ML101160185
| ML101160185 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 04/30/2010 |
| From: | GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy Americas |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| DRF 0000-0112-6795, TAC ME0438, TAC ME2451 NEDO-32484, Suppl 1, Rev 0 | |
| Download: ML101160185 (81) | |
Text
ATTACHMENT 21 Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN)
Unit I Technical Specifications (TS) Change-473 AREVA Fuel Transition Supplementary Report Regarding ECCS-LOCA Additional Single Failure Evaluation (Non-Proprietary)
Attached is the non-proprietary version of the Supplementary Report Regarding ECCS-LOCA Additional Single Failure Evaluation at Current Licensed Thermal Power, dated April 2010.
HITACHI GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy NEDO-32484, Supplement 1 Revision 0 DRF 0000-0112-6795 Class I April 2010 Non-ProprietaryInformation BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT REGARDING ECCS-LOCA ADDITIONAL SINGLE FAILURE EVALUATION AT CURRENT LICENSED THERMAL POWER Copyright 2010 GE-HitachiNuclear Energy Americas LLC All Rights Reserved
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION NOTICE This is a non-proprietary version of the document NEDC-32484P, Supplement 1, Revision 0, from which the proprietary information has been removed. Portions of the document that have been removed are identified by white space within double square brackets, as shown here IMPORTANT NOTICE REGARDING CONTENTS OF TIIIS REPORT PLEASE READ CAREFULLY The only undertakings of GEH with respect to information in this document are contained in the contract between TVA and GEH, and nothing contained in this document shall be construed as changing that contract. The use of this information by anyone for any purpose other than that for which it is intended is not authorized; and with respect to any unauthorized use, GEH makes no representation or warranty, and assumes no liability as to the completeness, accuracy, or usefulness of the information contained in this document.
No use of or right to copy any of this information contained in this document, other than by the NRC and its contractors in support of GEH's application, is authorized except by contract with GEH, as noted above. The information provided in this document is part of and dependent upon a larger set of knowledge, technology, and intellectual property rights pertaining to the design of standardized, nuclear powered, electric generating facilities. Without access and a GEH grant of rights to that larger set of knowledge, technology, and intellectual property rights, this document is not practically or rightfully usable by others, except by the NRC or through contractual agreements with TVA, as set forth in the previous paragraph.
Copyright 2010, GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy Americas LLC, All Rights Reserved.
ii
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION CONTENTS Page
1.0 INTRODUCTION
....................................................................................................... 1
2.0 DESCRIPTION
OF MODELS ...................................................................................... 2 3.0 ANALYSIS PROCEDURE ............................................................................................. 3 3.1 Licensing Criteria ............................................................... I............................................ 3 3.2 SAFER/GESTR-LOCA Licensing M ethodology ...................................................... 3 3.3 Generic Analysis ........................................................................................................ 3 3.4 BFNP Specific Analysis ............................................................................................ 3 4.0 INPUT TO ANALYSIS ................................................................................................. 4 4.1 Plant Inputs ..................................................................................................................... 4 4.2 Fuel Parameters ....................................................................................................... 4 4.3 ECCS Param eters ........................................................................................................ 4 5.0 RESULTS ................................................... ........................................................................ 8 5.1 Recirculation Line Breaks ........................................................................................... 8 5.2 Feedwater Line Breaks .............................................................................................. 9 5.3 Steam Line Breaks ................................................................................................... 11 5.4 Core Spray Line Breaks ............................................................................................. 13 5.5 Other Non-Recirculation Line Breaks ...................................................................... 14 5.6 Alternate Operating Modes ........................................ 15 5.7 Local Oxidation and Core-W ide M etal W ater Reaction ........................................... 15 5.8 Compliance Evaluation ............................................................................................. 16 6.0 CON CLUSION S ............................................................................................................... 18
7.0 REFERENCES
................................................................................................................. 19 APPENDIX A LOCA Event Timing Sequence (Appendix K Assumption Cases) ......... 20 APPENDIX B System Response Curves (Appendix K Assumption Cases) ................ 28 iii
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT I REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this document is to supplement the ECCS-LOCA evaluation results for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 (BFNP) documented in the Reference 7 analysis. The analysis methodology is consistent with that defined in Reference 7. The updated plant ECCS parameters (Reference 8) are used and the additional single failure cases are evaluated.
For the standard licensing analysis of the small break loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) several conservative assumptions are made about system operations and operator actions. These assumptions exaggerate the severity of the predicted consequence of a small break to conservatively bound the expected results. The most limiting single active failure is assumed to occur in conjunction with the pipe break. For small breaks, this limiting failure is typically the failure that leads to the loss of the high pressure emergency core cooling system (ECCS), and depending on the specific plant design, this single failure may also affect the performance of additional ECCS.
A review of the single failure analysis performed in the Reference 7 SAFER/GESTR-LOCA evaluation indicated that the evaluated single failure might not be the limiting single failure for Browns Ferry Unit 1. Reference 7 evaluated the single failure of Battery Board 1, impacting 250vDC RMOV Board 1A power loss (named Battery Board 1 in this report), which renders HPCI inoperable but leaves 6 automatic depressurization system (ADS) valves operable in automatic mode. The single failure of Battery Board 3, impacting 250vDC RMOV Board 1B power loss (named Battery Board 3 in this report) which leaves HPCI operable, 1 low pressure core spray (LPCS) operable, but renders the 6 ADS valves inoperable in automatic mode (4 ADS valves remain available in manual mode 10 minutes after the transient starts) may be more limiting. The Reference 7 report remains valid for Battery Board 1 single failure scenarios.
This report summarizes both the 250vDC RMOV Board IA and 1B single failure results for Browns Ferry Unit 1 at CLTP (3,458 MWth). This evaluation examines the break spectrum at recirculation suction line and discharge line locations, as well as the feedwater line, steam line, and the core spray line. Other non-limiting line breaks are also addressed in this report.
This analysis is performed for GEl4 fuel only. An analysis of GE13 fuel is not required because all the resident GEl3 fuel is highly exposed and loaded in low duty peripheral locations.
Justification regarding ECCS-LOCA compliance for GE13 fuel is demonstrated in Section 5.8.3.
I
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
2.0 DESCRIPTION
OF MODELS Consistent with Reference 7, the ECCS-LOCA results are generated using the standard four computer models. These models are LAMB, TASC, SAFER and GESTR-LOCA. See Reference 7 for further details.
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NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION 3.0 ANALYSIS PROCEDURE 3.1 Licensing Criteria Consistent with Reference 7, the acceptance criteria for the ECCS-LOCA results are based on the Code of Federal Regulations, 10 CFR 50.46. See Reference 7 for further details.
3.2 SAFER/GESTR-LOCA Licensing Methodology Consistent with Reference 7, the ECCS-LOCA analysis was generated using the SAFER/GESTR-LOCA licensing methodology that is discussed in References 1 through 5 (approved by the NRC) and the Reference 6 (as reviewed by the NRC in the letter specified in Reference 6).
3.3 Generic Analysis The generic ECCS-LOCA analysis for the BWR/3-4 product line is described in References 3 and 7.
3.4 BFNP Specific Analysis The BFNP plant specific SAFER/GESTR-LOCA analysis documented in Reference 7 analyzed the break spectrum for a variety of break locations, single failures, break sizes, and power flow operating conditions. Conservative values of peak linear heat generation rate (PLHGR) and initial minimum critical power ratio (MCPR) were utilized. Additionally, many of the ECCS parameters were conservatively established relative to their actual performance. See Reference 7 for further details.
3
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION 4.0 INPUT TO ANALYSIS 4.1 Plant Inputs The plant operating conditions for the BFNP LOCA analysis are presented in Table 4-1 of Reference 7. These inputs remain applicable to this additional Battery Board 3 single failure analysis.
4.2 Fuel Parameters All SAFER/GESTR-LOCA calculations are performed with a limiting combination of fuel rod power and pellet exposure (Table 4-2 of Reference 7). The axial power shape is calculated for each mid-peaked and top-peaked axial power shape to place the hot rod on the PLHGR limit while the bundle power is on the MCPR limit.
4.3 ECCS Parameters As discussed in Section 1, the Operating Plant Licensing parameters (OPL-4/5) used in this analysis are presented in Reference 8. Table 1 shows ECCS parameters utilized in this analysis that are different than those shown in Table 4-3 of Reference 7. Because these updated ECCS parameters are modified relative to the Reference 7 inputs, the results from Reference 7 remain conservative and valid.
Table 2 identifies the combinations of break locations, single failures and available systems applicable to the BFNP ECCS configuration. Because ADS does not affect the large break peak cladding temperature (PCT), the large break results from Reference 7 remain valid. However, additional small recirculation line break cases are evaluated for the Battery Board 3 single failure scenario, as well as other non-recirculation line breaks. Also, other non-limiting single failures are addressed in this report.
All known ECCS-LOCA analysis errors (up to and including error # 2006-01) have been considered in this analysis.
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NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Table 1 Updated ECCS Parameters (HPCI System)
High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System Variable Units Analysis Value
- a. Operating pressure range Maximum psid (vessel to torus) 1120(1)
Minimum psid (vessel to torus) 150(l)
- b. Minimum flow over the above pressure range gpm 5000(1)
C. Allowable time delay from initiating signal to rated flow sec 35 (2) available and injection valve wide open II Note:
- 1. HPCI pump flow curve full table is as follows:
Vessel to Torus Pressure HPCI Flow Rate (gpm)
Drop (psid)
<150 0 150 5000 1120 5000 1174 3600 (Linear interpolate HPCI flow between 1120 and 1174 psid)
>1174 0
- 2. Does not include signal processing delay time of 2 seconds. (Analysis uses 37 seconds).
5
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Table 2 BFNP Unit 1 Single Failure Evaluation 2
Remaining Systems Assumed Failure' Recirculation Suction Break Recirculation' Discharge Break Battery3 6 ADS4 , 1-LPCS 5 , 2-LPCI ADS ,
4 6 6 1-LPCS' (Battery Board 1, RMOV Board IA) (2 pumps into 1 loop)
Battery3 HPCI, 1-LPCS5 , 2-LPCI (Battery Board 3, RMOV Board (PCt, 1 -LPCSp lB) 7 (2 pumps into I loop)
Battery 3 4 ADS 4, HPCI, 2-LPCS5 , 4-LPCI 4 ADS 4, HPCI, 2-LPCS5 , 2-6 (Battery Board 2, RMOV Board IC) (2 pumps per loop) 6 LPCI (2 pumps into I loop)
Opposite Unit False LOCA Signal 6 ADS4, HPCI, 1-LPCS 5 6 , 2-LPCI ADS 4 , I{pCI, l-LpCS5 (U1 & 2 only) 8 (2 pumps into 1 loop) 6 LPCI Injection Valve 6 ADS 4, HPCI, 2-LPCSs, 2-LPCI 6 ADS, PCI, 2-LPCS' (2 pumps into 1 loop)6 5
Diesel Generator 6 ADS4, HPCI, 1-LPCS 5
6 , 2-LPCI 6 ADS 4 , BpCI, l-LpCS (2 pumps into 1 loop)
HPCI 6 ADS4 , .2-LPCS5 , 64-LPCI 6 ADS 4, 2-LPC5', 2-LPCI (2 pumps per loop) (2 pumps into I loop)
HPCI, 2-LPCS5 , 6 9
5 ADS4 , I-PCI, 2-LPCS5 ,
4-LPCI (2 pumps per loop) 2-LPCI (2 pumps into 1 loop) 6 5
ADS10 4 ADS, HPCI, 2-LPCS5 , 6 4 ADS, HPCI, 2-LPCS , 6 4-LPCI (2 pumps per loop) 2-LPCI (2 pumps into 1 loop)
Other postulated failures are not specifically considered because they all result in at least as much ECCS capacity as one of the above assumed failures.
2 Systems remaining, as identified in the table for recirculation suction line breaks, are applicable to other non-ECCS line breaks. For a LOCA from an ECCS line break, the systems remaining are those listed for recirculation suction breaks, less the ECCS in which the break is assumed.
1 Loss of a particular battery board impacts 250vDC RMOV board power loss differently for each plant depending, on the normal RMOV board power sources. (i) Loss of the RMOV board B eliminates the automatic feature of ADS. However, 4 ADS valves remain available for manual actuation at 10 minutes after break initiation. (ii) Loss of the RMOV board C results in loss of normal power to ADS solenoids for valves 1-5, and 1-34. However, the alternate power for valves 1-5, and 1-34 is the same as the source power for RMOV board C. Consequently, only 4 ADS valves are available for automatic actuation. (iii)Loss of battery board 2 does not impact the number of available LPCS/LPCI trains.
Loss of battery board 3 causes loss of Division II core spray and LPCI (B & D pumps). Loss of battery board 1 causes loss of Division I core spray and LPCI (A & C pumps).
No separate analyses required to support 1 ADS valve out-of-service (ADSOOS), as discussed in footnote 9.
Each LPCS means operation of two core spray pumps in a system. It is assumed that both pumps in a system must operate to take credit for core spray cooling or inventory makeup.
2-LPCI (2 pumps in 1 loop) means one LPCI loop with two RHR pumps operating; 2-LPCI (2 pumps in 2 loops) means one RHR pump in each loop operating. 4-LPCI (2 pumps in 2 loops) means two RHR pumps in each of two loops operating.
Loss of the RMOV Board B leads to loss of ADS automatic initiation function. However, in this case, a minimum of 4 ADS valves are assumed to be available for manual activation no sooner than 10 minutes after event initiation.
0 An opposite unit false LOCA signal only affects the number of available systems for combinations of real and spurious accident signals between Units 1 & 2. Combination of real and spurious accident signals between Units 1 & 3, or between Units 2 & 3, will not impact the number of available systems in either unit.
This scenario basically represents a single ADSOOS condition. Analysis of this single failure is not required, as the plant would enter Condition E of LCO 3.5.1, with allowed 14 day duration.
'0A special case of ADS failure involves failure of initiation logic. However, in this case, a minimum of 4 ADS valves are assumed to be available for manual activation no sooner than 10 minutes after event initiation.
6
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT I REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION The worst single failure is usually the failure that disables the largest amount of ECCS capacity.
For large breaks, disabling low pressure systems (i.e., LPCI or LPCS) is worse since the reactor depressurizes rapidly to pressures where the low pressure systems are most effective. For small breaks the worst single failure is usually the one that disables the high pressure systems (i.e.,
HPCI, ADS) as well as the maximum number of additional low pressure systems.
For BFNP, Table 2 indicates that Battery Board 1 and Battery Board 3 are potential candidates for the worst single failure for small breaks while Battery Board 1 and the LPCI IV are potentially the worst single failures for larger breaks.
The battery failure described in Table 4-4 of Reference 7 was determined to be the worst single failure for large and small breaks. The Reference 7 battery failure is the Battery Board 1 single failure presented in Table 2. The LPCI IV single failure was determined to be non-limiting in Reference 7. As noted in the introduction, the Reference 7 report remains valid for Battery Board 1 single failure scenarios.
The Battery Board 3 single failure, which leaves HPCI operable, 1 LPCS operable, but renders the 6 ADS valves inoperable in automatic mode (4 ADS valves remain available in manual mode 10 minutes after the transient starts) may be more limiting than the Reference 7 defined battery single failure and is therefore investigated in this analysis.
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NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION 5.0 RESULTS 5.1 Recirculation Line Breaks Using the Appendix K and nominal assumptions, analyses of different single failure and different break sizes were performed.
Results of various recirculation suction line break scenarios with Battery Board 1 assumed single failure from Reference 7 are provided in Table 3 for comparison with corresponding Battery Board 3 assumed single failure scenarios. Since the Battery Board 1 failure scenario results in HPCI being unavailable, the PCT results are not affected by the updated ?PCI system parameters presented in Table 1.
The Table 3 results show that the limiting break and single failure combination for GE14 fuel is the (( )) recirculation discharge line break with Battery Board 3 assumed single failure.
Consequently, the corresponding small break nominal case with the limiting PCT provides the basis for the sensitivity study in the Licensing Basis PCT calculation presented in Section 5.8.
The mid-peaked and top-peaked axial power shapes are both considered in the ECCS-LOCA analysis. ((
The most limiting Appendix K case, for large breaks, is the maximum recirculation suction line break with Battery Board 1 assumed single failure ((
)) Because ADS does not affect the large break PCT, the large break results from Reference 7 remain valid.
Table 3 Single Failure Study for Recirculation Line Breaks for GE14 at CLTP (1)
Break Break Single Mid-peak Top-peak Size Location Failure PCT ('F) PCT (f) 8
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Break Break Single Mid-peak Top-peak Size Location Failure PCT (0 F) PCT (fF)
Note:
- 1. ((
- 2. The analyses used the more conservative ECCS parameter values in Reference 7.
- 3. ((
5.2 Feedwater Line Breaks The non-recirculation line breaks are typically less limiting than the recirculation line breaks because the break location is well above the top of the core. However, a break in the ECCS line (or feedwater line for HPCI) may be more' limiting because the break prevents the flow from that 9
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION system from reaching the vessel. Experience shows that the limiting failure for the small recirculation line break will also be the limiting failure for the non-recirculation line breaks (i.e.,
the failure that disables the HPCI and the most low pressure ECC systems). However, for a feedwater line break, it is important to carefully consider an assumed single failure that disables the ADS function, as is the case with the Battery Board 3 assumed single failure.
Although HPCI is presented in Table 2 as a remaining system with the assumed single failure of Battery Board 3, a break in the line that provides the HPCI injection is analyzed in order to conservatively minimize the number of available mitigating ECCS. As shown in Figure 1, the feedwater line is assumed to break at a point downstream of where the HPCI injection line connects to the feedwater line. This prevents HPCI injection from reaching the vessel and reduces the vessel depressurization rate, which in turn delays the low pressure ECCS injection.
Moreover, HPCI is assumed to initiate on high drywell pressure at the onset of the event to maximize the delay of low pressure makeup water injection. It is also conservatively assumed that no steam is extracted for HPCI steam turbine operation.
Containment Vessel Break Reactor Vesselai Main Feedwater Line From HPCI Pump Figure 1 Feedwater Line Break Demonstration The Battery Board 1 assumed single failure is identical to the feedwater line break scenario presented in Table 5-2 of Reference 7 and therefore remains valid.
Using the Appendix K assumptions, analysis of the feedwater line break spectrum was performed for both mid-peaked and top-peaked axial power shapes. The results of these analyses are presented in Table 4.
The feedwater line break transient is presented in Figures B-5a - g. ((
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NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Table 4 Break Spectrum for Feedwater Line Breaks (Appendix K Assumption)(1' Break Break Single Top Peak APS Mid Peak APS Size Location Failure PCT (-F) PCT (-F)
Note:
- 1. ((
1]
- 2. ((
The break spectrum trend presented in Table 4 demonstrates that the (( )) break size is the size where break flow is approximately equal to the HPCI capacity. Break sizes larger than
)) result in a greater inventory loss and faster vessel depressurization permitting low pressure ECCS to start earlier and thus resulting in a lower PCT. Break sizes smaller than ((
)) experience the same vessel depressurization rate, but with less inventory loss, and this produces a lower PCT. The evaluation also confirms that the (( )) axial power shape yields the limiting PCT for feedwater line breaks.
I((
5.3 Steam Line Breaks Typically, only the full sized break is analyzed. However, in the case of BFNP it is necessary to analyze a spectrum of break sizes to determine the worst break size because operator action is required for depressurization due to the concurrent inoperability of HPCI and ADS as a result of the combination of the break location and Battery Board 3 assumed single failure. Again, the
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT I REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Battery Board 1 assumed single failure is identical to the scenario presented in Table 5-2 of Reference 7 and therefore remains valid.
The (( )) feedwater line break, discussed in Section 5.2 demonstrates the expected response of a steam line break since the break is uncovered for most of the transient. ((
Containment Break Vessel To HPCI Reactor Turbine Vessel Flow Limiter Main Steam Line Figure 2 Steam Line Break Demonstration
((
Using the Appendix K assumptions, analysis of the steam line break spectrum was performed for both mid-peaked and top-peaked axial power shapes. ((
)) The results of these analyses are presented in Table 5.
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NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Table 5 Break Spectrum for Steam Line Breaks (Appendix K Assumption)"1 )
Break Break Single Top Peak APS Mid Peak APS Size Location Failure PCT (0 F) PCT (fF)
Er
_ _ -]
Note:
- 1. [
1]
- 2. ((
1]
Comparing Table 4 and Table 5 results, the difference between steam and liquid breaks is apparent. Figures B-6 a - g show that a (( )) steam line break is effectively equivalent to the (( )) feedwater line break case. This is because of two factors : 1) A steam break removes less mass through the break than a corresponding liquid break, and 2) the depressurization of the system reduces the break flow. ((
5.4 Core Spray Line Breaks When analyzing a core spray line break with a battery failure, it is conservatively assumed that the battery failure disables an emergency diesel generator which disables one core spray system and the break is assumed in the core spray line in the other division, thus leaving no core spray systems available. Typically, only the full sized breaks are analyzed but for the purpose of this report a variety of breaks are analyzed for the Battery Board 3 assumed single failure. [
)) It is expected that the results of these calculations will not be significantly different that the core spray line break results presented in Table 5-2 of Reference 7 because the remaining ECCS (HPCI and 2 LPCI) are more than adequate to mitigate the full core spray line break spectrum. However, it is important to 13
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION note that since both core spray systems are unavailable, core submergence is required in order to comply with 10CFR50.46 criterion 5 for long-term cooling.
Using the Appendix K assumptions, analysis of the core spray line break spectrum was performed for both mid-peaked and top-peaked axial power shapes. The results of these analyses are presented in Table 6.
Table 6 Break Spectrum for Core Spray Line Breaks (Appendix K Assumption)(')
Break Break Single Top Peak APS Mid Peak APS Size Location Failure PCT (0 F) PCT (fF)
Notes:
- 1. ((
I]
The results of this evaluation of the Battery Board 3 assumed single failure presented in Figures B-7a-g ((
5.5 Other Non-Recirculation Line Breaks Other non-recirculation line breaks such as the RCIC steam line and injection line breaks, and RWCU line breaks are less limiting than the recirculation line break. This is because of three factors: 1) The break location is well above the top of the core, 2) the smaller line sizes, and 3) the ECCS capacity considering a worst case single failure is higher than the scenarios presented in the Section 5.1 through 5.4. ((
)) Based on this discussion, the non-recirculation line break results presented in Sections 5.2 through 5.4 sufficiently demonstrate that other non-recirculation line breaks are non-limiting relative to the recirculation line breaks.
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NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION 5.6 Alternate Operating Modes 5.6.1 Reduced Core Flow Regions (MELLLA)
MELLLA conditions are characterized by increased downcomer subcooling that results from the reduced core flow. The increased downcomer subcooling results in a higher initial break flow, earlier boiling transition, and an earlier core uncovery, with the predominant effect being the earlier boiling transition. The Appendix K results show that the limiting break and single failure combination for GE14 fuel is the ((
5]
5.6.2 Increased Core Flow (ICF)
((I 5.6.3 Final Feedwater Temperature Reduction (FFWTR) / Feedwater Heater Out-Of-Service (FWHOOS)
FFWTR / FWHOOS conditions are characterized by increased downcomer subcooling that results from the reduced feedwater temperature. The Reference 7 analysis concluded that the reduced feedwater temperature was characteristic by the higher liquid inventory and lower void fraction inside the core region, ((-
)) The Reference 7 conclusion remains valid 5.6.4 Single Loop Operation (SLO)
I((
5.7 Local Oxidation and Core-Wide Metal Water Reaction The local oxidation and core-wide metal water reaction (CWMWR) results for key cases performed in this analysis are presented in Table 7.
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NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Table 7 Local Oxidation and CWMWR (Appendix K Assumption Cases)
Break Break Single APS PCT Local CWMWR Size Location Failure OF Oxid. (%) (%)
5.8 Compliance Evaluation 5.8.1 Licensing Basis PCT Evaluation for GE14 Fuel As the BFNP SAFER/GESTR-LOCA results presented in Reference 7 and Section 5 of this report indicate, a sufficient number of plant-specific PCT points have been evaluated to establish the shape of both the nominal and Appendix K PCT versus break size curves.
The Appendix K results show that the limiting break is the recirculation discharge line break at
)) with Battery Board 3 failure for GEl4 fuel (Table 3). ((
)). The licensing basis PCT for GE14 fuel at current licensed thermal power 3458 MWt is calculated by applying the NRC approved SAFER/GESTR-LOCA licensing methodology described in Reference 3. BFNP unique variable uncertainties, including backflow leakage, ECCS initiation signal, stored energy, fuel rod gap pressure, and ADS actuation delay, were evaluated specifically to determine plant-specific adders. The final calculated licensing basis PCT is determined by top-peaked axial power shape and is presented in Table 8.
5.8.2 Plant-specific Upper Bound PCT Calculation for GE14 Fuel The primary purpose of the Upper Bound PCT calculation is to demonstrate that the Licensing Basis PCT is sufficiently conservative by showing that the Licensing Basis PCT is higher than the Upper Bound PCT.
The Upper Bound PCTs were calculated for GEl4 fuel at current licensed thermal power 3458 MWt. The results show that the licensing basis PCT is below the 10 CFR 50.46 limit of 2200'F and the Licensing Basis PCT bounds the corresponding Upper Bound PCT. Therefore, 10 CFR 50.46 acceptance criteria and the NRC SER requirements for SAFER/GESTR methodology are met for the complete licensed operating domain.
.16
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Table 8 BFNP ECCS-LOCA Analysis Results for GE14 CLTP Condition Parameter GE14 Result Acceptance Criteria
- 1. Licensing Basis PCT 1920°F < 2200°F
- 2. Upper Bound PCT 1480OF < LBPCT (1920°F)
- 3. Maximum Local < 4% < 17%
Oxidation
- 4. Core Wide < 0.1% < 1.0%
Metal-Water Reaction
- 5. Coolable Geometry Items 1 AND 2 Satisfied by:
PCT < 2200OF AND Maximum Local Oxidation < 17%
- 6. Core Long Term Satisfied by: Core temperature acceptably low Cooling EITHER AND Core reflooded above TAF Long-term decay heat removed OR Core reflooded to the elevation of jet pump suction and 1 core spray system in operation 5.8.3 GEl 3 Fuel Justification While the above analysis was performed for GE14 fuel, the results are also applicable to GEl3 fuel. Table 5-1 of Reference 7 shows that the GE13 PCT response is similar to the GE14 PCT response; therefore, it is expected that the GEl3 Battery Board 3 PCT increase will be similar to the GE14 Battery Board 3 PCT increase. ((
)) For these reasons it is judged that the existing GE13 Licensing Basis PCT of 181 0°F remains conservative and valid.
17
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
6.0 CONCLUSION
S LOCA analyses have been performed for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Units 1 using the GE SAFER/GESTR-LOCA application methodology approved by the NRC. These analyses were performed to demonstrate conformance with 10CFR50.46 and Appendix K, and to support a revised licensing basis for BFNP with the GE SAFER/GESTR-LOCA methodology.
The analyses demonstrate that the limiting GE14 Licensing Basis PCT at CLTP conditions occurs for the recirculation discharge line small break with Battery Board 3 assumed single failure at a break area of ((
The analyses demonstrate that the current GE13 Licensing Basis PCT of 1810'F at CLTP conditions remains valid with a (( ))
Table 8 summarizes the key SAFER/GESTR GE14 licensing results for BFNP at CLTP conditions.
The analyses presented are performed in accordance with NRC requirements and demonstrate conformance with the ECCS acceptance criteria of 10CFR50.46. Therefore, the results documented in this report may be used to provide a new GE14 LOCA Licensing Basis for BFNP.
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NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
7.0 REFERENCES
1 NEDE-23785-1-PA, Vol. I, "The GESTR-LOCA and SAFER Models for the Evaluation of the Loss-of-Coolant Accident, Volume I, GESTR-LOCA - A Model for the Prediction of Fuel Rod Thermal Performance," Revision 1, General Electric Company, October 1984.
2 NEDE-23785-1-PA, Vol. II, "The GESTR-LOCA and SAFER Models for the Evaluation of the Loss-of-Coolant Accident, Volume II, SAFER - Long Term Inventory Model for BWR Loss-of-Coolant Analysis," Revision 1, General Electric Company, October 1984.
3 NEDE-23785-1-PA, Vol. III, "The GESTR-LOCA and SAFER Models for the Evaluation of the Loss-of-Coolant Accident, Volume III, SAFER/GESTR Application Methodology,"
Revision 1, General Electric Company, October 1984.
4 NEDE-23785P-A, Vol. III, Supplement 1, "GESTR-LOCA and SAFER Models for the Evaluation of the Loss-of-Coolant Accident Volume III, Supplement 1, Additional Information for Upper Bound PCT Calculation," Revision 1, General Electric Company, March 2002.
5 NEDC-32084P-A, "TASC-03A A Computer Program for Transient Analysis of a Single Channel," Revision 2, July 2002.
6 NEDC-32950P, "Compilation of Improvements to GENE's SAFER ECCS-LOCA Evaluation Model," January 2000 as reviewed by letter from S. A. Richards (NRC) to J. F.
Klapproth (GE), "General Electric Nuclear Energy (GENE) Topical Reports NEDC-32950P and NEDC-32084P Acceptability Review," May 24, 2000.
7 NEDC-32484P, "Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Units 1, 2 and 3 SAFER/GESTER-LOCA Loss-of-Coolant Accident Analysis" Revision 6, February 2005.
8 0000-01 12-6803-RO, "OPL-4 and OPL-5 for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Only SAFER/GESTR-LOCA Analysis," Revision 2.1, February 2010.
19
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION APPENDIX A LOCA Event Timing Sequence (Appendix K Assumption Cases)
Included in this appendix are the LOCA event timing sequences for BFNP. Table A-1 shows the table numbering.
Table A-1 Appendix K Cases Timing Sequence Table Summary Note: All sequence are for GE14 fuel at CLTP.
((
Break Size DBA (( I (( II (( 11 (( 1)) (( II (( l]
Break Location Suction Discharge Discharge Discharge Feed Line Steam Line CS Line Single Failure Board 1 Board 1 Board I Board 3 Board 3 Board 3 Board 3 Table A-2 A-3 A-4 A-5 A-6 A-7 A-8 20
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Table A-2 Event Timing Sequence for Battery Board 1 Failure at DBA Suction Line Break Event Time (sec)
Break Occurs ((E Scram Initiated and Occurs Level 2 Reaches Level 1 Trip Feedwater Flow Reaches Zero Jet Pump Suction Uncovers First Peak PCT GE14 fuel Occurs Pump Suction Line Uncovers Lower Plenum Flashes MSIV Close Core Spray IV Low Pressure Opening Permissive Reached LPCI IV Low Pressure Opening Permissive Reached Recirc Discharge Valve Low Pressure Closing Permissive Core Spray IV Fully Open, Rated CS Flow Injection Recirc Discharge Valve Fully Closed LPCI IV Fully Open, Rated LPCI Flow Injection Second Peak PCT GE14 fuel Occurs Core Refloods Bypass Refloods 21
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Table A-3 Event Timing Sequence for Battery Board 1 Failure at (( )) Discharge Line Break Event Time (sec)
Break Occurs ((
Scram-Initiated and Occurs Feedwater Flow Reaches Zero Level 2 Reaches Level 1 Trip MSIV Close Jet Pump Suction Uncovers ECCS Ready Permissive to Start ADS Timer Suction Line Uncovers Lower Plenum Flashes ADS Valves Open Core Spray IV Low Pressure Opening Permissive Reached Core Spray IV Fully Open, Rated CS Flow Injection Recirc Discharge Valve Low Pressure Closing Permissive Recirc Discharge Valve Fully Closed Peak PCT GE14 fuel Occurs Core Refloods Bypass Refloods ))
22
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Table A-4 Event Timing Sequence for Battery Board 1 Failure at (( )) Discharge Line Break Event Time (sec)
Break Occurs ((
Scram Initiated and Occurs Feedwater Flow Reaches Zero Level 2 Reaches Level 1 Trip MSIV Close ECCS Ready Permissive to Start ADS Timer SRVs Open Jet Pump Suction Uncovers ADS Valves Open Lower Plenum Flashes Pump Suction Line Uncovers Core Spray IV Low Pressure Opening Permissive Reached Core Spray IV Fully Open, Rated CS Flow Injection Recirc Discharge Valve Low Pressure Closing Permissive Recire Discharge Valve Fully Closed Peak PCT GE14 fuel Occurs Core Refloods Bypass Refloods ))
23
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Table A-5 Event Timing Sequence for Battery Board 3 Failure at (( )) Discharge Line Break Event Time (see)
Break Occurs ((
Scram Initiated and Occurs Feedwater Flow Reaches Zero Level 2 Reaches HPCI Starts, Flow Injection to the Vessel Lower Plenum Flashes MSIV Close Jet Pump Suction Uncovers Pump Suction Line Uncovers Core Spray IV Low Pressure Opening Permissive Reached Core Spray IV Fully Open, Rated CS Flow Injection Recirc Discharge Valve Low Pressure Closing Permissive Recirc Discharge Valve Fully Closed Peak PCT GE14 fuel Occurs Core Refloods Bypass Refloods ADS Valves Open 24
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Table A-6 Event Timing Sequence for Battery Board 3 Failure at (( ))Feedwater Line Break Event Time (sec)
Break Occurs ((
Scram and HIPCI initiation signal on high drywell pressure Feedwater Flow Reaches Zero HPCI injection valve open (assume no injection, no steam extracted by turbine)
Level 2 Reaches MSIV Close SRVs Open ADS Valves Open Lower Plenum Flashes Jet Pump Suction Uncovers Core Spray IV Low Pressure Opening Permissive Reached Core Spray IV Fully Open, Rated CS Flow Injection Peak PCT GEl4 fuel Occurs Core Refloods LPCI IV Low Pressure Opening Permissive Reached Recirc Discharge Valve Low Pressure Closing Permissive Bypass Refloods Recirc Discharge Valve Fully Closed LPCI IV Fully Open, Rated LPCI Flow Injection 25
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Table A-7 Event Timing Sequence for Battery Board 3 Failure at (( )) Steam Line Break Event Time (sec)
Break Occurs E[
Scram Initiated and Occurs (Steam Line High Flow Trips)
SRVs Open Feedwater Flow Reaches Zero Level 2 Reaches ADS Valves Open Lower Plenum Flashes Jet Pump Suction Uncovers Core Spray IV Low Pressure Opening Permissive Reached Core Spray IV Fully Open, Rated CS Flow Injection Peak PCT GE14 fuel Occurs Core Refloods LPCI IV Low Pressure Opening Permissive Reached Recirc Discharge Valve Low Pressure Closing Permissive Bypass Refloods Recirc Discharge Valve Fully Closed LPCI IV Fully Open, Rated LPCI Flow Injection ))
26
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Table A-8 Event Timing Sequence for Battery Board 3 Failure at (( )) Core Spray Line Break Event Time (sec)
Break Occurs ((
Scram Initiated and Occurs Peak PCT (initial value) GE14 fuel Occurs Feedwater Flow Reaches Zero HPCI Starts, Flow Injection to the Vessel Lower Plenum Flashes HPCI Stops ADS Valves Open Level 2 Reaches HPCI Starts, Flow Injection to the Vessel LPCI IV Low Pressure Opening Permissive Reached Recirc Discharge Valve Low Pressure Closing Permissive Recirc Discharge Valve Fully Closed LPCI IV Fully Open, Rated LPCI Flow Injection HPCI Stops 27
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT I REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION APPENDIX B System Response Curves (Appendix K Assumption Cases)
Included in this appendix are the system response curves for BFNP. Table B-1 shows the figure numbering.
Table B-1 Appendix K Cases Figure Summary Note: All plots are for GE14 fuel at CLTP.
All the figures are only applied to BFNP unit 1, although their title are marked as "BFNP 1/2/3" which is from standard SAFER plotting setup.
All plots of ECCS flows show flow delivered to the vessel.
For suction line breaks, the break flow stands for:
((I 1]
For discharge line breaks, the break flow stands for:
Break Size DBA (( )) (( )) (( )) (( )) ((
Break Location Suction Discharge Discharge Discharge Feed Line Steam Line CS Line Single Failure Board 1 Board 1 Board 1 Board 3 Board 3 Board 3 Board 3 Power Shape Mid Top Mid Top Top Top Top Water Level in B-la B-2a B-3a B-4a B-5a B-6a B-7a Hot & Average Channels Water Level in B-lb B-2b B-3b B-4b B-5b B-6b B-7b Downcomer Region Break Flows B-ic B-2c B-3c B-4c B-5c B-6c B-7c Reactor Vessel B-ld B-2d B-3d B-4d B-5d B-6d B-7d Pressure Peak Cladding B-le B-2e B-3e B-4e B-5e B-6e B-7e Temperature Heat Transfer B-lf B-2f B-3f B-4f B-5f B-6f B-7f Coefficients ECCS Flows B-Ig B-2g B-3g B-4g B-5g B-6g B-7g 28
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION 1[
1]1 Figure B-la Water Level in Hot and Average Channels, DBA Recirculation Suction Line Break, Battery Board 1 Failure 29
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
((
1]
Figure B-lb Water Level in Downcomer Region, DBA Recirculation Suction Line Break, Battery Board 1 Failure 30
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
((
Figure B-ic Break Flows, DBA Recirculation Suction Line Break, Battery Board 1 Failure 31
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION 1[
1]
I Figure B-id Reactor Vessel Pressure, DBA Recirculation Suction Line Break, Battery Board 1 Failure 32
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
((
Figure B-le Peak Cladding Temperature, DBA Recirculation Suction Line Break, Battery Board 1 Failure 33
I REVISION 0 NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Coefficients, Figure B-if Heat Transfer Suction Line Break, Battery Board 1 Failure DBA Recirculation 34
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
((
Figure B-lg ECCS Flows, DBA Recirculation Suction Line Break, Battery Board 1 Failure 35
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Figure B-2a Water Level in Hot and Average Channels, 1] Recirculation Discharge Line Break, Battery Board 1 Failure 36
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION 1]
Figure B-2b Water Level in Downcomer Region, II )) Recirculation Discharge Line Break, Battery Board 1 Failure 37
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0
. NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
[I 1]
Figure B-2c Break Flows,
]1 Recirculation Discharge Line Break, Battery Board 1 Failure 38
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT I REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
((
Figure B-2d Reactor Vessel Pressure,
)) Recirculation Discharge Line Break, Battery Board 1 Failure 39
NEDO-32494, SUPPLEMENT I REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION 1[
Figure B-2e Peak Cladding Temperature,
)) Recirculation Discharge Line Break, Battery Board 1 Failure 40
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Figure B-2f Heat Transfer Coefficients, 11 Recirculation Discharge Line Break, Battery Board 1 Failure 41
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Figure B-2g ECCS Flows, II )) Recirculation Discharge Line Break, Battery Board 1 Failure 42
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Figure B-3a Water Level in Hot and Average Channels, II Recirculation Discharge Line Break, Battery Board 1 Failure 43
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION 1[
1]
Figure B-3b Water Level in Downcomer Region, II 11 Recirculation Discharge Line Break, Battery Board 1 Failure 44
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
((
Figure B-3c Break Flows,
)) Recirculation Discharge Line Break, Battery Board 1 Failure 45
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION 1]
Figure B-3d Reactor Vessel Pressure, 11 Recirculation Discharge Line Break, Battery Board 1 Failure 46
NEDO-32494, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION 1[
Figure B-3e Peak Cladding Temperature,
(( 1] Recirculation Discharge Line Break, Battery Board 1 Failure 47
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT I REVISION ID NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION 1]
Figure B-3f Heat Transfer Coefficients, it 11 Recirculation Discharge Line Break, Battery Board 1 Failure 48
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION 1[
Figure B-3g ECCS Flows, II )) Recirculation Discharge Line Break, Battery Board 1 Failure 49
NEDO-32494, SUPPLEMENT I REVISION ID NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
((
Figure B-4a Water Level in Hot and Average Channels, 1I ] Recirculation Discharge Line Break, Battery Board 3 Failure 50
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT I REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION 1]
Figure B-4b Water Level in Downcomer Region, II 1] Recirculation Discharge Line Break, Battery Board 3 Failure 51
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
[R 1]
Figure B-4c Break Flows, II )) Recirculation Discharge Line Break, Battery Board 3 Failure 52
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT I REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Figure B-4d Reactor Vessel Pressure, I1 )) Recirculation Discharge Line Break, Battery Board 3 Failure 53
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
[R Figure B-4e Peak Cladding Temperature,
)) Recirculation Discharge Line Break, Battery Board 3 Failure 54
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT I REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION 1[
Figure B-4f Heat Transfer Coefficients, It )) Recirculation Discharge Line Break, Battery Board 3 Failure 55
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Figure B-4g ECCS Flows,
[I )) Recirculation Discharge Line Break, Battery Board 3 Failure 56
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION I((
Figure B-5a Water Level in Hot and Average Channels, II )) Feedwater Line Break, Battery Board 3 Failure 57
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Figure B-5b Water Level in Downcomer Region, II JJ Feedwater Line Break, Battery Board 3 Failure 58
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
((I Figure B-5c Break Flows, I1 )) Feedwater Line Break, Battery Board 3 Failure 59
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT I REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
[1 Figure B-5d Reactor Vessel Pressure, II J] Feedwater Line Break, Battery Board 3 Failure 60
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Figure B-Se Peak Cladding Temperature, II )) Feedwater Line Break, Battery Board 3 Failure 61
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT I REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
((
Figure B-5f Heat Transfer Coefficients,
[I JJ Feedwater Line Break, Battery Board 3 Failure 62
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
((
Figure B-5g ECCS Flows,
)) Feedwater Line Break, Battery Board 3 Failure 63
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT I REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
((
1]
Figure B-6a Water Level in Hot and Average Channels,
[1 )) Steam Line Break, Battery Board 3 Failure 64
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Figure B-6b Water Level in Downcomer Region, II 11 Steam Line Break, Battery Board 3 Failure 65
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION 11 Figure B-6c Break Flows,
)) Steam Line Break, Battery Board 3 Failure 66
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
((
Figure B-6d Reactor Vessel Pressure,
]1 Steam Line Break, Battery Board 3 Failure 67
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT I REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
((
Figure B-6e Peak Cladding Temperature, II 1] Steam Line Break, Battery Board 3 Failure 68
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
((
1]
Figure B-6f Heat Transfer Coefficients, II J] Steam Line Break, Battery Board 3 Failure 69
NEDO-32494, SUPPLEMENT I REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Figure B-6g ECCS Flows, 11 J] Steam Line Break, Battery Board 3 Failure 70
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
((
Figure B-7a Water Level in Hot and Average Channels,
(( 11 CS Line Break, Battery Board 3 Failure 71
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
((
Figure B-7b Water Level in Downcomer Region,
[I )) CS Line Break, Battery Board 3 Failure 72
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION 1]
Figure B-7c Break Flows, II 1] CS Line Break, Battery Board 3 Failure 73
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
((I 1]
Figure B-7d Reactor Vessel Pressure, II )) CS Line Break, Battery Board 3 Failure 74
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Figure B-7e Peak Cladding Temperature, 11 CS Line Break, Battery Board 3 Failure 75
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
((
Figure B-7f Heat Transfer Coefficients,
)) CS Line Break, Battery Board 3 Failure 76
NEDO-32484, SUPPLEMENT 1 REVISION 0 NON-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
))
Figure B-7g ECCS Flows, It JJ CS Line Break, Battery Board 3 Failure 77