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Category:Letter
MONTHYEARIR 05000456/20230042024-02-0202 February 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000456/2023004 and 05000457/2023004 ML24025C7242024-01-29029 January 2024 Notification of NRC Baseline Inspection and Request for Information; Inspection Report 05000456/2024002; 05000457/2024002 IR 05000457/20230112024-01-25025 January 2024 2B Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Diesel Fuel Oil Dilution Report 05000457/2023011 and Preliminary Greater than Green Finding and Apparent Violation ML24018A0362024-01-17017 January 2024 Paragon Energy Solutions, Defect with Detroit Diesel/Mtu Fuel Injectors P/N R5229660 Cat Id 0001390618 RS-24-004, Proposed Alternative to the Distribution Requirements of ASME Code Table IWC-2411-1 for the Steam Generators2024-01-11011 January 2024 Proposed Alternative to the Distribution Requirements of ASME Code Table IWC-2411-1 for the Steam Generators ML23348A2162023-12-15015 December 2023 Exemption from Select Requirements of 10 CFR Part 73 (EPID L-2023-LLE-0030 (Security Notifications, Reports, and Recordkeeping and Suspicious Activity Reporting)) IR 05000456/20200232023-12-15015 December 2023 Baseline Security Inspection Document; 05000456/2023/402; 05000457/2023/402 ML23277A0032023-12-11011 December 2023 Issuance of Amendments Regarding Adoption of TSTF-370 ML23339A0452023-12-0505 December 2023 Request for Information for an NRC Post-Approval Site Inspection for License Renewal Inspection Report 05000546/2024010 ML23313A1552023-12-0101 December 2023 Review of the Fall 2022 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report ML23331A8922023-11-22022 November 2023 Supplement - Braidwood Security Rule Exemption Request ISFSI Docket No. Reference 05000457/LER-2023-001, Submittal of LER 2023-001-00 for Braidwood Station, Unit 2, Train B Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Was Inoperable Due to Degraded Oil in the Crank Case2023-11-17017 November 2023 Submittal of LER 2023-001-00 for Braidwood Station, Unit 2, Train B Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Was Inoperable Due to Degraded Oil in the Crank Case ML23321A0442023-11-17017 November 2023 Notification of Deviation from Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Topical Report MRP-227, Revision 1-A, Materials Reliability Program: Pressurized Water Reactor Internals Inspection and Evaluation Guideline RS-23-118, Supplemental Information Letter for Part 73 Exemption Request - Responses to Request for Confirmatory Information2023-11-10010 November 2023 Supplemental Information Letter for Part 73 Exemption Request - Responses to Request for Confirmatory Information ML23317A1192023-11-10010 November 2023 Constellation Energy Generation, LLC - 2023 Annual Report - Guarantees of Payment of Deferred Premiums RS-23-114, Proposed Alternative for Examination of Pressurizer Circumferential and Longitudinal Shell-to-Head Welds and Nozzle-to-Vessel Welds2023-11-0101 November 2023 Proposed Alternative for Examination of Pressurizer Circumferential and Longitudinal Shell-to-Head Welds and Nozzle-to-Vessel Welds IR 05000456/20234012023-10-18018 October 2023 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000456/2023401 and 05000457/2023401 IR 05000456/20230102023-10-18018 October 2023 Functional Engineering Inspection Commercial Grade Dedication Report 05000456/2023010 and 05000457/2023010 RS-23-097, Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Advisement of Leadership Changes and Submittal of Updated Standard Practice Procedures Plans2023-10-12012 October 2023 Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Advisement of Leadership Changes and Submittal of Updated Standard Practice Procedures Plans RS-23-108, Proposed Alternative for Examinations of Examination Categories B-B, B-D, and C-A Steam Generator Pressure Retaining Welds and Full Penetration Welded Nozzles2023-10-11011 October 2023 Proposed Alternative for Examinations of Examination Categories B-B, B-D, and C-A Steam Generator Pressure Retaining Welds and Full Penetration Welded Nozzles RS-23-105, Proposed Alternative for Examinations of Examination Category C-B Steam Generator Nozzle-to-Shell Welds and Nozzle Inside Radius Sections2023-10-10010 October 2023 Proposed Alternative for Examinations of Examination Category C-B Steam Generator Nozzle-to-Shell Welds and Nozzle Inside Radius Sections RS-23-093, License Amendment to Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, and Byron Station, Units 1 and 2, Technical Specifications 3.7.15, Spent Fuel Pool Boron Concentration, 3.7.16, Spent Fuel.2023-09-29029 September 2023 License Amendment to Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, and Byron Station, Units 1 and 2, Technical Specifications 3.7.15, Spent Fuel Pool Boron Concentration, 3.7.16, Spent Fuel. ML23226A0062023-09-19019 September 2023 Review of License Renewal Commitment Number 10 Submittal ML23180A1692023-09-11011 September 2023 Calvert Cliff Units 1 & 2, and R.E. Ginna Plant - Withdrawal of Proposed Alternatives to American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Requirements (Epids L-2022-LRR-0074, 0076, 0079, 0091, 0092, 0093 and 0094) IR 05000456/20230052023-08-30030 August 2023 Updated Inspection Plan for Braidwood Station Report 05000456/2023005 and 05000457/2023005 ML23234A2462023-08-25025 August 2023 Confirmation of Initial License Examination IR 05000456/20230022023-08-0303 August 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000456/2023002 and 05000457/2023002 ML23188A1292023-07-26026 July 2023 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 233 and 233 Adoption of TSTF-577, Revised Frequencies for Steam Generator Tube Inspections, Revision 1 ML23087A0762023-07-13013 July 2023 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 232 and 232 Revision of Technical Specifications for the Ultimate Heat Sink ML23191A8442023-07-10010 July 2023 05000456; 05000457 Notification of an NRC Biennial Licensed Operator Requalification Program Inspection and Request for Information ML23178A2422023-06-28028 June 2023 Reassignment of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Branch Chief in the Division of Operating Reactor Licensing for Plant Licensing Branch III RS-23-083, Withdrawal - Proposed Alternatives Related to the Steam Generators2023-06-27027 June 2023 Withdrawal - Proposed Alternatives Related to the Steam Generators RS-23-077, Response to NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2023-01, Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations2023-06-16016 June 2023 Response to NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2023-01, Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations ML23110A1152023-06-12012 June 2023 Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact Related to a Requested Increase in Ultimate Heat Sink Temperature (EPID L-2023-LLA-0042) (Letter) RS-23-074, Supplement to Application for License Amendment to Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, Technical Specification 3.7.9, Ultimate Heat Sink2023-06-0909 June 2023 Supplement to Application for License Amendment to Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, Technical Specification 3.7.9, Ultimate Heat Sink RS-23-075, Application for Technical Specification Improvement to Extend the Completion Time for Condition B of Technical Specification 3.5.1, Accumulators, Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process2023-06-0707 June 2023 Application for Technical Specification Improvement to Extend the Completion Time for Condition B of Technical Specification 3.5.1, Accumulators, Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process RS-23-050, Supplement to Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-577, Revised Frequencies for Steam Generator Tube.2023-05-22022 May 2023 Supplement to Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-577, Revised Frequencies for Steam Generator Tube. ML23138A1342023-05-18018 May 2023 Information Meeting with a Question and Answer Session to Discuss NRC 2022 End-Of-Cycle Plant Performance Assessment of Braidwood Station and Byron Station ML23132A0472023-05-12012 May 2023 Submittal of 2022 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report ML23130A0072023-05-10010 May 2023 Submittal of Core Operating Limits Report Cycle 24, Rev. 16 IR 05000456/20230012023-05-0808 May 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000456/2023001 and 05000457/2023001 ML23114A2522023-04-28028 April 2023 Request to Use a Provision of a Later Edition of the ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI ML23118A0202023-04-28028 April 2023 Submittal of 2022 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report ML23110A3202023-04-21021 April 2023 Information Request to Support the NRC Annual Baseline Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes Inspection RS-23-056, Response to Request for Additional Information to Braidwood Station, Unit 1, and Byron Station, Unit 1, for Steam Generator License Renewal Response to Commitment 102023-04-20020 April 2023 Response to Request for Additional Information to Braidwood Station, Unit 1, and Byron Station, Unit 1, for Steam Generator License Renewal Response to Commitment 10 RS-23-055, Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors2023-04-10010 April 2023 Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors ML23095A1292023-04-0505 April 2023 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report for Refueling Outage 23 ML23094A1352023-04-0404 April 2023 Request for Information for Nrc Commercial Grade Dedication Inspection Inspection Report 05000456/2023010 05000457/2023010 RS-23-052, License Amendment to Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, Technical Specification 3.7.9, Ultimate Heat Sink2023-03-24024 March 2023 License Amendment to Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, Technical Specification 3.7.9, Ultimate Heat Sink RS-23-049, Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Reactors and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations2023-03-23023 March 2023 Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Reactors and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations 2024-02-02
[Table view] Category:Licensee 30-Day Written Event Report
[Table view] |
Text
November 2, 2010 BW100120 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Braidwood Station, Unit 1 Facility Operating License No. NPF-72 NRC Docket No. STN 50-456
Subject:
Technical Requirements Manual, Section 5.3, "Special Reports" In accordance with Technical Requirements Manual (TRM), Section 5.3.c, "Special Reports",
the enclosed Special Report is being submitted. TRM Section 5.3.c, Item 3 requires that, in the event the unit is in MODE 4, 5, or 6 with the reactor head on and either the Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs), Residual Heat Removal (RHR) suction relief valves, or the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) vents are used to mitigate an RCS pressure transient, a Special Report be prepared and submitted to the NRC within 30 days. The Special Report shall describe the circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the PORVs, RHR suction relief valves, or RCS vents on the transient, and any corrective action necessary to prevent recurrence.
On October 4, 2010 during shutdown for Braidwood Unit 1 Refueling Outage 15 (A1R15), the 1B RHR suction relief valve lifted in response to an RCS pressure transient during a plant evolution. Therefore, a Special Report is required to be submitted to the NRC by November 3, 2010. The attached enclosure provides the Special Report.
There are no regulatory commitments contained in this letter.
Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Mr. Ronald Gaston, Regulatory Assurance Manager, at (815) 417-2800.
Sincerely, Amir Shahkarami Site Vice President Braidwood Station
Enclosure:
30 Day Special Report Due to Reactor Coolant System Pressure Transient cc: NRC Regional Administrator, Region III NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Braidwood Station
Enclosure 30 Day Special Report Due to Reactor Coolant System Pressure Transient In accordance with Technical Requirements Manual (TRM), Section 5.3.c, "Special Reports,"
Item 3, in the event the unit is in MODE 4, 5, or 6 with the reactor head on and either the Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs), Residual Heat Removal (RHR) suction relief valves, or the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) vents are used to mitigate an RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the NRC within 30 days. The Special Report shall describe the circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the PORVs, RHR suction relief valves, or RCS vents on the transient, and any corrective action necessary to prevent recurrence.
On October 4, 2010 during shutdown for Braidwood Unit 1 Refueling Outage 15 (A1R15), the 1B RHR suction relief valve lifted in response to an RCS pressure transient during a plant evolution. Therefore, the following information is being provided.
Circumstances initiating the transient On October 3, 2010, at 2300, Braidwood Unit 1 was shut down to begin refueling outage A1R15. Changes from previous outage plans resulted in several activities being performed simultaneously while the RCS was water solid. Typically, one train of Technical Specification (TS) surveillance testing of Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Safety Injection (SI) manual initiation and Phase A Containment Isolation manual initiation (SI/Phase A) is performed during the cooldown, and one train is performed while the RCS is under water solid conditions. This allows operators an opportunity to become accustomed to plant response before going water solid since the impact before going solid is not as significant. Delays in placing both RHR trains in service caused a cascading shift in outage activities resulting in both trains of the ESFAS TS surveillance testing being performed during RCS water solid conditions and coincident with RCS degassing.
To reduce dose as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA), hydrogen peroxide is added to the RCS for cleanup. The chemistry criteria for hydrogen peroxide addition include: RCS and pressurizer temperature within limits with the pressurizer solid (Le., RCS water solid), and Volume Control Tank (VCT) and RCS hydrogen concentration reduced to the extent possible.
The hydrogen concentration is reduced by performing a VCT degassing evolution. Mechanical degassing is performed by raising the VCT level to nearly full and opening the VCT vent valve to remove hydrogen gas from the VCT to the Waste Gas System. VCT level is reduced when a nitrogen cover gas is applied and the process is repeated several times until the desired RCS hydrogen concentration is achieved. In support of ALARA considerations, Chemistry requested a maximum RCS letdown flow through the Chemical Volume Control System (CVCS) demineralizers to maximize RCS cleanup prior to hydrogen peroxide addition and to continue after hydrogen peroxide addition until the last reactor coolant pump was stopped. The higher RCS letdown flow also assists in reducing RCS hydrogen concentration faster.
On October 4,2010, the first Sl/Phase A TS surveillance test was started with the RCS at approximately 350 psig and 140°F and the RCS under water solid conditions. A Heightened Level of Awareness (HLA) brief was performed. After the HLA brief, the Nuclear Station Operator (NSOs) began to align plant systems for the SI/Phase A TS surveillance test. This alignment required approximately 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> to complete. During plant alignment, an NSO was maintaining the RCS water solid. RCS letdown flow was 135 gpm and matched with charging flow to maintain the RCS water solid. A slight RCS cooldown was in progress and required Page 1 of 3
some adjustments to charging and letdown flow to maintain the RCS water solid. In addition, VCT degassing was continued by raising and lowering VCT level.
Following plant alignment to support the TS surveillance test and just prior to the actuation of the manual Sl/Phase A signal, the Test Coordinator performed an update brief with the Control Room. The update brief focused on the actuation and expected annunciator response, not on expected plant response. Current plant conditions were not verified against the prerequisites.
At the time of the initial HLA brief, the VCT level prerequisite was met at 48%. However, during plant alignment to support surveillance testing, VCT degassing continued resulting in VCT level rising. At the time of actuating the manual Sl/Phase A signal, the VCT level was at 88%.
In support of Sl/Phase A surveillance testing, the charging pump suction from the VCT was realigned to the Refueling Water Storage Tank. However, letdown was still directed to the VCT. Although the normal letdown isolation valves closed on the Phase A isolation signal, letdown flow was still aligned from the RHR pump discharge through the RHR to CV Letdown Flow Control Valve (1CV128). This resulted in the VCT filling at a rate of 135 gpm, because letdown was still established while normal charging was isolated.
The input to the VCT was recognized by the NSOs with the level at 88% and rising rapidly. The NSO immediately diverted letdown flow to the Hold Up Tank (HUT). However, this flowpath created a change in letdown flow backpressure resulting in letdown flow rising to 150 gpm. In an attempt to match letdown and charging flowrates, one NSO began to reduce letdown flow while another NSO began to reduce charging flow to maintain the RCS water solid and reduce the flow through the CVCS demineralizers due to concerns with the potential for channeling the resin. The flow balance was required to maintain RCS pressure adequate for RCP operation.
Due to the difference in valve controller response times, the NSO reduced letdown flow faster than the other NSO reduced charging flow. Normally, letdown and charging flow would be reduced in small increments and allow RCS pressure to stabilize. As a result of the reduced letdown flow with higher charging flow while the RCS was water solid, an RCS pressure perturbation was experienced and an RHR suction relief valve lifted to lower RCS pressure.
Charging and letdown flow were re-balanced to maintain 135 gpm letdown flow and RCS pressure stabilized at 350 psig.
Effect of the RHR Suction Reliefs on the Transient The 1B RHR suction relief lifted at 450 psig to lower RCS pressure and reseated. The 1A RHR suction relief did not lift. The 1B RHR suction relief valve lifted at the proper setpoint and was verified reseated by thermography. No Technical Specifications were required to be entered.
No EAL thresholds were met.
Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence The following corrective actions will be implemented:
- This event will be incorporated into Just-In-Time Training performed prior to refueling outages to address operation during RCS water solid conditions and contingencies.
- Procedures will be revised to add better controls because the surveillance alignment requires several hours to complete and some plant conditions and strategies for controlling key plant parameters when the RCS is water solid may change.
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- Any activities impacting RCS letdown or charging during RCS water solid conditions will be identified in the refueling outage schedules and logic ties incorporated to control schedule changes during this time period.
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