ML12156A329

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FC-2012-04 Draft Outlines
ML12156A329
Person / Time
Site: Fort Calhoun Omaha Public Power District icon.png
Issue date: 04/20/2012
From: Kelly Clayton
Division of Reactor Safety IV
To:
Omaha Public Power District
References
50-285/12-004
Download: ML12156A329 (44)
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Text

ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Facility: Fort Calhoun Station Date of Exam: 16 April 2012 RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points Tier Group K K K K K K A A A A G A2 G* Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4

  • Total
1. 1 3 3 3 2 3 4 18 3 3 6 Emergency &

Abnormal 2 1 1 2 N/A 2 1 N/A 2 9 2 2 4 Plant Evolutions Tier Totals 4 4 5 4 4 6 27 5 5 10 1 4 3 3 3 1 2 2 3 3 2 2 28 2 3 5 2.

Plant 2 0 0 0 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 0 10 1 1 1 3 Systems Tier Totals 4 3 3 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 2 38 4 4 8

3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities 1 2 3 4 10 1 2 3 4 7 Categories 3 2 2 3 2 2 1 2 Note: 1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the Tier Totals in each K/A category shall not be less than two).
2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table.

The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions.

The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.

3. Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.
4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.
5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected.

Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.

6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.

7.* The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable K/As.

8. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.
9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.

ES-401 2 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 000007 (BW/E02&E10; CE/E02) Reactor X 2.4.2 Knowledge of system set points, interlocks 4.5 51 Trip - Stabilization - Recovery / 1 and automatic actions associated with EOP entry conditions.

(CFR: 41.7, 45.7, 45.8) 000008 Pressurizer Vapor Space X Knowledge of the operational implications of 3.1 41 Accident / 3 the following concepts as they apply to a Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident:

AK1.02 Change in leak rate with change in pressure.

(CFR: 41.8, 41.10, 45.3) 000009 Small Break LOCA / 3 X Ability to determine or interpret the following 4.3 46 as they apply to a small break LOCA:

EA2.39 Adequate core cooling.

(CFR: 43.5, 45.13) 000011 Large Break LOCA / 3 X Knowledge of the interrelations between the 2.6* 40 following and the Large Break LOCA:

EK2.02 Pumps (CFR: 41.7, 45.7) 000015/17 RCP Malfunctions / 4 X Knowledge of the operational implications of 3.7 54 the following concepts as they apply to Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow):

AK1.02 Consequences of an RCPS failure.

(CFR: 41.8, 41.10, 45.3) 000022 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup / 2 X Ability to operate and / or monitor the following 3.4 42 as they apply to the Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup:

AA1.01 CVCS letdown and charging (CFR: 41.7, 45.5, 45.6) 000025 Loss of RHR System / 4 X Knowledge of the interrelations between the 3.2* 52 Loss of Residual Heat Removal System and the following:

AK2.02 LPI or Decay Heat Removal/RHR pumps.

(CFR: 41.7, 45.7) 000026 Loss of Component Cooling X 2.4.35 Knowledge of local auxiliary operator tasks 3.8 43 Water / 8 during an emergency and the resultant operational effects.

(CFR: 41.10, 43.5, 45.13) 000027 Pressurizer Pressure Control X Knowledge of the interrelations between the 2.6 47 System Malfunction / 3 Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions and the following:

AK2.03: Controllers and positioners (CFR: 41.7, 45.7) 000029 ATWS / 1

000038 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture / 3 X Knowledge of the reasons for the following 4.2 44 responses as they apply to the SGTR:

EK3.06 Actions contained in EOP for RCS water inventory balance, S/G tube rupture, and plant shutdown procedures (CFR: 41.5, 41.10, 45.6, 45.13) 000040 (BW/E05; CE/E05; W/E12) X 2.1.28 Knowledge of the purpose and function of 4.1 50 Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat major system components and controls Transfer / 4 (CFR: 41.7) 000054 (CE/E06) Loss of Main X Knowledge of the reasons for the following 3.2 53 Feedwater / 4 responses as they apply to the Loss of Feedwater:

EK3.4 RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

(CFR: 41.5, 41.10, 45.6, 45.13) 000055 Station Blackout / 6 X Knowledge of the reasons for the following 4.3 39 responses as they apply to the SBO:

EK3.02 Actions contained in EOP for loss of offsite and onsite power (CFR: 41.5, 41.10, 45.6, 45.13) 000056 Loss of Off-site Power / 6 X Ability to determine and interpret the following 2.9 48 as they apply to the Loss of Offsite Power:

AA2.54 Breaker position (remote and local)

(CFR: 43.5, 45.13) 000057 Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus / 6 2.2.37 Ability to determine operability and/or X availability of safety related equipment. 3.6 49 (CFR: 41.7, 43.5, 45.12)

Ability to operate and / or monitor the following 000058 Loss of DC Power / 6 X as they apply to the Loss of DC Power: 3.4* 55 AA1.01 Cross-tie of the affected dc bus with the alternate supply (CFR: 41.7, 45.5, 45.6) 000062 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water / 4 Ability to determine and interpret the following 000065 Loss of Instrument Air / 8 X as they apply to the Loss of Instrument Air: 2.8* 45 AA2.07 Whether backup nitrogen supply is controlling valve position.

(CFR: 43.5, 45.13)

W/E04 LOCA Outside Containment / 3 W/E11 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirc. / 4 BW/E04; W/E05 Inadequate Heat Transfer - Loss of Secondary Heat Sink / 4

Knowledge of the operational implications of 000077 Generator Voltage and Electric X the following concepts as they apply to 3.3 56 Grid Disturbances / 6 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances:

AK1.03 Under-excitation (CFR: 41.4, 41.5, 41.7, 41.10, 45.8)

K/A Category Totals: 3 3 3 2 3 4 Group Point Total: 18/6

ES-401 3 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 000001 Continuous Rod Withdrawal / 1 000003 Dropped Control Rod / 1 2.4.11 Knowledge of abnormal condition 000005 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1 X 4.0 57 procedures.

(CFR: 41.10, 43.5, 45.13) 000024 Emergency Boration / 1 000028 Pressurizer Level Malfunction / 2 000032 Loss of Source Range NI / 7 000033 Loss of Intermediate Range NI / 7 Knowledge of the operational 000036 (BW/A08) Fuel Handling Accident / 8 X 3.5 64 implications of the following concepts as they apply to Fuel Handling Incidents:

AK1.01 Radiation exposure hazards (CFR: 41.8, 41.10, 45.3) 000037 Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 2.4.50 Ability to verify system alarm 000051 Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 X 4.2 61 setpoints and operate controls identified in the alarm response manual.

(CFR: 41.10, 43.5, 45.3) 000059 Accidental Liquid RadWaste Rel. / 9 000060 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Rel. / 9 000061 ARM System Alarms / 7 Knowledge of the reasons for the 000067 Plant Fire On-site / 8 X 3.3 58 following responses as the apply to the Plant Fire on Site:

AK3.04 Actions contained in EOP for plant fire on site (CFR: 41.5, 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

Ability to determine and interpret the 000068 (BW/A06) Control Room Evac. / 8 X 4.1 63 following as they apply to the Control Room Evacuation:

AA2.06 RCS pressure (CFR: 43.5, 45.13) 000069 (W/E14) Loss of CTMT Integrity / 5 000074 (W/E06&E07) Inad. Core Cooling / 4

Knowledge of the reasons for the 000076 High Reactor Coolant Activity / 9 X 2.9 60 following responses as they apply to the High Reactor Coolant Activity:

AK3.05 Corrective actions as a result of high fission-product radioactivity level in the RCS.

(CFR: 41.5, 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

W/EO1 & E02 Rediagnosis & SI Termination / 3 W/E13 Steam Generator Over-pressure / 4 W/E15 Containment Flooding / 5 W/E16 High Containment Radiation / 9 BW/A01 Plant Runback / 1 BW/A02&A03 Loss of NNI-X/Y / 7 BW/A04 Turbine Trip / 4 BW/A05 Emergency Diesel Actuation / 6 BW/A07 Flooding / 8 BW/E03 Inadequate Subcooling Margin / 4 BW/E08; W/E03 LOCA Cooldown - Depress. / 4 BW/E09; CE/A13; W/E09&E10 Natural Circ. / 4 BW/E13&E14 EOP Rules and Enclosures Ability to operate and / or monitor the CE/A11; W/E08 RCS Overcooling - PTS / 4 X 3.2 65 following as they apply to the (RCS Overcooling)

AA1.2 Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

(CFR: 41.7, 45.5, 45.6)

Ability to operate and / or monitor the CE/A16 Excess RCS Leakage / 2 X 3.4 59 following as they apply to the (Excess RCS Leakage)

AA1.1 Components and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

(CFR: 41.7, 45.5, 45.6)

Knowledge of the interrelations between CE/E09 Functional Recovery X 3.7 62 the (Functional Recovery) and the following:

EK2.2 Facilitys heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

(CFR 41.5, 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

K/A Category Point Totals: 2 1 2 2 0 2 Group Point Total: 9/4

ES-401 4 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 Knowledge of RCPS design 003 Reactor Coolant Pump X X feature(s) and/or interlocks(s) which 2.8 1 provide for the following:

K4.04 Adequate cooling of RCP motor and seals.

(CFR: 41.7)

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following 3.3 20 concepts as they apply to the RCPS:

K5.01 The relationship between the RCPS flow rate and the nuclear reactor core operating parameters (quadrant power tilt, imbalance, DNB rate, local power density, difference in loop T-hot pressure)

(CFR: 41.5, 45.7)

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of 004 Chemical and Volume X the following malfunctions or 3.5 2 Control operations on the CVCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

A2.15 High or low PZR level (CFR: 41.5, 43.5, 45.3, 45.5)

Knowledge of the bus power 005 Residual Heat Removal X X supplies to the following: 2.7* 5 K2.03 RCS pressure boundary motor-operated valves.

(CFR: 41.7)

Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the RHRS will have on the following: 3.9 9 K3.01 RCS (CFR: 41.7, 45.6)

Knowledge of the effect of a loss or 006 Emergency Core Cooling X malfunction the following will have 3.6 24 on the ECCS:

K6.03 Safety Injection Pumps (CFR: 41.7, 45.7)

Knowledge of PRTS design 007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench X feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which 2.6 13 Tank provide for the following:

K4.01 Quench tank cooling (CFR: 41.7)

Knowledge of the effect that a loss 008 Component Cooling Water X X or malfunction of the CCWS will 3.4 4 have on the following:

K3.01 Loads cooled by CCWS.

(No CFR listed for this K3)

Ability to monitor automatic 2.9 23 operation of the CCWS, including:

A3.04 Requirements on and for the CCWS for different conditions of the power plant.

(CFR: 41.7, 45.5)

Knowledge of the physical 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control X connections and/or cause-effect 3.9 6 relationships between the PZR PCS and the following systems:

K1.01 RPS (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9, 45.7, 45.8)

Ability to monitor automatic 012 Reactor Protection X operation of the RPS, including: 3.4 18 A3.03 Power supply (CFR: 41.7, 45.5)

Ability to predict and/or monitor 013 Engineered Safety Features X changes in parameters (to prevent 3.6 12 Actuation exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ESFAS controls including:

A1.07 Containment radiation (CFR: 41.5, 45.5)

Ability to manually operate and/or 022 Containment Cooling X monitor in the control room: 3.6 27 A4.01 CCS fans (CFR: 41.7, 45.5 to 45.8) 025 Ice Condenser Ability to (a) predict the impacts of 026 Containment Spray X the following malfunctions or 3.2 19 operations on the CSS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

A2.08 Safe securing of containment spray (when it can be done)

(CFR: 41.5, 43.5, 45.3, 45.13)

Ability to monitor automatic 039 Main and Reheat Steam X operation of the MRSS, including: 3.1 3 A3.02 Isolation of the MRSS (CFR: 41.5, 45.5)

Ability to predict and/or monitor 059 Main Feedwater X changes in parameters (to prevent 2.7* 7 exceeding design limits) associated with operating the MFW controls including:

A1.03 Power level restrictions for operation of MFW pumps and valves.

(CFR: 41.5, 45.5)

Knowledge of the effect of a loss or 061 Auxiliary/Emergency X malfunction of the following will 2.5 17 Feedwater have on the AFW components:

K6.01 Controllers and positioners (CFR: 41.7, 45.7)

Knowledge of bus power supplies to 062 AC Electrical Distribution X X the following: 3.3 11 K2.01 Major system loads (CFR: 41.7)

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ac distribution system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedure to 2.9 26 correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

A2.05 Methods for energizing a dead bus (CFR: 41.5, 43.5, 45.3, 45.13)

Knowledge of the physical 063 DC Electrical Distribution X X connections and/or cause-effect 2.7 14 relationships between the DC electrical system and the following systems:

K1.02 AC electrical system (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9, 45.7, 45.8)

Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

3.0* 28 A4.03 Battery discharge rate (CFR: 41.7, 45.5 to 45.8)

Knowledge of the physical 064 Emergency Diesel Generator X connections and/or cause-effect 3.6 8 relationships between the ED/G system and the following systems:

K1.03 Diesel fuel oil supply system (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9, 45.7, 45.8)

Knowledge of PRM system design 073 Process Radiation X feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which 4.0 16 Monitoring provide for the following:

K4.01 Release termination when radiation exceeds setpoint.

(CFR: 41.7)

Knowledge of bus power supplies to 076 Service Water X X the following: 2.7* 25 K2.01 Service water (CFR: 41.7) 2.4.4 Ability to recognize abnormal indications for system operating 4.5 21 parameters that are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures.

(CFR: 41.10, 43.2, 45.6)

Knowledge of the physical 078 Instrument Air X connections and/or cause-effect 3.3* 15 relationships between the IAS and the following systems:

K1.03 Containment air (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9, 45.7, 45.8)

Knowledge of the effect that a loss 103 Containment X X or malfunction of the containment 3.8 22 system will have on the following:

K3.02 Loss of containment integrity under normal operations (CFR: 41.7) 2.1.20 Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps 4.6 10 (CFR: 41.10, 43.5, 45.11)

K/A Category Point Totals: 4 3 3 3 1 2 2 3 3 2 2 Group Point Total: 28/5

ES-401 5 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 Knowledge of the following operational 001 Control Rod Drive X implications as they apply to the 3.5 38 CRDS:

K5.28 Boron reactivity worth vs. boron concentration, i.e., amount of boron needed (ppm) to change core reactivity to desired amount (CFR: 41.5, 45.7)

Knowledge of the effect or a loss or 002 Reactor Coolant X malfunction on the following RCS 3.1 37 components:

K6.03 Reactor vessel level indication (CFR: 41.7, 45.7)`

Ability to predict and/or monitor 011 Pressurizer Level Control X changes in parameters (to prevent 2.8 32 exceeding design limits) associated with operating the PZR LCS controls including:

A1.03 VCT level (CFR: 41.5, 45.5)

Ability to manually operate and/or 014 Rod Position Indication X monitor in the control room: 3.4 35 A4.02 Control rod mode-select switch (CFR: 41.5, 45.7)

Ability to monitor automatic operation 015 Nuclear Instrumentation X of the NIS, including: 3.7 31 A3.02 Annunciator and alarm signals (CFR: 41.7) 016 Non-nuclear Instrumentation 017 In-core Temperature Monitor 027 Containment Iodine Removal 028 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control 029 Containment Purge

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the 033 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling X following malfunctions or operations 2.7 34 on the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

A2.02 Loss of SFPCS (CFR: 41.5, 43.5, 45.3, 45.13) 034 Fuel Handling Equipment Knowledge of operational implications 035 Steam Generator X of the following concepts as they apply 2.8 30 to the S/GS:

K5.03 Shrink and swell concept.

(CFR: 41.5, 45.7) 041 Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Control 045 Main Turbine Generator 055 Condenser Air Removal 056 Condensate 068 Liquid Radwaste 071 Waste Gas Disposal Ability to manually operate and/or 072 Area Radiation Monitoring X monitor in the control room: 3.0* 33 A4.01 Alarm and interlock setpoint checks and adjustments (CFR: 41.7, 45.5-45.8)

Knowledge of circulating water system 075 Circulating Water X design feature(s) and interlock(s) 2.5 36 which provide for the following:

K4.01 Heat sink (CFR: 41.7, 45.6) 079 Station Air Ability to predict and/or monitor 086 Fire Protection X changes in parameters (to prevent 2.9 29 exceeding design limits) associated with Fire Protection System operating the controls including:

A1.01 Fire header pressure (CFR: 41.5, 45.5)

K/A Category Point Totals: 0 0 0 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 0 Group Point Total: 10/3

ES-401 2 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 000007 (BW/E02&E10; CE/E02) Reactor Trip - Stabilization - Recovery / 1 000008 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident / 3 000009 Small Break LOCA / 3 X Ability to determine and interpret the following 4.6 as they apply to a small break LOCA:

EA2.36Difference between overcooling and LOCA indications (CFR 43.5) 000011 Large Break LOCA / 3 000015/17 RCP Malfunctions / 4 2.4.21 Knowledge of the parameters and logic used 000022 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup / 2 X to assess the status of safety functions, such as 4.6 reactivity control, core cooling and heat removal, reactor coolant system integrity, containment conditions, radioactivity release control, etc.

(CFR: 41.7, 43.5, 45.12) 000025 Loss of RHR System / 4 000026 Loss of Component Cooling Water / 8 000027 Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction / 3 000029 ATWS / 1 Ability to determine and interpret the following 000038 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture / 3 X as they apply to a SGTR:

4.6 EA2.14 Magnitude of atmospheric radioactive release if cool down must be completed using steam dumps or if atmospheric reliefs lift.

CFR (55.43.4)

Ability to determine and interpret the following 000040 (BW/E05; CE/E05; W/E12) X as they apply to the (Excess Steam Demand):

Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat Transfer / 4 4.0 EA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

(CFR 43.5) 000054 (CE/E06) Loss of Main X Feedwater / 4 000055 Station Blackout / 6 X 2.4.8 Knowledge of how AOPs are used in 4.5 conjunction with EOPs (CFR 43.5) 2.2.22 Knowledge of limiting conditions for 000056 Loss of Off-site Power / 6 X operations and safety limits. 4.7 (CFR: 41.5, 43.2, 45.2) 000057 Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus / 6

000058 Loss of DC Power / 6 000062 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water / 4 000065 Loss of Instrument Air / 8 W/E04 LOCA Outside Containment / 3 W/E11 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirc. / 4 BW/E04; W/E05 Inadequate Heat Transfer - Loss of Secondary Heat Sink / 4 000077 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances / 6 K/A Category Totals: 3 3 Group Point Total: 18/6

ES-401 3 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 000001 Continuous Rod Withdrawal / 1 2.2.37 Ability to determine operability of 000003 Dropped Control Rod / 1 X 4.6 safety related equipment (CFR :43.2) 000005 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1 000024 Emergency Boration / 1 000028 Pressurizer Level Malfunction / 2 000032 Loss of Source Range NI / 7 000033 Loss of Intermediate Range NI / 7 000036 (BW/A08) Fuel Handling Accident / 8 000037 Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 000051 Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 000059 Accidental Liquid RadWaste Rel. / 9 000060 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Rel. / 9 000061 ARM System Alarms / 7 000067 Plant Fire On-site / 8 000068 (BW/A06) Control Room Evac. / 8 000069 (W/E14) Loss of CTMT Integrity / 5 X 2.2.40 Ability to apply TS for a system 4.7 (CFR: 43.2) 000074 (W/E06&E07) Inad. Core Cooling / 4 000076 High Reactor Coolant Activity / 9 W/EO1 & E02 Rediagnosis & SI Termination / 3 W/E13 Steam Generator Over-pressure / 4 W/E15 Containment Flooding / 5 W/E16 High Containment Radiation / 9 BW/A01 Plant Runback / 1 BW/A02&A03 Loss of NNI-X/Y / 7 BW/A04 Turbine Trip / 4 BW/A05 Emergency Diesel Actuation / 6 BW/A07 Flooding / 8 BW/E03 Inadequate Subcooling Margin / 4 BW/E08; W/E03 LOCA Cooldown - Depress. / 4

Ability to determine and interpret the BW/E09; CE/A13; W/E09&E10 Natural Circ. / 4 X 3.8 following as they apply to the (Natural Circulation Operations)

AA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facilitys license and amendments.

(CFR: 43.5, 45.13)

BW/E13&E14 EOP Rules and Enclosures CE/A11; W/E08 RCS Overcooling - PTS / 4 Ability to determine and interpret the CE/A16 Excess RCS Leakage / 2 X 3.5 following as they apply to the (Excess RCS Leakage)

AA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

(CFR: 43.5, 45.13)

CE/E09 Functional Recovery K/A Category Point Totals: 2 2 Group Point Total: 9/4

ES-401 4 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 003 Reactor Coolant Pump 004 Chemical and Volume Control 005 Residual Heat Removal 2.2.5 Knowledge of process for making 006 Emergency Core Cooling X design or operating changes to the 3.2 facility (CFR: 43.3) 007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank 008 Component Cooling Water 2.2.37 Ability to determine operability 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control X and/or availability of safety related 4.6 equipment.

(CFR: 41.7, 43.5, 45.13) 012 Reactor Protection Ability to (a) predict the impacts of 013 Engineered Safety Features X the following malfunctions or 4.0 Actuation operations on the ESFAS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations; A2.06 Inadvertent ESFAS actuation (CFR: 41.5, 43.5, 45.3, 45.13)

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of 022 Containment Cooling X the following malfunctions or 2.9*

operations on the CCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations; A2.04 Loss of service water (CFR: 41.5, 43.5, 45.3, 45.13) 025 Ice Condenser 026 Containment Spray 039 Main and Reheat Steam 059 Main Feedwater 061 Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater 062 AC Electrical Distribution

063 DC Electrical Distribution 2.2.21 Knowledge of pre- and post-064 Emergency Diesel Generator X maintenance operability requirements 2.7 (CFR: 43.2) 073 Process Radiation Monitoring 076 Service Water 078 Instrument Air 103 Containment K/A Category Point Totals: 3 2 Group Point Total: 28/5

ES-401 5 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 001 Control Rod Drive 002 Reactor Coolant 011 Pressurizer Level Control 014 Rod Position Indication 015 Nuclear Instrumentation 016 Non-nuclear Instrumentation 017 In-core Temperature Monitor 027 Containment Iodine Removal X 2.4.6 4.7 Knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies.

(CFR 43.4, 43.5) 028 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control 029 Containment Purge 033 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Knowledge of design feature(s) and/or 034 Fuel Handling Equipment X interlock(s) which provide for the 3.3 following:

K4.02 Fuel movement (CFR: 41.7) 035 Steam Generator 041 Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Control 045 Main Turbine Generator 055 Condenser Air Removal 056 Condensate 068 Liquid Radwaste Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the 071 Waste Gas Disposal X following malfunctions or operations on 3.6 the Waste Gas Disposal System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures, to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

A2.02 Use of waste gas release monitors, radiation, gas flow rate, and totalizer (CFR: 41.5, 43.5, 45.3, 45.13) 072 Area Radiation Monitoring

075 Circulating Water 079 Station Air 086 Fire Protection K/A Category Point Totals: 1 1 1 Group Point Total: 10/3

ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3) Form ES-401-3 Facility: Date of Exam:

Category K/A # Topic RO SRO-Only IR # IR #

2.1.4 Knowledge of individual licensed operator responsibilities 3.3 related to shift staffing, such as medical requirements,

1. no-solo operation, maintenance of active license status, Conduct 10CFR55, etc.

of Operations (CFR: 41.10, 43.2) 2.1.15 Knowledge of administrative requirements for temporary 2.7 management directives, such as standing orders, night orders, Operations memos, etc.

(CFR: 41.10, 45.12) 2.1.32 Ability to explain and apply system limits and precautions 3.8 (CFR: 41.10, 43.2, 45.12) 2.1.35 Knowledge of the fuel-handling responsibilities of SROs. 3.9 (CFR: 41.10, 43.7) 2.1.37 Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or limitations 4.6 associated with reactivity management.

(CFR: 41.1, 43.6, 45.6) 2.1.

Subtotal 3 2 2.2.2 Ability to manipulate the console controls as required to 4.6 operate the facility between shutdown and designated power levels.

2.

Equipment (CFR: 41.6, 41.7, 45.2)

Control 2.2.20 Knowledge of the process for managing troubleshooting 2.6 activities.

(CFR: 41.10, 43.5, 45.13) 2.2.21 Knowledge of pre- and post-maintenance operability 4.2 requirements.

(CFR: 41.10, 43.2) 2.2.38 Knowledge of conditions and limitations in the facility 4.5 license.

(CFR: 41.7, 41.10, 43.1, 45.13) 2.2.

2.2.

Subtotal 2 2 2.3.

2.3.11 Ability to control radiation releases. 3.8 3.

(CFR: 41.11, 43.4, 45.10)

Radiation Control 2.3.13 Knowledge of radiological safety procedures pertaining to 3.4 licensed operator duties, such as response to radiation monitor alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc.

Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that 2.3.14 3.8 arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities (43.4) 2.3.

2.3.

Subtotal 2 1 2.4.32 Knowledge of operator response to loss of all 3.6 annunciators.

4.

Emergency (CFR: 41.10, 43.5, 45.13)

Procedures /

2.4.37 Knowledge of the lines of authority during implementation 3.0 Plan of the emergency plan.

(CFR: 41.10, 45.13) 2.4.42 Knowledge of emergency response facilities. 2.6 (CFR: 41.10, 45.11) 2.4.8 Knowledge of how abnormal operating procedures are 4.5 used in conjunction with EOPs.

(CFR: 41.10, 43.5, 45.13) 2.4.28 Knowledge of procedures relating to a security event 4.1 (non-safeguards information).

(CFR: 41.10, 43.5, 45.13) 2.4.

Subtotal 3 2 Tier 3 Point Total 10 7

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 Tier / Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected K/A 1/1 APE 022 AK2.01- No importance rating 2.5. Randomly replaced with AA1.01.

2.06 1/1 APE 27 AK2.01, Importance rating not 2.5. Randomly replaced with AK2.03.

AK2.02, AK2.04, AK2.05 1/1 EPE 38 EK2.01- Importance rating not 2.5. Randomly replaced with EK 3.07.

2.07 1/1 EPE 38 EK3.07 FCS does not have loop isolation valves. Randomly replaced with EK 3.04.

1/2 APE 28 AK3.04 At FCS, Program Tave not constant with power change. Randomly replaced with AK 3.05.

2/1 003 K4.05 Importance rating not 2.5. Randomly replaced with K 4.04.

2/1 003 A2.02 Resample to obtain required (by NUREG-1021) sample of category K5. Replaced with K 5.04.

2/1 006 K6.04 Importance rating not 2.5. Randomly replaced with K 6.03.

K6.16 2/1 007 K4.02 Importance rating not 2.5. Randomly replaced with K 4.01.

K4.03 2/1 022 K6.01 - Importance rating not 2.5. Replaced with A 4.05 to help maintain K6.08 even distribution between categories.

2/1 026 A2.06 Importance rating not 2.5. Randomly replaced with A 2.05.

2/1 026 A2.01 At FCS, reflux boiling pressure spike when first going on A2.05 recirculation is not an expected plant response (A2.01). Also, FCS does not have chemical addition tanks (A2.05). Randomly replaced with A 2.04.

2/1 059 K5 No importance rating 2.5. Randomly replaced with A 1.07.

2/1 059 A1.07 FCS does not have a turbine driven MFW pump. Randomly replaced with A 1.03.

2/1 062 A1.02 Importance rating not 2.5. Randomly replaced with A 1.01.

A1.05 2/1 063 K1.04 Importance rating not 2.5. Randomly replaced with K 1.02.

2/1 073 K4.02 FCS does not have automatic letdown isolation on high RCS activity. Randomly replaced with K 4.01.

2/2 014 A4 Resample to obtain required (by NUREG-1021) sample of category K5. Replaced with K 5.01.

2/2 014 K5.01 Not part of FCS design. No other K5 has importance rating 2.5.

K5.02 Replaced with A 4.02.

2/2 027 K2.01 FCS does not have this system. Randomly reselected Steam Generator system, K 5.03 to replace.

2/2 034 K5 Importance rating not 2.5. Randomly replaced with A 3.03.

2/2 034 A3.03 FCS does not have a high flux at shutdown alarm. Replaced with A 3.02.

2/2 075 K5 Importance rating not 2.5. Randomly replaced with K3.07.

2/2 075 K3.07 At FCS, no connection between circulating water system and ESFAS. No other K3 has importance rating 2.5, so randomly replaced with K 4.01.

2/1 004 A2.09 Cannot write a discriminating question using RO knowledge for this K/A (uses GFE knowledge). Randomly replaced with A2.15 2/1 103 2.4.41 Cannot write a question using RO knowledge for this K/A (tests SRO-only knowledge). Randomly replaced with generic K/A 2.1.20 2/2 001 K5.20 Cannot write a question using RO knowledge for this K/A (tests GFE knowledge). Replaced with K5.28 1/1 EPE38 EK3.04 Resampled for better distribution. Too many questions on PRMs.

Replaced with EK3.02 2/1 003 K5.04 Cannot write a question using RO knowledge for this K/A (tests GFE knowledge). Replaced with K5.01 2/1 008 A3.06 Cannot write a discriminating question using RO knowledge.

Replaced with A3.04 2/1 103 K3.03 Cannot write a question using RO knowledge (SRO-only level).

Replaced with K3.02 2/2 029 K1.03 Resampled for better question distribution. Too many containment questions. Replaced with 001 K5.20 2/2 001 K5.20 Cannot write discriminating question using RO knowledge.

Replaced with K5.28 2/2 068 A2.04 Resampled for better question distribution. Too many liquid radwaste questions. Replaced with 002 K6.03 2/2 041 A4.07 FCS does not remote gag stuck open relief valves. Replaced with A4.08 2/2 086 A1.04 Cannot write discriminating RO question. Replaced with A1.01 1/1 038 EK3.02 Cannot write discriminating RO question. Resample to EK3.06.

1/2 00040 2.2.42 Cannot write RO knowledge question. Replaced with 2.1.28 1/2 000057 2.2.40 Cannot write RO knowledge question, SRO-only knowledge.

Replaced with 2.2.37.

1/2 000069 AK1.01 Already had a question on pressure vs. leak rate. Resampled to obtain better K/A distribution and issue distribution (already questioned containment integrity). Replaced with 000068 AA2.06.

3 2.3.7 This K/A is being tested as an administrative JPM. Randomly replaced with 2.3.13.

2/2 0410000 A4.08 This system underwent major revisions during the outage, but post modification cannot be completed until plant restarts, and procedures are still in draft. Therefore, cannot write a question based on this as the modification is still outstanding, and resampled to 072000 Area Radiation Monitoring A4.01.

1/2 000076 AK3.05 This K/A was rejected due to concerns about the quality of the procedure associated with the K/A 1/1 0065 A2.07 This KA was rejected because this topic was already used on another question (ie handjacking of raw water valves). Reselected A2.08 in its place.

2/1 0007 K4.01 This KA was rejected because this topic was already used on another question (Q22). Reselected A1.02 in its place.

3 2.2.20 This KA was rejected because it was too difficult to write RO knowledge question on troubleshooting activities. Reselected 2.2.13 for Knowledge of tagging and clearance procedures.

Tier / Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected K/A (SRO only)

SRO only SRO only Q76 change 1/1 000008 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident / 3 KaA2.05 rejected since not capable of writing SRO only question from this selection.

Reselected new topic and K/A, 000009 Small Break LOCA -

EA2.36 1/1 Q77 change 000015/17 RCP Malfunctions - AA2.08 rejected since not capable of writing SRO only question from this selection. Reselected new topic and K/A, CE/E05 Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat Transfer EA2.1 Q78 change 1/1 000022 Loss of RCS makeup -G2.4.21, changed topic and kept K/A since not capable of writing SRO only question from this selection. Reselected new topic, 0025 Loss of RHR 1/1 Q79 change 000029 ATWS EA2.05 rejected since not capable of writing SRO only question from this selection. Reselected new topic and K/A, 0038 SGTR, EA2.14 Q 81 change 1/1 000077 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances / 6, K/A G2.4.46 , rejected since not capable of writing SRO only question from this selection. Reselected new topic and K/A, 000055 Station Blackout / 6 K/A 2.4.8 Q 82 change 1/2 000028 Pressurizer Level malfunction, K/A G2.4.9 , rejected since not capable of writing SRO only question from this selection.

Reselected new topic and K/A, 000003 Dropped Rod, K/A 2.2.37

Q 83 change 1/2 000068 Control Room Evac, K/A A2.09, rejected since not capable of writing SRO only question from this selection. Reselected new topic and K/A, 000069 Containment Integrity, K/A 2.2.40 Q 86 change 2/1 006 Emergency Core Cooling, K/A 2.4.34 changed K/A to 2.2.5 in order to balance CFR distribution. There were no CFR 43.3 topics selected for plant mods.

Q 89 change 2/1 022.A2.04 topic used on last exam as a JPM. Resampled and used 008.A2.03 (CCW hi/low Temperature)

Q 90 change 2/1 064 EDG, K/A A2.19 changed K/A to G2.2.21 in order to balance CFR distribution. There were no CFR 43.2 topics Q 92 change 2/2 045 Main TG, K/AG2.1.27 rejected since not capable of writing SRO only question from this selection. Reselected new topic and K/A, 00027 Containment iodine Removal, K/A G 2.4.6 Knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies.

3 Q98 change G2.3.5 K/A not SRO only topic, changed to G2.3.14.

3 Q 96 change G2.2.21 K/A already sampled for SRO in question 90. Changed to G2.2.22 3 Q 97 change G2.2.38 K/A not discriminating for SRO only question. Changed to G2.2.12 1/1 Q 80 K/A 2.2.22 N/A for 000054 Loss of Main Feedwater. Changed to 000056 Loss of Off-site Power (same K/A)

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Fort Calhoun Station Date of Examination: April 16, 2012 Examination Level: RO Operating Test Number: 2012-01 Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (see Note) Code*

Create a 1/M plot to estimate when criticality will be reached. (Per OP-2A, Attachment 2, 2A)

RA1: Conduct of Operations N, R K/A 2.1.23 Ability to perform specific and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation (CFR: 41.10, 45.2, 45.6)

RO IR: 4.3 Quadrant Power Tilt Calculation with Excore detectors RA2: Conduct of Operations operable and ERF inoperable per OI-NI-1 N, R K/A 2.1.20 Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps (CFR: 41.10, 45.12)

RO IR: 4.6 Determine tagout/clearance requirements to remove a HPSI pump from service.

RA3: Equipment Control N, R K/A 2.2.13 Knowledge of tagging and clearance procedures (CFR: 41.10, 45.13)

RO IR: 4.1 Perform a stay time calculation.

RA4: Radiation Control N, R K/A 2.3.7 Ability to comply with radiation work permit requirements during normal or abnormal conditions (CFR: 41.14, 45.10)

RO IR: 3.5 Emergency Procedures/Plan N/A NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.

  • Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected)

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Fort Calhoun Station Date of Examination: April 16, 2012 Examination Level: SRO Operating Test Number: 2012-01 Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (see Note) Code*

Perform a spent fuel pool demineralized water makeup calculation per OI-SFP-2 Appendix 1.

SA1: Conduct of Operations N, R K/A 2.1.37 Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or limitations associated with reactivity management.

(CFR: 43.6, 45.6)

SRO IR: 4.6 Quadrant Power Tilt Calculation with Excore detectors operable and ERF inoperable per OI-NI-1 SA2: Conduct of Operations N, R K/A 2.1.20 Ability to interpret and execute procedure (same as RA2) steps (CFR: 43.5, 45.12)

SRO IR: 4.6 Review a tagging/clearance for removal of a HPSI pump from service.

SA3: Equipment Control N, R K/A 2.2.13 Knowledge of tagging and clearance procedures (CFR: 45.13)

SRO IR: 4.3 Determine whether to install shielding based on given dose rates and work times.

SA4: Radiation Control K/A 2.3.12 Knowledge of radiological safety principles N, R pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc. (CFR: 45.9, 45.10)

SRO IR: 3.7 Determine Emergency Action Level for a given emergency.

SA5: Emergency K/A 2.4.38 Ability to take actions called for in the facility N, R emergency plan, including supporting or acting as Procedures/Plan emergency coordinator if required. (CFR: 43.5, 45.11)

SRO IR: 4.4 NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.

  • Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected)

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Fort Calhoun Station Date of Examination: April 16, 2012 Exam Level: RO Operating Test No.: 2012-01 Control Room Systems (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)

System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function S-1: Swap pressurizer pressure mode from manual to automatic, N, A, S 3 followed by spurious actuation of PORV (block valve not operable)

S-2: Engineered Safeguards Actuation Verification N, EN, A, S 2 S-3: Place a containment cooling unit in service D, S 5 S-4: Place shutdown cooling in service. N, L, S 4P S-5: Maintain S/G water levels during startup using AFW. N, A, L, S 4S S-6: Valve stroke time testing of CCW valves HCV-401C/D N, S 8 S-7: Dilute to achieve desired boron concentration for desired critical N, A, L, S 1 rod height (dilution continues until stopped)

S-8: Transfer 4160V loads onto 345kV bus per AOP-32 N, S 6 In-Plant Systems (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)

P-1: Respond to a steam bound AFW pump D, E 4S P-2: Rack in GE Automatic 480V breaker N 6 P-3: Waste Gas Transfer from the Vent Header to the Gas Decay D, A, R 9 Tank

@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

  • Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9/8/4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1/1/1 (EN)gineered safety feature - / - / 1 (control room system)

(L)ow-Power / Shutdown 1/1/1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2/2/1 (P)revious 2 exams 3 / 3 / 2 (randomly selected)

(R)CA 1/1/1 (S)imulator

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Fort Calhoun Station Date of Examination: April 16, 2012 Exam Level: SRO-I Operating Test No.: 2012-01 Control Room Systems (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)

System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function S-1: Swap pressurizer pressure mode from manual to automatic, N, A, S 3 followed by spurious actuation of PORV (block valve not operable)

S-2: Engineered Safeguards Actuation Verification N, EN, A, S 2 S-3: Place a containment cooling unit in service D, S 5 S-5: Maintain S/G water levels during startup using AFW. N, A, L, S 4S S-6: Valve stroke time testing of CCW valves HCV-401C/D N, S 8 S-7: Dilute to achieve desired boron concentration for desired critical N, A, L, S 1 rod height (dilution continues until stopped)

S-8: Transfer 4160V loads onto 345kV bus per AOP-32 N, S 6 In-Plant Systems (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)

P-1: Respond to a steam bound AFW pump D, E 4S P-2: Rack in GE Automatic 480V breaker N, R 6 P-3: Waste Gas Transfer from the Vent Header to the Gas Decay D, A, R 9 Tank

@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

  • Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9/8/4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1/1/1 (EN)gineered safety feature - / - / 1 (control room system)

(L)ow-Power / Shutdown 1/1/1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2/2/1 (P)revious 2 exams 3 / 3 / 2 (randomly selected)

(R)CA 1/1/1 (S)imulator

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Fort Calhoun Station Date of Examination: April 16, 2012 Exam Level: SRO-U Operating Test No.: 2012-01 Control Room Systems (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)

System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function S-1: Swap pressurizer pressure mode from manual to automatic, N, A, S 3 followed by spurious actuation of PORV (block valve not operable)

S-2: Engineered Safeguards Actuation Verification N, EN, A, S 2 S-7: Dilute to achieve desired boron concentration for desired critical N, A, L, S 1 rod height (dilution continues until stopped)

In-Plant Systems (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)

P-1: Respond to a steam bound AFW pump D, E 4S P-3: Waste Gas Transfer from the Vent Header to the Gas Decay D, A, R 9 Tank

@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

  • Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9/8/4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1/1/1 (EN)gineered safety feature - / - / 1 (control room system)

(L)ow-Power / Shutdown 1/1/1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2/2/1 (P)revious 2 exams 3 / 3 / 2 (randomly selected)

(R)CA 1/1/1 (S)imulator

ES-301 Operating Test Quality Checklist Form ES-301-3 Facilty: Fort Calhoun Station Date of Exam: April 16, 2012 Scenario Numbers: / / Operating Test No.: 2012-01 Initials

1. General Criteria a b* c#
a. The operating test conforms with the previously approved outline; changes are consistent with sampling requirements (e.g., 10 CFR 55.45, operational importance, safety function distribution).
b. There is no day-to-day repetition between this and other operating tests to be administered during this examination.
c. The operating test shall not duplicate items from the applicants audit test(s). (see Section D.1.a.)
d. Overlap with the written examination and between different parts of the operating test is within acceptable limits.
e. It appears that the operating test will differentiate between competent and less-than-competent applicants at the designated license level.
2. Walk-Through Criteria -- -- --
a. Each JPM includes the following, as applicable:
  • initial conditions
  • initiating cues
  • references and tools, including associated procedures
  • reasonable and validated time limits (average time allowed for completion) and specific designation if deemed to be time-critical by the facility licensee
  • operationally important specific performance criteria that include:

- detailed expected actions with exact criteria and nomenclature

- system response and other examiner cues

- statements describing important observations to be made by the applicant

- criteria for successful completion of the task

- identification of critical steps and their associated performance standards

- restrictions on the sequence of steps, if applicable

b. Ensure that any changes from the previously approved systems and administrative walk-through outlines (Forms ES-301-1 and 2) have not caused the test to deviate from any of the acceptance criteria (e.g., item distribution, bank use, repetition from the last 2 NRC examinations) specified on those forms and Form ES-201-2.
3. Simulator Criteria -- -- --

The associated simulator operating tests (scenario sets) have been reviewed in accordance with Form ES-301-4 and a copy is attached.

Printed Name / Signature Date

a. Author ______________________________________________ __ _ ______________
b. Facility Reviewer(*) ______________________________________________ __ _ ______________
c. NRC Chief Examiner (#) ______________________________________________ __ _ ______________
d. NRC Supervisor ______________________________________________ __ _ ______________

NOTE:

  • The facility signature is not applicable for NRC-developed tests.
  1. Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column c; chief examiner concurrence required.

ES-301 Simulator Scenario Quality Checklist Form ES-301-4 Facilty: Fort Calhoun Station Date of Exam: April 16, 2012 Scenario Numbers: / / Operating Test No.: 2012-01 QUALITATIVE ATTRIBUTES Initials a b* c#

1. The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue the operators into expected events.
2. The scenarios consist mostly of related events.
3. Each event description consists of
  • the point in the scenario when it is to be initiated
  • the malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event
  • the symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew
  • the expected operator actions (by shift position)
  • the event termination point (if applicable)
4. No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated into the scenario without a credible preceding incident such as a seismic event.
5. The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics.
6. Sequencing and timing of events is reasonable, and allows the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives.
7. If time compression techniques are used, the scenario summary clearly so indicates.

Operators have sufficient time to carry out expected activities without undue time constraints.

Cues are given.

8. The simulator modeling is not altered.
9. The scenarios have been validated. Pursuant to 10 CFR 55.46(d), any open simulator performance deficiencies or deviations from the referenced plant have been evaluated to ensure that functional fidelity is maintained while running the planned scenarios.
10. Every operator will be evaluated using at least one new or significantly modified scenario.

All other scenarios have been altered in accordance with Section D.5 of ES-301.

11. All individual operator competencies can be evaluated, as verified using Form ES-301-6 (submit the form along with the simulator scenarios).
12. Each applicant will be significantly involved in the minimum number of transients and events specified on Form ES-301-5 (submit the form with the simulator scenarios).
13. The level of difficulty is appropriate to support licensing decisions for each crew position.

Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) Actual Attributes -- -- --

1. Total malfunctions (5-8) 6/6/6/7
2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2/2/2/2
3. Abnormal events (2-4) 2/2/2/2
4. Major transients (1-2) 1/1/1/1
5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 2/2/2/2
6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 0/0/1/0
7. Critical tasks (2-3) 2/2/2/2

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: Fort Calhoun Station Date of Exam: April 16, 2012 Operating Test No.: 2012-01 A E Scenarios P V 1 2 3 4 T M P E O I L N CREW CREW CREW CREW T N I T POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION A I

M C S A B S A B S A B S A B L U A T R T O R T O R T O R T O M(*)

N Y O C P O C P O C P O C P R I U T P E

RX 1 1 1 R1 NOR 1,6 2 1 I/C 2,3,4 3,5,8, 7 4 9

MAJ 6 7 2 2 TS 0 0 RX 6 1 1 NOR 1 1 1 I/C 4,5, 2,4, 8 4 R2 7,8 5,9 MAJ 6 7 2 2 TS 0 0 RX 1 1 1 R3 NOR 1,6 2 1 I/C 2,3,4 3,5,8, 7 4 9

MAJ 6 7 2 2 TS 0 0 RX 6 1 1 R4 NOR 1 1 2 1 I/C 4,5, 2,4, 3,5,6 11 4 7,8 5,9 MAJ 6 7 8 3 2 TS 0 RX 6 1 1 R5 NOR 1 1 1 I/C 4,5, 2,4, 8 4 7,8 5,9 MAJ 6 7 2 2 TS 0 0

RX 1 1 2 1 I1 NOR 1 1,6 3 1 I/C 2,3,4 3,5,8, 2,9, 10 4 5,7,8 9 10 MAJ 6 7 8 3 2 TS 2,3, 3 2 5

RX 1 6 1 3 1 I2 NOR 1 1 2 1 I/C 2,3,4 2,3,4 2,3,5 15 4 5,8,9 6,9, 10 MAJ 6 7 8 3 2 TS 4,6,7 6 2 2,4,5 RX 1 6 2 1 I3 NOR 1 1 2 1 I/C 2,3,4 2,4, 3,5,6 11 4 5,7,8 5,9 MAJ 6 7 8 3 2 TS 2,3, 3 2 5

RX 1 1 2 1 I4 NOR 1,6 1 3 1 I/C 2,3,4 3,5,8, 2,3,5 10 4 9 6,9, 10 MAJ 6 7 8 3 2 TS 4,6,7 3 2 RX 6 1 2 1 I5 NOR 1 1 2 1 I/C 4,5, 2,3,4 2,9, 13 4 7,8 5,8,9 10 MAJ 6 7 8 3 2 TS 3 2 2,4,5 RX 1 6 2 0 U1 NOR 1 1 2 1 I/C 2,3,4 2,3,4 12 2 5,7,8 5,8,9 MAJ 6 7 2 1 TS 2,3, 6 2 5 2,4,5 RX 1 6 2 0 U2 NOR 1 1 2 1

I/C 2,3,4 2,3,4 12 2 5,7,8 5,8,9 MAJ 6 7 2 1 TS 2,3, 6 2 5 2,4,5 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis.
3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

ES-301 Competencies Checklist Form ES-301-6 Facility: Fort Calhoun Station Date of Examination: April 16, 2012 Operating Test No.: 2012-01 APPLICANTS RO BOP SRO Competencies SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Interpret/Diagnose 2,3, 2,4, 2,4, 5,6, 3,5, 3,5, 2,3, 2,3, 2,3, Events and Conditions 4,6 5,7, 7,8, 7,8 7,8, 6 4,5, 4,5, 4,5, 9 9, 9 6,7, 6,7, 6,7, 10 8 8 8,9, 10 Comply With and 1,2, 2,4, 1,2, 1,4, 1,3, 1,3, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, Use Procedures (1) 3,4, 5,6, 8,9, 5,6, 5,6, 5,6 3,4, 3,4, 3,4, 6 7,9 10 7,8 7,8, 5,6, 5,6, 5,6, 9 7,8 7,8, 7,8, 9 9, 10 Operate Control 1,2, 2,4, 1,2, 1,4, 1,3, 1,3, Boards (2) 3,4, 5,6, 8,9, 5,6, 5,6, 5,6 6 7,9 10 7,8 7,8, 9

Communicate 1,2, 2,4, 1,2, 1,4, 1,3, 1,3, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, and Interact 3,4, 5,6, 4,7, 5,6, 5,6, 5,6 3,4, 3,4, 3,4, 6 7,9 8,9, 7,8 7,8, 5,6, 5,6, 5,6, 10 9 7,8 7,8, 7,8, 9 9, 10 Demonstrate 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, Supervisory Ability (3) 3,4, 3,4, 3,4, 5,6, 5,6, 5,6, 7,8 7,8, 7,8, 9 9, 10 Comply With and 2,3, 2,4, 4,6, Use Tech. Specs. (3) 5 5 7 Notes:

(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SROs.

Instructions:

Check the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: _Fort Calhoun Station__ Scenario No.: __1____ Op-Test No.: _______

Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

Initial Conditions: _100% power, diesel generator #1 is tagged out for maintenance.________________

Turnover: __Reduce power to <95% per grid operator.___________________

Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description 1 R-ATCO Reduce power to <95% per OP-4, Attachment 2.

N-BOPO 2 I-ATCO PIC-244 fails, causing HCV-204 (Letdown heat exchanger isolation valve ) to close. Alarms are for VCT level low and Pressurizer level TS-CRS high (CB-1,2,3/A2 Window B-2 and CB-1,2,3/A4 Window A-8). If pressurizer level goes >69.2%, TS 2.1.7 applies. Reference OI-CH-1 to restore letdown.

3 C-ATCO Inadvertent VIAS. AOP-23 Section IV.

TS-CRS C-ATCO 4 C-BOPO HCV-153 opens, causing quench tank level to decrease. Alarm is CB-1,2,3/A4 Window C-3. Action will be to restore level and close HCV-153 C-BOPO 5 TS-CRS Loss of 161 kV line. Alarm is CB-20/A15, Window A-1, 4160V Supply Breaker from 161KV Tripped, also Windows A-2 and A-3.

Since a fast transfer will occur, the ARP states to go to AOP-31.

T.S. reference 2.7 6 M-All Loss of 345kV line (LOOP) Reactor trips, SRO enters EOP-00 and after SPTAs, transfers to EOP-07, due to below failure. Upon operator manually closing breaker, power will be restored to one vital bus.

7 C-BOPO AFW valve HCV-1108A remains closed. It can be opened from the control panel. EOP-07 Step 6.1. Critical task is to restore AFW (CT) flow using either FW-54 or FW-10 to either steam generator prior to reaching 27% wide range level.

8 C-BOPO Diesel Generator #2 breaker fails to close automatically due to diesel not reaching rated speed. Once operators increase (CT) governor, breaker will close once required speed is reached. See Step 12 of EOP-07. Critical task is to perform this action before exiting EOP-07

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: _ Fort Calhoun Station__ Scenario No.: __2____ Op-Test No.: _______

Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

Initial Conditions: 100% power. Condensate pump FW-2B is currently in service ____________

Turnover: ____. Rotate condensate pumps FW-2B and FW-2C._____________________________

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 N/A N-BOPO Rotate condensate pumps FW-2B and FW-2C per OI-FW-1 Attachment 4.

2 C-ATCO Charging pump CH1B trips. Alarm CB-1,2,3/A2, Window A-6L.

TS-CRS This isolates letdown. Another charging pump should be started per OI-CH-1. T.S. 2.15(5) requires CH-1B and required instruments for AI-179 I-BOPO 3 LT-903Y (Steam generator RC-1 level transmitter) degrades over a 10 minute period until it fails. This will shift FWCS to manual at the last good signal, requiring operator action to restore level. Alarm is ARP-DCS-FW, L0903E_AL5.

4 I-ATCO TS-CRS Pressurizer pressure instrument fails high. Possible TS if pressure falls below 2075 psia. Uses ARP-CB-1,2,3/A4 Window B-4 Pressurizer Pressure Deviation C-ATCO 5 C-BOPO Dropped CEA 4-01. Alarm CB-4/A8 Window A-5L. This will send TS-CRS the operators to AOP-02, which has actions to stabilize the plant.

T.S. 2.10. Because the rod is dropped, this will require a rapid downpower per AOP-05.

R-ATCO 6 N/A N-BOPO Rapid downpower per AOP-05.

M-All 7 RCP Seal Cooler Leak of CVC16. Due to high RCP temperatures, AOP-35 will be entered. AOP-35 will direct the operators to trip the reactor and enter EOP-00. This is an intersystem LOCA. EOP-03 will be entered after SPTAs are performed.

8 C-BOPO Turbine fails to trip. Critical task is for BOP to immediately trip the (CT) turbine before performing other SPTAs 9 C-ATCO HCV-438C fails to close on demand. This LOCA cannot be C-BOPO isolated. It will require a cooldown and depressurization to stop the LOCA. Critical task is to commence a cooldown and (CT) depressurization.

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: _Fort Calhoun Station__ Scenario No.: ___3____ Op-Test No.: _______

Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

Initial Conditions: _Reactor is currently at approximately 90% power. TM/LP trip unit for channel A is currently in BYPASS while I&C troubleshoots erratic pressurizer pressure readings. Technical Specification 2.15(1) was entered at 0428 today.

Turnover: ___Increase power to 100%_______________________________________________

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description R-ATCO 1 N-BOPO Increase power to 100% per OP-4 Attachment 1.

C-ATCO 2 SIT Tank level low on SI-6B. Alarm is from ARP-CB-4/A7 Window C-4L. Actions will require sluicing to SI-6B from another SIT or filling to restore level to >68% per OI-SI-1. T.S. 2.3 might apply.

C-BOPO 3 Instrument Air Compressor CA-1A fails. Standby compressor CA-1B running but not loaded. Alarm is ARP-CB-10,11/A11 Window B-3L. No entry into AOP-17.

TS-CRS 4 B/TI-112C fails high. Alarm is per ARP-CB-4/A20 Window E-6, Nuclear Power and T power deviation, only action for ATCO is to check indications and meters, and if an RCS temperature is abnormal, to notify I&C, therefore, this will not count towards an instrument failure for the ATCO.. T.S. 2.15(1) was already entered due to an inoperable TM/LP channel, so this channel must be placed in trip.

C-BOPO 5 ARP-CB-10,11/A10 Window A-6U, Iso Phase Bus Air Flow Low.

Entry into AOP-27 is directed. Operators will direct local operators to swap motor belt and start the standby motor.

C-BOPO 6 TS-CRS Loss of MCC 3C2 due to a ground fault. This causes a loss of boric acid pump CH-4A, boric acid gravity feed line valve HCV-265, and boric acid pumps discharge valve HCV-268. Alarm: CB-4/A7 Boric Acid Valves Trouble. T.S. 2.7 for MCC 3C2 (8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />). AOP-32 TS-CRS 7 RCS oxygen levels are greater than 0.15 ppm, causing entry into T.S. 2.1.5(1).

M-ALL 8 CVC16 (CT) ATWS - RPS pressurizer pressure channel D/PIA-102Y fails low, causing 2 out of 3 for TM/LP but no RPS trip. Critical task is for ATCO to manually trip the reactor before performing any other actions.

C-ATCO 9 Following manual trip, 5 control rods fail to insert. This will require emergency boration.

C-ATCO 10 (CT) Emergency boration problem - HCV-258 is mechanically bound when the operators attempt to open it. This results in the inability to emergency borate using the BASTs and requires use of the SIRWT to emergency borate. EOP-20. Critical task is to open LCV-218-3, Charging pump suction SIRWT isol. Valve, close LCV-218-2, VCT Outlet valve, and starting all charging pumps prior to exiting that safety function success path.

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: _Fort Calhoun Station__ Scenario No.: ____4___ Op-Test No.: _______

Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

Initial Conditions: __Mode 2 <1% power. Next step in OP-2A is to start 1 MFW pump. Desired MFW pump is FW-4B.___________

Turnover: _____Continue in OP-2A to raise power and load turbine__________________________

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description N-BOPO 1 Start MFW pump FW-4B per OP-2A, Attachment 3. Attachment 2 contains local operator actions and the instructions for starting the lube oil pump.

R-ATCO 2 Raise reactor power to 10% per OP-2A.

C-ATCO Wide range log NI-002 fails high. This failure should occur when 3 TS-CRS the ATC has raised power sufficient to see reactor response and when directed by lead examiner. ARP-CB-4/A20, Windows B-7 and C-1. This will send the operators to AOP-15, where they are directed to secure from raising power and stabilize reactor. T.S.

2.15 for failure of NI 4 C-BOPO MFW pump FW-4B trips, no auto start of standby pump. Alarm is ARP-CB-10,11/A12.

5 C-ATCO Controlling pressurizer level instrument 101X fails low. Alarm is ARP-CB-1,k2,3/A4 Windows A-8 and C-8 C-ATCO 6 TS-CRS CCW pump AC-3A trips, no autostart of standby pump. Alarm is ARP-CB-1,2,3/A2 Window D-3U. T.S. 2.4(b) applies.

7 C-BOPO Inadvertent AFAS. AOP-28 for inadvertent AFAS. T.S.2.5, 2.15, TS-CRS and 2.0.1 apply (Motherhood statement - 6 hr shutdown T.S.A.S.)

8 M-ALL Steam line break inside containment on RC-2A. EOP-00 to EOP-05.

(CT) 9 C-BOPO SGIS on RC-2A fails. Critical task will be for BOPO to isolate steam generator before exiting procedure step.

10 C-ATCO Containment spray pump 3B fails to autostart but can be started from control panel. Containment spray pump 3A shaft shears.

(CT) Critical task is to restore containment spray flow by either starting containment spray pump 3C or 3B.

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
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