ML082820562
| ML082820562 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  (DPR-070, DPR-075) |
| Issue date: | 08/19/2008 |
| From: | Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Brian Haagensen Operations Branch I |
| Hansell S | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML080030005 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272/08-301, 50-311/08-301, UO1686 | |
| Download: ML082820562 (75) | |
Text
SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO SCENARIO TITLE:
SGTR SCENARIO NUMBER:
J ILT NRC ESG-001 EFFECTIVE DATE:
811 912008 EXPECTED DURATION:
1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> REVISION NUMBER:
00 PROGRAM:
-1 L.O. REQUAL INITIAL LICENSE 1
STA I]
OTHER Revision Summary:
Rev 0: New Issue for J ILT NRC exam PREPARED BY:
Ed Gallagher (INSTRUCTOR)
APPROVED BY:
(OPERATIONS TRAIN1 NG MANAGER OR DIISIGNEE) 6/6/08 (DATE) tGh 7/@P (DATE) 6 d ~ c i - d 8 (DATE)
DE SIGN E E)
APPROVED BY:
J ILT NRC-ESG-001 Enabling Objectives A.
Given the unit at power the crew will reduce power to remove a Condensate Pump fi-om service, IAW approved station procedures Given the unit at power with a failure of a Pressurizer Level control channel, the crew will take action to stabilize PZR level and swap to a non-failed channel, IAW approved station procedures.
Given a SGTL, the crew will identic! and isolate the leaking SG, IAN approved station procedures.
Given the unit with a SGTR, take actions to minimize off site dose and RCS leakage, IAW approved station procedures.
B.
C.
I).
- 11.
MAJOR EVENTS A.
Power Reduction to 85%
- 3.
C.
D.
SGTL E.
Oil Leak on 2B EDG Failure of PZR level Channel 1 SGTR on 23 SG with subsequent failure of 23MS 10 to control pressure 2 of27
A.
B.
- c.
D.
E.
F.
G.
The crew will receive the unit at 10094 power with all system in automatic. One major piece of equipment will be C/Ted, 22 AFW Pump.
Once the crew takes the watch they will reduce reactor power to 85% at 20% per hour to remove 21 Condensate pump from service due to an emergent motor vibration problem.
Once the power reduction to 85% is underway the control room wili receive a call from the primary duty operator that 2B EDG has a major oil leak on the piping downstream of the lube oil heater discharge check valve. The crew will evaluate the leak location and declare 2B EDG inoperable and enter the appropriate TSAS.
After the TSAS has been evaluated for the 2B EDG, the controlling PZR level channel will fail low causing letdown isolation and increased charging flow. The crew will enter AB.CVC-0001, take inanual control of charging and restore letdown.
When letdown has been restored a SGTL will occur on 23 SG. The CRS will enter AB.SG-0001 and direct the crew to perform actions to address the SGTL. During the SGTL, the SG tube will rupture. The CRS will direct a manual SI initiation.
The RO will manually initiate SI and comnlence the Immediate Actions of EOP-TRIP-I. The CRS will perform EOP-TRIP-1 and transition to EOP-SGTR-1. After the ruptured SG is isolated the 23MS 10 will fail partially open in Automatic. The crew will take inanual control of 23MS10.
The crew will perform actions of EOP-SGTR-1 to cool down and depressurize the RCS, and subsequently terminate SI flow.
3 of27
"J" ILT NRC-ESG-001 SELF-CHECK Presnapped IC-24 1 from portable exam drive Description Delay Ramp Trigger Severity SELF-CHECK 1 Description PR0017,4 Pzr Lvl CH I (LT459) Fails HIL SG0078C 23 SG Tube Rupture
- 1.
- 2.
Delay Ramp I
Trigger 1
Condition NA NA RT-2 0
NA 3:oo RT-4 25 SELF-CHECK I_ 3.
- CV0208A 21 CV pump Trip
- NA NA Er-3 Tripped
- 4.
- CV0208B 22 CV pump Trip
- NA NA ET-3 Tripped
- See note oii page 12 DeTcnption Delay Ramp Tngger Action 1
7
- 3.
- 4.
- 6. *
- 7.
__ 5.
- 8 AF26D 22 AFM' Pump Rack Out AF25D 22 AFM' Pump Bkr Cont Pwr DGI 7D 28 DIESEL GEN ISOCHiDROOP SW DG 19D 2B DIESEL GEN LOCKED OUT DG03D DEENERGIZE "C" SEC CABINET
- DG02D DEENERGIZE "B" SEC CABINET
- MS06A 23MS45 23 STM GEN STM SUP-23 AFP AFOl D 23 AUX FP TRIP RESET NA NA NA NA S A NA XA KA S A NA NA NA NA N A NA NA NA NA RT-1 RT-I 2 ET-3 ET-3 Et-10 ET-I I Tagged Off Droop L! Out Yes Yes 0
Reset
- See note on page 13 I Discnption Coininand
- 1.
ET-3 Monp254<10 4 of 27
J ILT NRC-ESG-00 1 Description
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
RH1 and RH2 RH ISS RCPs (SELF CHECK)
RT (SELF CHECK)
MS 167s (SELF CHECK) 500 KV SWYD (SELF CHECK).
23 CV Pump (SELF CHECK) 22 AFW Pump (UT)
VC 1-4 OTHER CONDITIONS:
I I Description
- 1. Ensure Channel 1 Pressurizer Level selected for control 5 of27
J ILT NRC-ESG-001 A.
State shift job assignments:
B.
Hold a shift briefing, detailing instruction 1.0 the shift: (provide CREW members a copy of the shift turnover sheet)
Inform the crew The simulator is miming. You may commence panel walkdowns at this time. CRS please inform me when your crew is ready to assume the shift.
Allow sufficient time for panel walk-downs. When informed by the CKS that the crew is ready to assume the shift, ensure the simulator is cleared of unauthorized personnel.
Do not review objectives with crew C.
D.
E.
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J ILT NRC-ESG-001 In Expected PlanUStudent Respons Comme
- 1. Power Reduction to 85%
0 CRS briefs crew on evolution 0
CRS iniplctwnts S2.OP-I0.ZZ-0004 major action is required until 85%
CRS may decide to perform power reduction IAW AB.LOAD-0001 CRS may rc\\ficu. AB.
fir contingcnt action.; fiw loss ofa CY pump 0
CRS d.irects RO/PO to commence a power reduction to 85% at 20%/hr PO sers-up DEHC for correct reduction and rate IAW SLOP-SO.TRB-0002 0
CRS directs RO to commence a boration at rate and gallon amount as determined during brief IAW S2.0P-S0.CJC-0006 0
RO monitors reactor parameters to maintain Tavg within programmed value 0
PO monitors main turbine response and trends Main turbine parameters on plant computer PO monitors SGFP suction pressure to ensure it remains greater than 320 psig 0
PO monitors condenser Delta Ts 0
CREM rc\\iews S2.OI~-SO.CIi-O001 to remox 2 1 Condensatc pump ti-om senice reduction has proceeded to the 7 of 27
J ILT NRC-ESG-001 Insert RT-1 (EDG trouble alarm) at direction of lead Evaluator Expected Plant/Student Response omments Evalu ator/Ins tructor Activity 0
PO reports console alarm for 2B EDG trouble CRS dispatches primary N E 0 to investigate trouble alarm 0
Crew reviews print and determines that leak is not isolable 0
CRS directs to N E 0 to secure the 2B pre-lube pump and lock out 2B EDG 0
PO reports OHA J-12 and Aux Alarm when 2B EDG locked out 0
CRS refers to TS and enters TSAS 3.8.1.1.b actionb 0
CRS requests 3rd NCO to perform Line surveillance 0
CRS reviews 00s equipment and determines no additional equipment needs to be declared Inoperable.
0 If stopped, CRS briefs re-commencing load reduction to remove CN pump 8 of27
J ILT NRC-ESG-00 1 Evaluator/I tivi Expected Plant/Student Response Comments
- 3. Pressurizer Level Channel 1 Fails Low 0
RO responds to OHA E-36 Pzr Htr Off Level LO and reports that Pressurizer level Channd 1 has failed low. PZR heaters are off, and Letdown is isolated 0
RO requests permission to take charging pump master flow controller to manual and stabilize PZR level 0
CRS concurs with RO assessment and directs master flow controller placed in manual 0
CRS niay direct load reduction stopped and boration secured 0
CRS enters S2.OP-AB.CVC-0001 CRS directs PO to implement CAS RO reports charging pump is in service 0
RO reports CV pump is not cavitating 0
RO reports that controlling pressurizer level channel 1 is failed 0
RO acljust master flow controller to control PZR level 0
RO selects channel 3 for controlling channel 0
RO restores Pressurizer Heaters 0
PO restores letdown 0
CRS conducts brief and discusses 9 of 27
Eva1 next event when letdowu I
is restored or at the direction of the I lead evaluator J ILT NRC-ESG-00 1 Comments contingent actions. Also during brief infonil:; crew that TSAS 3.3.1. I. act 6 is applicable.
CRS directs RO to restore PZR level to program and place master flow controller to AUTO when Pressurizer level is restored to program CRS requests I&C assistance to remove failed charmel from service 10 of 27
J 1LT NRC-ESG-001 EvaluatorlInstruct tivi Expected PlantlStudent Respons Comments
- 4. Tube Leak on 23 SG 0
- 4. Tube Leak on 23 SG 0
RO reports OHA A-6 RMS HI Rad or Tro-uble verifies on CRT 2R53C in alarm 0
CRS directs monitoring of 2R19C and 2RI 5 to confirm status of SGTL 0
PO informs CRS that 2R19C and 2R15 (are rising as expected for tube leak 0
PO acknowledges multiple re-flashes of A-6 for alarms on 2R15,2R19C and 2R41 d 0
PO reports Blowdown is isolated 0
CRS enters S2.OP-AB.SG-0001 0
CRS directs RO to implement CAS 0
CRS requests SM implement ECG 0
CRS directs N E 0 to de-energize turbine and polisher area sumps RO reports PZR level lowering slowly CRS directs a swap to centrifugal charging pump 11 of27
J ILT NRC-ESG-001 EvaIuator/Instructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Response Comments I
0 RO places a centrifugal charging pump in service by performing the following:
o Closing CV55 o Starts 21 or 22 CV Pump o Places 23 CV pump in manual and lowers speed c Adjust CV5.5 to maintain stable charging flow and seal injection flow Sim Driver:
If 21 CV pump is star MALF:CVO2OSB and from E If 22 CV pump is started then dele MALF:CV028A and REM:DG03 from ET-3 o Stops 23 CV Pump c Places CV55 in automatic can be stabilize 0
0 0
AB.SG-0001 the CRS may stop to have a brief and discuss actions and CRS directs letdown flow to minimum RO reduces letdown to minimum RO adjusts charging to stabilize Pressurizer level and estimate leak rate CRS determines that Action level 3 is met and Unit must be less than 50%
power in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and must be in Mode 3 in the next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> 0 RO informs CRS that leak rate has increased and PZR level is lowering rapidly 0
CRS briefs crew that leak is beyond capacity of makeup system and directs a Rx trip and SI 12 of 27
J ILT NRC-ESG-001 Evalu a t or/Ins truc tor Activity Expected PBadStudent Response Comments
- 5. SGTR 0
RO trips reactor, confirms Rx trip and initiates SI 0
RO performs I/As of EOP-TRIP-1 0
CRS enters EOP-TRIP-1 0
CRS confirms immediate actions 0
RO announces reactor trip and request SM and STA report to control room within 10 min of identification of rupture and complete isolation of Ruptured Steam Generator Time of Isolation:
0 CRS directs isolation of23 SG 0
CREW continues with EOP-TRIP-I 0
When Immediate Actions are complete PO requests permission to throttle AFW and isolate 23 SG by closing 23AF:i 1 and 21 0
RO informs CRS that BIT flow is zero 0
PO evaluates AFW status and SEC Loading and reports that 22 AFW Pump is unavailable and multiple equipment froin C (or B depending on CV pump previously started) bus failed to load. and 21 (or 22) CV pump has tripped 0
CRS directs B and C SECs blocked and 13 of 27
Evaluator/Instructor Activity
-- I): Establish flow from at least 1 high-head ECCS pump before transition from EOP-TRIP-1 UNSAT SAT ___
e e
"J" ILT NRC-ESG-00 1 Expected Plant/Student Response Comments reset PO determines that C (B) SEC is de-energized and resets B (C)SEC RO attempts to start 21 (22) CV pump and informs CRS that it is tripped CRS directs C bus equipment started including: 22 CV pump, 22 SI pump, 23 and 25 CFCU in low speed, 2 ECAC:, 21 Aux bldg supply fan, and 23 Aux bldg exh fan and directs 23SW20 closed RO determines containment pressure has remained less than 15 psig CRS conducts brief to discuss plant status and minimizes length due to time critical nature of SGTR PO verifies all Vital busses energized RO verifies CAV and Swgr vent status RO verifies 2 CC pumps running RO evaluates SI status as within limits, and BIT flou. is restored.
PO maintains AFW flour >22E4 Ibdhr until 1 SG is greater than 9% and then throttles to maintain 9-33%
RO informs CRS that RCS temperature is sta.ble at 547°F 14 of 27
J ILT NRC-ESG-00 1 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Response Comments 0
RO reports Reactor Trip Breakers are open 0
RO reports both Pressurizer PORVs are closed, and block valves are open 0
PO eiduates all steam generator pressure are stable or rising and no faulted steam generator exist 0
CREW transitions to SGTR-I based on 23 SG Level rising in an uncontrolled manner 0
CREW identifies 23 SG as ruptured SG PO adjusts 23MS10 setpoint to 1045 PSk 0
PO closes 23MS7, 18. 167 and GR4 PO informs CRS that 23MS 10 is opening prior to SP is causing 23 SG to depressurize 0
CRS directs PO to take manual control and close 23MS10 0
0 PO places 23MS10 in manual and close:; the valve.
PO determines 23 AFNJ pump is not required to maintain feed flow since 2 1 AFU pump feeds 23/24 SGs and can provide sufficient AFW flow for coolclown 0
PO trips and stops 23 AFW pump 15 of 27
"J" ILT NRC-ESC-001 EvaluatorlInstructor Activi Expected Plant/Student Response Comments e
CRS d?spatches and NEO w t h RAD PRO tc) close 23MS45 0
CRS dispatches an operator to close 2SS333 0
PO dekrmines 23 SG is isolated from intact SGs and feed flow should remain isolated 0
0 CRS directs 23AFW pump trip reset RO reports PORVs closed and block valves open 0
PO determines no SG is faulted 0
CREW resets safeguards and opens 21 and 2XA330s 0
PO evaluates 23 SG as greater than 375 and not faulted 0
CRS dispatches operator to shift Gland seal supply to U1 0
CREW determines target temperature is 503'F:
CREW commences rapid cooldnwn to target temperature 16 of 27
"J" ILT NRC-ESG-001 Evalua tor/Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student Response Comments 0
PO selxts bypass Tavg when RCS is
<43" CT# 3 (E-3 -B): Establish/maintain an RCS temperature so that a transition from SGTR-1 does not occur UNSAT SAT
-1 PO cools down at max rate using main steam dumps 0
PO stops cooldown when target temperature is reached and dumps steam to stabilize temp CT# 4 (E-3 --C): Depressurize RCS until Ruptured SG and RCS pressure are equal and PZR level is,11%
with Subcooling >O, before water release from ruptured SGPOR\\' or Safet!. valve SAT UNSAT NOTE: 50 FSAR time criteria this scenario due to 0
0 RO reports subcooling >20" 0
CREW terminates SI PO determines 23 SG press is stable Terminate scenario when Depressurization is complete o 17 of 27
"J" ILT NRC-ESG-001 EvaluatorlInstru ivi Expected PlantlStudent Response Comments 18 of27
"J" ILT NRC-ESG-001 A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
I.
J.
K.
Alarm Response Procedures (Various)
Technical Specifications Emergency Plan (ECG)
SC.OP-AP.ZZ-O102(Q), Use of Procedures S2.OP-SO.CN-0001 - Condensate SI stein Operation S2.OP-S0.CVC-0006 - Boron Concentration Control S2.OP-I0.ZZ-0004 - Power Operation S2.OP-AB.CVC-0001 - Loss of Charging S2.OP-AB.SG-0001 - Steam Generator Tube Leak 2-EOP-TRIP Reactor Trip or Sakty Injection 2-EOP-SGTR-I - Steam Generator Tube Rupture 29 of 27
J ILT NRC-ESG-001 CT#l (E-3 --A): Close 21AF11 and 21 within 10 min on identification of fault and complete isolation of Ruptured Steam Generator Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of differential pressure between the ruptured SG and intact SGs. Upon loss of differential pressure the crew must transition tc a contingency procedue that necessitates the crew taking compensating action that cornplicat es the event mitigation strategy...
indication (9%).,.Any delay in the AFW isolation allows the ruptured SG level to increase as the AFW adds additional inventory along with the primary to secondary leakage. Too long a delay (> IO min) prevents the crew from depressurizing and terminating SI before excessive inventory seriously damages the SG as a fission product barrier.
CT#2 (E-0 -- I): Establish flow from at least 1 high-head ECCS pump before transition from Basis For feedwater, isolaticin must occur after ruptured SG level exceeds minimuin EOP-TRIP-1 Basis Failure to manually start at least 1 high-head ECCS pump under the postulated conditions constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to degraded ECCS...Capacity CT#3 (E-3 --B) Establish/maintain an RCS temperature so that a transition from SGTR-1 does not occur Failure to establish and maintain correct RCS temperature during a SGTR leads to a transition froin SGTR-1 to a contingency procedure, which constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the crew taking compensating action that complicates the event mitigation strategy...
CT# 4 (E-3 --C) Depressurize RCS until Ruptured SG and RCS pressure are equal and PZR level is ~ 1 1 ~ / 0 with Subcooling 10, before water release from ruptured SG PORV or Safety valve Basis Basis Failure to stop reactor coolant leakage into a ruptured SG by depressurizing the RCS needlessly complicates mitigation of the event. It also constitutes a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparabl). introduced by the scenario 20 of 27
J ILT NRC-ESG-001 S-ILT-2008 NRC ESG-1 SALEM ESG - PRA RELATIONSHIPS EFALUATIQR FORM EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE y/N N
Y N
N N
EVENT
\\a EVENT TRANSIENTS with PCS Unavailable N
Loss of Service Water N
Loss ofCCW N
Loss of Control Air N
Station Black Out Steam Generator Tube Rupture Loss of Offsite Power
~-
Loss of Switchgear and Pen Area Ventilaticdn LOCA COMPONENTITRAINISYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM. OR TRAIN COMPONENT. SYSTEM, OR y/N TRAIN N
Containment Sump Strainers N
Gas Turbine N
SSWS Valves to Turbine Generator Area N
Any Diesel Generator N
RHR Suction Line valves from Hot Leg Y
Auxiliary Feed Pump N
Valves h
SBO Air Compressor CVCS Letdown line Control and Isolation OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IX PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE p7J N
N N
N N
N Y
E E
N OPERATOR ACTION Restore AC power during SBO Connect to gas turbine Trip Reactor and RCPs after loss of compment cooling system Re-align RHR system for re-circulation Un-isolate the available CCW Heat Exchanger Isolate the CVCS letdown path and transfer charging suction to RUST Cooldown the RCS and depressurize the system Isolate the affected Steam generator which has the tube ruptures Early depressurize RCS Initiate feed and bleed Complete this evaluation form for each ESG.
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J ILT NRC-ESG-001 MODE:
I POWER:
100 RCIS BORON:
1200 SHUTDOWN SAFETY SYSTEM STATUS ( S, 6 & DEFUELED):
NIP.
REACTIVITY PARAMETERS Core Bum-up 10,500 MWD/MTU MOST LIMITING LCO AND DATE/TIME OF EXPIRATION:
3.7.1.2.a action a. 22 AF17 pump C!T for replacement of failed bearing EVOLUTIONSiPROCEDURES/SURVEILLANCES IN PROGRESS:
Shutdown to 85% at 20% per hour to support removal of 21 condensate pump from service, due to motor vibrations, RX engineering has been notified to prepare a reactillity plan. Operations manager has directed that load reduction be started using the preplanned Reactivity guidance.
ABNORMAL PLANT CONFIGURATIONS:
CONTROL ROOM:
Unit 1 and Hope Creek at 100% power.
No penalty minutes in the last 24 hrs.
PRIMARY:
NONE SECONDARY:
Heating steam is aligned to unit 1 RADWASTE:
No discharges in progress CIRCULATING WATEWSERVICE WATER:
22 of 27
J ILT NRC-ESG-001 Note:
Attach a separate copy of this form to each scenario reviewed. This form is used as guidance for the examination team as they conduct their reviw, for the proposed scenarios.
EXAMIKATION SCENARIO GUIDE (ESG) REVIEW/ VALJDATION P
Note:
SELF-CHECK
- 1.
7 -.
~
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
- 10.
- 11.
- 12.
~
- 13.
- 14.
This fonn is used as guidance for an examination team to conduct a review for the proposed exam scenario(s). Attach a separate copy of this form to each scenario reviewed.
RE\\IEWER:
Gallagher ESG- - J ILT NRC-ESG-001 -
THE SCENARIO HAS CLEARLY STATED OBJECTIVES IN THE SCENARIO.
The initial conditions are realistic, equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue the crew. into expected events.
Each event description consists of 0
0 0
0 The event termination point.
The use of non-mechanistic failures (e.g. pipe break) should be limited to one or a credible preceding event has occurred.
The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics.
Sequencingitiming of events is reasonable (e.g. the crew has time to respond to the malfunctions in an appropriate time frame and implements procedures andlor corrective actions).
Sequencing/timing of events is reasonable, and allows for the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives.
If time compression techniques are used, scenario summary clearly so indicates.
The simulator modeling is not altered.
All crew competencies can be evaluated.
Appropriate reference materials are available (SOERs, LERs, etc.).
If the sampling plan indicates that the scenario was used for training during the requalification cycle, evaluate the need to modify or replace the scenario.
Proper critical task methodology is used IAW NRC procedures ESG-PSA Evaluation Form is completed for the scenario at the applicable facility.
The point in the scenario when it is tl3 be initiated.
The malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event, The symptomsicues that will be visible to the crew, The expected operator actions (by shift position). and 23 of27
SCENARIO: J ILT NRC-ESG-1 RE VIEM'E Ed Gallagher INITIAL EG EG EG EG EG EG EG EG EG 5
2 0
2 1
1 0
84 0
5 094 e
0 0
0 e
4 0
R:
TARGET QUANTITATIVE ATTRIBUTES Total malfunctioiis inserted: 5-8 Malfunctions that occur after EOP entry: 1-2 AbiiotmaI Events: 2-4 Major Transients: 1-2 EOPs requiring substantive actions (not including TRIP-1): 1-2 EOP Contingency Procedures used: 0-2 Approximate scenario run time: 75-90 minutes EOP run time: 40-7096 of scenario run time Crew Critical Tasks: 2-3 COMMENTS:
24 of 27
- 1.
7 k.
1 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
- 10.
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- 12.
- 13.
- 14.
- 15.
- 16.
- 17.
- 18.
- 19.
- 20.
J 1LT NRC-ESG-001 ATTA.CHhCZEIVT 1 SIMULATOR READY-FOR-TRAINING CHECKLIST Verify simulator is in correct load for training All required computer terminals ir operation Simulator clocks synchronized Required chart recorders advanced and ON (proper paper installed)
Rod step counters correct (channei check)
A11 tagged equipment properly secured and documented (TSAS Log filled out)
DL-10 log up-to-date Required procedures clean All OHA lamps operating (OHA Test)
All printers have adequate paper AND functional ribbon Procedure pens avail ab 1 e Procedures in progress open and signed-off to proper step Shift maiming sheet available SPDS reset Reference verification performed with required documents available Ensure a current RCS Leak Rate Worksheet is placed by Aux Alarm Typewriter with Baseline Data filled out Required keys available Video Tape (if applicable)
Ensure ECG Classification is correct - - 960502 140 CRCA-03 Reset P-250 Rod Counters
J ILT NRC-ESG-001 ATTACNR1EKT 2 CRITICAL T AS E< METHOD OE 0 Gk In reviewing each proposed CT. the examination team assesses the task to ensure, that it is essential to safety. A task is essential to safety if, in the judgment of the examination team. the improper performance or omission of this task by a licensee will result in direct adverse consequences or in significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant.
The examination team determines if an automatically actuated plant system would have been required to mitigate the consequences of an individuals incorrect performance. If incorrect performance of a task by an individual necessitates the crew taking cornpensatory action that would coinplicate the event rnitig,ation strategy, the task is safety significant.
I. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which operation or correct performance prevents..,
0 0
degradation of any barrier to fission product release degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) or emergency power capacity 0
0 0
0 a violation of a safety limit a violation of the facility license condition incorrect reactivity control (such as failure to initiate Emergency Boration or Standby Liquid Control, or manually insert control rods) a significant reduction of safety rnargin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario A. Examples of CTs invoIving essential safety actions include those for which a crew demonstrates the ability to...
0 effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent any condition described in the previous paragraph.
recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.
take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.
unintentional Reactor Protection System (RPS) or ESF actuation.
0 0
0 prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such as an 26 of 27
J ILT NRC-ESG-001 EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE (ESG) Pre-Job Brief Checklist Note: This checklist is to be completed by the Lead Examiner prior to evaluating ail ESG. The Lead Examiner should lead a pre-job brief with all the examiners and s,imulator operators that includes, but is not limited to the following:
Lead ESG:
J ILT NRC-ESG-001 Examiner:
1.ESG overview and sequence of major events.
~
.Determine which optional events will be performed, if any
__- 3.ESG summary of Critical Tasks.
__- 4.Assign examiners to observe specific watch standers.
~- 5.Assign examiner ownership for observing and documenting performance / non-perfonnance of Critical Tasks.
__- 6.Review alternate path(s) identified by tne ESG.
__- 7.Assign examiner to document data related to the performance of Critical Tasks.
__- 8.Determines what parameters will be recorded in Data Collection.
Ensure SOE recorder is recording.
27 of 27
SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO Large Break LOCA with loss of Recirc SCENARIO TITLE:
SCENARIO NUMBER:
J ILT NRC ESG-002 EFFECTIVE DATE:
811 9/2008 EXPECTED DURATION:
1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> REVISION NUMBER:
00 PROGRAM:
n L.O. REQUAL INITIAL LICENSE
-1 STA n
OTHER Revision Summary:
Rev 0: New Issue for J ILT NRC exam PREPARED BY:
Ed Gallagher (I NSTRUCTO R) 6/6/08 (DATE)
APPROVED BY:
(OPERATIONS TRAINING (DATE)
MANAGER OR DESIGNEE)
APPROVED BY:
6-ZS-OQ (DATE)
DES I G N E E) u
J ILT NRC-ESG-002 Enabling Objectives A.
Given the unit in hot standby (mode 3) during a reactor startup, DIRECT actions to startup the reactor to the Point Of Adding Heat (POAH) by control rods or dilution in accordance with the approved station procedures.
Given the unit in mode 3, the crew will perform a reactor startup to the POAH, in accordance with S2.OP-IG.ZZ-0003 (Q).
Given a failure of an intermediate range instrument, take corrective action for ail intermediate range instrument failure IAW AB.NIS-000 1.
Given indications of a loss or malfunction of a safety related electrical distribution system, DIRECT the response to the loss or malfunction in accordance with the approved station procedures.
Given the order or indications of a loss or malfunction of a safety related electrical distribution system, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the loss or malfunction in accordance with the approved station procedures.
Given indication of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), DIRECT the immediate response to the LOCA in accordance with the approved station procedures.
Given the order or indications of a 1o:jS of coolant accident (LOCA), complete actions as the nuclear controi operator to PERFORM the immediate response to the LOCA in accordance with the approved station procedures Given a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and a loss of emergency recirculation, DIRECT actions to respond to the emergency recirculation loss in accordance with the approved station procedures.
Given the order or a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) with indication of a loss of emergency recirculation, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the loss of emergency recirculation in accordance with the approved station procedures.
B.
C D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
- 1.
A.
Power Increase to POAH B.
C.
D.
E.
Loss of Emergency Recirculation Intermediate Range NI channel fails Low D Vital Instrument Bus Fails causing loss of Rod Control RCS leak progressing to LB LOCA 2 of 26
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
The crew will receive the unit at 10 e-8 in the intermediate range with all systems in automatic. Orders to the shift are to raise power, place the Unit in Mode 1 ? and prepare for placing the turbine on line.
Once the crew takes the watch they will initiate a power increase at <1 decade per min.
Once the power increase is underway lntennediate Range I435 will fail low. Crew will remove the channel from service. review Tech Specs and determine power must be maintained 4%
After the TSAS has been evaluated for the N35, the crew will be told to stabilize power in the power range. As power is approaching the POAH D Vital instrument bus will deenergize.
This will cause a loss of Rod Control, the steam dumps will fail closed and 2 1 and 24MS 10 will have local control only. The CreAT will decide that there is no positive control of the reactor and initiate a reactor trip.
When the Reactor trips 22AFW pump will trip, the PO will compensate by feeding 21 and 22 SG with the 23 AFW pump.
After the crew transitions to EOP-TRIP-2 a large RCS leak will develop, the crew will initiate a safety injection and return to TRIP-1. After the crenr initiates an SI a DBA LOCA will occur. The crew will initiate Containment Spray.
The crew will perform actions of ECIP-LOCA-1 and transition to LOCA-3 in LOCA-3 the Crew will determine that recirc is not available and will transition to LOCA-5. In LOCA-5 the crew will initiate makeup to the RWST and reduce ECCS flow. The scenario will end when major actions of LOCA-5 are ~;omplete.
3 of26
-J ILT NRC-ESG-002 SELF-CHECK Presnapped IC-242 from portable exam drive Delay Rainp Trig g er Severity Description SEL F-CHECK SELF-CHECK I Description CV20A 201 81 BLENDER I S 0 VLV
- 20 RT-12 100
- 1.
- 2.
CV2lA 2CV184 BLENDER DISC TO RWST
- 45
- 20 RT-12 100
- 3.
CN23D FAIL OPE\\ 21 BF32 - ISOLATE AIR NA NA NA ISOL Description Delay Rainp I
Trigger 1
Action 4 of 26
EVENT SELF-CHECK ET#!>
Discription Command
- 1.
ET-5 GAI09ALKc0.3 5 Description
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
4 5
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
RHl and RH2 RH 18s RCPs (SELF CHECK)
RT (SELF CHECK)
MS 167s (SELF CHECK) 500 KV SWYD (SELF CHECK).
23 CV Pump (SELF CHECK)
VC 1-4 1. NR45 Recorder selected to IR on Pen 1 and PR on Pen 2 N35 selected on Pen 1 3
IOP-3 Marked up to Step 5.4.1 5 of 26
^_
J TLT NRC-ESG-002 A.
State shift job assignments:
B.
Hold a shifi briefing, detailing instruction to the shift: (provide CREW members a copy of the shift turnover sheet)
Inform the crew The simulator is running. You may commence panel walkdowns at this time. CRS please inform ine when your crew is ready to assume the shift.
Allow sufficient time for panel walk-downs. When informed by the CRS that the crew is ready to assume the shift, ensure the siinulator is cleared of unauthorized personnel.
Do not review objectives with crew C.
D.
E;.
6 of 26
J ILT NRC-ESG-002 EX Camments
- 1. Power Increase to POAH e
CRS briefs crew on evolution 0
CRS implements S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0003 e
CRS directs RO to commence a rod withdraw to establish a start-up rate of
< 1 dpin 0
PO monitors secondary plant for signs of nuclear heat and peer checks RO 0
RO monitors reactor parameters for indication of IR to PR overlap 0
RO rnonitors Delta Ts for indications of POAH 7 of 26
J ILT NRC-ESG-002 Expected PlantlStudent Respons Comment RO reports N35 startup rate is erratic going from full scale hi to low RO reports that Intermediate range NI channel 1 has failed low 0
CRS directs RO to insert rods to stabilize Reactor Power 0
CRS enters S2.OP-AB.NJS-0001 0
RO 1-eports a power range NI has NOT failed 0
RO N35 has failed Low e
CRS directs PO to remove failed chaimel from service IAW S2.0P-s0.RPs-0001.
0 PO reviews SO.RPS-0001 and discusses possibility of Rx Trip 0
At NI rack PO places N35 level trip bypass to bypass 0
RC) verifies OHA for level trip bypass 0
PO removes Instrument power fuses for 2N3 5 0
PO verifies proper bistables on 2RP4 0
CRS conducts brief and discusses cc;ntingent actions..41so during brief informs CI-~M that TSAS 3.3.1.1. act 3 is applichl~.
Reactor power at 2% in the Power Range until 2N35 can be repaired rate is restored, at direction of Lead 8 of 26
Evaluator/Instructor Activi Expected PlandStudent Response Comments
- 3. Loss of D Vital Instrument Bus 0
RO reports multiple OHAs including FAIL. also loss of indication for all CH 4 inqtniments.
B-27,2D VTL INSTR BUS INVERT 0
CRS directs RO to insert Rods to stabilize Reactor Power RO informs CRS that Rods do not respond 0
PO tnonitors CAS 0
RO defeats CH 4 inputs to Tavg and ATs e
CRS dispatches an operator to D VIB 0 CRS directs maintenance to jumper power to level comparator for L/D iso;ation and PZR heater interlock 0
CRS determines that ROD control is noi: available in auto or manual and Steam Dumps are not available PO determines only 22MS 1 0 available in auto CRS dispatches and operator to locally control 2CV.56 RO reports 23 CV pump operating with no indication of charging flow and no letdown 9 of 26
a_c1.-**
-~ - - ~
~
J ILT NRC-ESG-002 Evaluator/Instr ctivity Comments Crew determines charging flow is occuning CRS dispatches maintenance to install jumper to allow restoration of PZK heaters CRS directs a RX Trip 10 of 26
"J" ILT NRC-ESG-002 Expected PlantIStudent Respo Comment Evalu atorhstructor Activi
- 4. LOCA with loss of Recirc 0
ROP e
0 0
e ierforms Immediate actions Trips reactor Confirms Rx Trip Verifies Turbine Tripped Verifies SI not required by pressure is dropping RP-4, F/O OHA but RCS Crew initiates Safety Injection due to lowering Pressurizer Pressure 0
PO throttles AFW at completion of Immediate Actions and informs CRS that 22 AFW pump has tripped 0
RO announces Rx Trip and Safety Injection 0
RO/FO performs SEC loading verification 0
PO ensures 2 1 and 23 AF W pumps are running and throttles AFW flow to maintain Steam Generator level >9% or
>22E4 Ibm/hr feed flow.
0 PO verifies Safeguards Valve Alijinment is correct 0
RO closes 21I22CA330 0
RO reports Containment Spray not required 0
RO determines h4SLI isolation is not required 11 of26
J ILT NRC-ESG-002 Evalustor/lnstructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Respons Comment CREW closes CV 139 and CV 140 when RCS pressure is belom. 1500 psig with should be taken CT #1 (E-I-C) Trip all RCPs prior to RCS inventory becoming depleted to critical inventory. (within 5 mins of RCS pressure < 1350 with ECCS flow)
SAT UNSAT a
a CT#2 (EO-E) Manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling before an extreme challenge develops to the containment CSF SAT IJNSAT I
e e
CREW secures RCPs when RCS pressure is < 1350 with ECCS flow established RO reports containment pressure has exceeded 15 psig and Containment Spray has not auto actuated CRS directs RO to initiate Containment spray RO reports 21 CFCU has tripped PO verifies all 4KV vital busses energized RO reports Control Room Ventilation in Pressurized Mode RO reports proper Switchgear Room Ventilation lineup.
RO reports 2 CCW pumps running RO evaluates ECCS flow RO/PO verifies AFW flow >22E04 12 of 26
J ILT NRC-ESG-002 Evaiuator/Instructar Expected Plan dent Response Commen lbndhr or SG level >QYo.
0 Crew wxifies, RCS temperature control.
0 ROIPO verifies reactor trip breakers open.
0 RO verifies PORVs c!osed and Block Valves open CREW identifies PZR Sprays not available and RCPs secured.
0 PO verifies no fauIted SGs 0
0 ROIPO perform LOCA evaluation PO verifies no SGTRs exist.
0 CRS transitions to LOCA-1.
0 CRS transitions to FRTS-1 determines pressure <420 and SJ49 injection flow is established then FRCE-I based on purple path 0
CRS performs verifications of FRCE-1 then transitions back to LOCA-1 0
PO verifies no faulted SGs.
0 PO maintains SG levels 0
PO verifies no ruptured SGs 0
R O/P 0 resets Safeguards :
0 Resets SI; 0 Resets Phase A; 0 Resets Phase B; 0 Opens21 lk22CA330; 0 Resets each SEC; and 13 of 26
J ILT NRC-ESG-002 Once crew determines 21SJ44 did not open with 22 REIR pump tripped, CRS may transition to LOCA-5 immediately IAW CAS action or attempt to manually open the 215544
, IAW LOCA-3 step 5.2 Expected PlantlStudent Response Comments 0 Resets 23OV Control Centers 0
Crevr eiraluates SI flow reduction criteria 0
CRS determines spray pumps and KHR pumps should not be stopped RO reports trip of 22 RI-IR pump 0
PO stops unloaded diesels Crew determines recirc capability is available and no Aux bldg rad monitors in alarm 0
CRS requests Chemistry sample the RCS for failed fuel and boron 0
CRS dispatches operator to isolate CCW to the spent fuel pool 0
CRS transitions to LOCA-3 when RWST reaches 15.2 0
RO reports containment sump level is
>62% and permissive lights lit 0
RO depresses sump auto armed for 21 and 22SJ44 valves 0
PO removes lockout for 25367 68 and 69 0
RO reports 2 1 SJ44 valve did not open RO/PO reset SI and Emerg Loading unless completed in LOCA-1 0
Evaluatorhstructor Activity "J" ILT NRC-ESG-002 Expected PlantIStudent Response Comments RO closes 2SJ69 RO reports 22 RHR pump is tripped RO initiates closed on 21RH4 RO initiates apen on 2 1 SJ44 RO reports 2 1 SJ-14 did not open CRS transitions to LOCA-5 Crew resets or verifies Safeguards are reset Crew determines Containment sump is
>62% and recirc is not available RO initiates makeup to the RWST IAW S2.OP-SO.CVC-0006 RO calls N E 0 to start RWST Hleater Pump RO determines Boric Acid flow setpoint from REM figure or sets to maximum RO place Makeup Control Mode Select in Stop RO places 2CV179 & 2CV172 in hlanual R.0 calls N E 0 to ensure 2BR170 closed, and Open 2CV182 Bi 2CV184 EO starts 21 or 22 Primary Water Pump Et0 start 21 or 22 Boric Acid pump in manual fast 110 adjust 2CV172 flow to >27 1P-n 1x0 adjust 2CV179 to 150 pin CRS requests RX engineering monitor Shutdown margin PO commences cooldown at 1 OO"/hr 15 of 26
Evaluator/Instru
" J" ILT NRC - E S G-002 Expected PltmtlStudent Respons Comments using 2:! and 23MSl Os prior tc Lc Lo (1.2 fi> level in RWST I where ECCS pumps must be stopped.
RO verifies all CFCIls running in low speed CRS detennines no spray pumps are required and directs RO to stop 21 and 22 cs pumps RO resets spray actuation stops the pumps and closes 2 1 and 22CS2s CRS directs 1 charging and 1 SI pump stopped 16 of 26
J ILT NRC-ESG-002 A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
I.
J.
K.
L.
M.
N.
Alarm Response Procedures (Various )
Technical Specifications Emergency Plan (ECG)
OP-AA-101-111-1003, Use of Procedures S2.OP-I0.ZZ-0003 - Hot Standby to Minimum Load S2.OP-AB.NIS-0001 - Nuclear Instrumentation System Malhnction S2.OP-AB.115-0004 - Loss of 2D 1 15V Vital Instrument Bus 2-EOP-TRIP Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 2-EOP-FRTS-1 Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock 2-EOP-FRCE-1, Response to Excessive Containment Pressure 2-EOP-LOCA-1 Loss of Reactor Coolant 2-EOP-LOCA-3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation 2-EOP-LOCA-5, Loss of Emergency Recirculation S2.OP-S0.CVC-0006, Boron Concentration Control 17 of26
J ILT NKC-ESG-002 CT#1 (E-1-C) Trip all RCPs prior to RCS inventory becoming depleted to critical inventory. (within 5 inins of RCS pressure < 13SO with ECCS flow)
Basis CT#2 (E-0-E)
Basis Failure to trip the RCPs under the postulated plant conditions leads to core uncovery and to fuel cladding temperatures In excess of 2200. Thus. failure to perform the task reprcsents rnis-operation or incorrect creu performance which leads to the degradation of a barrier to fission product release.
WOG sponsored analysis to demonstrate that the operating crew would have sufficient time (from the point at which the criteria was met) to recognize the indications that the criteria are met and trip RCPs before the window for adverse consequence begins...The minimum response time for the operating crew is 5 minutes... if the RCPs are tripped within 5 minutes of the trip criteria being met. PCT remains below 220 Manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling before an extreme challenge develops to the containment CSF Failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling under postulated conditions constitutes a demonstrated inability by the crew to recognize a failurelincorrect auto actuation of an ESF system or component. Since the spray can be manually initiated from the control room. failure to manually actuate represents a demonstrated inability of the crew to effectively manipulate ESF controls that would lead to violation of the facilitjr license condition. Additionally. under the postulated conditions, failure to manually actuate results in a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.
CT#3 (ECA-1.1 -- B): Make up to the RWST and minimize RWST outflow prior to Lo Lo level where ECCS pumps must be stopped Under the postulated plant conditions, failure to establish make up flow to the RWST Basis and/or to minimize RWST outfiow leads to or accelerates depletion of the RWST inventory to the point at which the ECCS pumps taking suction on the RWST must be stopped. Loss of pumped injection coincident with loss of emergency cooling Recirculation will lead to a severe or an extreme challenge lo the core cooling CSF.
Failure to perform the critical task causes these challenges to occur needlessly or, at best, prematurely. Thus failure to perform the critical task leads to significant reduction in safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario. It also represents demonstrated inabilitjr by the crew to take an action or combination of actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety 18 of26
19 of 26
J iLT NRC-ESG-002 S-ILT-2008 NRC ESG-2 SALEM ESG - PRA RELATIONSHIPS EJALUATION FORM EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE J/N EVENT y/N-EVENT N
TRANSIENTS with PCS Unavailable N
Loss of Service Water N
Steam Generator Tube Rupture N
LossofCCW N
Loss of Control Air N
Station Black Out N
N Loss of Switchgear and Pen Area Ventilation
~-
Y LOCA COMPONENT/TR4IN/SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCV y/N COMPONENT. SYSTEM, OR TRAIN COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR y/N TRAIN N
Containment Sump Strainers N
Gas Turbine N
SSWS Valves to Turbine Generator Area N
Any Diesel Generator N
RHR Suction Line valves fi-om Hot Leg N
Auxiliary Feed Pump N
Valves N
SBO Air Compressor CVCS Letdown line Control and Isolation OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE Y/K OPERATOR ACTION N
N Connect to gas turbine N
Y N
N N
N N
Early depressurize RCS N
initiate feed and bleed Restore AC power during SBO Trip Reactor and RCPs after loss of comgonent cooling system Re-align RHR system for re-circulation Un-isolate the available CCW Heat Exchanger isolate the CVCS letdown path and transler charging suction to RWST Cooldown the RCS and depressurize the system Isolate the affected Steam generator which has the tube ruptures
~.
Complete this evaluation form for each ESG.
20 of 26
3 I LT NRC -ES G -002 MODE:
2 POWER:
0 RCS MWe: 0 SHUTDOWN SAFETY SYSTEM STATUS ( 5, 6 8L DEFUELED):
BORON:
NIA REACTIVITY PARAMETERS Core Bum-up 10,500 MWDIMTU, reactivity plan provided MOST LIMITING LCO AND DATE/TIME OF EXPIRATION:
EVOLUTIONSIPROCEDURES/SURVEILLANCES IK PROGRESS:
Raise power into the power range and stabilize at 2 4 % Reactor power in preparation for transition to Mode 1 ABNORMAL PLANT CONFIGURATIONS:
CONTROL ROOM:
Unit 1 and Hope Creek at 1 OOYo power.
No penalty minutes in the last 24 hrs.
PRIMARY:
SECONDARY:
Heating steam is aligned to unit 1.
RADWASTE:
No discharges in progress CIRCULATING WATER/SERVICE WATER:
21 of26
"J" ILT NRC-ESG-002 Note: Attach a separate copy of this form to each scenario reviewed. This form is uscd as guidance for the examination team as they conduct their rei-iew for the proposed scenarios.
EXAMINATlON SCENARIO GUIDE (ESG) REWE W/ VALIDATION Note:
This fsm. is used as guidance for an examination team to conduct a review for the proposed exam scenario(s). Attach a separate cop)' of this form to each scenario reviewed.
ESG- - "J" ILT NRC-ESG-002 -
REVIEWER: Ed Gallagher CHECK
__ 1.
__ 2.
__ 3.
THE SCENARIO HAS CLEARLY STATED OBJECTIVES IN THE SCENARIO.
The initial conditions are realistic, equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue the crew into expected events.
Each event description consists of:
The event terniination point.
The use ofnon-mechanistic failures (e.g. pipe break) should be limited to one or a credible preceding event has occurred.
The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics.
Sequencing/timing of events is reasonable (e.g. the crew has time to respond to the malfunctions in an appropriate time franie and implements procedures and/or corrective actions).
I_ 7.
Sequencing/timing of events is reasonable. and allows for the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives.
- 8.
If time compression techniques are used. scenario summary clearly so indicates.
___ 9.
The simulator modeIing is not altered.
__ 10. All crenr competencies can be evaluated.
__ 11. Appropriate reference inaterials are available (SOERs, LERs, etc.).
__ 12. Jf the sampling plan indicates that the scenario was used for training during the requalification cycle, evaluate the need to modify or replace the scenario.
__ 13. Proper critical task methodology is used IAW NRC procedures.
__ 14. ESG-PSA Evaluation Form is completed for the scenario at the applicable facility.
The point in the scenario when it is to be initiated, The malfimction(s) that are entered to initiate the event.
The symptomslcues that will be visible to the crew, The expected operator actions (by shift position). and
- 4.
__ 5.
__ 6.
22 of 26
SCENARIO:
INITIAL EG 7
-~
EG 3
EG 2
EG 2
EG 2
EG 1
EG 80 EG 65 EG 3
COMMENTS:
REIIE WE R:
TARGET QUARTITATITE ATTRIBUTES Total malfunctions inserted: 5-8 Malfunctions that occur after EOP entry: 1-2 Abnormal Events: 2-4 Major Transients: 1-2 EOPs requiring substantive actions (not including TRIP-1): 1-2 EOP Contingency Procedures used: 0-2 Approximate scenario run time: 75-90 minutes EOP run time: 40-70% of scenario run time Crew Critical Tasks: 2-3 For events after EOP entry 2 malhnctions used to cause loss of recirc capability other is failure of auto containment spray 23 of 26
1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 3.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
- 10.
- 11.
- 12.
- 13.
- 14.
- 15.
- 16.
- 17.
- 18.
- 19.
- 20.
"J" ILT NRC-ESG-002 ATTACHMENT 1 SIMULATOR READ1'-FOR-TRAINING CHECKLIST Verify simulator is in correct load for training All required computer terminals in operation Simulator clocks synchronized Required chart recorders advanced and ON (proper paper installed)
Rod step counters correct (channei checkj All tagged equipment properly secured and documented (TSAS Log filled out)
DL-I 0 log up-to-date Required procedures clean All OHA lamps operating (OHA Test)
All printers have adequate paper AND functional ribbon Procedure pens available Procedures in progress open and signed-off to proper step Shift manning sheet available SPDS reset Reference verification performed with required documents available Ensure a current RCS Leak Rate Worksheet is placed by Aux Alarm Typewriter with Baseline Data filled out Required keys available Video Tape (if applicable)
Ensure ECG Classification is correct - - 960502 140 CRCA-03 Reset P-250 Rod Counters 24 of 26
"J" ILT NRC-ESG-002 ATTA CHRIENT 2 CRITICAL TASK RJETHODOLOGY In reviewing each proposed CT, the examination team assesses the task to ensure, that it is essential to safety. A task is essential to safety if, in the judgment of the examination team, the improper performance or oniission of this task by a licensee will result in direct adverse consequences or in significant degradation in the mitigative capabili1:y of the plant.
The examination team determines if an automati~ally actuated plant system would have been required to mitigate the consequences of an individual's incorrect performance. If incorrect performance of a task by an individual necessitates the crew taking cocipensatory action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy, the task is safety significant.
I. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions inc:lude those for which operation or correct performance prevents...
0 degradation of any barrier to fission product release a violation of a safety limit a violation of the facility license condition Liquid Control, or manually insert control rods) a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario A. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which a crew demonstrates the 0
degraded emergency core cooling; system (ECCS) or emergency power capacity imorrect reactivity control (such as failure to initiate Emergency Boration or Standby 0
0 0
0 ability to...
0 effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent any condition described i.n the previous parag-aph.
0 0
recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.
take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.
prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such as an unintentional Reactor Protection System (RPS) or ESF actuation.
25 of 26
J 1LT NRC-ESG-002 Note: This checklist is to be completed by the Lead Examiner prior to evaluating an ESG. The Lead Examiner should lead a pre-job brief with all the examiners.md siinulator operators that includes, but is not limited to the following:
Lead ESG:
J ILT NRC-ESG-002 Examiner:
1.ESG overview and sequence of major events.
___ 2.Determine which optional events will be performed, if any.
3.ESG sumlnary of Critical Tasks.
4.Assign examiners to observe specific watch standers.
___ 5.Assign examiner ownership for observing and documenting performance / non-performance of Critical Tasks.
__ 6.Review alternate path(s) identified by the ESG.
7.Assign examiner to document data related to the performance of Critical Tasks.
8.Determines what parameters will be recorded in Data Collection.
Ensure SOE recorder is recording.
26 of 26
SIMULATOR EXAMINATION SCENARIO SCENARIO TITLE:
SCENARIO NUMBER:
EFFECTIVE DATE:
EXPECTED DURATION:
REVISION NUMBER:
PROGRAM:
ATWT, LOSC J ILT NRC ESG-003 811 912008 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> 00 L.0. REQUAL INITIAL LICENSE STA Revision Summary:
Rev 0: New Issue for J ILT NRC exam PREPARED BY:
Ed Gallagher (INSTRUCTOR) 6/6/08 (DATE)
(DATE)
APPROVED BY:
(OPERATIONS TFlAlNlNG MANAGER OR DESIGNEE) 6 W+Q%
(DATE)
DE SIGN E E)
APPROVED BY:
J ILT NRC-ESG-003 Enabling Objectives A.
Given the unit at 20% reactor power with the generator synchronized to the grid. the crew will perform a power increase to 100% at 1 Oo/b/hr, 1AW S2.OP-IO.ZZ-O004(Q).
Given a failure of the rod control system, which results in continuous rod motion, the crew will take corrective action, IAW S2.01-AB ROD-0003.
Given the unit at power and a trip of an operating main feedwater pump, take corrective action IAW AB.CN-0001 Given the order or indications of a reactor trip, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the reactor trip in accordance with the approved station procedures.
Given the order or indications of a loss of secondary coolant, perform actions as the nuclear control operator to RESPOND to the coolant loss in accordance with the approved station procedures.
Given indication of a loss of secondary coolant, DIRECT the response to the loss of secondary coolant, in accordance with the approved station procedures.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
Power Increase from 80% power Turbine Inlet Pressure PT50.5 fails High SGFP trip with failure of auto runback circuit Feedwater line rupture outside containment, ATWT with Trip from CR Steam Generator Safety Valves fails open 2 of22
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
The crew will receive the unit at 80% Reactix Power with all systems in automatic. Orders to the shift are to raise power to 100% using reactivity plan provided Once the crew takes the watch they will initiate a power increase at 2%/hour.
Once the power ascension is underway Turbine Inlet Pressure PT505 will fail high. Crew will take manual control of Rods and review Tech Specs for failed charmel After the TSAS has been evaluated for the PT505, an oil leak will develop on 21 SGFP, the crew will recognize the loss of flow fiom 21 SGFP and initiate a trip of 21 SGFP. Then crew will perform a manual runback IAW AB.CN-0001 when the auto runback does not occur.
Once the runback is complete a Feedwater line outside containment will rupture. As the secondary plant degrades the turbine will trip but the reactor will fail to auto trip The CRS will direct reactor trip and the RO will complete the trip by opening the 2E6D and 2G6D breakers.
As pressure increases from the ATWT, 3 safety valves on 24 SG will fail open and 2F 4KV group bus will fail to transfer to station Power. The crew will identify the steam flow and initiate a MSLI and SI.
The crew will perform actions of EOP-TRIP-1 and LOSC-1 to isolate the faulted SG 3 of22
J ILT NRC-ESG-003 Presnapped IC-243 from portable exam drive SELF-CHECK Description Ramp
- 1.
TU0055 Turb Inlet Press XMTR 505 FAIL NA NA RT-1 100
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
- 10.
- 11.
- 12.
EH0337 Turb Fails to Runback on SGFP BFOIOSA 21 Stm Gen Feed Pinp Trip BF0106 FW Coininon Disc11 Hdr Leak RPOO58 Failure of Auto RX Tnp RP0059A Failure of Munual RX Trip TU0066 MN Turb lnadvertantly Tnps MSOl19P 24MS1 I SG Safety Vlv Fails MSOl19Q 24MS12 SG Safety VI\\ Fails MSOl19R 24MS13 SG SAFETY VLV FAILS RP0279B Auto MSLl Fails to Act. Tm B RP0279A Auto MSLl Fails to Act, Tm A NA NA NA NA NA NA
- 20
- 20 2 0 NA NA NA NA 5:OG NA NA NA NA N A NA NA NA h A RT-2 Rr-3 NA NA RT-4 RT-4 RT-4 RT-4 NA NA NA 2500 I0000 NA NA NA Open Open Open NA NA
- 30 NA RT-4 NA
- 13.
EL0143 LOSS OF 2F 4160V GROUP BUS
__ 13.
- 5.
200 NA RT-3 2
2:15 NA RT-3 2
__ 16.
AN3738 AAS 738 FAILS - 2 4 TGA SUMP LEVE 7:40 NA RT-3 2
3:00 NA RT-3 2
3:15 N A RT-3 2
AN3730 AAS 739 FAILS - :25 TGA SUA4P LEVE AN3731 AAS 737 FAILS - :23 TGA SUMP LE:VE 7
AN3736 AAS 736 FAILS - :22 TGA SUMP LllVE AN3735 A A S 735 FAILS - 2 1 TGA SUMP LElVE NONE
- 1.
B440 OVDl Reactor Trip Breaker A-TRIP
- 1.
3 B441 OVDl Reactor Trip Breaker B-TRIP NA NA NA Off NA NA NA Off 4 of 22
J ILT NRC-ESG-003 SELF-CHECK Coin in and ET#n Discription
- 1.
None Description
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- 4.
5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
RH1 and RH2 RH 18s RCPs (SELF CHECK)
RT (SELF CHECK)
MS 167s (SELF CHECK) 500 KV SWYD (SELF CHECK).
23 CV Pump (SELF CHECK)
VC 1-4 Description 5 of22
J IL? NRC-ESG-003 A.
State shift job assignnients:
B.
Hold a shift briefing, detailing instruction to the shift: (provide CREW members a copy of the shift turnover sheet)
Inform the crew The simulator is running. You may commence panel walkdowns at this time. CRS please inform me when your crew is ready to assume the shift.
Allow sufficient time for panel walk-downs. When informed by the CRS tha1 the crew is ready to assume the shift, ensure the simulator is cleared of unauthorized personnel.
Do not review objectives with crew C.
D.
E.
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"J" ILT NRC-ESG-003 ctivi Expected PIant/Student R
- 1. Power Increase to 100%
0 CRS bnefs crew on evolution 0
CRS implements S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0004 CRS directs PO to cornmelice Turbine load increase at 2%/hour 0
RO initiates a dilution per the reactivity plan provided 0
PO monitors DEHC for indications of load increase 0
RO monitors Tavg and Delta T and MWe for indications of load increase lead evaluator; insure Rods have 7 of 22
Evaluator/Instructor Activity
- 2. Turbine Inlet Pressure PT505 fails a
a a
e a
a a
a a
"J" ILT NRC-ESG-003 Expected Plantistudent Response Comments RO reports 7 avg/Tref deviation and Rods stepping out Not expected for current load increase CRS directs RO to place Rods in manua! and stop dilution CRS dxects PO to hold Turbine load increase CRS enters S2.OP-AB.ROD-0003 PO reports Turbine Inlet Pressure PT505 has failed High RO monitors Tavg for needed adjustments IAW attachment 1 and controls Tavg by manually inserting Rods RO acknowledges Tavg/Tref deviation and OHA G-3 DEHC arid G-15 ADFCS trouble alarms due to PT505iPT506 mismatch RO infonns CRS that Rod motion was in the outward direction.
PO verifies PT505 failed High and place!; Steam Dumps in MS pressure control CRS refers to TSAS and requests I&C assistance to remove the channel from service CRS enters TSAS 3.3.2.1.b flu 1.f action 19" 8 of22
J ILT NRC-ESG-003 Evaluator/Instructor Activity Expected PlanuStudent Response Comme Proceed to next e
- 3. Trip of 21 SGFP 1
PO announces console alarm for 2 1 SGFP. TIJRB OIL RSVR LVL KI/LO followed by CONTROL OIL PRESSURE LOW.
PO refers to Console ARP and sends NE0 to investigate Crew may attempt to makeup IAW S0.PL-0002.
Based on report fiorn NEO, CRS may decide to reduce power to 50% IAW ARP for reservoir level. AB.LOAD may be entered Reactivity plan and contingencies should be discussed 0
21 SGFP speed dev OHA G-23 alarms 0
PO trips 21 SGFP 0
RO/PrO perform IAs of AB.CN-0001 0
PO reports auto runback is NOT occurring and initiates runback to
~ 6 6 % )
power @15%lmin 0
RO drives Rods in manual to control Tavg during downpower PO initiates CAS when runback is in progress 0
RO/PO initiates boration 9 of 22
Evalurrtor/Instructor Activity When runback is complete, and pl is stable, (BF19s have throttled to equalize SF/F.F) or at the direction
- 4. Feedline BreaMATWT 1 before transition to FRSM-1 CT#l (E-0 -- A): Manualljr Trip the Reactor from the Control Room J ILT NRC-ESG-003 Expected PladStudent Respon Comments PO opens 21 thru 23 CN108 valves and monito~s SG levels PO opens 2CN47 and isolates blow down As feed break size increases:
SGFP Speed will rise Feed Reg Valves will open farther.
Feed Flow to all S/Gs will lower.
S/G levels will begin to lower.
The PO should id en ti^ the transient as a loss of Feedwater flow.
0 PO iiiloms CRS that Aux alarms are TGA sumps overflowing PO inlorms the CRS that the BF19s are full open and 22 SGFP is at max flow The PO informs the CRS that SG levels are lowering rapidly RO reports that the turbine has tripped and the Reactor did not ATWT The ClRS directs the RO to Trip the RX The FLO turns the Reactor Trip handle and informs the CRS that the Reactor did not trip RO attempts to Trip Rx using breaker pushbuttons RO opens 2E6D and 2G6D to de-energize Rod Drive MG sets 10 of22
"J" ILT NRC-ESG-003 Evaluator/Instructor Expectizd PIant/Student Response Comments I SAT UNSAT I
0 RO coiifirnis Reactor trip 0
CRS dispatches NEO to open Reactor Trip breakers 0
RO infmns CRS that turbine is tripped and backs up turbine trip 0
RO informs CRS that all Vital busses are energized 0
RO verifies no SI has occurred but informs CRS that RCS pressure and temperature are lowering and an SI is required 0
CRS directs RO to initiate a MSLI and SI when steam flow is not isolated I before transition out of E-2 (LOSC) 0 RO initiates MSLI and informs CRS that steam flow is limited to 24 SG 0
RO kitiates SI based on continued steam flow 0
CRS verifies Immediate actions
~~
CT#2 (Part 2 AFW isolation)
(E-2 -- A): Isolate the faulted SG before transition out of E-2 (LOSC)
S A T UNSAT 0
PO ttlrottles AFW and isolates feed to 24SG based on TRIP-I CAS PO informs CRS that F Group bus is de-energized PO verifies SEC loading and safeguard 11 of22
Evaluator/Imtructor Activity "J" ILT NRC-ESG-00; Expected PlmtlStudent Response Commcnts valve a1 igmnent RO Lrerifies containment pressure has remained < 15 psig RO verifies ECCS flow RO verifies PORV and PZR spray status PO repxts 24 SG pressure dropping in an uncontrolled manner CRS transitions to LOSC-1 PO verifies MSLI valves closed PO veiifies FW, AFW, MS and GR valves for 24 SG are closed RO reset Phase A and opens SG sample valves CRS direct the PO to dump steam to stabilize RCS temperature CRS validates SGTR is not occurring and transitions to LOCA-I Crew resets safeguards and verifies SI flow reduction criteria CRS transitions to TRIP-3 for SI termination Evaluator Note: ECG Classification is 5.1.2.A for ATWT with trip 12 of 22
J ILT NRC-ESG-003 Expected PlantlStudent Response Comments 13 of 22
J ILT NRC-ESG-003 A.
B.
c:.
r).
E.
F.
G.
H.
- 1.
J.
Alarm Response Procedures (Various)
Technical Specifications Einergericy Plan (ECG)
OP-AA-101-111-1003, Use of Procedures S2.OP-1O.ZZ-0004 - Power Operation S2.OP-AB.ROD-0003 - Continous Rod Motion S2.OP-AB.CN-0001 - Main FeedwntdCondensate System Abnormality 2-EOP-TRIP Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 2-EOP-LOSC-I, Loss of Secondary Coolant 2-EOP-LOCA-1, Loss of Reactor Coolant 14 of 22
"J" ILT NRC-ESG-003 CT#1 (E-0 -- A): Manually Trip the Reactor from the Control Room before transition to FRSM-1 Basis Failure to manually trip the reactor causes a challenge to the subcriticality CSF beyond that irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions.
Additionally, it constitutes an "incorrect performance that necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy and demonstrates the inability of the crew to recognize a failure of the automatic actuation of the RPS" CT#2 (E-2 -- A): Isolate the faulted SG before transition out of E-2 (LOSC)
Basis Failure to isolate a faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions.
Also, depending on the plant conditions, it could constitute a demonstrated inability of the crew to recognize the failure of an automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.
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J ILT NRC-ESG-003 S-ILT-2008 NRC ESG-3 SALEM ESG - PRA RELATIONSHIPS E\\ALI_JATION FORM EIENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE E/N N
N N
N N
ESJENT YN EVENT TRANSIENTS with PCS Unavailable N
Loss of Service Water N
LossofCCW W
Loss of Control Air N
Station Black Out Steam Generator Tube Rupture I_-
Loss of Offsite Power Loss of Switchgear and Pen Area Ventilatiosn LOCA COMPOIVENT/TRAIN/SYSTEM UIVAIAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR YN TRAIN FREQUENCY Y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN N
Containment Sump Strainers N
Gas Turbine N
SSWS Valves to Turbine Generator Area N
Any Diesel Generator N
RHR Suction Line valves from Hot Leg N
Auxiliary Feed Pump N
Valves N
SBO Air Compressor CVCS Letdown line Control and Isolatiori OPERATOR ACTIONS lMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE N
N N
N N
N N
N N
N OPERATOR ACTION Restore AC power during SBO Connect to gas turbine Trip Reactor and RCPs after loss of component cooling system Re-align RHR system for re-circulation Un-isolate the available CCW Heat Exchanger Isolate the CVCS letdown path and transfer charging suction to RWST Cooldown the RCS and depressurize the system Isolate the affected Steam generator which has the tube ruptures Early depressurize RCS Initiate feed and bleed Complete this evaluation form for each ESG.
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J ILT NRC-ESG-003 MODE:
1 BORON:
SHIJTDOWN SAFETY SYSTEM STATUS (5,6 8r DEFUELED):
NiA REACTIVITY PARAMETERS Core Bum-up 10,500 MWD/MTU, reactivity pian for power increase at 20io/hr is to dilute 40 gal every 15 minutes for a total of 1600 gal over 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> MOST LIMITING LCO AND DATE/TIME OIF EXPIRATION:
EVOLUTIONS/PROCEDURES/SURVEILL~LNCES IN PROGRESS:
Raise power to 100% IAW IOP-4 at 2?6 per Hour ABNORMAL PLANT CONFIGURATIONS:
CONTROL ROOM:
Unit 1 and Hope Creek at 100% power.
No penalty minutes in the last 24 hs.
PRIMARY:
NONE SECONDARY:
Heating steam is aligned to unit I.
RADWASTE:
No discharges in progress CIRCULATING WATEWSERVICE WATER:
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J ILT NRC-E$G-OO_?
Note:
guidance for the examination team as they conduct their review for the proposed scenarios.
Attach a separate copy of this form to each scenario reviewed. This form is used as EXAMIYATIOIV SCENARIO GUIDE (ESG) REVIEW/ VALIDATION Note:
This fgrm is used as guidance for an examination team to conduct a review for the proposed exam sceIiario(s). Attach a separate copy of this fomi to each scenario reviewed.
ESGJ ILT NRC-ESG-003 -
RE\\IEMER:
Gallagher THE SCENARIO HAS CLEARLY STATED OBJECTIVES IN THE SCENARIO.
The initial conditions are realistic, equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue the crew into expected events.
Each event description consists of:
The event termination point.
The use of non-mechanistic failures (e.g. pipe break) should be limited to one or a credible preceding event has occurred.
The events are valid with regard to phjsics and thermodynamics.
Sequencinghiming of events is reasonable (e.g. the crew has time to respond to the malhiictioiis in an appropriate time frame and implements procedures and/or corrective actions).
Sequencinghiming of events is reasonable. and allows for the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives.
- 8.
If time compression techniques are used, scenario summary clearly so indicates.
- 9.
The simulator modeling is not altered
- 10. All crew competencies can be evaluated.
- 11. Appropriate reference materials are available (SOERs, LERs, etc.).
- 12. If the sampling plan indicates that the scenario was used for training during the requalification cycle. evaluate the need to modi@ or replace the scenario.
CHECK 1,
- 2.
__ 3.
The point in the scenario when it is to be initiated, The malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event, The symptoms/cues that will be visble to the crew, The expected operator actions (by shift position). and
__ 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
~.
- 13. Proper critical task niethodology is ucjied IAW NRC procedures.
- 14. ESG-PSA Evaluation Form is coniplzted for the scenario at the applicable facility.
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SCEEARIO: "J" ILT NRC-ESG003 INITIAL EG e
8 EG EG e
3 e
3 EG e
2 EG e
1 EG e
0 EG 65 0
EG EG e
40%
e 2
RE'VIEWE Ed Gallagher R:
TARGET QUAh'TI'I'ATI\\'E ATTRIBUTES Total malfunctions inserted. 5-8 Malfunctions that occn after EOP entry: 1-2 Abnormal Events: 2-4 Major Transients: 1-2 EOPs requiring substantive actions (not including TRIP-1): 1-2 EOP Contingency Procedures used: 0-2 Approximate scenario run time: 75-90 minutes EOP run time: 40-70'% of scenario run time Crew Critical Tasks: 2-3 COMMENTS:
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"J" ILT NRC-ESG-003 1
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- 20.
ATTACHMENT 1 SIRlULATOR READY-F'OR-TRAINING CHECKLIST Verify simulator is in correct load for training All required computer terminals in operation Simulator clocks synchronized Required chart recorders advanced and ON (proper paper installed)
Rod step counters correct (channel checkj All tagged equipment properly secured and docuniented (TSAS Log filled out)
DL-1 0 log up-to-date Required procedures clean All OHA lamps operating (OHA 'Test)
All printers have adequate paper.4ND functional ribbon Procedure pens available Procedures in progress open and signed-off to proper step Shift manning sheet available SPDS reset Reference verification performed with required documents available Ensure a current RCS Leak Rate Worksheet is placed by Aux Alarm Typewriter with Baseline Data filled out Required keys available Video Tape (if applicable)
Ensure ECG Classification is correct - - 9605021 40 CRCA-03 Reset P-250 Rod Counters 20 of 22
J ILT NRC-ESG-003 ATTA(3HhlENT 2 CRITICAL TASK RIETHODOLOGY In reviewing each proposed CT, the examination.earn assesses the task to ensure, that it is essential to safety. A task is essential to safety if, in the judgment of the examination team, the improper performance or omission of this task by a licensee will result in direct adverse consequences or in significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant.
The examination team determines if an automatically actuated plant system would have been required to mitigate the consequences of an individuals incorrect performance. If incorrect performance of a task by an individual necessitates the crew taking compensatory action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy, the task is safety significant.
- 1. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which operation or correct performance prevents...
e 0
0 degradation of any barrier to fission product release degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) or emergency power capacity a violation of a safety limit a violation of the facility license condition incorrect reactivity control (such as failure to initiate Emergency Boration or Standby Liquid Control, or manually insert control rods) a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario A. Examples of CTs involving essential safety actions include those for which a crew demonstrates the ability to...
effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent any condition described in the previous paragraph.
recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.
take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.
prevent inappropriate actions that create a challenge to plant safety (such as an unintentional Reactor Protection System (RPS) or ESF actuation.
e e
e 0
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J ILT N RC -ES G -00 3 Note: This checklist is to be completed by the Leaci Exanliner prior to evaluating an ESG. The Lead Examiner should lead a pre-job brief with all the examiners and simulator operators that includes, but is not limited to the followmg:
Lead ESG:
J ILT NRC-ESG-003 Examiner:
c _
1.ESG overview and sequence of major events.
2.Determine which optional events will be performed, if any.
__ 3.ESG summary of Critical Tasks.
4.Assign examiners to observe specific watch standers.
5.Assign examiner ownership for observing and documenting performance / non-performance of Critical Tasks.
___ 6.Reviea-alternate path(s) identified by the ESG.
7.Assign examiner to document data re1,ded to the performance of Critical Tasks.
-_ 8.Determines what parameters will be recorded in Data Collection.
Ensure SOE recorder is recording.
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