ML12152A384
| ML12152A384 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 06/11/2012 |
| From: | NRC Region 4 |
| To: | Luminant Generation Co |
| References | |
| Download: ML12152A384 (129) | |
Text
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: CPNPP 1 & 2 Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: June 2012 NRC Examiners: Operators:
Initial Conditions: 100% power MOL - RCS Boron is 908 ppm (by sample).
Turnover: Maintain steady-state power conditions.
Critical Tasks: Control Steam Generator Level to Avoid RPS or ESFAS Actuation per ABN-708, Feedwater Flow Instrument Malfunction.
Reduce Reactor Power to Less Than 100% Prior to Exiting ABN-304, Main Condenser and Circulating Water System Malfunction.
Initiate Emergency Boration Due to Loss of Digital Rod Position Indication Prior to Exiting EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
Trip Reactor Coolant Pumps within 10 minutes upon a Loss of Subcooling per EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, or EOP-1.0A, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, Foldout Pages.
Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description 1 RX01E I (BOP, SRO) Steam Generator (1-03) Feed Flow Instrument (FT-530) Fails High.
+10 min 2 NI05E I (RO, SRO) Power Range Nuclear Instrument Channel (N-43) Fails High.
+25 min TS (SRO) 3 CW02A R (RO) Circulating Water Pump (1-01) Trip.
+35 min N (BOP, SRO) 4 RX09A I (RO, SRO) Main Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter (PT-505) Fails Low.
+45 min TS (SRO) 5 RC19C M (RO, BOP, SRO) Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident Inside Containment at 1750
+55 min GPM on 300 second ramp.
6 RD12C I (RO) Loss of Digital Rod Position Indication.
+58 min 7 CC02D C (BOP) Component Cooling Water Pump (1-02) SI Sequencer Start Failure.
+58 min 8 SW01A C (BOP) Station Service Water Pump (1-01) Trip Upon Containment
+75 min Isolation Phase A RESET.
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Technical Specifications Actual Target Quantitative Attributes 8 Total malfunctions (5-8) 3 Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 4 Abnormal events (2-4) 1 Major transients (1-2) 1 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 0 EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 4 Critical tasks (2-3)
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #1 Rev e.docx
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #1 SCENARIO
SUMMARY
NRC #1 The crew will assume the watch at 100% power with no scheduled activities per IPO-003A, Power Operations.
The first event it is a high failure of Steam Generator (1-03) Feed Flow Instrument, FT-530. Operator actions are per ABN-708, Feedwater Flow Instrument Malfunction, Section 2.0. The crew must manually control Steam Generator level, transfer to an Alternate Channel, and restore Steam Generator (SG) Feedwater Flow Control to AUTO.
The next event is high failure of Power Range Nuclear Instrument Channel (N-43). Crew actions are per ABN-703, Power Range Instrumentation Malfunction, Section 2.0, and include placing Rod Control in MANUAL, bypassing the failed Channel, restoring TAVE to program, and verifying Permissive Interlocks match current power level. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.
When Technical Specifications have been reference, Circulating Water Pump (1-01) will trip. The crew enters ABN-304, Main Condenser and Circulating Water System Malfunction, Section 2.0, Circulating Water Pump Trip, and initiates a 50 MWe Turbine Load reduction when Reactor Power rises above 100%. Rod Control is returned to AUTO during this evolution.
When plant conditions are stable, Main Turbine First Stage Pressure Transmitter (PT-505) will fail low.
The crew enters ABN-709, Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Instrument Malfunction, Section 4.0, places Rod Control in MANUAL, disables the Steam Dump System, and transfers to Turbine Impulse Pressure Channel PT-506. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.
When Technical Specifications have been referenced, a Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident will commence on a 300 second ramp inside Containment. The crew will observe lowering Pressurizer pressure and level and manually initiate a Reactor Trip and Safety Injection. EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, is entered and actions implemented until a loss of primary coolant is diagnosed and then a transition into EOP-1.0A, Loss of Primary or Secondary Coolant, is made. An Emergency Boration due to loss of Digital Rod Position Indication must be initiated after Step 4 of EOP-0.0A.
The scenario includes a manual Train B Component Cooling Water (CCW) Pump start following failure of the Safety Injection Sequencer and a Service Water Pump 1-01 trip that requires stopping the Train A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) when Containment Isolation Phase A is RESET while in EOP-1.0A.
Additionally, the Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCPs) must be tripped when a loss of subcooling occurs in either EOP-0.0A or EOP-1.0A.
This scenario is terminated when a Reactor Coolant System cooldown is commenced per EOS-1.2A, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization.
Risk Significance:
Failure of risk important system prior to trip: SG Feed Flow Instrument Failure Risk significant core damage sequence: Small Break LOCA Risk significant operator actions: Restore SG Feedwater Flow Control Manually Initiate Emergency Boration Manually Start Train B CCW Pump Trip RCPs Due to Loss of Subcooling CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #1 Rev e.docx
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #1 CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #1 Rev e.docx
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #1 BOOTH OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS for SIMULATOR SETUP Initialize to IC #18 and NRC #1 Scenario File.
EVENT TYPE MALF # DESCRIPTION DEMAND INITIATING VALUE PARAMETER SETUP RD12C Loss of Digital Rod Position Indication OFF Reactor Trip CC02D CCW Pump (1-02) SI Sequencer Start Failure - SI Sequencer OVRDE CCW Pump (1-02) Override OFF {DICCHS4519} STP K0 COND Delete CCW Pump (1-02) Override DOR CCW to START
{DICCHS4519A}
1 RX01E SG (1-03) Feed Flow Instrument (FT-530) Failure 5E6 lbm/hr K1 2 NI05E PR Nuclear Instrument Channel (N-43) Failure 200% K2 3 CW02A Circulating Water Pump (1-01) Trip OFF K3 4 RX09A Main Turbine 1st Stage Pressure (PT-505) Failure 0 PSIG K4 5 RC19C Small Break LOCA Inside Containment 1750 GPM K5 (300 sec. ramp) 6 RD12C Loss of Digital Rod Position Indication OFF Reactor Trip 7 CC02D CCW Pump (1-02) SI Sequencer Start Failure - SI Sequencer 7 OVRDE CCW Pump (1-02) Override OFF {DICCHS4519} STP K0 7 COND Delete CCW Pump (1-02) Override DOR CCW to START
{DICCHS4519A}
8 COND SW01A Station Service Water Pump (1-01) Trip TRIP Phase A RESET CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #1 Rev e.docx
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #1 Booth Operator: INITIALIZE to IC #18 and NRC #1 Scenario File.
ENSURE all Simulator Annunciator Alarms are ACTIVE.
ENSURE all Control Board Tags are removed.
ENSURE Operator Aid Tags reflect current boron conditions.
ENSURE Rod Bank Update (RBU) is performed.
ENSURE Turbine Load Rate set at 10 MWe/minute.
ENSURE 60/90 buttons DEPRESSED on ASD.
ENSURE ASD speakers are ON at half volume.
ENSURE Reactivity Briefing Sheet printout provided with Turnover.
ENSURE procedures in progress are on SRO desk:
- COPY of IPO-003A, Power Operations, Section 5.5, Operating at Constant Turbine Load.
ENSURE Control Rods are in AUTO with Bank D at 215 steps.
Control Room Annunciators in Alarm:
PCIP-1.1 - SR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.2 - IR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.4 - CNDSR AVAIL STM DMP ARMED C-9 PCIP-1.6 - RX 10% PWR P-10 PCIP-2.1 - SR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.2 - IR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.5 - SR RX TRIP BLK PERM P-6 PCIP-3.2 - PR TRN A LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK PCIP-4.2 - PR TRN B LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #1 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 6 of 36 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Feed Flow Transmitter Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 1 (Key 1).
- RX01E, SG 1-03 Feed Flow Transmitter (FT-530) fails high.
Indications Available:
8A-3.8 - SG 3 STM & FW FLO MISMATCH 1-FI-530A, SG 3 FW FLO indication fails high
+30 sec BOP REFER to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.
BOP RECOGNIZE SG 1-03 Feed Flow Transmitter (FT-530) failed high.
Examiner Note: A Feedwater Flow Channel failing HIGH will cause feedwater flow to lower by closing the associated Feedwater Control Valve. Without operator action, the Reactor will trip at 38% Steam Generator level.
DIRECT implementation of ABN-708, Feedwater Flow Instrument US Malfunction, Section 2.0.
BOP DETERMINE controlling feed flow channel has failed. [Step 2.3.1 - YES]
CRITICAL TASK Control Steam Generator Level to Avoid RPS or ESFAS Actuation per STATEMENT ABN-708, Feedwater Flow Instrument Malfunction.
CRITICAL PLACE 1-FK-530, SG 3 FW FLO CTRL in MANUAL and CONTROL level.
TASK BOP
[Step 2.3.2 - YES]
VERIFY automatic SG 1-03 level control - DESIRED:
[Step 2.3.3 - YES]
VERIFY alternate SG 1-03 level control channel responding normally.
[Step 2.3.3.a - YES]
VERIFY automatic SG 1-03 level control is desired.
[Step 2.3.3.b - YES]
BOP SELECT an alternate channel. [Step 2.3.4 - YES]
PLACE 1-FS-530C, SG 3 FW FLO CHAN SELECT to FY-531B.
[Step 2.3.4 - YES]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #1 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 7 of 36 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Feed Flow Transmitter Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP VERIFY SG 1-03 ready for AUTO Level Control: [Step 2.3.5 - YES]
VERIFY Feedwater and Steam Flows matched. [Step 2.3.5.a - YES]
VERIFY Steam Generator level stable at program. [Step 2.3.5.b - YES]
PLACE 1-FK-530, SG 3 FW FLO CTRL in AUTO and MONITOR operation.
[Step 2.3.6 - YES]
US INITIATE a Condition Report per STA-421. [Step 2.3.7 - YES]
+10 min US INITIATE repairs per STA-606. [Step 2.3.8 - YES]
When Feedwater Control is restored, or at Lead Evaluators discretion, PROCEED to Event 2.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #1 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 8 of 36 Event
Description:
Power Range Nuclear Instrument Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 2 (Key 2).
- NI05E, Power Range Nuclear Instrument (N-43) detector fails high.
Indications Available:
6D-1.3 - 1 OF 4 HI SETPT PR FLUX HI 6D-3.3 - 1 OF 4 PR FLUX RATE HI 6D-3.4 - PR CHAN DEV HI 6D-2.14 - OP HI FLUX ROD STOP C-2 1-NI-43B, PR POWER CHAN III indication fails high
+30 sec RO REFER to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.
RO RECOGNIZE Power Range Nuclear Instrument N-43 detector failure.
Examiner Note: If a Power Range Channel fails HIGH while the Rod Control System is an AUTO, Control Rods will be rapidly inserted.
DIRECT implementation of ABN-703, Power Range Instrumentation US Malfunction, Section 2.0.
RO VERIFY rapid Control Rod insertion - NOT REQUIRED. [Step 2.3.1 - YES]
VERIFY Reactor and Turbine Power - MATCHED.
[Step 2.3.1.a - YES]
VERIFY TAVE less than 3°F above TREF. [Step 2.3.1.a - YES]
PLACE Rod Control in MANUAL. [Step 2.3.1.b - YES]
RO VERIFY Reactor Power < 75% rated thermal power. [Step 2.3.2 - NO]
INITIATE actions to comply with Technical Specification SR 3.2.4.2.
US
[Step 2.3.2 RNO - YES]
PERFORM at Channel N-43 Drawers: [Step 2.3.3 - YES]
At Detector Current Comparator Drawer, SELECT Rod Stop Bypass RO/BOP Switch to N-43. [Step 2.3.3.a - YES]
At Comparator and Rate Drawer, SELECT Comparator Channel Defeat RO/BOP Switch to N-43. [Step 2.3.3.b - YES]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #1 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 9 of 36 Event
Description:
Power Range Nuclear Instrument Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior At Detector Current Comparator Drawer, SELECT Upper Section Switch RO/BOP to N-43. [Step 2.3.3.c - YES]
At Detector Current Comparator Drawer, SELECT Lower Section Switch RO/BOP to N-43. [Step 2.3.3.d - YES]
At Detector Current Comparator Drawer, SELECT Power Mismatch RO/BOP Bypass Switch to N-43. [Step 2.3.3.e - YES]
At the Power Range A Drawer, SELECT Rate Mode Switch momentarily RO/BOP to RESET for N-43. [Step 2.3.3.f - YES]
PLACE 1/1-JS-411E, N16 PWR CHAN DEFEAT Switch to LOOP 3.
RO/BOP
[Step 2.3.3.g - YES]
PLACE 1/1-TS-412T, TAVE CHAN DEFEAT Switch to LOOP 3.
RO/BOP
[Step 2.3.3.g - YES]
PLACE 1/1-TS-411E, 1-TR-411 Channel Select to an OPERABLE channel.
RO/BOP
[Step 2.3.4 - YES]
RO RESTORE TAVE to within 1ºF of TREF. [Step 2.3.5 - YES]
Within one (1) hour, VERIFY Permissives P-7, P-8, P-9, and P-10 MATCH US/RO current power level: [Step 2.3.6 - YES]
RX & TURB 10% PWR P-7 (PCIP - 3.5) - DARK. [Step 2.3.6.a - YES]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #1 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 10 of 36 Event
Description:
Power Range Nuclear Instrument Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RX 48% PWR 3-LOOP FLO PERM P-8 (PCIP - 4.5) - DARK.
[Step 2.3.6.a - YES]
RX 50% PWR TURB TRIP PERM P-9 (PCIP - 1.7) - DARK.
[Step 2.3.6.a - YES]
RX 10% PWR P-10 (PCIP - 1.6) - LIT. [Step 2.3.6.a - YES]
US/RO RECORD verification in Unit Log. [Step 2.3.6.b - NO]
US/RO CHECK Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio within limits: [Step 2.3.7 - YES]
CHECK Power Range Channels- ONE OR MORE INOPERABLE
[Step 2.3.7.a - YES]
CHECK Reactor Power - GREATER THAN 50%. [Step 2.3.7.b - YES]
REFER to TS 3.2.4, Table 3.3.1-1, Items 2, 3 (ACTIONS D and E) and TR 13.2.33. [Step 2.3.7.c - YES]
Examiner Note: The next two (2) steps are only performed following I&C maintenance.
VERIFY I&C locates problem area AND completes appropriate repair within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of instrument malfunction. [Step 2.3.8 - NO]
RECORD data in Unit Log. [Step 2.3.8.a - NO]
VERIFY interlocks MATCH current power level: [Step 2.3.9 - DONE]
RX & TURB 10% PWR P-7 (PCIP - 3.5) - DARK RX 48% PWR 3-LOOP FLO PERM P-8 (PCIP - 4.5) - DARK RX 50% PWR TURB TRIP PERM P-9 (PCIP - 1.7) - DARK RX 10% PWR P-10 (PCIP - 1.6) - LIT CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #1 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 11 of 36 Event
Description:
Power Range Nuclear Instrument Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior US EVALUATE Technical Specifications. [Step 2.3.10 - YES]
LCO 3.3.1.D, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation.
CONDITION D - One Power Range Neutron Flux-High channel inoperable.
ACTION D.1.1 - Perform SR 3.2.4.2 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> from discovery of THERMAL POWER> 75% RTP, AND ACTION D.1.2 - Place channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, OR ACTION D.2 - Be in MODE 3 within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br />.
LCO 3.3.1.E, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation.
CONDITION E - One channel inoperable.
ACTION E.1 - Place channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, OR ACTION E.2 - Be in MODE 3 within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br />.
LCO 3.3.1.S, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation.
CONDITION S - One or more required channel(s) inoperable.
ACTION S.1 - Verify interlock is in the required state for existing unit conditions within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, OR ACTION S.2 - Be in MODE 3 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />.
LCO 3.3.1.T, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation.
CONDITION T - One or more required channel(s) inoperable.
ACTION T.1 - Verify interlock is in the required state for existing unit conditions within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
ACTION T.2 - Be in MODE 2 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />.
US INITIATE a Condition Report per STA-421. [Step 2.3.11 - YES]
+15 min US INITIATE repairs per STA-606. [Step 2.3.12 - YES]
When the Technical Specification actions are addressed, or at Lead Evaluators discretion, PROCEED to Event 3.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #1 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 12 of 36 Event
Description:
Circulating Water Pump Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 3 (Key 3).
- CW02A, Circulating Water Pump 1-01 trip.
Indications Available:
9A-11.8 - ANY CWP OVRLOAD / TRIP 1-II-2800, CWP 1 motor current at 0 amps 1-PI-2804, CWP 1 DISCH PRESS low
+10 sec BOP REFER to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.
BOP DETERMINE Circulating Water Pump 1-01 tripped.
DIRECT performance of ABN-304, Main Condenser and Circulating Water US System Malfunction, Section 2.0.
VERIFY Circulating Water Pumps 1-02, 1-03, and 1 OPERATING.
[Step 2.3.1 - YES]
RO/BOP VERIFY Reactor Power less than or equal to 100% [Step 2.3.2 - NO]
CRITICAL TASK Reduce Reactor Power to Less Than 100% Prior to Exiting ABN-304, Main STATEMENT Condenser and Circulating Water System Malfunction.
CRITICAL TASK BOP INITIATE a 50 MW Turbine Load reduction. [Step 2.3.2 RNO - YES]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #1 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 13 of 36 Event
Description:
Circulating Water Pump Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: The following steps are considered skill of the craft.
US DIRECT manual INITIATION of 50 MWe Turbine Runback.
RO PLACE 1/1-RBSS, Control Rod Bank Select Switch in AUTO.
BOP PERFORM the following to INITIATE 50 MWe Turbine Runback:
DEPRESS 50 MWe Manual Runback button.
CLICK on 0/1 button.
CLICK on EXECUTE then VERIFY Runback in progress.
Examiner Note: The crew may initially execute a 50 MWe power reduction (Runback) for a loss of secondary efficiency. Rod Control will be placed in AUTO and boration may or may not be performed.
On the TG Control Display, VERIFY Main Condenser Vacuum maintained -
US/BOP GREATER THAN 26.5 HG. [Step 2.3.3 - NO]
On the Back Pressure Limit Display ENSURE Turbine NOT operating for more than 5 minutes in the NOT PERMISSIBLE region by lowering Turbine Load. [Step 2.3.3 RNO - YES]
VERIFY Main Condenser Vacuum maintained - GREATER THAN 24.5 HG US/BOP AND Reactor Power LESS THAN 100%. [Step 2.3.4 - YES]
ENSURE at least two Circulating Water Pumps - OPERATING per BOP SOP-310A. [Step 2.3.5 - YES]
VERIFY PCIP Window 1.4 - CNDSR AVAIL STM DMP ARMED C LIT.
[Step 2.3.6 - YES]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #1 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 14 of 36 Event
Description:
Circulating Water Pump Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior VERIFY at least three Circulating Water Pumps - OPERATING.
[Step 2.3.7 - YES]
VERIFY Auxiliary Condenser Vacuum - GREATER THAN 21 HG AND US/BOP STABLE. [Step 2.3.8 - YES]
BOP CHECK Chemistry Sampling Requirements: [Step 2.3.9 - YES]
VERIFY Steam Generator Atmospheric Relief Valves - REMAINED CLOSED AND Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump - REMAINED STOPPED. [Step 2.3.9.a - YES]
VERIFY Reactor Power Change - < 15% WITHIN ONE HOUR.
[Step 2.3.9.b - YES]
Examiner Note: SOP-310A is addressed but NOT performed due to extensive field actions.
ENSURE Main Condenser Outlet Valves are adjusted as required to BOP maintain CWP discharge pressure within limits of SOP-310A and CWP running currents of 150-160 amps. [Step 2.3.10 - YES]
US INITIATE repairs per STA-606. [Step 2.3.11 - YES]
+10 min US INITIATE a Condition Report per STA-421. [Step 2.3.12 - YES]
When the Turbine Runback is complete and power is stabilized, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 4.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #1 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 15 of 36 Event
Description:
Main Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 4 (Key 4).
- RX09A, Main Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter (PT-505) fails low.
Indications Available:
6D-1.10 - AVE TAVE TREF DEV PCIP-2.4 - LO TURB PWR ROD WITHDRW BLK C-5 1-PI-505 - Turbine Impulse Pressure Channel I indication fails low 1-TI-412A - Ave TAVE TREF Deviation indication to maximum
+30 secs RO/BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.
RECOGNIZE Control Rods INSERTING due to Turbine Impulse Pressure RO/BOP Instrument failure.
RO/BOP REPORT PT-505, Turbine Impulse Pressure Channel I has failed low.
DIRECT implementation of ABN-709, Steam Line Pressure, Steam Header US Pressure, Turbine 1st Stage Pressure, and Feed Header Pressure Instrument Malfunction, Section 4.0.
PLACE 1/1-RBSS Control Rod Bank Select Switch in MANUAL.
[Step 4.3.1 - YES]
VERIFY Steam Dumps - CLOSED WITH NO OPEN DEMAND.
[Step 4.3.2 - NO]
If Steam Dump operation NOT required, PLACE at least one Steam Dump Interlock Select Switch - OFF. [Step 4.3.2 RNO - YES]
43/1-SDA, STM DMP INTRLK SELECT.
43/1-SDB, STM DMP INTRLK SELECT.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #1 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 16 of 36 Event
Description:
Main Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RESTORE Steam Dump availability, PLACE Steam Dumps in STEAM BOP PRESSURE Mode per Attachment 7. [Step 4.3.3 - YES]
Examiner Note: The following five (5) steps are from ABN-709, Attachment 7, Transferring Steam Dumps and are performed using the Control Board Job Aid.
BOP ENSURE 1-PK-507, STM DMP PRESS CTRL is in MANUAL. [Step 1 - YES]
MATCH 1-PK-507, STM DUMP PRESS CTRL demand to current Steam BOP Dump Valve position. [Step 2 - YES]
VERIFY 1-PCIP, Window 1.4 - CNDSR AVAIL STM DMP ARMED C-9 is ON.
[Step 3 - YES]
BOP PLACE 43/1-SD, STM DMP MODE SELECT in STM PRESS. [Step 4 - YES]
BOP ENSURE both STM DMP INTLK SELECT switches are ON. [Step 5 - YES]
If desired to control Steam Dumps in AUTO, then PERFORM the following:
[Step 6 - YES]
VERIFY 1-PI-507, MS HDR PRESS indicates current MSL pressure
[Step 6.A - YES]
ENSURE 1-PK-507, STM DMP PRESS CTRL set to control at 1092 psig for "no load" conditions (Pot setting 6.86). [Step 6.B - YES]
PLACE 1-PK-507, STM DMP PRESS CTRL in AUTO [Step 6.C - YES]
TRANSFER 1-PS-505Z, TURB IMP PRESS CHAN SELECT to PT-506.
[Step 4.3.4 - YES]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #1 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 17 of 36 Event
Description:
Main Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: When PT-506 is selected, the major event should be commenced. The Technical Specification call associated with the failed 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter can be performed when the scenario is completed. This will prevent delays associated with restoring TAVE to within 1ºF of TREF.
RO ENSURE TAVE within 1ºF of TREF. [Step 4.3.5 - NO]
PLACE 1/1-RBSS, CONTROL ROD BANK SELECT Switch in AUTO.
[Step 4.3.6 - YES]
US/RO CHECK Reactor Power in - MODE 1. [Step 4.3.7 - YES]
US/BOP CHECK Turbine Power - GREATER THEN 10% POWER. [Step 4.3.8 - YES]
Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, VERIFY PCIP Window 4.6 - TURB 10% PWR P-13, IN US PROPER STATE for existing plant conditions (DARK). [Step 4.3.9 - YES]
US EVALUATE Technical Specifications. [Step 4.3.9 - YES]
LCO 3.3.1.T, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation (Function 18.f).
CONDITION T - One or more required channels inoperable.
ACTION T.1 - Verify interlock is in required state for existing unit conditions within one (1) hour, OR ACTION T.2 - Be in MODE 2 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />.
VERIFY PCIP Window 1.3 - AMSAC BLK TURB < 40% PWR C IN US PROPER STATE (DARK) for actual Turbine power. [Step 4.3.10 - YES]
If AMSAC actuation blocked and Turbine power >40%, ENSURE Automatic Actions of ALB-9B, Window 3.7 - AMSAC ACT TURB TRIP as necessary.
US INITIATE a Condition Report per STA-421. [Step 4.3.11 - YES]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #1 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 18 of 36 Event
Description:
Main Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
+10 min US INITIATE repairs per STA-606. [Step 4.3.12 - YES]
When the PT-506 is placed in service, or at Lead Evaluators discretion, PROCEED to Events 5, 6, 7, and 8.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #1 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 19 of 36 Event
Description:
Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident / Loss of Digital Rod Position Indication / Component Cooling Water Pump Start Failure / Station Service Water Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Events 5, 6, 7, (Key 5) and 8.
- RC19C, Small Break LOCA at 1750 GPM on 300 second ramp.
- RD12C, Loss of Digital Rod Position Indication upon Reactor trip.
- CC02D, CCW Pump (1-02) fails to start on SI Sequencer.
- SW01A, Service Water Pump (1-01) trip upon Containment Isolation Phase A RESET.
Indications Available:
2A-2.8 - ANY CNTMT SMP PMP RUN 2B-4.12 - CNTMT FN CLR 1 & 2 CNDS FILL RATE HI 2B-3.12 - CNTMT FN CLR 3 & 4 CNDS FILL RATE HI 5B-3.4 - PRZR 1 OF 4 PRESS LO 5B-4.4 - PRZR 1 OF 4 SI PRESS LO 5B-3.6 - PRZR LVL LO 5C-1.2 - PRZR LVL DEV LO 5C-3.3 - PRZR PRESS LO BACKUP HTRS ON 6A-3.4 - CHRG FLO HI / LO
+10 sec RO/BOP RECOGNIZE Pressurizer level and pressure - LOWERING.
US DIRECT performance of EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
Examiner Note: The following steps are from EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
RO VERIFY Reactor Trip: [Step 1 - YES]
VERIFY Reactor Trip Breakers - OPEN. [Step 1.a - YES]
VERIFY Neutron flux - DECREASING. [Step 1.a - YES]
VERIFY all Control Rod Position Rod Bottom Lights - ON.
[Step 1.b - NO]
BOP VERIFY Turbine Trip: [Step 2 - YES]
VERIFY all HP Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED. [Step 2 - YES]
BOP VERIFY Power to AC Safeguards Buses: [Step 3 - YES]
VERIFY AC Safeguards Buses - AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED.
[Step 3.a - YES]
VERIFY both AC Safeguards Buses - ENERGIZED. [Step 3.b - YES]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #1 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 20 of 36 Event
Description:
Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident / Loss of Digital Rod Position Indication / Component Cooling Water Pump Start Failure / Station Service Water Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO CHECK SI status: [Step 4 - YES]
RO CHECK if SI is actuated. [Step 4.a - NO]
RO CHECK if SI is required. [Step 4.a RNO - YES]
VERIFY Steam Line Pressure < 610 PSIG. [Step 4.a RNO - NO]
VERIFY Pressurizer Pressure < 1820 PSIG. [Step 4.a RNO - YES]
VERIFY Containment Pressure > 3.0 PSIG. [Step 4.a RNO - NO]
PLACE 1/1-SIA2, SI MAN ACT Switch to ACT position at CB-07 and RO DETERMINE SI has actuated. [Step 4.a RNO - YES]
RO VERIFY Both Trains SI Actuated: [Step 4.b - YES]
SI Actuated blue status light - ON NOT FLASHING.
Examiner Note: Emergency boration is performed per the Foldout Page of EOP-0.0A using steps outlined in ABN-107, Emergency Boration, Attachment 1.
CRITICAL TASK Initiate Emergency Boration Due to Loss of Digital Rod Position Indication STATEMENT Prior to Exiting EOP-0.0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
CRITICAL TASK RO INITIATE Emergency Boration of 3600 gallons of Boric Acid.
ENSURE a Charging Pump is RUNNING. [Step 1 - YES]
START a Boric Acid Transfer Pump: [Step 2 - YES]
PLACE 1/1-APBA1, BA XFER PMP 1 in START.
PLACE 1/1-8104, EMER BORATE VLV in OPEN. [Step 3 - YES]
VERIFY flow on 1-FI-183A, EMER BORATE FLO. [Step 4 - YES]
VERIFY flow on 1-FI-121A, CHRG FLO. [Step 5 - YES]
Examiner Note: EOP-0.0A, Attachment 2 steps performed by BOP are identified later in the scenario. The RCPs may be tripped if subcooling is observed to be < 25ºF.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #1 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 21 of 36 Event
Description:
Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident / Loss of Digital Rod Position Indication / Component Cooling Water Pump Start Failure / Station Service Water Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior INITIATE Proper Safeguards Equipment Operation Per Attachment 2.
US/BOP
[Step 5 - YES]
RO VERIFY AFW Alignment: [Step 6 - YES]
VERIFY both MDAFW Pumps - RUNNING. [Step 6.a - YES]
PLACE TDAFW Pump in PULLOUT per Foldout Page. [Step 6.b - YES]
VERIFY AFW total flow - GREATER THAN 460 GPM. [Step 6.c - YES]
VERIFY AFW valve alignment - PROPER ALIGNMENT. [Step 6.d - YES]
RO VERIFY Containment Spray NOT Required: [Step 7 - YES]
VERIFY 1-ALB-2B, Window 1-8, CS ACT - NOT ILLUMINATED.
[Step 7.a - YES]
VERIFY 1-ALB-2B, Window 4-11, CNTMT ISOL PHASE B ACT - NOT ILLUMINATED. [Step 7.a - YES]
VERIFY Containment pressure - LESS THAN 18.0 PSIG.
[Step 7.a - YES]
VERIFY Containment Spray Heat Exchanger Outlet Valves - CLOSED.
[Step 7.b - YES]
VERIFY Containment Spray Pumps - RUNNING. [Step 7.c - YES]
RO CHECK if Main Steam lines should be ISOLATED: [Step 8 - YES]
VERIFY Containment pressure - GREATER THAN 6.0 PSIG.
[Step 8.a - NO]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #1 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 22 of 36 Event
Description:
Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident / Loss of Digital Rod Position Indication / Component Cooling Water Pump Start Failure / Station Service Water Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior VERIFY Steam Line pressure - LESS THAN 610 PSIG. [Step 8.a - NO]
GO to Step 9. [Step 8.a RNO - YES]
RO CHECK RCS Temperature: [Step 9 - YES]
VERIFY RCS Average Temperature - STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 557°F. [Step 9 - YES]
RO CHECK PRZR Valve Status: [Step 10 - YES]
VERIFY PRZR Safeties - CLOSED. [Step 10.a - YES]
VERIFY Normal PRZR Spray Valves - CLOSED. [Step 10.b - YES]
VERIFY PORVs - CLOSED. [Step 10.c - YES]
VERIFY Power to at least 1 Block Valve - AVAILABLE. [Step 10.d - YES]
VERIFY Block Valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN. [Step 10.e - YES]
Trip Reactor Coolant Pumps within 10 minutes upon a Loss of Subcooling per CRITICAL TASK EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, or EOP-1.0A, Loss of Reactor or STATEMENT Secondary Coolant, Foldout Pages.
CRITICAL RO VERIFY RCS subcooling less than 25ºF (55ºF FOR ADVERSE TASK CONTAINMENT) and STOP all RCPs.
VERIFY RCS subcooling - LESS THAN 25°F. [Step 11.a - YES]
VERIFY ECCS Pumps (CCP or SI) - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING.
[Step 11.b - YES]
STOP all RCPs. [Step 11.c - YES]
RO/BOP CHECK if Any Steam Generator Is Faulted: [Step 12 - YES]
VERIFY any Steam Generator pressure - DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER. [Step 12.a - NO]
VERIFY any Steam Generator pressure - COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED. [Step 12.a - NO]
GO to Step 13. [Step 12.a RNO - YES]
RO/BOP CHECK if Steam Generator Tubes Are NOT Ruptured: [Step 13 - YES]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #1 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 23 of 36 Event
Description:
Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident / Loss of Digital Rod Position Indication / Component Cooling Water Pump Start Failure / Station Service Water Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior VERIFY Condenser Off Gas radiation - NORMAL.
VERIFY Main Steam Line radiation - NORMAL.
VERIFY SG Blowdown Sample Radiation Monitor - NORMAL.
VERIFY levels in all Steam Generators - NORMAL.
RO/BOP CHECK if RCS is Intact: [Step 14 - YES]
VERIFY Containment pressure - LESS THAN 1.3 PSIG. [Step 14 - NO]
VERIFY Containment recirculation sump levels - NORMAL.
[Step 14 - YES]
VERIFY Containment radiation levels - NORMAL. [Step 14 - NO]
GO to EOP-1.0A, Loss of Reactor or Secondary, Step 1.
[Step 14 RNO - YES]
US TRANSITION to EOP-1.0A, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, Step 1.
Examiner Note: EOP-1.0A, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant steps begin here.
US CHECK If RCPs Should Be Stopped: [Step 1 - YES]
VERIFY RCS subcooling less than 25ºF (55ºF FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT). [Step 1.a - YES]
VERIFY ECCS Pumps (CCP or SI) - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING.
[Step 1.b - YES]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #1 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 24 of 36 Event
Description:
Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident / Loss of Digital Rod Position Indication / Component Cooling Water Pump Start Failure / Station Service Water Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Trip Reactor Coolant Pumps within 10 minutes upon a Loss of Subcooling per CRITICAL TASK EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, or EOP-1.0A, Loss of Reactor or STATEMENT Secondary Coolant, Foldout Pages.
CRITICAL RO VERIFY RCS subcooling less than 25ºF (55ºF FOR ADVERSE TASK CONTAINMENT) and STOP all RCPs.
STOP all RCPs. [Step 1.c - YES]
RO/BOP CHECK if Any Steam Generator Is Faulted: [Step 2 - YES]
VERIFY any Steam Generator pressure - DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER. [Step 2.a - NO]
VERIFY any Steam Generator pressure - COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED. [Step 2.a - NO]
GO to Step 3. [Step 2.a RNO - YES]
US CHECK Intact Steam Generator Levels: [Step 3 - YES]
VERIFY Narrow range level - GREATER THAN 43% (50% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT). [Step 3.a - NO]
MAINTAIN total AFW flow greater than 460 GPM until narrow range level GREATER THAN 43% (50% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT).
[Step 3.a RNO - YES]
US CHECK Secondary Radiation NORMAL: [Step 4 - YES]
VERIFY Condenser off gas radiation - NORMAL.
VERIFY Main Steam Line radiation - NORMAL.
VERIFY SG Blowdown Sample Radiation Monitor - NORMAL.
VERIFY levels in all Steam Generators - NORMAL.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #1 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 25 of 36 Event
Description:
Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident / Loss of Digital Rod Position Indication / Component Cooling Water Pump Start Failure / Station Service Water Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior US CHECK PRZR PORVs and Block Valves: [Step 5 - YES]
VERIFY power to Block Valves - AVAILABLE. [Step 5.a - YES]
VERIFY PORVs - CLOSED. [Step 5.b - YES]
VERIFY Block Valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN. [Step 5.c - YES]
US/RO CHECK if ECCS Flow Should Be Reduced: [Step 6 - YES]
VERIFY Secondary heat sink conditions - SATISFIED. [Step 6.a - YES]
VERIFY total AFW flow to Intact SGs - GREATER THAN 460 GPM.
VERIFY intact SG NR level - GREATER THAN 43% (50% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT)
VERIFY RCS subcooling - GREATER THAN 25°F (55°F FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT). [Step 6.b - NO]
GO to Step 7 and OBSERVE CAUTIONS prior to Step 7.
[Step 6.b RNO - YES]
RO/BOP RESET ESF Actuation Signals. [Step 7 - YES]
PLACE both EDG EMERG STOP/START handswitches in START.
RO/BOP
[Step 7.a - YES]
RO/BOP RESET SI. [Step 7.b - YES]
RO/BOP RESET SI Sequencers. [Step 7.c - YES]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #1 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 26 of 36 Event
Description:
Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident / Loss of Digital Rod Position Indication / Component Cooling Water Pump Start Failure / Station Service Water Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: SSW pump 1-01 will trip when Train B Containment Isolation Phase A is reset.
RO/BOP RESET Containment Isolation Phase A and Phase B. [Step 7.d - YES]
RO/BOP RESET Containment Spray Signal. [Step 7.e - YES]
BOP Respond to alarm 1-ALB-01, 1.8, SSWP 1/2 OVRLOAD/TRIP.
BOP DETERMINE SSW Pump 1-01 Trip.
Examiner Note: The following is an initial operator action per ABN-501, section 2.3.
Examiner Note: Diamond steps () are Initial Operator Actions.
BOP PLACE Train A EDG Emergency Start/Stop handswitch in PULL-OUT.
[Step 1 - YES]
Examiner Note: EOP-1.0A, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant steps continue here.
US CHECK If RHR Pumps Should Be Stopped: [Step 8 - YES]
VERIFY RCS pressure - GREATER THAN 325 PSIG (425 PSIG FOR RO/BOP ADVERSE CONTAINMENT). [Step 8.a.1) - YES]
RO/BOP VERIFY RCS pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING. [Step 8.b.2) - YES]
VERIFY RHR Pumps - RUNNING WITH SUCTION ALIGNED TO RO/BOP RWST. [Step 8.b - YES]
RO/BOP STOP RHR Pumps and PLACE in standby. [Step 8.c - YES]
RO/BOP RESET RHR Auto Switchover. [Step 8.d - YES]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #1 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 27 of 36 Event
Description:
Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident / Loss of Digital Rod Position Indication / Component Cooling Water Pump Start Failure / Station Service Water Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior US CHECK RCS and SG Pressures: [Step 9 - YES]
RO/BOP VERIFY RCS pressure - STABLE OR DECREASING. [Step 9 - YES]
RO/BOP VERIFY all SG pressures - STABLE OR INCREASING. [Step 9 - YES]
US CHECK If Diesel Generators Should Be Stopped: [Step 10 - YES]
VERIFY AC Safeguards Buses ENERGIZED by Offsite Power.
RO/BOP
[Step 10.a - YES]
PLACE Train B EDG EMERG STOP/START handswitch in STOP.
[Step 10.b - YES]
US INITIATE Evaluation of Plant Status. [Step 11 - YES]
RO/BOP VERIFY Cold Leg Recirculation capability: [Step 11.a - YES]
VERIFY Train A RHR Pump - AVAILABLE. [Step 11.a.1) - YES]
VERIFY CCW to Train A RHR Pump - AVAILABLE.
[Step 11.a.1) - YES]
VERIFY 1/1-8811A, CNTMT SMP TO RHRP 1 SUCT ISOL VLV -
AVAILABLE. [Step 11.a.1) - YES]
VERIFY Train B RHR Pump - AVAILABLE. [Step 11.a.1) - YES]
VERIFY CCW to Train B RHR Pump - AVAILABLE.
[Step 11.a.1) - YES]
VERIFY 1/1-8811B, CNTMT SMP TO RHRP 2 SUCT ISOL VLV -
AVAILABLE. [Step 11.a.1) - YES]
VERIFY 1/1-8804A, RHRP 1 TO CCP SUCT VLV - AVAILABLE.
[Step 11.a.2) - YES]
VERIFY 1/1-8804B, RHRP 2 TO SIP SUCT VLV - AVAILABLE.
[Step 11.a.2) - YES]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #1 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 28 of 36 Event
Description:
Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident / Loss of Digital Rod Position Indication / Component Cooling Water Pump Start Failure / Station Service Water Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CHECK Auxiliary Building and Safeguards Building radiation -
RO/BOP NORMAL: [Step 11.b - YES]
CHECK PC-11 monitors - NORMAL OR Notify Radiation Protection to take local Radiation Surveys. [Step 11.b - YES]
NOTIFY Chemistry to obtain RCS samples to assist in determining US extent of the accident. [Step 11.c - YES]
US CONTACT Plant Staff to EVALUATE plant equipment. [Step 11.d - YES]
US CHECK if RCS Cooldown and Depressurization Is Required: [Step 12 - YES]
VERIFY RCS pressure - GREATER THAN 325 PSIG (425 PSIG FOR RO/BOP ADVERSE CONTAINMENT). [Step 12.a - YES]
GO to EOS-1.2A, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization, Step 1.
US
[Step 12.b - YES]
Examiner Note: EOS-1.2A, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization, steps begin here.
Steps in [brackets] are from the associated EOS-1.2A Attachments.
RO/BOP [1.D] VERIFY Diesel Generators - NOT RUNNING. [Step 1 - YES]
RO/BOP [1.D] VERIFY SI - RESET. [Step 2 - YES]
RO/BOP [1.D] VERIFY SI Sequencers - RESET. [Step 3 - YES]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #1 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 29 of 36 Event
Description:
Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident / Loss of Digital Rod Position Indication / Component Cooling Water Pump Start Failure / Station Service Water Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO/BOP [1.D] VERIFY Containment Isolation Phase A and Phase B - RESET.
[Step 4 - YES]
RO/BOP [1.D] VERIFY Containment Spray Signal - RESET. [Step 5 - YES]
Booth Operator: If required, EXECUTE remote functions EDR73, 1EB3/11D BKR to CLOSE and EDR74, 1EB4/11D BKR to CLOSE to RESET Instrument Air Compressors 1-01
& 1-02.
RO/BOP [1.D] ESTABLISH Instrument Air and Nitrogen to Containment. [Step 6 - YES]
ESTABLISH Instrument Air: [Step 6.a - YES]
VERIFY Air Compressor - RUNNING. [Step 6.a.1) - YES]
ESTABLISH Instrument Air to Containment: [Step 6.a.2) - YES]
ESTABLISH Nitrogen: [Step 6.b - YES]
VERIFY ACCUM 14 VENT CTRL, 1-HC-943 - CLOSED.
[Step 6.b.1) - YES]
OPEN SI/PORV ACCCUM N2 ISOL VLV 1/1-8880.
[Step 6.b.2) - YES]
BOP VERIFY all AC Buses - ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER. [Step 7 - YES]
RO DEENERGIZE PRZR Heaters: [Step 8 - YES]
PLACE all PRZR heater switches in OFF position. [Step 8.a - YES]
CONSULT Plant Staff for a recommended minimum indicated PRZR water level that will ensure heaters are covered. [Step 8.b - YES]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #1 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 30 of 36 Event
Description:
Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident / Loss of Digital Rod Position Indication / Component Cooling Water Pump Start Failure / Station Service Water Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior US CHECK If RHR Pumps Should Be Stopped. [Step 9 - YES]
VERIFY RHR Pumps - ANY RUNNING WITH SUCTION ALIGNED TO RWST. [Step 9.a - NO]
GO to Step 10. [Step 9.a RNO - YES]
US CHECK Intact SG Levels: [Step 10 - YES]
VERIFY narrow range level - GREATER THAN 43% (50% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT): [Step 10.a - YES]
CONTROL AFW flow to maintain narrow range level between 43% (50%
FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT) and 60%. [Step 10.b - YES]
+30 min US INITIATE RCS Cooldown to Cold Shutdown: [Step 11 - YES]
MAINTAIN cooldown rate in RCS Cold Legs - LESS THAN 100°F/HR.
[Step 11.a - YES]
BLOCK Low Main Steam Pressure SI signal when Pressurizer pressure
- LESS THAN 1960 PSIG. [Step 11.b - YES]
DUMP steam from intact Steam Generators via ARVs. [Step 11.c - YES]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #1 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 31 of 36 Event
Description:
Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident / Loss of Digital Rod Position Indication / Component Cooling Water Pump Start Failure / Station Service Water Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior US CHECK RCS subcooling - GREATER THAN 25°F (55°F FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT). [Step 12 - NO]
GO to Step 25. [Step 12 RNO - YES]
US VERIFY ECCS Flow Not Required: [Step 25 - YES]
CHECK RCS subcooling - GREATER THAN 25°F (55°F FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT). [Step 25.a - NO]
Manually START ECCS Pumps as necessary. [Step 25.a RNO - YES]
GO to Step 26. [Step 25.a RNO - YES]
When a transition to Step 26 of EOS-1.2A is required, TERMINATE the scenario.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #1 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 32 of 36 Event
Description:
Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident / Loss of Digital Rod Position Indication / Component Cooling Water Pump Start Failure / Station Service Water Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: These steps are performed by the BOP per EOP-0.0A, Attachment 2.
BOP VERIFY SSW Alignment: [Step 1 - YES]
VERIFY SSW Pumps - RUNNING. [Step 1.a - YES]
VERIFY Train A EDG Cooler SSW return flow. [Step 1.b - YES]
BOP VERIFY Safety Injection Pumps - RUNNING. [Step 2 - YES]
BOP VERIFY Containment Isolation Phase A - APPROPRIATE MLB LIGHT INDICATION (RED WINDOWS). [Step 3 - YES]
BOP VERIFY Containment Ventilation Isolation - APPROPRIATE MLB LIGHT INDICATION (GREEN WINDOWS). [Step 4 - YES]
BOP VERIFY CCW Pumps - RUNNING. [Step 5 - NO]
BOP DETERMINE CCW Pump 1-02 failed to start and MANUALLY START CCW Pump 1-02. [Step 5 RNO - YES]
BOP VERIFY RHR Pumps - RUNNING. [Step 6 - YES]
BOP VERIFY Proper CVCS Alignment: [Step 7 - YES]
VERIFY CCPs - RUNNING. [Step 7.a - YES]
VERIFY Letdown Relief Valve Isolation: [Step 7.b - YES]
Letdown Orifice Isolation Valves - CLOSED. [Step 7.b.1) - YES]
Letdown Isolation Valves 1/1-LCV-459 & 1/1-LCV-460 - CLOSED.
[Step 7.b.2) - YES]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #1 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 33 of 36 Event
Description:
Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident / Loss of Digital Rod Position Indication / Component Cooling Water Pump Start Failure / Station Service Water Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP VERIFY ECCS flow: [Step 8 - YES]
CCP SI flow indicator - CHECK FOR FLOW. [Step 8.a - YES]
RCS pressure - LESS THAN 1700 PSIG (1800 PSIG FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT). [Step 8.b - YES]
SIP discharge flow indicator - CHECK FOR FLOW. [Step 8.c - YES]
RCS pressure - LESS THAN 325 PSIG (425 PSIG FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT). [Step 8.d - NO]
GO to Step 9. [Step 8.d RNO) - YES]
BOP VERIFY Feedwater Isolation Complete: [Step 9 - YES]
Feedwater Isolation Valves - CLOSED.
Feedwater Isolation Bypass Valves - CLOSED.
Feedwater Bypass Control Valves - CLOSED.
Feedwater Control Valves - CLOSED.
BOP VERIFY Train B Diesel Generator - RUNNING. [Step 10 - YES]
BOP VERIFY Monitor Lights for SI Load Shedding on 1-MLB-9 and 1-MLB10 -
LIT. [Step 11 - YES]
BOP VERIFY Proper SI alignment - PROPER MLB LIGHT INDICATION.
[Step 12 - YES]
BOP INITIATE periodic monitoring of Spent Fuel Cooling. [Step 13 - YES]
Spent Fuel Pool temperature (T2900A, T2901A).
Spent Fuel Pool level (L4800A, L4801A, L4802A, L4803A).
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #1 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 34 of 36 Event
Description:
Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident / Loss of Digital Rod Position Indication / Component Cooling Water Pump Start Failure / Station Service Water Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP VERIFY Components on Table 1 are Properly Aligned. [Step 14 - YES]
Location Equipment Description Condition CB-03 X-HS-5534 H2 PRG SPLY FN 4 STOPPED CB-03 X-HS-5532 H2 PRG SPLY FN 3 STOPPED CB-04 1/1-8716A RHRP 1 XTIE VLV OPEN CB-04 1/1-8716B RHRP 2 XTIE VLV OPEN CB-06 1/1-8153 XS LTDN ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-06 1/1-8154 XS LTDN ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-07 1/1-RTBAL RX TRIP BKR OPEN CB-07 1/1-RTBBL RX TRIP BKR OPEN CB-07 1/1-BBAL RX TRIP BYP BKR OPEN/DEENERGIZED CB-07 1/1-BBBL RX TRIP BYP BKR OPEN/DEENERGIZED CB-08 1-HS-2397A SG 1 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-08 1-HS-2398A SG 2 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-08 1-HS-2399A SG 3 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-08 1-HS-2400A SG 4 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-08 1-HS-2111C FWPT A TRIP TRIPPED CB-08 1-HS-2112C FWPT B TRIP TRIPPED CB-09 1-HS-2490 CNDS XFER PUMP STOPPED (MCC deenergized on SI)
CV-01 X-HS-6181 PRI PLT SPLY FN 17 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6188 PRI PLT SPLY FN 18 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #1 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 35 of 36 Event
Description:
Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident / Loss of Digital Rod Position Indication / Component Cooling Water Pump Start Failure / Station Service Water Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CV-01 X-HS-6195 PRI PLT SPLY FN 19 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6202 PRI PLT SPLY FN 20 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6209 PRI PLT SPLY FN 21 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6216 PRI PLT SPLY FN 22 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6223 PRI PLT SPLY FN 23 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6230 PRI PLT SPLY FN 24 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-3631 UPS & DISTR RM A/C FN 1 & STARTED BSTR FN 42 CV-01 X-HS-3632 UPS & DISTR RM A/C FN 2 & STARTED BSTR FN 43 CV-01 1-HS-5600 ELEC AREA EXH FN 1 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 1-HS-5601 ELEC AREA EXH FN 2 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 1-HS-5602 MS & FW PIPE AREA EXH STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 3 & EXH DMPR CV-01 1-HS-5603 MS & FW PIPE AREA EXH STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 4 & EXH DMPR CV-01 1-HS-5618 MS & FW PIPE AREA SPLY STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 17 CV-01 1-HS-5620 MS & FW PIPE AREA SPLY STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 18 CV-03 X-HS-5855 CR EXH FN 1 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5856 CR EXH FN 2 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5731 SFP EXH FN 33 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5733 SFP EXH FN 34 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5727 SFP EXH FN 35 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5729 SFP EXH FN 36 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED Examiner Note: The next four (4) steps would be performed on Unit 2.
CB-03 2-HS-5538 AIR PRG EXH ISOL DMPR CLOSED CB-03 2-HS-5539 AIR PRG EXH ISOL DMPR CLOSED CB-03 2-HS-5537 AIR PRG SPLY ISOL DMPR CLOSED CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #1 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page 36 of 36 Event
Description:
Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident / Loss of Digital Rod Position Indication / Component Cooling Water Pump Start Failure / Station Service Water Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CB-03 2-HS-5536 AIR PRG SPLY ISOL DMPR CLOSED BOP NOTIFY Unit Supervisor attachment instructions complete AND to IMPLEMENT FRGs as required. [Step 14 - YES]
EOP-0.0A, Attachment 2 steps are now complete.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #1 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: CPNPP 1 & 2 Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: June 2012 NRC Examiners: Operators:
Initial Conditions: 100% power MOL - RCS Boron is 908 ppm (by sample).
Turnover: Maintain steady-state power conditions. Boric Acid Transfer Pump 1-01 is OOS.
Critical Tasks: Close PORV Block Valve to Maintain RCS Pressure Greater Than Low Pressure Reactor Trip Setpoint Following Entry Into ABN-705, Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction.
Control Steam Generator Level to Avoid RPS or ESFAS Actuation per ABN-710, Steam Generator Level Instrumentation Malfunction.
Initiate Emergency Boration due to Two (2) Stuck Control Rods Prior to Exiting EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
Trip Reactor Coolant Pumps Prior to Establishing Bleed and Feed per FRH-0.1A, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.
Establish Core Cooling via Reactor Coolant System Bleed and Feed per FRH-0.1A, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.
Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description 1 RX08B I (RO, SRO) Pressurizer Pressure Channel (PT-456) Fails High.
+10 min RX16B TS (SRO) Stuck Power Operated Relief Valve (PCV-456) at 50% Open.
2 RX04B I (BOP, SRO) Steam Generator (1-02) Level Transmitter (LT-552) Fails High.
+20 min TS (SRO) 3 RP06B I (RO, SRO) Loop 2 N-16 Channel (JI-421A/B) Fails Low.
+30 min TS (SRO) 4 FW03A R (RO) Main Feedwater Pump A Trip.
+40 min TC09C N (BOP, SRO) Automatic Turbine Runback Failure.
5 FW06A M (RO, BOP, SRO) Main Feedwater Pump A Recirculation Valve (FV-2289) Fails
+45 min Open. Loss of both Main Feedwater Pumps.
6 RD04K2 C (RO) Two Control Rods Fail to Insert Upon Reactor Trip.
+45 min RD04K8 Emergency Boration Required.
7 FW08B C (BOP) Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (1-02) Start Failure.
+47 min 8 OVRDE C (BOP) Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (TDAFW) Steam Valves
+47 min FW09B Fail to Auto Open Followed by TDAFW Trip (60 second time delay).
9 ED05H C (BOP) 6900 Volt Train A Safeguards Bus 1EA1 86-1 Trip and Lockout
+50 min M (RO, BOP, SRO) Five minutes Post Trip. Loss of Feedwater Flow.
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Technical Specifications CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #2 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Actual Target Quantitative Attributes 9 Total malfunctions (5-8) 4 Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 4 Abnormal events (2-4) 2 Major transients (1-2) 1 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1 EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 5 Critical tasks (2-3)
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #2 Rev e.docx
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #2 SCENARIO
SUMMARY
NRC #2 The crew will assume the watch at 100% power with no scheduled activities per IPO-003A, Power Operations. Boric Acid Transfer Pump 1-01 is out-of-service.
The first event it is a high failure of a Pressurizer Pressure Channel. Operator actions are per ABN-705, Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction, Section 2.0, and require closing the Block Valve on a partially open Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV), placing the Pressurizer Master Pressure Controller in MANUAL, selecting an alternate controlling Channel, and restoring Pressurizer pressure to normal. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.
The next event is a high failure of a Steam Generator (1-02) Level Transmitter. Crew actions are per ABN-710, Steam Generator Level Instrumentation Malfunction, Section 2.0, and include placing Steam Generator (SG) Level Control in MANUAL, stabilizing the plant, aligning an Alternate Channel, and transferring SG Level Control back to AUTO. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.
When Technical Specifications are referenced, a low failure of TCOLD Temperature Instrument, TI-421A will occur. Operator actions are per ABN-704, TC/N-16 Instrumentation Malfunction, Section 2.0, and require stopping Control Rod motion and stabilizing Reactor Coolant System (RCS) temperature and Pressurizer level. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.
When RCS temperature is restored to normal, a Main Feedwater Pump (MFW) will trip and an AUTO Turbine Runback will fail to initiate. Rod Control will be placed in AUTO and a Manual Turbine Runback to 900 MWe is commenced per ABN-302, Feedwater, Condensate, Heater Drain System Malfunction, Section 2.0. The MFW Pump Recirculation Valve will fail open shortly after the Runback initiates and result in a lowering MFW Pump suction pressure and a trip of the second MFW Pump. When this occurs, the crew will manually trip the Reactor and enter EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
Two Control Rods failed to insert on the Reactor Trip and an Emergency Boration is required. While performing the actions of EOP-0.0A, a Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pump will fail to start and require placing the Turbine Driven AFW (TDAFW) Pump in service. Shortly after the TDAFW Pump is started, the pump will trip. The crew will transition from EOP-0.0A to EOS-0.1A, Reactor Trip Response. Five minutes after the Reactor trips, Train A Safeguards Bus 1EA1 will trip and lockout resulting in a Loss of Feedwater Flow. Entry into FRH-0.1A, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, will be performed with an immediate transition to Step 12 for RCS Bleed and Feed.
The scenario success path includes tripping the Reactor Coolant Pumps and opening the Pressurizer and Reactor Head Vents.
Risk Significance:
Failure of risk important system prior to trip: Automatic Turbine Runback Failure Risk significant core damage sequence: Loss of Feedwater Flow Risk significant operator actions: Close PORV Block Valve Restore Steam Generator 1-02 Level Control Start TDAFW Pump Trip Reactor Coolant Pumps Initiate RCS Bleed and Feed CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #2 Rev e.docx
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #2 BOOTH OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS for SIMULATOR SETUP Initialize to IC #18 and NRC #2 Scenario File.
EVENT TYPE MALF # DESCRIPTION DEMAND INITIATING VALUE PARAMETER SETUP Boric Acid Transfer Pump 1-01 PULLOUT -
Boric Acid Transfer Pump 1-02 AUTO -
RD04K2 Stuck Control Bank B Control Rod K2 STUCK K0 RD04K8 Stuck Control Bank A Control Rod K8 STUCK K0 FW08B Motor Driven AFW Pump (1-02) Start Failure OFF K0 OVRDE TDAFW Pump Steam Valves Failure - K0 FW09B TDAFW Pump Trip TRIP 60 second TD Post Start ED05H Train A Safeguards Bus 1EA1 Trip and Lockout TRIP 300 second TD Post Trip NOTE: ENSURE keys for Pressurizer & Reactor Head Vent Valves are moved to top of Key Locker.
1 RX08B Pressurizer Pressure Channel (PT-456) Failure 100% K1 1 RX16B Stuck PORV (PCV-456) at 50% Open 50% K1 1 RCR24 PORV Block Valve 1/1-8000B Breaker OPEN K6 2 RX04B SG (1-02) Level Transmitter (LT-552) 100% K2 3 RP06B Loop 2 N-16 Channel (JI-421A/B) Failure 0% K3 4 FW03A Main Feedwater Pump (1-01) Trip TRIP K4 4 TC09C Automatic Turbine Runback Failure FAIL K4 5 FW06A MFW Pump (1-01) Recirculation Valve Failure OPEN K4 5 second delay 6 RD04K2 Stuck Control Bank B Control Rod K2 STUCK K0 6 RD04K8 Stuck Control Bank A Control Rod K8 STUCK K0 7 FW08B Motor Driven AFW Pump (1-02) Start Failure OFF K0 CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #2 Rev e.docx
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #2 8 OVRDE TDAFW Pump Steam Supply Valve 1-HS-2451-1 CLOSED K0 DIFWHS24521 from SG 1-04 (NOTE 1) 8 OVRDE TDAFW Pump Steam Supply Valve 1-HS-2451-2 CLOSED K0 DIFWHS24522 from SG 1-01 (NOTE 1)
NOTE 1: 1-HS-2452-1/2, TDAFW Pump Valves will NOT AUTO open but will open when taken to START.
This will prevent an AUTO start on 86-1 Trip and Lockout if TDAFW Pump was not previously started.
8 FW09B TDAFW Pump Trip TRIP 60 second TD Post Start 8 TDAFW Pump Trip {AOFW SI 2452A. Value > 1600} IMF FW09B f:1 d:60 9 ED05H Train A Safeguards Bus 1EA1 Trip and Lockout 86-1 300 second TD Post Trip 9 EDR74 IA Compressor 1-02 1EB4/11D FDR BKR CLOSED When directed RCR24 PORV Block Valve 1/1-8000B Breaker (NOTE 2) ON K7 NOTE 2: Power is restored to PORV Block Valve 1/1-8000B when FRH-0.1A is entered.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #2 Rev e.docx
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #2 Booth Operator: INITIALIZE to IC #18 and NRC #2 Scenario File.
ENSURE all Simulator Annunciator Alarms are ACTIVE.
ENSURE Boric Acid Transfer Pump 1-01 in PULLOUT and TAGGED.
ENSURE Boric Acid Transfer Pump 1-02 in AUTO.
ENSURE keys for PRZR & RX Head Vent Valves moved to top of Key Locker.
ENSURE Operator Aid Tags reflect current boron conditions.
ENSURE Rod Bank Update (RBU) is performed.
ENSURE Turbine Load Rate set at 10 MWe/minute.
ENSURE 60/90 buttons DEPRESSED on ASD.
ENSURE ASD speakers are ON at half volume.
ENSURE Reactivity Briefing Sheet printout provided with Turnover.
ENSURE procedures in progress are on SRO desk:
- COPY of IPO-003A, Power Operations, Section 5.5, Operating at Constant Turbine Load.
ENSURE Control Rods are in AUTO with Bank D at 215 steps.
Control Room Annunciators in Alarm:
PCIP-1.1 - SR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.2 - IR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.4 - CNDSR AVAIL STM DMP ARMED C-9 PCIP-1.6 - RX 10% PWR P-10 PCIP-2.1 - SR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.2 - IR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.5 - SR RX TRIP BLK PERM P-6 PCIP-3.2 - PR TRN A LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK PCIP-4.2 - PR TRN B LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #2 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 7 of 28 Event
Description:
Pressurizer Pressure Channel Failure / Power Operated Relief Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 1 (Key 1).
- RX08B, Pressurizer Pressure Channel (PT-456) fails high.
- RX16B, PORV (PCV-456) fails 50% open.
Indications Available:
5B-3.1 - PRZR PORV OUT TEMP HI 5B-4.1 - PRZR ANY SFTY RLF VLV OUT TEMP HI 5C-1.4 - PORV 455A / 456 NOT CLOSE 5C-2.1 - PRZR PRESS HI 5C-3.1 - PRZR 1 OF 4 PRESS HI 5C-3.3 - PRZR PRESS LO BACKUP HTRS ON 6A-3.4 - CHRG FLO HI / LO (~10 seconds later) 1-TI-463, PRZR PORV OUT TEMP indication rising 1-PI-456, PRZR PRESS CHAN II indication failed high 1/1-PCV-456, PRZR PORV indicates mid position
+1 min RO RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.
RO RECOGNIZE PRZR pressure lowering.
DIRECT performance of ABN-705, Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction, US Section 2.0.
Examiner Note: Diamond steps () are Initial Operator Actions.
RO VERIFY PORV - CLOSED. [Step 2.3.1 - NO]
PLACE 1/1-PCV-456, PRZR PORV in CLOSE. [Step 2.3.1 RNO - YES]
Close PORV Block Valve to Maintain Reactor Coolant System Pressure Greater CRITICAL TASK Than Low Pressure Reactor Trip Setpoint Following Entry into ABN-705, STATEMENT Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #2 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 8 of 28 Event
Description:
Pressurizer Pressure Channel Failure / Power Operated Relief Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRITICAL RO CLOSE PORV Block Valve. [Step 2.3.1 RNO - YES]
TASK PLACE 1/1-8000B, PRZR PORV BLK VLV in CLOSE.
[Step 2.3.1 RNO - YES]
PLACE 1-PK-455A, PRZR MASTER PRESS CTRL in MANUAL.
[Step 2.3.2 - YES]
RO ADJUST 1-PK-455A for current RCS pressure. [Step 2.3.3 - YES]
TRANSFER 1/1-PS-455F, PRZR PRESS CTRL CHAN SELECT to an RO Alternate Controlling Channel. [Step 2.3.4 - YES]
PLACE 1-PK-455A, PRZR MASTER PRESS CTRL in AUTO.
[Step 2.3.5 - YES]
VERIFY automatic control restoring Pressurizer pressure to 2235 PSIG.
[Step 2.3.6 - YES]
ENSURE valid channel to recorder 1/1-PS-455G, 1-PR-455 PRZR PRESS RO SELECT. [Step 2.3.7 - YES]
VERIFY 1/1-PCV-456, PRZR PORV failed in mid position.
[Step 2.3.8 - YES]
MAINTAIN 1/1-8000B, PRZR PORV BLK VLV in CLOSE due to PORV in RO mid position. [Step 2.3.9 - YES]
Within one hour, VERIFY PCIP Window 2.6 - PRZR PRESS SI BLK PERM US/RO P DARK. [Step 2.3.10 - YES]
VERIFY other instruments on common instrument line - NORMAL.
US/RO
[Step 2.3.11 - YES]
VERIFY Loop 2 Instruments LT-460 and PT-458 responding normally per Attachment 1.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #2 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 9 of 28 Event
Description:
Pressurizer Pressure Channel Failure / Power Operated Relief Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: The next two (2) steps are only performed following I&C maintenance.
Within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, PERFORM the following: [Step 2.3.12 - YES]
- PLACE 1/1-RBSS, CONTROL ROD BANK SELECT in MANUAL.
[Step 2.3.12.a - YES]
- SELECT the failed channel on following switches: [Step 2.3.12.b - YES]
1-TS-412T, TAVE CHAN DEFEAT 1/1-JS-411E, N16 PWR CHAN DEFEAT
- ENSURE valid N16 channel is supplying recorder: [Step 2.3.12.c - YES]
1/1-TS-411E, 1-TR-411 CHAN SELECT
- CONTACT I&C to place bistable test switches for PT-456 in CLOSE.
[Step 2.3.12.d - YES]
VERIFY appropriate alarms and trip status lights ON per Attachment 4.
[Step 2.3.13 - YES]
OBSERVE TSLB-1, Window 2.7 - PRZR PRESS LO PB-456D is LIT.
OBSERVE TSLB-5, Window 2.2 - PRZR PRESS LO PB-456C is LIT.
OBSERVE TSLB-5, Window 2.3 - PRZR PRESS HI PB-456A is LIT.
OBSERVE TSLB-9, Window 2.3 - PRZR PRESS SI PERM PB-456B is LIT.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #2 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 10 of 28 Event
Description:
Pressurizer Pressure Channel Failure / Power Operated Relief Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
+10 min US EVALUATE Technical Specifications. [Step 2.3.14 - YES]
LCO 3.3.1.E, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation (Function 8.b).
CONDITION E - One channel inoperable.
ACTION E.1 - Place channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, OR ACTION E.2 - Be in MODE 3 within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br />.
LCO 3.3.1.M, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation (Function 8.a).
CONDITION M - One channel inoperable.
ACTION M.1 - Place channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, OR ACTION M.2 - Reduce THERMAL POWER to < P-7 within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br />.
LCO 3.3.2.D, ESFAS Instrumentation (Function 1.d).
CONDITION D - One channel inoperable.
ACTION D.1 - Place channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, OR ACTION D.2.1 - Be in MODE 3 within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br />, AND ACTION D.2.2 - Be in MODE 4 within 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br />.
LCO 3.3.2.L, ESFAS Instrumentation (Function 8.b).
CONDITION L - One or more required channel(s) inoperable.
ACTION L.1 - Verify interlock is in required state for existing unit condition within one hour, OR ACTION L.2.1 - Be in MODE 3 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />, AND ACTION L.2.2 - Be in MODE 4 within 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />.
Booth Operator: When contacted to remove power to 1/1-8000B, PRZR PORV BLK VLV, EXECUTE remote function RCR24 (Key 6), 1/1-8000B to OFF.
LCO 3.4.11.B, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve.
CONDITION B - One PORV inoperable and not capable of being manually cycled.
ACTION B.1 - Close associated block valve within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, AND ACTION B.2 - Remove power from associated block valve within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, AND ACTION B.3 - Restore PORV to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #2 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 11 of 28 Event
Description:
Pressurizer Pressure Channel Failure / Power Operated Relief Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior US INITIATE a work request per STA-606. [Step 2.3.15 - YES]
+10 min US INITIATE a Condition Report per STA-421. [Step 2.3.16 - YES]
When Technical Specifications are addressed, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 2.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #2 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 12 of 28 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Level Channel Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 2 (Key 2).
- RX04B, Steam Generator 1-02 Level Channel (LT-552) fails high.
Indications Available:
8A-2.8 - SG 2 STM & FW FLO MISMATCH 8A-2.12 - SG 2 LVL DEV 1-LI-552, SG 2 LVL (NR) CHAN II indication failed high
+30 sec BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.
BOP RECOGNIZE Steam Generator 1-02 level lowering.
Examiner Note: Steam Generator (SG) Level Channel II failing HIGH will cause the Feedwater Control Valve to CLOSE, thereby lowering SG level. Unit 1 LOW LEVEL REACTOR TRIP is at 38%.
DIRECT performance of ABN-710, Steam Generator Level Instrumentation US Malfunction, Section 2.0.
RECOGNIZE Steam Generator 1-02 Level Channel (LT-552) failed high.
[Step 2.3.1 - YES]
BOP VERIFY controlling level channel - FAILED. [Step 2.3.1 - YES]
CRITICAL TASK Control Steam Generator Level to Avoid RPS or ESFAS Actuation per STATEMENT ABN-710, Steam Generator Level Instrumentation Malfunction.
CRITICAL PLACE 1-FK-520, SG 2 FW FLO CTRL in MANUAL and CONTROL level.
TASK BOP
[Step 2.3.2 - YES]
VERIFY instruments on common instrument line - NORMAL.
[Step 2.3.3 - YES]
VERIFY Loop 2 Instrument LT-502 responding normally per Attachment 1.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #2 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 13 of 28 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Level Channel Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior VERIFY all HI-HI level bistable windows on TSLB-3 for SG 1 DARK.
[Step 2.3.4 - YES]
OBSERVE TSLB-3, Window 1.3 - SG 2 LVL HI-HI LB-529A is DARK.
OBSERVE TSLB-3, Window 3.3 - SG 2 LVL HI-HI LB-528A is DARK.
OBSERVE TSLB-3, Window 4.3 - SG 2 LVL HI-HI LB-527A is DARK.
BOP VERIFY automatic SG level control available: [Step 2.3.5 - YES]
OBSERVE alternate level control channel 1-LI-529A indication NORMAL.
[Step 2.3.5.a - YES]
DETERMINE automatic level control desired by Unit Supervisor.
[Step 2.3.5.b - YES]
BOP SELECT Alternate Channel: [Step 2.3.6 - YES]
PLACE 1-LS-529C, SG 2 LVL CHAN SELECT to the LY-529 position.
BOP VERIFY affected SG conditions for auto level control: [Step 2.3.7 - YES]
OBSERVE Feedwater and Steam Flows - MATCHED.
OBSERVE Steam Generator Level - STABLE AT PROGRAM.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #2 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 14 of 28 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Level Channel Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior PLACE 1-FK-520, SG 2 FW FLO CTRL in AUTO and MONITOR operation.
[Step 2.3.8 - YES]
Examiner Note: The next two (2) steps are performed after I&C troubleshooting is completed.
WITHIN 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, CONTACT I&C to PLACE bistable test switches for Level Channel II in CLOSE per Attachments 2 and 3. [Step 2.3.9 - YES]
VERIFY appropriate alarms and Trip Status Lights LIT per Attachment 3 and NOTE in the Unit Log. [Step 2.3.10 - YES]
OBSERVE TSLB-3, Window 1.3 - SG 2 LVL HI-HI LB-529A is LIT.
OBSERVE TSLB-5, Window 2.5 - SG 2 LVL LO-LO LB-552B is LIT.
US EVALUATE Technical Specifications. [Step 2.3.11 - YES]
LCO 3.3.1.E, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation (Function 14).
CONDITION E - One channel inoperable (Channel 2 LO-LO).
ACTION E.1 - Place channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, OR ACTION E.2 - Be in MODE 3 within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br />.
LCO 3.3.2.D, ESFAS Instrumentation (Functions 6.c).
CONDITION D - One channel inoperable.
ACTION D.1 - Place channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, OR ACTION D.2.1 - Be in MODE 3 within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br />, AND ACTION D.2.2 - Be in MODE 4 within 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br />.
LCO 3.3.2.I, ESFAS Instrumentation (Function 5.b).
CONDITION I - One channel inoperable (Channel 2 HI-HI).
ACTION I.1 - Place channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, OR ACTION I.2 - Be in MODE 3 within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br />.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #2 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 15 of 28 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Level Channel Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior US INITIATE a work request per STA-606. [Step 2.3.12 - YES]
+10 min US INITIATE a Condition Report per STA-421. [Step 2.3.13 - YES]
When Technical Specifications are addressed, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 3.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #2 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 16 of 28 Event
Description:
Reactor Protection System Loop 2 N16 Channel Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 3 (Key 3).
- RP06B, Loop 2 N-16 Channel (1-JI-421A/B) fails low.
Indications Available:
5C-1.3 - PRZR LVL DEV HI 5C-1.5 - ANY N16 DEV HI/LO 5C-3.5 - ANY TAVE DEV HI/LO 6D-1.10 - ANY TAVE TREF DEV 6D-3.13 - TREF-AUCT LO TAVE MISMATCH 6D-4.13 - AUCT TAVE LO 1-JI-421A/B, RC LOOP 2 N16 PWR CHAN II indication failed low 1-TI-421B, RC LOOP 2 OT N16 SETPOINT CHAN II indication reads higher than the others
+30 sec RO RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.
RECOGNIZE Loop 4 N-16 Channel failure at 1-JI-441A/B on CB-05 and/or RO CB-07.
DIRECT performance of ABN-704, Tc / N16 Instrumentation Malfunction, US Section 2.0.
PLACE 1/1-RBSS, CONTROL ROD BANK SELECT in MANUAL.
[Step 2.3.1 - YES]
PLACE 1-TS-412T, TAVE CHAN DEFEAT in LOOP 2 position.
[Step 2.3.2 - YES]
VERIFY Steam Dump System - NOT ACTUATED AND NOT ARMED.
[Step 2.3.3 - YES]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #2 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 17 of 28 Event
Description:
Reactor Protection System Loop 2 N16 Channel Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Using Control Rods, RESTORE TAVE to within 1ºF of TREF.
[Step 2.3.4 - YES]
PLACE 1/1-JS-411E, N16 PWR CHAN DEFEAT in LOOP 2 position.
[Step 2.3.5 - YES]
ENSURE valid N16 Channel supplying recorder on 1/1-TS-411E, 1-TR-411 RO CHAN SELECT. [Step 2.3.6 - YES]
BOP VERIFY Steam Dump System - NOT ARMED. [Step 2.3.7 - YES]
PCIP Window 3.4 - TURB LOAD REJ STM DMP ARMED C-7 is DARK.
BOP VERIFY Steam Dump System - NOT BLOCKED. [Step 2.3.8 - YES]
Examiner Note: The next two (2) steps are performed after I&C troubleshooting is completed.
WITHIN 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, CONTACT I&C to PLACE bistable test switches for LOOP 2 in CLOSE per Attachments 1 and 2. [Step 2.3.9 - YES]
VERIFY appropriate alarms and Trip Status Lights LIT per Attachment 3 and NOTE in the Unit Log. [Step 2.3.10 - YES]
VERIFY TSLB-5, Window 2.8 - RC LOOP 2 OT N16 is LIT.
VERIFY TSLB-9, Window 2.4 - OT N16 ROD STOP & TURB RUNBACK is LIT.
US EVALUATE Technical Specifications. [Step 2.3.11 - YES]
LCO 3.3.1.E, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation (Function 6 & 7).
CONDITION E - One channel inoperable (Channel 2 LO-LO).
ACTION E.1 - Place channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, OR ACTION E.2 - Be in MODE 3 within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br />.
US INITIATE a work request per STA-606. [Step 2.3.12 - YES]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #2 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 18 of 28 Event
Description:
Reactor Protection System Loop 2 N16 Channel Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
+10 min US INITIATE a Condition Report per STA-421. [Step 2.3.13 - YES]
When Technical Specifications are addressed, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 4.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #2 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 4&5 Page 19 of 28 Event
Description:
Main Feedwater Pump Trip / Automatic Turbine Runback Failure / MFWP Recirculation Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 4 (Key 4).
- FW03A, Main Feedwater Pump A trip.
- TC09C, Auto Turbine Runback failure.
Indications Available:
7B-1.12 - FWPT A TRIP 8A-1.8 / 2.8 / 3.8 / 4.8 - SG 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 STM & FW FLO MISMATCH 8A-1.12 / 2.12 / 3.12 / 4.12 - SG 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 LVL DEV (~10 seconds later) 6D-1.9 - ANY TURB RUNBACK EFFECTIVE (when Manual Runback initiated) 6D-1.10 - AVE TAVE-TREF DEV (when Manual Runback initiated) 1-HS-2111, FWPT A TRIP light LIT Steam Dump System Group 1 Valves OPEN Control Rods stepping IN
+30 sec RO/BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.
RECOGNIZE trip of Main Feedwater Pump A with no Automatic Turbine BOP Runback.
DIRECT performance of ABN-302, Feedwater, Condensate, Heater Drain US System Malfunction, Section 2.0.
Examiner Note: Diamond steps () are Initial Operator Actions.
RO/BOP VERIFY automatic plant response. [Step 2.3.1 - NO]
RO - VERIFY Control Rods in - AUTO.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #2 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 4&5 Page 20 of 28 Event
Description:
Main Feedwater Pump Trip / Automatic Turbine Runback Failure / MFWP Recirculation Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP - VERIFY Turbine Runback - IN PROGRESS.
If Turbine Power is > ~700 MWe, PERFORM the following:
RO/BOP
[Step 2.3.1 RNO - YES].
- PLACE 1/1-RBSS, CONTROL ROD BANK SELECT in AUTO.
[Step 2.3.1.a RNO - YES].
- ENSURE Turbine Runback to 700 MWE initiated.
[Step 2.3.1.b RNO - YES].
DEPRESS 700 MWe MANUAL RUNBACK button.
CLICK on 0/1 button.
CLICK on Execute then VERIFY Manual Runback in progress.
Examiner Note: 5 seconds following Main Feedwater Pump A Trip.
- FW06A, Main Feedwater Pump A Recirculation Valve fails open.
Examiner Note: When Main Feedwater Pump (MFWP) A Recirculation Valve fails open, Steam Generator level will lower and an automatic Reactor Trip will occur.
STABILIZE Reactor power using one or more of the following:
RO/BOP
[Step 2.3.2 - YES]
- Control Rods / Steam Dumps / Boration / Turbine Load.
BOP VERIFY Main Feedwater flow to Steam Generators. [Step 2.3.3 - YES]
- VERIFY one Main Feedwater Pump - RUNNING. [Step 2.3.3.a - NO]
- VERIFY Main Feedwater - ALIGNED. [Step 2.3.3.a - NO]
PERFORM the following: [Step 2.3.3.a RNO - YES]
If SG level is lowering in an uncontrolled manner, TRIP the Reactor and GO to EOP-0.0A. [Step 2.3.3.a.1) RNO - YES]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #2 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 4&5 Page 21 of 28 Event
Description:
Main Feedwater Pump Trip / Automatic Turbine Runback Failure / MFWP Recirculation Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior THROTTLE AFW Control Valves to 25%.
[Step 2.3.3.a.2) RNO - YES]
START both Motor Driven AFW Pumps.
[Step 2.3.3.a.3) RNO - YES]
ENSURE Feedwater System Bypass Valves - CLOSED.
[Step 2.3.3.a.4) RNO - YES]
ENSURE Main Feedwater ALIGNED. [Step 2.3.3.a.5) RNO - NO]
ADJUST AFW Flow Control Valves to maintain SG narrow range
+10 min level between 60% and 75%. [Step 2.3.3.a.6) RNO - YES]
When the Reactor is tripped, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Events 6, 7, 8, and 9.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #2 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8, & 9 Page 22 of 28 Event
Description:
Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pump Start Failure / Two Stuck Control Rods / Turbine Driven AFW Pump Steam Supply Valve Failure & Trip / Train A Safeguards Bus Trip and Lockout Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Events 6, 7, 8, and 9.
- RD04K2 / RD04K8, Two (2) Stuck Control Rods.
- FW08B, Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-02 start failure.
- OVRDE, Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Steam Supply Valves fail to AUTO open.
- FW09B, Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump trip.
- ED05H, Train A Bus 1EA1 86-1 trip and lockout (5 minutes post trip).
Indications Available:
Numerous Reactor Trip alarms US DIRECT performance of EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
Examiner Note: The following steps are from EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
RO VERIFY Reactor Trip: [Step 1 - YES]
VERIFY Reactor Trip Breakers - OPEN. [Step 1.a - YES]
VERIFY Neutron flux - DECREASING. [Step 1.a - YES]
VERIFY all Control Rod Position Rod Bottom Lights - ON.
[Step 1.b - NO]
BOP VERIFY Turbine Trip: [Step 2 - YES]
VERIFY all HP Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED. [Step 2 - YES]
BOP VERIFY Power to AC Safeguards Buses: [Step 3 - YES]
VERIFY AC Safeguards Buses - AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED.
[Step 3.a - YES]
VERIFY both AC Safeguards Buses - ENERGIZED. [Step 3.b - YES]
RO CHECK SI status: [Step 4 - YES]
CHECK if SI is actuated. [Step 4.a - NO]
CHECK if SI is required. [Step 4.a RNO - YES]
VERIFY Steam Line Pressure < 610 PSIG. [Step 4.a RNO - NO]
VERIFY Pressurizer Pressure < 1820 PSIG. [Step 4.a RNO - NO]
VERIFY Containment Pressure > 3.0 PSIG. [Step 4.a RNO - NO]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #2 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8, & 9 Page 23 of 28 Event
Description:
Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pump Start Failure / Two Stuck Control Rods / Turbine Driven AFW Pump Steam Supply Valve Failure & Trip / Train A Safeguards Bus Trip and Lockout Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior IF SI is NOT required, GO to EOS-0.1A, Reactor Trip Response, Step 1.
US
[Step 4.a RNO - YES]
Examiner Note: Emergency boration is performed per the Foldout Page of EOP-0.0A using steps outlined in ABN-107, Emergency Boration, Attachment 1.
CRITICAL TASK Initiate Emergency Boration Due to Two (2) Stuck Control Rods Prior to Exiting STATEMENT EOP-0.0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
CRITICAL TASK RO INITIATE Emergency Boration of 3600 gallons of Boric Acid.
ENSURE a Charging Pump is RUNNING. [Step 1 - YES]
START a Boric Acid Transfer Pump: [Step 2 - YES]
PLACE 1/1-APBA1, BA XFER PMP 2 in START.
PLACE 1/1-8104, EMER BORATE VLV in OPEN. [Step 3 - YES]
VERIFY flow on 1-FI-183A, EMER BORATE FLO. [Step 4 - YES]
VERIFY flow on 1-FI-121A, CHRG FLO. [Step 5 - YES]
Examiner Note: The following steps are from EOS-0.1A, Reactor Trip Response.
Examiner Note: Depending on crew response, the RED PATH for Heat Sink will occur at some point early in EOS-0.1A. This condition occurred at Step 3 during validation.
RO CHECK RCS Temperature: [Step 1 - YES]
VERIFY RCS average temperature stable at or trending to 557ºF.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #2 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8, & 9 Page 24 of 28 Event
Description:
Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pump Start Failure / Two Stuck Control Rods / Turbine Driven AFW Pump Steam Supply Valve Failure & Trip / Train A Safeguards Bus Trip and Lockout Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO/BOP CHECK FW Status: [Step 2 - YES]
VERIFY Reactor Trip Breakers - OPEN. [Step 2.a - YES]
CHECK RCS average temperatures < 564ºF. [Step 2.b - NO]
CONTINUE with Step 3. When temperature is less than 564°F PERFORM Steps 2.c & 2.d. [Step 2.b RNO - YES]
VERIFY total AFW flow to SGs - GREATER THAN 460 GPM.
[Step 2.d - YES]
RO CHECK PRZR Level Control: [Step 3 - YES]
VERIFY PRZR Level - GREATER THAN 17%. [Step 3.a - YES]
VERIFY Charging - IN SERVICE. [Step 3.b - YES]
VERIFY Letdown - IN SERVICE. [Step 3.c - YES]
VERIFY PRZR Level - TRENDING TO 25%. [Step 3.d - YES]
RO CHECK PRZR Pressure Control: [Step 4 - YES]
VERIFY Pressurizer Pressure - GREATER THAN 1820 PSIG.
[Step 4.a - YES]
VERIFY Pressurizer Pressure - STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG. [Step 4.b - YES]
RO CHECK Steam Generator Levels: [Step 5 - YES]
VERIFY Steam Generator Level - GREATER THAN 43%.
[Step 5.a - NO]
MAINTAIN total feed flow greater than 460 GPM until narrow range level greater than 43% in at least one SG. [Step 5.a RNO - YES]
VERIFY Pressurizer Pressure - STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG. [Step 4.b - YES]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #2 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8, & 9 Page 25 of 28 Event
Description:
Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pump Start Failure / Two Stuck Control Rods / Turbine Driven AFW Pump Steam Supply Valve Failure & Trip / Train A Safeguards Bus Trip and Lockout Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO VERIFY All AC Buses - ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER: [Step 6 - YES]
Examiner Note: FRH-0.1A, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, steps begin here.
US/BOP CHECK If Secondary Heat Sink Is Required: [Step 1 - YES]
VERIFY RCS pressure -GREATER THAN ANY NON-FAULTED SG PRESSURE. [Step 1.a - YES]
VERIFY RCS temperature > 350ºF. [Step 1.b - YES]
US/RO CHECK CCP Status - BOTH AVAILABLE. [Step 2 - NO]
IMMEDIATELY PERFORM the following: [Step 2 RNO - YES]
CRITICAL TASK Trip Reactor Coolant Pumps Prior to Establishing Bleed and Feed per STATEMENT FRH-0.1A, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.
CRITICAL TASK RO STOP all RCPs. [Step 2.a RNO - YES]
VERIFY power to PRZR PORV Block Valves - AVAILABLE.
[Step 2.b RNO - NO]
Locally RESTORE power to PRZR PORV Block Valves.
[Step 2.b RNO - YES]
GO to Step 12. Observe CAUTION prior to Step 12.
[Step 2.c RNO - YES]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #2 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8, & 9 Page 26 of 28 Event
Description:
Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pump Start Failure / Two Stuck Control Rods / Turbine Driven AFW Pump Steam Supply Valve Failure & Trip / Train A Safeguards Bus Trip and Lockout Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO/BOP Manually ACTUATE Safety Injection. [Step 12 - YES]
RO/BOP VERIFY RCS Feed Path: [Step 13 - YES]
VERIFY at least one (1) CCP and one (1) SI PUMP - RUNNING.
[Step 13.a - YES]
Examiner Note: Attachment 3, ECCS Valve Alignment, valves are in their proper position.
CHECK valve alignment for operating pumps - PROPER EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT PER ATTACHMENT 3. [Step 13.b - YES]
Examiner Note: The following six (6) steps are performed per FRH-0.1A, Attachment 1.D.
RO/BOP [1.D] PLACE Train B DG EMER STOP/START handswitch in START.
[Step 14 - YES]
RO/BOP [1.D] VERIFY SI - RESET. [Step 15 - YES]
RO/BOP [1.D] VERIFY SI Sequencers - RESET. [Step 16- YES]
RO/BOP [1.D] VERIFY Containment Isolation Phase A and Phase B - RESET.
[Step 17- YES]
RO/BOP [1.D] VERIFY Containment Spray Signal - RESET. [Step 18- YES]
Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE remote function EDR74, 1EB4/11D BKR to CLOSE to RESET Instrument Air Compressors 1-02.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #2 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8, & 9 Page 27 of 28 Event
Description:
Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pump Start Failure / Two Stuck Control Rods / Turbine Driven AFW Pump Steam Supply Valve Failure & Trip / Train A Safeguards Bus Trip and Lockout Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO/BOP [1.D] ESTABLISH Instrument Air and Nitrogen to Containment.
[Step 19 - YES]
ESTABLISH Instrument Air: [Step 19.a - YES]
VERIFY Air Compressor - RUNNING. [Step 19.a.1) - NO]
Manually START Air Compressor and align valves.
[Step 19.a.1) RNO - YES]
ESTABLISH Instrument Air to Containment: [Step 19.a.2) - YES]
ESTABLISH Nitrogen: [Step 19.b - YES]
VERIFY ACCUM 14 VENT CTRL, 1-HC-943 - CLOSED.
[Step 19.b.1) - YES]
OPEN SI/PORV ACCCUM N2 ISOL VLV 1/1-8880.
[Step 19.b.2) - YES]
RO/BOP NOTIFY Unit Supervisor Attachment 1.D steps - COMPLETE.
[Step 20 - YES]
CRITICAL TASK Establish Core Cooling via Reactor Coolant System Bleed and Feed per STATEMENT FRH-0.1A, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.
CRITICAL TASK RO ESTABLISH RCS Bleed Path: [Step 20 - YES]
VERIFY power to PRZR PORV Block Valves - AVAILABLE.
[Step 20.a - YES]
VERIFY OPEN 1/1-8000A, PRZR PORV Block Valve. [Step 20.b - YES]
OPEN 1/1-8000B, PRZR PORV Block Valve. [Step 20.b - NO]
OPEN 1-PCV-455A, PRZR PORV. [Step 20.c - YES]
+20 min RO VERIFY Adequate RCS Bleed Path: [Step 21 - YES]
VERIFY both PRZR PORVs - OPEN. [Step 21.a - NO]
OPEN Reactor Vessel Head and Pressurizer Vents.
[Step 21.a RNO - YES]
INSERT key and OPEN 1-HV-3607, RV HEAD VENT VLV.
[Step 21.a RNO - YES]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #2 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8, & 9 Page 28 of 28 Event
Description:
Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pump Start Failure / Two Stuck Control Rods / Turbine Driven AFW Pump Steam Supply Valve Failure & Trip / Train A Safeguards Bus Trip and Lockout Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior INSERT key and OPEN 1-HV-3608, RV HEAD VENT VLV.
[Step 21.a RNO - YES]
INSERT key and OPEN 1-HV-3609, PRZR VENT VLV.
[Step 21.a RNO - YES]
INSERT key and OPEN 1-HV-3610, PRZR VENT VLV.
[Step 21.a RNO - YES]
When an adequate Reactor Coolant System bleed and feed path is aligned, TERMINATE the scenario.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #2 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: CPNPP 1 & 2 Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: June 2012 NRC Examiners: Operators:
Initial Conditions: 100% power MOL - RCS Boron is 908 ppm (by sample).
Turnover: Maintain steady-state power conditions.
Critical Tasks: Close Pressurizer Spray Valve to Maintain RCS Pressure Greater Than Low Pressure Reactor Trip Setpoint Following Entry Into ABN-705, Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction.
Control Steam Generator Level to Avoid RPS or ESFAS Actuation per ABN-709, Feed Header Pressure Instrument Malfunction.
Identify and Isolate Ruptured Steam Generator Prior to Commencing an Operator Induced Cooldown per EOP-3.0A, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.
Initiate Cooldown of Reactor Coolant System Prior to Exiting EOP-3.0A, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.
Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description 1 CV31A C (RO, SRO) Centrifugal Charging Pump (1-01) Sheared Shaft.
+5 min TS (SRO) 2 CH10 C (BOP, SRO) Control Rod Drive Mechanism Ventilation Fan (1-01) Overcurrent
+10 min Trip.
3 RX15A C (RO, SRO) Pressurizer Spray Valve (PCV-455B) Fails 35% Open.
+20 min TS (SRO) 4 RX18 I (BOP, SRO) Main Feedwater Header Pressure Transmitter (PT-508) Fails Low.
+25 min 5 SG01A R (RO) Steam Generator (1-01) Tube Leak at 10 GPM.
+45 min N (BOP, SRO) Rapid Down Power Required.
TS (SRO) 6 SG01A M (RO, BOP, SRO) Steam Generator (1-01) Tube Rupture at 300 GPM (300 second
+50 min ramp).
7 SS02A1 I (BOP) Main Turbine Trip Block Failure.
+50 min SS02A2 TC07C 8 CS02E C (RO) Train A Containment Spray Pumps (1-01 & 1-03) Safety Injection
+55 min CS02G Sequencer Start Failure.
9 OVRDE Main Steam Isolation Valve (HV-2333A) Fails to Auto Close.
+55 min
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Technical Specifications Actual Target Quantitative Attributes 9 Total malfunctions (5-8) 3 Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 4 Abnormal events (2-4) 1 Major transients (1-2) 1 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 0 EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 4 Critical tasks (2-3)
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #3 Rev e.docx
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #3 SCENARIO
SUMMARY
NRC #3 The crew will assume the watch at 100% power with no scheduled activities per IPO-003A, Power Operations. The first event is a sheared shaft of the running Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP). When low flow alarms for Charging and Reactor Coolant Pump seal flow are received, the initial operator actions of ABN-105, Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction, Section 3.0, will be performed (start the standby CCP). Any delay in determining the cause of the low Charging flow will result in the isolation of Letdown which will be restored prior to proceeding. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.
The next event is an overcurrent trip of the running Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) Ventilation Fan. Crew actions are per 1-ALB-3A, Window 2-1, CONTAINMENT FAN MASTER TRIP. The Alarm Light Box (ALB) will direct starting of the standby CRDM Vent Fan.
This event is followed by a Pressurizer Spray Valve that is failed 35% open. The crew enters ABN-705, Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction, Section 3.0, and attempts to close the valve. When this action fails, Pressurizer Heaters are energized and the Driver Card for the failed Spray Valve is pulled to close the valve. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.
When Pressurizer pressure is restored, a Main Feedwater (MFW) Header Pressure Transmitter will fail low. Entry into ABN-709, Feedwater Header Pressure Instrument Malfunction, Section 5.0, is required and the MFW Pump Turbine Master Speed Controller is placed in MANUAL. This controller will remain in MANUAL for the duration of the scenario and require monitoring during the subsequent down power.
When Feedwater Pressure Control is restored, a 10 GPM Steam Generator (SG) Tube Leak will ensue.
The crew will enter ABN-105, High Secondary Activity, Section 3.0, and determine that a Rapid Downpower is required. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications. When power has been reduced 3% to 5%, a 300 GPM Steam Generator Tube Rupture will commence on a 300 second ramp.
When control of the power reduction is no longer feasible, the crew will trip the Reactor, initiate a Safety Injection, and enter EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. While performing the actions of EOP-0.0A, the Main Turbine will fail to trip until the Electro Hydraulic Control Pumps are secured. The crew will transition from EOP-0.0A to EOP-3.0A, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.
The scenario includes Train A Containment Spray Pumps that fail to start upon initiation of the Safety Injection Sequencer and a Main Steam Isolation Valve (HV-2333A) that fails to AUTO Close. This scenario is terminated when the Ruptured Steam Generator is isolated, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) temperature is lowered, and a depressurization of the RCS to the Ruptured Steam Generator pressure is commenced as outlined in EOP-3.0A.
Risk Significance:
Failure of risk important system prior to trip: Loss of Centrifugal Charging Pump Risk significant core damage sequence: Steam Generator Tube Rupture Main Turbine Trip Failure Risk significant operator actions: Close Pressurizer Spray Valve Restore Steam Generator Level Control Identify & Isolate Ruptured SG Cooldown/Depressurize RCS CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #3 Rev e.docx
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #3 BOOTH OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS for SIMULATOR SETUP Initialize to IC #18 and NRC #3 Scenario File.
EVENT TYPE MALF # DESCRIPTION DEMAND INITIATING VALUE PARAMETER SETUP SS02A1 Main Turbine Trip Block Failure ON K0 SS02A2 TC07C CS02E CS Pump (1-01) Auto Start Failure on SI Signal - K0 CS02G CS Pump (1-03) Auto Start Failure on SI Signal - K0 OVRDE MSIV (HV-2333A) Fails to Auto Close - K0 1 CV31A Centrifugal Charging Pump (1-01) Sheared Shaft SHEARED K1 2 CH10 CRDM Ventilation Fan (1-01) Overcurrent Trip TRIP K2 3 RX15A Pressurizer Spray Valve (PCV-455B) Fails Open 35% K3 3 RXR096 PRZR Spray Valve (PCV-455B) Driver Card OUT K6 3 RX15A Pressurizer Spray Valve (PCV-455B) Fails Open DELETE K6 4 RX18 MFW Header Pressure (PT-508) Failure 200 PSIG K4 5 SG01A Steam Generator (1-01) Tube Leak 10 GPM K5 6 SG01A Steam Generator (1-01) Tube Rupture 300 GPM K7 (300 sec. ramp) 7 SS02A1 Main Turbine Trip Block Failure ON K0 SS02A2 TC07C 8 CS02E CS Pump (1-01) Auto Start Failure on SI Signal - K0 8 CS02G CS Pump (1-03) Auto Start Failure on SI Signal - K0 9 OVRDE MSIV (HV-2333A) Fails to AUTO Close - K0 9 DIMSHS2333A MSIV (HS-2333A) Manually Closes - K0 CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #3 Rev e.docx
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #3 Booth Operator: INITIALIZE to IC #18 and NRC #3 Scenario File.
ENSURE all Simulator Annunciator Alarms are ACTIVE.
ENSURE all Control Board Tags are removed.
ENSURE Operator Aid Tags reflect current boron conditions.
ENSURE Rod Bank Update (RBU) is performed.
ENSURE Turbine Load Rate set at 10 MWe/minute.
ENSURE 60/90 buttons DEPRESSED on ASD.
ENSURE ASD speakers are ON at half volume.
ENSURE Reactivity Briefing Sheet printout provided with Turnover.
ENSURE procedures in progress are on SRO desk:
- COPY of IPO-003A, Power Operations, Section 5.5, Operating at Constant Turbine Load.
ENSURE Control Rods are in AUTO with Bank D at 215 steps.
Control Room Annunciators in Alarm:
PCIP-1.1 - SR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.2 - IR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.4 - CNDSR AVAIL STM DMP ARMED C-9 PCIP-1.6 - RX 10% PWR P-10 PCIP-2.1 - SR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.2 - IR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.5 - SR RX TRIP BLK PERM P-6 PCIP-3.2 - PR TRN A LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK PCIP-4.2 - PR TRN B LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #3 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 5 of 34 Event
Description:
Centrifugal Charging Pump Sheared Shaft Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 1 (Key 1).
- CV31A, Centrifugal Charging Pump 1-01 sheared shaft.
Indications Available:
5A-1.6 - ANY RCP SEAL WTR INJ FLO LO 6A-1.4 - REGEN HX LTDN OUT TEMP HI 6A-3.4 - CHG FLO HI / LO 1-FI-121A, CHRG FLO lowers to zero (0) GPM
+1 min RO RESPOND to Annunciator Procedure Alarms.
RECOGNIZE Charging Pump 1-01 sheared shaft due to loss of Charging RO flow.
DIRECT performance of ABN-105, Chemical and Volume Control System US Malfunction, Section 3.0.
Examiner Note: Diamond steps () are Initial Operator Actions.
RO START Centrifugal Charging Pump 1-02. [Step 3.3.1 - YES]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #3 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 6 of 34 Event
Description:
Centrifugal Charging Pump Sheared Shaft Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO VERIFY one Centrifugal Charging Pump - RUNNING. [Step 3.3.2 - YES]
VERIFY Seal Injection Flow to each RCP - BETWEEN 6 GPM AND 13 RO GPM. [Step 3.3.3 - YES]
Booth Operator: When contacted, REPORT motor side of CCP 1 is warm and pump side of CCP 1 is hot.
VERIFY RCP parameters in - NORMAL OPERATING RANGE.
[Step 3.3.4 - YES]
VERIFY PRZR level - GREATER THAN 17% AND RISING.
[Step 3.3.5 - YES]
Examiner Note: ABN-706, Attachment 6 is used in the event Letdown is isolated in Step 1.
Letdown flow is re-established using the Letdown Restoration Job Aid.
When Pressurizer level is greater than 17%, RESTORE Letdown per RO Attachment 6. [Step 3.3.6 RNO - YES/NO]
OPEN or VERIFY OPEN Letdown Isolation Valves 1/1-LCV-460 &
1/1-LCV 459. [Step 1 - YES]
Manually OPEN 1-PK-131, LTDN HX OUT PRESS CTRL to 30% (75 GPM) or 50% (120 GPM) DEMAND. [Step 2 - YES]
Manually OPEN 1-TK-130, LTDN HX OUT TEMP CTRL to 50%
DEMAND. [Step 3 - YES]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #3 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 7 of 34 Event
Description:
Centrifugal Charging Pump Sheared Shaft Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ADJUST Charging to desired flow and MAINTAIN Seal Injection flow between 6 and 13 GPM. [Step 4 - YES]
OPEN selected Orifice Isolation Valves. [Step 5 - YES]
1/1-8149A, LTDWN ORIFICE ISOL VLV (45 GPM) 1/1-8149B, LTDWN ORIFICE ISOL VLV (75 GPM) 1/1-8149C, LTDWN ORIFICE ISOL VLV (75 GPM)
ADJUST 1-PK-131, LTDN HX OUT PRESS CTRL to ~310 psig on 1-PI-131, LTDN HX OUT PRESS then PLACE in AUTO. [Step 6 - YES]
ADJUST 1-TK-130, LTDN HX OUT TEMP CTRL to obtain ~95ºF on 1-TI-130, LTDN HX OUT TEMP, then PLACE in AUTO. [Step 7 - YES]
RO VERIFY RCS leakage - NORMAL: [Step 3.3.7 - YES]
VERIFY PRZR level stable at or trending to program. [Step 3.3.7.a - YES]
VERIFY Charging flow less than 15 GPM above Letdown flow.
[Step 3.3.7.b - YES]
US EVALUATE Technical Specifications. [Step 3.3.8 - YES]
LCO 3.5.2.A, ECCS - Operating.
CONDITION A - One train inoperable because of the inoperability of a centrifugal charging pump.
ACTION A.1 - Restore pump to OPERABLE status within 7 days.
US INITIATE a work request per STA-606. [Step 3.3.9 - YES]
+10 min US INITIATE a Condition Report per STA-421. [Step 3.3.10 - YES]
When Technical Specifications are addressed, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 2.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #3 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 8 of 34 Event
Description:
Control Rod Drive Mechanism Cooling Fan Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 2 (Key 2).
- CH10, Control Rod Drive Mechanism Fan (1-01) trips.
Indications Available:
3A-2.1 - CNTMT FN MASTER TRIP 3A-1.3 - CRDM VENT FN 1 P LO 3A-1.6 - CRDM SHROUD EXH TEMP HI 3B-4.2 - CRDM ANY VENT FAN DISCH TEMP HI (30 seconds later) 1-HS-5421, CRDM VENT FN amber MISMATCH, white TRIP, and green STOP lights LIT
+1 min BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.
BOP RECOGNIZE CRDM Vent Fan 1-01 tripped.
DIRECT performance of ALM-0031A, 1-ALB-3A, Window 1.6 - CRDM US SHROUD EXH TEMP HI.
BOP VERIFY at least one CRDM Vent Fan in service. [Step 1 - NO]
If NO fans are in service, START one CRDM Vent Fan per SOP-801A, BOP Containment Ventilation System. [Step 1.a - YES]
Examiner Note: The following two steps are from SOP-801A, Containment Ventilation System.
PLACE 1-HS-5423, CRDM VENT FN 2 handswitch in START.
[Step G - YES]
BOP MONITOR Containment Radiation levels until they stabilize. [Step I - YES]
Examiner Note: The next steps continue with ALM-0031A, 1-ALB-3A, Window 1.6 - CRDM SHROUD EXH TEMP HI.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #3 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 9 of 34 Event
Description:
Control Rod Drive Mechanism Cooling Fan Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP MONITOR 1-TI-5400A, CNTMT AVE TEMP. [Step 2 - YES]
VERIFY X-TI-6071, CH WTR SPLY HDR TEMP is 45ºF to 55ºF at X-CV-01.
[Step 3 - YES]
ENSURE 1-FI-6081, CNTMT FN CLR CH WTR RET FLO is between 912 BOP and 1008 GPM with any combination of 3 of 4 units in service. [Step 4 - YES]
BOP MONITOR CRDM Shroud exhaust temperature. [Step 5 - YES]
1-TI-5455, CRDM VENT FN 2 DISCH TEMP.
REFER to Technical Specifications LCO 3.6.5, Containment Air US Temperature. [Step 6 - YES]
CORRECT the condition or INITIATE a work request per STA-606.
+5 min US
[Step 7 - YES]
When CRDM cooling is restored, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 3.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #3 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 10 of 34 Event
Description:
Pressurizer Spray Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 3 (Key 3).
- RX15A, Pressurizer Spray Valve (PCV-455B) fails 35% open.
Indications Available:
6C-3.3 - PRZR PRESS LO BACKUP HTRS ON (~2 minutes later) 5B-1.6 - PRZR LO PRESS PORV 456 BLK (~3 minutes later) 5B-2.6 - PRZR LO PRESS PORV 455A BLK (~3 minutes later)
Plant Computer System low Pressurizer Pressure alarms Pressurizer pressure lowering
+2 min RO RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.
RECOGNIZE PZR pressure lowering and DETERMINE PCV-455B, RO Pressurizer Spray Valve malfunction.
DIRECT implementation of ABN-705, Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction, US Section 3.0.
RO CLOSE Pressurizer Spray Valve(s): [Step 3.3.1 - YES]
PLACE PK-455B, RC LOOP 1 PRZR SPR VLV CTRL in MANUAL and CLOSE Spray Valve. [Step 3.3.1 - NO]
DETERMINE Pressurizer Pressure NOT lowering in an uncontrolled manner. [Step 3.3.1.a RNO - YES]
INITIATE load reduction per IPO-003A as directed by Shift Manager.
[Step 3.3.1.b RNO - NO]
ENSURE All Pressurizer Heaters - ON. [Step 3.3.1.c RNO - YES]
Examiner Note: The crew may execute a 50 MWe power reduction (Runback) to restore pressure.
BOP PERFORM the following to INITIATE 50 MWe Turbine Runback:
DEPRESS 50 MWe Manual Runback button.
CLICK on 0/1 button.
CLICK on EXECUTE then VERIFY Runback in progress.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #3 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 11 of 34 Event
Description:
Pressurizer Spray Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When contacted as I&C, WAIT 1 minute then EXECUTE remote function RXR096 (Key 6), to remove 1-PCY-0455B, Pressurizer Pressure Control Driver Card AND REMOVE malfunction RX15A (Key 6).
Close Pressurizer Spray Valve to Maintain RCS Pressure Greater Than Low CRITICAL TASK Pressure Reactor Trip Setpoint Following Entry Into ABN-705, Pressurizer STATEMENT Pressure Malfunction.
CRITICAL CONTACT I&C to deenergize and fail CLOSED Loop 1 Spray Valve TASK RO by removing Controller Driver Card. [Step 3.3.1.d RNO - YES]
ACKNOWLEDGE annunciator 1-ALB-4B, Window 2.6 - CTRL GRP PROC CTRL CAB PWR SPLY FAIL.
RO CHECK PRZR Pressure - STABLE OR RISING. [Step 3.3.2 - YES]
RO VERIFY PRZR Pressure - TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG. [Step 3.3.3 - YES]
Examiner Note: When RCS pressure drops below 2220 PSIG during steady-state conditions, Pressurizer Pressure is less than the limit specified in the COLR.
US EVALUATE Technical Specifications. [Step 3.3.4 - YES]
LCO 3.4.1.A, RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nuclear Boiling (DNB) Limits.
CONDITION A - One or more RCS DNB parameters not within limits.
ACTION A.1 - Restore RCS DNB parameter(s) to within limit in 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
US INITIATE a work request per STA-606. [Step 3.3.5 - YES]
+10 min US INITIATE a Condition Report per STA-421. [Step 3.3.6 - YES]
When Technical Specifications are referenced, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 4.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #3 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 12 of 34 Event
Description:
Feed Header Pressure Transmitter Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 4 (Key 4).
- RX18, Feed Header Pressure Transmitter (PT-508) fails low.
Indications Available:
Plant Computer Alarm for low Feed Header pressure 1-PI-508, FWP DISCH HDR PRESS indication fails low
+1 min BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.
BOP RECOGNIZE Feed Header Pressure 1-PT-508 transmitter failure.
Examiner Note: Feed header pressure failing low will cause Feedwater Pump speed to rise.
The Main Feedwater Pump Master Speed Controller will remain in MANUAL for the subsequent down power during Event 5.
DIRECT performance of ABN-709, Steam Line Pressure, Steam Header US Pressure, Turbine 1st Stage Pressure, and Feed Header Pressure Instrument Malfunction, Section 5.0.
CRITICAL TASK Control Steam Generator Level to Avoid RPS or ESFAS Actuation per STATEMENT ABN-709, Feed Header Pressure Instrument Malfunction.
CRITICAL PLACE 1-SK-509A, FWPT Master Speed Controller in MANUAL.
TASK BOP
[Step 5.3.1 - YES]
ADJUST 1-SK-509A, FWPT Master Speed Controller to MAINTAIN P BOP between FWP Discharge Pressure and Steam Line Pressure.
[Step 5.3.2 - YES]
From 20% to 100% power, RAMP P from 80 PSIG to 170 PSIG.
[Step 5.3.2 - YES]
US INITIATE a Condition Report per STA-421. [Step 5.3.3 - YES]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #3 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 13 of 34 Event
Description:
Feed Header Pressure Transmitter Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
+5 min US INITIATE a work request per STA-606. [Step 5.3.4. - YES]
When control of Feedwater is restored, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 5.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #3 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 14 of 34 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 5 (Key 5).
- SG01A, Steam Generator 1-01 Tube Leak at 10 GPM.
Indications Available:
PC MSL-178 (1-RE-2325) is RED PC N16-174 MSL #1 (1-RE-2325A) is RED PC COG-182 (1-RE-2959) is RED (Condenser Off Gas is delayed)
+1 min RO/BOP RESPOND to PC-11, Digital Radiation Monitoring System alarms.
RO/BOP RECOGNIZE radiation monitor alarms associated with Steam Generator 1-01.
US DIRECT performance of ABN-106, High Secondary Activity, Section 3.0.
DETERMINE Main Steam Line 1-01 radiation alarm 1-RE-2325 is RED on RO/BOP PC-11. [Step 3.3.1 - YES]
REDUCE power to 50% in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> AND be in MODE 3 in the next 2 US hours. [Step 3.3.1.a RNO - YES]
US GO to Step 5.b. [Step 3.3.1.b RNO - YES]
Examiner Note: Crew may implement Reactivity Briefing Sheet for a Rapid Plant Shutdown within one (1) hour. This guidance includes a boration of ~ 650 gallons at ~20 GPM and a Main Turbine load reduction to 200 MWe at ~20 MWe/min.
VERIFY PRZR level - STABLE OR TRENDING TO NORMAL LEVEL.
[Step 3.3.5.b - YES]
VERIFY Condenser off Gas Radiation Monitor OR Main Steam Line Leak US Rate Radiation Monitor on Affected Steam Generator - OPERABLE.
[Step 3.3.6 - YES]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #3 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 15 of 34 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior US DIRECT Chemistry to implement CHM-113. [Step 3.3.7 - YES]
ADJUST Steam Generator 1-01 Atmospheric Relief Controller setpoint to BOP 1160 PSIG per TDM-501A. [Step 3.3.8 - YES]
BOP VERIFY Affected Steam Generator - SG 1-01. [Step 3.3.9 - YES]
PLACE 1-HV-2452-2, TDAFW Pump Steam Supply Valve from SG 1-01 in PULLOUT. [Step 3.3.9.a - YES]
+10 min US EVALUATE Technical Specifications. [Step 3.3.9.b - YES]
LCO 3.7.5.A, Auxiliary Feedwater System CONDITION A - One steam supply to turbine driven AFW pump inoperable.
ACTION A.1 - Restore steam supply to OPERABLE status within 7 days.
LCO 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage CONDITION B - Primary to secondary LEAKAGE not within limits.
ACTION B.1 - Be in MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
ACTION B.2 - Be in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
Examiner Note: The following steps are from IPO-003A, Power Operations, Section 5.6, Reducing Turbine Power from 100% to MODE 3.
DIRECT load reduction to 200 MWe per IPO-003A, Power Operations, US Section 5.6, Reducing Turbine Power from 100% to MODE 3.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #3 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 16 of 34 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CONTACT Chemistry and place specified demineralizers in-service.
[Step 5.6.1 - YES]
RO NOTIFY QSC Generation Controller prior to reducing load. [Step 5.6.2 - YES]
NOTIFY Chemistry and Radiation Protection that power will be lowered RO 15% within a one hour period. [Step 5.6.3 - YES]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #3 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 17 of 34 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior PERFORM the following to reduce Turbine Load to ~200MWe:
[Step 5.6.4 - YES]
DETERMINE the amount of Boration required to reduce Reactor Power to 200 MWe (~15% power). [Step 5.6.4.A - YES]
If desired, DETERMINE the rate of Boration required to allow slow Control RO Rod inward motion as Turbine load lowers. [Step 5.6.4.B - NO]
REFER to Attachment 2 for guidance in controlling AFD during power ramp.
[Step 5.6.4.C - YES]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #3 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 18 of 34 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior INITIATE RCS boration per SOP-104A, Reactor Make-up and Chemical RO Control System. [Step 5.6.4.D - YES]
Examiner Note: The following steps are from SOP-104A, Reactor Make-up and Chemical Control System, Section 5.1.2, Borate Mode.
RO PERFORM the following to COMMENCE RCS boration:
ENSURE Prerequisites of Section 2.1 and 2.2 or met.
[Step 5.1.2.A - YES]
ENSURE 1/1-MU, RCS MU MAN ACT is in STOP.
[Step 5.1.2.B - YES]
PLACE 43/1-MU, RCS MU MODE SELECT in BORATE.
[Step 5.1.2.C - YES]
SET 1-FK-110, BA BLNDR FLO CTRL to 5.3 pot setting for ~20 GPM.
[Step 5.1.2.D - YES]
SET 1-FY-110B, BA BATCH FLO counter for ~650 gallons.
[Step 5.1.2.E - YES]
ENSURE 1/1-FCV-110A, BA BLNDR FLO CTRL VLV in AUTO.
[Step 5.1.2.F - AS IS]
PLACE 1/1-MU, RCS MU MAN ACT in START. [Step 5.1.2.G - YES]
VERIFY 1/1-APBA1, BA XFR PMP 1 STARTS.
[Step 5.1.2.H - YES]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #3 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 19 of 34 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior VERIFY 1/1-FCV-110A, BA BLNDR FLO CTRL VLV throttles to 20 GPM.
[Step 5.1.2.I - YES]
VERIFY 1/1-FCV-110B, RCS MU TO CHG PMP SUCT ISOL VLV OPEN. [Step 5.1.2.I - YES]
VERIFY 1-FY-110B, BA BATCH FLO counter operating properly.
[Step 5.1.2.J - YES]
VERIFY 1-FR-110, BA BATCH FLO TO BLNDR red pen operating properly. [Step 5.1.2.J - YES]
OPERATE 1/1-LCV-112A, VCT LVL CTRL VLV as necessary to maintain proper VCT level. [Step 5.1.2.K - YES]
When desired amount of boric acid is added, PLACE 1/1-MU, RCS MU MAN ACT in STOP. [Step 5.1.2.L - N/A]
Examiner Note: The following steps continue from IPO-003A, Power Operations, Section 5.6.
SET Turbine Load Rate Setpoint Controller to ~20 MWe/min.
[Step 5.6.4.E - YES]
OPEN Load Rate Setpoint OSD.
SELECT blue bar and ENTER 20 MWe/min.
CLOSE Load Rate Setpoint OSD.
BOP SET Turbine Load Target to 200 MWe. [Step 5.6.4.F - YES]
OPEN Load Target OSD.
SELECT blue bar and ENTER 200 MWe.
DEPRESS Accept then VERIFY value in blue bar is desired Load Target (magnitude and direction).
DEPRESS Execute then VERIFY Load Target changes to desired load.
CLOSE Load Target OSD.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #3 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 20 of 34 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
+20 min CREW MONITOR load change.
When power has been reduced 3% to 5%, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Events 6, 7, 8, and 9.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #3 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, 8, & 9 Page 21 of 34 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture / Main Turbine Trip Block Failure / Containment Spray Pump Safety Injection Sequencer Failure / Main Steam Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Events 6, 7, 8, and 9.
- SG01A, SG 1-01 Tube Rupture at 300 GPM on 300 second ramp (Key 7).
- SS02A1 / SS02A2, Main Turbine Trip Block failure.
- CS02E, Containment Spray Pump 1-01 SI Sequencer start failure.
- CS02G, Containment Spray Pump 1-03 SI Sequencer start failure.
- TC07 Turbine Fails to Trip (Auto and Pushbutton)
- OVRDE, Main Steam Isolation Valve (HV-2333A) fails to AUTO close.
Indications Available:
6A-3.4 - CHRG FLO HI / LO 5C-1.2 - PRZR LVL DEV LO 5C-3.3 - PRZR PRESS LO BACKUP HTRS ON PC MSL-178 (1-RE-2325) is RED Main Steam Line Radiation level rising Pressurizer pressure lowering Examiner Note: The Main Steam Isolation Valve (HV-2333A) failure is required in the event the Main Turbine is not tripped in a timely manner. This prevents an AUTO closure on a Main Steam Isolation Signal.
+2 min RO/BOP RECOGNIZE Pressurizer level and pressure LOWERING at a rising rate.
RECOGNIZE PRZR pressure decreasing with Steam Line Radiation RO/BOP Monitors in alarm and steam / feed mismatch.
RO Manually INITIATE a Reactor Trip.
PLACE 1/1-RTC, RX TRIP Switch in TRIP.
US DIRECT performance of EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
RO VERIFY Reactor Trip: [Step 1 - YES]
VERIFY Reactor Trip Breakers - OPEN. [Step 1.a - YES]
VERIFY Neutron flux - DECREASING. [Step 1.a - YES]
VERIFY all Control Rod Position Rod Bottom Lights - ON.
[Step 1.b - YES]
BOP VERIFY Turbine Trip: [Step 2 - YES]
VERIFY all HP Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED. [Step 2 - NO]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #3 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, 8, & 9 Page 22 of 34 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture / Main Turbine Trip Block Failure / Containment Spray Pump Safety Injection Sequencer Failure / Main Steam Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Manually TRIP Turbine. [Step 2 RNO - YES]
If Turbine will NOT trip, PULLOUT all EHC Fluid Pumps.
[Step 2 RNO - YES]
BOP VERIFY Power to AC Safeguards Buses: [Step 3 - YES]
VERIFY AC Safeguards Buses - AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED.
[Step 3.a - YES]
VERIFY both AC Safeguards Buses - ENERGIZED. [Step 3.b - YES]
RO CHECK SI status: [Step 4 - YES]
RO CHECK if SI is actuated. [Step 4.a - NO]
RO CHECK if SI is required. [Step 4.a RNO - YES]
VERIFY Steam Line Pressure < 610 PSIG. [Step 4.a RNO - NO]
VERIFY Pressurizer Pressure < 1820 PSIG. [Step 4.a RNO - YES]
VERIFY Containment Pressure > 3.0 PSIG. [Step 4.a RNO - NO]
PLACE 1/1-SIA2, SI MAN ACT Switch to ACT position at CB-07 and RO DETERMINE SI has actuated. [Step 4.a RNO - YES]
RO VERIFY Both Trains SI Actuated: [Step 4.b - YES]
RO SI Actuated blue status light - ON NOT FLASHING.
Examiner Note: EOP-0.0A, Attachment 2 steps performed by the BOP are identified later in the scenario.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #3 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, 8, & 9 Page 23 of 34 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture / Main Turbine Trip Block Failure / Containment Spray Pump Safety Injection Sequencer Failure / Main Steam Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior INITIATE Proper Safeguards Equipment Operation Per Attachment 2.
US/BOP
[Step 5 - YES]
RO VERIFY AFW Alignment: [Step 6 - YES]
VERIFY both MDAFW Pumps - RUNNING. [Step 6.a - YES]
PLACE TDAFW Pump in PULLOUT per Foldout Page. [Step 6.b - YES]
VERIFY AFW total flow - GREATER THAN 460 GPM. [Step 6.c - YES]
VERIFY AFW valve alignment - PROPER ALIGNMENT. [Step 6.d - YES]
RO DETERMINE Containment Spray NOT Required: [Step 7 - YES]
VERIFY 1-ALB-2B, Window 1-8, CS ACT - NOT ILLUMINATED.
[Step 7.a - YES]
VERIFY 1-ALB-2B, Window 4-11, CNTMT ISOL PHASE B ACT - NOT ILLUMINATED. [Step 7.a - YES]
VERIFY Containment pressure - LESS THAN 18.0 PSIG.
[Step 7.a - YES]
VERIFY Containment Spray Heat Exchanger Outlet Valves - CLOSED.
[Step 7.b - YES]
VERIFY Containment Spray Pumps - RUNNING. [Step 7.c - NO]
RO START Containment Spray Pumps 1-01 and 1-03.
[Step 7.c RNO - YES]
RO CHECK if Main Steam lines should be ISOLATED: [Step 8 - YES]
VERIFY Containment pressure - GREATER THAN 6.0 PSIG.
[Step 8.a - NO]
VERIFY Steam Line pressure - LESS THAN 610 PSIG. [Step 8.a - NO]
GO to Step 9. [Step 8.a RNO - YES]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #3 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, 8, & 9 Page 24 of 34 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture / Main Turbine Trip Block Failure / Containment Spray Pump Safety Injection Sequencer Failure / Main Steam Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior VERIFY RCS Average Temperature - STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 557°F. [Step 9 - YES]
RO CHECK PRZR Valve Status: [Step 10 - YES]
VERIFY PRZR Safeties - CLOSED. [Step 10.a - YES]
VERIFY Normal PRZR Spray Valves - CLOSED. [Step 10.b - YES]
VERIFY PORVs - CLOSED. [Step 10.c - YES]
VERIFY Power to at least 1 Block Valve - AVAILABLE. [Step 10.d - YES]
VERIFY Block Valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN. [Step 10.e - YES]
RO CHECK If RCPs Should Be Stopped: [Step 11 - YES]
VERIFY RCS subcooling - LESS THAN 25°F (55°F FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT). [Step 11.a - NO]
GO to Step 12. [Step 11.a RNO - YES]
US/RO CHECK if any SG is Faulted: [Step 12 - YES]
VERIFY any Steam Generator pressure - DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER. [Step 12.a - NO]
VERIFY any Steam Generator pressure - COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED. [Step 12.a - NO]
GO to Step 13. [Step 12.a RNO - YES]
+15 min US/RO CHECK if SG Tubes are Not Ruptured: [Step 13 - YES]
DETERMINE SG 1-01 is ruptured and TRANSITION to EOP-3.0A, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, Step 1. [Step 13 RNO - YES]
Examiner Note: EOP-3.0A, Steam Generator Tube Rupture steps begin here.
US/RO CHECK If RCPs Should Be Stopped: [Step 1 - YES]
VERIFY RCS subcooling - LESS THAN 25°F. [Step 1.a - NO]
GO to Step 12. [Step 1.a RNO - YES]
US/BOP IDENTIFY Steam Generator 1-01 as ruptured. [Step 2 - YES]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #3 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, 8, & 9 Page 25 of 34 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture / Main Turbine Trip Block Failure / Containment Spray Pump Safety Injection Sequencer Failure / Main Steam Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior OBSERVE rise in Steam Generator 1-01 narrow range level.
OBSERVE high radiation from Steam Generator 1-01 Main Steam Line.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #3 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, 8, & 9 Page 26 of 34 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture / Main Turbine Trip Block Failure / Containment Spray Pump Safety Injection Sequencer Failure / Main Steam Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRITICAL TASK Identify and Isolate the Ruptured Steam Generator Prior to Commencing an STATEMENT Operator Induced Cooldown per EOP-3.0A, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.
CRITICAL TASK RO/BOP ISOLATE flow from Ruptured Steam Generator 1-01: [Step 3 - YES]
ADJUST SG 1-01 Atmospheric Controller Setpoint to 1160 PSIG.
[Step 3.a - DONE]
CHECK SG 1-01 Atmospheric Relief Valve - CLOSED.
[Step 3.b - YES]
CLOSE SG 1-01 Main Steam Line Isolation Valve. [Step 3.c - YES]
CLOSE SG 1-01 Drip Pot Isolation Valves. [Step 3.c - YES]
VERIFY 1-HS-2452-2, SG 1-01 TDAFW Pump Steam Supply Valve -
CLOSED. [Step 3.d - YES]
CLOSE SG 1-01 Blowdown Valves. [Step 3.e - DONE]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #3 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, 8, & 9 Page 27 of 34 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture / Main Turbine Trip Block Failure / Containment Spray Pump Safety Injection Sequencer Failure / Main Steam Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO/BOP CHECK Ruptured SG 1-01 Level: [Step 4 - YES]
VERIFY narrow range level - GREATER THAN 43%. [Step 4.a - YES]
STOP AFW flow to SG 1-01. [Step 4.b - YES]
CLOSE 1-FK-2453A, MD AFW 1 SG 1 FLO CTRL. [Step 4.b - YES]
RO/BOP CHECK SG 1-01 Pressure - GREATER THAN 420 PSIG. [Step 5 - YES]
CRITICAL TASK Initiate Cooldown of the Reactor Coolant System Prior to Exiting EOP-3.0A, STATEMENT Steam Generator Tube Rupture.
CRITICAL TASK RO/BOP INITIATE RCS Cooldown using Steam Dump Valves. [Step 6 - YES]
When PRZR pressure decreases to less than 1960 psig, BLOCK the Low RO/BOP Steam Line Pressure SI Signal. [Step 6.a - YES]
PLACE 1/1-SLS-1RBA and 1/1-SLS-1RBB, Main Steam Line Isolation Safety Injection Reset / Block in BLOCK position.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #3 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, 8, & 9 Page 28 of 34 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture / Main Turbine Trip Block Failure / Containment Spray Pump Safety Injection Sequencer Failure / Main Steam Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior DETERMINE required Core Exit Thermocouple (CET) temperature from US Table 1. [Step 6.b - YES]
OBSERVED Steam Generator pressure = _____ PSIG TARGET Core Exit Thermocouple (CET) temperature = _____ ºF DUMP steam to Condenser from intact SG(s) at maximum rate and avoid BOP Main Steam Isolation. [Step 6.c. - YES]
TRANSFER Steam Dump to Steam Pressure Mode. [Step 6.c.1) - YES]
PLACE Steam Pressure Controller in MANUAL and RAISE demand.
[Step 6.c.2) - YES]
When P-12 (553°F TAVE) is reached, SELECT Bypass Interlock on Steam Dumps and continue cooldown. [Step 6.c.3) - YES]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #3 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, 8, & 9 Page 29 of 34 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture / Main Turbine Trip Block Failure / Containment Spray Pump Safety Injection Sequencer Failure / Main Steam Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior US/RO VERIFY Core Exit Thermocouples - LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE. [Step 6.d - YES]
BOP STOP RCS cooldown. [Step 6.e - YES]
RO/BOP MAINTAIN Core Exit Thermocouples - LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE. [Step 6.f - YES]
Examiner Note: Steam Generator levels may be controlled between 50% and 60% per EOP operating practices (should ADVERSE Containment conditions occur).
+30 min RO/BOP CHECK Intact SG Levels: [Step 7 - YES]
VERIFY Narrow Range Level - GREATER THAN 43% (50% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT). [Step 7.a - YES]
CONTROL AFW flow to maintain level between 43% and 60%.
[Step 7.b - YES]
When the Steam Generator is isolated and required CET temperature is approached, TERMINATE the scenario.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #3 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, 8, & 9 Page 30 of 34 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture / Main Turbine Trip Block Failure / Containment Spray Pump Safety Injection Sequencer Failure / Main Steam Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: These steps are performed by the BOP per EOP-0.0A, Attachment 2.
BOP VERIFY SSW Alignment: [Step 1 - YES]
VERIFY SSW Pumps - RUNNING. [Step 1.a - YES]
VERIFY EDG Cooler SSW return flow. [Step 1.b - YES]
BOP VERIFY Safety Injection Pumps - RUNNING. [Step 2 - YES]
BOP VERIFY Containment Isolation Phase A - APPROPRIATE MLB LIGHT INDICATION (RED WINDOWS). [Step 3 - YES]
BOP VERIFY Containment Ventilation Isolation - APPROPRIATE MLB LIGHT INDICATION (GREEN WINDOWS). [Step 4 - YES]
BOP VERIFY CCW Pumps - RUNNING. [Step 5 - YES]
BOP VERIFY RHR Pumps - RUNNING. [Step 6 - YES]
BOP VERIFY Proper CVCS Alignment: [Step 7 - YES]
VERIFY Train B CCP - RUNNING. [Step 7.a - YES]
VERIFY Letdown Relief Valve Isolation: [Step 7.b - YES]
Letdown Orifice Isolation Valves - CLOSED. [Step 7.b.1) - YES]
Letdown Isolation Valves 1/1-LCV-459 & 1/1-LCV-460 - CLOSED.
[Step 7.b.2) - YES]
BOP VERIFY ECCS flow: [Step 8 - YES]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #3 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, 8, & 9 Page 31 of 34 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture / Main Turbine Trip Block Failure / Containment Spray Pump Safety Injection Sequencer Failure / Main Steam Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CCP SI flow indicator - CHECK FOR FLOW. [Step 8.a - YES]
RCS pressure - LESS THAN 1700 PSIG (1800 PSIG FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT). [Step 8.b - YES]
SIP discharge flow indicator - CHECK FOR FLOW. [Step 8.c - YES]
RCS pressure - LESS THAN 325 PSIG (425 PSIG FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT). [Step 8.d - NO]
GO to Step 9. [Step 8.d RNO - YES]
BOP VERIFY Feedwater Isolation Complete: [Step 9 - YES]
Feedwater Isolation Valves - CLOSED.
Feedwater Isolation Bypass Valves - CLOSED.
Feedwater Bypass Control Valves - CLOSED.
Feedwater Control Valves - CLOSED.
BOP VERIFY Diesel Generators - RUNNING. [Step 10 - YES]
BOP VERIFY Monitor Lights for SI Load Shedding on 1-MLB-9 and 1-MLB10 -
LIT. [Step 11 - YES]
BOP VERIFY Proper SI alignment - PROPER MLB LIGHT INDICATION.
[Step 12 - YES]
BOP INITIATE periodic monitoring of Spent Fuel Cooling. [Step 13 - YES]
Spent Fuel Pool temperature (T2900A, T2901A).
Spent Fuel Pool level (L4800A, L4801A, L4802A, L4803A).
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #3 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, 8, & 9 Page 32 of 34 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture / Main Turbine Trip Block Failure / Containment Spray Pump Safety Injection Sequencer Failure / Main Steam Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP VERIFY Components on Table 1 are Properly Aligned. [Step 14 - YES]
Location Equipment Description Condition CB-03 X-HS-5534 H2 PRG SPLY FN 4 STOPPED CB-03 X-HS-5532 H2 PRG SPLY FN 3 STOPPED CB-04 1/1-8716A RHRP 1 XTIE VLV OPEN CB-04 1/1-8716B RHRP 2 XTIE VLV OPEN CB-06 1/1-8153 XS LTDN ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-06 1/1-8154 XS LTDN ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-07 1/1-RTBAL RX TRIP BKR OPEN CB-07 1/1-RTBBL RX TRIP BKR OPEN CB-07 1/1-BBAL RX TRIP BYP BKR OPEN/DEENERGIZED CB-07 1/1-BBBL RX TRIP BYP BKR OPEN/DEENERGIZED CB-08 1-HS-2397A SG 1 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-08 1-HS-2398A SG 2 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-08 1-HS-2399A SG 3 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-08 1-HS-2400A SG 4 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-08 1-HS-2111C FWPT A TRIP TRIPPED CB-08 1-HS-2112C FWPT B TRIP TRIPPED CB-09 1-HS-2490 CNDS XFER PUMP STOPPED (MCC deenergized on SI)
CV-01 X-HS-6181 PRI PLT SPLY FN 17 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6188 PRI PLT SPLY FN 18 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6195 PRI PLT SPLY FN 19 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #3 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, 8, & 9 Page 33 of 34 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture / Main Turbine Trip Block Failure / Containment Spray Pump Safety Injection Sequencer Failure / Main Steam Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CV-01 X-HS-6202 PRI PLT SPLY FN 20 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6209 PRI PLT SPLY FN 21 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6216 PRI PLT SPLY FN 22 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6223 PRI PLT SPLY FN 23 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6230 PRI PLT SPLY FN 24 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-3631 UPS & DISTR RM A/C FN 1 & STARTED BSTR FN 42 CV-01 X-HS-3632 UPS & DISTR RM A/C FN 2 & STARTED BSTR FN 43 CV-01 1-HS-5600 ELEC AREA EXH FN 1 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 1-HS-5601 ELEC AREA EXH FN 2 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 1-HS-5602 MS & FW PIPE AREA EXH STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 3 & EXH DMPR CV-01 1-HS-5603 MS & FW PIPE AREA EXH STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 4 & EXH DMPR CV-01 1-HS-5618 MS & FW PIPE AREA SPLY STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 17 CV-01 1-HS-5620 MS & FW PIPE AREA SPLY STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 18 CV-03 X-HS-5855 CR EXH FN 1 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5856 CR EXH FN 2 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5731 SFP EXH FN 33 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5733 SFP EXH FN 34 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5727 SFP EXH FN 35 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5729 SFP EXH FN 36 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED Examiner Note: The next four (4) steps would be performed on Unit 2.
CB-03 2-HS-5538 AIR PRG EXH ISOL DMPR CLOSED CB-03 2-HS-5539 AIR PRG EXH ISOL DMPR CLOSED CB-03 2-HS-5537 AIR PRG SPLY ISOL DMPR CLOSED CB-03 2-HS-5536 AIR PRG SPLY ISOL DMPR CLOSED CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #3 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, 8, & 9 Page 34 of 34 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture / Main Turbine Trip Block Failure / Containment Spray Pump Safety Injection Sequencer Failure / Main Steam Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP NOTIFY Unit Supervisor attachment instructions complete AND to IMPLEMENT FRGs as required. [Step 14 - YES]
EOP-0.0A, Attachment 2 steps are now complete.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #3 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: CPNPP 1 & 2 Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.: June 2012 NRC Examiners: Operators:
Initial Conditions: ~3% power BOL - RCS Boron is 1659 ppm by Chemistry sample. Steam Dump System in service for Reactor Coolant System Temperature Control.
Turnover: Restore Accumulator 1-01 level prior to MODE 1 entry then raise Reactor Power from 3% to 8% in preparation for Turbine Startup.
Critical Tasks:
- Manually Initiate Train A Safety Injection Signal Prior to Exiting EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
- Manually Initiate Train A Containment Spray Flow Prior to Exiting EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
- Identify and Isolate the Faulted Steam Generator Prior to Exiting EOP-2.0A, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.
Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description 1 N (BOP, SRO) Raise Safety Injection Accumulator (1-01) Level Prior to MODE 1
+10 min Entry per SOP-202A, Safety Injection Accumulators.
2 R (RO) Raise Power to 6% to 8% in Preparation for Synchronizing Main
+30 min N (BOP, SRO) Generator to Electrical Grid.
3 RX05A I (RO, SRO) Pressurizer Level Channel (LT-459) Fails High.
+40 min 4 MS13B I (BOP, SRO) Steam Generator (1-02) Atmospheric Relief Valve (HV-2326) Fails
+45 min Open due to Steam Pressure Transmitter (PT-2326) Failure.
5 SW01B C (BOP, SRO) Station Service Water Pump 1-02 Trip.
+50 min TS (SRO) 6 RP17D TS (SRO) Containment Pressure Transmitter (PT-937) Fails High.
+55 min 7 MS01C M (RO, BOP, SRO) Faulted Steam Generator (1-03) Inside Containment @ 2.0 ft2
+58 min (180 second ramp).
8 ED05F C (BOP) Safeguards Bus 1EA2 86-2 Trip and Lockout on Reactor Trip.
+58 min 9 RP07A C (RO) Train A Safety Injection Fails to Automatically Actuate.
+58 min 10 CS07A C (RO) Train A Containment Spray Isolation Valve (HV-4776) Fails to
+60 min Open.
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Technical Specifications CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #4 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Actual Target Quantitative Attributes 8 Total malfunctions (5-8) 3 Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 3 Abnormal events (2-4) 1 Major transients (1-2) 2 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 0 EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 3 Critical tasks (2-3)
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #4 Rev e.docx
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #4 SCENARIO
SUMMARY
NRC #4 The crew will assume the watch with power at approximately 3% per IPO-003A, Power Operations.
With Safety Injection Pump 1-01 running in the recirculation mode per SOP-201A, Safety Injection System, raise Safety Injection Accumulator (1-01) level prior to MODE 1 entry per SOP-202A, Safety Injection Accumulators. When Accumulator level is within specification, the crew will continue with IPO-003A, Section 5.1, Warmup and Synchronization of the Turbine Generator, Step 5.1.16, and perform a power ascension using the Rod Control and Steam Dump Systems.
When power has been raised 3% to 5%, a Pressurizer Level Channel will fail high. Response is per ABN-706, Pressurizer Level Instrumentation Malfunction, Section 2.0, and requires MANUAL control of either the Pressurizer Level Controller or the Charging Flow Controller. If response to this channel failure is not timely, Letdown will isolate. Once an Alternate Channel is selected, Pressurizer Level is restored to AUTO operation.
The next event is caused by a Main Steam Line Pressure Instrument that fails high and opens its associated Steam Generator Atmospheric Relief Valve. Actions are per ABN-709, Steam Line Pressure Instrument Malfunction, Section 2.0, and requires taking MANUAL control of the Atmospheric Relief Valve and closing the valve.
When conditions are stable, Station Service Water Pump 1-02 will trip. The crew will enter ABN-501, Station Service Water System Malfunction, Section 2.0. Initial operator actions include placing the Train A Emergency Diesel Generator in PULLOUT. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.
The next event is a Containment Pressure Transmitter failure. Actions are per ALM-0022A, 1-ALB-2B, Window 3.10 - CNTMT 1 OF 4 PRESS HI-3. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.
A Faulted Steam Generator is the major event, and a manual Reactor Trip and Safety Injection should be performed per EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a transition to EOP-2.0, Faulted Steam Generator. When EOP-0.0A, Attachment 2, Safety Injection Actuation Alignment, actions are complete, the SRO may transition to FRZ-0.1A, Response to High Containment Pressure, if an Orange Path exists at that time. With Containment pressure remaining less than 50 PSIG, the Response Not Obtained actions of FRZ-0.1A, Step 1, will return the crew to the Procedure and Step in effect.
This event is complicated by a trip and lockout of the Train B 6900 Volt Safeguards Bus, Train A Safety Injection Actuation failure, and a Train A Containment Spray System (CSS) Isolation Valve that does not open. These conditions reduce the event success path to single Train A operation.
When the Faulted Steam Generator is isolated, the crew will transition from EOP-2.0A to EOS-1.1A, Safety Injection Termination.
Risk Significance:
- Failure of risk important system prior to trip: Station Service Water Pump Trip
- Risk significant core damage sequence: Faulted Steam Generator Containment Spray Flow Failure
- Risk significant operator actions: Manually Initiate Train A Safety Injection Manually Open CSS Isolation Valve Identify and Isolate Faulted SG CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #4 Rev e.docx
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #4 BOOTH OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS for SIMULATOR SETUP Initialize to IC #34 and NRC #4 Scenario File.
EVENT TYPE MALF # DESCRIPTION DEMAND INITIATING VALUE PARAMETER SETUP ED05F Safeguards Bus 1EA2 86-2 Trip and Lockout TRIP Reactor Trip RP07A Train A Safety Injection Actuation Failure FAIL Reactor Trip CS07A Train A CSS Isolation Valve (HS-4776) Failure AS IS Reactor Trip NOTE: ENSURE SIP 1 is running and aligned per SOP-201A.
1 - Raise Safety Injection Accumulator (1-01) Level - N/A 2 - Raise power to 6% to 8% - N/A 3 RX05A Pressurizer Level Channel (LT-459) Failure 100% K3 4 MS13B SG (1-02) ARV (HV-2326) Failure 1300 PSIG K4 5 SW01B Station Service Water Pump (1-02) Trip TRIP K5 6 RP17D Containment Pressure Transmitter Failure 60 PSIG K6 7 MS01C Faulted SG 1-03 Inside Containment 2.0 ft2 K7 (180 sec. ramp) 8 ED05F Safeguards Bus 1EA2 86-2 Trip and Lockout TRIP Reactor Trip 9 RP07A Train A Safety Injection Actuation Failure FAIL Reactor Trip 10 CS07A Train A CSS Isolation Valve (HS-4776) Failure AS IS Reactor Trip CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #4 Rev e.docx
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario #4 Booth Operator: INITIALIZE to IC #34 and NRC #4 Scenario File.
ENSURE all Simulator Annunciator Alarms are ACTIVE.
ENSURE all Control Board Tags are removed.
ENSURE Operator Aid Tags reflect current boron conditions.
ENSURE Control Rods are in MANUAL with Control Rod Bank C @ 225 steps and Bank D @ 110 steps.
ENSURE Rod Bank Update (RBU) is performed.
ENSURE SIP 1-01 is running and aligned per SOP-201A.
REMOVE N-16 detectors from POLL on PC-11.
ENSURE 1-HS-2484 & 1-HS-2485, Condensate Storage Tank Isolation Valves are OPEN.
SET Plant Computer screen for MODE 2.
ENSURE Reactivity Briefing Sheet printout provided with Turnover.
PLACE Plant Computer, right hand RO and US Computer screens for MODE 2.
PLACE Plant Computer, left hand RO with SIP 1-01 information (GD-SIP12).
PLACE Group Display LPTDIFF on the BOP Desktop Computer.
ENSURE all PRZR Heaters energized.
ENSURE procedures in progress are on SRO desk:
- COPY of IPO-003A, Power Operations, Section 5.1, Warmup and Synchronization of the Turbine Generator, INITIALED to Step 5.1.15.
- COPY of IPO-003A, Power Operations, Attachment 17, MODE 1 Bubble Chart.
- COPY of SOP-201A, Safety Injection System, Section 5.4.1, Starting an SIP in Recirculation (RCS Temperature > 350°F OR TS 3.4.1 2 Not Applicable),
INITIALED to Step 5.4.1.H.
- COPY of SOP-202A, Safety Injection Accumulators, Section 5.4.1, Raising Accumulator Level, INITIALED to Step 5.4.1.A.
Significant Control Room Annunciators in Alarm:
PCIP-1.1 - SR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.3 - AMSAC BLK TURB < 40% PWR C-20 PCIP-1.4 - CNDNSR AVAIL STM DUMP ARMED C-9 PCIP-1.7 - RX 50% PWR TURB TRIP PERM P-9 PCIP-2.1 - SR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.4 - LO TURB PWR ROD WTHDRWL BLK C-5 PCIP-2.5 - SR RX TRIP BLK PERM P-6 PCIP-3.4 - TURB LOAD REJ STM DMP ARMED C-7 PCIP-3.5 - RX & TURB 10% PWR P-7 PCIP-4.5 - RX 48% PWR 3-LOOP FLO PERM P-8 PCIP-4.6 - TURB 10% PWR P-13 6D-1.1 - SR HI VOLT FAIL 7B-4.8 - FWP A/B RECIRC VLV NOT CLOSED 8A-1.3 - FWPT B TRIP 8A-1.10 - 1 OF 4 TURB STOP VLV CLOSE Numerous 9A Feedwater alarms CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #4 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 6 of 31 Event
Description:
Raise Safety Injection Tank Accumulator Level Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: ENSURE Simulator in RUN when crew is ready to assume the watch.
Examiner Note: Safety Injection Accumulator level is raised using procedures SOP-202A, Safety Injection Accumulators, and SOP-201A, Safety Injection System.
DIRECT performance of SOP-202A, Safety Injection Accumulators, Section
+1 min US 5.4.1, Raising Accumulator Level.
START a Safety Injection Pump in recirculation per SOP-201A.
[Step 5.4.1.A - DONE]
BOP OPEN 1/1-8888, ACCUM FILL ISOL VLV. [Step 5.4.1.B - YES]
BOP OPEN 1/1-8871, SI TEST HDR RET ISOL VLV. [Step 5.4.1.C - YES]
BOP OPEN 1/1-8878A, ACCUM 1 FILL VLV. [Step 5.4.1.D - YES]
When level is restored to between 39% and 61%, then CLOSE 1/1-8878A, BOP ACCUM 1 FILL VLV. [Step 5.4.1.E - YES]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #4 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 7 of 31 Event
Description:
Raise Safety Injection Tank Accumulator Level Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ENSURE ACCUMULATOR 1 level is between 39% AND 61%.
[Step 5.4.1.F - YES]
- ACCUM 1; 1-LI-950 _____%, 1-LI-951 _____%.
BOP CLOSE 1/1-8871, SI TEST HDR RET ISOL VLV. [Step 5.4.1.G - YES]
BOP CLOSE 1/1-8888, ACCUM FILL ISOL VLV. [Step 5.4.1.H - YES]
BOP STOP the SI Pump per SOP-201A. [Step 5.4.1.I - YES]
Examiner Note: The following steps are from SOP-201A, Safety Injection System, Section 5.4.1.
When the recirculation is completed, STOP 1/1-APSI1 SIP 1 and PLACE BOP handswitch in AUTO. [Step 5.4.1.I - YES]
ENSURE OPEN 1/1-8821A SIP 1 XTIE VLV, associated train cross tie valve.
+10 min BOP
[Step 5.4.1.J - YES]
Examiner Note: The following steps are from SOP-202A, Safety Injection Accumulators, Section 5.4.1.
ENSURE the Accumulator 1 pressure is between 623 PSIG and 644 PSIG.
[Step 5.4.1.J - YES]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #4 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 8 of 31 Event
Description:
Raise Safety Injection Tank Accumulator Level Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CONTACT Chemistry to sample of Accumulator 1 to ENSURE Boron BOP concentration is between 2300 and 2600 PPM. [Step 5.4.1.K - YES]
When Accumulator pressure is verified, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 2.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #4 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 9 of 31 Event
Description:
Raise Reactor Power Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: MONITOR Simulator parameters while the crew transitions to IPO-003A.
Examiner Note: The following steps are from IPO-003A, Power Operations, Section 5.1, Warmup and Synchronization of the Turbine Generator, Step 5.1.16.
If desired, ENSURE Feedwater Bypass Control Valve Controllers in AUTO.
[Step 5.1.16.A - YES]
VERIFY Attachment 1 was COMPLETED & REVIEWED by the Shift Manager US per the Turnover Sheet prior to exceeding 5% power.
[Step 5.1.16.B - DONE]
As Reactor power rises, VERIFY Steam Dump System continues to maintain BOP Main Steam pressure at approximately 1092 psig. [Step 5.1.16.C - YES]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #4 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 10 of 31 Event
Description:
Raise Reactor Power Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: The next three (3) steps are guidance from the Unit Supervisor per OPGD-3, Operations Standards and Expectations, Section 5.0, Operating Tactics.
Direct WITHDRAWAL of Control Rods in no more than five (5) step US increments to raise power.
WITHDRAW Control Rods in no more than five (5) step increments while RO monitoring Reactor power level.
RO VERIFY Power Range Channels respond appropriately as power level rises.
Examiner Note: Crew will likely use N-16 power indication from Plant Computer.
When reactor power is greater than 5%, LOG entry into MODE 1.
US
[Step 5.1.16.D - YES]
US PERFORM OPT-102A for MODE 1 Surveillances. [Step 5.1.16.E - YES]
Floor Cue: If requested, REPORT OPT-102A, Operations Shiftly Routine Tests was completed last shift.
+15 min RO Slowly RAISE Reactor power to between 6% and 8%. [Step 5.1.16.F - YES]
When power level is stabilized at 6% to 8%, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 3.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #4 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 11 of 31 Event
Description:
Pressurizer Level Transmitter Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 3 (Key 3).
- RX05A, Pressurizer Level Transmitter (LT-459A) fails high.
Indications Available:
5A-1.6 - ANY RCP SEAL WTR INJ FLO LO 5C-4.2 - PRZR 1 OF 3 LVL HI 5C-1.3 - PRZR LVL DEV HI 1-LI-459A, PRZR LVL CHAN I indication failed high
+30 sec RO RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.
RECOGNIZE PZR level lowering and REPORT Pressurizer Level Channel I RO (LT-459A) failed high.
DIRECT performance of ABN-706, Pressurizer Level Instrumentation US Malfunction, Section 2.0.
PLACE PZR Level Control or Charging Flow in MANUAL to maintain level on RO program using one of the following controllers: [Step 2.3.1 - YES]
- 1-LK-459, PRZR LVL CTRL
- 1-FK-121, CCP CHRG FLO CTRL TRANSFER 1/1-LS-459D, PZR Level Control Channel Select to an RO/BOP OPERABLE channel. [Step 2.3.2 - YES]
TRANSFER 1/1-LS-459E, 1/1-LR-459 PZR Level Select to an OPERABLE RO/BOP channel. [Step 2.3.3 - YES]
RO DETERMINE Normal Letdown aligned. [Step 2.3.4 - YES]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #4 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 12 of 31 Event
Description:
Pressurizer Level Transmitter Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO VERIFY PZR Control Heater Group C operating normally. [Step 2.3.5 - YES]
RESTORE PZR Level Control or Charging Flow Control to AUTO as desired.
[Step 2.3.6 - YES]
VERIFY other instruments on common instrument line - NORMAL.
US/RO
[Step 2.3.7 - YES]
- VERIFY Loop 1 Instruments LT-459A and PT-455 responding normally per Attachment 1.
Examiner Note: The next two (2) steps are only performed following I&C maintenance.
Within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, CONTACT I&C to place Bistable Test Switches for LT-459 in CLOSE. [Step 2.3.8 - YES]
VERIFY appropriate alarms and trip status lights ON per Attachment 4 and NOTE verification in Unit Log. [Step 2.3.9 - YES]
- OBSERVE TSLB-5, Window 1.1 - PRZR LVL HI LB-459A is LIT.
US EVALUATE Technical Specifications. [Step 2.3.10 - Tracking LCOAR only]
US INITIATE repairs per STA-606. [Step 2.3.11 - YES]
+10 min US INITIATE a Condition Report per STA-421. [Step 2.3.12 - YES]
When Pressurizer Level is restored, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 4.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #4 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 13 of 31 Event
Description:
Steam Generator Atmospheric Relief Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 4 (Key 4).
-MS13B, SG 1-02 Steam Pressure Channel (PT-2326) fails high.
Indications Available:
1-PI-2326, MSL 2 PRESS failed high 1-ZL-2326, SG 2 ATMOS RLF VLV red OPEN light LIT Y6704B Plant Computer alarm
+1 min BOP RESPOND to Dynamic Alarm Display (DAD) Alarm.
DIRECT performance of ABN-709, Steam Line Pressure, Steam Header US Pressure, Turbine 1st-Stage Pressure, and Feed Header Pressure Instrument Malfunction, Section 2.0.
IDENTIFY Steam Generator 1-02 Steam Pressure Transmitter (PT-2326) -
BOP GREATER THAN 60 PSIG difference between remaining channels.
[Step 2.3.1 - YES]
VERIFY Steam Generator Atmospheric Relief Valve - CLOSED.
[Step 2.3.2 - NO]
- If pressure is less than 1125 PSIG, PLACE 1-PK-2326, SG 2 ATMOS RLF VLV CTRL in MANUAL and 0% DEMAND to CLOSE Valve.
[Step 2.3.2.a RNO - YES]
- NOTIFY Chemistry that a release has occurred and DETERMINE if a release permit is required per STA-603. [Step 2.3.2.b RNO - YES]
- GO to Step 11. [Step 2.3.2.c RNO - YES]
REFER to Attachment 6 and DETERMINE that no Technical Specifications US are applicable to PT-2326 failure. [Step 2.3.11 - YES]
US INITIATE a Condition Report per STA-421. [Step 2.3.12 - YES]
+5 min US INITIATE repairs per STA-606. [Step 2.3.13 - YES]
When the Atmospheric Relief Valve is closed, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 5.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #4 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 14 of 31 Event
Description:
Station Service Water Pump Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 5 (Key 5).
- SW01B, Station Service Water Pump 1-02 trip.
Indications Available:
01-1.8 - SSWP 1 / 2 OVRLOAD / TRIP 01-2.11 - CCP 2 L/O CLR SSW RET FLO LO 01-2.12 - SIP 2 L/O CLR SSW RET FLO LO 01-4.8 - CSP 2 & 4 BRG CLR SSW RET FLO LO Station Service Water Pump 1-02 amber MISMATCH and white TRIP lights lit
+30 sec BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.
RECOGNIZE 1-HS-4251A, Service Water Pump 1-02 amber MISMATCH BOP and white TRIP lights LIT.
DIRECT performance of ABN-501, Station Service Water System US Malfunction, Section 2.0.
Examiner Note: Diamond steps () are Initial Operator Actions.
PLACE CS-1-DG2E, DG2 Emergency Stop / Start Switch in PULLOUT.
[Step 2.3.1 - YES]
BOP VERIFY Train A SSW Pump - RUNNING. [Step 2.3.2 - YES]
BOP VERIFY Train A CCW Pump - RUNNING. [Step 2.3.3 - YES]
Booth Operator: When asked about status of SSW Pump, REPORT that the SSW Pump 1-02 50/51 overcurrent relays on Phases B & C are tripped.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #4 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 15 of 31 Event
Description:
Station Service Water Pump Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior VERIFY equipment on Train B - NOT REQUIRED FOR OPERATION:
RO/BOP
[Step 2.3.4 - YES]
- Centrifugal Charging Pump 1-02
- Diesel Generator 1-02
- Component Cooling Water Pump 1-02
- Safety Injection Pump 1-02
- Containment Spray Pumps 1-02 & 1-04 RO/BOP PLACE equipment on Train B in PULLOUT. [Step 2.3.5 - YES]
- Centrifugal Charging Pump 1-02
- Station Service Water Pump 1-02 (may leave as is due to CAUTION)
- Safety Injection Pump 1-02
- Containment Spray Pumps 1-02 & 1-04 BOP CHECK status of Train B CCW Pump. [Step 2.3.6 - YES]
- VERIFY CCW Pump - NOT RUNNING. [Step 2.3.6.a - YES]
- VERIFY CCW Heat Exchanger outlet temperature on Train B < 122ºF.
[Step 2.3.6.b - YES]
US INITIATE a work request per STA-606. [Step 2.3.6 - YES]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #4 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 16 of 31 Event
Description:
Station Service Water Pump Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior US REFER to EPP-201. [Step 2.3.7 - YES]
US EVALUATE Technical Specifications. [Step 2.3.8 - YES]
- LCO 3.7.8.B, Station Service Water System.
- CONDITION B - One SSWS Train inoperable.
- ACTION B.1 - Restore SSWS Train to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
- LCO 3.8.1.B, AC Sources - Operating.
- CONDITION B - One DG inoperable.
- ACTION B.1 - Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for the required offsite circuit(s) within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> AND once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter, AND
- ACTION B.2 - Declare required feature(s) supported by the inoperable DG inoperable when its required redundant feature(s) is inoperable within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> from discovery of Condition B concurrent within inoperability of redundant required feature(s), AND
- ACTION B.3.1 - Determine OPERABLE DG(s) is not inoperable due to common cause failure within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, OR
- ACTION B.3.2 - Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for OPERABLE DG(s) within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Booth Operator: If contacted, INFORM the Unit Supervisor that another operator will perform required Technical Specification Surveillance.
US COMPLETE OPT-215 verification within one hour. [Step 2.3.9 - YES]
+10 min US SUBMIT a Condition Report per STA-421. [Step 2.3.10 - YES]
When Technical Specifications are addressed, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 6.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #4 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 17 of 31 Event
Description:
Containment Pressure Transmitter Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 6 (Key 6).
- RP17D, Containment Pressure Transmitter (PT-937) fails high.
Indications Available:
2B-3.10 - CNTMT 1 OF 4 PRESS HI-3 1-PT-937, CNTMT PRESS (IR) CHAN I Containment pressure transmitter indication failed high
+30 secs RO RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.
RECOGNIZE Containment pressure transmitter 1-PT-937, CNTMT PRESS RO (IR) CHAN I failed high.
DIRECT performance of ALM-0022A, 1-ALB-2B, Window 3.10 - CNTMT 1 US OF 4 PRESS HI-3.
RO MONITOR Containment pressure. [Step 1 - YES]
- 1-PI-934, CNTMT PRESS (IR) CHAN IV
- 1-PI-935, CNTMT PRESS (IR) CHAN III
- 1-PI-936, CNTMT PRESS (IR) CHAN II
DETERMINE 1-PI-937, CNTMT PRESS (IR) CHAN I reading 2.5 PSIG RO from other channels. [Step 3 - YES]
If a single instrument is affected, REFER to Technical Specifications.
[Step 3.A - YES]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #4 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 18 of 31 Event
Description:
Containment Pressure Transmitter Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior US EVALUATE Technical Specifications. [Step 3.A - YES]
- LCO 3.3.2.E, ESFAS Instrumentation [Function 2.c, 3.b.(3)].
- CONDITION E - One Containment Pressure channel inoperable.
- ACTION E.1 - Place channel in bypass within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, OR
- ACTION E.2.1 - Be in MODE 3 within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br />, AND
- ACTION E.2.2 - Be in MODE 4 within 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br />.
RO/BOP MONITOR 1-MR-5460, DEW PT TEMP °F. [Step 4 - YES]
- If Containment dewpoint temperatures indicate an increasing trend, PERFORM OPT-303 to determine source of leakage. [Step 4.A - YES]
+5 min CORRECT the condition or INITIATE a Work Request per STA-606.
US
[Step 5 - YES]
When Technical Specifications are addressed, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Events 7, 8, 9, and 10.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #4 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8, 9, & 10 Page 19 of 31 Event
Description:
Faulted Steam Generator / Train B Safeguards Bus Trip and Lockout / Train A Safety Injection Failure /
Train A Containment Spray Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Events 7, 8, 9, and 10 (Key 7).
- MS01C, SG 1-03 2 ft2 Steam Line Break inside Containment on 180 second ramp.
- ED05F, Train B Safeguards Bus 86-2 trip and lockout on Reactor Trip.
- RP07A, Train A Safety Injection fails to AUTO actuate.
- CS07A, Train A Containment Spray Isolation Valve (HV-4776) fails to open.
Indications Available:
6D-1.10 - AVE TAVE -TREF DEV 2B-3.12 - CNTMT FN CLR 3 & 4 CND FILL RATE HI 2B-4.12 - CNTMT FN CLR 1 & 2 CND FILL RATE HI 3A-1.1 - CNTMT TEMP HI Examiner Note: The crew may enter ABN-101, Reactor Coolant Pump Trip / Malfunction, if it is not immediately determined that a Reactor Trip is required.
+30 sec RO/BOP RECOGNIZE lowering RCS temperature and pressure.
RO/BOP DETERMINE Reactor Trip required and manually TRIP Reactor.
Examiner Note: The following steps are from EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
RO VERIFY Reactor Trip: [Step 1 - YES]
- VERIFY Reactor Trip Breakers - OPEN. [Step 1.a - YES]
- VERIFY Neutron flux - DECREASING. [Step 1.a - YES]
- VERIFY all Control Rod Position Rod Bottom Lights - ON.
[Step 1.b - YES]
BOP VERIFY Turbine Trip: [Step 2 - YES]
- VERIFY all HP Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED. [Step 2 - YES]
BOP VERIFY Power to AC Safeguards Buses: [Step 3 - YES]
- VERIFY AC Safeguards Buses - AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED.
[Step 3.a - YES]
- VERIFY both AC Safeguards Buses - ENERGIZED. [Step 3.b - NO]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #4 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8, 9, & 10 Page 20 of 31 Event
Description:
Faulted Steam Generator / Train B Safeguards Bus Trip and Lockout / Train A Safety Injection Failure /
Train A Containment Spray Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
- RESTORE power to deenergized AC Safeguards Bus per ABN-601, Response to a 138/345 KV System Malfunction OR ABN-602, RO Response to a 6900/480 Volt System Malfunction.
[Step 3.b RNO - YES]
RO CHECK SI status: [Step 4 - YES]
- CHECK if SI is actuated. [Step 4.a - NO]
CRITICAL TASK Manually Initiate Train A Safety Injection Signal prior to Exiting EOP-0.0A, STATEMENT Reactor Trip or Safe Injection.
CRITICAL TASK RO Manually INITIATE Train A Safety Injection Signal.
- VERIFY Both Trains SI Actuated: [Step 4.b - NO]
- SI Actuated blue status light - ON NOT FLASHING. [Step 4.b - NO]
- PLACE 1/1-SIA2, SI MAN ACT Switch to ACT position at CB-07 and RO DETERMINE SI has actuated on both Trains. [Step 4.b RNO - YES]
Examiner Note: EOP-0.0A, Attachment 2 steps performed by the BOP are at the end of the scenario.
INITIATE Proper Safeguards Equipment Operation Per Attachment 2.
US/BOP
[Step 5 - YES]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #4 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8, 9, & 10 Page 21 of 31 Event
Description:
Faulted Steam Generator / Train B Safeguards Bus Trip and Lockout / Train A Safety Injection Failure /
Train A Containment Spray Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO VERIFY AFW Alignment: [Step 6 - YES]
- VERIFY Train A MDAFW Pump - RUNNING. [Step 6.a - YES]
- START TDAFW Pump per Foldout Page. [Step 6.b - YES]
- VERIFY AFW total flow - GREATER THAN 460 GPM. [Step 6.c - YES]
- VERIFY AFW valve alignment - PROPER ALIGNMENT. [Step 6.d - NO]
RO VERIFY Containment Spray NOT Required: [Step 7 - YES]
- VERIFY 1-ALB-2B, Window 1-8, CS ACT - NOT ILLUMINATED.
[Step 7.a - NO]
- VERIFY 1-ALB-2B, Window 4-11, CNTMT ISOL PHASE B ACT - NOT ILLUMINATED. [Step 7.a - NO]
- VERIFY Containment pressure - LESS THAN 18.0 PSIG.
[Step 7.a - NO]
- VERIFY Containment Spray AND Phase B Actuation - INITIATED.
[Step 7.a.1) RNO - NO]
- Manually ACTUATE Containment Spray AND Phase B Actuation.
[Step 7.a.1) RNO - YES]
- VERIFY appropriate MLB indication for CNTMT SPRAY (blue windows) AND PHASE B (orange windows). [Step 7.a.2) RNO - NO]
- Manually ALIGN Containment Spray Valves.
[Step 7.a.1) RNO - YES]
CRITICAL TASK Manually Initiate Train A Containment Spray Flow prior to Exiting EOP-0.0A, STATEMENT Reactor Trip or Safe Injection.
CRITICAL
- OPEN HV-4776, Train A CSS Isolation Valve to INITIATE Train A TASK RO Containment Spray flow. [Step 7.a.3) RNO - YES]
- ENSURE 1-HS-4752, Train A Chemical Addition Tank Discharge Valve - OPEN. [Step 7.a.4) RNO - YES]
- STOP all RCPs. [Step 7.a.5) RNO - YES]
US
- GO to Step 8. [Step 7.a.6) RNO - YES]
RO CHECK if Main Steam lines should be ISOLATED: [Step 8 - YES]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #4 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8, 9, & 10 Page 22 of 31 Event
Description:
Faulted Steam Generator / Train B Safeguards Bus Trip and Lockout / Train A Safety Injection Failure /
Train A Containment Spray Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
- VERIFY Containment pressure - GREATER THAN 6.0 PSIG AND Main Steam Line pressure less than 610 PSIG. [Step 8.a - YES]
- VERIFY Main Steam Line Isolation - COMPLETE. [Step 8.a - YES]
RO CHECK RCS Temperature: [Step 9 - YES]
- STOP dumping steam. [Step 9.a RNO - YES]
- REDUCE AFW flow as necessary to minimize cooldown.
[Step 9.b RNO - YES]
- CLOSE Main Steam Isolation Valves. [Step 9.c RNO - DONE]
RO CHECK PRZR Valve Status: [Step 10 - YES]
- VERIFY PRZR Safeties - CLOSED. [Step 10.a - YES]
- VERIFY Normal PRZR Spray Valves - CLOSED. [Step 10.b - YES]
- VERIFY PORVs - CLOSED. [Step 10.c - YES]
- VERIFY Power to at least 1 Block Valve - AVAILABLE. [Step 10.d - YES]
- VERIFY Block Valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN. [Step 10.e - YES]
RO CHECK If RCPs Should Be Stopped: [Step 11 - DONE]
- VERIFY RCS subcooling - LESS THAN 25°F (55°F FOR A DVERSE CONTAINMENT). [Step 11.a - NO]
- GO to Step 12. [Step 11.a RNO - YES]
US/RO CHECK if any SG is Faulted: [Step 12 - YES]
- VERIFY any Steam Generator pressure - DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER. [Step 12.a - YES]
- VERIFY any Steam Generator pressure - COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED. [Step 12.a - YES]
- GO to EOP-2.0A, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, Step 1.
[Step 12.b - YES]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #4 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8, 9, & 10 Page 23 of 31 Event
Description:
Faulted Steam Generator / Train B Safeguards Bus Trip and Lockout / Train A Safety Injection Failure /
Train A Containment Spray Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: EOP-2.0A, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation steps begin here.
+15 min US/RO CHECK Main Steam Line Isolation Valves - CLOSED. [Step 1 - YES]
CHECK at Least One Steam Generator Pressure - STABLE OR US/RO INCREASING. [Step 2 - YES]
US/RO IDENTIFY Faulted Steam Generator 1 COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED. [Step 3 - YES]
CRITICAL TASK Identify and Isolate Faulted Steam Generator Prior to Exiting EOP-2.0A, Faulted STATEMENT Steam Generator Isolation.
CRITICAL TASK RO/BOP ISOLATE Faulted Steam Generator 1-03. [Step 4 - YES]
- ISOLATE Main Feed Line to Steam Generator 1-03. [Step 4 - DONE]
- ISOLATE AFW flow to Steam Generator 1-03. [Step 4 - YES]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #4 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8, 9, & 10 Page 24 of 31 Event
Description:
Faulted Steam Generator / Train B Safeguards Bus Trip and Lockout / Train A Safety Injection Failure /
Train A Containment Spray Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
- CLOSE 1-HS-2493, AFWIV 3.
- ISOLATE Blowdown and Sample Lines to Steam Generator 1-03.
[Step 4 - DONE]
- ENSURE Steam Generator 1-03 Atmospheric Relief Valve - CLOSED.
[Step 4 - DONE]
- ENSURE Main Steam Line Drip Pot Isolation Valve - CLOSED.
[Step 4 - DONE]
RO CHECK CST Level - GREATER THAN 10%. [Step 5 - YES]
US/BOP VERIFY Faulted Steam Generator 1-03 Break Inside Containment.
[Step 6 - YES]
US/RO CHECK Secondary Radiation: [Step 7 - YES]
- REQUEST periodic activity samples of all Steam Generators.
[Step 7.a - YES]
- CHECK available secondary radiation monitors - NORMAL.
[Step 7.b - YES]
US/RO CHECK if ECCS Flow to Should Be Reduced: [Step 8 - YES]
- VERIFY Secondary heat sink: [Step 8.a - YES]
- DETERMINE Narrow Range Level in SGs 1-01, 1-02, & 1-04 > 50%.
- DETERMINE RCS subcooling - GREATER THAN 25°F (55°F FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT). [Step 8.b - YES]
- VERIFY PRZR level - GREATER THAN 13% (34% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT). [Step 8.d - YES]
- GO to EOS-1.1A, Safety Injection Termination, Step 1. [Step 8.e - YES]
Examiner Note: EOS-1.1A, Safety Injection Termination steps begin here.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #4 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8, 9, & 10 Page 25 of 31 Event
Description:
Faulted Steam Generator / Train B Safeguards Bus Trip and Lockout / Train A Safety Injection Failure /
Train A Containment Spray Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: The following six (6) steps are performed per EOS-1.1A, Attachment 1.D.
BOP [1.D] PLACE Train A Diesel EMER START/STOP handswitch in START.
[Step 1 - YES]
BOP [1.D] RESET SI. [Step 2 - YES]
BOP [1.D] RESET SI Sequencers. [Step 3 - YES]
BOP [1.D] RESET Containment Isolation Phase A and B. [Step 4 - YES]
BOP [1.D] RESET Containment Spray Signal. [Step 5 - YES]
[1.D] ESTABLISH Instrument Air and Nitrogen to Containment.
RO/BOP
[Step 6 - YES]
- ESTABLISH instrument air. [Step 6.a - YES]
- VERIFY air compressor running. [Step 6.a.1) - YES]
- OPEN 1-HS-3487, Containment Instrument Air Isolation Valve.
[Step 6.a.2) - YES]
- ESTABLISH Nitrogen: [Step 6.b - YES]
- VERIFY 1-HC-3943, ACCUM 14 VENT CTRL Valve - CLOSED.
[Step 6.b.1) - YES]
- OPEN 1/1-8880, SI/PORV ACCUM N2 ISOL VLV. [Step 6.b.2) - YES]
RO STOP all but one CCP and PLACE in Standby. [Step 7 - DONE]
US/RO CHECK RCS Pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING. [Step 8 - YES]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #4 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8, 9, & 10 Page 26 of 31 Event
Description:
Faulted Steam Generator / Train B Safeguards Bus Trip and Lockout / Train A Safety Injection Failure /
Train A Containment Spray Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: The following two (2) steps are performed per EOS-1.1A, Attachment 1.J.
Examiner Note: None of the Train B Valves repositioned due to a loss of power, therefore, they are in the correct position for performance of EOS-1.1A, Attachment 1.J actions. Valve position is verified via the Monitor Light Boxes (MLB).
RO [1.J] ISOLATE CCP Injection Line Flow Path: [Step 9 - YES]
- ALIGN CCP Miniflow Valves: [Step 9.b - YES]
- OPEN 1/1-8110 and 1/1-8111, CCP Miniflow Valves.
[Step 9.b.1) - YES]
- CLOSE 1/1-8511A and 1/1-8511B, CCP Alternate Miniflow Isolation Valves. [Step 9.b.2) - YES]
- PLACE Charging Flow Control Valve in MANUAL and 35% demand.
[Step 9.c - YES]
- CLOSE 1/1-8801A and 1/1-8801B, CCP Injection Line Isolation Valves.
[Step 9.d - YES]
+30 min RO [1.J] ESTABLISH Charging Flow Path: [Step 10 - YES]
- OPEN 1/1-8105 and 1/1-8106, Charging Line Isolation Valves.
[Step 10.a - YES]
- ADJUST Charging Flow Control Valve to establish Charging flow.
[Step 10.b - YES]
- ADJUST RCP seal flow to maintain between 6 GPM and 13 GPM.
[Step 10.c - YES]
When EOS-1.1A, Safety Injection Termination, Attachment 1.J is complete, TERMINATE the scenario.
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #4 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8, 9, & 10 Page 27 of 31 Event
Description:
Faulted Steam Generator / Train B Safeguards Bus Trip and Lockout / Train A Safety Injection Failure /
Train A Containment Spray Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: These steps are performed by the BOP per EOP-0.0A, Attachment 2.
BOP VERIFY SSW Alignment: [Step 1 - YES]
- VERIFY Train A SSW Pump - RUNNING. [Step 1.a - YES]
BOP VERIFY Train A Safety Injection Pump - RUNNING. [Step 2 - YES]
BOP VERIFY Containment Isolation Phase A (Train A) - APPROPRIATE MLB LIGHT INDICATION (RED WINDOWS). [Step 3 - YES]
BOP VERIFY Containment Ventilation Isolation (Train A) - APPROPRIATE MLB LIGHT INDICATION (GREEN WINDOWS). [Step 4 - YES]
BOP VERIFY Train A CCW Pump - RUNNING. [Step 5 - YES]
BOP VERIFY Train A RHR Pump - RUNNING. [Step 6 - YES]
BOP VERIFY Proper CVCS Alignment: [Step 7 - YES]
- VERIFY Train A CCP - RUNNING. [Step 7.a - YES]
- VERIFY Letdown Relief Valve Isolation: [Step 7.b - YES]
- Letdown Orifice Isolation Valves - CLOSED. [Step 7.b.1) - YES]
- Letdown Isolation Valves 1/1-LCV-459 & 1/1-LCV-460 - CLOSED.
[Step 7.b.2) - YES]
BOP VERIFY ECCS flow: [Step 8 - YES]
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #4 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8, 9, & 10 Page 28 of 31 Event
Description:
Faulted Steam Generator / Train B Safeguards Bus Trip and Lockout / Train A Safety Injection Failure /
Train A Containment Spray Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
- SIP discharge flow indicator - CHECK FOR FLOW. [Step 8.c - YES]
- GO to Step 9. [Step 8.d RNO - YES]
BOP VERIFY Feedwater Isolation Complete: [Step 9 - YES]
- Feedwater Isolation Valves - CLOSED.
- Feedwater Isolation Bypass Valves - CLOSED.
- Feedwater Bypass Control Valves - CLOSED.
- Feedwater Control Valves - CLOSED.
BOP VERIFY Train A Diesel Generator - RUNNING. [Step 10 - YES]
BOP VERIFY Monitor Lights for SI Load Shedding on 1-MLB-9 and 1-MLB10 -
LIT. [Step 11 - YES]
- Window 1.4, 1EB2-1EB4 Not Load Shed (DARK).
BOP VERIFY Proper SI alignment - PROPER MLB LIGHT INDICATION.
[Step 12 - YES]
BOP INITIATE periodic monitoring of Spent Fuel Cooling. [Step 13 - YES]
- Spent Fuel Pool temperature (T2900A, T2901A).
CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #4 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8, 9, & 10 Page 29 of 31 Event
Description:
Faulted Steam Generator / Train B Safeguards Bus Trip and Lockout / Train A Safety Injection Failure /
Train A Containment Spray Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
- Spent Fuel Pool level (L4800A, L4801A, L4802A, L4803A).
BOP VERIFY Components on Table 1 are Properly Aligned. [Step 14 - YES]
Location Equipment Description Condition CB-03 X-HS-5534 H2 PRG SPLY FN 4 STOPPED CB-03 X-HS-5532 H2 PRG SPLY FN 3 STOPPED CB-04 1/1-8716A RHRP 1 XTIE VLV OPEN CB-04 1/1-8716B RHRP 2 XTIE VLV OPEN CB-06 1/1-8153 XS LTDN ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-06 1/1-8154 XS LTDN ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-07 1/1-RTBAL RX TRIP BKR OPEN CB-07 1/1-RTBBL RX TRIP BKR OPEN CB-07 1/1-BBAL RX TRIP BYP BKR OPEN/DEENERGIZED CB-07 1/1-BBBL RX TRIP BYP BKR OPEN/DEENERGIZED CB-08 1-HS-2397A SG 1 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-08 1-HS-2398A SG 2 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-08 1-HS-2399A SG 3 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-08 1-HS-2400A SG 4 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-08 1-HS-2111C FWPT A TRIP TRIPPED CB-08 1-HS-2112C FWPT B TRIP TRIPPED CB-09 1-HS-2490 CNDS XFER PUMP STOPPED (MCC deenergized on SI)
CV-01 X-HS-6181 PRI PLT SPLY FN 17 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #4 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8, 9, & 10 Page 30 of 31 Event
Description:
Faulted Steam Generator / Train B Safeguards Bus Trip and Lockout / Train A Safety Injection Failure /
Train A Containment Spray Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CV-01 X-HS-6188 PRI PLT SPLY FN 18 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6195 PRI PLT SPLY FN 19 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6202 PRI PLT SPLY FN 20 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6209 PRI PLT SPLY FN 21 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6216 PRI PLT SPLY FN 22 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6223 PRI PLT SPLY FN 23 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6230 PRI PLT SPLY FN 24 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-3631 UPS & DISTR RM A/C FN 1 & STARTED BSTR FN 42 Examiner Note: X-HS-3632 on CV-01 will NOT start due to loss of power.
CV-01 X-HS-3632 UPS & DISTR RM A/C FN 2 & STARTED BSTR FN 43 CV-01 1-HS-5600 ELEC AREA EXH FN 1 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 1-HS-5601 ELEC AREA EXH FN 2 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 1-HS-5602 MS & FW PIPE AREA EXH STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 3 & EXH DMPR CV-01 1-HS-5603 MS & FW PIPE AREA EXH STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 4 & EXH DMPR CV-01 1-HS-5618 MS & FW PIPE AREA SPLY STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 17 CV-01 1-HS-5620 MS & FW PIPE AREA SPLY STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 18 CV-03 X-HS-5855 CR EXH FN 1 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5856 CR EXH FN 2 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5731 SFP EXH FN 33 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5733 SFP EXH FN 34 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5727 SFP EXH FN 35 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5729 SFP EXH FN 36 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CPNPP NRC 2012 Sim Scenario #4 Rev e.docx
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8, 9, & 10 Page 31 of 31 Event
Description:
Faulted Steam Generator / Train B Safeguards Bus Trip and Lockout / Train A Safety Injection Failure /
Train A Containment Spray Isolation Valve Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: The next four (4) steps would be performed on Unit 2.
CB-03 2-HS-5538 AIR PRG EXH ISOL DMPR CLOSED CB-03 2-HS-5539 AIR PRG EXH ISOL DMPR CLOSED CB-03 2-HS-5537 AIR PRG SPLY ISOL DMPR CLOSED CB-03 2-HS-5536 AIR PRG SPLY ISOL DMPR CLOSED BOP NOTIFY Unit Supervisor attachment instructions complete AND to IMPLEMENT FRGs as required. [Step 14 - YES]
EOP-0.0A, Attachment 2 steps are now complete.