Text

Draft - Section C Operating Exam (Folder 2)
	ML082730736
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	07/02/2008
From:	; Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Brian Haagensen; Operations Branch I
	Hansell S
Shared Package
ML080030005	List: ML081060248; ML082350047; ML082470469; ML082730736; ML082730775; ML082730779; ML082730784; ML082730786; ML082730790; ML082820486; ML082820496; ML082820517; ML082820534; ML082820540; ML082820562; ML082970764; ML082970767;
References
	50-272/08-301, 50-311/08-301, ES-D-1, U01686 50-272/08-301, 50-311/08-301
	Download: ML082730736 (124)
	v • d • e

Appendix D Scenario (Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:

SALEM 1 & 2 Scenario No.: jJRC ESG-1 Op-Test No.: 07-01 NRC ll Examiners :

Operators:

Initial Conditions:

Turnover:

preparation for removing a Condensate Pump from service.

100% Rated Thermal Power Unit at 100% power. 22 AFW pp is C/T. Lower power to 85% at 20% per hour in Event Type*

N,R CRS/RO/PO I

CRS/RO/PO C

CRSlROlPO M

CRSlROlPO

~

C CRS/PO C

CRSlPO Event Description Power reduction for Condensate Pump emergent maint.

EDG oil leak (TS)

PZR level channel failure, letdown isolation, letdown r e establish (TS) Note: The RO will provide the PZR level channel failure initial response, the PO will restore letdown)

Steam Glenerator Tube Leak Steam Generator Tube Rupture

~

~-~

SEC activated equipment fails to start SG Atmospheric relief fails partially open (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D, Page 38 of 39

SIMULATOR EXAMINA1:ION SCENARIO SCENARIO TITLE:

SGTR SCENARIO NUMBER:

J ILT NRC ESG-.001 EFFECTIVE DATE:

811 9/2008 EXPECTED DURATION:

1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months REV1 SlON NUMB E R:

00 PROGRAM:

L.O. REQUAL INITIAL LICENSE STA OTHER Revision Summary:

Rev 0: New Issue for J ILT NRC exam PREPARED BY:

Ed Gallagher (INSTRUCTOR)'

6/6/08 (DATE)

(DATE)

APPROVED BY:

G-z9-.8 APPROVED BY: yc%>F

( PERATIONS MANAC JER OR (DATE)

D ESI G N EE)

" J " I LT N RC-E S G -0 0 1 Enabling 0 bjectives A.

B.

Given the unit at power the crew will reduce power to remove a Condensate Pump from service, IAW approved station procedures.

Given the unit at power with a failure of a Pressurizer Level control channel, the crew will take action to stabilize PZR level and swap to a non-failed channel, IAW approved station procedures.

Given a SGTL, the crew will identify and isolate the leaking SG, IAW approved station procedures.

Given the unit with a SGTR, take actions to minimize off site dose and RCS leakage, IAW approved station procedures.

C.

D.

A.

Power Reduction to 85%

8.

C.

D.

SGTL E.

Oil Leak on 26 EDG Failure of PZR level Channel 1 SGTR on 23 SG with subsequent failure of 23MS10 to control pressure 2 of 26

J I LT N RC-ESG-00 1 A.

B.

C.

The crew will receive the unit at 100% power with all system in automatic. One major piece of equipment will be W e d, 22 AFW Pump.

Once the crew takes the watch they will reduce reactor power to 85% at 20% per hour to remove 21 Condensate pump from service due to an emergent motor vibration problem.

Once the power reduction to 85% is underway the control room will receive a call from the primary duty operator that 26 EDG has a major oil leak on the piping downstream of the lube oil heater discharge check valve. The crew will evaluate the leak location and declare 26 EDG inoperable and enter the appropriate TSAS.

After the TSAS has been evaluated for the 2B EDG, the controlling PZR level channel will fail low causing letdown isolation and increased charging flow. The crew will enter AB.CVC-0001, take manual control of charging and restore letdown.

When letdown has been restored a SGTL will occur on 23 SG. The CRS will enter AB.SG-0001 and direct the crew to perform actions to address the SGTL. During the SGTL, the SG tube will rupture. The CRS will direct a manual SI initiation, The RO will manually initiate SI and commence the Immediate Actions of EOP-TRIP-1. The CRS will perform EOP-TRIP-1 and transition to EOP-SGTR-1. After the ruptured SG is isolated the 23MS10 will fail partially open in Automatic. The crew will take manual control of 23MS10.

The crew will perform actions of EOP-SGTR-1 to cool down and depressurize the RCS, and subsequently terminate SI flow.

D.

E.

F.

G.

3 of 26

"J" ILT NRC-ESG-001 SELF-CHECK Presnapped IC-241 from portable exam drive Trigger 1

Condition Description Delay Ramp I

MALFUNCTIONS:

I I

SELF-CHECK SELF-CHECK Description

1.

PR0017A Pzr Lvl CH I (LT459) Fails HIL NA NA RT-2 0

2.

SG0078C 23 SG Tube Rupture NA 3:OO RT-4 25

3.

CV0208A 21 CV pump Trip

NA NA ET-3 Tripped

4.

CV0208B 22 CV pump Trip

NA NA ET-3 Tripped Description Delay Ramp I

Trigger I

Action

See note on page 12 REMOTES:

I I

1.

CDOI OVDl2B DIESEL GEN-AUTO NA NA NA On

2.

CDOI OVLO 28 DIESEL GEN-AUTO NA NA NA On

4.

CF15 OVA0 23MS10 SP

20 NA RT-5 1045

3.

CDOl OVLO 28 DIESEL GEN-LOCAL MANUAL NA NA NA Off

6.

CF16 OVLO 23MS10 Press SP Decrease

20 NA RT-5 Off

5.

CF16 OVDl23MS10 Press SP Decrease

20 NA RT-5 On EVENT TRIGGERS:

I I

SELF-CHECK I ET#n 1 Discription Command

1.

ET-3 Monp254-4 0 4 of 26

J ILT NRC-ESG-001 I

1. RHI and RH2

3. RH 18s

2. VC 1-4

4. RCPs (SELF CHECK)

5. RT (SELF CHECK)

6. MS 167s (SELF CHECK)

7. 500 KV SWYD (SELF CHECK).

8. 23 CV Pump (SELF CHECK)

9. 22 AFW Pump (Cn) 1 OTHER CONDITIONS:

I I

1. Ensure Channel 1 Pressurizer Level selected for control 5 of 26

92 40 9

J ILT NRC-ESG-001 Eiahatorllnstructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Response Commeri

1. Power Reduction to 85%

0 CRS briefs crew on evolution 0

CRS directs ROlPO to commence a power reduction to 85% at 20%/hr 0 PO sets-up DEHC for correct reduction and rate IAW S2.OP-SO.TRB-0002 0

CRS directs RO to commence a boration at rate and gallon amount as determined during brief IAW S2.OP-S0.CVC-0006 0

RO monitors reactor parameters to maintain Tavg within programmed value 0

PO monitors main turbine response and trends Main turbine parameters on plant computer e

PO monitors SGFP suction pressure to ensure it remains greater than 320 psig PO monitors condenser Delta Ts 0

CREW reviews S2.OP-SO.CN-0001 to remove 21 Condensate pump from service 7 of 26

J ILT NRC-ESG-001 reset local alarm then insert RT-I1 and that there is an !oil leak on the when 2B E.DG locked out 0

PO reports console alarm for 2B EDG trouble 0

CRS dispatches primary NE0 to investigate trouble alarm 0

Crew reviews print and determines that leak is not iisolable CRS directs to NE0 to secure the 2B the pre-lube pump and Lock Out pre-lube pump and lock out 28 EDG 0

CRS refers to TS and enters TSAS 3.8.1.I

.b action b 0

CRS requests 3rd NCO to perform Line surveil1anc;e 0

CRS reviews 00s equipment and determines no additional equipment needs to be declared Inoperable.

determination is made 0

If stopped, CRS briefs re-commencing load reduction to remove CN pump 8 of 26

J ILT NRC-ESG-001 Fjow map already be in manual,

I

/

Evaluatorllnstructor Activity

, Expected PlantlStudent Response Comments,Aa I)

3. Pressurizer Level Channel 1 Fails Low Enter RT-2, PZR Lvl Channel 1 fails to 0 0

RO responds to OHA E-36 Pzr Htr Off Level LO and reports that Pressurizer level Channel 1 has failed low, PZR heaters are off, and Letdown is isolated RO requests permission to take charging pump master flow controller to manual aind stabilize PZR level 0

CRS concurs with RO assessment and directs master flow controller placed in manual This may have been completed during EDG leak CRS may direct RO to restore Zietdown, but should then insure PO is monitoring reactor 0

CRS may direct load reduction stopped and boration secured CRS enters S2.OP-AB.CVC-0001 CRS directs PO to implement CAS 0

RO reports charging pump is in service 0

RO reports CV pump is not cavitating RO reports that controlling pressurizer level channel 1 is failed RO adjust master flow controller to control PZR level RO selects channel 3 for controlling channel RO restores Pressurizer Heaters PO restores letdown 0

CRS COndiJCtS brief and discusses contingent actions. Also during brief informs crew that TSAS 3.3.1.I.

act 6 is applicable.

9 of 26

J ILT NRC-ESG-001 Crew may enter ABRAD-0001.

CRS directs monitoring of 2R19C and 2R15 to confirm status of SGTL P.

then transition to AB.SG-0001 I

1. kf;. -. I Evaluatorllnstructor Activity Expected PIantlStudent Response

. Comments

, s :

4. Tube Leak on 23 SG 0

RO reports OHA A-6 RMS HI Rad or Trouble verifies on CRT 2R53C in alarm 0

PO informs CRS that 2R19C and 2R15 are rising as expected for tube leak 0

PO acknowledges multiple re-flashes of A-6 for alarms on 2R15, 2R19C and 2R41d PO reports Blowdown is isolated 0

CRS enters S2.OP-AB.SG-0001 0

CRS directs RO to implement CAS 0

CRS requests SM implement ECG 0

CRS directs NE0 to de-energize turbine and polisher area sumps 0

RO reports PZR level lowering slowly 0

CRS directs a swap to centrifugal charging pump

" J" ILT NRC-ESG-001 Evaluatodlnstructor Activity Expected PYantlStudent Response Comment?:

Due to small size of leak, PZR level can be stabilized and CRS may decide to not reduce letdown of A6.SG-0001 the CRS may stop to have a brief and discuss actions and 0

RO places 21 centrifugal charging pump in service by performing the following:

o Closing CV55 o Starts 21 or 22 CV Pump o

Places 23 CV pump in manual and lowers speed o Adjust CV55 to maintain stable charging flow and seal injection flow o

Stops 23 CV Pump o

Places CV55 in automatic CRS directs letdown flow to minimum 0

RO reduceis letdown to minimum 0

RO adjusts charging to stabilize Pressurizer level and estimate leak rate 0

CRS determines that Action level 3 is met and Unit must be less than 50%

power in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and must be in Mode 3 in the next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months 0

RO informis CRS that leak rate has increased and PZR level is lowering rapidly 0

CRS brief:; crew that leak is beyond capacity of makeup system and directs a Rx trip and SI 12 of 26

J ILT NRC-ESG-001 i. 1 Evaluator/lnstructor Activity-

~~

O :,. Expected PlantlStudent Response Comments

~

5. SGTR ET-3 will enter on Reacto trip in-service CV pump a energize SEC for bus with remaining 0

RO trips reactor, confirms Rx trip and initiates SI 0

RO performs [/As of EOP-TRIP-1 0

CRS enters EOP-TRIP-1 c \\ d M 0

CRS confirms immediate actions fU

, A 6

,,-+

?--

0 RO announces reactor trip and request SM and SI-A report to control room 1 1

.&GL 0

When Immediate Actions are complete PO requests permission to throttle AFW and isolate 23 SG by closing 23AFll arid 21 Time of Isolation:

SAT UNSAT 0

CRS directs isolation of 23 SG CREW continues with EOP-TRIP-1 RO informs CRS that BIT flow is zero PO evaluates AFW status and SEC Loading and reports that 22 AFW Pump is unavailable and multiple equipment from C bus failed to load, and 21 CV pump has tripped CRS directs B and C SECs blocked and reset CRS may dispatch an operator to de-energize C(6) sec, if so after 2 min report as NE0 that C(B) sec,was.

discovered Tri ed 0

PO determines that C sec is de-energizec and resets 8 SEC 0

RO attempts to start 21 CV pump and informs CRS that it is tripped 13 of 26

" J " I LT N RC-ES G -00 1

1.

I(

Evaluatorllnstryctor Activity. ':

Expected PlantlStudent Response

~

Comments CT#2 (E-0 -- I): Establish flow from at least I high-head ECCS pump before transition from EOP-TRIP-1 SAT UNSAT

l!f@

SEC is used RO will start; 2%

' :i?H,R, 22 and 24 CFCU, 21 CV pump, '

-and attempt to start 22CV pump 0

CRS directs C bus equipment started including: 22 CV pump, 22 SI pump, 23 and 25 CFCU in low speed, 2 ECAC, 21 Aux bldg supply fan, and 23 Aux bldg exh fan 0

RO determines containment pressure has remained less than 15 psig 6

CRS conducts brief to discuss plant status and minimizes length due to time critical nature of SGTR 0

PO verifies all Vital busses energized 0

RO verifies CAV and Swgr vent status 0

RO verifiems 2 CC pumps running 0

RO evaluates SI status as within limits, and BIT flow is restored.

0 PO maintains AFW flow >22E4 Ibrn/hr until 1 SG is greater than 9% and then throttles to maintain 9-33%

0 RO inforrris CRS that RCS temperatiire is stable at 547°F 0

RO reports Reactor Trip Breakers are open 0

RO reports both Pressurizer PORVs are closeld, and block valves are open 0

PO evaluates all steam generator pressure are stable or rising and no faulted steam generator exist 0

CREW tr,ansitions to SGTR-1 based on 23 SG Level rising in an uncontrolled manner CREW identifies 23 SG as ruptured SG 14 of 26

J ILT NRC-ESG-001 Comments Evaluatorhstructor Activity Expected PlanVStudent Response Insert RT-5 after 23MS167 is closed.

RT-5: 23MS10 setpoint fails low PO maintains 22e4 ARN flow to 24 SG using 24AF21 unless 1 SG level is >9%

After 3 mins Insert RT-10 and inform CRS that 23MS45 is closed.

PO adjusts 23MS10 setpoint to 1045 Psig PO closes 23MS7, 18,167 and GI34 PO informs CRS that 23MS10 is opening prior to SP is causing 23 SG to depressurize CRS directs PO to take manual control and close 23MS10 PO places 23MS10 in manual and closes the valve.

PO deterrnines 23 AFW pump is not required to maintain feed flow since 21 AFW pump feeds 23/24 SGs and can provide sufficient AFW flow for cooldown PO trips and stops 23 AFW pump CRS dispatches and NE0 with RAD Pro to close 23MS45 CRS dispatches an operator to close 2SS333 PO determines 23 SG is isolated from intact SGs and feed flow should remain isolated 15 of 26

"J" ILT NRC-ESG-001 Evaluatorllnstructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Response Comments

-I, When directed insert RT-11, CRS should brief operator that pump is going to start when reset.

AFW status should not delay initiation of cooldown; all intact SGs should be used for cooldown.

1 CT# 3 (E-3 -6): Establish/maintain an RCS temperature so that a transition from SGTR-1 does not occur UNSAT 0

RO reports PORVs closed and block valves open 0

PO determines no SG is faulted 0

CREW resets safeguards and opens 21 and 22CA330s 0

RO stops both RHR pumps 0

PO evaluates 23 SG as greater than 375 and not faulted CRS dispatches operator to shift Gland seal supply to U1 0

CREW determines target temperature is 503°F 0

CREW commences rapid cooldown to target temperature PO select!; bypass Tavg when RCS is 4 4 3 "

PO cools down at max rate using main steam dumps 0

PO stops cooldown when target temperature is reached and dumps steam to :stabilize temp PO determines 23 SG press is stable 0

RO reports subcooling >20" 16 of 26

J ILT NRC-ESG-00 I Comments Evaluator/lnstructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Response CT# 4 (E-3 4):

Depressurize RCS until Ruptured SG and RCS pressure are equal and PZR level is 5 1 1%

with Subcooling >O, before water release from ruptured SGPORV or Safety valve SAT UNSAT Terminate scenario when Depressurization is complete or at discretion of lead evaluator Crew determines normal spray is available arid depressurizes using normal spray RO terminates depressurization when criteria of table E is met CREW terminates SI 17 of 26

J ILT NRC-ESG-001 A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

H.

I.

J.

K.

Alarm Response Procedures (Various)

Technical Specifications Emergency Plan (ECG)

SC.OP-AP.ZZ-O102(Q), Use of Procedures S2.OP-SO.CN-0001 - Condensate System Operation S2.OP-S0.CVC-0006 - Boron Concentration Control S2.OP-I0.ZZ-0004 - Power Operation S2.OP-AB.CVC-0001-Loss of Charging S2.OP-AB.SG-0001 - Steam Generator Tube Leak 2-EOP-TRIP Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 2-EOP-SGTR Steam Generator Tube Rupture F

18 of 26

J ILT NRC-ESG-001 Vil. ESG CRITJCAL TASK RATIONAL CT#1 (E-3 --A): Close 21AF11 and 21 within 10 niin on identification of fault and complete isolation of Ruptured Steam Generator Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of differential pressure between the ruptured SG and intact SGs. Upon loss of differential pressure the crew must transition to a contingency procedure that necessitates the crew taking compensating action that complicates the event mitigation strategy...

For feedwater, isolation must occur after ruptured SG level exceeds minimum indication (9%)...Any delay in the AFW isolation allows the ruptured SG level to increase as the AFW adds additional inventory along with the primary to secondary leakage. Too long a delay (>I 0 min) prevents the crew from depressurizing and terminating SI before excessive inventory seriously damages the SG as a fission product barrier.

Basis CT#2 (E-0 -- I): Establish flow from at least 1 high-head ECCS pump before transition from EOP-TRIP-I Basis CT#3 (E-3 --B)

Basis CT# 4 (E-3 --C)

Basis Failure to manually start at least 1 high-head ECCS pump under the postulated conditions constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to degraded ECCS...Capacity Establishlmaintain an RCS temlperature so that a transition from SGTR-1 does not occur Failure to establish and maintain correct RCS temperature during a SGTR leads to a transition from SGTR-1 to a contingency procedure, which constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the crew taking compensating action that complicates the event mitigation strategy...

Depressurize RCS until Ruptured SG and RCS pressure are equal and PZR level is ~ 1 1 %

with Subcooling >O, before water release from ruptured SG PORV or Safety valve Failure to stop reactor coolant leakage into a ruptured SG by depressurizing the RCS needlessly complicates mitigation of the event. It also constitutes a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario 19 of 26

J ILT NRC-ESG-001 S-ILT-2006 NF!C ESG-1 SALEM ESG - PRA RELATIONSHIPS EVALUATION FORM EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE Y/N EVENT Y/N EVENT N

TRANSIENTS with PCS Unavailable N

Loss of Service Water Y

Steam Generator Tube Rupture N

LossofCCW N

Loss of Offsite Power N

Loss of Control Air N

Loss of Switchgear and Pen Area Ventilation N

Station Black Out N

LOCA COMPONENTlTRAlNlSYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR YIN TRAIN YIN COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN N

Containment Sump Strainers N

Gas Turbine N

SSWS Valves to Turbine Generator Area N

Any Diesel Generator N

RHR Suction Line valves from Hot Leg Y

Auxiliary Feed Pump N

Valves N

SBO Air Compressor CVCS Letdown line Control and Isolation OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE Y/N OPERATOR ACTION N

N Connect to gas turbine N

N N

N Y

Y Y

Early depressurize RCS N

Initiate feed and bleed Restore AC power during SBO Trip Reactor and RCPs after loss of component cooling system Re-align RHR system for re-circulation Un-isolate the available CCW Heat Exchanger Isolate the CVCS letdown path and transfer charging suction to RWST Cooldown the RCS and depressurize the system Isolate the affected Steam generator which has the tube ruptures Complete this evaluation form for each ESG.

20 of 26

J ILT NRC-ESG-001 100 RCS BORON:

SHUTDOWN SAFETY SYSTEM STATUS ( 5 6 & DEFUELED):

NIA REACTIVITY PARAMETERS Core Burn-up 10,500 MWD/MTU, reactivity plan provided MOST LIMITING LCO AND DATERIME OF EXPIRATION:

3.7.1.2.a action a. 22 AFW pump C/T EVOLUTlONS/PROCEDURES/SURVElLLANCES IN PROGRESS:

Shutdown to 85% at 20% per hour to supplort removal of 21 condensate pump from service, due to motor vibrations ABNORMAL PLANT CONFIGURATIONS:

CONTROL ROOM:

Unit 1 and Hope Creek at 100% power.

No penalty minutes in the last 24 hrs.

PRIMARY:

NONE SECONDARY:

Heating steam is aligned to unit 1.

RADWASTE:

No discharges in progress C I RCU LATl N G WATE R/S ERVl CE WATER:

21 of 26

J ILT NRC-ESG-001 Note: Attach a separate copy of this form to each scenario reviewed. This form is used as guidance for the examination team as they conduct their review for the proposed scenarios.

EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE (ESG) REVIEW/ VALIDATION Note:

This form is used as guidance for an examination team to conduct a review for the proposed exam scenario(s). Attach a separate copy of this form to each scenario reviewed.

SELF-CHECK ESG-J ILT NRC-ESG-001 REVIEWER:

Ed Gatlasher

1.

2.

3.

THE SCENARIO HAS CLEARLY STATED OBJECTIVES IN THE SCENARIO.

The initial conditions are realistic, equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue the crew into expected events.

Each event description consists of:

The event termination point.

The point in the scenario when it is to be initiated, The malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event, The symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew, The expected operator actions (by shift plDsition), and

4.

The use of non-mechanistic failures (e.g. pipe break) should be limited to one or a credible preceding event has occurred.

The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics.

Sequencingltiming of events is reasonable (e.g. the crew has time to respond to the malfunctions in an appropriate time frame and implements procedures andlor corrective actions).

Sequencingltiming of events is reasonable, and allows for the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives.

8.

If time compression techniques are used, scenario summary clearly so indicates.

9.

The simulator modeling is not altered.

10. All crew competencies can be evaluated.

11. Appropriate reference materials are available (SOERs, LERs, etc.).

12. If the sampling plan indicates that the scenario was used for training during the requalification cycle, evaluate the need to modify or replace the scenario.

13. Proper critical task methodology is used IAW NRC procedures.

14. ESG-PSA Evaluation Form is completed for the scenario at the applicable facility.

5.

6.

7.

22 of 26

SCENARIO: J ILT NRC-ESG-1 J ILT NRC-ESG-001 REVIEVVER:

Ed Gallagher INITIAL TARGET QUANTITATIVE ATTRIBUTES EG 5

EG 2

0 Total malfunctions inserted: 5-8 0

Malfunctions that occur after EOP entry: 1-2 EG 2

EG 1

0 Abnormal Events: 2-4 0

Major Transients: 1-2 0

EOPs requiring substantive actions (not including TRIP-1): 1-2 EG 0

0 EOP Contingency Procedures used: 0-2

~

EG 84 EG 50%

EG 4

0 0

0 Crew Critical Tasks: 2-3 Approximate scenario run time: 75-90 minutes EOP run time: 40-70% of scenario run time COMMENTS:

23 of 26

J ILT NRC-ESG-001 ATTACHMENT I SIMULATOR READY-FOE!-TRAINING CHECKLIS

1.

2.

3.

Simulator clocks synchronized

4.

5.

6.

7.

DL-10 log up-to-date

8.

Required procedures clean

9.

IO.

11.

Procedure pens available

12.

13.

Shift manning sheet available

14.

SPDS reset 1 5.

16.

Verify simulator is in correct load for training All required computer terminals in opeiration Required chart recorders advanced and ON (proper paper installed)

Rod step counters correct (channel check)

All tagged equipment properly secured and documented (TSAS Log filled out)

All OHA lamps operating (OHA Test)

All printers have adequate paper AND functional ribbon Procedures in progress open and signed-off to proper step Reference verification performed with required documents available Ensure a current RCS Leak Rate Worl<sheet is placed by Aux Alarm Typewriter with Baseline Data filled out

17.

Required keys available

18.

Video Tape (if applicable)

19.

Ensure ECG Classification is correct - - 9605021 40 CRCA-03

20.

Reset P-250 Rod Counters 24 of 26

J I LT N RC-E S G -0 0 1 ATTACHMENT 2 CRITICAL TASK IMETHODOLOGY In reviewing each proposed CT, the examination team assesses the task to ensure, that it is essential to safety. A task is essential to safety if, in the judgment of the examination team, the improper performance or omission of this task by a licensee will result in direct adverse consequences or in significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant.

The examination team determines if an automatically actuated plant system would have been required to mitigate the consequences of an individuals incorrect performance. If incorrect performance of a task by an individual necessitates the crew taking compensatory action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy, the task is safety significant.

I. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which operation or correct performance prevents...

e e

degradation of any barrier to fission product release degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) or emergency power capacity a violation of a safety limit a violation of the facility license condition incorrect reactivity control (such as failure to initiate Emergency Boration or Standby a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the Liquid Control, or manually insert control rods) scenario e

A. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which a crew demonstrates the ability to...

e effectively direct or manipulate enginleered safety feature (ESF) controls that would recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.

take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.

prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such as an prevent any condition described in the previous paragraph.

e e

0 unintentional Reactor Protection System (RPS) or ESF actuation.

25 of 26

J ILT NRC-ESG-001 ATTAC~MENT 3 ESG PRE-JOB BRIEF CHECKLIST EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE (ESG) Pre-Job Brief Checklist Note: This checklist is to be completed by the Lead Examiner prior to evaluating an ESG. The Lead Examiner should lead a pre-job brief with all the examiners and simulator operators that includes, but is not limited to the following:

Lead ESG J ILT NRC-ESG-001 Examiner:

1.

___ 2.

3.

___ 4.

5.

ESG overview and sequence of major events.

Determine which optional events will be performed, if any.

ESG summary of Critical Tasks.

Assign examiners to observe specific watch standers.

Assign examiner ownership for observing and documenting performance / non-performance of Critical Tasks.

Review alternate path(s) identified by the ESG.

Assign examiner to document data related to the performance of Critical Tasks.

Determines what parameters will be recorded in Data Collection.

6.

___ 7.

__ 8.

Ensure SOE recorder is recording.

26 of 26

ADDendix D Scenario Clutline Form ES-D-1 3

4

~

Facility:

SALEM 1 & 2 Scenario No.: _N RC ESG-2 Op-Test No.: 07-01 NRC Examiners:

Operators:

M CRS/RO C

CRS/RO/PO C

CRS/RO/PO 4

5 Initial Conditions:

Turnover: Raise power to 34%.

l X l @ Amps for critical data.

I I

R.N I

CRSlRO c

I CRSlRO I

3 It I

Event Description Raise Rx power to 3-4%

IR NI fails I6w (TS)

D VIB deen'ergizes causing no Auto or Manual rod control just as Rx is entering POAH (TS) 1 of 2 operating MDAFW pps trip on RX trip.

RCS leak pirogressing to LBLOCA w Auto SI failure.

Various SEC initiated components malfunction (RHR pp fail to start, no i3uto CS)

Loss of Emergency Recirc (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D, Page 38 of 39

SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO Large Break LOCA with loss of Recirc SCENARIO TITLE:

SCENARIO NUMBER:

J ILT NRC ESG-002 EFFECTIVE DATE:

811 9/2008 EXPECTED DURATION:

1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months REV1 SI ON NUMBER:

00 PROGRAM:

1.0. REQUAL INITIAL, LICENSE STA OTHER Revision Summary:

Rev 0: New Issue for J ILT NRC exam PREPARED BY:

Ed Gallagher (INSTRUCTOR) 6/6/08 (DATE)

(DATE)

APPROVED BY:

IlNG MANAGER OR DESIGINEE)

"J" ILT NRC-ESG-002 r

II: '

MAJOREVENTS 4 %

Enabling Objectives A.

Given the unit in hot standby (mode 3) during a reactor startup, DIRECT actions to startup the reactor to the Point Of Adding Heat (POAH) by control rods or dilution in accordance with the approved station procedures.

Given the unit in mode 3, the crew will peiform a reactor startup to the POAH, in accordance with S2.OP-I0.ZZ-0003 (Q).

Given a failure of an intermediate range instrument, take corrective action for an intermediate range instrument failure IAW AB.NIS-0001.

Given indications of a loss or malfunction of a safety related electrical distribution system, DIRECT the response to the loss or malfunction in accordance with the approved station procedures.

Given the order or indications of a loss or malfunction of a safety related electrical distribution system, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the loss or malfunction in accordance with the approved station procedures.

Given indication of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), DIRECT the immediate response to the LOCA in accordance with the approved station procedures.

Given the order or indications of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), complete actions as the nuclear control operator to PERFORM thie immediate response to the LOCA in accordance with the approved station procedures.

Given a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and a loss of emergency recirculation, DIRECT actions to respond to the emergency recirculation loss in accordance with the approved station procedures.

Given the order or a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) with indication of a loss of emergency recirculation, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the loss of emergency recirculation in accordance with the approved station procedures.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

H.

I.

A.

Power Increase to POAH B.

C.

D.

E.

Loss of Emergency Recirculation Intermediate Range NI channel fails Low D Vital Instrument Bus Fails causing loss of Rod Control RCS leak progressing to LB LOCA 2 of 24

J ILT NRC-ESG-002 A.

The crew will receive the unit at 10 e-8 in the intermediate range with all systems in automatic. Orders to the shift are to raise power, place the Unit in Mode 1, and prepare for placing the turbine on line.

Once the crew takes the watch they will initiate a power increase at <I decade per min.

Once the power increase is underway Intermediate Range N35 will fail low. Crew will remove the channel from service, review Tech Specs and determine power must be maintained 6%

After the TSAS has been evaluated for the N35, the crew will be told to stabilize power in the power range, As power is approaching the POAH D Vital instrument bus will deenergize.

This will cause a loss of Rod Control, the steam dumps will fail closed and 21 and 24MS10 will have local control only. The Crew will decide that there is no positive control of the reactor and initiate a reactor trip.

When the Reactor trips 22AFW pump will trip, the PO will compensate by feeding 21 and 22 SG with the 23 AFW pump.

After the crew transitions to EOP-TRIP-2 a large RCS leak will develop, the crew will initiate a safety injection and return to TRIP-1. After the crew initiates an SI a DBA LOCA will occur. The crew will initiate Containment Spray.

The crew will perform actions of EOP-LOCA-1 and transition to LOCA-3 in LOCA-3 the Crew will determine that recirc is not available and will transition to LOCA-5. In LOCA-5 the crew will initiate makeup to the RWST and reduce ECCS flow. The scenario will end when major actions of LOCA-5 are complete.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

3 of 24

J I LT NRC-ESG-002 SELF-CHE CK Presnapped IC-242 from portable exam drive Description

~~

MALFUNCTIONS:

I I

I SELF-CHECK SELF-CHECK Description Description 1

Delay 1

Ramp I

Trigger 1

Action 1

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

a.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

N10197A IR CH N35 NOISY N10297A IR CH N35 FAILS HllLO EL0150 LOSS OF 2D VITAL INSTRUMENT BUS RC0002 RCS LEAK INTO CONTAINMENT RCOOOIB RCS RUPTURE OF RC LOOP 22 RH0026B 22 RHR PUMP TRIP AF0181 22 AUX FEEDWATER PUMP TRIP RP0277A AUTO CNT SPRAY FAILS TR A RP0277b AUTO CNT SPRAY FAILS TR B VL0120 21SJ44 Fails to Position AN0490 SER 490 FAILS - :D40 AN0491 SER 491 FAILS - :D48 SUBCOOLING SUBCOOLING VC0173A 21 CNTMT FAN COIL UNIT TRIP NA

30 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA

I O NA NA NA NA 1 min 3:OO NA NA NA NA NA NA NA RT-1 RT-1 RT-2 RT-3 RT-4 ET-5 NA NA NA NA NA NA RT-4 10 0

NA 10000 NA NA NA NA NA 0

NA NA NA REMOTES:

I I

I OVERRIDES:

I I

4 of 24

J ILT NRC-ESG-002 SELF-CHECK ET#n Discription Command i

r

\\

I.

TAGGED EQUIPMENT:

DescnDtion

1. RHI and RH2

2. VC 1-4

3. RH 18s

5. RT (SELF CHECK)

6. MS 167s (SELF CHECK)

4. RCPs (SELF CHECK)

7. 500 KV SWYD (SELF CHECK).

8. 23 CV Pump (SELF CHECK)

OTHER CONDITIONS:

Descriotion

1. NR45 Recorder selected to IR on Pen 1 and PR on Pen 2 N35 selected on Pen 1 5 of 24

J ILT NRC-ESG-002 CREW will be provided with a.lOP-3 --

marked up to current step x Comments Evaluator/lnstructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Response

1. Power Increase to POAH IF asked CRS will perform the duties 0

CRS briefs crew on evolution 0

CRS implernents S2.OP-I0.ZZ-0003 0

CRS directs RO to commence a rod withdraw to establish a start-up rate of

9%

or >22E4 Ibm/hr feed flow.

PO verifies Safeguards Valve Alignment i s correct RO closes 21/22CA330 RO reports Containment Spray not required RO determines MSLl isolation is not required CREW closes CV139 and CV140 when RCS pressure is below 1500 psig with BIT Flow

J ILT NRC-ESG-002 CT #I (E-1-C)

Trip all RCPs prior to RCS inventory becoming depleted to critical inventory. (within 5 mins of RCS pressure < 1350 with ECCS flow)

SAT UNSAT I

Evaluator/lnstructor Activity

, Expected PLantlStudent Response Comments..

0 CREW secures RCPs when RCS pressure is < 1350 with ECCS flow established Insert RT-4 after RCPs are stopped MALF: RCOOOIB LB-LOCA, and ZICFCU Trip 0

RO reports containment pressure has exceeded 15 psig and Containment Spray has not auto actuated CT#2 (EO-E) Manually actuate the W e q u i r e d complement of containment cooling before an extreme 0

CRS directs RO to initiate Containment challenge develops to the containment RO reports 21 CFCU has tripped

?! CSF 0

PO verifies all 4KV vital busses energized 0

RO reports Control Room Ventilation in Pressurized Mode 0

RO reports proper Switchgear Room Ventilation I i ne up.

0 RO reports 2 CCW pumps running RO evaluates ECCS flow ROlPO verifies AFW flow >22E04 Ibm/hr or SG level >9%.

0 Crew verifies RCS temperature control.

0 ROlPO verifies reactor trip breakers open.

0 RO verifies PORVs closed and Block Valves open 12 of 24

J ILT NRC-ESG-002 If not stopped previously the RCPs should be stopped at this point Evaluatorllnstructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Response,

. Comments

1 CREW identifies PZR Sprays not available and RCPs secured.

When RWST level reaches I S ft 22RHR pump will trip (ET-5)

PO verifies no faulted SGs 0

CRS determines spray pumps and RHR pumps should not be stopped PO verifies no SGTRs exist.

0 RO/PO perform LOCA evaluation 0

CRS transitions to LOCA-1.

0 CRS transitions to FRTS-1 determines pressure ~ 4 2 0 and SJ49 injection flow is established then FRCE-1 based on purple path 0

CRS performs verifications of FRCE-1 then transitions back to LOCA-1 PO verifies no faulted SGs.

0 PO maintains SG levels PO verifies no ruptured SGs Transition to LOCA-3 may occur before safeguard reset depending

.on Crew pace thr 0

b ROlPO resets Safeguards:

Resets SI; Resets Phase A; b Resets Phase B; Opens 21 & 22CA330; b Resets each SEC; and Resets 230V Control Centers Crew evaluates SI flow reduction criteria 0

0 PO stops unloaded diesels RO reports trip of 22 RHR pump 13 of 24

J ILT NRC-ESG-002 Evaluatorllnstructor Activity Expected PlantlStuden$ Response

. Comments 0

Crew determines recirc capability is available and no Aux bldg rad monitors in alarm 0

CRS requests Chemistry sample the RCS for failed fuel and boron 0

CRS dispatches operator to isolate CCW to the spent fuel pool CRS transitions to LOCA-3 when RWST reaches 15.2 RO reports containment sump level is

>62% and permissive lights lit 21SJ44 failed closed is pre-inserted RO depresses sump auto armed for 21 and 22SJ44 valves 0

PO removes lockout for 2SJ67 68 and 69 RO reports 21SJ44 valve did not open 0

RO/PO reset SI and Emerg Loading unless completed in LOCA-1 0

RO stops ;!I RHR pump 0

RO closes 2SJ69 RO reports 22 RHR pump is tripped 0

RO initiates closed on 21RH4 0

RO initiates open on 21SJ44 0

RO reports 21SJ44 did not open 0

CRS transitions to LOCA-5 Crew resets or verifies Safeguards are reset 14 of 24

J ILT NRC-ESG-002 Evaluatorllnstructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Response _

2 Comments 0

Crew determines Containment sump is

>62% and recirc is not available 0

0 e

prior to Lo Lo (1.2 ft) level in RWST where ECCS pumps must be stopped.

RO initiates makeup to the RWST IAW S2.OP-S0.CVC-0006 RO calls NE0 to start RWST Heater Pump RO determines Boric Acid flow setpoint from REM figure or sets to maximum RO place Makeup Control Mode Select in Stop RO places 2CV179 & 2CV172 in Manual RO calls NE0 to ensure 2BR170 closed, and Open 2CV182 &

2CV184 RO starts 21 or 22 Primary Water pump RO start 21 or 22 Boric Acid pump in manual fast RO adjust 2CV172 flow to >27 gpm RO adjust 2CV179 to 250 gpm CRS requests RX engineering monitor Shutdown margin PO commences cooldown at 1 OOo/hr using 22 arid 23MS10s RO verifies; all CFCUs running in low speed CRS determines no spray pumps are required and directs RO to stop 21 and 22 cs pum1ps RO resets spray actuation stops the pumps and closes 21 and 22CS2s CRS directs 1 charging and 1 SI pump stopped 15 of 24

J I LT NRC-ESG-002 VI.

SCENARIO REFERENCES A.

6.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
I.
J.
K.
L.
M.
N.
Alarm Response Procedures (Various)
Technical Specifications Emergency Plan (ECG)
OP-AA-101-111-1003, Use of Procedures S2.OP-I0.ZZ-0003 - Hot Standby to Minimum Load S2.OP-AB.NIS-0001 - Nuclear Instrumentation System Malfunction S2.0P-AB.115-0004 - Loss of 2D 1 15V Vital Instrument Bus 2-EOP-TRIP Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 2-EOP-FRTS-I, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock 2-EOP-FRCE-I, Response to Excessive Containment Pressure 2-EOP-LOCA-1, Loss of Reactor Coolant 2-EOP-LOCA-3, Transfer to Cold Leg Rec,irculation 2-EOP-LOCA-5, Loss of Emergency Recirculation S2.OP-SO.CVC-0006, Boron Concentration Control 16 of 24
J ILT NRC-ESG-002 VII.
ESG CRITICAL TASK RATIONAL CT#1 (E-I-C)
Basis Trip all RCPs prior to RCS inventory becoming depleted to critical inventory. (within 5 mins of RCS pressure < 1350 with ECCS flow)
Failure to trip the RCPs under the postulated plant conditions leads to core uncovery and to fuel cladding temperatures in excess of 2200. Thus, failure to perform the task represents mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to the degradation of a barrier to fission product release WOG sponsored analysis to demonstrate that the operating crew would have sufficient time (from the point at which the criteria was met) to recognize the indications that the criteria are met and trip RCP!; before the window for adverse consequence begins...The minimum response time for the operating crew is 5 minutes... if the RCPs are tripped within 5 minutes of the trip criteria being met, PCT remains below 220 CT#2 (E-O-E)
Manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling before an extreme challenge develops to the (containment CSF Basis Failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling under postulated conditions constitutes a demonstrated inability by the crew to recognize a failurelincorrect auto actuation of an ESF system or component. Since the spray can be manually initiated from the control room, failure to manually actuate represents a demonstrated inability of the crew to effectively manipulate ESF controls that would lead to violation of the facility license condition. Additionally, under the postulated conditions, failure to manually actuate results in a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.
CT#3 (ECA-1.1 -- B): Make up to the RWST and minimize RWST outflow prior to Lo Lo tevel where ECCS pumps must be stopped Under the postulated plant conditions, failure to establish make up flow to the RWST Basis and/or to minimize RWST outflow leads to or accelerates depletion of the RWST inventory to the point at which the ECXS pumps taking suction on the RWST must be stopped. Loss of pumped injection coincident with loss of emergency cooling Recirculation will lead to a severe or an extreme challenge to the core cooling CSF.
Failure to perform the critical task causes these challenges to occur needlessly or, at best, prematurely. Thus failure to perform the critical task leads to significant reduction in safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario. It also represents demonstrated inability by the crew to take an action or combination of actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety 17 of 24
J ILT NRC-ESG-002 1
VIII.
ESG - PSA RELATIONSHIP EVALUATION S-ILT-2006 NRC ESG-I SALEM ESG - PRA RELATIONSHIPS EVALUATION FORM EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE Y/N EVENT Y/N EVENT
~
N TRANSIENTS with PCS Unavailable N
Loss of Service Water N
Steam Generator Tube Rupture N
Loss of CCW N
Loss of Offsite Power N
Loss of Control Air N
Loss of Switchgear and Pen Area Ventilation N
Station Black Out Y
LOCA COMPONENT/TRAIN/SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR Y/N TRAIN Y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN N
Containment Sump Strainers N
Gas Turbine N
SSWS Valves to Turbine Generator Area N
Any Diesel Generator N
RHR Suction Line valves from Hot Leg N
Auxiliary Feed Pump N
Valves N
SBO Air Compressor CVCS Letdown line Control and Isolation OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE Y/N OPERATOR ACTION N
N Connect to gas turbine N
Y N
N N
N N
Early depressurize RCS N
Initiate feed and bleed Restore AC power during SBO Trip Reactor and RCPs after loss of component cooling system Re-align RHR system for re-circulation Un-isolate the available CCW Heat Exchanger Isolate the CVCS letdown path and transfer charging suction to RWST Cooldown the RCS and depressurize the systern Isolate the affected Steam generator which has the tube ruptures Complete this evaluation form for each ESG.
18 of 24
J ILT NRC-ESG-002 MODE:
2 POWER:
0 RCS BORON:
MWe: 0 SHUTDOWN SAFETY SYSTEM STATUS (5,6 & IDEFUELED):
N/A REACTIVITY PARAMETERS Core Burn-up 10,500 MWD/MTU, reactivity plan provided MOST LIMITING LCO AND DATE/TIME OF EXPI~RATION:
EVOLUTIONS/PROCEDURES/.SilRVEILLANCES IN PROGRESS:
Raise power into the power range and stabilize at 2-4% Reactor power in preparation for transition to Mode 1 AB N 0 RM AL PLANT CON FIG U RAT1 0 N S :
CONTROL ROOM:
Unit 1 and Hope Creek at 100% power No penalty minutes in the last 24 hrs.
PRIMARY:
NONE SECONDARY:
Heating steam is aligned to unit 1 RADWASTE:
No discharges in progress CIRCULATING WATER/SERVICE WATER:
19 of 24
J ILT NRC-ESG-002 X.
SIMULATOR ESG REVIEWNALIDATION CHECKLIST Note: Attach a separate copy of this form to each scenario reviewed. This form is used as guidance for the examination team as they conduct their review for the proposed scenarios EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE (ESG) REVIEW/ VALIDATION Note:
§LF CHECK
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
This form is used as guidance for an examination team to conduct a review for the proposed exam scenario(s). Attach a separate copy of this form to each scenario reviewed.
ESG-J ILT NRC-ESG-002 REVIEWER:
Ed Gallacjher THE SCENARIO HAS CLEARLY STATED OBJECTIVES IN THE SCENARIO.
The initial conditions are realistic, equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue the crew into expected events.
Each event description consists of:
0 The event termination point.
The point in the scenario when it is to be initiated, The malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event, The symptomslcues that will be visible to the crew, The expected operator actions (by shift position), and The use of non-mechanistic failures (e.g. pipe break) should be limited to one or a credible preceding event has occurred.
The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics.
Sequencing/timing of events is reasonable (42,s. the crew has time to respond to the malfunctions in an appropriate time frame and implements procedures andlor corrective actions).
Sequencing/timing of events is reasonable, and allows for the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives.
If time compression techniques are used, scenario summary clearly so indicates.
The simulator modeling is not altered.
All crew competencies can be evaluated.
Appropriate reference materials are available (SOERs, LERs, etc.).
If the sampling plan indicates that the scenario was used for training during the requalification cycle, evaluate the need to rnlodify or replace the scenario.
Proper critical task methodology is used IAVV NRC procedures.
ESG-PSA Evaluation Form is completed for the scenario at the applicable facility.
20 of 24
J ILT NRC-ESG-002 SCENARIO:
INITIAL EG 7
EG 3
EG 2
EG 2
EG 2
EG 1
EG 80
~~
EG 65 EG 3
COMMENTS:
REVIEWIER:
~
TARGET QUANTITATIVE ATTRIBUTES Total malfunctions inserted: 5-8 Malfunctions that occur after EOP entry: 1-2 Abnormal Events: 2-4 Major Transients: 1-2 EOPs requiring substantive actions (not including TRIP-1 ): 1-2 EOP Contingency Procedures used: 0-2 Approximate scenario run time: 75-90 minutes EOP run time: 40-70% of scenario run time Crew Critical Tasks: 2-3 For events after EOP entry 2 malfunctions used to cause loss of recirc capability other is failure of auto containment spray 21 of 24
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
IO.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
J ILT NRC-ESG-002 ATTACHMENT I SIMULATOR READY-FOR-TRAI NI NG CHECKLIST Verify simulator is in correct load for training All required computer terminals in operation Simulator clocks synchronized Required chart recorders advanced arid ON (proper paper installed)
Rod step counters correct (channel check)
All tagged equipment properly secured and documented (TSAS Log filled out)
DL-10 log up-to-date Required procedures clean All OHA lamps operating (OHA Test)
All printers have adequate paper AND functional ribbon Procedure pens available Procedures in progress open and sigried-off to proper step Shift manning sheet available SPDS reset Reference verification performed with required documents available Ensure a current RCS Leak Rate Worksheet is placed by Aux Alarm Typewriter with Baseline Data filled out Required keys available Video Tape (if applicable)
Ensure ECG Classification is correct - - 960502140 CRCA-03 Reset P-250 Rod Counters 22 of 24
J ILT NRC-ESG-002 ATTACHMENT 2 CRITICAL TASK METHODOLOGY In reviewing each proposed CT, the examination team assesses the task to ensure, that it is essential to safety. A task is essential to safety if, in the judgrnent of the examination team, the improper performance or omission of this task by a licensee will result in direct adverse consequences or in significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant.
The examination team determines if an automatically actuated plant system would have been required to mitigate the consequences of an individuals incorrect performance. If incorrect performance of a task by an individual necessitates the crew taking compensatory action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy, the task is safety significant.
I. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which operation or correct performance prevents...
0 0
0 0
0 degradation of any barrier to fission product release degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) or emergency power capacity qviolation of a safety limit a violation of the facility license condition incorrect reactivity control (such as failure to initiate Emergency Boration or Standby a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the Liquid Control, or manually insert control rods) scenario 0
A. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which a crew demonstrates the ability to...
0 effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.
take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.
prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such as an prevent any condition described in the previous paragraph.
0 0
0 unintentional Reactor Protection System (RPS) or ESF actuation.
23 of 24
J ILT NRC-ESG-002 ATTACHMENT 3 ESG PRE-JOB BRIEF CHECKLIST EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE (ESG) Pre-Job Elrief Checklist Note: This checklist is to be completed by the Lead Examiner prior to evaluating an ESG. The Lead Examiner should lead a pre-job brief with all the examiners and simulator operators that includes, but is not limited to the following:
Lead ESG J ILT NRC-ESG-002 Examiner:
__ 1.
2.
3.
___ 4.
5.
ESG overview and sequence of major events.
Determine which optional events will be performed, if any.
ESG summary of Critical Tasks.
Assign examiners to observe specific watch standers.
Assign examiner ownership for observing and documenting performance / non-performance of Critical Tasks.
Review alternate path($) identified by the ESG.
Assign examiner to document data related to the performance of Critical Tasks.
Determines what parameters will be recorded in Data Collection.
6.
___ 7.
8.
Ensure SOE recorder is recording.
24 of 24
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event No.
Facility:
SALEM 1 & 2 Scenario No.: NF:C ESG-3 Op-Test No.: 07-01 NRC Examiners:
Operators:
Malf. No.
Initial Conditions: 80% power for last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Turnover:
Raise power to 90% @ 3% per hour. (Power ascension ramp limit is 3%/hr)
I 2
2 l
3 l
4 I
4 1
5 Event Type*
N,R CRSIROlPO I
CRSIROIPO CIR CRSIROIPO M
CRSlROIPO C
CRSIPO C
CRSIROIPO Event Description Raise Rx power MT Steamline Inlet Pressure Transmitter fails high (TS)
SGFP oil leak, trip with no auto MT runback Feedwater rupture on common SGFP discharge header, MSLl failure SG Code Safety fails open post trip Single 4KV Group bus fails to transfer (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrumenl, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D, Page 38 of 39
SIMULATOR EXAM IN AT1 0 N SC EN ARlO SCENARIO TITLE:
ATWT, LOSC SCENARIO NUMBER:
J ILT NRC ESG-003 EFFECTIVE DATE:
811 912008 EXPECTED DURATION:
1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months 00 REVISION NUMBER:
PROGRAM:
L.O. REQUAL INITIAL LICENSE STA OTHER Revision Summary:
Rev 0: New Issue for J ILT NRC exam PREPARED BY:
Ed Gallagher (INSTRUCTOR) 6/6/08 (DATE)
(DATE)
APPROVED BY:
c (DATE)
APPROVED BY:
w&.t-a A'OWRATIONS MANAGER OR
/'- \\ DESIGNEE)
J ILT NRC-ESG-003 Enabling Objectives A.
B.
C.
D.
Given the unit at 80% reactor power with the generator synchronized to the grid, the crew will perform a power increase to 100% at 10%/hr, IAW S2.OP-IO.ZZ-O004(Q).
Given a failure of the rod control system, which results in continuous rod motion, the crew will take corrective action, IAW S2.0P-AB ROD-0003.
Given the unit at power and a trip of an operating main feedwater pump, take corrective action IAW AB.CN-0001 Given the order or indications of a reactor trip, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPONP to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures.
Given the order or indications of a loss of (secondary coolant, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the coolant loss in accordance with the approved station procedures.
Given indication of a loss of secondary coolant, DIRECT the response to the loss of secondary coolant, in accordance with the approved station procedures.
E.
F.
- b A.
Power Increase from 80% power
6.
Turbine Inlet Pressure PT505 fails High A -$)
-&,I41ir C.
D.
SGFP trip with failure of auto runback circuit L - 2 t
,A2 f V K bbbk Feedwater line rupture outside containment, ATWT with Trip from CR E.
Steam Generator Safety Valves fails open
&$Jd 2 of 21
J ILT NRC-ESG-003 A.
B.
C.
D.
The crew will receive the unit at 80% Reactor Power with all systems in automatic. Orders to the shift are to raise power to 100% using reactivity plan provided Once the crew takes the watch they will initiate a power increase at 2YJhour.
Once the power ascension is underway Turbine Inlet Pressure PT505 will fail high. Crew will take manual control of Rods and review Tech Specs for failed channel After the TSAS has been evaluated for the PT505, an oil leak will develop on 21 SGFP, the crew will recognize the loss of flow from 21 SGFP and initiate a trip of 21 SGFP. Then crew will perform a manual runback IAW AB.CN-0001 when the auto runback does not occur.
Once the runback is complete a Feedwater line outside containment will rupture. As the secondary plant degrades the turbine will trip but the reactor will fail to auto trip The CRS will direct reactor trip and the RO will complete the trip by opening the 2E6D and 2G6D breakers.
As pressure increases from the ATWT, 3 safety valves on 24 SG will fail open and 2F 4KV group bus will fail to transfer to station Pcilwer. The crew will identify the steam flow and initiate a MSLl and SI.
The crew will perform actions of EOP-TRIP-I and LOSC-1 to isolate the faulted SG E.
F.
G.
3 of 21
"J" ILT NRC-ESG-003 Presnapped IC-243 from portable exam drive B
MALFUNCTIONS:
I I
I I
I SELF-CHECK Description
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7"
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
TU0055 Turb Inlet Press XMTR 505 FAIL EH0327 Turb Fails to Runback on SGFP BF0105A 21 Stm Gen Feed Pmp Trip BFOl06 FW Common Disch Hdr Leak RP0058 Failure of Auto RX Trip RP0059A Failure of Munual RX Trip TU0066 MN Turb lnadvertantly Trips MSOI 19P 24MS11 SG Safety Vlv Fails MSOI 19Q 24MS12 SG Safety Vlv Fails MSOI19R 24MS13 SG SAFETY VLV FAILS RP0279B Auto MSLl Fails to Act, Trn B RP0279A Auto MSLl Fails to Act, Trn A EL0143 LOSS OF 2F 4160V GROUP BUS AN3739 AAS 739 FAILS - 125 TGA SUMP LEVE AN3737 AAS 737 FAILS - 123 TGA SUMP LEVE AN3738 AAS 738 FAILS - :24 TGA SUMP LEVE AN3736 AAS 736 FAILS - :22 TGA SUMP LEVE AN3735 AAS 735 FAILS - 2 1 TGA SUMP LEVE NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
20
20
20 NA NA
30 2:oo 2:15 2:40 3:OO 3:15 NA NA NA 5:OO NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA RT-1 NA RT-2 RT-3 NA NA RT-4 RT-4 RT-4 RT-4 NA NA RT-4 RT-3 RT-3 RT-3 RT-3 RT-3 100 NA 2500 10000 NA NA NA Open Open Open NA NA NA 2
2 2
2 2
REMOTES:
I I
I I
I I
Delay 1
Ramp 1
Trigger I
Condition NA NA NA Yes
1.
OVERRIDES:
I I
I I
I SELF-CHECK 1 Description
[
Delay 1
Ramp I
Trigger I Action
1.
B440 OVDl Reactor Trip Breaker 'A-TRIP NA NA NA Off
2.
6441 OVDl Reactor Trip Breaker '6'-TRIP NA NA NA Off 4 of 21
J ILT NRC-ESG-003
EVENT TRIGGERS: 1 y
I I
SELF-CHECK 1 ET#n I Discription Command
1.
None TAGGED EQUIPMENT:
I 1 Description
1. RH1 and RH2
2. VC 1-4
3. RH 18s
__ 4. RCPs (SELF CHECK)
5. RT (SELF CHECK)
6. MS 167s (SELF CHECK)
7. 500 KV SWYD (SELF CHECK).
8. 23 CV Pump (SELF CHECK)
OTHER CONDITIONS:
I 1 Description I
5 of 21
J ILT NRC-ESG-003 A.
State shift job assignments:
B.
Hold a shift briefing, detailing instruction to the shift: (provide CREW members a copy of the shift turnover sheet)
C.
Inform the crew The simulator is running. You may commence panel walkdowns at this time. CRS please inform me when your crew is ready to assume the shift.
D.
Allow sufficient time for panel walk-downs. When informed by the CRS that the crew is ready to assume the shift, ensure the simulator is cleared of unauthorized personnel.
E.
Do not review objectives with crew 6 of 21
J ILT NRC-ESG-003 Comments.
Evaluatorllnstructor Activity
~
Expected PlanttStudent Response CRS briefs crew on evolution CRS implements S2.OP-I0.ZZ-0004 CRS directs PO to commence Turbine load increase at 2%/hour RO initiates a dilution per the reactivity plan provided PO monitors DEHC for indications of load increase RO monitors Tavg and Delta T and MWe for indications of load increase
,Proceed to next event at direction of lead evaluator, insure.Rods have been returned to AUTO.
7 of 21
J I LT N RC-E S G -0 0 3 Proceed to next event when TSAS is determined or at direction of lead
. evaluator Evaluatorllnstructor Activity Expected PJantlStudent Response Comments
2. Turbine Inlet Pressure PT505 fails Hiah Enter RT-I, when rods are in auto PT505 fails High 0
RO reports Tavgnref deviation and Rods stepping out Not expected for current load increase 0
CRS direct!; RO to place Rods in manual and stop dilution 0
CRS directs PO to hold Turbine load increase 0
CRS enters S2.OP-AB:ROD-0003 may not come in until rods are 0
PO reports Turbine Inlet Pressure PT505 has failed High 0
RO monitors Tavg for needed adjustments IAW attachment 1 and controls Tavg by manually inserting Rods 0
RO acknowledges Tavgnref deviation 0
RO informs CRS that Rod motion was in the outward direction.
0 PO verifieis PT505 failed High and places Steam Dumps in MS pressure control 0
CRS refers to TSAS and requests I&C assistance to remove the channel from service 0
CRS enters TSAS 3.3.2.1.b flu 1.f action 19 8 of 21
J ILT NRC-ESG-003 Evaluatorhstructor Activity.
Expected PlantlStudent Response Comments This will occur about 5 mins after RT-2 is inserted 0
e 0
0 e
e 0
e e
e e
e e
0 e
PO announi:;es console alarm for 21 SGFP: TUF!B OIL RSVR LVL HVLO followed by CONTROL OIL PRESSURE LOW.
PO refers to Console ARP and sends NE0 to investigate Crew may attempt to makeup IAW SO.PL-000:2 Based on report from NEO, CRS may decide to reduce power to 50% IAW ARP for reservoir level. AB.LOAD may be entered Reactivity plan and contingencies should be discussed 21 SGFP speed dev OHA G-23 alarms CRS directs 21 SGFP tripped PO trips 21 SGFP CRS enters AB.CN-0001 RO/PO perform IAs of AB.CN-0001 PO reports auto runback is NOT occurring and initiates runback to
<66% power @I 5%/min RO drives Rods in manual to control Tavg during downpower PO initiates CAS when runback is in progress R 0 in i t i a t e!s bora t i o n PO opens 21 thru 23 CN108 valves and monitlors SG levels PO opens 2CN47 and isolates blowdown 9 of 21
J ILT NRC-ESG-003 NOTE: CRS may order a Reactor Trip at any time due to the multiple malfunctions occurring.
I F:;.
Evaluatorllnstructor Activity.
Expected PlantlStudent Response Comments I
0 The PO should identify the transient as a loss of Feedwater flow.
4. Feedline BreaWATWT Alarms JAW the appropriate Alarm 0
AS feed break size increases:
Feed Reg Valves will open farther Feed Flaw to all S/Gs will lower.
S/G levels will begin to lower.
SGFP Speed will rise 0
PO informs CRS that Aux alarms are TGA sumps overflowing 0
PO informs the CRS that the BF19s are full open and 22 SGFP is at max flow 0
The PO informs the CRS that SG levels are lowering rapidly Sim Driver insert RT-4 Turbine Trip when CRS briefs Reactor Trip 0
RO reports that the turbine has tripped and the Reactor did not ATWT The CRS directs the RO to Trip the RX The RO turns the Reactor Trip handle and informs the CRS that the Reactor did not trip 0
RO attempts to Trip Rx using breaker pushbuttons CT#I (E-0 -- A): Manually Trip the Reactor from the Control Room before transition to FRSM-1 UNSAT 3 Nlhs after dispatched delete overrides on Rx Trip buttons and
, open breakers Note: 24 SG safety valves will open 20 seconds after turbine trip 0
RO opens 2E6D and 2G6D to de-energize Rod Drive MG sets 0
RO confirms Reactor trip CRS dispatches NE0 to open Reactor Trip breakers 0
RO informs CRS that turbine is tripped and backs up turbine trip 0
RO informs CRS that all Vital busses are energized 10 of 21
J ILT NRC-ESG-003 Evaluator/lnstructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Response Comments i.
no SI has occurred but informs CRS that RCS pressure and are lowering and an SI is 0
CRS directs RO to initiate a MSLl and SI when steam flow is not isolated 1 SAT UNSAT I
RO initiates MSLI and informs CRS that steam flow is limited to 24 SG RO initiates SI based on continued steam flow CRS verifies Immediate actions CT#2 (Part 2 AFW isolation)
(E-2 -- A): Isolate the faulted SG before transition out of E-2 (LOSC)
PO throttle:; AFW and isolates feed to 24SG based on TRIP-1 CAS UNSAT PO informs CRS that F Group bus is de-energized 0
PO verifies SEC loading and safeguard valve alignment 0
RO verifies containment pressure has remained sC15 psig 0
RO verifies CAV and SWGR ventilation 0
RO verifies ECCS flow RO verifies PORV and PZR spray status PO reports 24 SG pressure dropping in an uncontrolled manner CRS tranisitions to LOSC-1 0
PO verifies MSLl valves closed 11 of 21
"J" ILT NRC-ESG-003 Evaluatorllnstructor Activity Expected Plant/ Student Response Comments to current SG pressure and monitor for 24 SG dry-out at that point adjust intact MSlOs to prevent RCS Scenario can be terminated when PO stabilizes RCS temperature at the discretion of the Lead Evaluator PO verifies FW, AFW, MS and GB valves for 24 SG are closed RO reset Phase A and opens SG sample valves CRS direct the PO to dump steam to stabilize RCS temperature CRS validates SGTR is not occurring and transitions to LOCA-1 Crew resets safeguards and verifies SI flow reduction criteria CRS transitions to TRIP-3 for SI termination Evaluator Note: ECG Classification is 5.1.2.A for ATWT with trip completed from the control room 12 of 21
J ILT NRC-ESG-003
?
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
I.
J.
Alarm Response Procedures (Various)
Technical Specifications Emergency Plan (ECG)
OP-AA-101-111-1003, Use of Procedures S2.OP-I0.ZZ-0004 - Power Operation S2.OP-AB.ROD-0003 - Continous Rod Motion S2.OP-AB.CN-0001 - Main Feedwater/Condensate System Abnormality 2-EOP-TRIP Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 2-EOP-LOSC-1, Loss of Secondary Coolant 2-EOP-LOCA-I, Loss of Reactor Coolant 13 of 21
J ILT NRC-ESG-003 r
wi.-
ESG CRITICAL TASK RATIONAL CT#1 (E-0 -- A): Manually Trip the Reactor from the Control Room before transition to FRSM-I Basis Failure to manually trip the reactor causes a challenge to the subcriticality CSF beyond that irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Additionally, it constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the crew taking comlpensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy and demonstrates the inability of the crew to recognize a failure of the autornatic actuation of the RPS CT#2 (E-2 -- A): Isolate the faulted SG before transition out of E-2 (LOSC)
Basis Failure to isolate a faulted SG thait can be isolated causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions.
Also, depending on the plant conditions, it could constitute a demonstrated inability of the crew to recognize the failure of an automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.
14 of 21
" J " I LT N RC-E S G-0 0 3 Vlll.
ESG - PSA RELATIONSHIP EVALUATION S-ILT-2008 NRC ESG-3 SALEM ESG - PRA RELATIONSHIPS EVALUATION FORM EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE Y/N EVENT YIN EVENT N
TRANSIENTS with PCS Unavailable N
Loss of Service Water N
Steam Generator Tube Rupture N
LossofCCW N
Loss of Offsite Power N
Loss of Control Air N
Loss of Switchgear and Pen Area Ventilation N
Station Black Out N
LOCA COMPONENTlTRAlNlSYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR Y/N TRAIN YIN COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN N
Containment Sump Strainers N
Gas Turbine N
SSWS Valves to Turbine Generator Area N
Any Diesel Generator N
RHR Suction Line valves from Hot Leg N
Auxiliary Feed Pump N
Valves N
SBO Air Compressor CVCS Letdown line Control and Isolation OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE Y/N OPERATOR ACTION N
N Connect to gas turbine N
N N
N N
N N
Early depressurize RCS N
Initiate feed and bleed Restore AC power during SBO Trip Reactor and RCPs after loss of component cooling system Re-align RHR system for re-circulation Un-isolate the available CCW Heat Exchanger Isolate the CVCS letdown path and transfer charging suction to RWST Cooldown the RCS and depressurize the systern Isolate the affected Steam generator which has the tube ruptures Complete this evaluation form for each ESG.
15 of 21
J ILT NRC-ESG-003 SHUTDOWN SAFETY SYSTEM STATUS (5,6 & DEFUELED):
NIA REACTIVITY PARAMETERS Core Burn-up 10,500 MWDIMTU, reactivity plan provided MOST LIMITING LCO AND DATE/TIME OF EXPIRATION:
EVOLUTIONSIPROCEDURESlSURVElLLANCES !N PROGRESS:
Raise power to 100% IAW IOP-4 at 2% per Hour ABNORMAL PLANT CONFIGURATIONS:
CONTROL ROOM:
Unit 1 and Hope Creek at 100% power.
No penalty minutes in the last 24 hrs.
PRIMARY:
NONE SECONDARY:
Heating steam is aligned to unit 1 RADWASTE:
No discharges in progress CIRCULATING WATEWSERVICE WATER:
16.of 21
J ILT NRC-ESG-003 Note:
guidance for the examination team as they conduct their review for the proposed scenarios.
Attach a separate copy of this form to each scenario reviewed. This form is used as EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE (ESG) REVIEW/ VALIDATION Note:
This form is used as guidance for an examination team to conduct a review for the proposed exam scenario(s). Attach a separate copy of this form to each scenario reviewed.
ESG-2 ILT NRC-ESG-003 CHECK REVIEWER:
Ed Gallagher I.
2.
3.
THE SCENARIO HAS CLEARLY STATED OBJECTIVES IN THE SCENARIO.
The initial conditions are realistic, equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue the crew into expected events.
Each event description consists of:
The point in the scenario when it is to be initiated, 0
The malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event, The symptomslcues that will be visible to the crew, 0
The expected operator actions (by shift position), and 0
The event termination point.
4.
The use of non-mechanistic failures (e.g. pipe break) should be limited to one or a credible preceding event has occurred.
The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics.
Sequencinghiming of events is reasonable (e.g. the crew has time to respond to the malfunctions in an appropriate time frame and implements procedures and/or corrective actions).
Sequencinghiming of events is reasonable, and allows for the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives.
If time compression techniques are used, scenario summary clearly so indicates.
The simulator modeling is not altered.
10. All crew competencies can be evaluated.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
11. Appropriate reference materials are available (SOERs, LERs, etc.).
12. If the sampling plan indicates that the scenario was used for training during the
13. Proper critical task methodology is used IAVV NRC procedures.
14. ESG-PSA Evaluation Form is completed for the scenario at the applicable facility.
requalification cycle, evaluate the need to modify or replace the scenario.
17 of 21
J ILT NRC-ESG-003 SCENARIO: J ILT NRC-ESG-003 REVIEWER:
Ed Gallagher INITIAL EG EG EG EG
~
EG EG EG EG EG 8
3 3
2 1
0 65 40%
2 TARGET QUANTITATIVE ATTRIBUTES Total malfunctions inserted: 5-8 Malfunctions that occur after EOP entry: 1-2 Abnormal Events: 2-4 Major Transients: 1-2 EOPs requiring substantive actions (not including TRIP-1 ): 1-2 EOP Contingency Procedures used: 0-2 Approximate scenario run time: 75-90 minutes EOP run time: 40-70% of scenario run time Crew Critical Tasks: 2-3 COMMENTS:
18 of 21
J ILT NRC-ESG-003 ATTACHMENT 1 SIMULATOR READY-FOR-TRAINING CHECKLIST
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
I O.
11.
12.
Verify simulator is in correct load for training All required computer terminals in operation Simulator clocks synchronized Required chart recorders advanced and ON (proper paper installed)
Rod step counters correct (channel check)
All tagged equipment properly secured and documented (TSAS Log filled out)
DL-IO log up-to-date Required procedures clean All OHA lamps operating (OHA Test)
All printers have adequate paper AND functional ribbon Procedure pens available Procedures in progress open and signed-off to proper step
13.
Shift manning sheet available
14.
SPDS reset
15.
16.
Reference verification performed with required documents available Ensure a current RCS Leak Rate Worksheet is placed by Aux Alarm Typewriter with Baseline Data filled out
17.
Required keys available
18.
Video Tape (if applicable)
19.
20.
Reset P-250 Rod Counters Ensure ECG Classification is correct - - 960502140 CRCA-03 19 of 21
J ILT NRC-ESG-003 ATTACHMENT 2 CRITICAL TASK METHODOLOGY In reviewing each proposed CT, the examination team assesses the task to ensure, that it is essential to safety. A task is essential to safety if, in the judgment of the examination team, the improper performance or omission of this task by a licensee will result in direct adverse consequences or in significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant.
The examination team determines if an automatically actuated plant system would have been required to mitigate the consequences of an individuals incorrect performance. If incorrect performance of a task by an individual necessitates the crew taking cornpensatory action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy, the task is safety significant.
I.
Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which operation or correct performance prevents...
degradation of any barrier to fission product release degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) or emergency power capacity a violation of a safety limit a violation of the facility license condition incorrect reactivity control (such as failure to initiate Emergency Boration or Standby Liquid Control, or manually insert control rods) a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which a crew demonstrates the ability to...
effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent any condition described in the previous paragraph.
recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.
take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.
prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such as an unintentional Reactor Protection System (RPS) or ESF actuation.
20 of 21
J ILT NRC-ESG-003 ATTACHMENT 3 ESG PRE-JOB BRIEF CHECKLIST, EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE (ESG) Pre-Job Brief Checklist Note: This checklist is to be completed by the Lead Examiner prior to evaluating an ESG. The Lead Examiner should lead a pre-job brief with all the examiners and simulator operators that includes, but is not limited to the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Lead ESG J ILT NRC-ESG-003 IExaminer:
ESG overview and sequence of major events.
Determine which optional events will be performed, if any.
ESG summary of Critical Tasks.
Assign examiners to observe specific watch standers.
Assign examiner ownership for observing and documenting performance / non-performance of Critical Tasks.
Review alternate path(s) identified by the IESG.
Assign examiner to document data related to the performance of Critical Tasks.
Determines what parameters will be recorded in Data Collection.
Ensure SOE recorder is recording.
21 of 21
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (1 Facility:
SALEM 1 & 2 Scenario No.: N R C ESG-4 Op-Test No.: 07-01 NRC Examiners:
Operators:
00% power 100% power Malf' No. 1 Event Type*
I I
CRSlRO CRS/RO/PO CRS/RO/PO C
1 CRSlPO y-pF CRS/RO/PO I
(R)eactivity, (1)nstrumen Event Description Power range NI fails high (TS)
B 4KV vital loads in Blackout, power reduction to required ESO predicted voltage level e493 KV (TS)
ESO directed rapid load reduction.
100%
Loss of 2314 CW bus (3 circulators)
Loss of 4th circulator requiring Rx trip LOCA outsilde containment (200 gpm in RHR pp room)
(C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D, Page 38 of 39
SIMULATOR EXAM IN AT1 O N SCENARIO SCENARIO TITLE:
SCENARIO NUMBER:
EFFECTIVE DATE:
LOCA Outside Containment J ILT NRC ESG-004 8/19/2008 EXPECTED DURATION:
I
.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months REVISION NUMBER:
00 PROGRAM:
L.O. REQUAL INITIAL LICENSE STA OTHEF!
Revision Summary:
Rev 0: New Issue for J ILT NRC exam 6/6/08 (DATE)
PREPARED BY:
7/oB APPROVED BY:
(DATE) 6 08 (DATE)
APPROVED BY:
J ILT NRC-ESG-004 Enabling Objectives A.
B.
C.
Given a failure of a power range detector, take corrective action for a power range instrument failure IAW AB.NIS-0001 Given a loss of a 4 KV vital bus, take corrective action, IAW S2.OP-AB.4KV-0001.
Given the order or indications of an abnormal grid, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the malfunction in accordance with the approved station procedures.
Given indication or order of an abnormal grid, DIRECT the response to the malfunction, in accordance with the approved station procedures.
Given the order or indications of a loss or rnalfunction of a non-safety related plant cooling water system, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the loss or malfunction of the non-safety related plant cooling water system in accordance with the approved station procedures.
Given indication of a loss or malfunction of a non-safety related plant cooling water system, DIRECT the response to the loss or malfunction in accordance with the approved station procedures.
Given the unit with a RCS Leak outside containment, PERFORM actions to isolate the leak, IAW approved station procedures.
Given the unit with a RCS Leak outside containment, DIRECT actions to isolate the leak, IAW approved station procedures.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
If..
MAJOR EVENTS A.
6.
C.
D.
E.
F.
Power Range NI fails High B 4KV Vital bus De-energizes and Loads in Blackout Loading Electric System Operator directs a rapid load reduction Circ water bus section 23 de-energizes causing loss of 3 circulators Loss of 4h circulator requires Reactor Trip LOCA outside Containment with loss of Off-Site Power 2 of 24
J ILT NRC-ESG-004 A.
B.
The crew will receive the unit at 100% Reactor Power with all systems in automatic. Orders to the shift are to maintain 100% power Once the crew takes the watch power range NI N41 will fail high causing the rods to step in at max rate. The crew will take manual control of rods and remove the channel from service.
When the N41 channel is removed 2B 4KV Vital bus will de-energize, load on the diesel generator and the SEC will load blackout loads. The crew will enter AB-4KV-0002 stop loads as necessary and reduce power to less than 100%.
When the crew has addressed the blackout loading, the control room will receive a call from the Electric System Operator informing the crew of a predicted grid voltage of ~493KV. CRS will enter AB-GRID and declare the off-site power sources inoperable and enter the appropriate TSAS.
After the TSAS has been evaluated the electric system operator will call back and request Salem Unit 2 to reduce load to 850 MWe at 15% min. The crew will reduce load IAW AB.GRID as requested Once the runback is complete circ water bus section 23 will de-energize causing the loss of 3 circulators. The crew will enter AB.CW-1 and monitor plant conditions for additional power reduction, as the crew is implementing the AB a 4h circulator will develop a screen diff and be lost. The CRS will implement the CAS of AB.CW-1 and initiate a Reactor TRIP.
After the reactor trip off-site power will be lost and intersystem leak will develop into the RHR system the crew will implement TRIP-I and transition to EOP-TRIP-2 as the intersystem leak progresses the crew will initiate an SI and return to TRIP-?. After transition to the LOCA series the RHR system will rupture causing an RCS leak into the auxiliary building.
The crew will perform actions of EOP-LQCA-I and transition to LOCA-6 to isolate the leakage. The scenario will end when the leak is isolated.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
3 of 24
J ILT NRC-ESG-004 17 JV.
INITIAL CONOITIONS SELF-CHE CK Presnapped IC-244 from portable exam drive Description I
Delay I
Ramp I
Trigger 1
Severity d
MALFUNCTIONS:
I I
I I
I SELF-CHECK ET#n Discription Command REMOTES:
I I
I I
I
1.
ED28D 24BSD 4KV BKR LOCAL TRIP NA NA RT-2 Yes
2.
EL69D-B 2B VITAL INVTR FAIL ALARM RESET
.NA NA RT-10 Reset
3.
EL69D-D 2D VITAL INVTR FAIL ALARM RESF
20 NA RT-1 0 Reset OVERRIDES:
I I
I I
I SELF-CHECK I Description I
Delay 1
Ramp I
Trigger I
Action
1.
2105 OVLO 21 SWGR Exhaust Fan - Start NA NA ET-4 Off
2.
2105 OVLO 21 SWGR Exhaust Fan - Stop NA NA ET-4 On EVENT TRIGGERS:
4 of 24
J ILT NRC-ESG-004 I Description
1. RHI and RH2
3. RH 18s
4.
RCPs (SELF CHECK)
5. RT (SELF CHECK)
6. MS 167s (SELF CHECK)
7. 500 KV SWYD (SELF CHECK)
8. 23 CV Pump (SELF CHECK)
2. VC 1-4 I Description 5 of 24
J ILT NRC-ESG-004 CRS may enter AB.NIS directly or may first enter AB.ROD-3, this will direct entry into AB.NIS Evaluatorllnstructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Response II.
. Comments 0
CRS concurs and directs Rods to manu a I I. Power Ranae N41 Fails Hiah RO reports Rods stepping in with no Insert RT-I load reduction in progress and recommends Rods to manual 0
PO refers to OHA response for multiple OHAs, E-15, 31, 39 and 47 0
CRS enters AB.NIS Brief should include the fact that outward rod motion is blocked until Rod Stop Bypass is selected for 0
RO determines 2N41 is failed 0
CRS directs the failed channel be removed from service JAW SO.RPS-0001 0
PO defeats, Rod Stop Bypass IAW SO.RPS-0001 0
CRS requests I&C assistance for removing the failed channel CRS briefs crew on plant condition and discusses contingencies CRS enters TS for failed channel 3.3.1.I act 2 and 6 0
0 0
CRS requests Reactor Engineering to perform flux map in support of TSAS 7 of 24
J ILT NRC-ESG-004 After 4 mhs report 2SW26 appears to be almost full open and the breaker is tripped Evaluatorhstructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Response Comments I_
CRS dispa!ches NE0 to verify position of 2SW26
2. 28 Vital bus loads in Blackout After TS determination at direction of lead evaluator insert RT-2 PO reports 28 Vital bus de-energized 0
PO reports rnultiple OHAs and reports 28 EDG has started and loaded in Blackout loading 0
CRS enters AB.4KV-0002 CRS directs PO to initiate CAS of AB.4KV-0002 CRS directs primary operator to B diesel to monitor 0
PO reports no indication on 2SW26 valve but OHA for TGA SW header pressure is not in alarm 0
RO reports 21 Charging Pump is running bul was not in-service prior to event 0
RO reports 22RHR pump not required CRS Dispatches NE0 to investigate B and D Inverter alarms 0
PO reports B bus energized from the diesel and resets emergency loading and 230V control centers 0
RO stops 21 Charging Pump and 22 CCW pump 0
PO stops :24 SW pump and places 22 SW pump in auto 0
RO reports Letdown is NOT isolated 8 of 24
J ILT NRC-ESG-004 Evaluatorllnstructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Response Comments PO depresses start pushbutton for 22 AFW pump and opens sample valves and initiates restoration of blowdown CRS directs PO to stop 22AFW pump and directs NE0 to perform backleakage surveillance CRS requests assistance from Engineering1 and maintenance to determine cause of blackout loading CRS reviews Tech Specs and determines most limiting TSAS is 3.6.1.1 (IHI-) for 2SW26 inoperable also 3.8.2.1 for 2B bus (8 Hr) 9 of 24
J ILT NRC-ESG-004 1
Evaluatorllnstructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Response Comments CRS may decide to allow runback to stop automatically at completion of SMD #2 setting (63%)
Rapid boration should be IAW S2.OP-S0.CVC-0008 insert ET-3 and proceed to next CRS enters AB.GRID-0001 0
CRS directs PO to monitor CAS of AB.GRID 0
CRS declares Off-Site power sources inoperable and enters TSAS 3.8.1.1.d 0
CRS initiates Station Load Curtailment 0
CRS informs ESO of problem with 8 bus and short duration TSAS 0
CRS irnplernents Attachment 4 of AB-GRID and directs a load reduction to 850 MWe at 15%/min 0
PO selects SMD #2 on DEHC and selects GO 0
RO initiates boration and drives rods in manual (if not restored to auto from loss of N41) 0 PO places turbine on hold when load reaches 5850 MWe CRS initiates AB-LOAD 0
RO energizes pressurizer heaters 0
RO starts Rapid boration when OHA for Rod insertion LO LO is received 0
PO stops I condensate pump when load is <75%
0 RO initiates rapid boration if OHA E-I6 Rod Insertion Limit LO LO is received.
10 of 24
"J" ILT NRC-ESG-004 Evaluatorllnstructor Activity Expected PtantlStudant Response Comments
4. Loss of multiple Circulators At discretion of evaluation team the ramp on 238 screen can be shortened to force Reactor trip PO reports loss of circ water bus 23 and loss of 21A, 22A and 23A circulators CRS enters AB.CW-0001 PO initiates CAS of AB.CW and monitors parameters for load reduction requirements Crew determines 3 circulators are sufficient far current load PO reports screen Ap rising on 236 traveling screen.
PO states CAS for tripping with <3 circulators I/S CRS directs RO to trip the Reactor and transitions to EOP-TRIP-1 11 of 24
J ILT NRC-ESG-004 NOTE: SECs will have to be reset before fans can be manually started
. Evaluatodlnstructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Response Comments CRS direzts RO to start 2 SWGR supply arid 1 Exhaust fans
4. LOCA outside Containment RO performs VAS of TRIP-1 0
CRS enters TRIP-1 0
PO reports loss of all Off-Site Power 0
CRS reads immediate actions of TRIP-1 CREW trartsitions to TRIP-2 RO states PZR level is not lowering but 2 Charging pumps are in service with no letdown RO reports high discharge pressure alarms on RHR CREW initiates and SI and returns to TRIP-1 After transition to TRIP-2 modify MALFSJ0312B to 20 I
cooldown 1
PO throttks AFW Flow to SGs to limit 0
CREW verifies safeguards status RO reports Control area ventilation is in accident Pressurized mode RO reports no SWGR fans running 0
CRS directs RO to block B and C SEC and PO to reset B and C SEC CRS directs RO to SWGR fans 12 of 24
J ILT NRC-ESG-004 NOTE: If not started previously the SWGR fans should be started when the SECs are reset in Appx 1 CT#I (UFSAR) Start Minimum compliment of Switchgear Ventilation prior to completion of scenario UNSAT 0
RO reports SWGR fans started Insert RT-5: RMR leak after transition I to^LOCA-l CT#2 (E K) Manually start minimum number of CCW pumps required prior to transition out of SAT UNSAT 0
0 CRS directs PO to start ICCW pump
.- 7 IAW APPX-I cavitation indication is due to flow 0
Y PO blocks B and C SEC, stops 22 SWGR supply fan, starts 23 SWGR supply fan, stops 22 and 24 CFCU, verifies 22 Aux Bldg Exh fan is not running and starts 22 CCW pump.
PO verifies 3 SW pumps IIS and dispatches ;an operator to restore SW cooling to 21 and 22 CCW HXs RO verifies PORV Status and Spray Valve Status PO determines no faulted or ruptured SG If directed the RO resets SI and the SECs then stops 21 and 22 RHR pumps CRS dispatches and NE0 to isolate CCW to Spent Fuel cooling CREW performs diagnostics and determines that a leak exist from the RCS CRS dispatches and NE0 to monitor running diesel generators CRS transitions to LOCA-1 13 of 24
J ILT NRC-ESG-004
>... Evaluatodlnstructor Activity Expected PIantlStudent Response Comments 0
PO verifies no faulted or ruptured SG 0
RO resets safeguards if not completed in TRIP-1 0
RO verifies PORV status 0
CREW determines SI cannot be terminated 0
Crew deterrnines SJ49 injection flow is
<300 gpm 0
RO determines RCS pressure is NOT stable or rising 0
RO informs CRS that 22 RHR sump overflow 0HA C-34 is in alarm PO determines SG pressures are stable RO determunes RCS pressure is lowering Crew determines RAD monitors 2R41 D is in alarm CREW performs diagnostics and determines that Rad indications are due to a LOCA outside containment 0
CRS transitions to LOCA-6 RO verifies RH1 and 2 closed 0
RO closes RH1 9s 0
RO determines RCS pressure is NOT rising RO verifies 2RH26 closed RO determines RCS pressure is NOT rising 14 of 24
"J" ILT NRC-ESG-004 Scenario c y be termination after transition to LOCA-1 Expected PlantlStudent Response Comments
i.
Evaluatorllnstructor Activity 0
0 0
0 0
0 CT#3 (ECA-I.2 - A) Isolate the LOCA outside containment before transition out of LOCA-6(ECA-1.2)
UNSAT 0
0 RO places 21 RH29 in AUTO CRS directs lockout removed for 21 SJ49 RO closes 21 SJ49 while monitoring RCS pressure RO informs CRS that RCS pressure is NOT rising RO re-opens 21SJ49 RO places 22RH29 in AUTO CRS directs lockout removed for 22SJ49 RO closes 22SJ49 while monitoring RCS pressure RO informs CRS that RCS pressure is rising CRS directs RO to stop 22 RHR pump CREW transitions back to LOCA-I Crew verifies SI termination criteria and transitions to TRIP-3 15 of 24
"J" ILT NRC-ESG-004 A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
I J.
K.
L.
M.
N.
Alarm Response Procedures (Various)
Technical Specifications Emergency Plan (ECG)
OP-AA-101-111-1003, Use of Procedures S2.OP-I0.ZZ-0004 - Power Operation S2.OP-AB.NIS-0001 - Nuclear 1nstrumeni.ation System Malfunctions S2.OP-AB.4KV-0001 -Loss of 2A 4KV Vital Bus S2.OP-AB.GRID-0001 -Abnormal Grid S2.OP-AB.CW-0001 -Circulating Water S'ystem Malfunction 2-EOP-TRIP Reactor Trip or Safety lnllection 2-EOP-TRIP Reactor Trip Response 2-EOP-TRIP Safety Injection Termination 2-EOP-LOCA-6, LOCA Outside Containment 2-EOP-LOCA-1, Loss of Reactor Coolant 16 of 24
J ILT NRC-ESG-004 Vll;;
ESG CRITICAL TASK RATIONAL K
CT#I (UFSAR) Start Minimum compliment of Switchgear Ventilation prior to completion of scenario Restoration of Minimum Switch Gear ventilation is required to insure the long Basis term reliability of required ECCS components. Mis-operation or incorrect Crew performance leads to a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario. Timeframe of before end of scenario is to insure long term reliability of switchgear.
CT#2 (E K) Manually start minimum number (of CCW pumps required prior to transition out of TRIP-I Basis Failure to manually start at least the minimum number of CCW pumps required to provide adequate component cooling for the operating safeguards trains represents a demonstrated inability of the crew to effectively directlmanipulate ESF controls. Additionally, under the postulated plant conditions, failure to manually start at least the minimum number of CCW pumps (when it is possible to do so) is a violation of the facility license condition.
CT#3 (ECA-1.2 - A) Isolate the LOCA outside containment before transition out of LOCA-6(ECA-1.2)
Basis Failure to isolate a LOCA outside containment (that can be isolated) degrades containment integrity beyond the level of degradation irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. It also constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to degradation of a barrier to fission product release and eventually to degraded ECCS capacity. Failure to perform the critical task leads to a significant reduction in safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario. It also represents a significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant.
17 of 24
"J" ILT NRC-ESG-004 r
VIII.
ESG - PSA RELATIONSHIP EVALUATION S-ILT-2008 NRC ESG-3 SALEM ESG - PRA RELATIONSHIPS EVALUATION FORM EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE YIN N
N Y
Y Y
~ -~
YIN EVENT EVENT TRANSIENTS with PCS Unavailable Loss of Offsite Power N
Loss of Control Air Loss of Switchgear and Pen Area Ventilation LOCA N
Loss of Service Water Steam Generator Tube Rupture Y
Lossof ccw N
Station Black Out COMPONENT/TRAlN/SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR
'IN TRAIN
)"&
COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN N
Gas Turbine N
Containment Sump Strainers N
SSWS Valves to Turbine Generator Area N
Any Diesel Generator N
RHR Suction Line valves from Hot Leg N
Auxiliary Feed Pump N
Valves N
SBO Air Compressor CVCS Letdown line Control and Isolation OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE Y/N OPERATOR ACTION N
N Connect to gas turbine N
N Y
N N
N N
Early depressurize RCS N
Initiate feed and bleed Restore AC power during SBO Trip Reactor and RCPs after loss of component cooling system Re-align RHR system for re-circulation Un-isolate the available CCW Heat Exchanger Isolate the CVCS letdown path and transfer charging suction to RWST Cooldown the RCS and depressurize the system Isolate the affected Steam generator which has the tube ruptures Complete this evaluation form for each ESG.
18 of 24
J ILT NRC-ESG-004 SHUTDOWN SAFETY SYSTEM STATUS (5,6 & DEFUELED):
N/A REACTIVITY PARAMETERS Core Burn-up 17500 MWDlMTU MOST LIMITING LCO AND DATERIME OF El PIRATION:
EVOLUTIONS/PROCEDUl?ES/SURVEILLANCES IN PROGRESS:
ABNORMAL PLANT CONFIGURATIONS:
CONTROL ROOM:
Unit 1 and Hope Creek at 100% power.
No penalty minutes in the last 24 hrs.
PRIMARY:
NONE SECONDARY:
Heating steam is aligned to unit 1.
RADWASTE:
No discharges in progress Cl RCULATl NG WATE WSERVICE WATER:
19 of 24
J I LT NRC-ESG-004 X.
SIMULATOR ESG REVIEWNAUDATION CHECKLIST A
Note:
guidance for the examination team as they conduct their review for the proposed scenarios.
Attach a separate copy of this form to each scenario reviewed. This form is used as EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE (ESG) REVIEW/ VALIDATION Note:
This form is used as guidance for an examination team to conduct a review for the proposed exam scenario(s). Attach a separate copy of this form to each scenario
reviewed, ESG-J ILT NRC-ESG-004 CHECK REVIEWER: Ed Gallanher
1.
2.
3.
THE SCENARIO HAS CLEARLY STATED OBJECTIVES IN THE SCENARIO.
The initial conditions are realistic, equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue the crew into expected events.
Each event description consists of:
The event termination point.
The use of non-mechanistic failures (e.g. pipe break) should be limited to one or a credible preceding event has occurred.
The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics.
Sequencingltiming of events is reasonable (e.g. the crew has time to respond to the malfunctions in an appropriate time frame and implements procedures and/or corrective a ction s).
Sequencinghiming of events is reasonable, rind allows for the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives.
If time compression techniques are used, scenario summary clearly so indicates.
The simulator modeling is not altered.
The point in the scenario when it is to be initiated, The malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event, The symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew, The expected operator actions (by shift position), and
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
I O. All crew competencies can be evaluated.
11. Appropriate reference materials are available (SOERs, LERs, etc.).
12. If the sampling plan indicates that the scenario was used for training during the requalification cycle, evaluate the need to modify or replace the scenario.
13. Proper critical task methodology is used IAW NRC procedures.
14. ESG-PSA Evaluation Form is completed for the scenario at the applicable facility.
20 of 24
J ILT NRC-ESG-004 SCENARIO: J ILT NRC-ESG-004
-REVIEWER:
Ed Gallagher INITIAL EG EG EG EG EG EG EG EG EG 8
2 4
I 2
1 70 50%
3 TARGET QUANTITATIVE ATTRIBUTES Total malfunctions inserted 5-8 Malfunctions that occur after EOP entry: 1-2 Abnormal Events: 2-4 Major Transients: 1-2 EOPs requiring substantive actions (not including TRIP-1 ): 1-2 EOP Contingency Procedures used: 0-2 Approximate scenario run time: 75-90 minutes EOP run time: 40-70% of scenario run time Crew Critical Tasks: 2-3 COMMENTS:
21 of 24
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
I O.
11.
12.
13.
14.
"J" ILT NRC-ESG-004 ATTACHMENT 1 SIMULATOR READY-FOR*-TRAI N I NG CHECKLIST Verify simulator is in correct load for training All required computer terminals in operation Simulator clocks synchronized Required chart recorders advanced and ON (proper paper installed)
Rod step counters correct (channel check)
All tagged equipment properly secured and documented (TSAS Log filled out)
DL-10 log up-to-date Required procedures clean All OHA lamps operating (OHA Test)
All printers have adequate paper AND functional ribbon Procedure pens available Procedures in progress open and signed-off to proper step Shift manning sheet available SPDS reset
15.
Reference verification performed with required documents available
16.
Ensure a current RCS Leak Rate Worksheet is placed by Aux Alarm Typewriter with Baseline Data filled out
17.
Required keys available
18.
Video Tape (if applicable)
19.
20.
Reset P-250 Rod Counters Ensure ECG Classification is correct - - 9605021 40 CRCA-03 22 of 24
J ILT NRC-ESG-004 ATTACHMENT 2 CRITICAL TASK METHODOLOGY In reviewing each proposed CT, the examination team assesses the task to ensure, that it is essential to safety. A task is essential to safety if, in the judgment of the examination team, the improper performance or omission of this task by a licensee wiill result in direct adverse consequences or in significant degradation in the mitigative capability of.the plant.
The examination team determines if an automatically actuated plant system would have been required to mitigate the consequences of an individuals incorrect performance. If incorrect performance of a task by an individual necessitates the crew taking compensatory action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy, the task is safety significant.
I. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which operation or correct performance prevents...
0 0
0 a
0 degradation of any barrier to fission product release degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) or emergency power capacity a violation of a safety limit a violation of the facility license condition incorrect reactivity control (such as failure to initiate Emergency Boration or Standby a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the Liquid Control, or manually insert control rods) scenario 0
A. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which a crew demonstrates the ability to...
0 effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would recognize a failure or an incorrect aulomatic actuation of an ESF system or component.
take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.
prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such as an prevent any condition described in the previous paragraph.
0 0
0 unintentional Reactor Protection System (RPS) or ESF actuation.
23 of 24
J ILT NRC-ESG-004 ATTACHMENT 3 1 %
ESG PRE-JOB BRIEF CHECKLIST EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE (ESG) Pre-Job E3rief Checklist Note: This checklist is to be completed by the Lead Examiner prior to evaluating an ESG. The Lead Examiner should lead a pre-job brief with all the examiners and simulator operators that includes, but is not limited to the following:
Lead ESG J ILT NRC-ESG-004 Examiner:
1.
___ 2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
___ 7.
8.
ESG overview and sequence of major events.
Determine which optional events will be performed, if any.
ESG summary of Critical Tasks.
Assign examiners to observe specific watch standers.
Assign examiner ownership for observing and documenting performance / non-performance of Critical Tasks.
Review alternate path(s) identified by the ESG.
Assign examiner to document data related to the performance of Critical Tasks.
Determines what parameters will be recorded in Data Collection.
Ensure SOE recorder is recording.
24 of 24
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Malf. No.
1 2
3 4
4 5
Event Type*
I CRS/RO C
CRS/RO/PO C,R CRSIROIPO M
C CRS/RO/PO (R)eactivity, Event Description VCT level transmitter fails 2C SEC loss of power (TS)
Facility:
SALEM 1 8, 2 Scenario No.: M l C ESG-5 (Spare) Op-Test No.: 07-01 NRC Examiners:
Operators:
Initial Conditions:
40% power Turnover:
23 charging pump C/T for scheduled maint.
Event 1
2 3
4 5
1
(N)orma (1)nstrumen
~~~
~
Centrifugal charging pump trip (TS)
Loss of Main Turbine Lube Oil (Rx trip not required)
Steam Rupture (unisolable) outside containment.
FRHS with no centrifugal charging pps available (Bleed and Feed required. one PZR PORV wont open, RC head vents required.) LOOP. AFP recovery.
(C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D, Page 38 of 39
SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO SCENARIO TITLE:
Loss Of Heat Sink SCENARIO NUMBER:
J ILT NRC ESG-1005 EFFECTIVE DATE:
8/19/2008 EXPECTED DURATION:
1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months REVISION NUMBER:
00 PROGRAM:
L.O. REQUAL INITIAL. LICENSE STA OTHER:
Revision Summary:
Rev 0: New Issue for J ILT NRC exam PREPARED BY:
Ed Gallagher (INSTRUCTOR) 611 9/08 (DATE)
APPROVED BY:
(DATE)
APPROVEDBY: /tyw l I
=)
RA I SMANA DES I GN E E)
=OR (DAT1
"J" ILT NRC-ESG-005 Enabling Objectives A.
6.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
Given indication of a loss or malfunction of the Charging system DIRECT corrective action for a Charging System malfunction in accordance with the approved station procedures.
Given indication of a loss or malfunction 01 the Charging system DIRECT corrective action for a Charging System malfunction in accordance with the approved station procedures.
Given the failure of an SEC, DIRECT the response to the malfunction IAW approved station procedures.
Given the failure of an SEC, perform actioins as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the malfunction, IAW approved station procedures.
Given the unit at 40% power and a loss of main turbine lube oil, take corrective action IAW Given the indication of excessive steam flow, DIRECT the response to excessive flow in accordance with the approved station procedures.
Given the indication of excessive steam flow, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to excessive flow in accordance with the approved station procedures.
Given indication of a safety injection, DIRECT the response to the safety injection in accordance with the approved station procedures.
Given a safety injection has occurred and equipment has failed to start, START equipment that has failed to automatically start in acc:ordance with station procedures.
Given indication of a loss of secondary heat sink, DIRECT the response to the heat sink loss in accordance with the approved station procedures.
Given the order or indications of a loss of secondary heat sink, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the loss of heat sink in accordance with the approved station procedures.
AB.TL-0001.
H.
I.
J.
K.
A.
B.
Loss of "C" SEC C.
D.
E.
F.
VCT level device fails to 0% level Trip of in service Charging pump Loss of Main Turbine Lube Oil leading to Turbine Trip Steam Leak during down power Loss of Heat Sink with no charging pumps available 2 of 24
"J" ILT NRC-ESG-005 A.
The crew will receive the unit at 40% Reaclor Power with all systems in automatic. 23 Charging pump is tagged to repair excessive packing leakage. Orders to the shift are to maintain 40% power until directed to raise power.
After the crew has accepted the watch, VCT level device 2LT112 will fail low causing auto makeup to start. Crew will secure auto makeup and discuss operational limitations with 2LT112 failed.
Once the VCT channel is addressed "C" sec will de-energize, the crew will dispatch an operator and maintenance to investigate and the CRS will review tech specs.
After the TSAS is entered 21 Charging purnp will trip, the crew will enter AB.CVC-1, start the standby pump and restore letdown.
As the crew is restoring letdown, main turbine lube oil pressure will begin to lower. The crew will implement AB.TL-1, start the backup MTLO pumps as required and determine a turbine shutdown is required.
When the crew has tripped the turbine and started a power reduction a main steam leak outside containment will develop. The crew will implement AB.STM-1, initiate a reactor trip and attempt a main steam line isolation. The main steam line isolation valves will fail to G.
After the trip the remaining charging pump will trip when a start is attempted, S m i c e Water T:?
H.
In FRHS-1 the crew will establish bleed and feed with no charging pumps available. Once bleed and feed is established, an aux feed pump will be restored and the crew will establish aux feed to at least 1 Steam Generator.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
close initially and then they will drift closed crew will perform the actions of TRIP-1 restore Service Water to the diesels and transition @
.3d' rare.ssyre to the des& w ill be inadeauate, and a_ux Feedwater will not be available. The h q y FRHS-1. -
3 of 24
J ILT NRC-ESG-005 Presnapped IC-245 from portable exam drive I
NCTl ON S:
I i
i
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
I O.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
CV0037 VCT LEVEL XMTR LTI 12 FAILS HIL TU0077 MAIN TURB LUBE OIL PRESSURE LOW TA0306A TURB AUX BRNG OIL PMP FAILS TO A CV0208A 21 CHARGING PUMP TRIP AF0181A 21 AUX FEEDWATER PUMP TRIP AF0183 23 AUX FW PMP OVERSPEED TRIP MS0091r Main Steam Header Leak Outside AFOI 828 22 AFP PRESS OVRD PROT FAILS VL0420 21 MS 167 Fails to Position VL0421 22MS167 Fails to Position VL0422 23MS167 Fails to Position VL0423 24MS167 Fails to Position VL0298 2PR2 Fails to Position EL0134 LOSS OF ALL 500KV OFF-SITE POWE CV0208B 22 CHARGING PUMP TRIP RP0247 FALSE FW ISOLATION ( K636 Relay )
RP318B2 PRIM SW PUMP 24 Fails to Start RP318C2 ALT SW PUMP 23 Fails to Start VL0053 2SW26 Fails to Position NA NA NA NA NA
30 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 1 :oo 1 :30 NA NA NA NA NA 5:00 NA NA NA NA 5:00 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA RT-1 RT-4 NA RT-3 NA ET-7 ET-5 NA NA NA NA NA NA RT-7 RT-7 RT-7 NA NA RT-7 0
75 NA NA NA NA 65 NA 95.2 95.2 95.2 95.2 0
Trip Yes NA NA 95 SELF-CHECK Description DG03D DEENERGIZE C SEC CABINET NA NA RT-2 Off CV53D 23 CHG PUMP RACK OUT NA NA NA CV52D 23 CHG PUMP BKR CONTROL POWER NA NA NA Off AFOSA 21AF20 22 AF PMP-221 SG STP VLV NA NA NA 0
AFOGA 22AF20 22 AF PMP->22 SG STP VLV NA NA NA 0
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Tagged 4 of 24
J ILT NRC-ESG-005 SELF-CHECK SELF-CHECK Description Ramp I
Trigger I
Action ET#n Discription Command None
1.
VENT TRIGGERS:
i
__ 1.
ET-5 MONP 09840
2.
ET-7 MONP 25440
__ 3.
ET-11 MONP1484750
4.
ET-12 MONP148<1735
5.
ET-13 MONP148C1725
6.
ET-14 MONP1484 71 5 DMF VL0421 DMF VL0423 DMF VL0422 DMF VL0420 GGED EQUIPMENT:
I
1. RHI and RH2
3. RH 18s
2. VC 1-4
4. RCPs (SELF CHECK)
5. RT(SELFCHECK)
6. MS 167s (SELF CHECK)
7. 500 KV SWYD (SELF CHECK).
8. 21 CV Pump (SELF CHECK)
9. 23 CV Pump (C/T)
OTHER CONDITIONS:.
5 of 24
.I J ILT NRC-ESG-005 A.
State shift job assignments:
B.
Hold a shift briefing, detailing instruction to the shift: (provide CREW members a copy of the shift turnover sheet)
C.
Inform the crew The simulator is running. You may commence panel walkdowns at this time. CRS please inform me when your crew is ready to assume the shift.
D.
Allow sufficient time for panel walk-downs. When informed by the CRS that the crew is ready to assume the shift, ensure the simulator is cleared of unauthorized personnel.
E.
Do not review objectives with crew 6 of 24
J I LT N RC-ES G-005 CRS should direct monitoring of VCT level and set a control band for manual make-up
> I $4 Evaluatorllnstructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Response..
Comments I
RO stops auto makeup and places make-up system in manual.
1. VCT Level Channel ZLTl12 Fails 0
RO reports CVCS auto make-up is in progress and VCT level appears to be failed low RO verifies actual VCT level on P250 using VCT level 2LT114 0
Proceed to next event when auto make-up is secured at the direction L
of the lead evaluator.
1 0
CRS enters AB-CVC-0001 Loss of C h a rg i n g CRS holds brief on implications of the failed channel and determines no Tech Spec implications 0
RO verifies Charging pump in service 0
RO reports no indication of charging pump cavitation 0
RO reports no PZR level channel has failed 0
RO confirms VCT level channel 2LT112 is failed low 0
CRS requests 1&C support to repair the failed instrumentation.
7 of 24
J ILT NRC-ESG-005 Proceed to next event when the action statement is determined at the direction of the lead evaluator
1.. Evaluatorflnstructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Response Comments CRS briefs crew on implications of SEC failure and contingencies 0
RO reports OHA A-29 SEC test or trouble and A-41 Aux alarm printing 0
PO reviews Aux alarm and reports 2C SEC loss of power 0
PO confirm!; indication on 2CC3 by loss of power indication on diesel bezel After 2 mins report as NE0 that C SEC supply breaker 2C V(B breaker 9 i s tripped and the SEC panel is de-0 CRS refers to ARP and dispatches an operator to investigate 0
CRS request maintenance to investigate trip of 2C SEC 0
CRS refers to Tech Specs and determines 3.3.2.1.b action 13 is applicable 6 hr action and 6 hrs to HSB 8 of 24
J ILT NRC-ESG-005 E$faluator/lnstru&r Activity Expected PlantlStudent Response Coinments CRS may initiate AB-RCP for loss of seal injection flow but AB.CVC has corrective actions required RO reports 21 Charging pump has tripped and lietdown has isolated.
CRS re-enters AB-CVC-0001 RO reports no charging pumps running RO reports that there was no sign of cavitation prior to the trip of 21 pump RO reports Letdown is isolated CRS determines 23 CV pump is not available RO reports 22 CV pump is available RO verifies RCP seal temps, closes 2CV55, starts 22 CV pump, and adjusts 2CV55 to restore charging flow PO restores letdown or monitors primary plant while RO restores letdown RO reports PZR level is stable CRS dispatches maintenance to investigatle the trip of 22 charging Pump CRS reviews Tech Specs and determines 3.1.2.2.b, 3.1.2.4, and 3.5.2.a are all applicable with the most limiting being 72 hrs but the limiting T,SAS is the C SEC 9 of 24
J ILT NRC-ESG-005 lnsertRT-4 3
Evaiuatorllnstructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Response
Comments, L*,
0 RO reports SW header pressure low alarm, header pressure has lowered but not to the auto pump start
4. Loss of MTLO Pressure CRS should take the YES path in AB.TL for auto start of pump as the pump should have auto started PO determines that pressure has recovered after start of aux brg oil Pump 0
PO reports start of the High Pressure seal oil back-up pump, Main Turbine lube oil pressure has lowered to less than 12 psi and reports that Aux Bearing oil pump has NOT auto started 0
PO determines that MTLO reservoir is not lowering CRS requests Maintenance and engineering assistance to determine cause of MTLO pressure loss PO monitors Turbine parameters on plant com pi.1 te r 0
CRS determines a load reduction is necessary to remove the turbine from service 0
CRS directs the PO to trip the turbine CRS enters AB.TRB-0001 PO verifies all Turb Stop Valves are closed RO places rods in Manual 0
PO verifies MTLO pressure >8 psi 0
PO verifies Gen output breakers open after 30 sec. time delay 10 of 24
J ILT NRC-ESG-005 1,
7 Evaluatorhstructor Activity Expected PYantlStudent Response
, Comments.
0 PO verifies 1 SGFP in service and SG levels controlling in auto 0
PO verifies (condenser vacuum is stable and :-3 CW pumps IIS and Steam dumps are available PO places steam dumps in MS pressure control mode PO starts oil lift pump turbine trip ET-5 as steam leak builds in the stm dumps will thrott and steam leak will be difficult to.
0 CRS briefs (crew on continuing power reduction PO reports Steam dump is lowering without corresponding change in steam flow e
CRS enters AB.STM-0001 0
CRS dispatches NEOs to look for steam leaks or possibly open Safety valves PO reports MSI Os and steam dumps are not malfunctioning CRS direct:, NE0 to clear the area steam leak in the outer penetration.
0 CRS directs the RO to trip the reactor initiate MSL.1 verify steam leak is isolated and initiate SI if required 11 of24
"J" ILT NRC-ESG-005 f
Evaluatorllnstructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Response Comments
5. Loss of Heat Sink tripped I
SIM Driver: MSl67s will close between 1750 and 1715 psi on PZR pressure 5 mins after dispatched adjust SW26 MALF to 0% and call as NE0 to report 2SW26 is closed CT#I (E-0 -L) Manually start at least the minimum number of ESW pumps in an operating safeguards train before transition from E-0 SAT UNSAT 0
RO trips the Reactor, attempts to MSLI, and reports the steam leak is not isolated 0
CRS directs the RO to initiate an SI 0
RO initiates SI and performs immediate actions of TRIP-1
-71 PO reports loss of off-site power 0
PO reports ino aux feed flow --.c-w"'7 0
PO reports SEC loading is not complete, C: bus is de-energized, the diesel did not start, B bus has no SW pump and on A bus 21 AFW pump has tripped RO reports SW header pressure is very low and the 2SW26 and 23SW20 did not close CRS directs A and B SECs blocked and reset and C diesel started RO depresses stop pushbuttons for C bus loads 25 and 26 SW pump, 22 CV pump, 23 and 25 CFCU's 0
PO resets A and I3 SEC and starts 2C diesel 0
PO closes output breaker for 2C diesel and re-energizes 2C vital bus RO starts 23 or 24 SW pumps and attempts to close 2SW26 0
RO reports SW header pressure has increased to 75 psig r i 12 of 24
J ILT NRC-ESG-005 i.s. ~ Evaluatorhstructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Response Comments _.
-If C diesel is started. CRS should also direct the 23SW20 closed to
, restore SW header pressure requests assistance with AFW, investigate trip of 21 and 23 pumps and valve lineup for 22 A M I pump IF not done previously the 23SW20 should be closed (if C bus is e ne rg ized) if steam leak is not isolated CRS directs the start of 22 CV pump and 25 or 26 SW pump PO attempts to start 21 AFW pump but reports it is tripped Crew starts remaining C bus equipment 22SI pump, 2 ECAC, 23 and 25 CFCN, 21 Aux bldg sup fan, 23 Aux bldg ex:h fan and dispatches and operator to restore 23 Chiller PO reports 22 AFW pump is running but the valves are not open and recommendes Pressure override defeat for 22 AFW pump CRS direct:; PO to attempt pressure override defeat for 22 AFW pump PO selects pressure override defeat but reports no flow indicated from 22 AFW pump PO attempts to start 23 AFW pump but reports it will not start PO verifies safeguards valve alignment R.0 verifies containment pressure is normal PO reports that there is no high steam flow and MS167s are now closed CRS directs SM to implement the ECG CRS briefs crew but informs crew of time critical nature due to loss of heat sink Crew verifies control room ventilation in AP mode 13 of 24
J ILT NRC-ESG-005 CT#2 (FR-H.l -F) Initiate RCS bleed and feed so that the RCS depressurizes sufficiently for intermediate-head injection to occur SAT UNSAT Evalyatorll nstructor.Activity*
Expected PlantlStudent Response Comments 0
0 0
b b
0 0
b 0
e 0
0 0
RO starts 21 or 22 CCW pump IAW EOP-APPX-1 and dispatches an operator to restore 21 and 22 CC HX RO evaluates ECCS flow and reports no BIT flow due to no charging pumps available CRS evaluates heat sink status and transitions to FRHS-1 CRS determines loss of AFW not due to operator action RO reports RCS pressure is > SG pressure and Thot >350°F RO reports no Charging pumps available CRS proceeds to establishing bleed and feed RO verifies all RCPs stopped and SI is initiated PO verifies all SI valves in required position RO verifies SI pumps IIS and valves in proper position RO verifies both PORV stop valves open RO opens 2PR1 and reports 2PR2 will not open RO opens reactor head vent valves CRS dispatches operators to align alternate cooling IAW S2.0P-SO.AF-0001 14 of 24
J ILT NRC-ESG-005 Scenario can be terminated after Feed is restored at the discretion of the lead evaluator bk; - Evaluator/lnstructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Response Comments-I 0
CRS directs PO to feed SGs at
>22e4 lbmlhr 0
CRS selects 1 SG for depressurization and directs KO to fully open selected MSI 0 CREW resets safeguards 0
PO reports ;!I AFW pump I/S and feeding 23 and 24 SG 0
RO reports CETs are not rising 0
PO reports SG WR levels are not less than 11%
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J ILT NRC-ESG-005 A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
I.
J.
K.
L.
M.
Alarm Response Procedures (Various)
Technical Specifications Emergency Plan (ECG)
OP-AA-101-111-1003, Use of Procedures S2.OP-I0.ZZ-0004 - Power Operation S2.OP-AB.CVC-0001 - Loss of Charging S2.OP-S0.CVC-0006 - boron Concentratiton Control S2.OP-AB.TL-0001 -Loss of Main Turbine Lube Oil S2.OP-AB.TRB-0001 -Turbine Trip S2.OP-AB.STM-0001 -Excessive Steam Flow 2-EOP-TRIP Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 2-EOP-FRHS - Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink S2.OP-SO.AF-0001 - Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation 16 of 24
J ILT NRC-ESG-005 vu.
ESG CRITICAL TASK RATIONAL i
CT#I (E-0 -1)
Manually start at least the minimurn number of ESW pumps in an operating safeguards train before transition from E-0 Basis Failure to manually start at least the minimum number of ESW pumps in an operating safeguards train represents a demonstrated inability by the crew to:
Recognize a failurelincorrect auto actuation of an ESF system or component 0
Effectively directlmanipulate ESF controls Additionally, under the postulated plant conditions, failure to manually start at least the minimum required number of ESW pumps (when it is possible to do so) is a violation of the facility license condition CT#2 (FR-H.l -F) Initiate RCS bleed and feed so that the RCS depressurizes sufficiently for intermediate-head injection to occur Basis Failure to initiate RCS bleed and feed before the RCS saturates at a pressure above the shutoff head (of the intermediate-head ECCS pumps results in significant and sustained core uncovery. If RCS bleed is initiated so that the RCS is depressurized below the shutoff head of the intermediate-head ECCS pumps, then core uncovery is prevented or minimized.
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J ILT NRC-ESG-005 S-ILT-2008 NRC ESG-5 SALEM ESG - PRA RELATIONSHIPS EVALUATION FORM EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE Y/N EVENT Y/N EVENT N
TRANSIENTS with PCS Unavailable N
Loss of Service Water Y
Loss of Offsite Power N
Loss of Control Air N
Steam Generator Tube Rupture Y
Lossof ccw N
N LOCA Loss of Switchgear and Pen Area Ventilation N
Station Black Out COMPONENTlTRAINlSYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR YIN TRAIN Y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN N
Containment Sump Strainers N
Gas Turbine N
SSWS Valves to Turbine Generator Area N
Any Diesel Generator N
RHR Suction Line valves from Hot Leg Y
Auxiliary Feed Pump N
Valves N
SBO Air Compressor CVCS Letdown line Control and Isolation OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE Y/N OPERATOR ACTION N
N Connect to gas turbine N
N Y
N N
N N
Early depressurize RCS Y
Initiate feed and bleed Restore AC power during SBO Trip Reactor and RCPs after loss of component cooling system Re-align RHR system for re-circulation Un-isolate the available CCW Heat Exchanger Isolate the CVCS letdown path and transfer charging suction to RWST Cooldown the RCS and depressurize the system Isolate the affected Steam generator which has the tube ruptures Complete this evaluation form for each ESG.
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J ILT NRC-ESG-005 UNI TU MODE:
1 POWER:
40 RCSBORON:
1268 MWe: 390 SHUTDOWN SAFETY SYSTEM STATUS ( 5 6 & DEFUELED):
NIA REACTIVITY PARAMETERS Core Burn-up 4000 MWDIMTU MOST LIMITING LCO AND DATERIME OF EXPIRATION:
EVOLUTIONSIPROCEDURESISURVEILLANCES; IN PROGRESS:
ABNORMAL PLANT CONFIGURATIONS:
CONTROL ROOM:
Unit 1 and Hope Creek at 100% power.
No penalty minutes in the last 24 hrs.
P R I MARY:
23 Charging pump is C / l for a planned FEG window SECONDARY:
Heating steam is aligned to unit 1 RADWASTE:
No discharges in progress CIRCULATING WATERlSERVICE WATER:
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J I L J NRC-ESG-005 Note:
guidance for the examination team as they conduct their review for the proposed scenarios.
Attach a separate copy of this form to each scenario reviewed. This form is used as EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE (ESG) REVIEW/ VALIDATION Note:
This form is used as guidance for an examination team to conduct a review for the proposed exam scenario(s). Attach a separate copy of this form to each scenario reviewed.
ESG-J ILT NRC-ESG-005 REVIEWER:
Ed Gallaqher THE SCENARIO HAS CLEARLY STATED OBJECTIVES IN THE SCENARIO.
The initial conditions are realistic, equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue the crew into expected events.
Each event description consists of:
The event termination point.
CHECK
1.
2.
3.
The point in the scenario when it is to be initiated, The malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event, The symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew, The expected operator actions (by shift position), and
4. The use of non-mechanistic failures (e.g. pipe break) should be limited to one or a credible preceding event has occurred.
The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics.
Sequencingltiming of events is reasonable (e.g. the crew has time to respond to the malfunctions in an appropriate time frame and implements procedures andlor corrective actions).
7.
Sequencinghiming of events is reasonable, and allows for the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives.
__. 8.
If time compression techniques are used, scenario summary clearly so indicates.
9.
The simulator modeling is not altered.
I O. All crew competencies can be evaluated.
5.
6.
11. Appropriate reference materials are available (SOERs, LERs, etc.).
12. If the sampling plan indicates that the scenario was used for training during the requalification cycle, evaluate the need to modify or replace the scenario.
13. Proper critical task methodology is used IACV NRC procedures.
14. ESG-PSA Evaluation Form is completed for the scenario at the applicable facility.
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J ILT NRC-ESG-005 SCENARIO: J ILT NRC-ESG-005 REVIEWER:
Ed Gallagher INITIAL TARGET QUANTITATIVE ATTRIBUTES EG 8
Total malfunctions inserted: 5-8 EG 3
0 Malfunctions that occur after EOP entry: 1-2 EG 3
Abnormal Events: 2-4 EG 2
Major Transients: 1-2 EG I
EOPs requiring substantive actions (not including TRIP-1): 1-2 EG 1
EOP Contingency Procedures used: 0-2 EG 70 Approximate scenario run time: 75-90 minutes
~~
EG 45%
EOP run time: 40-70% of scenario run time EG 2
Crew Critical Tasks: 2-3 COMMENTS:
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
J ILT NRC-ESG-005 ATTACHMENT I SIMULATOR READY-FOR-TRAINING CHECKLIST Verify simulator is in correct load for training All required computer terminals in operation Simulator clocks synchronized Required chart recorders advanced and ON (proper paper installed)
Rod step counters correct (channel check)
AIt tagged equipment properly secured and documented (TSAS Log filled out)
DL-10 log up-to-date Required procedures clean All OHA lamps operating (OHA Test)
All printers have adequate paper AND functional ribbon Procedure pens available Procedures in progress open and signed-off to proper step Shift manning sheet available SPDS reset Reference verification performed with, required documents available Ensure a current RCS Leak Rate Worksheet is placed by Aux Alarm Typewriter with Baseline Data filled out Required keys available Video Tape (if applicable)
Ensure ECG Classification is correct - - 960502140 CRCA-03 Reset P-250 Rod Counters 22 of 24
J ILT NRC-ESG-005 ATTACHMENT 2 CRITICAL TASK METHODOLOGY In reviewing each proposed CT, the examination tearn assesses the task to ensure, that it is essential to safety. A task is essential to safety if, in the judgment of the examination team, the improper performance or omission of this task by a licensee will result in direct adverse consequences or in significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant.
The examination team determines if an automatically actuated plant system would have been required to mitigate the consequences of an individuals incorrect performance. If incorrect performance of a task by an individual necessitates the crew taking compensatory action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy, the task is safety significant.
I. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which operation or correct performance prevents...
0 e
0 0
degradation of any barrier to fission product release degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) or emergency power capacity a violation of a safety limit a violation of the facility license condition a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the incorrect reactivity control (such as failure to initiate Emergency Boration or Standby Liquid Control, or manually insert control rods) scenario 0
A. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which a crew demonstrates the ability to...
e effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.
take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.
prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such as an prevent any condition described in the previous paragraph.
0 0
0 unintentional Reactor Protection System (RPS) or ESF actuation.
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J ILT NRC-ESG-005 TTACHMENT 3 1 -
?
ESG PRE-JOB BRIEF CHECKLIST EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE (ESG)
Pre-Job Brief Checklist Note: This checklist is to be completed by the Lead Examiner prior to evaluating an ESG. The Lead Examiner should lead a pre-job brief with all the examiners and simulator operators that includes, but is not limited to the following:
Lead ESG J ILT NRC-ESG-005 Examiner:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
ESG overview and sequence of major events.
Determine which optional events will be performed, if any.
ESG summary of Critical Tasks.
Assign examiners to observe specific watch standers.
Assign examiner ownership for observing and documenting performance / non-performance of Critical Tasks.
Review alternate path(s) identified by the ESG.
Assign examiner to document data related to the performance of Critical Tasks.
Determines what parameters will be recorded in Data Collection.
6.
7.
8.
Ensure SOE recorder is recording.
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ML082730736

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