the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .
19
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 8 of 9 Event
Description:
Turbine First Stage Pressure Channel, P-3-447 fails low. ATC determines no runback. Rod Control is taken to manual per 3-ONOP-028 or 0-ADM-21 1. 3-ONOP-049.1 is entered for mitigation. The SRO will address LCO 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. This channel is declared inoperable.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATTACHMENT 4 FAILED CHANNEL BISTABLE LIST P-3-447 Turbine First Stage Pressure Ref Dwgs 5610-T-D-ISA,I8B,12A,12E &17; 561 0-T-L1, Sb 17, 21 & 22A Max Deviation As Compared to other Channels 50 P510 DEVIATION RACK BISTASLE BISTABLE STATUS FUNC No. FUNCTION ANNUNCIATOR LOGIC AFFECTED No. LIGHT TION P-7, 1/2 turbine first stage pressure 10%
Turbine Power power to allow at power trips (P-iC also Input to P-7 an input to enable at power trips).
25 65 3447 P (Turbine 10% Pwr) 2)2 turbine first stage pressure -10% and PC44781 3/4 power range channels >10% blocks a power trips.
All L d L mlI Turb Pow 2/2 channels >70% turbine power, allows 25 8S-3-447-2 Load Limit P load limit runback for NISIRPI rod drop
°jnck PC447E2 signal (Runback on Rod Drop Deleted)
Program Steam Flow LOOP A HI SO A 1/2 channels on 2/3 S/Gs high steam flow 24 BS-3-475 Versus STM FLOW C 7/1 STEAMLINE S program with 2/3 low Tang (543F) or Turbine Load FC475 HI FLOW 2)3 ow 5/0 pressure (614 psig)
Program Steam Flow LOOP B HI SG B I/2 channels on 2/3 S/Os high steam flow 25 BS-3-485 Versus STM FLOW C 7/2 STEAMLINE S > program with 2/3 low Tang (543F) or Turbine Load FC485 HI FLOW 2/3 ow S/G pressure (614 psig(
Program Steam Flow LOOP C HI SG C 1/2 channels on 2/3 S/Os high steam flow 25 DS-3-495 Versus STM FLOW C 7/3 STEAMLINE S > program with 2/3 low Tang (543F) or Turbine Load FC495 HI FLOW 2/3 low S/G pressure 1614 psig(
C CONTROL RELATED P RX PROTECTION RELATED S SAFETY INJECTION RELATED ATTACHMENTS AMSAC CONTROL PANEL Place the Normal/Bypass uwitch(es) to BYPASS for the applicable failed channel(s) at the local AMSAC Couhol Panel.
a. Processor A (1) Level I (A SIG Level, Channel 47-I)
(2) Level 2 (B S/G Level. Channel 484)
(3) Level 3 (C S/C Level, Channel 494)
(4) Power 1 (First Stage Turbine Pressure, Channel 446)
(5) Power 2 (First Stage Turbine Pressure, Channel 447)
b. Processor B (1) Level 1 (A S/G Level, Channel 475)
(2) Level 2 (B S/C Level. Channel 485)
(3) Level 3 (C S/C Level, Channel 495)
(4) Power 1 (First Stage Turbine Pressure, Channel 446)
(5) Power 2 (First Stage Turbine Pressure, Channel 447)
2. At the AMSAC PaneL depress and relesse the SYSTEM RESET pushbutton.
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test NoV: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 2 of 5 Event
Description:
SIG Steam Flow Channel Fl-474 fails as is for A SIG. The A SIG Feed Reg Valve does respond properly during power maneuver. Action is necessary for manual control and/or swap channels. When discovered, the SRO will address LCO 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. This channel is declared inoperable.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior D 4 rF a onti ot function n as pled in nvinwil sonnol due to the hihu e TBEN rift the conol function is retuined to automatic. -
55 IF the jailed channel is NOT ielated to Technical Specifications 4.NE is NOT in input to SRO!ATC Reactor Protection or Sategunids go to Step 16 D 6 Refer to Technical Specifications 3/4 Insthimentition AN]) entv the minimum channels operable
, 6 1 Take appropriate actions as speci+/-ied is Technical Specincations CAUTION The failed channel bistable(s) is required to be placed in the tripped mode within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months of the failure determination, except if other channel bistable(s) are in the S ROIATC tripped or test position and would result in an undesired Engineered Safety Features actuation or Reactor Trip actuation. The overall effect of a failure of this type is a reduction of instrumentation redundancy and, therefore, a possible reduction in plant protection I /A 5.7 a 4KV hus/480V load center iindervoltage channel has failed, perform Attachment 1.
SROIATC 5.8 IF a turbine stop valve closure channel has failed. perform Attachment 2.
5.9 IF a turbine auto stop oil channel has failed, perform Attachment S.
SROIATC ri a If l&C determines a Test Sequence Processor for an Eagle-21 Channel has failed then that associated Eag/e-21 Channel may remain in service if Attachment 6 is performed once I per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . (Reference Safety Evaluation JPN-PTN-SEIS-95-OO1)
.------------------------I 5.10 IF I&C determines a Test Sequence Processor on an Eagle-21 Channel has failed no S ROIATC off-normal bistnbles are lit, TIIFN perform Attachment 6 once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months until the associated Eagle-21 Channel is removed from service for repair.
5.11 IF a containment pressure channel has failed, ThEN place the failed channel in the tripped condition by performing the following:
S RO/ATC 5.11.1 Remove fu.ses for failed channel using Attachment 7.
5.11.2 Verify channel is in tripped condition by observing corresponding status light (VPB) lit.
23
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 4 of 5 Event
Description:
SIG Steam Flow Channel Fl-474 fails as is for A S/G. The A S/G Feed Reg Valve does respond properly during power maneuver. Action is necessary for manual control and/or swap channels. When discovered, the SRO will address LCO 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. This channel is declared inoperable.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.1 As a minimum, the Reactor Trip System instnjmentation channels and interlocks of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-1.
ACTION:
As shown in Table 3.3-1.
TABLE 3.3-1 (Cntir,uI REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICAELE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION
12. Steam Generator Water Level 2 stm. gen. 1 stm. gen. 1 sim. gen. 1,2 6 Low Coincident With Steam! level and level coin- level and Feadwater Flow Mismatch 2 stmifeed- cident with 2 stm.!feed water flow I stm./[eed- water flow mismatch in water flow mismatch in each stm. gen. mismatch in same stm. gen.
same stm. or 2 stm. gen.
gen. level and 1 stm.!feedwater flow mismatch in same stm.
gen.
ACTION 6 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed until performance of the next required ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATlONA TEST provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within S hours.
25
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 5 of 5 Event
Description:
SIG Steam Flow Channel Fl-474 fails as is for A SIG. The A S/G Feed Reg Valve does respond properly during power maneuver. Action is necessary for manual control and/or swap channels. When discovered, the SRO will address LCD 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. This channel is declared inoperable.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NSTRUMENTATlOll 314.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITiNG CON 0 ON FOE OPERATiON 3.3.2 The Engineered Safely Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) instrumentation channels arid interlocks shown in Table 3.3-2 shall be OPERABLE with their Trip Setpoints sat cortaistent with the values shown in the Trip Seipoint column of Table 3.3-3 APPLIC.&BILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-2.
ACTION:
a. With an ESFAS Instrumentation or lnterloci Trip Setpoini less conservative than the value shown in the Trip Setpoint column but more conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Value column oi Table 3.3-3, adjust the Setpoinl consistent with the Trip Seipoint value within pens isaible calibration toleranca.
b. With an ESFAS Instrumentation or Interlock Trip Setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Value column of Table 3.3-3, either
1. Adjust the Setpoint consistent with the Trip Setpoint value of Table 3.3-3 and determine within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months That the affected channel is OPERABLE; or
2. Declare the channel inoperable and apply the applicable ACTION statement requirements aiTable 3.3-2 until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with its setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.
c. With an ESFAS instrumentation ciionne or interlock inoperable, take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-2.
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION
4. Steam Line Isolation (Continued>
d. Steam Line PlowHigh 2/steam line 1/steam lIne 1/steam line 1,2,3 15 Coincident with: in any two in any two Steam Generator steam lInes steam lInes PressureLow 1/steam 1/steam i/steam I, 2, 3 IS generator generator generator in any two In any two steam lines steam lines or TeaLow 1/Loop i/loop in 1/loop In 1, 2, 3 25 any two any two loops loops ACTION 15 With tha number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channela, operation may proceed until performance of the next required ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATiONAL TEST or TRIP ACTUA11NG DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .
26
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 8 Page 2 of 12 Event
Description:
During the loss of Main Feed, a common loss of suction to all AFW pumps.
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H.1 to initiate Feed and Bleed. The Main Turbine fails to automatically trip. The BOP will take compensatory action to trip the Turbine manually. The lOW to TPCW Heat Exchanger Valve, POV-3-4883,. does not automatically isolate on a Safety Injection signal. The BOP takes action while performing Attachment 3 of 3-EOP-E-0 to manually close the valve.
Applicants Actions or Behavior Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
[!ATkII[fAj: Manually trip the Main Turbine prior to Step 5 of 3-EOP-E-O as read by the Unit Supervisor.
3 Verify Power To Emergency 4 Ky Buses
a. Check the 3A and 38 4 Ky buses - a. Perform the following:
MAINTAIN AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED
1) Attempt to emergency start any Unit 3 available diesel generator.
2) IPneither3Anor3B4KVbusis energized, ItiE!::i go to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O, LOSS ALL AC POWER, Step 1.
b. Check the 3A and 38 4 (V buses - b. Attempt to emergency start the MAINTAiN BOTH ENERGIZED de-energized Unit 3 bus diesel generator.
c. Maintran the 304 (V bus energized - c. Perform the following:
ALIGNED TO AN ENERGIZED 4 Ky BUS
1) lFlockoutof3D4KVbusNOT present, jjj,j perform the following:
a) Verify 3C CCW pump -
BREAKER OPEN.
b) Verify3ClCWpump BREAKER OPEN.
SRO/BOP c) Operate bus supply breakers to restore power.
\1 33
AppendixD Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 8 Page 3 of 12 Event
Description:
During the loss of Main Feed, a common loss of suction to all AFW pumps.
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H. 1 to initiate Feed and Bleed. The Main Turbine fails to automatically trip. The BOP will take compensatory action to trip the Turbine manually. The lOW to TPCW Heat Exchanger Valve, POV-3-4883, does not automatically isolate on a Safety Injection signal. The BOP takes action while performing Attachment 3 of 3-EOP-E-0 to manually close the valve.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 4 Check If SI Is Actuated Perform the fcflowin:
SI Annunciators ANY ON
- a. Check if SI is required:
OR
Low presaurtzer pressure 1730 psig Safeguards equipmentAUTO STARTED High ccntrfnment pressure 4 psig OR
High steam line differential pressure 100 paid 2a SROIATC
Hich steam time wiTh low S1G pressure 614 psig OR low Tavg (43 F) 7l. IF SI is required, THEN manually actuate SI and containment solaton phase A AND go to SEep 5.
c. SI is required, IU perform the following:
1) Monitor Ctitical Satiny Functions using 3-EOP-F-0, CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES.
/ 2) Go to 3-EOP-ES-O.1, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE, Step 1 CREW L
TPag rnonito:dhe:a:pro -
CREW Monitors 3-EOP-E-0 Foldout page (see next page) Faulted SIG Criteria 5 Continue With Attachment 3 To Complete SRO/BOP The Prompt Action Verifications While Performing This Procedure Examiner Note: 3-EOP-E-O, Attachment 3 commences at Page 38 and at Page 47.
Examiner Note: The SRO and ATC will complete the remaining steps in 3-EOP-E-O, while the GOP performs 3-EOP-E-O Prompt Action Verifications using Attachment 3.
34
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 8 Page 4 of 12 Event
Description:
During the loss of Main Feed, a common loss of suction to all AFW pumps.
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H.1 to initiate Feed and Bleed. The Main Turbine fails to automatically trip. The BOP will take compensatory action to trip the Turbine manually. The lOW to TPCW Heat Exchanger Valve, POV-3-4883, does not automatically isolate on a Safety Injection signal. The BOP takes action while performing Attachment 3 of 3-EOP-E-0 to manually close the valve.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior FOLDOUT FOR PROCEDURE E-0
1. ADVERSE CONTAINMENT CONDITIONS IE either of the conditions listed below occur, THEN use adverse containment setpoints:
Containment atmosphere temperature 180F OR Containment radiation levels 1.3x105 RIhr WHEN containment parameters drop below the above values, THEN normal setpoints can again be used IF the TSC determines that containment integrated dose rate has not exceeded j6 Rads.
2. RCP TRIP CRITERIA
a. IF both conditions listed below occur. THEN trip all RCPs:
1) High-head SI pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING
- SI FLOWPATH VERIFIED.
2) RCS subcooling LESS THAN 25°Fr65F]
b. IF phase B actuated, THEN trip all RCPs.
3 FAULTED SIG ISOLATION CRITERIA IF any S/G pressure decreasing in an uncontrolled manner OR any S1G completely depressurized,;THEN the following may be performed a Maintain total feedwater flow greater than 345 gjm until narrow range level in at least: one SIG is greater than 6%32%] -
b Isolate AFW flow to faulted S/G(s). - -
Stabilize RCS 1ot leg tamperati.ire using steam dumps when faulted SIG has blown dovn to less than 10% widerang. - -.
4. RUPTURED SJG ISOLATION CRITERiA IF any SIG level increases in an uncontrolled manner OR any SIG has abnormal radiation, AND narrow range level in affected S/G(s) is greater than 6%[32%], THEN feed flow may be stopped to affected S1G(s).
5. AFW SYSTEM OPERATION CRITERIA
a. LE two AFW pumps are operating on a single train, THEN one of the pumps shall be shut down within one hour of the initial start signal
b. two AFW trains are operating and one of the AFW pumps has been operating at low flow of 60 gpm or less for one hour, THEN that AFW pump shall be shut down
6. CST MAKEUP WATER CRITERIA i.E OST level decreases to less than 10%, THEN add makeup to CST using 3-NOP-018.01, CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK (CST).
7. RHR SYSTEM OPERATION CRITERIA IF RHR flow is less than 1000 gpm, THEN the RHF. pumps shall be shut down within 44 minutes of the initial start signal.
35
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 8 Page 5 of 12 Event
Description:
During the loss of Main Feed, a common loss of suction to all AFW pumps.
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H.1 to initiate Feed and Bleed. The Main Turbine fails to automatically trip. The BOP will take compensatory action to trip the Turbine manually. The ICW to TPCW Heat Exchanger Valve, POV-3-4883, does not automatically isolate on a Safety Injection signal. The BOP takes action while performing Attachment 3 of 3-EOP-E-0 to manually close the valve.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 6 Check AFW Pumps AT LEAST TWO
- Perform the following:
RUNNING
a. Manuafy open valves to establish two AFW pumps running.
b j an APV pump is tripped, Ii!i dispatch an operator to locally reset the AEW turbine trips.
c. both units require AEW ANDonly one AEW pump is avat able, THEN perform the following:
1) Verify all RCPs -TRIPPED SRO/ATC
2) Establish 270 gprn AFt/V flow to each unit.
3) Use a setpoint of 270 gpm for required AFW flow instead of 345 gpm specified in subsequent Steps and Procedures.
EXAMINER NOTE: The Aux. Feedwater Pumps initially come up to speed. This scenario simulates a total loss of suction in the Aux. Feed Water System. The key parameters to watch are S!G Levels and AFW Flow. A Red Path for 3-EOP-FR-H.1 will come in quickly due to this massive break.
7 Verify AFW Valve Alignment PROPER
- Manually align valves to establish proper AEW EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT alignment S ROIATC 36
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 8 Page 9 of 12 Event
Description:
During the loss of Main Feed, a common loss of suction to all AFW pumps.
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H.1 to initiate Feed and Bleed. The Main Turbine fails to automatically trip. The BOP will take compensatory action to trip the Turbine manually. The lOW to TPCW Heat Exchanger Valve, POV-3-4883, does not automatically isolate on a Safety Injection signal. The BOP takes action while performing Attachment 3 of 3-EOP-E-0 to manually close the valve.
Time
[ Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
5. Verify Containment Cooling
a. Check emergency containment coolers - a. Manually start or stop emergency ONLY TWO RUNNING containment coolers to establish ONLY BOP TWO RUNNING.
b. Verify emergency containment filter fans - b. Manually start emergency containment AT LEAST TWO RUNNING filter fans.
. Verify Pump Operation
a. At least two high head SI pumps running a. Manually start high-head pump(s).
BOP b. Both RHR pumps running b. Manually start RHR pump(s).
8. Verify SI Flow
a. RCS pressure LESS THAN 1600 PSIG
=
a. Go to 6iep 9.
[2000 PSIG]
b. High-head SI pump flow indicator b. Manually start pumps AND align valves to CHECK FOR FLOW establish an injection fiowpath.
c. RCS pressure LESS THAN 250 PSIG
c. Go to Step 9.
[650 PSIGJ
d. RHR pump flow indicator - d. Manually start pumps jj align valves to CHECK FOR FLOW establish an injection flowpath.
j.--
. 9. Realign SI System a Vehfy Unit 3 high-head SI pumps TWO
- a. Peo the following:
. RUNNING
1) Operate Unit 3 and Unit 4 high-head SI pumps to establish injection to Unit 3 from two high-heed SI pumps.
BOP 2) Direct Unit 4 Reactor Operator to
align Unit 4 high-head SI pump SLiCfiOfl to Unit 3 RWST using ATTACHMENT 1 of this Procedure
-1 . -. 3) Go to Step 10.
= b. Stop both iJn4 high-head Si pumps -
:- .placeiitstandby :
40
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 8 Page 10 of 12 Event
Description:
During the loss of Main Feed, a common loss of suction to all AFW pumps.
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H.1 to initiate Feed and Bleed. The Main Turbine fails to automatically trip. The BOP will take compensatory action to trip the Turbine manually. The lOW to TPCW Heat Exchanger Valve, POV-3-4883, does not automatically isolate on a Safety Injection signal. The BOP takes action while performing Attachment 3 of 3-EOP-E-0 to manually close the valve.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
10. Verify Containment Isoation Phase AValve Perform the following:
White Lights On VPB ALL BRIGHT
a. Manually actuate Containment Isolation Phase A
b. j any Containment Isolation Phase A BOP valve is NOT closed, THEN manually close valve. j valve(s) can NOT be manually closed, manually or locally isolate affected containment penetration.
ii. verify si Valve Amber Ughts On VPB - Manually align valves to establish proper SI ALL BRIGHT alignment for an injection ltowpath.
BOP 12 VenfySlRESET ResetSl
. BOP:.
iS Verify Containment Phase ARESET Re-etPha..e ZBOP
14. Reestablish RCP Cooling
a. Check RCPs AT LEAST ONE a. Go to Step 15.
RUNNING
b. Open CCVV to normal containment cooler b. Stop all RCPs valves SOP
MOV-3-1417
MOV-3-1418
c. Reset and start normal containment c. Stop all ROPe coolers I
41
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 8 Page 11 of 12 Event
Description:
During the loss of Main Feed, a common loss of suction to all AFW pumps.
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H.1 to initiate Feed and Bleed. The Main Turbine fails to automatically tnp. The BOP will take compensatory action to trip the Turbine manually. The lOW to TPCW Heat Exchanger Valve, POV-3-4883, does not automatically isolate on a Safety Injection signal. The BOP takes action while performing Attachment 3 of 3EOP-E-0 to manually close the valve.
Applicants Actions or Behavior Monitor Containment Pressure To verify Containment Spray NOT Required
a. Containment pressure HAS REMAINED
- a. Perform the following:
LESS THAN 20 PSIG
1) IF containment spray initiated, PR-3-6306A THEN manually initiate containment spray.
AND
2) Verify Containment Isolation Phase B PR-3-6306B - ACTUATED.
3) Verify Containment Isolation Phase B valve white lights on VPB ALL BRIGHT.
4) E any Containment Isolation Phase B valve did NOT close, THEN manually or locally isolate affected containment penetration.
5) Stop all RCPs.
Verify Containment and Control Room Ventilation Isolation
a. Unit 3 containment purge exhaust and a. Manually stop fans.
supply fans OFF
b. Verify Control Room ventilation status b. Manually align equipment for Control panel PROPER EMERGENCY
- Room emergency recirculation.
RECIRCULATION ALIGNMENT NOTE Hydrogen lvlonitors should be in service within 30 minutes of a va/id SI signal. They should be available in a timely manner to support decision-making related to hydrogen generation in containment I
a a a
17. Monidrli Service Using, 4
laceHyrbgei
3-NOP094,.COtTAINMENT POST ACCIDENr MqNITORING SYSTEM
18. Verify All Four EDGs RUNNING EMERGENCY START any available EDG NOT running.
42
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 8 Page 12 of 12 Event
Description:
During the loss of Main Feed, a common loss of suction to all AFW pumps.
The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H.1 to initiate Feed and Bleed. The Main Turbine fails to automatically trip. The BOP will take compensatory action to trip the Turbine manually. The lOW to TPCW Heat Exchanger Valve, POV-3-4883, does not automatically isolate on a Safety Injection signal. The BOP takes action while performing Attachment 3 of 3-EOP-E-0 to manually close the valve.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior i9. Verify Power To Emergency 4KV
]
Buses and Load Centers
a. Check the 3A, 3B and 3D 4 Ky buses - a. Perform the following:
ALL ENERGIZED
1) Inform the Unit Supervisor that ATTACHMENT 3 is complete with the exception of the de-energized bus or buses.
2) iF the Unit Supervisor decides not to energize the dc-energized bus or buses, THEN go to Step 20.
3) IF the Unit Supervisor decides to energize SA, 3B, or 3D bus, THEN BoP perform the following:
a) IF 3A 4 KV bus dc-energized,
)jjJ restore power to bus using 3-ON OP-004.2, LOSS OF 3A 4KV BUS.
b) IF 38 4 KV bus dc-energized, THEN restore power to bus using 3-ON OP-004.3, LOSS OF 3B 4KV BUS.
c) IF 3D 4 1KV bus dc-energized, fljgj restore power to bus using 3-ONOP-004.5, LOSS OF 3D 4KV BUS.
0. Notify The Unit Supervisor That The PROMPT ACTION VERIFICATIONS Attachment Is Complete And Discuss Any Jr Safeguards Equipment That Is Not In The r, Required Condition 43
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 9 Page 2 of3 During the loss of Main Feed, a common loss of suction to all AFW pumps. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H.1 to initiate Feed and Bleed.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 1,2 . ActuatSI AND aihmebtjsadon
.PhaseA 13 Verify RCS Feed Path Manually start pumps and align valve(s) to establish RCS feed path. IF RCS feed path
a. Check high-head SI pumps AT LEAST can be established, continue ONE RUNNING attempts to establish S/G feed flow.
Observe CAUTIONS prior to Step 2 fl
b. Verity SI valve amber lights on VPB ALL
- return to Step 2.
BRIGHT 14 Establish RCS Bleed Path
a. Verify power to PRZ PORV block valves - a. Restore power to block valves.
AVAlLBLE
.OiATc:L
b. Verify PRZ PORV block valves BOTH
- b. Open both block valves.
OPEN
c. Open both PRZ PORVs 15 Verify Instrument Air To Containment
a. Verify Instrument Air Containment Isolation, CV-3-2803 OPEN S RO!ATC
b. Verify instrument air pressure, P1-3-1444 - b. Restore instrument air pressure using GREATER THAN 95 PSIG O-ONOP-013, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR, while continuing with Ibis procedure.
16 Verify Adequate RCS Bleed Path SRO!ATC
PRZPORVs-BOTH OPEN
. PRZ PORV block valves BOTH OPEN CAUTION If SI is reset and either offsite power is lost or SI actuation occurs on the other unit, manual action may be required to restore safeguards equipment to the required configuration.
17 Reset SI I
45
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 9 Page 3 of 3 During the toss of Main Feed, a common toss of suction to all AFW pumps. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H.1 to initiate Feed and Bleed.
18 Reset Containment Isolation Phase A And Phase B 9 Realign SI System
a. Verify Unit 3 high-head SI pumps TWO
- a. Perform the following:
RUNNING
1) Direct Unit 4 Reactor Operator to align Unit 4 high-head SI pump suction to Unit 3 RWST using ATTACHMENT 1 of this procedure.
2) Operate Unit 3 and Unit 4 high-head SI pumps to establish injection to Unit 3 from two high-head SI pumps.
3) Observe CAUTION prior to Step 20 ANDgotoStep2o.
b. Stop both Unit 4 high-head SI pumps Ai place in standby Crew Critical Task At the CAUTION before Step 2 of 3-EOP-FR-H.1, initiate bleed and feed to depressurize the RCS sufficiently for HHSI injection flow.
TERMINATION CRITERIA EXAMINER NOTE: The scenario is terminated when the crew verifies the RCS bleed &
feed flowpath of 3-EOP-FR-H.1 after Step 19 or earlier based on the discretion of the Lead Examiner.
46
( Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 8 Page 1 of 6 NOTE: This is an additional Attachment 3 which is conveniently at the end for evaluator comments.
3-EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Attachment 3, Prompt Action Verifications Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
1. Check The Load Centers Associated With Close the Load Center supply breakers.
The Energized 4 KV Buses ENERGIZED
. 3ALC
3BLC BOP
3CLC
3DLC f . 3HLC
2. Check If Main Steamlines Should Be Isolated
a. Check main steamline isolation and a. Go to Step 3.
bypass valves ANY OPEN
b. Check if either main steam isolation b. ( to Step 3.
signal has actuated BOP
High steam flow with either low Sf0 pressure 614 psig OR low Tavg 543 OR
Hi-Hi containment pressure 20 PSIG
c. Verify main steam isolat and bypass c. Push manual Stearoline Isolation push valves CLOSED buttons on VPB manually close valves.
3. Verify Feedwater Isolation
a. Place ma n feedwatei- pump switches in
. STOP -
b. Feedwater control.valves CLOSED b. Manually close valves.
BOP
c. Feedwater bypass valves CLOSED c. Manually close valves.
d. Close feedwater isolation MOVs d. Locally close valves.
a. Verify standby feedwater pumps OFF e. IF standby feedwater is aligned to Unit 3,
.. . . . - THEN stop standby feedwater pump(s).
47
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 8 Page 2 of 6 NOTE: This is an additional Attachment 3 which is conveniently at the end for evaluator comments 3-EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Attachment 3, Prompt Action Verifications Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
. 4. Verify Proper ICW System Operation
a. Verity CW pumps AT LEAST TWO
a. Start ICW pump(s) to establish at least RUNNING tvo running.
b. Verity ICW to TPCW Heat Exchanger
[Eventlil ISOLATED b. Manually close valve(s). E viIves) can NOT be closed, THEN locally close the BOP-- following valves:
f -
. POV-3-4882CLOSED
a-5o-al for POV-3-4682
POV-3-483 - CLOSED 3-50-339 for POV-3-4883 c Check ICW headers TIED TOGETHER
- c. IF both ICW headers are intact, Ill direct operator to tie headers together.
5. Verify Proper CCW System Operation a CCW Heal Exchaneers THREE IN a Perform the followino:
SERVICE
1) Start or stop CCW pumps as necessary to establish ONLY ONE RUNNING CCW PUMP.
2) Verify Emergency Containment Coolers ONLY TWO RUNNING
3) Go to Step 5c.
b CCW pLimpS ONLY TWO RUNNING
b. Start or siop CCV! pumps as necessary BOP to establish ONLY iWO RUNNING CCVI PUMPS.
c CCW headers TiED TOGETHER
c. IF both CCVI headers are intact, fli!+/-
direct a field operator to tie the headers together.
d. RCP Thermal Barrier CCW Outlet, d. IF containment isolation phase B NOT MOV-3-1526 OPEN actuated AND CCVI radiation levels are normal, AND RCP number one seal leak-off temperature is less than 235F, manually open MOV-3-626. IE MOV-3-526 can NOT be manually
/
opened, direct operator to open MOV-3-626 locally.
48
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test Na.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 8 Page 4 of 6 NOTE: This is an additional Attachment 3 which is conveniently at the end for evaluator comments.
3-EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Attachment 3, Prompt Action Verifications Time Position
[ Applicants Actions or Behavior
10. Venfy Containment Isolation Phase A Valve Perform the following:
White Lights On VPB ALL BRIGHT
a. Manually actuate Containment Isolation Phase A
b. IF any Containment Isolation Phase A BOP valve is closed, IE manually close valve. IF valve(s) can NOT be manually closed, jjj manually or locally isolate affected containment penetration.
IL Verify SI Valve Amber lights On VPB - Manually agn valves to establish proper SI ALL BRIGHT alignment for an injection flowpath.
BOP 12 VerLfy SI RESET Ret SI BOP 13 Verify Containment Phase A RESET Ret Ph..
14. Reestablish RCP Cooling
a. Check RCPs AT LEAST ONE a. Go to Step 15.
RUNNING
b. Open COW to normal containment cooler b. Stop all RCPs valves BOP
MOV-3-1417
MOV-3-1418
o. Reset and start normal containment c. Stop all RCPs coolers 1
50
CD CD CD 0
0
-o CD 0
1 C,
0 C,
-n 0
m C) 6 r.,3
Appendix b - Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 8 Page 6 of 6 NOTE: This is an additional Attachment 3 which is conveniently at the end for evaluator comments.
3-EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety injection Attachment 3, Prompt Action Verifications Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
19. Verify Power To Emergency 4KV Buses and Load Centers
a. Check the 3A, 3B and 3D 4 Ky buses - a. Perform the following:
ALL ENERGIZED
1) Inform the Unit Supervisor that ATTACHMENT 3 is complete with the exception of the de-energized bus or buses.
2) IF the Unit Supervisor decides not to energize the de-energized bus or buses, THEN go to Step 20.
3) IF the Unit Supervisor decides to energize 3A, 36, or 3D bus, IU!+/-
BOP perform the following:
a) 3A 4 Ky bus de-energized, THEN restore power to bus using 3-ONOP-004.2, LOSS OF 3A 4KV BUS.
b) jf 38 4 KV bus de-energized, THEN restore power to bus using 3-ONOP-004.3, LOSS OF 38 4KV BUS.
c) IF 3D 4 K\J bus de-energized, THEN restore power to bus using 3-ONOP-004.5, LOSS OF 3D 4KV BUS.
20. Notify The Unit Supervisor That The PROMPT ACTION VERIFICATIONS Attachnient Is Complete And Discuss Any Bp
- Safeguards Equipment That Is Not In The
( Required Condition 52
ILC-27 NRC Scenario #3 Event Description FaciIity Turkey Point Scenar,o 3 Op Test.: 20t1 -302 Examiners: Candidates: US ATC BOP Initial Conditions: Mode 2 2% power at MOL.
Raise Reactor Power to 5% with Control Rods. Reactor Engineering has limited Turnover:
rod withdrawl rate to 5 step pulls.
Setting up plant conditions to roll the Main Turbine next shift.
o MODE 1 preparations are complete along with permission to enter MODE 1.
Event Malt.
Event Type Event Description No. No.
A Power Range Nuclear Instrument N-42 Control Power fuse blows. The l BOP ATC checks all PR NI Channels to determine the failure. 3-ONOP-059.8, 1 TFN1CP22 (ITS) SRO Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunction, is entered to remove the channel from service. The SRO will address LCO 3.3.1.
(R) ATC In accordance with 3-GOP-301, raise power to 5% for rolling the Main 2 N/A Turbine with Control Rods. MODE 1 preps are complete for the MODE (R) SRO change.
TFK1A12T 3A CCW Pump trips due to breaker failure. 3-701G, PC-3_611 isolation, is TFK1A61 1 (C) ATC inadvertently closed which prevents the Auto Start of 3B CCW Pump. The TFK1S61 1 (C, TS) SRO ATC uses the ARP, 3-ONOP-030, or O-ADM-21 1 to start 3B CCW Pump.
Technical Specification 3.7.2 is entered.
The incoming feeder breaker from 3B 4KV Bus, 3AD06, fails open. The (C) BOP result is a loss of the 3D 4KV Bus power. The loss of this bus can affect TFE2D22T 4 ICW/CCW lineups due to shared power. The crew is able to restore power (C) SRO to the 3D 4KV Bus from the 3A 4KV Bus with 3-ONOP-004.5, Loss of 3D 4KV Bus.
(C) BOP TFKXSMA The 3A TPCW Pump shaft fails. The BOP will start the 3B TPCW pump (C) SRO using the ARP, 3-ONOP-008, or 0-ADM-21 1 to maintain plant operations.
The Master Pressurizer Controller fails to high demand and causes the IAH2S44J (I) ATC Pressurizer Spray Valves to fail open. The ATC responds by selecting 6
(I) SRO manual control of the Master Controller or both Spray Valve Controllers and controlling per ARP, 3-ONOP-041 .5, or O-ADM-21 1.
A Main Steam Line Leak upstream of the 3B MSIV inside Containment M ALL TVSBVL14 gradually develops. A manual or automatic Reactor Trip occurs. The crew 7
responds using 3-EOP-E-0. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-P.1 when present after exiting 3-EOP-E-0.
(C) BOP TFL3SIA2 During the performance of 3-EOP-E-0; 1) the B Train of SI fails to actuate, 8 TFL3S1 (C) ATC 2) The A Ctmt Spray Signal fails to actuate, and 3) MOV-3-880B fails to TFMUV41C (C) SRO open. The ATC/BOP manually actuates SI and aligns Ctmt Spray.
TFSWX6C (C) ATC Manualllocal actions are required to isolate 3B SIG. 1) The 3B MSIV fails TFFYO32 to close in AUTO. The BOP manually closes using Attachment 3 of 3-TAFKOO7 (C) SRO EOP-E-0. 2) Also, the 3B S/G AFW Control Valve, CV-3-2832, fails open.
AFPD-3-007 is closed locally to isolate.
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1
ILC-27 NRC Scenario #3 Event Description SIMULATOR SETUP INSTRUCTIONS
1. Reset to 10-5 (2% MOL) or other IC with correct setup conditions.
2. Place Simulator in RUN
3. Open and Execute ILC27SCN3N.lsn.
4. Start 3A COW Pump.
5. Stop 3B COW Pump.
6. Trigger lesson steps:
SETUP B TRAIN OF SI FAILS TO ACTUATE insert TFL3SIA2 TRUE delay=0 ramp=0 on=0 off=0
SETUP 3B MSIV FAILS TO AUTO CLOSE insert TFSWX6C true delay=0 ramp=0 on=0 off=0
7. Store IC with initial conditions setup if desired.
8. Place Simulator in freeze.
9. Provide Shift Turnover Checklists
10. Perform Simulator Operator Checklist
11. When ready to begin, place Simulator in RUN.
2
ILC-27 NRC Scenario #3 Event Description
- FACILITY OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS EVENT I A Power Range Nuclear Instrument N-42 Control Power fuse blows. The ATC checks all PR NI Channels to determine the failure. 3-ONOP-059.8, Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunction, is entered to remove the channel from service. The SRO will address LCO 3.3.1.
When directed, Trigger EVENT I N42 PR NI CONTROL POWER FUSE BLOWS.
insert TFN1CP22 TRUE delay=0 ramp=0 on=0 off=0 SM - If directed, respond and acknowledge the failure of Power Range Nuclear Instrument N-42.
WCC If directed, respond and acknowledge the failure of Power Range Nuclear Instrument N-42 and to write a PWO for troubleshooting.
EVENT 2 In accordance with 3-GOP-301, raise power to 5% for rolling the Main Turbine with Control Rods.
MODE 1 preps are complete for the MODE change.
SM - If directed, acknowledge power increase.
WCC - If directed, acknowledge power increase.
SYSTEM DISPATCH - If directed, acknowledge power increase.
ENGINEERING If directed, acknowledge power increase.
CHEMISTRY If directed, acknowledge power increase.
When directed, RACKOUT breakers on Schema: 3A CCW Pump = TAKIAI2P and 3A TPCW Pump = TAK3AI I P EVENT 3 3A CCW Pump trips due to breaker failure. 3-701 G, PC-3_61 1 isolation, is inadvertently closed which prevents the Auto Start of 38 CCW Pump. The ATC uses the ARP, 3-ONOP-030, or 0-ADM-21 1 to start 3B CCW Pump. Technical Specification 3.7.2 is entered.
When directed, Trigger EVENT 3 - 3A CCW PUMP BREAKER TRIPS.
insert TFK1 S61 1 TRUE delay=0 ramp=0 on=0 off=0
insert TFK1A61 1 TRUE delay=0 ramp=0 on=0 off=0
insert TFK1A12T TRUE delay=0 ramp=0 on=0 off=0 SM - If directed, respond and acknowledge the failure of 3A CCW PUMP TRIP.
WCC - If directed, respond and acknowledge the failure of 3A COW PUMP TRIP and to write a PWO for troubleshooting.
SN P0! If directed, respond and investigate the failure of 3A CCW PUMP TRIP. Also, verify a SAT FS start on the 38 COW Pump or the 30 COW Pump.
3
ILC-27 NRC Scenario #3 Event Description EVENT4 -
The incoming feeder breaker from 3B 4KV Bus, 3AD06, fails open. The result is a loss of the 3D 4KV Bus power. The loss of this bus can affect ICW/CCW lineups due to shared power. The crew is able to restore power to the 3D 4KV Bus from the 3A 4KV Bus with 3-ONOP-004.5, Loss of 3D 4KV Bus.
When directed, Trigger EVENT 4 LOSS OF 3D BUS.
insert TFE2D22T TRUE delay=0 ramp=0 on=0 off=0 SM - If directed, respond and acknowledge the loss of the 3D Bus.
WCC - If directed, respond and acknowledge the loss of the 3D Bus and to write a PWO for troubleshooting.
SNPOI If directed, respond and investigate the loss of the 3D Bus. After a minute, call back without any ES protective relays actuated, lockout relays reset, and both 3ADO1 (Supply from Bus 3A) and ADO6 (Supply from Bus 3B) are open.
When directed, Trigger EVENT 5 3A TPCW PUMP SHAFT FAILS.
insert TFKXSMA TRUE delay=0 rampo onO off=0 SM - If directed, respond and acknowledge the issue with 3A TPCW Pump shaft failure.
WCC - If directed, respond and acknowledge the issue with 3A TPCW Pump shaft failure.
U3 TO! If directed, respond and investigate the loss of the 3A TPCW Pump. Also, after a few minutes, FS report 3B TPCW Pump is running SAT.
EVENT 6 The Master Pressurizer Controller fails to high demand and causes the Pressurizer Spray Valves to fail open. The ATC responds by selecting manual control of the Master Controller or both Spray Valve Controllers and controlling per ARP, 3-ONOP-041 .5, or 0-ADM-21 1.
When directed, Trigger EVENT 6 MASTER PZR PRESS CNTRL FAIL.
insert IAH2S44J 0.000000 delay=0 ramp=180 on=0 off=0 SM - If directed, respond and acknowledge the failure of PC-3-444J, Pressurizer Pressure Controller.
WCC - If directed, respond and acknowledge the failure of PC-3-444J, Pressurizer Pressure Controller and to write a PWO for troubleshooting.
EVENT 7 Event
Description:
A Main Steam Line Leak upstream of the 3B MSIV inside Containment gradually develops. A manual or automatic Reactor Trip occurs. The crew responds using 3-EOP-E-0. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-P.1 when present after exiting 3-EOP-E-0. Otherwise, 3-EOP-E-2 ensures 3B MSIV is closed and 3B SIG isolation.
When directed, Trigger EVENT 7 3B MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK INSIDE CTMT.
insert TVSBVL14 0.5 delay=0 ramp=120 on=0 off=0 4
ILC-27 NRC Scenario #3 Event Description EVENT 8 During the performance of 3-EOP-E-0; 1) the B Train of SI fails to actuate, 2) The A Ctmt Spray Signal fails to actuate, and 3) MOV-3-880B fails to open. The ATC manually actuates SI and aligns Ctmt Spray.
The triggers below are linked or previously performed, ENSURE they are actuated.
Triggered during Simulator Setup Instructions, SETUP B TRAIN OF SI FAILS TO ACTUATE.
insert TFL3SIA2 TRUE delay=0 ramp=0 on=0 off=0 Auto triggers off of EVENT 7, EVENT 8 CTMT SPRAY FAILURES.
insert TFL3S1 0.5 delayz0 ramp=120 on0 off=0
insert TFMUV41C 0.5 delay=0 rampl2O on=0 off=0 EVENT 9 Manual/local actions are required to isolate 3B SIG. 1) The 3B MSIV fails to close in AUTO. The BOP manually closes using Attachment 3 of 3-EOP-E-0. 2) Also, the 3B S/G AFW Control Valve, CV-3-2832, fails open. AFPD-3-007 is closed locally to isolate.
When contacted by the crew to isolate, then TRIGGER, EVENT 9 FAIL OPEN FK-CV-2832 AFW TO 3B SG. Report back when isolated.
insert TAFKOO7 0.000000 delay0 ramp=0 on=0 off=0 The triggers below are linked or previously performed, ENSURE they are actuated.
Triggered during Simulator Setup Instructions, SETUP 3B MSIV FAILS TO AUTO CLOSE.
insert TFSWX6C true delay=0 ramp=0 on=0 off=0 Conditional IMSIX6C (3B MSIV SW-CLOSE), triggers EVENT 9 MANUAL CLOSURE OF 3B MSIV
dellA TFSWX6C 2 delay=0 Auto triggers off of EVENT 8, EVENT 9 FAIL OPEN FK-CV-2832 AFW TO 38 SG.
insert TFFYO32 true delay=0 ramp0 on0 off=0 5
ILC-27 NRC Scenario #3 Event Description SCENARIO QUANTITATIVE ATTRIBUTES Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario, See Section D 5 d) #
1. Total malfunctions (58) 5
2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (12) 5
3. Abnormal events (24) 4
4. Major transients (12) 1
5. EQPs entered/requiring substantive actions (12) 2
6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (02) 1
7. Critical tasks (23) 3 CRITICAL TASKS
1. Trip RCPs due high Containment pressure and Phase B Isolation of CCW to RCPs prior to exiting 3-EOP-E-O.
2. Isolates the Faulted 3B SIG prior to exiting 3-EOP-E-O when 3-EOP-FR-P.1 is NOT present, otherwise as directed in 3-EOP-FR-P.1.
3. If RHR Flow less than 1000 gpm, stop the RHR Pumps within 44 minutes of their start signal. (3-EOP-FR-P.1) 6
OPERATiONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT ONCOMING CREW ASSIGNMENTS Shift Mgr: Inside SNPO:
Field Supv.: Outside SNPO:
AdminRCO: ANPO:
Unit 3 Unit 4 Unit Supv.: Unit Supv.:
RCO: RCO:
NPO: NPO:
Plant Status Unit 3 Unit 4 Mode: 2 Mode: 1 Power: 2% Power: 100 %
MWe: 0 MWe: 758 Gross Leakrate: 0.03 gpm Gross Leakrate: 0.03 gpm RCS Boron Conc: 1 139 ppm RCS Boron Cone: 268 ppm Operational Concerns:
. Raise Reactor Power to 5% with Control Rods. Reactor Engineering has limited rod withdrawl rate to 5 step pulls.
. Setting up plant conditions to roll the Main Turbine next shift.
. MODE 1 preparations are complete along with permission to enter MODE 1.
U3 Anticipated LCO Actions:
U4 Anticipated LCO Actions:
Results of Offgoing Focus Area:
[ Unit3Status L Reactor Operator Mode: 2 RCS Leakrate Accumulator Ref Levels Power: % 2 Gross: 0.03 gpm A 6616 gal MWe: 0 Unidentified 0.02 gpm B 6641 gal Tavg: *F 549 Charging Pps: 0.01 gpm C 6627 gal RCS Pressure: psig 2235 RCS Boron Conc: 1139 ppm Abnormal Annunciators:
Annunciator: Various alarms for startup Comp Actions:
Annunciator:
Comp Actions:
Annunciator:
Comp Actions:
Annunciator:
Comp Actions:
Annunciator:
Comp Actions:
Annunciator:
Comp Actions:
Annunciator:
Comp Actions:
Annunciator:
Comp Actions:
Annunciator:
Comp Actions:
Annunciator:
Comp Actions:
Current Tech Spec Action Statements: (Does Not Include For Tracking Only Items T.S.A.S / Component:
Reason:
Entry Date:
T.S.A.S / Component:
Reason:
Entry Date:
T.S.A.S / Component:
Reason:
Entry Date:
T.S.A.S / Component:
Reason:
Entry Date:
T.S.A.S / Component:
Reason:
Entry Date:
T.S.A.S / Component:
Reason:
Entry Date:
Unit .3 Status Changes to Risk Significant Equipment:
B train protected both units
Online risk green Upcoming Reactivity Management Activities:
Upcoming Major POD Activities:
Upcoming ECOs to Hang and br Release:
Evolutions or Compensatory Actions in Progress:
General Information, Remarks, and Operator Work Around Status:
Unit 4 supplying Auxiliary steam.
Condenser air inleakage 0 scfm.
Severe thunderstorm warning in South Dade County expires in 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .
[ AppendIx D Rquirci OpratorActIori Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-302 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 3 Event
Description:
A Power Range Nuclear Instrument N-42 Control Power fuse blows. The ATC checks all PR NI Channels to determine the failure. 3-ONOP-059.8, Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunction, is entered to remove the channel from service. The SRO will address LCO 3.3.1.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Direct Facility Operator to trigger lesson step, EVENT I - N42 PR NI CONTROL POWER FUSE BLOWS.
(insert TEN 1CP22 TRUE delay=O ramp=O on=O off=O)
Observes failure of N42 PR NI Control Power
Alarms B6/1,6/2,6/3,6/5, &711 SRO/ATC
PR N42 control power fuse blows.
B 6/5 may not be the first or only ARP referred to CAUSES: Failure of power rouge drannel due to loss of power 842 POWER RANGE SRO/ATC LOSS OF DETECTOR VOLTAGE ALARM CONFIRMATION
1. CHECK LOSS OF DETECTOR VOLT light on any PR channel lit.
SRO/ATC
2. CHECK PR drawers for blown fuses.
3. CHECK loss of vital AC power supply to a PR drawer.
OPERATOR ACTIONS
1. ENSURE auto rod withdrawal block is lit.
SROIATC
2. WHEN plant conditions stabilize, THEN PERFORM 3-ONOP-059.8, Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunction.
Directs response using 3-ONOP-059.8, Power range Nuclear SRO Instrument Malfunction to restore level control.
3.0 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS 3.2 Mode 2 - Startup SRO/ATC j.2. 1 Malfunction of ONE channel:
1. Possible Manual Rod Withdrawal Block.
I
Apendbc D - RequIred Oirtor At1on Fim ES-D-2 I Op-Test No.: 2010-302 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 1 Page 2 of 3 Event
Description:
A Power Range Nuclear Instrument N-42 Control Power fuse blows. The ATC checks all PR NI Channels to determine the failure. 3-ONOP-059.8, Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunction, is entered to remove the channel from service. The SRO will address LCO 3.3.1.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 4.0 IMMEDIATE ACTiONS 4.2 Mode 2 Startup SRO/ATC 4.2.1 Malfunction of ONE channel:
1. None 5.2 SIude 2
).2. SI lunenon of ON]. elrmnel:
1, Slaintoin manual .nd ( oiurol.
2. le the 1 )R( )PPI I) J{( >1) 5 Ii ), )1 st ih.li fth the ln led el ounel ii the BY PASS position.
3. Pluec the applicable ROl ) S I I (P 115 (ASS . itch to the failed channel BYPASS poition
.1 1 ens Icr the 1 PP1 11 SI ( Ill iN ralot defluil sss itch to the (ailed SROIBOP
. En. icier the I OWl R SI C I IO\ .aiitpei atni detcat uw itch to tli. hued channel.
( Transfer rpp1ieah1e Pt )\\ I R SIISNIA It 11 BYPASs os itch nu BYPASS the Gil ed Innuu iel.
7. urucf.r the C. (YsIlAR,\ [C of (I I \\Nl I. 1>1 1 LA F uth ti Inc tailed ehainici.
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t NOTE I I The Reactor Protection System bistables associated with the failed power range channel SRO/BOP will be in the tripped condition when its bistable test switch is placed in the test (to the right) position as indicated by the red trip LEO on the Channel Status Light section of the EAGLE j 21 Test Panel being ON. j a
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I Apntx D - Rqulrd Operator AtlO11 FaiTh ES-tJ-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 1 Event
Description:
In accordance with 3-GOP-301, raise power to 5% for rolling the Main Turbine with Control Rods. MODE 1 preps are complete for the MODE change.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Conducts reactivity briefing with crew.
CREW Participates in reactivity briefing.
Directs the evolution per 3-GOP-301, Hot Standby to Power Operation SRO in accordance with Step 5.53.2.
=
NOTES I . If reactor power changes by more than 15 percent in a 1-hour period, Chemistry is required to sample the RCS per Technical Specification 4.4.8, Table 4.4-4. Item 6b.
I i
I . if reactor power is stabilized for any reason and performance of Attachment 4 is terminated, power data recording shall be recommenced when power changes are recommenced.
SROIATC I
All available indication should be monitored when changing power, including OSI/PI I
i and DCS. During power ascension, a rolling average power increase should be accessed every 15 minutes to ensure that the recommended ramp rate is not exceeded in any Ihourtime period.
As power is increased, the SDTA valves will open as steam flow increases.
ICommitment Step 2.3.11 CAPRJ EXAMINER NOTE: Reactivity briefing will occur prior to assuming the watch in the Simulator Briefing Room.
5. 5 In piepuation loi rolhuv ilie mum turbine, tucretne Reucini Powet to 3 to 5 percem SRO/ATC by dilution usiiie O-OP-1J46 CVCS - Boron (oncentralion tfontrol OR h wi1idrauug control rod. [Cmnmilnient Step 2.3.1 1 CAPP..j In preparation for rolling the Main Turbine, increases Reactor Power to SRO/ATC 3 to 5 percent by withdrawing Control Rods. The ATC has been given guidance to withdraw rods in 2 step increments.
SROIBOP Adjusts feedwater flow on the bypasses as reactor power is raised.
EXAMINER NOTE: Once an observable change in reactivity is noted (>1%), then proceed to Event3 3A CCW Pump tripping due to a breaker failure.
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Apiendix D ReqUired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 2 of 7 Event
Description:
3A COW Pump trips due to breaker failure. 3-701 G, PC-3_61 1 isolation, is inadvertently closed which prevents the Auto Start of 3B COW Pump. The ATC uses the ARP, 3-ONOP-030, or 0-ADM-21 1 to start 3B CCW Pump. Technical Specification 3.7.2 is entered.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER NOTE: SRO refers to 3-ONOP-030 and recognizes CCW was restored by starting a standby pump. The following steps will offer minimal direction for current lineup and situation.
CAUTION S RO!ATC if RCP bearing tempera lure annunciator alarm actuates AND its associated motor bearing temperature is greater than 195P, trip the reactor and stop the affected RCPs.
NOTE S RO/ATC Foldout page should be monitored throughout this procedure.
L_________.._J EXAMINER NOTE: The foldout page is on the following page.
I Verity Power Ic 4KV Bus 3D
a. Maintain 4KV Bus 3D energized - a. IF lockout of 4KV Bus 3D NOT present, ALIGNED TO AN ENERGIZED 4KV BUS flj perform the following
1. Verify 3C CCW Pump -
BREAKER OPEN SROIBOP 2. Verity 3C ICW Pump -
BREAKER OPEN
3. Operate bus supply breakers to energize bus.
/
2 Verify Component Cooling Water Pumps a. IE starting an idle COW pump will QI In Service overload an EDG, THEN start COW pumps as necessary to establish flow in both headers.
SROIATC 6
[ Appndbc D RquIred Oprator ActlOn Form ES-13-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 3 of 7 Event
Description:
3A CCW Pump trips due to breaker failure. 3-701 G, PC-3 61 1 isolation, is inadvertently closed which prevents the Auto Start of 3B CCW Pump. The ATC uses the ARP, 3-ONOP-030, or 0-ADM-21 1 to start 3B CCW Pump. Technical Specification 3.7.2 is entered.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior FOLDOUT FOR 3-ONOP-030
1. TOTAL LOSS OF CCW FLOW A. Manually trip the reactor. verify reactor trip using the EOP network, THEN stop the RCPs.
B. Isolate letdown and excess letdown.
C. Establish one charging pump running at niaximum speed TD dispatch operator to establish emergency cooling water to one of the remaining two charging pumps using Attachment 1. Monitor RCS pressure closely while running charging pump at maximum speed.
D. WHEN Attachment 1 is complete, THEN operate charging pump supplied with emergency cooling as necessary to maintain RCP seal cooling,
2. LOSS OF CCW TO ANY COMPONENT IF component cooling water flow to any component cooled by CCW i.s lost. THEN shut down the affected component.
3. CHARGING PUi\IP EMERGENCY COOLING CRITERIA IF Cooling Water is NOT available to charging pumps. THEN charging pump operation shall be at maximum speecfiitil cooling is restored from CCW System or using Attachment 1.
4. CCW PUMP STOPPING CRITERIA any Component Cooling Water Pump is cavitating, THEN stop the affected Component Cooling Water Pumps and place in PullToLock.
5. REACTOR TRIP CRITERIA IF tripping a RCP is required. THEN manually trip the reactor prior to stopping the RCP.
6. RCP STOPPING CRITERIA any RCP bearing tempeiatiue annunciator alarm actuates its associated motor bearing temperature is greater than 195F, THEN trip reactor and stop the affected RCPs.
7. CCW System operation once CCW System Hclr has been restored shall be within the operating restrictions of3-NOP-030 summarized as follows: [Commitment Step 3.3.2]
CCW Pumps, Heat Exchangers, and Flows/Loads.
N-i CCW Pumps (where N = number of CCW Hxs aligned to CCW)
All CCW Hxs in service when RHR in service with only 2 CCW Hxs in service, place 2 CCW Pumps in Pull-To-Lock.
Maximum of 5 out of 6 CCW Heat Loads.
7
Appendbc D - Required Oertor Atih Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 4 of 7 Event
Description:
3A CCW Pump trips due to breaker failure. 3-701G, PC-3_611 isolation, is inadvertently closed which prevents the Auto Start of 3B COW Pump. The ATC uses the ARP, 3-ONOP-030, or 0-ADM-21 1 to start 3B CCW Pump. Technical Specification 3.7.2 is entered.
Time Position
[ Applicants Actions or Behavior 3 Verify Flow In Both Component cooling Perform the following:
Water Headers NORMAL I FT-3-61 3A for header A
a. IF CCA flow to RCPS can NOT be established, THEN manually trip the reactor AND verify reactor trip using the
\j,.
FT-3-613B for header B EOP Network. then stop all RCPS AND perform the following:
SROIATC 1. Isolate Letdown and Excess Letdown
2. IF any charging pump is running, THEN operate at maximum speed until Attachment 1 is completed.
3. Dispatch an operator to establish emergency cooling water to desired charging pump using Attachment 1.
NOS
. The top of the conipoirenf cooling water singe tank divider plate is located at
approximately 25% indicated level.
. If a cross tie valve between the units is leaking or open, the surge tank on the opposite unit may be experiencing level control problems.
I SROIATC j . If in Modes 1 through 3, and CCW System level is NOT maintained within the CCW Head Tank, restore CCW System level to be within the CCW Head Tank within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .
I
LI-3-613A and Ll-3-614A are NOT overlapping (I&., LI-3-614A will go ott scale low I
before L!-3-613A comes off ifs high peg with decreasing level).
4 Verify Component Cooling Water Surge Perform the following:
Tank Level Being Maintained
1. Open Component Cooling Water Surge
a. Component Cooling Waler Surge Tank Tank Makeup, MOV-3-832 as necessary Level. Ll-3-613A- to add makeup.
. GREATER THAN 25% 2. IF Component Cooling Water Surge Tank Level can NOT be maintained, SRO/ATC AND perform the following:
. STAbLE OR INCREASING a) Trip the reactor AND perform 3-EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, while continrang with this procedure.
4,
/ b) WHEN rector verified tripped, THEN siop all ROPs.
3. Observe NOTES prior to Step B and go to Step 8.
8
Appendix D- Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2]
Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 5 of 7 Event
Description:
3A CCW Pump trips due to breaker failure. 3-701 G, PC-3_61 1 isolation, is inadvertently closed which prevents the Auto Start of 3B CCW Pump. The ATC uses the ARP, 3-ONOP-030, or 0-ADM-21 1 to start 3B COW Pump. Technical Specification 3.7.2 is entered.
Time Position
[ Applicants Actions or Behavior 5 Check If Component Cooling Water Headers Should Be Tied Together Check CCW headers SPLIT - a. Go to Step 34.
SROIATC Nh. Check if flow has been lost in any CCW b. jf flow in both CCW headers is normal, header flfj go to Step 34.
FT-3-613A for header A FT-3-613B for header B 34 Verify Component Cooling Water From Unit 4 NOT REQUIRED
a. Unit 3 CCW headers filled and intact a. Return to Step 4.
b. Verify CCW pumps AT LEAST ONE
- b. Start a Standby CCW pump.
RUNNING SROIATC c. Verify flow in at least one intact CCW c. Perform the following:
header 11 Try to establish flow in at least one Fl-3-613A for header A mtact CCW header Ft-3-613B for header B 2) IF flow in at least one intact CCW header can NOT be estthtished observe NOTE prior to Step 36 and go to Step 36
d. Verify intake cooling water flow to all in d. Perform the following:
service CCW heat exchangers
1) Try to establish intake cooling water P1-3-1407 for Hx A flow to in-service CCW heat exchangers P1-3-1408 for Hx B
2) Stop components cooled by
\ / Ft-3-140 for Hx C component cooling water as S ROIATC necessary to stabilize component cooling water temperature.
3) j any component cooled by component cooling water must be operated AND stable component cooling water temperature can be maintained, THEN observe NOTE prior to Step 36 and go to Step 38.
EXAMINER NOTE: Additional steps are NOT carried in scenario guide. The actions from this procedure should be minimal.
Refers to Technical Specifications and enters 3.7.2 for the Component Cooling Water System.
SRO 9
Appendix D Required OperatorActions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 6 of 7 Event
Description:
3A COW Pump trips due to breaker failure. 3-701 G, PC-3_61 1 isolation, is inadvertently closed which prevents the Auto Start of 3B CCW Pump. The ATC uses the ARP, 3-ONOP-030, or 0-ADM-21 1 to start 3B CCW Pump. Technical Specification 3.7.2 is entered.
Time
[ Position Applicants Actions or Behavior PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.2 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.2 The Component Cooling Water System (CCW) shall be OPERABLE with:
a. Three CCW pumps, and
b. Two CCW heat exchangers.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3. and 4.
ACTION:
a. With only two CCW pumps with Independent power supplies OPERABLE, restore the inoperable CCW pump to OPERABLE status within 30 clays or be in HOT STANDEY within the next B hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
b. With only one CCW pump OPERABLE or with two CCW pumps OPERABLE hut not from independent power supplies, restore two pumps from independent power supplies to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .
c. With less than two CCW heat exchangers OPERABLE, restore two heat exchangers to OPERABLE status within I hour or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .
SRO Enters 3.7.2, Action b for 2 COW Pumps without separate power.
EXAMINER NOTE: The SRO refers to 3-ONOP-030 and recognizes CCW was restored by starting a standby pump. The following steps will offer minimal direction for current lineup and situation. Also, the SRO may refer to 3-NOP-005, 4KV Buses A, B and D, or skill of the craft.
5.4 Transfer of 3D 4KV Bus from 38 4KV Bus to 3A 4KV Bus CAUTION De-energizing 3D 4KV BLI5 places Unit 3 in a Technical Specification LCO action statement due to the associated Component Cooling Water and Intake Cooling Water Pumps being inoperable.
1. ENSURE the following:
a 3A 4KV Bus s ENERGIZED.
SROIBOP a 3C COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP IS stopped.
30 INTAKE COOLING WATER PUMP is stopped 10
t AppndixD - Required Operat3rActksns Foi ES-D.2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 7 of 7 Event
Description:
3A CCW Pump trips due to breaker failure. 3-701G, PC-3_611 isolation, is inadvertently closed which prevents the Auto Start of 3B CCW Pump. The ATC uses the ARP, 3-ONOP-030, or 0-ADM-21 1 to start 3B CCW Pump. Technical Specification 3.7.2 is entered.
Time Position
[ Applicants Actions or Behavior
2. OPEN 3AB19, FEEDER TO 4KV BUS 3D.
3, OPEN 3AD05, SUPPLY FROM 4KV BUS 35, SRO/BOP
4. CLOSE 3ADOI SUPPLY FROM 4KV BUS 3A.
5. CLOSE 3AA17, FEEDER TO 4KV BUS 3D.
6. CHECK 3D 4KV Bus voltage between 3744 and 4576 volts at cubicle 3AD08.
7. START one of the followina o PMT the Bkr supply for 3D 4KV Bus:
SRO/BOP 3CICWPUMP 3C COW PUMP Enters 3.7.2, Action a for 2 CCW Pumps inoperable with separate SRO/BOP power supplies and exits Action b.
EXAMINER NOTE: When TS determination is made, then proceed to Event 4.
11
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AppridIcD RequIrt Operator At1On Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4 Page 2 of 4 The incoming feeder breaker from 3B 4KV Bus, 3AD06, fails open. The result is a loss of the 3D 4KV Bus power. The loss of this bus can affect ICW/CCW lineups due to shared power. The crew is able to restore power to the 3D 4KV Bus from the 3A 4KV Bus with 3-ONOP-004.5, Loss of 3D 4KV Bus.
3 DIsconnect Loads From 3D 4KV Dus
a. Venly 3C make Coollag Water Pump SROIBOP breaker. 3AD05 OPEN b, Verify 30 Component Cooling Water Pump breaker, 3AD04 OPEN 4 taetermtne Source Of Power For 3D 4KV Bus
a. Check 3A and 3B 4KV buses - BOTH a. Perform the following:
ENERGIZED 1> IF 3A 4KV bus is energized, THEN ao to Step 5.
2) IF 3 4KV bus is energized, THEN go1 tep7 SRO/BOP b. Consult with Nuclear Plant Supemisor determine desired source of power for 3D 4KV bus:
3A4KVbus 384KV bus
c. Check desired source of power for 3D 4KV toStep7 bus 3A 4KV bus 5 Re-energize 3D 4KV Bus From 3A 4KV Bus Go to Step 7.
a. Open Feeder To 4KV Bus 3D, 3AB19
b. Open Supply From 4KV Bus 3B 3AD06 SROIBOP
c. Close Supply From 4KV Bus 3A, 3ADO1 f d. Close Feeder To 4KV Bus 3D, 3AA17 6 GoToStep8 13
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4 Page 3 of 4 The incoming feeder breaker from 3B 4KV Bus, 3AD06, fails open. The result is a loss of the 3D 4KV Bus power. The loss of this bus can affect 1GW/COW lineups due to shared power. The crew is able to restore power to the 3D 4KV Bus from the 3A 4KV Bus with 3-ONOP-004.5, Loss of 3D 4KV Bus.
8 Verify 3D 4KV Bus ALIGNED TO AN
- Perform the following:
ENERGIZED BUS
a. Notify Nuclear Plant Supervisor that 3D 3A 4KV bus 4KV bus cannot be re-energized.
OR
b. Continue efforts to re-energize 3D 4KV
bus from one of the following:
38 4KV bus SROIBOP
3A 4KV bus using Step 5 38 4KV bus using Step 7
c. WHEN 3D 4KV bus has been re-energized, do Steps 9 and 10.
d. Continue with procedure and step in effect.
CAUTION If a loss of all AC power has occurred, safeguards equipment shall be restarted as directed in the Emergency Operating Procedures or 3-ONOP-004, LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER.
SROIBOP 9 Locally Verify No Breaker Targets Exist On IF any 3D 4KV bus breaker target is in, 3D 4KV Bus Breakers THEN DO NOT ENERGIZE ASSOCIATED COMPONENT until cause of breaker target V has been determined and corrected.
SROIBOP 14
- Appndlx D -. Rlulrd OpertrAtIn FO?rri ES-D Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4 Page 4 of 4 The incoming feeder breaker from 3B 4KV Bus, 3AD06, fails open. The result is a loss of the 3D 4KV Bus power. The loss of this bus can affect low/cow lineups due to shared power. The crew is able to restore power to the 3D 4KV Bus from the 3A 4KV Bus with 3-ONOP-004.5, Loss of 3D 4KV Bus.
CAUTION CCW System load requirements for the EOP network, and the SHUTDOWN LOCA ONOP5, 3-ONOP-041.7 and 3-ONOP-041.8 SHALL NOT be exceeded. These requirements are:
1. The number of running CCW pumps shall be one less than the number of In-Service CCW Heat Exchangers.
2. No more than 5 of the following loads shall be on the CCW SROIBO System at one time.
a. Normal Containment Coolers (equals I Load).
b. RHR Heat Exchanger (each HX equals I load].
c. Emergency Containment Coolers (each ECC equals I load, and for a loss of instrument air ALL ARE IN-SERVICE LOADS].
3. If only 2 CCW Heat Exchangers are in service and CCW valves MOV-3-749A and MOV-3-749B are open, two CCW Pumps are required to be in Pull-To-Lock.
10 Restart Components Supplied By 3D 4KV Bus As Directed By Shift Manager 3C Intake CooHng Water Pump 3C Component Cooling Water Pump SROIBOP V EXAMINER NOTE: After the decision and action to restore 3C 1GW Pump and 3C CCW Pump is complete, then proceed to Event 5.
15
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ApndIIc D - Requled OpeitoFAtiiis Form ES-EJ-2 L Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 4 Event
Description:
The Master Pressurizer Controller fails to high demand and causes the Pressurizer Spray Valves to fail open. The ATC responds by selecting manual control of the Master Controller or both Spray Valve Controllers and controlling per ARP, 3-ONOP-041 .5, or0-ADM-211.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Direct Facility Operator to trigger lesson step, EVENT 6 - MASTER PZR PRESS CNTRL FAIL. (insert 1AH2S44J 0.000000 delay=0 ramp=180 on=0 off0)
Observes the following:
RCS Pressure lowers SROIATC
. Both PCV-3-455A and B Spray Valves open in automatic.
Manual operation of is successful with reclosing the valves.
A_9/2_PZR_Control_Hi/Lo_Press RCS Pressure is noticed lowering along with PCV-3-455A and B SROIATC going further open.
Either the Master Pressure Controller and/or the Individual Spray Controllers are taken to manual and output lowered to close the PZR SROIATC Spray Valves. Taking manual actions to control plant parameters if an automatic control system is out of service / malfunctioning is in accordance with 0-ADM-211.
EXAMINER NOTE: If prompt action is taken, there may not be an annunciator response. In the case where action is delayed, then initial actions will be taken in accordance with these ARPs prior to entering 3-ONOP-041.5, Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunction.
Directs response using 3-ONOP-041 .5, Pressurizer Pressure Control SRO Malfunction.
NOTE SROIATC I Foldout page is required to be monitored throughout this procedure.
17
Appendix B RequIred Operator AtiOns Form ES-D-7 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6 Page 2 of 4 Event
Description:
The Master Pressurizer Controller fails to high demand and causes the Pressurizer Spray Valves to fail open. The ATC responds by selecting manual control of the Master Controller or both Spray Valve Controllers and controlling per ARP, 3-ONOP-041 .5, or 0-ADM-21 1.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior FOLDOUT FOR PROCEDURE 3-ONOP-041 .5
1. FAILED INSTRUMENT ISOLATION
a. IF any Pressurizer Pressure control Instrument Loop fails. THEN place appicabIe control switches to a position that isolates the failed instrument.
2. 3-EOP-E-O TRANSITION CRITERIA
a. IF PZR pressure cannot be mainlained greater than 2000 prig, THEN perform the to low ng:
- Con(nue efforts to restore PZR pressure and
2. Trip the reactor and turbine and go to 3-EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY I[JJECTIOF&
3 PORV ISOLATIONILEAKING PORV IDENTIFICATION
a. IF any P0EV is OPEN OR Leaking AND pressure is less than 2235 prig, THEN CLOSE the appical:le P0EV and!or Block valve.
b. The following are indicat:ons of leakage from a PZR PORV and should be used to identify and isolate a leaking PORV:
I) R relef line temperature. 71-3-463, INCREASING.
2:1 PZR relief tank lesal, LI-3-470, INCREASING.
3) PZR rerief tank temperature. 11-3-471, INCREASING.
4) PZR re cf tank pressure, P1-3-472. INCREASING.
51 PZR PORVISAFETY ACOUSTIC MONITOR. LEDs LIT.
4. OPEIJILEAKING PZR SAFETY VALVE IDENTIFICATION
a. The following are indications that a PZR safety rs open or leaking:
II PZR Safety I ne temperature, Tl-3-465. INCREASING or at asturaton temperature associated with the PZR relief tank pressure per ATTACHMENT 2.
2) PZR Safety line temperature, Tl-3-467, INCREASING or at saturation temperature associated with the PZE reltef tank pressure per ATTACHMENT 2.
3) PZR Safety line temperature, Tl-3-459, INCREASING or at sa1uraiioi temperature associated with the PZE relief tank pressure per ATTACHMENT 2.
41 PZR relief tank level, Ll-3-470, INCREASING.
51 PZR r&ief tank temperature, 11-3-471, INCREASING.
6) PZR relief tank preesure, P1-3-472, INCREASING.
7) PZR PORV/Safety Acoustic Monitor, LEDs LIT.
5. SPURIOUS ACTUATION OF CV-3-311 AUXILIARY SPRAY VALVE due to 6re in Containment or 36 4Krr Switchgear Room
a. IF pressurizer pressure is decreasing and Aux liacy Spray Valve, CV-3-31 1, is suspect. THEN reduce charging to one charging pump on slow speed AND close charging to RCS Control Valve HCV-3-12 1.
18
Appendix D Rqulred Opratr AtIn Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6 Page 3 of 4 Event
Description:
The Master Pressurizer Controller fails to high demand and causes the Pressurizer Spray Valves to fail open. The ATC responds by selecting manual control of the Master Controller or both Spray Valve Controllers and controlling per ARP, 3-ONOP-041 .5, or 0-ADM-21 1.
Time
[ Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CAUTION The Master Controller should be operated carefully (Normal controller output for 2235 psig is 42.5 percent demand; 92 percent demand will open PCV-3-455C). If the following conditions are met, an excessive increase in controller output could cause Power Operated Relief Valve PCV-3-455C to open:
SRO/ATC
1. PCV-3-455C hand switch in AUTO.
2. Pressurizer pressure is greater than or equal o 2000 psig, or OMS switch in LO Press Ops.
Check PZR Pressure Control Instrument Loop Not Failed
a. Check PT-3-444 NOT FAILED by
- a. Pefornt tne fofowin:
conparison with adjacent pcessure channels and known pwnt paraew 1) Verify PCV-3-455C MOV-3-53f CLOSED.
2) Take manual control of PC-3-44$J, PZR PRESS CONTROL 3i IF nianual control of PC-3-444J a SRO/ATC effect ye, perform the followin:
Take manual control of PZR
\ spray valves.
Take manual control of PZR heaters.
. Check PT3_e45 NOT FAILED by
- b. Perform the fol owing:
comparison with adjacent pressure
1) Verify PCV-3-45&OR MO/-3-535 channels and known plant parameters CLOSED 2 Check PORVs Closed Perform the followin:
SROIATC
cv-.4ssc - CLOSED . IF FZR pressure ia less than 2335, TI-tEN manually close PORV& IL any
PC/-3-456 - CLOSED PZR PORV can NOT be c[oaed, THEN manually close its block valve.
SRO/ATC I CAUTION A fire in containment or the 3S 4KV Switch gear Room may cause spurious actuation of and give false valve position indication forAuxilia,y Spray Valve, CV-3-311.
I 19
AppendixD Required Operator Actions - Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6 Page 4 of 4 Event
Description:
The Master Pressurizer Controller fails to high demand and causes the Pressurizer Spray Valves to fail open. The ATC responds by selecting manual control of the Master Controller or both Spray Valve Controllers and controlling per ARP, 3-ONOP-041 .5, or O-ADM-21 1.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 3 Check PZR Spray Valves Closed j PZR prsaurs lass than norms: flj parhrni th- fotIoohq:
. PZR pressure normal or treadi5 to normal F a. Vurify PZR Spray vahe ctasd.
Plow PZR Spray Loop PCV-:-4S3A in MANUAl ow ILLCISE, Piano PZR Spray Lan t. B PV3-4555 in MANUAL and SRO/ATC
/ Vainy Aux Spray Value i_.V--3 1 I CLOSED.
b. JLPZR pressure can 2I be maintained greater then 2000 psig.
THEN perform the following:
t Trip the reactor and turbine and go to E-0. REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.
2) Trip the RCP in the affected ioop.
4 Check PZR Safety Valves Closed
a. PZF PORViSafety acoustic irionitor LEDs - NOT LIT
b. PZR safety line temperatures at or near nomia SROIATC
PZR safety ins temperature.
TI-3-465
PZR safety line temperature, T[-3-467
/
PZR safet ins temperature, Tl-3-465 5 Check PZR Pressure Stable Or Increasing Perform the following:
SROIATC \Ii Continue effons to restore PZR V pressure control.
EVALUATOR NOTE: After PZR Pressure is checked stable, then proceed with Event 7 -
3B Main Steam Line Break Inside Ctmt.
20
Appendix D -Required OperarnrAtions - FOrm ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7/8/9 Page 1 of 20 Event
Description:
A Main Steam Line Leak upstream of the 3B MSIV inside Containment gradually develops. A manual or automatic Reactor Trip occurs. The crew responds using 3-EOP-E-0. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-P.1 when present after exiting 3-EOP-E-0.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Direct Facility Operator to trigger lesson step, EVENT 7 3B MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK INSIDE CTMT. (insert TVSBVL14 0.5 delay=0 rampl2O on0 offo)
SRO Directs response using 3-EOP-E-0 starting at Step 1.
flo-CREW Steps 1 through 4 are IMMEDIATE ACTION steps.
Verify Reactor Trip Manually trip reactor. IF reactor po.ver is greater than 5% intermediate range power
. Rod bottom lights ON is NOT stable or decreasing, THEN perform the following:
. Reactor trip and bypass breakers OPEN a. Monitor Critical Safety Functions using 3.EQP-F-0, CRITICAL SAFETY SROIATC
Rod position indicators AT ZERO FUNCTION STATUS TREES.
4. /. Neutron flux DECREASING b. Go to 3-EOP-FR-S.1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION!
ATWS. Step 1.
2 Verify Turbine Trip
a. All turbine stop or associated control a. Manually trip turbine. jf unable to verify valves CLOSED turbine trip, THEN close main steamline isolation and bypass valves.
b. Verify Moisture Separator Reheater b. Manually close valves. IF any valve can Steam Valves CLOSED NOT be closed, THEN close main steamline isolation and bypass valves.
SROIBOP
MSR Main Steam Supply Stop MOVs
Reheater Timing Valves
MSR Purge Steam Valves
c. Check Mid and East OCEs OPEN c. Manually open breakers. IF breakers do (Normally 30-second delay) NOT open. THEN actuate EMERGENCY GEN. BKR. TRIP SWITCH for the affected breaker(s).
21
I Appendix D - Required OperatorActions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7/8/9 Page 2 of 20 Event
Description:
A Main Steam Line Leak upstream of the 3B MSIV inside Containment gradually develops. A manual or automatic Reactor Trip occurs. The crew responds using 3-EOP-E-0. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-P.1 when present after exiting 3-EOP-E-0.
Time
[ Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 3 Verify Power To Emergency 4 KV Buses a Check the SA and SB 4 KV buses - a. Perform the following:
MAINTAIN AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED
1) Attempt to emergency start any Unit 3 available diesel generator.
2) IF neither 3A nor 3D 4KV bus is energized, THEN go to 3-EOP-ECA-OO, LOSS ALL AC POWER, Step 1.
/ b. Check the 3A and 3B 4 KV buses - b. Attempt to emergency start the MAINTAIN BOTH ENERGIZED de-energized Unit 3 bus diesel generator c Maintain the 3D 4 KV bus energized - c Perform the following:
ALIGNED TO AN ENERGIZED 4 KV BUS
1) IF lockout of 3D 4 KV bus NOT present, THEN perform the following a) Verify 3C CCW pump -
BREAKER OPEN b) Verify SC ICW pump BREAKER OPEN c) Operate bus supply breakers to restore power.
SROIBOP 22
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[ AppiidIIcD RequIred Operto Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7/8/9 Page 4 of 20 Event
Description:
A Main Steam Line Leak upstream of the 3B MSIV inside Containment gradually develops. A manual or automatic Reactor Trip occurs. The crew responds using 3-EOP-E-0. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-P.1 when present after exiting 3-EOP-E-0.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATCIBOP FOLDOUT FOR PROCEDURE E0
1. ADVERSE CONTAINMENT CONDONS IF either of the coneitions listed helot, occur, THEN use adverse containment setponts:
Containment atmosphere temperature 180F OR Containment radiation levels 1 ,3x1 0 R/hr WHEN containment parameters drop below the above values, THEN normal setpoints can again he used IF the TSC determines that containment integrated close rote has not exceeded i0 Rods.
2. RCP TRIP CRITERIA
a. both conditions listed below occur. THEN trip all ROPe:
1) High-head SI pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING LD SI FLOWPATH VERIFIED.
Ti RCS subcooling LESS THAN 25Ff65F]
b. IF phase B actuated. THEN trip all RCP5.
3. FAULTED 5/0 ISOLATION CRITERIA (3B SIG Faulted)
IF any 5/0 pressure decreasing in an uncontrolled manner OR any 5/0 completely depressurizecl, THEN the folIo ;.ing may he performed:
a. Maintain total feedvater flow greater than 345 gpm until narrow range level in at least one S!G is greater than 6t
[32%].
0
h. Isolate AFW flow to faulted 5/0(s).
c. Stabilize ROS hot leg temperature using steam dumps when faulted 5/0 has bIovn do% m 1o less than 10% wide range.
4. RUPTURED SIG ISOLATION CRITERIA IF any Sf0 level increases in an uncontrolled manner OR any SIG has abnormal radiation, AND narrow range level in affected S/G(s) is greater than 6%[32%], THEN feed flow may be stopped to affected S/G(s).
5. AFW SYSTEM OPERATION CRITERIA -
a. E two AFW pumps are operating on a single train, THEN one of the pumps shall be shut down within one hour of the initial start signal
b. IF two AFW trains are operating and one of the AFW pumps has been operating at low flow of 50 gprn or less for one hour, THEN that AFVV pump shall be shut down
6. CST MAKEUP WATER CRITERIA IF CST level decreases to less than 10%, THEN add makeup to CST using 3-NOP-018.01, CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK (CST).
ATCIBOP
7. RHR SYSTEM RATION CRITERIA IF RHR flo*. is less than 1000 gpm, THEN the RHR pumps shall be shut clov.n within 44 minutes of the initial start signal.
24
Appendix D Required Operator Ations Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7/8/9 Page 5 of 20 Event
Description:
A Main Steam Line Leak upstream of the 3B MSIV inside Containment gradually develops. A manual or automatic Reactor Trip occurs. The crew responds using 3-EOP-E-0. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-P.1 when present after exiting 3-EOP-E-0.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Trip RCPs due high Containment pressure and Phase B Isolation SROIATC ofCCWtoRCPS.
[1AEI4V: Trip RCPs due high Containment pressure and Phase B Isolation of CCW to RCPs prior to exiting 3-EOP-E-O.
6 Check AFW Pumps AT LEAST TWO
- Perform the following:
RUNNING
a. Manually open valves to establish Iwo AFW pumps running.
b. IF an APW pump is tripped. THEN dispatch an operator to locally reset the AEW turbine trips.
c. j both units require AFW only one AFW pump is available, THEN perform the following SRO/ATC
( I) Verity all REPs TRIPPED
2) Establish 270 gpm APW flow to each unit.
3) Use a setpoint of 270 gprn for required AEW flow instead of 345 gpm specified in subsequent Steps and Procedures.
EXAMINER NOTE: CV-3-2832 is failed open to B SIG, there will be an attempt to manually isolate if not already locally isolated over the next steps.
7 Verity AFW Valve Alignment PROPER
- Manually align vives to establish proper AlW EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT fr alignment SRO!ATC 25
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-21 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7/8/9 Page 6 of 20 Event
Description:
A Main Steam Line Leak upstream of the 3B MSIV inside Containment gradually develops. A manual or automatic Reactor Trip occurs. The crew responds using 3-EOP-E-0. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-P.1 when present after exiting 3-EOP-E-0.
Time Position
[ Applicants Actions or Behavior 8 Verify Proper AFW Flow a Check narrow range level in at least one a. Prfocm the following:
S/G GREATER THAN 6%132%)
1) Jeri[y ARV flow grealer than 345 gpm.
2) IFAFW flow less than 345 gpnt, THEN manually start pumps AND align valves to establish greater than 345 gprn flow.
3) IF total feed flow from all sources greater ,an 345 gpn can NOT be established IU.EU perfom the SROIATC following:
a) Monitor Critical Safety Fancons ucrng 3-EOP-F-D, CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATIJS TREES b) Go ta3-EOP-FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK, Step 1.
b hirtrin feai fIw In S unb)
SRO/ATC roie )eiel betwean l5[32 ancr 52 Dispatches U3 Turbine Operator (TO) to locally isolate the 3B SIG SRO!ATC AFW Control Valve, CV-32832 (failed open) with AFPD-3-007.
EXAMINER NOTE: Raises flow to the 3A and 3C SIG to at least 345 gpm total.
26
I Appendix C) Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011 -302 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7/8/9 Page 7 of 20 Event
Description:
A Main Steam Line Leak upstream of the 3B MSIV inside Containment gradually develops. A manual or automatic Reactor Trip occurs. The crew responds using 3-EOP-E-0. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-P.1 when present after exiting 3-EOP-E-0.
Time Position Applicant!s Actions or Behavior 9 Check RCP Seat CooIng Check all RCP thermal barrier alarms a. J.E CCW to an RCP thermal banier is lost.
OFF THEI:
A 111, RCP THERMAL BARR 1) Trip the affected RCP(s).
COOLING WATER Hi F!OW 9c.
A 1)2, RCP THERMAL BARR
\V
COOLING WATER HI TEMP A 1)3, RCP THERMAL COOL1NG WATER LO FLOW
b. Go to Step 10
c. Check all RCP seat relurn ternperawres c. GotoSteplO.
are ieee than 235 F rfC1-RECET d. Rese IF oFt te oc.eer it tOT otal>le TNEII paotv adequate to one cong puirp F suaie dese:
capacirj NOT aai.aoIe, THEN ched noneasertiol loaoa.
SRO/ATC F:enr to ATTACHMEiT 2tcr t-t lca ratnq f 2tartfS carting piinq at to rir.cr f. Go t ten j
) trtai njeLoO g Adjuot harg rj Flow To Rngsn Heat Eruhrtnger H-3-I2l, trt maintein prcper seal rtjecrtort fow 27
AppendixD- Required OperatorActions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7/8/9 Page 8 of 20 Event
Description:
A Main Steam Line Leak upstream of the 3B MSIV inside Containment gradually develops. A manual or automatic Reactor Trip occurs. The crew responds using 3-EOP-E-0. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-P.1 when present after exiting 3-EOP-E-0.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO/ATC 10 Maintain RCS Cold Leg T&rnperatuie Penfomi the following.
STABLEATTRENDlNGTO547FlF a enpnrawre ecren;n ANY RCP RUNNING peHorn the ía low ng:
QF.. sop du epag LESS THAN 547F AND STABLE IF NO Reduce aal teed flow o 45 gprn RCP RUNNING un:f narrow rage IaaI gresier than tE32,1 a least one RiG 3t iF caadowr is die o a cersrie n:anru tw.e, THEN Jns anna eni-arnhne isolation and Lpics aLe.
b. iF ienperature greater than 547F AND increasing, THEN perform the following:
Dump steam to coridensen OR Dump steam using RiG steam dump to atmosphere valnes SROIATC Reduces total AFW flow to > 345 gpm max for both A & C SIGs.
SROIATC Places 3B Main Steam Isolation Valve to CLOSE.
CREW:CaflICALTA$K : Isolates the Faulted 3B SIG prior to exiting 3-EOP-E-O when 3-EOP-FR-P.1 is NOT present, otherwise as directed in 3-EOP-FR-P.1.
EXAMINER NOTE: 3B Main Steam Isolation Valve may be CLOSED in Attachment 3 of 3-EOP-E-O.
EXAMINER NOTE: Facility Operator ensures trigger, TFSWX6C true is DELETED.
28
AppndHxD eqWrdOratorMtIoh Frni ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 1 -302 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7/8/9 Page 9 of 20 Event
Description:
A Main Steam Line Leak upstream of the 3B MSIV inside Containment gradually develops. A manual or automatic Reactor Trip occurs. The crew responds using 3-EOP-E-0. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-P.1 when present after exiting 3-EOP-E-0.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior II Check PRZ PORVs, Spray valves And Excess Letdown Isolated a PORVs CLOSED a. IF PRZ pressure less than 2335 psig, THEN manually close PC>RVs any PRZ PORV can NOT be closed, THEN manually close its block valve. if block valve can QI be closed. THEN perform the following I) Monitor Crilical Safety Functions using 3-EOP-F-D, CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES
2) Go to 3-EOP-E- I LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 1.
h. Normal PRZ spray valves CLOSED b. IF PRZ pressure less than 2260 psig.
THEN manually close valves. valvels) can 2I be closed, Iu stop RCPI5) as necessary to stop spray flow.
c Auxiliary Spray Valve, CV-3-31 I c. Manually close auxiliary spray valve. IF SROIATC CLOSED auxiliary spray valve can NOT he closed, THEN close Charging Flow to Regen Heal Exchanger, HC\f-3-i 21 cl. Excess letdown isolation valves d. Manually close valve(s).
CLOSED
. CV3-387, Excess Letdown Isolation Valve From Cold Leg To Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger
. HCV-3-l 37. Excess Letclown Flow Controller s/
29
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I Appendix 0 Required Operatcr Actions Forffi ES-D-Z Op-Test No.: 201 1 -302 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7/8/9 Page 1 1 of 20 Event
Description:
A Main Steam Line Leak upstream of the 3B MSIV inside Containment gradually develops. A manual or automatic Reactor Trip occurs. The crew responds using 3-EOP-E-0. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-P.1 when present after exiting 3-EOP-E-0.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Directs response using 3-EOP-FR-P.1.
CAUTIONS
. If CST level decreases to less than 10%, makeup water sources for the CST will be necessary to maIntaIn secondary heatsink.
CREW
. Operation of RHR pumps for greater than 44 minutes on minimum recirculation can cause overheating and failure of the RHR pump.
CREW I \ /Chck RCS Pressure GREATER THAN
- IF RHR Flow greater than 1000 gpm, p-WJJ 4 250 PSIG [650 PSIG] return to procedure AND step in effect.
CAUTIONS
. Low range flow indication is NOT available when using main feedwaler instrumentation and an alternate source of feedwater. Changes in RCS C REW temperature and S/C level may be used to control feedwater flow.
. If the AFW pumps are the only available source of feed flow, the steam supply to the AFW pumps needs to be maintained from at least one S/C.
n NOTE If RCPs are NOT running and Steps Ii through 34 of 3-EOP-E-3, Steam Generator Tube I RuptLire, are in effect, this procedure shall not be performed.
L___.._.I C REW 31
- I Appendix D - Required OperatrAtIon Form ES-D-2 I Op-Test No.: 201 1-302 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7/8/9 Page 12 of 20 Event
Description:
A Main Steam Line Leak upstream of the 3B MSIV inside Containment gradually develops. A manual or automatic Reactor Trip occurs. The crew responds using 3-EOP-E-0. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-P.1 when present after exiting 3-EOP-E-0.
2 Cheek RCS Cold Le Temperatures - Try to stop RCS coolctown:
STABLE OR INCREASING a Verify SIG steam dump to atmosphere valves CLOSED.
b. Verify steam dump to condenser Valves
- CLOSED.
SRO!BOP C IF RHR System in service. THEN stop any cooldown from RHR System.
ci. s-oritrol ferd tkw to non-faulted SiCtist to stop RCS cooldo-on Mwntwn total teed llo.c preoter than 3-15 ppm Sot I f rwrro: rana level prealer than LrS3251l not least ca non-lou ted GiG.
NOTE C REW I A fau!ted S/G is any SIG that is depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner or is completely I depressurized.
L_____i 3 Minimize Coclilowo From Faulleri S.Glsl o Check S!Gc - Al, I FAJLTEE a. c-o to S:ap 4.
5. Check s: C :00 e5 teriperalores 1: 5-c to C:c 4.
DEC5E3lt:G
/
c. city iOu 5153 dine atur C cc see o>cc fi cart too reQ 515 o fetySl-RESET a le-ufy a:sair cuprty 0 flCQ t both trorrir 1 s- Repoc lion AVI steam s.ippy croca SF11 pjuvpo two, li:jct SlGisu cOflflCCt a vea.o lJlu-IJe sscn froit untOci SlOts 1o at AO purroc, Maintasi s:ec I cui to SFW cocos wisi e reroeutucrmg crooc-cornect SRO/BOP I Dispatch ooerwor to r cm- oe frI owij 1 I Opec OFCJ p c:eam ca.ol MCi.
l:oeaker on to iso Cl3I:
2i cocA .5 p.irm. eteOc at.:y t.fG, ciI .e0SiO51
s. Slier al SIG .J1 310 jj °AULTED
- g. at SIGa looked. jcontrclteeci Iowa: :s to each 55; AND co to St, 4.
S Ocncoi ced flo. at 25 ocr, to coy fajl:ac SOIspaeejed tar RCC tempcra:u:e crrorc i rotate fecdo 01cr to at larcited Cu 3:01 NOT I iceded for °.5S teniperata e corro 32
Appendix I) - Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 1-302 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7/8/9 Page 13 of 20 Event
Description:
A Main Steam Line Leak upstream of the 3B MSIV inside Containment gradually develops. A manual or automatic Reactor Trip occurs. The crew responds using 3-EOP-E-0. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-P.1 when present after exiting 3-EOP-E-0.
4 Check PRZ PORV Block Valves SROIATC a. Power to block valves - AVA1LABLE a Restore power to block valves.
\[fV
b. Block valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN b. Open one block valve unless twos closed to solate an open PORJ.
CAUTION SRO/ATC PRZ PORV opens because of birth PRZ pressure, slap 5 should be repeated after pressure decreases to less titan the setpoint.
5 Check If PRZ PORVs Should Be Closed
a. Check OverpressLre Mitigation System a. Go to Step 5o.
(OMS) IN SERVICE
/
b. Check RCS pressure LESS THAN 460
- /Vetify at east one PRZ POBV open.
P510 / WHEN pressure less than 460 psig,
/ ILL veri all PRZ PORVa closed or
/ isolated. Continue with Step &
SROIATC c. GotoSlepSe d Check PRZ pressure LESS THAN d Vetify Cl east one PRZ PORV open.
2335 PSIG WHEN pressure less than 2335 psig, I THEN verify all PRZ PORVs closed or
, isolated. Continue with Step 6.
a. PRZ PORVs - CLOSED a. Mantis ly close PORV. any valve can
[JOT cc c osed, THEN mantis ly close its block valve.
SROIATC 6 Check High-Head SI Pumps ANY Go to Step 13.
RUNNING 7 Check If St Should Be Terniiriated Go to Step 27.
RCS subcooling kased on core exit TCs -
GREATER THAN 60F(260F]
SROIATC
RVLMS (QSPDS) plenum indication -
GREATER THAN 0%
CAUTION If SI is reset and either offsite power is lost or SI actuation occurs on the other unit, SROA TC man ual action may be required to restore safeguards equipment to the required configuration.
SROIATC 8 Verify SI - RESET 33
Appendix B Required OpertorAtioris FOrni ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7/8/9 Page 14 of 20 Event
Description:
A Main Steam Line Leak upstream of the 3B MSIV inside Containment gradually develops. A manual or automatic Reactor Trip occurs. The crew responds using 3-EOP-E-0. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-P.1 when present after exiting 3-EOP-E-0.
SROIATC 9 Reset Containment Isolahon Phase A And Phase B 10 Verify Instrument Air To Containment
a. Verify Instrument Air Containment Isolation, CV-3-2803 OPEN SR0IATc b.
Verify instrument air pressure. P1-3-1444 - b. Restore instrument air pressure using j GREATER THAN 95 PSIG 0-ONOP-013, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT P AIR, while continuing with this procedure.
CAUTION S ROIATC if charging pump suction auto transfers to RWST, RCS makeup control switch needs to be placed in STOP.
II Estabi sh Charging Flua
.:.n rung p.iirpn - .. LE.ST LtIE Perrnt 15 c ril ow rig RUtIt1G ii i.V ibm rim ROE rum ra Lamar is oat Ijj!Ioimaly isolate nsa ilteel Sm to a mrictud RCP(nj icicle ritOrtit g chnrciirg pu -lips
-7I.forRP
.2Y7BfcrrR:P8 3-257C fr-i F L 2i IFoffairia prime s NOT anoilab THEN rmI-ec rlwselca,rcity S RO!ATC agc, in a to cii uhaigi aurrpa ndsqimte Ci.rinl cmpacit iri NOT a a Lii In, ThEN al liii ioirw ci tin lomb, FLaerto aTT,aCi$%lT 1 tue c:rmpanent lAi ond raliirg Imi Chart at laat ore aharg rig pump or Entablimbm 20 cpa- charjirc Co..
I -r J 1 chaging pauma Opeed 000tr era ho eshma .l 20 goii chargiui fo,n
2) sojiintchargirq F.owTo eger tnat Erinliarigar, iOJ-3-12i to rita ritain wooer SCSI rucuicn flow 12 Stop The Following Pumps flPIacu In statuby SROIATC sm, i RHRmtmps
-igh-trsat Ct CREW CRItiCAL rASK If RHR Flow less than 1000 gpm, stop the RHR Pumps within 44 minutes of their start signal. (3-EOP-FR-P.1)
EXAMINER NOTE: After RHR Pumps are secured, the scenario is terminated after SI Termination is checked or earlier based on the discretion of the Lead Examiner.
34
[ Appendix D - Requirett Operattsr Actians Fm ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7/8/9 Page 15 of 20 Event
Description:
A Main Steam Line Leak upstream of the 3B MSIV inside Containment gradually develops. A manual or automatic Reactor Trip occurs. The crew responds using 3-EOP-E-0. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-P.1 when present after exiting 3-EOP-E-0.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
[ [
1. Check The Load Centers Associated With Close the Load Center supply breakers.
The Energized 4 KV Buses ENERGIZED
. 3ALC
3BLC BOP
3CLC
3DLC
3HLC
2. Check If Main Steamlines Should Be Isolated a Clock main stoamline isolation and a. Lo to Stop LpoSs voIces AkJY OPEN P Check if either meet steOm isolatian H Co to Sp 1.
sianol has actuated H p1 steam II w sPin either lcw So BO p *
[rsittl4isJORlov/TovpC$DF OR
HH. containment pi assure 21t PSlC-
\ fc. Vernv main clean- isolation and ts,pass c. Push manual Steandins isolation push Ps (Li) FE t r OR ii nit Il rio CREWCRlTICALTASK Isolates the Faulted 3B SIG prior to exiting 3-EOP-E-O when 3-EOP-FR-P.1 is NOT present, otherwise as directed in 3-EOP.FR-P.1.
3. Verify Feedwater Isolation
a. Place main ieeclwatet pump a.vitrhes in STOP
b. Peedwater control valves CLOSED b. Manually close valves.
c. Feedwater bypass valves CLOSED c Manually close valves.
H Close feedwater isolation MOVs d Locally close valves
e. \Jerify standby feedwater pumps OFE e. IF standby teedwater is aligned to Unit 3, BOP IN stop standby feedwater pump(s)
\/
35
Appendix D Required Operator Atkrns FOilli ES-D-Z Op-Test No.: 201 1-302 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7/8/9 Page 16 of 20 Event
Description:
A Main Steam Line Leak upstream of the 3B MSIV inside Containment gradually develops. A manual or automatic Reactor Trip occurs. The crew responds using 3-EOP-E-0. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-P.1 when present after exiting 3-EOP-E-0.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
4. Verify Proper ICW System Operation a Verify ICW pumps AT LEAST TWO
- a. Start ICW pump(s) to establish at least RUNNING two running.
b Verity ICW to TPCW Heat Exchanger b. Manually close vatve( ). IF valve(s) can ISOLATED NOT be closed, locally close the BOP following valves:
. POV-3-4882 CLOSED
. 3-50-319 for POV-3-4882
. POV-3-4883 CLOSED
. 3-50-339 for POV-3-4883
c. Check 1GW headers TIED TOGETHER
- c. IF both ICW headers are intact, THEN direct operator to tie headers together.
5. Verify Proper CCW System Operation
a. CCW Heat Exchangers THREE IN a. Perform the following:
SER/ICE
1) Start or stop cc:w pumps as necessary to establish ONLY ONE PLINNING CCW PUMP.
2) Veiify Emergency Containment Coolers ONLY TWO RUNNING
3) Go to Step 5c.
b. CCW pumps - ONLY TWO RUNNING b. Slart or stop CCW pumps as necessary BOP to establish ONLY TWO RUNNING CCW PUMPS.
c CCW headers - TIED TOGETHER c. IF both CCW headers are intact THEN direct a field operator to tie the headers together
d. RCP Thermal Barrier CCW Outlet, d. IF containment isolation phase B NOT MOV-3-626 OPEN actuated Q CCW radiation levels are normal, RCP number one seal leak-off temperature is less than 235SF, THEN manually open MOV-3-626.
MOV-3-626 can QI be manually opened, THEN direct operator to open MOV-3-626 locally.
6. Verify Containment Cooling
a. Check emergency containment coolers - a. Manually start or stop emergency ONLY TWO RUNNING containment coolers to establish - ONLY TWO RUNNING.
BOP
. Verify emergency containment filter fans - b. Manually start emergency containment AT LEAST TWO RUNNING filterfans.
36
Appendix D RquIredOprtr MtiOns Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7/8/9 Page 17 of 20 Event
Description:
A Main Steam Line Leak upstream of the 3B MSIV inside Containment gradually develops. A manual or automatic Reactor Trip occurs. The crew responds using 3-EOP-E-0. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-P.1 when present after exiting 3-EOP-E-0.
Time
[ Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 7 Verify Pump Operation
a. At least two high head SI pumps running a. Manually start high-head pump(s).
BOP h. Both RHR pumps running b. Manually start RHR pump(s).
8 verify SI Flow
a. RCS pressure - LESS THAN 1600 PSIG a. Go to Step 9.
[2000 PSIG]
b. High-head SI pump flow indicator b. Manually start pumps AND align valves to CHECK FOR FLOW establish an injection flowpath.
c. RCS pressure - LESS THAN 250 PSIG c. Go to Step 9.
BOP [650 PSIG]
d. RHR pump flow indicator - d. Manually start pumps AND align valves to CHECK FOR FLOW establish an injection flowpath.
9 Realign SI System
a. Verify Unit 3 high-head SI pLimps - TWO a. Perform the following:
RIJNNING
1) Operate Unit 3 and Unit 4 highhead SI pumps to establish irection to unit 3 from two high-head SI pumps.
21 Direct Unit 4 Reactor Operator to align Unit 4 high-head SI PLIFflI)
Suction to lJnit 3 RWST using ATTACHMENT 1 of this procedure.
BOP 3j Goto Step 10.
h 1 Slop loth Unn 4 high-twod Si ploce in stulidhy 37
Appt1dIx D - RequIred Operator Atiof1 FOm ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7/8/9 Page 18 of 20 Event
Description:
A Main Steam Line Leak upstream of the 3B MSIV inside Containment gradually develops. A manual or automatic Reactor Trip occurs. The crew responds using 3-EOP-E-0. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-P.1 when present after exiting 3-EOP-E-0.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
10. Verify containment Isolation Phase A valve Perform the following:
White Lights On VP8 ALL BRIGHT
a. Manually actuate Contasirnent Isolation Phase A.
B OP b i.E any Containment Isolation Phase A valve is closed, manually close valve. i.E valve(s) can NOT be manually closed, manually or locally isolate affected containment penetration
11. Verify SI valve Amber Lights On VPB - Manually align valves to establish proper SI ALL BRIGHT alignment for an injection flowpath.
BOP
12. Verify SI RESET Revet .l BOP
13. Verify Containment Phase A RESET Reset Phase A BOP 14 Reestablish RCP Cooling
a. Check RCPs AT LEAST ONE a. Go to Step 15.
RUNNING
b. Open CCW to normal containment cooler b. Stop all RCPs valves BOP
MOV-3-1417
MOV-3-1418
c. Reset and start normal containment c. Stop all RCPs coolers 4f 38
I Appendix D RequiredOperatorActions Form ES-D-7 Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7/8/9 Page 19 of 20 Event
Description:
A Main Steam Line Leak upstream of the 3B MSIV inside Containment gradually develops. A manual or automatic Reactor Trip occurs. The crew responds using 3-EOP-E-0. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-P.1 when present after exiting 3-EOP-E-0.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
15. Monitor Containment Pressure To Verify Containment Spray NOT Required a, Containment pressure HAS REMANED
- a. Perform the following:
LESS THAN 20 P510 ii containment spray initiated, PR-3-6306A jj manually initiate containment spray.
AND 21 Verify Containment Isolation Phase B PR-3-6306B -ACTUATED BOP
3) Verify Containment Isolation Phas B vaGe ihite hghts on VPB ALL BRIGHT.
41 IF any Containment Isolation Phase B valve did Q3 close. I[ manually or locally isolate affected containment penetration, 51 Stop all RCPs
16. verify Containment and Control Room Ventilation Isolation
a. Unit 3 contaInment purge exhaust and a. Manually stop fans.
BOP supply fans OFF
\V1/ b. Verify Control Room ventilation status panel PROPER EMERGENCY
b. Manually align eqLnpment for Control Room emergency recirculation.
RECIRCULATION ALIGNMENT NOTE BOP Hydrogen Monitors should be in seivice within 30 minutes of a valid SI signal. They should be available in a timely manner to support decision-making related to hydrogen generation in containment.
= = a a a S
17. PIece Hydrogen Monitors In Service Using 3-NOP-94, CONTAINMENT POST ACCIDENT MON1TORING SYSTEM BOP
18. Verify All Four EDG5 RUNNING EMERGENCY START any available EDG
!iQI running.
BOP
\j/
39
[ Apperidtx D- Required OperaturActions Form ES-D-2 I Op-Test No.: 2011-302 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7/8/9 Page 20 of 20 Event
Description:
A Main Steam Line Leak upstream of the 3B MSIV inside Containment gradually develops. A manual or automatic Reactor Trip occurs. The crew responds using 3-EOP-E-0. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-P.1 when present after exiting 3-EOP-E-0.
Otherwise, 3-EOP-E-2 ensures 3B MSIV is closed and 3B S/G isolation.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
19. Verify Power To Emergency 4KV Buses and Load Centers
a. Check the 3A, 3B and 304 KV buses - a Perform the following:
ALL ENERGIZED
1) Inform the Unit Supervisor that ATTACHMENT 3 is complete with the exception of the de-energized bus or buses,
2) IF the Unit Supervisor decides not to energize the dc-energized bus or buses, THEN go to Step 20.
3) IF the Unit SLipervisor decides to energize 3A, 39, or 3D bus, THEN BP perform the following:
a) IF 3A 4 KV bus dc-energized, THEN restore power to bus using 3-ONOP-004.2, LOSS OF 3A 4KV BUS.
b) IF 3B 4 KV bus dc-energized, THEN restore power to bus using 3-ONOP-004.3. LOSS OF 3B 4KV BUS.
C) IF 304 KV bus dc-energized, THEN restore power to bus using 3-ONOP-004.5, LOSS OF 3D 4KV BUS.
20. Notify The Unit Supervisor That The PROMPT ACTION VERIFICATiONS Attachment Is Complete And Discuss Any BOP safeguards Equipment That Is Not In The Required Condition 40

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